B.RAMAN
On July 23,2009, at the request of the Editor of Rediff.com, I had written an article titled "Talking to the ISI". In that article, I had stated as follows: "I have been of the view that the R&AW and the ISI should maintain a secret liaison of which only the leaderships of the two countries should be aware. Such a liaison helps in many ways: Firstly, it provides the leadership with a clandestine channel of
communication. Secondly, intelligence chiefs of the two countries are able to know and assess each other in flesh and blood during personal meetings and not merely through media reports and uncorroborated source information. Thirdly, it helps them to pick each other's brains and understand each other's mindset. Intelligence professionals are not like diplomats. They speak to each other more freely and
frankly than diplomats do. And the fact that they enjoy the confidence of their leadership and have direct access to them for informal discussions gives them a certain self-confidence which non-intelligence senior bureaucrats do not have. There is no harm in our giving a try to the idea of an informal, clandestine one-to-one liaison relationship between the ISI and the R&AW. We should not have any illusions that it would result in a sharing of actionable intelligence. Intelligence agencies share actionable intelligence only when they have common State and non-State enemies. India and Pakistan do not have common enemies."
2. According to a despatch from Nirupama Subramanian, its correspondent in Islamabad, carried by "The Hindu" of September 11,2009, Lt.Gen.Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the Director-General of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), attended an Iftar (breaking the holy fast after sunset) party hosted by Sharat Sabharwal, the Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan, at an Islamabad hotel on September 10,2009. This is an important development and indicates winds of change blowing in the relations between India and Pakistan despite the perceived foot-dragging by Pakistan's Ministry of the Interior headed by Interior Minister Rehman Malik in extending the required co-operation to India in the investigation of the role of the conaspirators based in Pakistan in organising the terrorist attack by the Lashkar-e-Toiba in Mumbai in November,2008.
3. One could sense that the Indian dissatisfaction over the foot-dragging has not come in the way of exploring the possibility of a liaison relationship between the appropriate agencies of the intelligence communities of the two countries. Normally, the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) should be the agency from the Indian side handling such relationship, but one should not be surprised if the Intelligence
Bureau (IB) is asked to handly any liaison with the ISI in view of the fact that terrorism is at present the main issue between the two countries and the IB heads the Multi-Agency Centre against terrorism. Moreover, P.Chidambaram, the Home Minister, might prefer to have a say in the way the liaison is handled and might feel more comfortable if the IB, which works under him, handles it.
4. It is not clear whether the Indian High Commissioner's Iftar invitation to Lt.Gen.Pasha was addressed to him by name or whether the HC only invited Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), and the latter asked Lt.Gen.Pasha to represent him after obtaining the clearance of President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani. i am inclined to believe that Kayani must have
been invited and he must have asked Pasha to represent him because normally even between countries already having a liaison relationship, the intelligence chiefs are not invited to such functions in order to avoid public exposure. Even if invited, they politely decline the invitation.
5. Whether Lt.Gen.Pasha responded to an invitation personally addressed to him or whether he represented Gen.Kayani, who himself did not want to come, the presence of the ISI chief at the Iftar reception is a significant gesture by the Government of Zardari and has to be recognised as such.
6. Even if a formal liaison relationship between the ISI and an appropriate Indian agency has not yet been established, India should not hesitate to take the initiative in suggesting it. An intelligence liaison relationship between two countries with an adversarial relationship can be a double-edged sword. It can be beneficial sometimes. It can also harm the national interests under certain circumstances. It is a risk well worth taking. Informal discussions between the intelligence chiefs of the two countries could produce better results than
discussions between the two Foreign Secretaries on the issue of terrorism.
7. One should not have any illusion of any change in Pakistan's use of terrorism against India, but clandestine discussions between intelligence chiefs can help in promoting habits of co-operation at least in the investigation of terrorism cases even if they don't help in prevention.
8. Even though Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh has put in cold storage for the time being the implementation of the Sharm-el-Sheikh agreement with Pakistani Prime Minister Gilani for the resumption of the composite dialogue, my own reading is that it was a tactical move in view of the forthcoming elections to the Maharashtra Assembly. If the Congress (I)-led coalition retains power, I would not be surprised if the implementation of the Sharm-el-Sheikh agreement is revived in some other form. The Pakistani gesture in sending Lt.Gen.Pasha to the reception is an indication that the Zardari Government understands the electoral compulsions of Dr.Manmohan Singh and wants to maintain an ambiance of goodwill despite India's foot-dragging on the Sharm-el-Sheikh agreement. (11-9-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, September 11, 2009
Wednesday, September 9, 2009
CHINESE MILITARY "GREATLY DISPLEASED" BY INDIAN MEDIA CAMPAIGN AGAINST CHINA
B.RAMAN
In a report under the heading "China Refutes Trespass Claims" carried on September 10,2009 , the "Global Times", the English-language daily published by the Communist Party-owned "People's Daily" group, has quoted a spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of National Defence as saying that Chinese border patrols strictly abide by the relevant agreements on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) along the
India-China border and have never carried out "provocative actions" towards India.
According to the paper, he said on September 9: "The recent reports by Indian media of intrusions are groundless and irresponsible." The previous day, Jiang Yu, a spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, had described the India reports of a Chinese troop intrusion into Indian territory near Mount Gya in the Ladakh region as "groundless and incorrect."
2. The "Global Times" has quoted a source "close to the Chinese military" as saying as follows: " "Indian media always quotes government officials as their sources, but the Chinese military has not received any protests from the Indian Ministry of Defense recently." It further quotes the same source as saying that the reports have "greatly displeased" officials in the Chinese military.
3. The paper also quotes Ouyang Wei, a Chinese military expert from the University of National Defense, as claiming that the negative reports on China by Indian media far exceeded negative reports on India in the Chinese media. He described this as a very significant problem in the bilateral relations and added: "The Indian government should investigate the irresponsible reports, to find the sources of the
fake news, and refute the rumors."
4.Chinese non-governmental analysts have also been critical of the way sections of the Indian media sensationalised an incident involving the temporary detention of a plane of the UAE Air Force at Kolkata earlier this week for not correctly declaring that it was carrying a consignment of arms and ammunition and "combat missiles" to China. According to them, these arms and ammunition and missiles, which were manufactured in China, had been sent to Abu Dhabi for displaying in an international exhibition of military equipment and were being taken back to China after the exhibition was over. These analysts have expressed surprise over the manner in which the whole issue was sought to be sensationalised by sections of the Indian media as if it was a sinister development.
5. The same report of the "Global Times" cited above has stated on this incident as follows: " Dai Xu, a renowned military expert, said that the actions by Indian authorities violated diplomatic rights as the cargo on board belong to China. "Any inspection onboard, which may have violated China's property rights and constituted spying on its military secrets, should be approved by both the UAE and China," Dai said.An unnamed military source told the Global Times the UAE airplane was on a mission transporting Chinese arms from an arms expo in Abu Dhabi. "When the airplane stopped in Kolkata Sunday to refuel, the UAE crew member used the empty cargo certificate it used when it flew to China to carry the weapons at the beginning."
