B.RAMAN
Will President Barack Obama continue to stand by Google in its dispute with the Government of China over its misuse of the Internet for State-sponsored cyber harassment of political dissidents opposed to one-party rule and cyber espionage not only on States perceived as threats to China’s security , but also on the leaders of ethnic minority groups of China such as His Holiness the Dalai Lama and Rebiya Kadeer, the Uighur leader, or will he let down Google as he let down the human rights activists after paying some lip sympathy to them?
2. That is an issue that needs to be closely monitored in the wake of Google’s notice to China on January 12,2010, that it might be forced to close down its operations in China if Beijing continued to insist on censorship of the results of Google’s search engine in order to deny public access to information about the activities of political dissidents and human rights activists. Google is also reportedly annoyed over the growing Chinese practice of web snooping.
3.The controls, already being exercised by the Chinese State and particularly its Ministry for Public Security over the Internet were further enhanced last month in the so-called interest of national security. “The Internet has become an important avenue through which anti-China forces infiltrate, sabotage and magnify their capabilities for destruction,” wrote Meng Jianzhu, the Minister for Public Security, in the December 1 issue of “Qiushi”, a magazine published by the Communist Party’s Central Committee. He added: “Therefore it represents a new challenge to the public security authority in maintaining national security and social stability.”
4.During the widespread disturbances against the Government by the Uighurs in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region last year, the protesters and their overseas supporters used the Internet to keep in touch with each other and to disseminate information about the happenings in Xinjiang. The followers of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and his overseas supporters have also been making similar use of the Internet. The Chinese authorities have also been noting with concern the use of the Internet by political dissidents in Iran to keep up their protests against President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
5. Apart from attacks of disruption allegedly launched by the Ministry for Public Security on servers being used by the dissidents at home and abroad, the Ministry has also been trying to forcibly close down individual web sites seeking to propagate alternative or inconvenient points of view by projecting them falsely as pornographic.
6. A Bill introduced in the US Congress last year by Rep. Chris Smith that sought to impose restrictions on Internet companies doing business in countries that use the Internet for spying or censorship failed to win support. He has promised to revive the Bill in the wake of the Google announcement.
7. The Paris-based Reporters Without Borders group, which has been strongly critical of the Chinese Government restrictions on the free use of the Internet, has called upon information technology and internet companies to form a united front to resist the Chinese misuse of the Internet, but the prospects of such a united front even among American companies doing business in China are not very bright. Microsoft has already marked its distance from Google with the following statement: “"We don't have any indiciation that our corporate network or any of our mail properties were attacked. We work closely with authorities and other technology companies like Google on Internet safety issues, and we will continue to actively monitor this situation."
8. The Chinese are confident that they will be able to get away with their Internet censorship and misuse not only because there is no unity among Western Internet companies, but also because in the Chinese perception, in the midst of the present economic difficulties, the Obama Administration does not have the political will or even the option to act strongly. The Chinese are, therefore, not unduly concerned over the strong statement of support by Robert Gibbs, a spokesman of the White House, on January 13,2010, to the position taken up by Google. (17-1-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, January 15, 2010
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER
B.RAMAN
The institution of a National Security Adviser (NSA) came into being in the US in the wake of the absence of inter-departmental co-ordination in defence-related policy-making that prevailed during and before the Second World War. The NSA’s role was to harmonise the views and inputs of different departments and project to the President the available options which had inter-departmental support. Once the President chose the option, it was the task of the NSA to co-ordinate the implementation. Thus, the NSA was essentially a policy synthesizer and co-ordinator and not a policy innovator.
2. As the National Security Council (NSC) of which the President was the political head and the NSA the executive head grew up in strength and power, different NSAs started imparting to the institution of the NSA their own individual stamp. Under Dr.Henry Kissinger, who was the NSA under President Richard Nixon, the NSA became a policy innovator, who often gave to the President policy options, which were not necessarily the product of inter-departmental synthesis. He left the responsibility for the co-ordination of the implementation of the policy approved by the President largely to his juniors.
3. Since then, there have been other instances of NSAs venturing out from the domain of policy co-ordination to that of innovation. Zbigniew Brzezinski who was the NSA under President Jimmy Carter, is an example. NSAs, who kep themselves strictly confined to the original role of co-ordinator, hardly left their mark in the history of policy-making. Not so policy innovators, who are remembered even today.
4.NSAs are members of the executive staff ( White House staff ) of the President. Their appointment by the President is not subject to confirmation by the Senate. They do not enjoy the same position in the Administration as the independent heads of different departments such as the Secretary of State, of Defence etc. They do not have the same political clout as the departmental heads, who are in a better position to introduce policy innovation than the NSA. Some NSAs really shone in their brilliance when they gravitated from the office of the NSA to that of the Secretary of State. Kissinger and Ms. Condoleezza Rice were examples. How many remember the role of Rice as the NSA during the first term of George Bush as the President? Her initiative and original ideas in policy-making came into their own only after she became the Secretary of State during Bush’s second term.
5. In India, till 1989, the responsibility for policy co-ordination in national security related matters was shared by the Cabinet Secretary and the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, both of whom came directly under the Prime Minister. They performed jointly the task of policy synthesis, formulation and implementation. In times of crisis, they became policy innovators instead of remaining merely policy co-ordinators. One saw this under Mrs.Indira Gandhi in the months before and during the Indo-Pak war of 1971.
6. A post of NSA to co-ordinate policy-making in national security matters was created when V.P.Singh was the Prime Minister. M.K.Narayanan, who was the Director of the Intelligence Bureau under Rajiv Gandhi, held this post for less than a year. It ceased to exist till 1999 when it was re-created along with a full-fledged National Security Council mechanism by the Government of Atal Behari Vajpayee in pursuance of recommendations made by a Task Force headed by K.C.Pant, the then Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission.
7. The Task Force was reportedly in favour of the creation of an independent NSA, who will function along with the CS and the Principal Secretary under the Prime Minister. It envisaged a policy-making and co-ordinating troika advising the Prime Minister. Vajpayee approved the re-creation of the post of the NSA, but instead of appointing an independent person to hold it, he asked Brajesh Mishra, his Principal Secretary in the Prime Minister’s Office, to wear a second hat as the NSA. Many questioned the wisdom of this decision and felt that national security policy-making would not get undivided attention if the post is not held by an independent person. Despite this, Vajpayee felt that there would be advantages if the Principal Secretary also functioned as the NSA.
8. In the US, the NSA has no substantive role as the co-ordinator and/or innovator of intelligence-related policy-making. Before 2004, this task was being performed by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in his additional role as the Director, Central Intelligence, in which capacity he was the principal adviser to the President in intelligence-related matters. In 2004, Bush accepted a recommendation of the National Commission, which enquired into the 9/11 terrorist strikes, to create a post of Director, National Intelligence, to function directly under the President and co-ordinate the functioning of the multiplicity of intelligence agencies and their policy-making. This responsibility is no longer exercised by the Director of the CIA.
9. In India, the administrative co-ordination of the functioning of the intelligence agencies was being and is even now exercised by the CS. There was no formal mechanism for operational co-ordination. The Task Force for the revamping of the intelligence apparatus under G.C.Saxena, former head of the R&AW, set up by the Vajpayee Government in 2000 suggested that the Principal Secretary to the PM should exercise this function in his capacity as the NSA. This was accepted.
10. When Manmohan Singh became the Prime Minister in 2004, he split the functions of the NSA from those of the Principal Secretary and made J.N.Dixit, former Foreign Secretary, as an independent NSA. He also appointed Narayanan as the Internal Security Adviser. In addition to advising the PM on all matters relating to external policy-making, Dixit also exercised the function of operational intelligence co-ordinator. Narayanan, as the Internal Security Adviser, had no formal role in intelligence co-ordination.
11. After the death of Dixit in January 2005, Narayanan was designated as the NSA exercising all functions relating to external and internal security and intelligence co-ordination. Questions have been raised since then by some about the wisdom of appointing an expert in internal security matters to be in charge of external-policy making where, it was argued, experience in diplomacy was essential.
12. In the US, after 9/11, a post of Adviser to the President on Homeland Security has been created to advise the President on all homeland security matters from his office in the White House. Thus, there are two posts--- the Secretary for Homeland Security, who is the political head of the Homeland Security Department, and the Adviser on Homeland Security, who is a member of the executive staff of the President.
13.The introduction of this arrangement is justified because internal or homeland security requires a kind of expertise different from external policy making and the ability to co-ordinate the internal security functions of not only all the federal Departments, but also of the States. A person with a purely academic or diplomatic experience may not be able to do justice to this.
14. in India too, external and internal policy making in national security matters require two different kinds of professional background, expertise and professional networking at the central and state levels. There have been reports that the Government is contemplating the appointment of a new NSA.
15. If so, this is also the right time to consider the following questions: Would it be advisable to have a separate adviser for internal security working in the PMO? Who will be responsible for intelligence co-ordination and policy-making? Should India also have a separate intelligence adviser and co-ordinator working directly under the Prime Minister similar to the arrangement in many countries, including the USA and the UK? (16-1-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
The institution of a National Security Adviser (NSA) came into being in the US in the wake of the absence of inter-departmental co-ordination in defence-related policy-making that prevailed during and before the Second World War. The NSA’s role was to harmonise the views and inputs of different departments and project to the President the available options which had inter-departmental support. Once the President chose the option, it was the task of the NSA to co-ordinate the implementation. Thus, the NSA was essentially a policy synthesizer and co-ordinator and not a policy innovator.
2. As the National Security Council (NSC) of which the President was the political head and the NSA the executive head grew up in strength and power, different NSAs started imparting to the institution of the NSA their own individual stamp. Under Dr.Henry Kissinger, who was the NSA under President Richard Nixon, the NSA became a policy innovator, who often gave to the President policy options, which were not necessarily the product of inter-departmental synthesis. He left the responsibility for the co-ordination of the implementation of the policy approved by the President largely to his juniors.
3. Since then, there have been other instances of NSAs venturing out from the domain of policy co-ordination to that of innovation. Zbigniew Brzezinski who was the NSA under President Jimmy Carter, is an example. NSAs, who kep themselves strictly confined to the original role of co-ordinator, hardly left their mark in the history of policy-making. Not so policy innovators, who are remembered even today.
4.NSAs are members of the executive staff ( White House staff ) of the President. Their appointment by the President is not subject to confirmation by the Senate. They do not enjoy the same position in the Administration as the independent heads of different departments such as the Secretary of State, of Defence etc. They do not have the same political clout as the departmental heads, who are in a better position to introduce policy innovation than the NSA. Some NSAs really shone in their brilliance when they gravitated from the office of the NSA to that of the Secretary of State. Kissinger and Ms. Condoleezza Rice were examples. How many remember the role of Rice as the NSA during the first term of George Bush as the President? Her initiative and original ideas in policy-making came into their own only after she became the Secretary of State during Bush’s second term.
5. In India, till 1989, the responsibility for policy co-ordination in national security related matters was shared by the Cabinet Secretary and the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, both of whom came directly under the Prime Minister. They performed jointly the task of policy synthesis, formulation and implementation. In times of crisis, they became policy innovators instead of remaining merely policy co-ordinators. One saw this under Mrs.Indira Gandhi in the months before and during the Indo-Pak war of 1971.
6. A post of NSA to co-ordinate policy-making in national security matters was created when V.P.Singh was the Prime Minister. M.K.Narayanan, who was the Director of the Intelligence Bureau under Rajiv Gandhi, held this post for less than a year. It ceased to exist till 1999 when it was re-created along with a full-fledged National Security Council mechanism by the Government of Atal Behari Vajpayee in pursuance of recommendations made by a Task Force headed by K.C.Pant, the then Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission.
7. The Task Force was reportedly in favour of the creation of an independent NSA, who will function along with the CS and the Principal Secretary under the Prime Minister. It envisaged a policy-making and co-ordinating troika advising the Prime Minister. Vajpayee approved the re-creation of the post of the NSA, but instead of appointing an independent person to hold it, he asked Brajesh Mishra, his Principal Secretary in the Prime Minister’s Office, to wear a second hat as the NSA. Many questioned the wisdom of this decision and felt that national security policy-making would not get undivided attention if the post is not held by an independent person. Despite this, Vajpayee felt that there would be advantages if the Principal Secretary also functioned as the NSA.
8. In the US, the NSA has no substantive role as the co-ordinator and/or innovator of intelligence-related policy-making. Before 2004, this task was being performed by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in his additional role as the Director, Central Intelligence, in which capacity he was the principal adviser to the President in intelligence-related matters. In 2004, Bush accepted a recommendation of the National Commission, which enquired into the 9/11 terrorist strikes, to create a post of Director, National Intelligence, to function directly under the President and co-ordinate the functioning of the multiplicity of intelligence agencies and their policy-making. This responsibility is no longer exercised by the Director of the CIA.