6. My comment: While it is important for the media to report instances of alleged Chinese troop intrusions into Indian territory, it should take care at the same time not to cretate an anti-China frenzy, which may get out of control. One was disturbed by the way a national TV channel played up in a jingoistic manner the incident in the Ladakh sector in which a Chinese patrol was alleged to have intruded into Indian
territory and painted on a stone "China". Two acknowledged experts on China, who have an excellent knowledge of the Chinese language, appeared on the programme---- a reputed academic of Delhi and a retired China expert of the Government of India. One would have expected the anchor to ask them to translate for the viewers what was written on the stone and to comment on the implications of it. If he had done
it, the entire jingoistic programme might have ended in a fizzle. He did not do so. Instead, most of the time, the viewers were subjected to an anti-China harangue by a retired Army officer. I myself do not know Chinese, but I am told by those who know Chinese that what was written on the stone was "MiddleYellow River". It could also be translated as "Central Yellow River".
7."Middle" can also refer to China----an allusion to the so-called Middle Kingdom. What should have been discussed at the very beginning of the programme was: Normally, detractors of China refer to it as suffering from the Middle Kingdom mentality. Would a Chinese Army soldier use it? Why the reference to the "Yellow River"? Where is this river? Instead of having a balanced debate on such questions, the anchor went bang, bang, bang against China without first ascertaining from the two Chinese experts what exactly was written in Chinese script on the stone, which was shown in a sinister manner to the viewers.
8.We have a very strong case against the Chinese on the border issue, which we should project in a non-sensational, non-jingoistic manner, but by indulging in such methods we might find our credibility weakened in the eyes of the international community.(10-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
In a report under the heading "China Refutes Trespass Claims" carried on September 10,2009 , the "Global Times", the English-language daily published by the Communist Party-owned "People's Daily" group, has quoted a spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of National Defence as saying that Chinese border patrols strictly abide by the relevant agreements on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) along the
India-China border and have never carried out "provocative actions" towards India.
According to the paper, he said on September 9: "The recent reports by Indian media of intrusions are groundless and irresponsible." The previous day, Jiang Yu, a spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, had described the India reports of a Chinese troop intrusion into Indian territory near Mount Gya in the Ladakh region as "groundless and incorrect."
2. The "Global Times" has quoted a source "close to the Chinese military" as saying as follows: " "Indian media always quotes government officials as their sources, but the Chinese military has not received any protests from the Indian Ministry of Defense recently." It further quotes the same source as saying that the reports have "greatly displeased" officials in the Chinese military.
3. The paper also quotes Ouyang Wei, a Chinese military expert from the University of National Defense, as claiming that the negative reports on China by Indian media far exceeded negative reports on India in the Chinese media. He described this as a very significant problem in the bilateral relations and added: "The Indian government should investigate the irresponsible reports, to find the sources of the
fake news, and refute the rumors."
4.Chinese non-governmental analysts have also been critical of the way sections of the Indian media sensationalised an incident involving the temporary detention of a plane of the UAE Air Force at Kolkata earlier this week for not correctly declaring that it was carrying a consignment of arms and ammunition and "combat missiles" to China. According to them, these arms and ammunition and missiles, which were manufactured in China, had been sent to Abu Dhabi for displaying in an international exhibition of military equipment and were being taken back to China after the exhibition was over. These analysts have expressed surprise over the manner in which the whole issue was sought to be sensationalised by sections of the Indian media as if it was a sinister development.
5. The same report of the "Global Times" cited above has stated on this incident as follows: " Dai Xu, a renowned military expert, said that the actions by Indian authorities violated diplomatic rights as the cargo on board belong to China. "Any inspection onboard, which may have violated China's property rights and constituted spying on its military secrets, should be approved by both the UAE and China," Dai said.An unnamed military source told the Global Times the UAE airplane was on a mission transporting Chinese arms from an arms expo in Abu Dhabi. "When the airplane stopped in Kolkata Sunday to refuel, the UAE crew member used the empty cargo certificate it used when it flew to China to carry the weapons at the beginning."
6. My comment: While it is important for the media to report instances of alleged Chinese troop intrusions into Indian territory, it should take care at the same time not to cretate an anti-China frenzy, which may get out of control. One was disturbed by the way a national TV channel played up in a jingoistic manner the incident in the Ladakh sector in which a Chinese patrol was alleged to have intruded into Indian
territory and painted on a stone "China". Two acknowledged experts on China, who have an excellent knowledge of the Chinese language, appeared on the programme---- a reputed academic of Delhi and a retired China expert of the Government of India. One would have expected the anchor to ask them to translate for the viewers what was written on the stone and to comment on the implications of it. If he had done
it, the entire jingoistic programme might have ended in a fizzle. He did not do so. Instead, most of the time, the viewers were subjected to an anti-China harangue by a retired Army officer. I myself do not know Chinese, but I am told by those who know Chinese that what was written on the stone was "MiddleYellow River". It could also be translated as "Central Yellow River".
7."Middle" can also refer to China----an allusion to the so-called Middle Kingdom. What should have been discussed at the very beginning of the programme was: Normally, detractors of China refer to it as suffering from the Middle Kingdom mentality. Would a Chinese Army soldier use it? Why the reference to the "Yellow River"? Where is this river? Instead of having a balanced debate on such questions, the anchor went bang, bang, bang against China without first ascertaining from the two Chinese experts what exactly was written in Chinese script on the stone, which was shown in a sinister manner to the viewers.
8.We have a very strong case against the Chinese on the border issue, which we should project in a non-sensational, non-jingoistic manner, but by indulging in such methods we might find our credibility weakened in the eyes of the international community.(10-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, September 8, 2009
DESPITE HARMONIOUS URUMQI CAMPAIGN, CITY FAR FROM NORMAL
B.RAMAN
The authorities of Urumqi, the capital of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, have launched a 'Harmonious Urumqi' campaign to improve the relations between the Uighurs and the Hans and between the residents and the administration. Under this campaign, which was launched on September 6,2009, 7,000 police officers and other public servants described as 'harmony squads' have been visiting families in various
sensitive parts of the city to appeal to the families to help the authorities maintain inter-community harmony and social order. While launching the campaign, Wang Lequan, the Secretary of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Regional Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), said: "The officials will go door to door to explain policies and solve disputes."
2. In spite of this campaign, the atmosphere in the city is far from normal. Though there have been no public demonstrations by the Han residents after September 5 and the local mosques have been holding their Ramadan prayers, there is an undercurrent of tension and the panic over the needle-stabbings still remains. Despite the stern warnings issued by the Public Security Department that those indulging in
syringe-needle stabbings will be held guilty of an act of terrorism and may be sentenced to death, if guilty, reports of needle-stabbings continue to be received from different parts of the city.
3. Among the various measures taken by the authorities to improve the security situation and remove the panic in public are: Warnings of stern action against those indulging in needle-stabbings as well as against those making false reports of needle-stabbings; identity checks of all those buying chemicals and syringe needles; and warnings of strong action against those lynching suspects instead of handing them
over to the police.
4. These measures have not had any impact so far. It has been reported that there is a scarcity of syringe needles in the pharmacies and doctors and hospitals have been facing difficulties in procuring them for their legitimate use. The" China Daily" of September 9,2009, has quoted the local Police as saying that there were 77 reports of needle-stabbings between 5 PM on September 6 and 5 PM on September 7.
The police arrested 45 suspects of whom 33 were released after investigation for want of evidence against them of indulging in needle-stabbings and the remaining 12 have been detained for further investigation. The paper also reported that eight of those released have been sent to drug rehabilitation centres. This indicates that the police are rounding up known drug addicts in order to check whether any of them are indulging in needle-stabbings.