9. In India, the administrative co-ordination of the functioning of the intelligence agencies was being and is even now exercised by the CS. There was no formal mechanism for operational co-ordination. The Task Force for the revamping of the intelligence apparatus under G.C.Saxena, former head of the R&AW, set up by the Vajpayee Government in 2000 suggested that the Principal Secretary to the PM should exercise this function in his capacity as the NSA. This was accepted.
10. When Manmohan Singh became the Prime Minister in 2004, he split the functions of the NSA from those of the Principal Secretary and made J.N.Dixit, former Foreign Secretary, as an independent NSA. He also appointed Narayanan as the Internal Security Adviser. In addition to advising the PM on all matters relating to external policy-making, Dixit also exercised the function of operational intelligence co-ordinator. Narayanan, as the Internal Security Adviser, had no formal role in intelligence co-ordination.
11. After the death of Dixit in January 2005, Narayanan was designated as the NSA exercising all functions relating to external and internal security and intelligence co-ordination. Questions have been raised since then by some about the wisdom of appointing an expert in internal security matters to be in charge of external-policy making where, it was argued, experience in diplomacy was essential.
12. In the US, after 9/11, a post of Adviser to the President on Homeland Security has been created to advise the President on all homeland security matters from his office in the White House. Thus, there are two posts--- the Secretary for Homeland Security, who is the political head of the Homeland Security Department, and the Adviser on Homeland Security, who is a member of the executive staff of the President.
13.The introduction of this arrangement is justified because internal or homeland security requires a kind of expertise different from external policy making and the ability to co-ordinate the internal security functions of not only all the federal Departments, but also of the States. A person with a purely academic or diplomatic experience may not be able to do justice to this.
14. in India too, external and internal policy making in national security matters require two different kinds of professional background, expertise and professional networking at the central and state levels. There have been reports that the Government is contemplating the appointment of a new NSA.
15. If so, this is also the right time to consider the following questions: Would it be advisable to have a separate adviser for internal security working in the PMO? Who will be responsible for intelligence co-ordination and policy-making? Should India also have a separate intelligence adviser and co-ordinator working directly under the Prime Minister similar to the arrangement in many countries, including the USA and the UK? (16-1-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Thursday, January 14, 2010
HEADLEY TWICE BROUGHT GPS TO INDIA WITHOUT BEING DETECTED BY CUSTOMS
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.609
B.RAMAN
On January 14,2010, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) filed before Judge Harry D.Leinenweber of the Northern District Court of Eastern Illinois Division a charge-sheet (indictment) relating to the the role of David Coleman Headley and Tahawwur Hussain Rana of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in the Mumbai terrorist strikes of 26/11 of 2008 and in a planned terrorist attack on the office of a Danish newspaper in Denmark, which had published cartoons of the Holy Prophet in 2005.
2. The charge sheet projects the Mumbai attacks as a joint operation of the LET and the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) involving, among others, four members of the LET and Major Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed alias Pasha, who acted as an intermediary between Headley and Rana on the one side and the Waziristan-based Ilyas Kashmiri, the head of the 313 Brigade of the HUJI.
3. The charge sheet does not identify the four members of the LET based in Pakistan on whose behalf Headley was acting. They are merely referred to as Lashkar Member A, Lashkar Member B, Lashkar Member C and Lashkar Member D. None of them is cited as a co-accused (co-defendant), indicating thereby that the FBI does not propose asking for their arrest and extradition by Pakistan to face trial by the Chicago court.This could be an indicator that the four unidentified LET members are among the seven presently in custody in Pakistan and being prosecuted before an anti-terrorism court of Islamabad for their role in the Mumbai conspiracy. Since they are already facing trial in Pakistan, the FBI does not feel the need for prosecuting them on similar charges in Chicago.
4. Indian investigators should be able to identify these four members of the LET from the following tell-tale evidence in the charge-sheet:
“Lashkar Member A” was a resident of Pakistan "associated with the LET who supervised others associated with the LET and served as a “handler” for HEADLEY and others."
“Lashkar Member B” was a resident of Pakistan "associated with the LET who trained others in combat techniques for use in terrorist attacks."
“Lashkar Member C” was a resident of Pakistan and "one of the LET commanders."
“Lashkar Member D” was a resident of Pakistan and "one of Lashkar’s commanders. "
"During the course of the attacks in Mumbai, the attackers were in telephonic contact with Lashkar Members A, B and C, all of whom were then located in Pakistan. More specifically, during the course of the attacks, the attackers were advised to, among other actions, kill hostages and throw grenades. Lashkar Member A also sought to arrange the release of a hostage in exchange for the release of a captured attacker." ( My comments: Kasab)
5. The charge-sheet also refers to a “Person A”, a resident of Pakistan", "who participated in planning and funding attacks carried out by the LET. " It does not describe him as a member of the LET. By going through the charge-sheet, one could infer that Person A is most probably Major (retd) Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed alias Pasha. It was he who allegedly gave US $ 25,000 to Headley in July 2006 for his expenses in India, another sum of US $ 2000 in Indian rupees in September 2007 and a third amount of US $ 1500 in Indian rupees in June 2008. In March 2008, Lashkar Member A gave him US $ 1000 in Indian rupees.
6. While no Pakistani resident has been cited as a co-accused in connection with the Mumbai attacks, Ilyas Kashmiri and Major Abdur Rehman have been cited as co-accused in connection with the planned terrorist attack on the Danish newspaper office. The FBI has thus reserved to itself the option of demanding that Pakistan should arrest and extradite them to the US for trial. According to the charge-sheet, the Denmark attack was also envisaged as a joint LET-HUJI (313 Brigade) operation, but the LET withdrew from it in March 2009 following the action taken against some of its members by the Pakistani authorities in connection with the Mumbai attacks. Thereafter, it was planned as a purely HUJI attack. Earlier in February 2009, when Headley met Ilyas Kashmiri in Waziristan along with Maj.Abdur Rehman, Ilyas Kashmiri informed him that he would arrange the manpower for the Denmark attack and that the participation of the LET was not necessary.
7. Headley made six visits to India in September 2006, February 2007, September 2007, April 2008, July 2008 and March 2009. The first five visits were to collect operational details and video recordings for the Mumbai strike. The March 2009 visit was for the collection of details for a future attack. During his visit to Pakistan in September 2007, Lashkar Member A showed him a styrofoam mockup of the Taj Mahal hotel.
8. For two of his visits to India in April 2008 and July 2008, Lashkar Members A and B gave him a Global Positioning System (GPS) instrument and asked him to record in it the location of the possible landing sites for the boat and other targets. On both the occasions, Headley would appear to have brought the GPS instrument into India and taken it back to Pakistan without being detected by the indian customs.
9. Rana has been cited as a co-accused in respect of two charges "Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Terrorism in India" and the planned attack in Denmark. In respect of the planned Denmark attack, Ilyas Kashmiri and Major Abdur Rehman are also co-accused. In respect of all other charges relating to the Mumbai attack, Headley is the only accused. No one else has been cited as co-accused.
10. Salient points of the charge sheet are annexed. ( 16-1-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
SALIENT POINTS FROM THE CHARGE SHEET
HEADLEY attended LET training camps in Pakistan "which began in or around February 2002, August 2002, April 2003, August 2003 and December 2003." HEADLEY assisted senior LET personnel in planning and preparing for terrorist attacks.
First World Immigration Services (“First World”) was an immigration services business with its principal place of business in Chicago, Illinois. First World used the business name “Immigrant Law Center,” and also maintained offices in New York City, Toronto, and elsewhere. Tahawwur Hussain Rana owned First World and controlled its operations. He is a long-time associate of HEADLEY.
An individual referred to in the indictment as “Lashkar Member A” was a resident of Pakistan associated with the LET who supervised others associated with the LET and served as a “handler” for HEADLEY and others.
An individual referred to as “Lashkar Member B” was a resident of Pakistan associated with the LET who trained others in combat techniques for use in terrorist attacks.
An individual referred to as “Lashkar Member C” was a resident of Pakistan and one of the LET commanders.
An individual referred to as “Lashkar Member D” was a resident of Pakistan and one of the LET commanders.
An individual referred to as “Person A” was a resident of Pakistan who participated in planning and funding attacks carried out by the LET.
Between late 2005, and till his arrest on October 3, 2009, HEADLEY "conspired with Lashkar Members A, B, C, and D, and others known and unknown to the grand jury, to deliver, place, discharge and detonate explosives and other lethal devices in, into and against places of public use, state and government facilities, public transportation systems, and infrastructure facilities in India, with the intent to cause death and serious bodily injury, and with the intent to cause extensive destruction of such places and facilities and where such destruction would likely result in major economic loss."
Around late 2005, Lashkar Member A, Lashkar Member B, and Lashkar Member D told HEADLEY that he should travel to India to carry out surveillance of potential targets for attack by the LET, and that he should take steps to conceal his association with Pakistan and his Muslim religion during his travels in India.
In February 2006, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, HEADLEY changed his original name of “Daood Gilani” to “David Coleman Headley” in order to facilitate his activities on behalf of the LET by enabling him to present himself in India as an American who was neither Muslim nor Pakistani.
In the spring of 2006, Lashkar Member A and Lashkar Member D discussed with HEADLEY the idea that he could open an immigration office in Mumbai, as a cover for his surveillance activities in India.
In June 2006, HEADLEY traveled to Chicago, advised Tahawwur Hussain Rana of his assignment to perform surveillance for potential targets in India, and obtained Rana’s approval for opening a First World office in Mumbai, as cover for these activities. Rana directed an individual associated with First World to prepare documents to support HEADLEY's cover story. Rana also advised HEADLEY on how to obtain a visa for travel to India. In applying for his visa for travel to India, HEADLEY misrepresented his birth name, father’s true name, and the purpose for his travel.
In July 2006, Person A provided to HEADLEY approximately $25,000 to, among other purposes, establish and operate the Mumbai office of First World and pay for living expenses while he carried out his assignments for the LET in India.
In September 2006, February 2007, September 2007, April 2008, and July 2008, HEADLEY traveled to Mumbai for extended periods for conducting surveillance of possible targets of attacks by the LET, using his association with First World as cover for his travels. Prior to HEADLEY's departure for each of these trips, Lashkar Member A, Person A and others, instructed HEADLEY regarding locations where he was to conduct video surveillance in and around Mumbai, as well as other locations in India. After each trip, HEADLEY traveled to Pakistan, where he met with Lashkar Member A, Person A and persons associated with the LET to report on the results of his surveillance, and provided Lashkar Member A and Person A with photographs and videos from the surveillance.
Prior to HEADLEY's surveillance activities in India starting in September 2006, Lashkar Member A and Person A instructed him to get settled in India, including by opening the business and obtaining an apartment, and to take photographs and make videos of various locations of public significance in India, including but not limited to, the Taj Mahal hotel in Mumbai.
In November 2006, HEADLEY opened the Mumbai office of First World for the purpose of providing cover for his travel and activities in India on behalf of the LET.
In September 2006, HEADLEY conducted surveillance on behalf of the LET, including taking pictures and making videotapes, of various targets in India, including but not limited to, the Taj Mahal hotel in Mumbai
Following these initial surveillance activities, HEADLEY traveled to Pakistan, where he met with Lashkar Members A and B and Person A and provided them with accounts of his surveillance. HEADLEY provided photographs and videos taken during the surveillance to Lashkar Member A and Person A.
Prior to HEADLEY's surveillance activities in India starting in February 2007, Lashkar Member A and Person A separately instructed him to conduct surveillance of the second floor of the Taj Mahal hotel in Mumbai, specifically including the conference rooms and ballrooms.
In February 2007, HEADLEY conducted surveillance on behalf of the LET, including taking pictures and making videotapes, of various targets in India, including but not limited to the Taj Mahal hotel (where he made detailed videos of the second floor conference rooms and ballrooms), and the Oberoi hotel, both in Mumbai.
Following these surveillance activities, HEADLEY traveled to Pakistan, where he met with Lashkar Members A, B and D, and Person A, and provided themwith accounts of his surveillance. HEADLEY provided photographs and videos taken during the surveillance to Lashkar Member A and Person A.
Prior to HEADLEY's surveillance activities in India starting in September 2007, Lashkar Member A and Person A separately instructed him to conduct further surveillance of the second floor of the Taj Mahal hotel, specifically including the conference rooms, and to obtain schedules of future conferences at the hotel.
In September 2007, HEADLEY conducted surveillance, including taking pictures and making videotapes, of various targets in India, including but not limited to the Taj Mahal hotel. In addition, HEADLEY attempted to obtain a schedule of conferences to be held at the Taj Mahal hotel.
Following these surveillance activities, HEADLEY traveled to Pakistan, where he met with Lashkar Member A and Person A, and provided them with accounts of his surveillance. HEADLEY provided photographs and videos taken during the surveillance to Lashkar Member A and Person A. During one of HEADLEY's meetings with persons associated with Lashkar, Lashkar Member A displayed to HEADLEY a styrofoam mockup of the Taj Mahal hotel. During a meeting with Person A, HEADLEY was provided with approximately $2,000 worth of Indian currency for expenses in connection with HEADLEY's activities in India.
In March 2008, HEADLEY met with Lashkar Members A and B and other persons associated with Lashkar, and discussed potential landing sites for a team of attackers who would arrive in Mumbai by sea. In March 2008, Lashkar Member A and other persons associated with the LET instructed HEADLEY to take boat trips in and around the Mumbai harbor and to take surveillance video of various locations. Lashkar Member A also provided HEADLEY with approximately $1000 worth of Indian currency to use for his expenses in Mumbai.
In March or April 2008, Lashkar Members A and B provided HEADLEY with a global positioning system (GPS) device. Lashkar Members A and B showed HEADLEY how to enter locations into the GPS device and instructed him to use it to record the locations of possible landing sites.
In April 2008, HEADLEY conducted surveillance of the Mumbai harbor and surrounding areas, using the GPS device and making videotapes. HEADLEY also conducted surveillance of, among other locations, the Chhatarapati Shivaji Terminus train station, using the GPS device and making videotapes.
Following these surveillance activities, HEADLEY traveled to Pakistan, where he met separately with Lashkar Member A and Person A, and provided them with accounts of his surveillance, as well as with his recommendations as to which landing sites the attackers should use. HEADLEY provided photographs and videos taken during the surveillance to these same persons, and the GPS device to Lashkar Member A.
Prior to HEADLEY's surveillance activities in India starting in or about July 2008, Lashkar Member A instructed HEADLEY to conduct further surveillance of various locations in Mumbai using the GPS device, which was returned to HEADLEY. Lashkar Members A and B discussed with HEADLEY the need to do further surveillance of the Taj Mahal hotel and landing points for the attackers, including videotaping the route from a police station to the Taj Mahal hotel. Both Lashkar Member A and Person A separately instructed HEADLEY to conduct videotape surveillance of the Chabad House, a Jewish community center located in Mumbai.
In June 2008, Person A provided to HEADLEY additional funds of approximately $1,500 worth of Indian currency to keep open the First World office in Mumbai, but approved closing that office in the future and opening a new business in Delhi, to be used as cover for future activities by HEADLEY.
In July 2008, HEADLEY conducted surveillance, including taking pictures and making videotapes, of various targets, including but not limited to, the Taj Mahal hotel, the Chabad House, the Chhatarapati Shivaji Terminus train station, the Leopold Café and various landing sites, and entered various locations into the GPS device.
While HEADLEY was in India for conducting surveillance starting in July 2008, Person A communicated with HEADLEY by passing messages to HEADLEY through Tahawwur Hussain Rana.
Following his July 2008 surveillance activities in India, HEADLEY traveled to Pakistan, met at times with Lashkar Members A and B and Person A, and provided them with accounts of his surveillance. HEADLEY provided photographs and videos taken during the surveillance to Lashkar Member A and Person A, and the GPS device to Lashkar Member A.
In July and August 2008, Lashkar Member B and others were training a number of young men in Pakistan in various skills and tactics to be used in carrying out terrorist attacks in Mumbai, including combat tactics, room entry, hostage rescue, nautical training and swimming.
During the course of the attacks in Mumbai, the attackers were in telephonic contact with Lashkar Members A, B and C, all of whom were then located in Pakistan. More specifically, during the course of the attacks, the attackers were advised to, among other actions, kill hostages and throw grenades. Lashkar Member A also sought to arrange the release of a hostage in exchange for the release of a captured attacker.
Following the November 2008 attacks, Person A advised HEADLEY to avoid contact with him until further notice and to remove any incriminating materials from his home in Pakistan.
In June 2008, Al Qaeda, through As Sahab Media, took credit for an attack on the Danish Embassy in Islamabad and called for further attacks against Danish interests to avenge the publication (and re-publication) of the cartoons of the Prophet Mohamed.
In August 2008, Al Qaeda released a video (“the al Qaeda video”) through As Sahab Media calling for further attacks in retaliation for the publication of the cartoons. Mustafa Abu al Yazid of Al Qaeda, among others, appeared on the video.
ILYAS KASHMIRI was an influential leader of HUJI. Beginning in 2007, KASHMIRI based his operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. KASHMIRI was in regular contact with Al Qaeda and in particular with Mustafa Abu al Yazid, a/k/a “Sheik Said al Masri.”
ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED was a resident of Pakistan and former member of the Pakistani military who was associated with ILYAS KASHMIRI and Lashkar Member A.
Between October 2008, and October 3, 2009, ILYAS KASHMIRI, ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED, and DAVID COLEMAN HEADLEY, conspired with each other, and others known and unknown to the grand jury, to commit acts outside the United States that would constitute the offenses of murder and maiming if committed in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, namely, murder and maiming in connection with an attack to be carried out against the facilities of Jyllands-Posten, located in Denmark, and at least two of its employees.
In October 2008, Lashkar Member A and HEADLEY met in Pakistan and discussed the prospect of an attack on the Jyllands-Posten newspaper, which would be preceded by extensive surveillance work to be performed by HEADLEY. HEADLEY recorded and saved notes reflecting the attack plan he discussed with Lashkar Member A.
In October 2008, Lashkar Member A provided defendant HEADLEY with a thumb drive containing information about Denmark, the city of Copenhagen and the Jyllands-Posten newspaper.
In late December 2008 and early January 2009, after reviewing with Tahawwur Hussain Rana how HEADLEY had performed the surveillance of the targets attacked in Mumbai in November 2008, HEADLEY advised Rana of the planned attack on the Jyllands-Posten and his intended travel to Denmark for the purpose of performing surveillance of the Jyllands-Posten facilities. HEADLEY obtained Rana’s approval and assistance to identify HEADLEY as a representative of First World, to falsely represent that First World was planning to open an office in Copenhagen, and to gain entry to the Jyllands-Posten's offices by falsely expressing interest in placing an advertisement for First World in the newspaper. Before leaving Chicago, HEADLEY and Rana caused to be made business cards that identified HEADLEY as a representative of the Immigrant Law Center.
In late December 2008 and early January 2009, HEADLEY, while in Chicago, sent emails to, and received emails from ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED in order to continue planning for the attack and coordinate HEADLEY’s travel to Denmark to conduct surveillance.
In January 2009, HEADLEY traveled from Chicago to Copenhagen to conduct surveillance of the Jyllands Posten newspaper offices in the cities of Copenhagen and Aarhus in Denmark.
On January 20, 2009, HEADLEY obtained entry to the Jyllands Posten newspaper office in Copenhagen on the pretext that he was seeking to place an ad on behalf of First World in the newspaper. HEADLEY also scouted and videotaped the surrounding areas.
On January 23, 2009, HEADLEY obtained entry to the Jyllands Posten newspaper office in Aarhus, on the pretext that he was seeking to place an ad on behalf of First World in the newspaper. HEADLEY also scouted the surrounding areas.
On January 29, 2009, Tahawwur Hussain Rana, posing as HEADLEY, sent an email to the Jyllands Posten newspaper pretending to be interested in placing an advertisement in the newspaper on behalf of First World.
In late January 2009, HEADLEY traveled to Pakistan and met separately with Lashkar Member A and defendant ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED concerning the planned attack on the newspaper and provided each with videotapes of his Copenhagen surveillances. Subsequently, in March 2009, Lashkar Member A advised HEADLEY that Lashkar put the attack on the newspaper on hold due to pressure on Lashkar resulting from the November 2008 Mumbai attacks.
In January 2009, ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED provided the Al Qaeda video to HEADLEY in Pakistan.
In February 2009, ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED took HEADLEY to meet ILYAS KASHMIRI in the Waziristan region of Pakistan. During the meeting, KASHMIRI indicated that he had already reviewed the Copenhagen videotapes made by HEADLEY and suggested that they consider using a truck bomb in the operation. KASHMIRI also indicated that he could provide manpower for the operation and that the participation of LET was not necessary.
In or about May 2009, ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED and HEADLEY went again to meet KASHMIRI in Waziristan. During this meeting, KASHMIRI advised that he had met with a European contact who could provide HEADLEY with money, weapons and manpower for the attack on the newspaper. KASHMIRI directed HEADLEY to meet with KASHMIRI’s European contacts.
In July 2009, ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED was arrested by Pakistani authorities. HEADLEY contacted associates in Pakistan in an effort to learn whether he would be able to continue working with ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED.
In July 2009, HEADLEY, from Chicago, sent a messenger to meet with KASHMIRI in Waziristan to advise KASHMIRI of the arrest of ABDUR REHMAN SAYED and his unsuccessful efforts to contact KASHMIRI’s European contacts. KASHMIRI sent back word that the planned operation in Denmark should continue and that HEADLEY should continue to attempt to contact KASHMIRI’s European contacts at the telephone numbers already provided.
In late July and early August 2009, HEADLEY traveled from Chicago to various places in Europe, including Copenhagen to conduct additional surveillance of the Jyllands-Posten newspaper office and the surrounding area. HEADLEY made approximately 13 additional surveillance videos. During the trip, HEADLEY also attempted to obtain assistance from Kashmiri’s European contacts.
In July 2009, HEADLEY provided the al Qaeda video to Rana in Chicago.
On August 5, 2009, HEADLEY returned to the United States, falsely advising a Customs and Border Patrol inspector at the airport in Atlanta that he had visited Europe for business reasons related to First World.
On August 22, 2009, HEADLEY, from Chicago spoke with ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED (who had been released fromcustody) in Pakistan concerning, among other things, the efforts by ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED to contact KASHMIRI, and the plans for the operation in Denmark.
In September 2009, HEADLEY sought to pass a message through ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED to KASHMIRI concerning suggestions from HEADLEY about changes to the plan for the attack on the Jyllands-Posten in Copenhagen.
In September 2009, ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED, from Pakistan, communicated with HEADLEY, in Chicago by telephone and email concerning reports that KASHMIRI had been killed in a drone attack and the implications of KASHMIRI’s possible death for the plan for the attack on the Jyllands-Posten in Copenhagen.
In September 2009, HEADLEY and Rana spoke concerning reports that KASHMIRI had been killed in a drone attack and the implications of KASHMIRI’s possible death for the plan for the attack on the Jyllands-Posten in Copenhagen.
In late September 2009, ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED, from Pakistan, communicated with HEADLEY in Chicago by telephone and email to report that KASHMIRI had not been killed and that KASHMIRI was anxious to move forward with the plan for the attack on the Jyllands-Posten in Copenhagen.
In the late summer of 2009, Rana and HEADLEY agreed that funds that had been provided to Rana could be used to fund the plot to attack the Jyllands-Posten newspaper in Copenhagen.
On October 3, 2009, HEADLEY traveled to O’Hare Airport in Chicago, Illinois, intending to ultimately travel to Pakistan in order to meet with ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED and KASHMIRI, and to deliver to them approximately 13 surveillance videos. He was arrested before he could leave.
B.RAMAN
On January 14,2010, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) filed before Judge Harry D.Leinenweber of the Northern District Court of Eastern Illinois Division a charge-sheet (indictment) relating to the the role of David Coleman Headley and Tahawwur Hussain Rana of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in the Mumbai terrorist strikes of 26/11 of 2008 and in a planned terrorist attack on the office of a Danish newspaper in Denmark, which had published cartoons of the Holy Prophet in 2005.
2. The charge sheet projects the Mumbai attacks as a joint operation of the LET and the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) involving, among others, four members of the LET and Major Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed alias Pasha, who acted as an intermediary between Headley and Rana on the one side and the Waziristan-based Ilyas Kashmiri, the head of the 313 Brigade of the HUJI.
3. The charge sheet does not identify the four members of the LET based in Pakistan on whose behalf Headley was acting. They are merely referred to as Lashkar Member A, Lashkar Member B, Lashkar Member C and Lashkar Member D. None of them is cited as a co-accused (co-defendant), indicating thereby that the FBI does not propose asking for their arrest and extradition by Pakistan to face trial by the Chicago court.This could be an indicator that the four unidentified LET members are among the seven presently in custody in Pakistan and being prosecuted before an anti-terrorism court of Islamabad for their role in the Mumbai conspiracy. Since they are already facing trial in Pakistan, the FBI does not feel the need for prosecuting them on similar charges in Chicago.