5.As a precautionary measure after the fresh reports of needle-stabbings, the authorities directed all shops to close early on the evenings of September 6 and 7 and imposed an undeclared night curfew on the two nights under the guise of traffic regulations for security reasons. Nothing untoward happened.
6. The authorities have ordered the demolition of a building in Urumqi belonging to Mrs.Rebiya Kadeer, the US-based head of the World Uighur Congress (WUC), on the alleged ground that it had become dangerous to public safety because of poor maintenance. The building was having a shopping complex with about 500 shops.
7.It was announced on September 8 that the fourth plenary session of the 17th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) will be held at Beijing from September 15 to 18 to discuss a draft document on improving Party building. Even though this has been projected as a routine meeting scheduled earlier before fresh troubles broke out in Urumqi, it is likely that the handling of the Urumqi
situation by the local authorities will aso be discussed. Hu Jintao will chair the meeting. (9-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The authorities of Urumqi, the capital of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, have launched a 'Harmonious Urumqi' campaign to improve the relations between the Uighurs and the Hans and between the residents and the administration. Under this campaign, which was launched on September 6,2009, 7,000 police officers and other public servants described as 'harmony squads' have been visiting families in various
sensitive parts of the city to appeal to the families to help the authorities maintain inter-community harmony and social order. While launching the campaign, Wang Lequan, the Secretary of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Regional Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), said: "The officials will go door to door to explain policies and solve disputes."
2. In spite of this campaign, the atmosphere in the city is far from normal. Though there have been no public demonstrations by the Han residents after September 5 and the local mosques have been holding their Ramadan prayers, there is an undercurrent of tension and the panic over the needle-stabbings still remains. Despite the stern warnings issued by the Public Security Department that those indulging in
syringe-needle stabbings will be held guilty of an act of terrorism and may be sentenced to death, if guilty, reports of needle-stabbings continue to be received from different parts of the city.
3. Among the various measures taken by the authorities to improve the security situation and remove the panic in public are: Warnings of stern action against those indulging in needle-stabbings as well as against those making false reports of needle-stabbings; identity checks of all those buying chemicals and syringe needles; and warnings of strong action against those lynching suspects instead of handing them
over to the police.
4. These measures have not had any impact so far. It has been reported that there is a scarcity of syringe needles in the pharmacies and doctors and hospitals have been facing difficulties in procuring them for their legitimate use. The" China Daily" of September 9,2009, has quoted the local Police as saying that there were 77 reports of needle-stabbings between 5 PM on September 6 and 5 PM on September 7.
The police arrested 45 suspects of whom 33 were released after investigation for want of evidence against them of indulging in needle-stabbings and the remaining 12 have been detained for further investigation. The paper also reported that eight of those released have been sent to drug rehabilitation centres. This indicates that the police are rounding up known drug addicts in order to check whether any of them are indulging in needle-stabbings.
5.As a precautionary measure after the fresh reports of needle-stabbings, the authorities directed all shops to close early on the evenings of September 6 and 7 and imposed an undeclared night curfew on the two nights under the guise of traffic regulations for security reasons. Nothing untoward happened.
6. The authorities have ordered the demolition of a building in Urumqi belonging to Mrs.Rebiya Kadeer, the US-based head of the World Uighur Congress (WUC), on the alleged ground that it had become dangerous to public safety because of poor maintenance. The building was having a shopping complex with about 500 shops.
7.It was announced on September 8 that the fourth plenary session of the 17th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) will be held at Beijing from September 15 to 18 to discuss a draft document on improving Party building. Even though this has been projected as a routine meeting scheduled earlier before fresh troubles broke out in Urumqi, it is likely that the handling of the Urumqi
situation by the local authorities will aso be discussed. Hu Jintao will chair the meeting. (9-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, September 7, 2009
INDIA-CHINA: DANGEROUS HYSTERIA
B.RAMAN
A dangerous hysteria has taken hold of India-China relations since the anti-Beijing uprising in Lhasa in March last year. This hysteria is not due to any actions or rhetoric by the two Governments, which have been conducting themselves in a balanced and restrained manner.They have been trying to preserve and expand the gains in bilateral relations since the famous visit of Rajiv Gandhi to China in 1988. They have been sincerely trying to adhere to the bilateral agreement on maintaining peace and tranquillity till a final solution is reached to the border dispute between the two countries. This hysteria has been the creation of some sections of the non-governmetal strategic communities in the two countries.
2.There are issues on which the two Governments have reasons to be concerned and unhappy with each other. India has reasons to be concerned over past Chinese contacts with the Naga and Mizo insurgents in the North-East and with their present contacts, as suspected,with the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). Similarly, China has reasons to be concerned over the activities of the set-up of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC) from the Indian territory and over the reported presence in the Indian territory of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) of the US which they blame for part of their troubles in Xinjiang and Tibet.The two Governments have refrained from publicly articulating these concerns and have taken care to see that these concerns do not come in the
way of the further development of the bilateral relations.
3. Even in respect of the bilateral dispute over the border, one has to take note of the fact that there has been no attempt by either Government to change the status quo by setting up an illegal territorial presence in any sector of the border. In respect of the Ladakh sector, India feels that the status quo favours the Chinese because of the Chinese occupation of large parts of our territory in this sector
after the People's Republic of China came into existence in 1949. The Chinese have consolidated the status quo, which favours them, by constructing roads, setting up border posts and creating boder habitations in areas which used to be unpopulated. India, while not accepting the status quo de jure, has not tried to disturb it de facto.
4. In the Eastern sector (Arunachal Pradesh), the status quo, which we inherited from the British, favours us. The Chinese disturbed it briefly during the Sino-Indian war of 1962 by occupying large parts of it by taking advantage of our weak military and administrative presence in that area, but they unilaterally restored the status quo by withdrawing from the area occupied by them. If they had not withdrawn unilaterally, our Army was not in a position to eject them and we would have been confronted in the Eastern sector with a situation similar to the one in the Western sector---that is, with a new post-1949 status quo set up by the Chinese which we are not in a position to change. The Chinese have been trying to change the status quo in the Eastern sector in their favour not through military means, but by claiming a large part of this territory and insisting on our conceding their demand over some (Tawang) if not all of this territory as part of a border settlement.
5.Unfortunately, we find ourselves in an unequal position with the Chinese. This is because while the Chinese have consolidated the status quo in the Western sector and made sure that India will not be able to change it militarily, we have similarly not consolidated the status quo in the Eastern sector and made sure that the Chinese will not be able to change this militarily. Our long-neglect of the North-East and our failure to consolidate the status quo in Arunachal Pradesh have placed China in a strategically advantageous position in the Eastern sector. Only in the last two or three years have we realised the importance of consolidating the status quo in the Eastern sector by strengthening our military and administrative presence in the area through the construction of roads and inducting fresh military units to protect this area from any adventurist Chinese action.
6. While the Chinese have not sought to change the status quo in the Arunachal Pradesh sector militarily, they have created for themselves a capability for doing so eventually if the border talks fail. They have done this by developing road and rail communications in Tibet and by strengthening military deployments in Tibet. We have only recently realised the importance of giving ourselves a capability in the Arunachal Pradesh sector to thwart any Chinese attempt to change the status quo militarily if the bilateral border talks fail to break the deadlock.