4. Indian investigators should be able to identify these four members of the LET from the following tell-tale evidence in the charge-sheet:
“Lashkar Member A” was a resident of Pakistan "associated with the LET who supervised others associated with the LET and served as a “handler” for HEADLEY and others."
“Lashkar Member B” was a resident of Pakistan "associated with the LET who trained others in combat techniques for use in terrorist attacks."
“Lashkar Member C” was a resident of Pakistan and "one of the LET commanders."
“Lashkar Member D” was a resident of Pakistan and "one of Lashkar’s commanders. "
"During the course of the attacks in Mumbai, the attackers were in telephonic contact with Lashkar Members A, B and C, all of whom were then located in Pakistan. More specifically, during the course of the attacks, the attackers were advised to, among other actions, kill hostages and throw grenades. Lashkar Member A also sought to arrange the release of a hostage in exchange for the release of a captured attacker." ( My comments: Kasab)
5. The charge-sheet also refers to a “Person A”, a resident of Pakistan", "who participated in planning and funding attacks carried out by the LET. " It does not describe him as a member of the LET. By going through the charge-sheet, one could infer that Person A is most probably Major (retd) Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed alias Pasha. It was he who allegedly gave US $ 25,000 to Headley in July 2006 for his expenses in India, another sum of US $ 2000 in Indian rupees in September 2007 and a third amount of US $ 1500 in Indian rupees in June 2008. In March 2008, Lashkar Member A gave him US $ 1000 in Indian rupees.
6. While no Pakistani resident has been cited as a co-accused in connection with the Mumbai attacks, Ilyas Kashmiri and Major Abdur Rehman have been cited as co-accused in connection with the planned terrorist attack on the Danish newspaper office. The FBI has thus reserved to itself the option of demanding that Pakistan should arrest and extradite them to the US for trial. According to the charge-sheet, the Denmark attack was also envisaged as a joint LET-HUJI (313 Brigade) operation, but the LET withdrew from it in March 2009 following the action taken against some of its members by the Pakistani authorities in connection with the Mumbai attacks. Thereafter, it was planned as a purely HUJI attack. Earlier in February 2009, when Headley met Ilyas Kashmiri in Waziristan along with Maj.Abdur Rehman, Ilyas Kashmiri informed him that he would arrange the manpower for the Denmark attack and that the participation of the LET was not necessary.
7. Headley made six visits to India in September 2006, February 2007, September 2007, April 2008, July 2008 and March 2009. The first five visits were to collect operational details and video recordings for the Mumbai strike. The March 2009 visit was for the collection of details for a future attack. During his visit to Pakistan in September 2007, Lashkar Member A showed him a styrofoam mockup of the Taj Mahal hotel.
8. For two of his visits to India in April 2008 and July 2008, Lashkar Members A and B gave him a Global Positioning System (GPS) instrument and asked him to record in it the location of the possible landing sites for the boat and other targets. On both the occasions, Headley would appear to have brought the GPS instrument into India and taken it back to Pakistan without being detected by the indian customs.
9. Rana has been cited as a co-accused in respect of two charges "Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Terrorism in India" and the planned attack in Denmark. In respect of the planned Denmark attack, Ilyas Kashmiri and Major Abdur Rehman are also co-accused. In respect of all other charges relating to the Mumbai attack, Headley is the only accused. No one else has been cited as co-accused.
10. Salient points of the charge sheet are annexed. ( 16-1-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
SALIENT POINTS FROM THE CHARGE SHEET
HEADLEY attended LET training camps in Pakistan "which began in or around February 2002, August 2002, April 2003, August 2003 and December 2003." HEADLEY assisted senior LET personnel in planning and preparing for terrorist attacks.
First World Immigration Services (“First World”) was an immigration services business with its principal place of business in Chicago, Illinois. First World used the business name “Immigrant Law Center,” and also maintained offices in New York City, Toronto, and elsewhere. Tahawwur Hussain Rana owned First World and controlled its operations. He is a long-time associate of HEADLEY.
An individual referred to in the indictment as “Lashkar Member A” was a resident of Pakistan associated with the LET who supervised others associated with the LET and served as a “handler” for HEADLEY and others.
An individual referred to as “Lashkar Member B” was a resident of Pakistan associated with the LET who trained others in combat techniques for use in terrorist attacks.
An individual referred to as “Lashkar Member C” was a resident of Pakistan and one of the LET commanders.
An individual referred to as “Lashkar Member D” was a resident of Pakistan and one of the LET commanders.
An individual referred to as “Person A” was a resident of Pakistan who participated in planning and funding attacks carried out by the LET.
Between late 2005, and till his arrest on October 3, 2009, HEADLEY "conspired with Lashkar Members A, B, C, and D, and others known and unknown to the grand jury, to deliver, place, discharge and detonate explosives and other lethal devices in, into and against places of public use, state and government facilities, public transportation systems, and infrastructure facilities in India, with the intent to cause death and serious bodily injury, and with the intent to cause extensive destruction of such places and facilities and where such destruction would likely result in major economic loss."
Around late 2005, Lashkar Member A, Lashkar Member B, and Lashkar Member D told HEADLEY that he should travel to India to carry out surveillance of potential targets for attack by the LET, and that he should take steps to conceal his association with Pakistan and his Muslim religion during his travels in India.
In February 2006, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, HEADLEY changed his original name of “Daood Gilani” to “David Coleman Headley” in order to facilitate his activities on behalf of the LET by enabling him to present himself in India as an American who was neither Muslim nor Pakistani.
In the spring of 2006, Lashkar Member A and Lashkar Member D discussed with HEADLEY the idea that he could open an immigration office in Mumbai, as a cover for his surveillance activities in India.
In June 2006, HEADLEY traveled to Chicago, advised Tahawwur Hussain Rana of his assignment to perform surveillance for potential targets in India, and obtained Rana’s approval for opening a First World office in Mumbai, as cover for these activities. Rana directed an individual associated with First World to prepare documents to support HEADLEY's cover story. Rana also advised HEADLEY on how to obtain a visa for travel to India. In applying for his visa for travel to India, HEADLEY misrepresented his birth name, father’s true name, and the purpose for his travel.
In July 2006, Person A provided to HEADLEY approximately $25,000 to, among other purposes, establish and operate the Mumbai office of First World and pay for living expenses while he carried out his assignments for the LET in India.
In September 2006, February 2007, September 2007, April 2008, and July 2008, HEADLEY traveled to Mumbai for extended periods for conducting surveillance of possible targets of attacks by the LET, using his association with First World as cover for his travels. Prior to HEADLEY's departure for each of these trips, Lashkar Member A, Person A and others, instructed HEADLEY regarding locations where he was to conduct video surveillance in and around Mumbai, as well as other locations in India. After each trip, HEADLEY traveled to Pakistan, where he met with Lashkar Member A, Person A and persons associated with the LET to report on the results of his surveillance, and provided Lashkar Member A and Person A with photographs and videos from the surveillance.
Prior to HEADLEY's surveillance activities in India starting in September 2006, Lashkar Member A and Person A instructed him to get settled in India, including by opening the business and obtaining an apartment, and to take photographs and make videos of various locations of public significance in India, including but not limited to, the Taj Mahal hotel in Mumbai.
In November 2006, HEADLEY opened the Mumbai office of First World for the purpose of providing cover for his travel and activities in India on behalf of the LET.
In September 2006, HEADLEY conducted surveillance on behalf of the LET, including taking pictures and making videotapes, of various targets in India, including but not limited to, the Taj Mahal hotel in Mumbai
Following these initial surveillance activities, HEADLEY traveled to Pakistan, where he met with Lashkar Members A and B and Person A and provided them with accounts of his surveillance. HEADLEY provided photographs and videos taken during the surveillance to Lashkar Member A and Person A.
Prior to HEADLEY's surveillance activities in India starting in February 2007, Lashkar Member A and Person A separately instructed him to conduct surveillance of the second floor of the Taj Mahal hotel in Mumbai, specifically including the conference rooms and ballrooms.
In February 2007, HEADLEY conducted surveillance on behalf of the LET, including taking pictures and making videotapes, of various targets in India, including but not limited to the Taj Mahal hotel (where he made detailed videos of the second floor conference rooms and ballrooms), and the Oberoi hotel, both in Mumbai.
Following these surveillance activities, HEADLEY traveled to Pakistan, where he met with Lashkar Members A, B and D, and Person A, and provided themwith accounts of his surveillance. HEADLEY provided photographs and videos taken during the surveillance to Lashkar Member A and Person A.
Prior to HEADLEY's surveillance activities in India starting in September 2007, Lashkar Member A and Person A separately instructed him to conduct further surveillance of the second floor of the Taj Mahal hotel, specifically including the conference rooms, and to obtain schedules of future conferences at the hotel.
In September 2007, HEADLEY conducted surveillance, including taking pictures and making videotapes, of various targets in India, including but not limited to the Taj Mahal hotel. In addition, HEADLEY attempted to obtain a schedule of conferences to be held at the Taj Mahal hotel.
Following these surveillance activities, HEADLEY traveled to Pakistan, where he met with Lashkar Member A and Person A, and provided them with accounts of his surveillance. HEADLEY provided photographs and videos taken during the surveillance to Lashkar Member A and Person A. During one of HEADLEY's meetings with persons associated with Lashkar, Lashkar Member A displayed to HEADLEY a styrofoam mockup of the Taj Mahal hotel. During a meeting with Person A, HEADLEY was provided with approximately $2,000 worth of Indian currency for expenses in connection with HEADLEY's activities in India.
In March 2008, HEADLEY met with Lashkar Members A and B and other persons associated with Lashkar, and discussed potential landing sites for a team of attackers who would arrive in Mumbai by sea. In March 2008, Lashkar Member A and other persons associated with the LET instructed HEADLEY to take boat trips in and around the Mumbai harbor and to take surveillance video of various locations. Lashkar Member A also provided HEADLEY with approximately $1000 worth of Indian currency to use for his expenses in Mumbai.
In March or April 2008, Lashkar Members A and B provided HEADLEY with a global positioning system (GPS) device. Lashkar Members A and B showed HEADLEY how to enter locations into the GPS device and instructed him to use it to record the locations of possible landing sites.
In April 2008, HEADLEY conducted surveillance of the Mumbai harbor and surrounding areas, using the GPS device and making videotapes. HEADLEY also conducted surveillance of, among other locations, the Chhatarapati Shivaji Terminus train station, using the GPS device and making videotapes.
Following these surveillance activities, HEADLEY traveled to Pakistan, where he met separately with Lashkar Member A and Person A, and provided them with accounts of his surveillance, as well as with his recommendations as to which landing sites the attackers should use. HEADLEY provided photographs and videos taken during the surveillance to these same persons, and the GPS device to Lashkar Member A.
Prior to HEADLEY's surveillance activities in India starting in or about July 2008, Lashkar Member A instructed HEADLEY to conduct further surveillance of various locations in Mumbai using the GPS device, which was returned to HEADLEY. Lashkar Members A and B discussed with HEADLEY the need to do further surveillance of the Taj Mahal hotel and landing points for the attackers, including videotaping the route from a police station to the Taj Mahal hotel. Both Lashkar Member A and Person A separately instructed HEADLEY to conduct videotape surveillance of the Chabad House, a Jewish community center located in Mumbai.
In June 2008, Person A provided to HEADLEY additional funds of approximately $1,500 worth of Indian currency to keep open the First World office in Mumbai, but approved closing that office in the future and opening a new business in Delhi, to be used as cover for future activities by HEADLEY.
In July 2008, HEADLEY conducted surveillance, including taking pictures and making videotapes, of various targets, including but not limited to, the Taj Mahal hotel, the Chabad House, the Chhatarapati Shivaji Terminus train station, the Leopold Café and various landing sites, and entered various locations into the GPS device.
While HEADLEY was in India for conducting surveillance starting in July 2008, Person A communicated with HEADLEY by passing messages to HEADLEY through Tahawwur Hussain Rana.
Following his July 2008 surveillance activities in India, HEADLEY traveled to Pakistan, met at times with Lashkar Members A and B and Person A, and provided them with accounts of his surveillance. HEADLEY provided photographs and videos taken during the surveillance to Lashkar Member A and Person A, and the GPS device to Lashkar Member A.
In July and August 2008, Lashkar Member B and others were training a number of young men in Pakistan in various skills and tactics to be used in carrying out terrorist attacks in Mumbai, including combat tactics, room entry, hostage rescue, nautical training and swimming.
During the course of the attacks in Mumbai, the attackers were in telephonic contact with Lashkar Members A, B and C, all of whom were then located in Pakistan. More specifically, during the course of the attacks, the attackers were advised to, among other actions, kill hostages and throw grenades. Lashkar Member A also sought to arrange the release of a hostage in exchange for the release of a captured attacker.
Following the November 2008 attacks, Person A advised HEADLEY to avoid contact with him until further notice and to remove any incriminating materials from his home in Pakistan.
In June 2008, Al Qaeda, through As Sahab Media, took credit for an attack on the Danish Embassy in Islamabad and called for further attacks against Danish interests to avenge the publication (and re-publication) of the cartoons of the Prophet Mohamed.
In August 2008, Al Qaeda released a video (“the al Qaeda video”) through As Sahab Media calling for further attacks in retaliation for the publication of the cartoons. Mustafa Abu al Yazid of Al Qaeda, among others, appeared on the video.
ILYAS KASHMIRI was an influential leader of HUJI. Beginning in 2007, KASHMIRI based his operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. KASHMIRI was in regular contact with Al Qaeda and in particular with Mustafa Abu al Yazid, a/k/a “Sheik Said al Masri.”
ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED was a resident of Pakistan and former member of the Pakistani military who was associated with ILYAS KASHMIRI and Lashkar Member A.
Between October 2008, and October 3, 2009, ILYAS KASHMIRI, ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED, and DAVID COLEMAN HEADLEY, conspired with each other, and others known and unknown to the grand jury, to commit acts outside the United States that would constitute the offenses of murder and maiming if committed in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, namely, murder and maiming in connection with an attack to be carried out against the facilities of Jyllands-Posten, located in Denmark, and at least two of its employees.
In October 2008, Lashkar Member A and HEADLEY met in Pakistan and discussed the prospect of an attack on the Jyllands-Posten newspaper, which would be preceded by extensive surveillance work to be performed by HEADLEY. HEADLEY recorded and saved notes reflecting the attack plan he discussed with Lashkar Member A.
In October 2008, Lashkar Member A provided defendant HEADLEY with a thumb drive containing information about Denmark, the city of Copenhagen and the Jyllands-Posten newspaper.
In late December 2008 and early January 2009, after reviewing with Tahawwur Hussain Rana how HEADLEY had performed the surveillance of the targets attacked in Mumbai in November 2008, HEADLEY advised Rana of the planned attack on the Jyllands-Posten and his intended travel to Denmark for the purpose of performing surveillance of the Jyllands-Posten facilities. HEADLEY obtained Rana’s approval and assistance to identify HEADLEY as a representative of First World, to falsely represent that First World was planning to open an office in Copenhagen, and to gain entry to the Jyllands-Posten's offices by falsely expressing interest in placing an advertisement for First World in the newspaper. Before leaving Chicago, HEADLEY and Rana caused to be made business cards that identified HEADLEY as a representative of the Immigrant Law Center.
In late December 2008 and early January 2009, HEADLEY, while in Chicago, sent emails to, and received emails from ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED in order to continue planning for the attack and coordinate HEADLEY’s travel to Denmark to conduct surveillance.
In January 2009, HEADLEY traveled from Chicago to Copenhagen to conduct surveillance of the Jyllands Posten newspaper offices in the cities of Copenhagen and Aarhus in Denmark.
On January 20, 2009, HEADLEY obtained entry to the Jyllands Posten newspaper office in Copenhagen on the pretext that he was seeking to place an ad on behalf of First World in the newspaper. HEADLEY also scouted and videotaped the surrounding areas.
On January 23, 2009, HEADLEY obtained entry to the Jyllands Posten newspaper office in Aarhus, on the pretext that he was seeking to place an ad on behalf of First World in the newspaper. HEADLEY also scouted the surrounding areas.
On January 29, 2009, Tahawwur Hussain Rana, posing as HEADLEY, sent an email to the Jyllands Posten newspaper pretending to be interested in placing an advertisement in the newspaper on behalf of First World.
In late January 2009, HEADLEY traveled to Pakistan and met separately with Lashkar Member A and defendant ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED concerning the planned attack on the newspaper and provided each with videotapes of his Copenhagen surveillances. Subsequently, in March 2009, Lashkar Member A advised HEADLEY that Lashkar put the attack on the newspaper on hold due to pressure on Lashkar resulting from the November 2008 Mumbai attacks.
In January 2009, ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED provided the Al Qaeda video to HEADLEY in Pakistan.
In February 2009, ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED took HEADLEY to meet ILYAS KASHMIRI in the Waziristan region of Pakistan. During the meeting, KASHMIRI indicated that he had already reviewed the Copenhagen videotapes made by HEADLEY and suggested that they consider using a truck bomb in the operation. KASHMIRI also indicated that he could provide manpower for the operation and that the participation of LET was not necessary.
In or about May 2009, ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED and HEADLEY went again to meet KASHMIRI in Waziristan. During this meeting, KASHMIRI advised that he had met with a European contact who could provide HEADLEY with money, weapons and manpower for the attack on the newspaper. KASHMIRI directed HEADLEY to meet with KASHMIRI’s European contacts.
In July 2009, ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED was arrested by Pakistani authorities. HEADLEY contacted associates in Pakistan in an effort to learn whether he would be able to continue working with ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED.
In July 2009, HEADLEY, from Chicago, sent a messenger to meet with KASHMIRI in Waziristan to advise KASHMIRI of the arrest of ABDUR REHMAN SAYED and his unsuccessful efforts to contact KASHMIRI’s European contacts. KASHMIRI sent back word that the planned operation in Denmark should continue and that HEADLEY should continue to attempt to contact KASHMIRI’s European contacts at the telephone numbers already provided.
In late July and early August 2009, HEADLEY traveled from Chicago to various places in Europe, including Copenhagen to conduct additional surveillance of the Jyllands-Posten newspaper office and the surrounding area. HEADLEY made approximately 13 additional surveillance videos. During the trip, HEADLEY also attempted to obtain assistance from Kashmiri’s European contacts.
In July 2009, HEADLEY provided the al Qaeda video to Rana in Chicago.
On August 5, 2009, HEADLEY returned to the United States, falsely advising a Customs and Border Patrol inspector at the airport in Atlanta that he had visited Europe for business reasons related to First World.
On August 22, 2009, HEADLEY, from Chicago spoke with ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED (who had been released fromcustody) in Pakistan concerning, among other things, the efforts by ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED to contact KASHMIRI, and the plans for the operation in Denmark.
In September 2009, HEADLEY sought to pass a message through ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED to KASHMIRI concerning suggestions from HEADLEY about changes to the plan for the attack on the Jyllands-Posten in Copenhagen.
In September 2009, ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED, from Pakistan, communicated with HEADLEY, in Chicago by telephone and email concerning reports that KASHMIRI had been killed in a drone attack and the implications of KASHMIRI’s possible death for the plan for the attack on the Jyllands-Posten in Copenhagen.
In September 2009, HEADLEY and Rana spoke concerning reports that KASHMIRI had been killed in a drone attack and the implications of KASHMIRI’s possible death for the plan for the attack on the Jyllands-Posten in Copenhagen.
In late September 2009, ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED, from Pakistan, communicated with HEADLEY in Chicago by telephone and email to report that KASHMIRI had not been killed and that KASHMIRI was anxious to move forward with the plan for the attack on the Jyllands-Posten in Copenhagen.
In the late summer of 2009, Rana and HEADLEY agreed that funds that had been provided to Rana could be used to fund the plot to attack the Jyllands-Posten newspaper in Copenhagen.
On October 3, 2009, HEADLEY traveled to O’Hare Airport in Chicago, Illinois, intending to ultimately travel to Pakistan in order to meet with ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED and KASHMIRI, and to deliver to them approximately 13 surveillance videos. He was arrested before he could leave.
Wednesday, January 13, 2010
INDIA-PAKISTAN: NEED FOR A SUB-COMPOSITE DIALOGUE
B.RAMAN
The pending issues standing in the way of a thaw in Indo-Pakistan relations could be divided into the following groups:
GROUP 1---INTERNAL SECURITY RELATED: Pakistan's continued use of terrorism against India, inaction against the anti-India terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory and lack of mutual legal assistance in the investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related cases. High priority for India and low priority for Pakistan.
GROUP 2---TERRITORY RELATED: The Kashmir issue, the Siachen Glacier and the Sir Creek. High priority for Pakistan and low priority for India.
GROUP 3--- ECONOMIC TIES RELATED:Normalisation of bilateral trade and transit rights for Indian trade with Afghanistan. Medium priority for India and low priority for Pakistan.
GROUP 4---- OFFICIAL EXCHANGES RELATED: Exchanges of visits of political leaders, senior bureaucrats and military officers to remove the trust deficit and increase the mutual comfort level. Low priority for both countries
GROUP 5--- OTHER ISSUES: Facilities to the media for better coverage, easier travel, exchanges of visits between relatives, easier access to visa, greater exchange of pilgrim groups, facilities for tourism. Low priority for both.
2. The inflexible line taken by the two countries as indicated below in the past made any progress difficult:
INDIA: No progress on other issues possible until and unless its internal security related concerns are addressed by Pakistan.
PAKISTAN: No progress on other issues possible unless and until its territory-related interests are addressed.
3.To get around this log-jam, the idea of a composite dialogue was devised. That is, discussing all the issues simultaneously through different groups of officials. The composite dialogue was unable to break this log-jam because instead of taking up first issues amenable to an easy solution and proceeding gradually from the easier-to-solve to the more difficult, it made a messy mix of both. As a result, even easier issues, which could have been solved a long time ago such as those relating to econimic ties remained unresolved.
4.There are certain defining characteristics of Indo-Pakistan relations since 1947, namely,
No.1: A greater trust deficit between the two States than between the two civil societies.
No.2: The two political leaderships and civil and military bureaucracies living and working in isolation from each other without an exercise involving periodic exchanges of visits and views.
No.3: Past memories. 1971 in the case of Pakistan and terrorism in the case of India.
No.4: A tendency of the opponents of the ruling dispensation in the two countries to politically exploit any seeming concession to the other side in order to embarrass and discredit the ruling dispensation.
No.5: The role of the Pakistan Army and its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) as a deciding factor in determining the future direction of the bilateral ties. No Pakistani political leader, however strong and popular, can overrule the Army and the ISI in matters relating to India.
5. Aware of the sensitivities and difficulties, the leaders of the two countries have tried over the years two formats to ease, if not break, the log jam:
THE FORMAL DIALOGUE: The composite dialogue, which is in a state of suspension since the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, is an example.
BACK CHANNEL CONTACTS: These were between trusted representatives---governmental or non-governmental--- of the leaders of the two countries. Such back channel contacts at the governmental and non-governmental levels existed under Rajiv Gandhi, Chandrasekhar. Atal Behari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh. There were no back channel contacts under V.P.Singh, Narasimha Rao, Deve Gowda and Inder Gujral. Back channel contacts differ from the so-called track II diplomacy. Track II diplomacy is diplomacy through non-governmental initiatives through non-governmental intermediaries. Back channel diplomacy is diplomacy through governmental initiatives through governmental or non-governmental intermediaries. Back channel diplomacy also differs from the formal dialogue in many respects. A formal dialogue has a rigid structure---- a formal pre-agreed agenda, jointly agreed minutes and the relative irreversibility of positions agreed upon if there is a backlash back home. It is held in the full glare of publicity. Back channel diplomacy has no formal structure--- no formal agenda, no joinly-agreed minutes and the easier reversibility of agreed positions in case of a controversy back home. Back channel diplomacy provides a greater wriggle room unlike a formal dialogue.
6.Back channel diplomacy poses a major problem to which no satisfactory solution has been found. That arises from the question: How and when to formalise the progress achieved through informal contacts. Often, political leaderships and bureaucracies have failed in giving a formal shape to the progress made through informal back channel diplomacy. The demilitarisation of Siachen is a good example. Governments keep the opposition informed about a formal dialogue, but in the dark about back channel diplomacy. This adds to the difficulties in formalising the progress made through back channels.
7. One could see once again attempts to break the ice between India and Pakistan. The New Year telephonic conversations between the Foreign Ministers of the two countries about which the media has reported on January 14,2010, is indicative of the beginning of a groping forward once again. The fact that many of the details as given in the media seem to have come from the Government would indicate an attempt by the Government to test the waters of public opinion before making any concrete move towards the resumption of a dialogue.