7.The Chinese long-term strategy with regard to India has many facets. The trans-border developments are only one---but the most important--- component of their strategy. There are other components---namely, strengthening their relationship with Pakistan in order to confront India with the danger of a two-front war should it try to change militarily the status quo either in respect of China or in respect of
Pakistan with regard to Jammu & Kahmir; giving Pakistan a nuclear and missile capability for threatening India; weakening the Indian influence in the rest of South Asia and strengthening their presence and influence in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal; creating a presence for their Navy in the Inbdian Ocean region and opposing India's attempts to emerge as an Asian power on par with China.
8. Till recently, we had no well thought-out long-term strategy with regard to China----neither in the border region, nor in South Asia nor in the Indian Ocean region.Only recently the initial rudiments of such a strategy have been appearing. Our attempts to strengthen our strategic relationship with the US and Japan is one such building-block of this comprehensive strategy. Our proactive Indian Ocean policy is another building block. But we find ourselves handicapped in further developing such a comprehensive strategy because we have let our influence
be weakened in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal.
9.The post-March 2008 hysteria in the bilateral relations has not been the creation of the two Governments. It has been the outcome of a new activism with regard to each other in the non-governmental strategic communities of the two countries. Sections of the Indian strategic community saw in the Lhasa uprising an opportunity to change the status quo in Tibet by playing the Tibet card against China through helping the Tibetans in securing their legitimate rights from the Han Chinese. By changing the status quo in Tibet----not militarily which is out of question, but politically by backing the Tibetan people's efforts to change the status quo themselves--- India might be able to change the status quo in the Western sector and preserve the status quo in the Eastern sector. So these analysts believed and started advocating vigorously a policy of playing the Tibet card against China.
10. The activism in the Chinese non-governmental strategic community is partly the result of what they see as the Indian activism on Tibet and partly the result of the Indian activism in Arunachal Pradesh for consolidating the status quo. They want their Government to be more assertive in playing the Arunachal Pradesh card and to take advantage of the difficulties faced by India in the North-East to counter any
attempt by India to play the Tibet card. This hysteria has resulted in a campaign of mutual demonisation and mutual sabre-rattling. This sabre-rattling is only at the non-Governmental level. The two Governments have maintained a distance from this hysteria without trying to discourage it.
11. The danger of such hysteria is that it could acquire an uncontrollable momentum and take the two countries towards a precipice from where they may not be able to withdraw. Any confrontation as a result of this hysteria would damage the interests of both the countries.This hysteria has to be defused in time by the top leaderships of the two countries interacting with each other more frequenly and more directly
than now and taking initiatives to remove wrong perceptions about each other. It is unwise for Indian analysts to talk of the Tibetan card.The international community has recognised Tibet as a part of China. While it will be sympathetic to any Tibetan attempts to free themselves of Chinese control, it will not support any Indian initiative or move in this regard. By frequently talking of the Tibetan card, we
will only be adding to the suspicions and concerns in the Chinese mind.
12. It is equally unwise for Chinese analysts to talk of the Arunachal Pradesh (southern Tibet as they call it) or the North-East card. The international community looks upon these areas as a part of India and will not support any Chinese move to change the status quo. Much of this hysteria will die down automatically if the two countries reach a border settlement.The only border settlement, which will be equally
advantageous, is for India to accord de jure recognition to the status quo in the Western sector in return for China recognising the status quo in the Eastern sector. The present difficulties in the Eastern sector are apparently due to the fact that China wants a face-saving formula by India handing over at least Tawang to it.India cannot do this because Tawang is a populated area. Its inhabitants are Indian
citizens. No Indian political leader will be able to sell to the people and the parliament any concession, which would involve any population transfer.
13. So, what are the options? Either go on holding one meeting after another without any forward movement or think of some idea which could break the present deadlock. One idea could be to explore the possibility of a 'status quo plus' solution under which China will recognise the status quo in Arunachal Pradesh in return for India accommodating some of the Chinese interests in Tawang.
14. Once the border dispute is solved to our mutual satisfaction, the danger of a military confrontation between the two countries across the Himalayas will lessen considerably. But the competition between the two countries for influence in the region and outside will remain in the near and medium-term future, but this competition need not lead to a military confrontation. ( 8-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
A dangerous hysteria has taken hold of India-China relations since the anti-Beijing uprising in Lhasa in March last year. This hysteria is not due to any actions or rhetoric by the two Governments, which have been conducting themselves in a balanced and restrained manner.They have been trying to preserve and expand the gains in bilateral relations since the famous visit of Rajiv Gandhi to China in 1988. They have been sincerely trying to adhere to the bilateral agreement on maintaining peace and tranquillity till a final solution is reached to the border dispute between the two countries. This hysteria has been the creation of some sections of the non-governmetal strategic communities in the two countries.
2.There are issues on which the two Governments have reasons to be concerned and unhappy with each other. India has reasons to be concerned over past Chinese contacts with the Naga and Mizo insurgents in the North-East and with their present contacts, as suspected,with the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). Similarly, China has reasons to be concerned over the activities of the set-up of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC) from the Indian territory and over the reported presence in the Indian territory of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) of the US which they blame for part of their troubles in Xinjiang and Tibet.The two Governments have refrained from publicly articulating these concerns and have taken care to see that these concerns do not come in the
way of the further development of the bilateral relations.
3. Even in respect of the bilateral dispute over the border, one has to take note of the fact that there has been no attempt by either Government to change the status quo by setting up an illegal territorial presence in any sector of the border. In respect of the Ladakh sector, India feels that the status quo favours the Chinese because of the Chinese occupation of large parts of our territory in this sector
after the People's Republic of China came into existence in 1949. The Chinese have consolidated the status quo, which favours them, by constructing roads, setting up border posts and creating boder habitations in areas which used to be unpopulated. India, while not accepting the status quo de jure, has not tried to disturb it de facto.
4. In the Eastern sector (Arunachal Pradesh), the status quo, which we inherited from the British, favours us. The Chinese disturbed it briefly during the Sino-Indian war of 1962 by occupying large parts of it by taking advantage of our weak military and administrative presence in that area, but they unilaterally restored the status quo by withdrawing from the area occupied by them. If they had not withdrawn unilaterally, our Army was not in a position to eject them and we would have been confronted in the Eastern sector with a situation similar to the one in the Western sector---that is, with a new post-1949 status quo set up by the Chinese which we are not in a position to change. The Chinese have been trying to change the status quo in the Eastern sector in their favour not through military means, but by claiming a large part of this territory and insisting on our conceding their demand over some (Tawang) if not all of this territory as part of a border settlement.
5.Unfortunately, we find ourselves in an unequal position with the Chinese. This is because while the Chinese have consolidated the status quo in the Western sector and made sure that India will not be able to change it militarily, we have similarly not consolidated the status quo in the Eastern sector and made sure that the Chinese will not be able to change this militarily. Our long-neglect of the North-East and our failure to consolidate the status quo in Arunachal Pradesh have placed China in a strategically advantageous position in the Eastern sector. Only in the last two or three years have we realised the importance of consolidating the status quo in the Eastern sector by strengthening our military and administrative presence in the area through the construction of roads and inducting fresh military units to protect this area from any adventurist Chinese action.