8. Rigidity is always bad diplomacy. Good diplomacy is a mix of firm adherence to national interests and flexibility in having an open mind to alternative approaches. Has the time come for an alternative approach? If so, what could be that one? The present atmosphere is not conducive to a resumption of the composite dialgue in its past format. Pakistan has not acted against the anti-India terrorist infrastructure. It shows no signs of giving up the use of terrorism against India. It has been dragging its feet in prosecuting its nationals involved in the 26/11 terrorist strikes.
9. While adhering to our reasonable stand that there can be no composite dialogue till Pakistan at least shows an inclination to address our internal security related concerns, the time has come to explore the possibility of initiating a sub-composite dialogue by focussing on other issues. Start with the less difficult first and move to the more difficult later. (14-1-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Inbstitute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The pending issues standing in the way of a thaw in Indo-Pakistan relations could be divided into the following groups:
GROUP 1---INTERNAL SECURITY RELATED: Pakistan's continued use of terrorism against India, inaction against the anti-India terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory and lack of mutual legal assistance in the investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related cases. High priority for India and low priority for Pakistan.
GROUP 2---TERRITORY RELATED: The Kashmir issue, the Siachen Glacier and the Sir Creek. High priority for Pakistan and low priority for India.
GROUP 3--- ECONOMIC TIES RELATED:Normalisation of bilateral trade and transit rights for Indian trade with Afghanistan. Medium priority for India and low priority for Pakistan.
GROUP 4---- OFFICIAL EXCHANGES RELATED: Exchanges of visits of political leaders, senior bureaucrats and military officers to remove the trust deficit and increase the mutual comfort level. Low priority for both countries
GROUP 5--- OTHER ISSUES: Facilities to the media for better coverage, easier travel, exchanges of visits between relatives, easier access to visa, greater exchange of pilgrim groups, facilities for tourism. Low priority for both.
2. The inflexible line taken by the two countries as indicated below in the past made any progress difficult:
INDIA: No progress on other issues possible until and unless its internal security related concerns are addressed by Pakistan.
PAKISTAN: No progress on other issues possible unless and until its territory-related interests are addressed.
3.To get around this log-jam, the idea of a composite dialogue was devised. That is, discussing all the issues simultaneously through different groups of officials. The composite dialogue was unable to break this log-jam because instead of taking up first issues amenable to an easy solution and proceeding gradually from the easier-to-solve to the more difficult, it made a messy mix of both. As a result, even easier issues, which could have been solved a long time ago such as those relating to econimic ties remained unresolved.
4.There are certain defining characteristics of Indo-Pakistan relations since 1947, namely,
No.1: A greater trust deficit between the two States than between the two civil societies.
No.2: The two political leaderships and civil and military bureaucracies living and working in isolation from each other without an exercise involving periodic exchanges of visits and views.
No.3: Past memories. 1971 in the case of Pakistan and terrorism in the case of India.
No.4: A tendency of the opponents of the ruling dispensation in the two countries to politically exploit any seeming concession to the other side in order to embarrass and discredit the ruling dispensation.
No.5: The role of the Pakistan Army and its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) as a deciding factor in determining the future direction of the bilateral ties. No Pakistani political leader, however strong and popular, can overrule the Army and the ISI in matters relating to India.
5. Aware of the sensitivities and difficulties, the leaders of the two countries have tried over the years two formats to ease, if not break, the log jam:
THE FORMAL DIALOGUE: The composite dialogue, which is in a state of suspension since the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, is an example.
BACK CHANNEL CONTACTS: These were between trusted representatives---governmental or non-governmental--- of the leaders of the two countries. Such back channel contacts at the governmental and non-governmental levels existed under Rajiv Gandhi, Chandrasekhar. Atal Behari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh. There were no back channel contacts under V.P.Singh, Narasimha Rao, Deve Gowda and Inder Gujral. Back channel contacts differ from the so-called track II diplomacy. Track II diplomacy is diplomacy through non-governmental initiatives through non-governmental intermediaries. Back channel diplomacy is diplomacy through governmental initiatives through governmental or non-governmental intermediaries. Back channel diplomacy also differs from the formal dialogue in many respects. A formal dialogue has a rigid structure---- a formal pre-agreed agenda, jointly agreed minutes and the relative irreversibility of positions agreed upon if there is a backlash back home. It is held in the full glare of publicity. Back channel diplomacy has no formal structure--- no formal agenda, no joinly-agreed minutes and the easier reversibility of agreed positions in case of a controversy back home. Back channel diplomacy provides a greater wriggle room unlike a formal dialogue.
6.Back channel diplomacy poses a major problem to which no satisfactory solution has been found. That arises from the question: How and when to formalise the progress achieved through informal contacts. Often, political leaderships and bureaucracies have failed in giving a formal shape to the progress made through informal back channel diplomacy. The demilitarisation of Siachen is a good example. Governments keep the opposition informed about a formal dialogue, but in the dark about back channel diplomacy. This adds to the difficulties in formalising the progress made through back channels.
7. One could see once again attempts to break the ice between India and Pakistan. The New Year telephonic conversations between the Foreign Ministers of the two countries about which the media has reported on January 14,2010, is indicative of the beginning of a groping forward once again. The fact that many of the details as given in the media seem to have come from the Government would indicate an attempt by the Government to test the waters of public opinion before making any concrete move towards the resumption of a dialogue.
8. Rigidity is always bad diplomacy. Good diplomacy is a mix of firm adherence to national interests and flexibility in having an open mind to alternative approaches. Has the time come for an alternative approach? If so, what could be that one? The present atmosphere is not conducive to a resumption of the composite dialgue in its past format. Pakistan has not acted against the anti-India terrorist infrastructure. It shows no signs of giving up the use of terrorism against India. It has been dragging its feet in prosecuting its nationals involved in the 26/11 terrorist strikes.
9. While adhering to our reasonable stand that there can be no composite dialogue till Pakistan at least shows an inclination to address our internal security related concerns, the time has come to explore the possibility of initiating a sub-composite dialogue by focussing on other issues. Start with the less difficult first and move to the more difficult later. (14-1-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Inbstitute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
TARGETED ATTACKS ON IRANIAN SCIENTISTS CONTINUE
B. Raman
The targeted attacks on qualified Iranian scientists by unidentified elements continue under a suspected covert action programme of Mossad, the Israeli external intelligence agency, to disrupt Iran's military nuclear programme.
2. The first incident came to notice on February 4,2007, when the Sunday Times of London reported as follows: "A prize-winning Iranian nuclear scientist has died in mysterious circumstances, according to Radio Farda, which is funded by the US State Department and broadcasts to Iran. An intelligence source suggested that Ardeshire Hassanpour, 44, a nuclear physicist, had been assassinated by Mossad, the Israeli security service. Hassanpour worked at a plant in Isfahan where uranium hexafluoride gas is produced. The gas is needed to enrich uranium in another plant at Natanz which has become the focus of concerns that Iran may be developing nuclear weapons. According to Radio Farda, Iranian reports of Hassanpour's death emerged on January 21 after a delay of six days, giving the cause as gas poisoning. The Iranian reports did not say how or where Hassanpour was poisoned, but his death was said to have been announced at a conference on nuclear safety."
3. This was followed by an incident of mysterious disappearance of an Iranian scientist who had gone on pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia last month. He reportedly did not return to Iran. The Iranian authorities alleged that the US was behind his disappearance. The Saudi authorities denied that any such incident had taken place in their territory. The US did not comment on the Iranian allegation.
4. In a third incident targeting Iranian scientists, Massoud Ali Mohammadi, a particle physics professor at the Tehran University, is reported to have been killed on January,12,2010, by the remote-controlled explosion of an improvised explosive device attached to an unattended motor-cycle as he was getting into his car outside his house in a posh suburb of Tehran. The Iranian authorities have blamed "mercenaries" in the pay of the Israeli and US intelligence agencies for his death.
5.Ramin Mehmanparast, a spokesman of the Iranian Foreign Office, has been quoted as saying: "One can see in preliminary investigations signs of evil by the triangle of the Zionist regime, America and their mercenaries in Iran in this terrorist incident." Abbas Jafari Dolatabadi, Tehran's chief prosecutor, told the news service of the State-controlled radio: "Given the fact that Massoud Ali Mohammadi was a nuclear scientist, the CIA and Mossad services and agents most likely have had a hand in it.On the one hand, US government spy agents kidnap Iranians in third countries and transfer them to America and on the other hand their sellout agents in Iran assassinate a scholarly citizen.
Intelligence and security bodies will try to identify and arrest the perpetrators of this crime and expose their foreign backers." A spokesman of the US State Department has denied the allegations as absurd.
6. Quoting a statement of Basij, the student militia of the University, the official IRNA news agency has alleged that Mohammadi's name figured in a list prepared by Western Governments of Iranian scientists connected with the nuclear programme for whom visas should be refused as part of the sanctions against Iran for refusing to give up its nuclear enrichment programme. The news agency said: ""Dr Massoud Ali Mohammadi, whose name was on the list of sanctioned individuals ... was one of the outstanding professors of Tehran University's physics faculty." Other reports have claimed that Mohammadi's name had appeared on a list of academics backing Iranian opposition leader Mir Hossein Mousavi for the disputed June 12, 2009, presidential election, which gave President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a second term. Allegations of irregularities in the elections have led to widespread and continuing unreest by the opponents of Ahmadinejad.
7. in my article of February 5,2007, ( http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/common/uploaded_files/paper2121.html ) ,I had drawn attention to the Psywar campaign against Iran initiated by the Bush Administration and the Israeli agencies. This Psywar campaign apparently continues under the Obama Administration too with discreet support to the opposition elements after the disputed elections through Radio and TV stations of the Iranian exiles in the West and through the Internet. However, this continuing Psywar campaign shows no signs of making Iran change its policies and be more responsive to Western demands.
8. For the first time in many months, Gen. David Petraeus, the chief of the US Central Command, made detailed comments on the possibility of military options against Iran in a CNN interview with Christiane Amanpour on January 11,2010. Relevant extracts from the interview are annexed. His comments seem to be part of the stepped up Psywar.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMENTS OF GEN. DAVID PETRAEUS
AMANPOUR: Again, the noise is growing about a potential strike, a potential military strike by Israel on Iran's nuclear capabilities. Do you think it's possible to do it?
PETRAEUS: Well, I won't talk about the military capabilities of -- of one of our close allies, in this case, Israel. Certainly, there has been a good bit published about what Israel could and perhaps could not do. And I think, also, there has been quite a bit written about the implications of this and the second- and third- and fourth-order effects of it.
AMANPOUR: In terms of an actual physical capability, could Iran's nuclear facilities be bombed, in terms of effectively, because there are a lot of tunnels people are talking about?
PETRAEUS: They certainly can be bombed. The -- the level of effect would vary with who it is that carries it out, what ordnance they have, and what capability they can bring to bear.
AMANPOUR: What is the difference now, in terms of Iran's physical infrastructure, compared to, for instance, what Israel did back in 1980 or '81 against the Osirak reactor in Iraq or, indeed, against the Syrian reactor a couple of years ago?
PETRAEUS: Well, I think it's well known that Iran has gone to considerable lengths to harden, to put underground, to use tunnels and so forth, to -- to reduce the vulnerability of its various nuclear facilities.
AMANPOUR: What are the drawbacks to military action there?
PETRAEUS: Well, in a sense, the -- the consequences of this, really - - you know, they're just very, very difficult to calculate. We have done quite a bit of thinking about this, as you would expect. That's what we get paid to do. It would be almost literally irresponsible if CENTCOM were not to have been thinking about the various "what ifs" and to make plans for a whole variety of different contingencies. And we generally try not to be irresponsible.
As you think through this, of course, the disruptions to the global economy, the challenges to infrastructure in that particular very, very important region, again, important to the whole world, not just to those countries themselves, threats against various U.S. forces -- of course, we've got some 230,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines deployed in the Central Command area of responsibility and so forth.
But, again, we have done quite a bit of thinking about this. We have done quite a bit of contingency planning. And, again, that's what we get paid to do, and -- and that's what we've sought to do.
AMANPOUR: Is there sort of a deadline on whether you implement that planning?
PETRAEUS: We don't -- we don't see a deadline. There's a variety of different timelines out there that folks have -- have discussed. We think there's a period of time, certainly, before all this might come to a head, if you will. There's certainly more room for the P5-plus-one to engage, perhaps, in a bit -- bit more diplomacy and then certainly to explore heightened economic sanctions and -- and so forth."
The targeted attacks on qualified Iranian scientists by unidentified elements continue under a suspected covert action programme of Mossad, the Israeli external intelligence agency, to disrupt Iran's military nuclear programme.