6. While the Chinese have not sought to change the status quo in the Arunachal Pradesh sector militarily, they have created for themselves a capability for doing so eventually if the border talks fail. They have done this by developing road and rail communications in Tibet and by strengthening military deployments in Tibet. We have only recently realised the importance of giving ourselves a capability in the Arunachal Pradesh sector to thwart any Chinese attempt to change the status quo militarily if the bilateral border talks fail to break the deadlock.
7.The Chinese long-term strategy with regard to India has many facets. The trans-border developments are only one---but the most important--- component of their strategy. There are other components---namely, strengthening their relationship with Pakistan in order to confront India with the danger of a two-front war should it try to change militarily the status quo either in respect of China or in respect of
Pakistan with regard to Jammu & Kahmir; giving Pakistan a nuclear and missile capability for threatening India; weakening the Indian influence in the rest of South Asia and strengthening their presence and influence in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal; creating a presence for their Navy in the Inbdian Ocean region and opposing India's attempts to emerge as an Asian power on par with China.
8. Till recently, we had no well thought-out long-term strategy with regard to China----neither in the border region, nor in South Asia nor in the Indian Ocean region.Only recently the initial rudiments of such a strategy have been appearing. Our attempts to strengthen our strategic relationship with the US and Japan is one such building-block of this comprehensive strategy. Our proactive Indian Ocean policy is another building block. But we find ourselves handicapped in further developing such a comprehensive strategy because we have let our influence
be weakened in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal.
9.The post-March 2008 hysteria in the bilateral relations has not been the creation of the two Governments. It has been the outcome of a new activism with regard to each other in the non-governmental strategic communities of the two countries. Sections of the Indian strategic community saw in the Lhasa uprising an opportunity to change the status quo in Tibet by playing the Tibet card against China through helping the Tibetans in securing their legitimate rights from the Han Chinese. By changing the status quo in Tibet----not militarily which is out of question, but politically by backing the Tibetan people's efforts to change the status quo themselves--- India might be able to change the status quo in the Western sector and preserve the status quo in the Eastern sector. So these analysts believed and started advocating vigorously a policy of playing the Tibet card against China.
10. The activism in the Chinese non-governmental strategic community is partly the result of what they see as the Indian activism on Tibet and partly the result of the Indian activism in Arunachal Pradesh for consolidating the status quo. They want their Government to be more assertive in playing the Arunachal Pradesh card and to take advantage of the difficulties faced by India in the North-East to counter any
attempt by India to play the Tibet card. This hysteria has resulted in a campaign of mutual demonisation and mutual sabre-rattling. This sabre-rattling is only at the non-Governmental level. The two Governments have maintained a distance from this hysteria without trying to discourage it.
11. The danger of such hysteria is that it could acquire an uncontrollable momentum and take the two countries towards a precipice from where they may not be able to withdraw. Any confrontation as a result of this hysteria would damage the interests of both the countries.This hysteria has to be defused in time by the top leaderships of the two countries interacting with each other more frequenly and more directly
than now and taking initiatives to remove wrong perceptions about each other. It is unwise for Indian analysts to talk of the Tibetan card.The international community has recognised Tibet as a part of China. While it will be sympathetic to any Tibetan attempts to free themselves of Chinese control, it will not support any Indian initiative or move in this regard. By frequently talking of the Tibetan card, we
will only be adding to the suspicions and concerns in the Chinese mind.
12. It is equally unwise for Chinese analysts to talk of the Arunachal Pradesh (southern Tibet as they call it) or the North-East card. The international community looks upon these areas as a part of India and will not support any Chinese move to change the status quo. Much of this hysteria will die down automatically if the two countries reach a border settlement.The only border settlement, which will be equally
advantageous, is for India to accord de jure recognition to the status quo in the Western sector in return for China recognising the status quo in the Eastern sector. The present difficulties in the Eastern sector are apparently due to the fact that China wants a face-saving formula by India handing over at least Tawang to it.India cannot do this because Tawang is a populated area. Its inhabitants are Indian
citizens. No Indian political leader will be able to sell to the people and the parliament any concession, which would involve any population transfer.
13. So, what are the options? Either go on holding one meeting after another without any forward movement or think of some idea which could break the present deadlock. One idea could be to explore the possibility of a 'status quo plus' solution under which China will recognise the status quo in Arunachal Pradesh in return for India accommodating some of the Chinese interests in Tawang.
14. Once the border dispute is solved to our mutual satisfaction, the danger of a military confrontation between the two countries across the Himalayas will lessen considerably. But the competition between the two countries for influence in the region and outside will remain in the near and medium-term future, but this competition need not lead to a military confrontation. ( 8-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
Sunday, September 6, 2009
AL QAEDA: AS ELUSIVE, AS INNOVATIVE, AS HOMING-PIGEON LIKE AS EVER
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.555
B.RAMAN
Despite attrition in its ranks and lower and middle-level leadership, Al Qaeda remains as elusive, as innovative and as homing-pigeon like as ever. That is the assessment that one could draw 11 years after its terrorist strikes in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam and eight years after its 9/11 strikes in the US Homeland.
2.Despite the most sophisticated search for eight years with the help of modern gadgetry and some of the sharpest minds in the US counter-terrorism community, the US has not been able to pin-point the location of Osama bin Laden and his No.2 Ayman-al Zawahiri.The supposition ---this is strongly denied by Pakistan---is that they are somewhere in the North Waziristan or Chitral area of the Pashtun tribal belt of Pakistan.There has been no confirmation of this supposition. Neither human nor technical intelligence regarding their exact whereabouts has been forthcoming.
3. The flow of human and technical intelligence regarding the Pakistani Taliban has improved considerably resulting in some very successful operations by the US. The most spectacular in recent months was the elimination of Baitullah Mehsud, the Amir of the Pakistani Taliban, through a Predator strike on the house of his father-in-law in South Waziristan, where he was resting, on August 5,2009.
4. There have been no similar operations against OBL and Zawahiri since January 2006 when the US narrowly missed killing Zawahiri in the Bajaur Agency through a Predator strike on the house of one of his friends with whom he was reportedly planning to eat. He did not turn up at the last minute. The US strike killed a large number of civilians, but not Zawahiri.
5.Offers of millions of dollars in reward for information leading to OBL and Zawahiri have not helped. There are Pashtuns who are prepared to betray the leaders of the Pakistani Taliban, but not OBL or Zawahiri.Is the absence of even scanty information regarding their whereabouts due to the devotion and loyalty of the Pashtuns to OBL and Zawahiri, whom they regard as their honoured guests or is it due to the fact that neither of them is in the Pashtun belt, where the US has been looking for them?
6.Some middle-level leaders of Al Qaeda, who had taken shelter in the Pashtun belt, were killed by Predator strikes. Abu Faraj al-Libi, another middle-level leader, was arrested in the Pashtun belt in May, 2005 and flown to the Guantanamo Bay detention centre in Cuba . All other Al Qaeda leaders caught in Pakistan since 9/11 were found in non-tribal areas and arrested in places such as Faislabad, Karachi,
Rawalpindi etc. Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (KSM), the most important Al Qaeda leader arrested in Pakistan, was reportedly found in the house of a women's wing leader of the Jamaat-e-Islami in Rawalpindi. Is it necessary for the US to revisit its supposition that OBL andZawahiri must be in the tribal belt----most probably in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)? Which are the other areas where they
could hide as effectively as in the Pashtun belt? These questions must be already engaging the attention of the US intelligence.