2. The first incident came to notice on February 4,2007, when the Sunday Times of London reported as follows: "A prize-winning Iranian nuclear scientist has died in mysterious circumstances, according to Radio Farda, which is funded by the US State Department and broadcasts to Iran. An intelligence source suggested that Ardeshire Hassanpour, 44, a nuclear physicist, had been assassinated by Mossad, the Israeli security service. Hassanpour worked at a plant in Isfahan where uranium hexafluoride gas is produced. The gas is needed to enrich uranium in another plant at Natanz which has become the focus of concerns that Iran may be developing nuclear weapons. According to Radio Farda, Iranian reports of Hassanpour's death emerged on January 21 after a delay of six days, giving the cause as gas poisoning. The Iranian reports did not say how or where Hassanpour was poisoned, but his death was said to have been announced at a conference on nuclear safety."
3. This was followed by an incident of mysterious disappearance of an Iranian scientist who had gone on pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia last month. He reportedly did not return to Iran. The Iranian authorities alleged that the US was behind his disappearance. The Saudi authorities denied that any such incident had taken place in their territory. The US did not comment on the Iranian allegation.
4. In a third incident targeting Iranian scientists, Massoud Ali Mohammadi, a particle physics professor at the Tehran University, is reported to have been killed on January,12,2010, by the remote-controlled explosion of an improvised explosive device attached to an unattended motor-cycle as he was getting into his car outside his house in a posh suburb of Tehran. The Iranian authorities have blamed "mercenaries" in the pay of the Israeli and US intelligence agencies for his death.
5.Ramin Mehmanparast, a spokesman of the Iranian Foreign Office, has been quoted as saying: "One can see in preliminary investigations signs of evil by the triangle of the Zionist regime, America and their mercenaries in Iran in this terrorist incident." Abbas Jafari Dolatabadi, Tehran's chief prosecutor, told the news service of the State-controlled radio: "Given the fact that Massoud Ali Mohammadi was a nuclear scientist, the CIA and Mossad services and agents most likely have had a hand in it.On the one hand, US government spy agents kidnap Iranians in third countries and transfer them to America and on the other hand their sellout agents in Iran assassinate a scholarly citizen.
Intelligence and security bodies will try to identify and arrest the perpetrators of this crime and expose their foreign backers." A spokesman of the US State Department has denied the allegations as absurd.
6. Quoting a statement of Basij, the student militia of the University, the official IRNA news agency has alleged that Mohammadi's name figured in a list prepared by Western Governments of Iranian scientists connected with the nuclear programme for whom visas should be refused as part of the sanctions against Iran for refusing to give up its nuclear enrichment programme. The news agency said: ""Dr Massoud Ali Mohammadi, whose name was on the list of sanctioned individuals ... was one of the outstanding professors of Tehran University's physics faculty." Other reports have claimed that Mohammadi's name had appeared on a list of academics backing Iranian opposition leader Mir Hossein Mousavi for the disputed June 12, 2009, presidential election, which gave President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a second term. Allegations of irregularities in the elections have led to widespread and continuing unreest by the opponents of Ahmadinejad.
7. in my article of February 5,2007, ( http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/common/uploaded_files/paper2121.html ) ,I had drawn attention to the Psywar campaign against Iran initiated by the Bush Administration and the Israeli agencies. This Psywar campaign apparently continues under the Obama Administration too with discreet support to the opposition elements after the disputed elections through Radio and TV stations of the Iranian exiles in the West and through the Internet. However, this continuing Psywar campaign shows no signs of making Iran change its policies and be more responsive to Western demands.
8. For the first time in many months, Gen. David Petraeus, the chief of the US Central Command, made detailed comments on the possibility of military options against Iran in a CNN interview with Christiane Amanpour on January 11,2010. Relevant extracts from the interview are annexed. His comments seem to be part of the stepped up Psywar.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMENTS OF GEN. DAVID PETRAEUS
AMANPOUR: Again, the noise is growing about a potential strike, a potential military strike by Israel on Iran's nuclear capabilities. Do you think it's possible to do it?
PETRAEUS: Well, I won't talk about the military capabilities of -- of one of our close allies, in this case, Israel. Certainly, there has been a good bit published about what Israel could and perhaps could not do. And I think, also, there has been quite a bit written about the implications of this and the second- and third- and fourth-order effects of it.
AMANPOUR: In terms of an actual physical capability, could Iran's nuclear facilities be bombed, in terms of effectively, because there are a lot of tunnels people are talking about?
PETRAEUS: They certainly can be bombed. The -- the level of effect would vary with who it is that carries it out, what ordnance they have, and what capability they can bring to bear.
AMANPOUR: What is the difference now, in terms of Iran's physical infrastructure, compared to, for instance, what Israel did back in 1980 or '81 against the Osirak reactor in Iraq or, indeed, against the Syrian reactor a couple of years ago?
PETRAEUS: Well, I think it's well known that Iran has gone to considerable lengths to harden, to put underground, to use tunnels and so forth, to -- to reduce the vulnerability of its various nuclear facilities.
AMANPOUR: What are the drawbacks to military action there?
PETRAEUS: Well, in a sense, the -- the consequences of this, really - - you know, they're just very, very difficult to calculate. We have done quite a bit of thinking about this, as you would expect. That's what we get paid to do. It would be almost literally irresponsible if CENTCOM were not to have been thinking about the various "what ifs" and to make plans for a whole variety of different contingencies. And we generally try not to be irresponsible.
As you think through this, of course, the disruptions to the global economy, the challenges to infrastructure in that particular very, very important region, again, important to the whole world, not just to those countries themselves, threats against various U.S. forces -- of course, we've got some 230,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines deployed in the Central Command area of responsibility and so forth.
But, again, we have done quite a bit of thinking about this. We have done quite a bit of contingency planning. And, again, that's what we get paid to do, and -- and that's what we've sought to do.
AMANPOUR: Is there sort of a deadline on whether you implement that planning?
PETRAEUS: We don't -- we don't see a deadline. There's a variety of different timelines out there that folks have -- have discussed. We think there's a period of time, certainly, before all this might come to a head, if you will. There's certainly more room for the P5-plus-one to engage, perhaps, in a bit -- bit more diplomacy and then certainly to explore heightened economic sanctions and -- and so forth."
Tuesday, January 12, 2010
SEALANE SECURITY: INDIA,CHINA & JAPAN SHOULD GET TOGETHER
B.RAMAN
China’s concerns over developments in the Gulf of Aden area, which could affect the movement of oil to China from West Asia and Africa, are increasingly evident. These concerns have been triggered off by three developments.
2.The first was the seajacking of a Chinese ship transporting coal to China by a group of Somali pirates in October,2009, off Seychelles. The pirates managed to take the ship to the waters off Somalia and made demands for ransom. After concluding that their anti-piracy naval patrol in the area would not be in a position to intervene to have the ship and its 25-member Chinese crew rescued from the pirates, the company owning the ship made a deal with the pirates, allegedly paid the ransom and got the ship and its crew back on December 28,2009.
3.The second was the escalation in the activities of pro-Al Qaeda elements in Somalia. The Chinese recognize that the US is the only country in a position to deal with Al Qaeda in Somalia and media comments in China expressed their disappointment and concern that the US, in its preoccupation with countering the activities of Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the Af-Pak region, was not paying adequate attention to the increasing activities of Al Qaeda in Somalia.
4.In the Chinese perception, Al Qaeda activities in Somalia, if not controlled, could ultimately affect sealane security and jeopardize the movement of oil supplies to China. The sustained activities of the Somali pirates despite the deployment of anti-piracy patrols by the navies of many countries including those of the NATO, India, China and Japan show that while these patrols might have been tactically successful in dealing with certain individual incidents, they have not been strategically effective in dealing with the problem of piracy in an Al Qaeda infested region.
5.The third is the emergence of Al Qaeda in Yemen as a second major source of threat to peace and security after Al Qaeda of Osama bin Laden based in North Waziristan in Pakistan. While there is a broad convergence of views among counter-terrorism analysts and experts of different countries on the need for a more comprehensive strategy to deal with the escalation in the activities of Al Qaeda, the trigger for action is not the same. In the case of the US, the trigger is Washington’s concerns over threats to the security of the US Homeland from the mushrooming Al Qaedas. In the case of Beijing, the trigger is its concerns over possible future threats to sealane security from the Al Qaedas of the region, which would directly impact on the Chinese economy.
6.There is a tacit recognition among Chinese experts that the Chinese Navy by itself will not be in a position to deal with the looming threat to maritime security from a mix of escalating piracy and escalating activities of Al Qaeda. The inability of the Chinese anti-piracy patrols to go to the rescue of the seajacked ship brought out the capacity limitations of the Chinese Navy. This gave rise to a debate on the need for a Chinese naval base in the region to give a greater thrust to the anti-piracy patrols and give them a longer staying power.
7.The debate was triggered off by surprisingly outspoken comments by retired Admiral Yin Zhuo, who is now stated to be a senior researcher at the Navy’s Equipment Research Centre, in an interview on December 29, 2009, a day after the Chinese company allegedly paid the ransom to the Somali pirates and got its ship back. He was quoted as saying in his interview:: “Setting up a base would bolster China's long-term participation in the operations. We are not saying we need our navy everywhere in order to fulfill our international commitments. We are saying to fulfill our international commitments, we need to strengthen our supply capacity. China has sent four flotillas to the region since the end of last year, with the first escort fleet spending 124 days at sea without docking, a length of time that added to the challenges of the operation. Since then, Chinese vessels have docked at a French naval base for supplies. The United States, the European Union and Japan have supply bases in the region. If China establishes a similar long-term supply base, I believe that the nations in the region and the other countries involved with the (anti-pirate) escorts would understand."
8.The sensation caused by his remarks led to an attempt by Beijing to play down the significance of what he said and remove the impression that his advocacy of an overseas naval base had the support of the party and the Government. In comments quoted by the "China Daily" on January 1,2010,a Chinese Defence Ministry spokesman said: "China will stick to its current supply regime to support anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Some countries have set up overseas supply bases (but) the Chinese fleet is currently supplied at sea and through regular docking (in the Gulf of Aden region)."
9. Interestingly, side by side with the denial of the Defence Ministry, the "China Daily" carried the comments of some experts, which were not categorical in ruling out the option of an overseas naval base. Some of these comments are given below:
(a). Jin Canrong, an international relations expert at the Renmin University: Beijing has yet to seriously consider setting up a permanent overseas supply base. It's unnecessary to "play up the personal view of Yin, a retired admiral". However, the possibility of setting up such a base should not be ruled out. "China's national interests have extended beyond its border, so it's necessary to have strong ability to protect them."
(b).Li Jie, a senior colonel and researcher with the Chinese Navy's Military Academy: Beijing should consider setting up an overseas supply base "in the long run". "For many other countries, it's a common way of ensuring naval supplies." Such a base, "not a military one", would not only ease supply but also provide a venue for naval personnel to take a break. But an overseas base could only be set up "within the UN framework and concurrence of surrounding countries".
10. The possibility of linkages eventually developing between the mushrooming Al Qaedas and the Somali pirates----if such linkages do not already exist--- has also been reflected in recent comments of Chinese non-Governmental analysts.
11. The perception that the US focus in the "war" against Al Qaedas tends to be Homeland security related and that the protection of sealane security from the new generations of Al Qaedas and pirate gangs has not been receiving adequate attention has much validity. Possible future threats to sealane security from developments in the Somalia-Yemen region should be a matter of common concern to India, China and Japan, whose economies largely depend on energy supplies coming from or transiting this region.
12. Last year, I had proposed an India-China-Japan trialogue on maritime security issues. The need for such a trialogue has assumed greater importance and urgency in the light of the recent developments. India should take the initiative in the matter. (13-1-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
China’s concerns over developments in the Gulf of Aden area, which could affect the movement of oil to China from West Asia and Africa, are increasingly evident. These concerns have been triggered off by three developments.
2.The first was the seajacking of a Chinese ship transporting coal to China by a group of Somali pirates in October,2009, off Seychelles. The pirates managed to take the ship to the waters off Somalia and made demands for ransom. After concluding that their anti-piracy naval patrol in the area would not be in a position to intervene to have the ship and its 25-member Chinese crew rescued from the pirates, the company owning the ship made a deal with the pirates, allegedly paid the ransom and got the ship and its crew back on December 28,2009.
3.The second was the escalation in the activities of pro-Al Qaeda elements in Somalia. The Chinese recognize that the US is the only country in a position to deal with Al Qaeda in Somalia and media comments in China expressed their disappointment and concern that the US, in its preoccupation with countering the activities of Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the Af-Pak region, was not paying adequate attention to the increasing activities of Al Qaeda in Somalia.