7.OBL and Zawahiri have not been seen by anyone outside Al Qaeda since 2002, but they are heard from time to time through their messages disseminated by As-Sahab, the propaganda wing of Al Qaeda. The US has not even been able to track their message trail back to their hide-outs. It seems to be clueless as to how and where these messages are being recorded and how they are disseminated.
8. The relentless US hunt for OBL and Zawahiri and the constant fear of their being killed or captured have not come in the way of Al Qaeda continuing to organise, guide or inspire terrorist strikes in different parts of the world. It may not have succeeded in carrying out another 9/11 in the US homeland, but its record in terms of terrorist strikes right across the world organised ,guided or inspired by it has been impressive. Bali (2002 and 2005), Mombasa ( 2002), Madrid ( 2004), Jakarta (2003,2004 and 2009),London (2005), Mumbai (2006 by the Lashkar-e-Toiba), Islamabad (Marriott Hotel explosion in September 2008), Mumbai ( November,2008 again by the LET) and Jeddah (August 2009) are the notable examples. There are many other examples from Algeria, Somalia, Iraq, Egypt,Morocco, Turkey and Yemen.
9. Al Qaeda's leaders are widely scattered. They do not live and operate from the same place. That is why whenever an Al Qaeda leader was killed or captured he was found alone. No other leader was found with him. They maintain communication and restrictive security effectively. That is why whenever an Al Qaeda leader was captured, his interrogation did not lead to the hide-outs of OBL, Zawahiri or others. From this it should be evident that the Shura of Al Qaeda is no longer able to operate as a shura with all members meeting at one place and taking joint decisions. Despite this, new ideas have been flowing back and forth and innovative modus operandi ----new ones or old ones with new gadgetry to increase their destruction-multiplier effect---are being tried by Al Qaeda and its associates such as the LET.
10.Among the innovative MOs seen since 9/11 of 2008, one could mention the commando-style attacks with hand-held weapons on multiple targets mounted from the sea in Mumbai in November,2008 by the LET, terrorists checking into hotels as normal guests and the explosive material being reached to them separately for mounting a suicide attack as was seen in Jakarta in July,2009, and a terrorist posing as a deserter from Al Qaeda and wanting to surrender in order to gain access to an important, well-protected leader as was seen during the failed attempt to kill the Saudi Deputy Minister of the Interior, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, at Jeddah on August 27,2009. According to unconfirmed reports, the suicide terrorist, who was accidentally blown up before he could come close to the VIP, was wearing a suicide under-wear and not a vest as used to be normally done.
11. There has been no degradation of Al Qaeda's ability to think and innovate and to take the intelligence and security agencies by surprise. Al Qaeda derives its ability to surprise from the fact that it continues to be the least penetrated of the jihadi terrorist organisations of the world. Neither the strengthening of national intelligence capabilities nor the development of international intelligence co-operation has succeeded in penetrating it. There have been tactical successes scored by the intelligence agencies of the US, the UK, Canada, Saudi Arabia and India in thwarting terrorist operations by identifying and neutralising the cells constituted by Al Qaeda and its associates for carrying out terrorist strikes, but the neutralisation of such cells has not yet led to a withering away of the organisation. Al Qaeda continues to think globally and operate globally.
12.Al Qaeda's principal adversaries remain the same---the US and Israel. Its subsidiary national targets keep changing depending on the policies of different States towards the US and Israel. Spain and Italy, which were among its important national targets immediately after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, no longer seem to receive the same attention in its planning. Among its new targets post-2003 are Pakistan and India---- Pakistan because of its alleged co-operation with the US in its anti-Al Qaeda and anti-Taliban operations and India because of its developing strategic relationships with the US and Israel.In Europe it pays more attention to the UK and Germany as possible targets because of their active role in helping the US in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia's importance in the eyes of Al Qaeda remains undiminished----not only because the holy places of Islam are located there, but also because its oil wealth could be used to economically damage the West. Its
presence in South-East Asia and Central Asia is important for it to project itself as a global force defending the interests and honour of Islam.
13. Al Qaeda continues to view its battle against the US as being fought on many fronts----Algeria, Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan. In its view,the ultimate defeat or victory will come in the battlefields of the Af-Pak region. Afghanisation of Pakistan is one of its important objectives----that is, making Pakistan as unstable and as ungovernable as Afghanistan and as receptive to the jihadis of the world. It
originally thought it would engage the US in a two-front war in Iraq and Afghanistan, but in Iraq things have not developed the way it hoped they would. Iraq has not been a success story for Al Qaeda.
14. What it failed to achieve in Iraq----the defeat and humiliating withdrawal of the US---- it hopes to achieve in the Af-Pak region. It is encouraged by what it perceives as the first signs of public fatigue in the US with its involvement in Afghanistan.Till some months ago,public support for the US operations in Afghanistan was high. The US public---like its political leadership---viewed continued US military operations in the Af-Pak region as important to prevent another 9/11 in the US homeland. But memories of 9/11 are fading. Fears of a catastrophic act of terrorism by Al Qaeda or its associates involving the use of weapons of mass destruction material no longer strengthen public support to the same extent as they did. The present visuals before the US public are of the Americans being killed in increasing numbers in Afghanistan and not of the hundreds of civilians killed on 9/11
15. There has been no spectacular battle-field success of the US and other NATO troops against the Afghan Taliban or Al Qaeda. The US successes against the Pakistani Taliban are not exciting the American public. What it wants is signs of success against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban.
16. What stands in the way of the US ability to turn the tide of the campaign in the Af-Pak region in its favour decisively is its failure to realise that its continued pampering of Pakistan is the root cause of its difficulties in Afghanistan and of the lack of success against Al Qaeda. Without a more robust policy to make Pakistan act really and not seemingly against Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban and the Punjabi
jihadi organisations, American difficulties will not end.
17. It is in the common interest of the international community to work in a co-ordinated and determined manner for making Al Qaeda and its
associates wither way.They will not wither away so long as they find a fertile, well-irrigated soil in Pakistan. ( 6-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
Despite attrition in its ranks and lower and middle-level leadership, Al Qaeda remains as elusive, as innovative and as homing-pigeon like as ever. That is the assessment that one could draw 11 years after its terrorist strikes in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam and eight years after its 9/11 strikes in the US Homeland.
2.Despite the most sophisticated search for eight years with the help of modern gadgetry and some of the sharpest minds in the US counter-terrorism community, the US has not been able to pin-point the location of Osama bin Laden and his No.2 Ayman-al Zawahiri.The supposition ---this is strongly denied by Pakistan---is that they are somewhere in the North Waziristan or Chitral area of the Pashtun tribal belt of Pakistan.There has been no confirmation of this supposition. Neither human nor technical intelligence regarding their exact whereabouts has been forthcoming.
3. The flow of human and technical intelligence regarding the Pakistani Taliban has improved considerably resulting in some very successful operations by the US. The most spectacular in recent months was the elimination of Baitullah Mehsud, the Amir of the Pakistani Taliban, through a Predator strike on the house of his father-in-law in South Waziristan, where he was resting, on August 5,2009.
4. There have been no similar operations against OBL and Zawahiri since January 2006 when the US narrowly missed killing Zawahiri in the Bajaur Agency through a Predator strike on the house of one of his friends with whom he was reportedly planning to eat. He did not turn up at the last minute. The US strike killed a large number of civilians, but not Zawahiri.