4.In the Chinese perception, Al Qaeda activities in Somalia, if not controlled, could ultimately affect sealane security and jeopardize the movement of oil supplies to China. The sustained activities of the Somali pirates despite the deployment of anti-piracy patrols by the navies of many countries including those of the NATO, India, China and Japan show that while these patrols might have been tactically successful in dealing with certain individual incidents, they have not been strategically effective in dealing with the problem of piracy in an Al Qaeda infested region.
5.The third is the emergence of Al Qaeda in Yemen as a second major source of threat to peace and security after Al Qaeda of Osama bin Laden based in North Waziristan in Pakistan. While there is a broad convergence of views among counter-terrorism analysts and experts of different countries on the need for a more comprehensive strategy to deal with the escalation in the activities of Al Qaeda, the trigger for action is not the same. In the case of the US, the trigger is Washington’s concerns over threats to the security of the US Homeland from the mushrooming Al Qaedas. In the case of Beijing, the trigger is its concerns over possible future threats to sealane security from the Al Qaedas of the region, which would directly impact on the Chinese economy.
6.There is a tacit recognition among Chinese experts that the Chinese Navy by itself will not be in a position to deal with the looming threat to maritime security from a mix of escalating piracy and escalating activities of Al Qaeda. The inability of the Chinese anti-piracy patrols to go to the rescue of the seajacked ship brought out the capacity limitations of the Chinese Navy. This gave rise to a debate on the need for a Chinese naval base in the region to give a greater thrust to the anti-piracy patrols and give them a longer staying power.
7.The debate was triggered off by surprisingly outspoken comments by retired Admiral Yin Zhuo, who is now stated to be a senior researcher at the Navy’s Equipment Research Centre, in an interview on December 29, 2009, a day after the Chinese company allegedly paid the ransom to the Somali pirates and got its ship back. He was quoted as saying in his interview:: “Setting up a base would bolster China's long-term participation in the operations. We are not saying we need our navy everywhere in order to fulfill our international commitments. We are saying to fulfill our international commitments, we need to strengthen our supply capacity. China has sent four flotillas to the region since the end of last year, with the first escort fleet spending 124 days at sea without docking, a length of time that added to the challenges of the operation. Since then, Chinese vessels have docked at a French naval base for supplies. The United States, the European Union and Japan have supply bases in the region. If China establishes a similar long-term supply base, I believe that the nations in the region and the other countries involved with the (anti-pirate) escorts would understand."
8.The sensation caused by his remarks led to an attempt by Beijing to play down the significance of what he said and remove the impression that his advocacy of an overseas naval base had the support of the party and the Government. In comments quoted by the "China Daily" on January 1,2010,a Chinese Defence Ministry spokesman said: "China will stick to its current supply regime to support anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Some countries have set up overseas supply bases (but) the Chinese fleet is currently supplied at sea and through regular docking (in the Gulf of Aden region)."
9. Interestingly, side by side with the denial of the Defence Ministry, the "China Daily" carried the comments of some experts, which were not categorical in ruling out the option of an overseas naval base. Some of these comments are given below:
(a). Jin Canrong, an international relations expert at the Renmin University: Beijing has yet to seriously consider setting up a permanent overseas supply base. It's unnecessary to "play up the personal view of Yin, a retired admiral". However, the possibility of setting up such a base should not be ruled out. "China's national interests have extended beyond its border, so it's necessary to have strong ability to protect them."
(b).Li Jie, a senior colonel and researcher with the Chinese Navy's Military Academy: Beijing should consider setting up an overseas supply base "in the long run". "For many other countries, it's a common way of ensuring naval supplies." Such a base, "not a military one", would not only ease supply but also provide a venue for naval personnel to take a break. But an overseas base could only be set up "within the UN framework and concurrence of surrounding countries".
10. The possibility of linkages eventually developing between the mushrooming Al Qaedas and the Somali pirates----if such linkages do not already exist--- has also been reflected in recent comments of Chinese non-Governmental analysts.
11. The perception that the US focus in the "war" against Al Qaedas tends to be Homeland security related and that the protection of sealane security from the new generations of Al Qaedas and pirate gangs has not been receiving adequate attention has much validity. Possible future threats to sealane security from developments in the Somalia-Yemen region should be a matter of common concern to India, China and Japan, whose economies largely depend on energy supplies coming from or transiting this region.
12. Last year, I had proposed an India-China-Japan trialogue on maritime security issues. The need for such a trialogue has assumed greater importance and urgency in the light of the recent developments. India should take the initiative in the matter. (13-1-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, January 11, 2010
CIA: AFTER THE KHOST TRAGEDY
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.608
B.RAMAN
The US has kept up its Drone strikes in the two Waziristans of Pakistan. While this is a continuation of the policy initiated under George Bush in August,2008, the stepped-up strikes since the beginning of the New Year are meant to convey a message of renewed resolve to go after Al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists operating from Pakistani territory unshaken by the claimed success of the Pakistani Taliban in killing seven officers of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and one of the Jordanian intelligence in the Khost area of Afghanistan on December 30,2009, through a Jordanian agent of the Jordanian intelligence, who betrayed the two intelligence agencies. The stepped-up Drone strikes are meant to show that the tragedy suffered by the CIA has not affected its determination to go after the terrorists. Any wrong message that the CIA's morale has suffered would have been counter-productive.
2. The Drone strikes depend partly on human intelligence and partly on technical intelligence. Since August,2008, there was a considerable improvement in the flow of HUMINT as could be seen from the increasing successes of the strikes. The success of a Drone strike in killing Baitullah Mehsud, the then Amir of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), in August , 2009, was made possible by precise TECHINT pinpointing the house of Baitullah's father-in-law in South Waziristan and equally precise HUMINT indicating that Baitullah had come to his father-in-law's house for medical assistance.
3. While the flow of TECHINT will not be affected by the Khost tragedy, the flow of HUMINT can be in the short-term. This is because the CIA has lost some experienced field operatives with considerable knowledge of the area across the Af-Pak border. It is also because the CIA is likely to be more cautious in its operations in future and more careful in assessing the dependability of its sources. Extra or over caution tends to slow down HUMINT operations affecting the flow of HUMINT.
4. In the short-term till the CIA is able to find alternate ways of keeping up the HUMINT flow without exposing its field operatives to physical dangers due to excessive risk-taking as one saw at Khost, the TEHINT agencies will have to step up their coverage in order to make up for the difficulties that could be faced by the CIA in its HUMINT coverage.
5.The US will not be able to depend on Pakistan's intelligence agencies to fill the gap in HUMINT. While there is no evidence of any institutional collusion between Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the TTP, there is definite collusion between the ISI and the Afghan Taliban operating from the Quetta area of Balochistan and between the ISI and the Haqqani network operating in the Khost and adjoining areas of Afghanistan from North Waziristan. The question of the CIA depending on the ISI for HUMINT collection would not, therefore, arise.
6. The Afghan and Uzbeck intelligence agencies could be useful to the CIA in its efforts to fill the HUMINT gap. The fact that a joint operation with the Jordanian intelligence proved catastrophic should not inhibit the CIA from exploring the possibilities of joint operations with the intelligence agencies of Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. There would always be the risk of double agents betraying the CIA, but the risk has to be faced.
7. There is no intelligence without risk-taking. The tragedy struck the CIA on December 30,2009, not because it took risks, but because the risk was not combined with adequate caution. It has been reported in the US media that the CIA did subject the Jordanian suicide bomber to frisking, but he triggered the improvised explosive device in his suicide vest just as the frisking was about to start. This is what has been happening in Pakistan repeatedly----TTP suicide bombers set off the IED just as the frisking is about to start. This has resulted in the death of a number of policemen in Pakistan who died while trying to frisk TTP suspects.
8. Unfortunately, no new technology has been devised so far which could enable the neutralization of the triggering device of an IED carried by a person from a distance without subjecting him to physical frisking. This problem poses a serious dilemma without a solution. One idea that could be tried is frisking of suspects through robots before they are brought inside a camp for a more detailed search.
9. The CIA would now go after Hakimullah Mehsud, the Amir of the TTP, and Hussain Mehsud, its trainer of suicide bombers, with greater determination than before now that the video released by the TTP has established that the TTP had motivated and trained the Jordanian suicide bomber. Baitullah suffered from health problems. His movements were, therefore, confined to the South Waziristan area. It was comparatively easier to hunt him and run him down, but even then, it took two years. Hakimullah and Hussain move around in a much larger area in the Pakistani tribal belt. Running them down is going to be even more difficult. That should not deter the CIA from going after them. ( 11-1-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
The US has kept up its Drone strikes in the two Waziristans of Pakistan. While this is a continuation of the policy initiated under George Bush in August,2008, the stepped-up strikes since the beginning of the New Year are meant to convey a message of renewed resolve to go after Al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists operating from Pakistani territory unshaken by the claimed success of the Pakistani Taliban in killing seven officers of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and one of the Jordanian intelligence in the Khost area of Afghanistan on December 30,2009, through a Jordanian agent of the Jordanian intelligence, who betrayed the two intelligence agencies. The stepped-up Drone strikes are meant to show that the tragedy suffered by the CIA has not affected its determination to go after the terrorists. Any wrong message that the CIA's morale has suffered would have been counter-productive.
2. The Drone strikes depend partly on human intelligence and partly on technical intelligence. Since August,2008, there was a considerable improvement in the flow of HUMINT as could be seen from the increasing successes of the strikes. The success of a Drone strike in killing Baitullah Mehsud, the then Amir of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), in August , 2009, was made possible by precise TECHINT pinpointing the house of Baitullah's father-in-law in South Waziristan and equally precise HUMINT indicating that Baitullah had come to his father-in-law's house for medical assistance.
3. While the flow of TECHINT will not be affected by the Khost tragedy, the flow of HUMINT can be in the short-term. This is because the CIA has lost some experienced field operatives with considerable knowledge of the area across the Af-Pak border. It is also because the CIA is likely to be more cautious in its operations in future and more careful in assessing the dependability of its sources. Extra or over caution tends to slow down HUMINT operations affecting the flow of HUMINT.
4. In the short-term till the CIA is able to find alternate ways of keeping up the HUMINT flow without exposing its field operatives to physical dangers due to excessive risk-taking as one saw at Khost, the TEHINT agencies will have to step up their coverage in order to make up for the difficulties that could be faced by the CIA in its HUMINT coverage.
5.The US will not be able to depend on Pakistan's intelligence agencies to fill the gap in HUMINT. While there is no evidence of any institutional collusion between Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the TTP, there is definite collusion between the ISI and the Afghan Taliban operating from the Quetta area of Balochistan and between the ISI and the Haqqani network operating in the Khost and adjoining areas of Afghanistan from North Waziristan. The question of the CIA depending on the ISI for HUMINT collection would not, therefore, arise.
6. The Afghan and Uzbeck intelligence agencies could be useful to the CIA in its efforts to fill the HUMINT gap. The fact that a joint operation with the Jordanian intelligence proved catastrophic should not inhibit the CIA from exploring the possibilities of joint operations with the intelligence agencies of Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. There would always be the risk of double agents betraying the CIA, but the risk has to be faced.
7. There is no intelligence without risk-taking. The tragedy struck the CIA on December 30,2009, not because it took risks, but because the risk was not combined with adequate caution. It has been reported in the US media that the CIA did subject the Jordanian suicide bomber to frisking, but he triggered the improvised explosive device in his suicide vest just as the frisking was about to start. This is what has been happening in Pakistan repeatedly----TTP suicide bombers set off the IED just as the frisking is about to start. This has resulted in the death of a number of policemen in Pakistan who died while trying to frisk TTP suspects.
8. Unfortunately, no new technology has been devised so far which could enable the neutralization of the triggering device of an IED carried by a person from a distance without subjecting him to physical frisking. This problem poses a serious dilemma without a solution. One idea that could be tried is frisking of suspects through robots before they are brought inside a camp for a more detailed search.
9. The CIA would now go after Hakimullah Mehsud, the Amir of the TTP, and Hussain Mehsud, its trainer of suicide bombers, with greater determination than before now that the video released by the TTP has established that the TTP had motivated and trained the Jordanian suicide bomber. Baitullah suffered from health problems. His movements were, therefore, confined to the South Waziristan area. It was comparatively easier to hunt him and run him down, but even then, it took two years. Hakimullah and Hussain move around in a much larger area in the Pakistani tribal belt. Running them down is going to be even more difficult. That should not deter the CIA from going after them. ( 11-1-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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