5.Offers of millions of dollars in reward for information leading to OBL and Zawahiri have not helped. There are Pashtuns who are prepared to betray the leaders of the Pakistani Taliban, but not OBL or Zawahiri.Is the absence of even scanty information regarding their whereabouts due to the devotion and loyalty of the Pashtuns to OBL and Zawahiri, whom they regard as their honoured guests or is it due to the fact that neither of them is in the Pashtun belt, where the US has been looking for them?
6.Some middle-level leaders of Al Qaeda, who had taken shelter in the Pashtun belt, were killed by Predator strikes. Abu Faraj al-Libi, another middle-level leader, was arrested in the Pashtun belt in May, 2005 and flown to the Guantanamo Bay detention centre in Cuba . All other Al Qaeda leaders caught in Pakistan since 9/11 were found in non-tribal areas and arrested in places such as Faislabad, Karachi,
Rawalpindi etc. Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (KSM), the most important Al Qaeda leader arrested in Pakistan, was reportedly found in the house of a women's wing leader of the Jamaat-e-Islami in Rawalpindi. Is it necessary for the US to revisit its supposition that OBL andZawahiri must be in the tribal belt----most probably in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)? Which are the other areas where they
could hide as effectively as in the Pashtun belt? These questions must be already engaging the attention of the US intelligence.
7.OBL and Zawahiri have not been seen by anyone outside Al Qaeda since 2002, but they are heard from time to time through their messages disseminated by As-Sahab, the propaganda wing of Al Qaeda. The US has not even been able to track their message trail back to their hide-outs. It seems to be clueless as to how and where these messages are being recorded and how they are disseminated.
8. The relentless US hunt for OBL and Zawahiri and the constant fear of their being killed or captured have not come in the way of Al Qaeda continuing to organise, guide or inspire terrorist strikes in different parts of the world. It may not have succeeded in carrying out another 9/11 in the US homeland, but its record in terms of terrorist strikes right across the world organised ,guided or inspired by it has been impressive. Bali (2002 and 2005), Mombasa ( 2002), Madrid ( 2004), Jakarta (2003,2004 and 2009),London (2005), Mumbai (2006 by the Lashkar-e-Toiba), Islamabad (Marriott Hotel explosion in September 2008), Mumbai ( November,2008 again by the LET) and Jeddah (August 2009) are the notable examples. There are many other examples from Algeria, Somalia, Iraq, Egypt,Morocco, Turkey and Yemen.
9. Al Qaeda's leaders are widely scattered. They do not live and operate from the same place. That is why whenever an Al Qaeda leader was killed or captured he was found alone. No other leader was found with him. They maintain communication and restrictive security effectively. That is why whenever an Al Qaeda leader was captured, his interrogation did not lead to the hide-outs of OBL, Zawahiri or others. From this it should be evident that the Shura of Al Qaeda is no longer able to operate as a shura with all members meeting at one place and taking joint decisions. Despite this, new ideas have been flowing back and forth and innovative modus operandi ----new ones or old ones with new gadgetry to increase their destruction-multiplier effect---are being tried by Al Qaeda and its associates such as the LET.
10.Among the innovative MOs seen since 9/11 of 2008, one could mention the commando-style attacks with hand-held weapons on multiple targets mounted from the sea in Mumbai in November,2008 by the LET, terrorists checking into hotels as normal guests and the explosive material being reached to them separately for mounting a suicide attack as was seen in Jakarta in July,2009, and a terrorist posing as a deserter from Al Qaeda and wanting to surrender in order to gain access to an important, well-protected leader as was seen during the failed attempt to kill the Saudi Deputy Minister of the Interior, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, at Jeddah on August 27,2009. According to unconfirmed reports, the suicide terrorist, who was accidentally blown up before he could come close to the VIP, was wearing a suicide under-wear and not a vest as used to be normally done.
11. There has been no degradation of Al Qaeda's ability to think and innovate and to take the intelligence and security agencies by surprise. Al Qaeda derives its ability to surprise from the fact that it continues to be the least penetrated of the jihadi terrorist organisations of the world. Neither the strengthening of national intelligence capabilities nor the development of international intelligence co-operation has succeeded in penetrating it. There have been tactical successes scored by the intelligence agencies of the US, the UK, Canada, Saudi Arabia and India in thwarting terrorist operations by identifying and neutralising the cells constituted by Al Qaeda and its associates for carrying out terrorist strikes, but the neutralisation of such cells has not yet led to a withering away of the organisation. Al Qaeda continues to think globally and operate globally.
12.Al Qaeda's principal adversaries remain the same---the US and Israel. Its subsidiary national targets keep changing depending on the policies of different States towards the US and Israel. Spain and Italy, which were among its important national targets immediately after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, no longer seem to receive the same attention in its planning. Among its new targets post-2003 are Pakistan and India---- Pakistan because of its alleged co-operation with the US in its anti-Al Qaeda and anti-Taliban operations and India because of its developing strategic relationships with the US and Israel.In Europe it pays more attention to the UK and Germany as possible targets because of their active role in helping the US in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia's importance in the eyes of Al Qaeda remains undiminished----not only because the holy places of Islam are located there, but also because its oil wealth could be used to economically damage the West. Its
presence in South-East Asia and Central Asia is important for it to project itself as a global force defending the interests and honour of Islam.
13. Al Qaeda continues to view its battle against the US as being fought on many fronts----Algeria, Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan. In its view,the ultimate defeat or victory will come in the battlefields of the Af-Pak region. Afghanisation of Pakistan is one of its important objectives----that is, making Pakistan as unstable and as ungovernable as Afghanistan and as receptive to the jihadis of the world. It
originally thought it would engage the US in a two-front war in Iraq and Afghanistan, but in Iraq things have not developed the way it hoped they would. Iraq has not been a success story for Al Qaeda.
14. What it failed to achieve in Iraq----the defeat and humiliating withdrawal of the US---- it hopes to achieve in the Af-Pak region. It is encouraged by what it perceives as the first signs of public fatigue in the US with its involvement in Afghanistan.Till some months ago,public support for the US operations in Afghanistan was high. The US public---like its political leadership---viewed continued US military operations in the Af-Pak region as important to prevent another 9/11 in the US homeland. But memories of 9/11 are fading. Fears of a catastrophic act of terrorism by Al Qaeda or its associates involving the use of weapons of mass destruction material no longer strengthen public support to the same extent as they did. The present visuals before the US public are of the Americans being killed in increasing numbers in Afghanistan and not of the hundreds of civilians killed on 9/11
15. There has been no spectacular battle-field success of the US and other NATO troops against the Afghan Taliban or Al Qaeda. The US successes against the Pakistani Taliban are not exciting the American public. What it wants is signs of success against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban.
16. What stands in the way of the US ability to turn the tide of the campaign in the Af-Pak region in its favour decisively is its failure to realise that its continued pampering of Pakistan is the root cause of its difficulties in Afghanistan and of the lack of success against Al Qaeda. Without a more robust policy to make Pakistan act really and not seemingly against Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban and the Punjabi
jihadi organisations, American difficulties will not end.
17. It is in the common interest of the international community to work in a co-ordinated and determined manner for making Al Qaeda and its
associates wither way.They will not wither away so long as they find a fertile, well-irrigated soil in Pakistan. ( 6-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Saturday, September 5, 2009
TWO HEADS ROLL IN XINJIANG
B.RAMAN
The demonstrations by a large number of Han residents of Urumqi, the capital of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region of China, from September 2 to 4,2009, to protest against the failure of the local authorities to stop the wave of mysterious attacks by hypodermic syringe needles since August 17,2009, have claimed their first victims--- one at the level of the Urumqi city and the other at the provincial level..
2. The officially-controlled Xinhua news agency announced on September 5,2009, that the regional committee of the Communist Party of China for the Xinjiang Autonomous Region has replaced Li Zhi, who was the Secretary of the Urumqi Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China, by Zhu Hailun, who was the Secretary of the Regional Political and Legislative Affaitrs Committee of the entire province.
3. At the provincial level, Xinhua reported that the Standing Committee of the People's Congress of the province, which is the provincial legislature, has replaced Liu Yaohua, who was the Director of the Public Security Department of the province, by Zhu Changjie, who was the party chief in the Aksu Prefecture of the province. The Public Security Department of the province, which works under the Ministry of Public
Security of the central Government in Beijing, is responsible for internal intelligence and internal security. The police also comes under its supervision. In China, the head of the Public Security Department of a province is generally referred to as the police chief of the province and the Minister for Public Security at Beijing is referred to as the police chief of China. All police chiefs are appointed by the respective legislatures on the recommendation of the party--- the provincial police chiefs by the provincial legislature and the Minister for Public
Security by the National People's Congress or by its Standing Committee, if it is not in session.
4.Some interesting points about these two changes need to be underlined. Firstly, the two decisions have been projected as taken at the provincial level, but the instructions for the changes must have come from Beijing. Secondly, while the change at the party level has been restricted to the municipality of Urumqi, the change at the governmental level has affected the head of the Public Security Department for
the entire province. There has been no announcement regarding the head of the Public Security Department in the Urumqi municipality. Any decision regarding him has apparently been left to the new provincial chief.
5. It is also interesting to note that Wang Lequan, the head of the Communist Party of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, has not so far been affected. He is the provincial head of the party continuously since 1994 and is considered very close to President Hu Jintao. During the demonstrations, most of the slogans were against him. Large sections of the Hans of Urumqi blame him for the failure of the police to
protect them, but he can be removed only by the central party Politburo or its Standing Committee in Beijing. It would be interesting to see whether he too is removed by the Politburo or whether he is protected from any humiliation by President Hu Jintao.
6. If he is removed, that could be an indication that Hu's position in the party has been weakened by the developments in Xinjiang. If he manages to stay on despite his alleged mishandling of the situation, that could be an indication that Hu's position remains strong.
7. The other person whose future requires watching is China's Public Security Minister Meng Jianzhu, who rushed to Urumqi from Beijing on September 4. He is responsible for supervising the work of the Public Security Department of the province. If the provincial chief is removed because of the situation, can Meng in Beijing escape responsibility for failing to supervise his work effectively. Meng can be removed only by the National People's Congress or its Standing Committee on the recommendation of the party.
8. One possibility is that Wang and Meng may be allowed to continue till the celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the People's Republic of China next month are over and may be eased out thereafter. Will the Han residents of Urumqi remain quiet till then or will they resume their demand for sacking Wang immediately. If the Hans resume their demand for removing Wang and if Hu doesn't do so, there is a danger of the public anger turning against him.
9. In the meanwhile, there was relative calm in Urumqi on September 5. There was one attempt by a group of about 1000 young Hans to gather at the central square, but this was thwarted by the police without using force. The authorities allowed the local mosques to hold their Ramadan prayers. Many shops were open. However, there was a heavy presence of the People's Armed Police all over the city. Despite
this, more incidents of needle-stabbings were reported. There have been no fatalities due to the stabbings, but for the last three days rumours have been circulating in the city that the Uighurs have been trying to infect the Hans with the HIV virus. This has added to the panic. A team of Army doctors has been rushed to Urumqi from the PLA headquarters in Beijing to examine the persons injured by the
needle-stabbings and to dispel these rumours.
10.The local security agencies are totally non-plussed and do not know how to deal with the new modus operandi of the Uighurs, which amounts to the use of soft terror, that is, criminal intimidation, causing polarisation between Muslims and non-Muslims and discrediting the security agencies in the eyes of the public through means, which do not cause mass fatalities. Or are some local irrational elements, having
nothing to do with terrorism or extremism, causing a scare in the population similar to the anthrax scare in the US after 9/11? (5-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
The demonstrations by a large number of Han residents of Urumqi, the capital of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region of China, from September 2 to 4,2009, to protest against the failure of the local authorities to stop the wave of mysterious attacks by hypodermic syringe needles since August 17,2009, have claimed their first victims--- one at the level of the Urumqi city and the other at the provincial level..
2. The officially-controlled Xinhua news agency announced on September 5,2009, that the regional committee of the Communist Party of China for the Xinjiang Autonomous Region has replaced Li Zhi, who was the Secretary of the Urumqi Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China, by Zhu Hailun, who was the Secretary of the Regional Political and Legislative Affaitrs Committee of the entire province.
3. At the provincial level, Xinhua reported that the Standing Committee of the People's Congress of the province, which is the provincial legislature, has replaced Liu Yaohua, who was the Director of the Public Security Department of the province, by Zhu Changjie, who was the party chief in the Aksu Prefecture of the province. The Public Security Department of the province, which works under the Ministry of Public
Security of the central Government in Beijing, is responsible for internal intelligence and internal security. The police also comes under its supervision. In China, the head of the Public Security Department of a province is generally referred to as the police chief of the province and the Minister for Public Security at Beijing is referred to as the police chief of China. All police chiefs are appointed by the respective legislatures on the recommendation of the party--- the provincial police chiefs by the provincial legislature and the Minister for Public
Security by the National People's Congress or by its Standing Committee, if it is not in session.
4.Some interesting points about these two changes need to be underlined. Firstly, the two decisions have been projected as taken at the provincial level, but the instructions for the changes must have come from Beijing. Secondly, while the change at the party level has been restricted to the municipality of Urumqi, the change at the governmental level has affected the head of the Public Security Department for
the entire province. There has been no announcement regarding the head of the Public Security Department in the Urumqi municipality. Any decision regarding him has apparently been left to the new provincial chief.
5. It is also interesting to note that Wang Lequan, the head of the Communist Party of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, has not so far been affected. He is the provincial head of the party continuously since 1994 and is considered very close to President Hu Jintao. During the demonstrations, most of the slogans were against him. Large sections of the Hans of Urumqi blame him for the failure of the police to
protect them, but he can be removed only by the central party Politburo or its Standing Committee in Beijing. It would be interesting to see whether he too is removed by the Politburo or whether he is protected from any humiliation by President Hu Jintao.
6. If he is removed, that could be an indication that Hu's position in the party has been weakened by the developments in Xinjiang. If he manages to stay on despite his alleged mishandling of the situation, that could be an indication that Hu's position remains strong.
7. The other person whose future requires watching is China's Public Security Minister Meng Jianzhu, who rushed to Urumqi from Beijing on September 4. He is responsible for supervising the work of the Public Security Department of the province. If the provincial chief is removed because of the situation, can Meng in Beijing escape responsibility for failing to supervise his work effectively. Meng can be removed only by the National People's Congress or its Standing Committee on the recommendation of the party.
8. One possibility is that Wang and Meng may be allowed to continue till the celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the People's Republic of China next month are over and may be eased out thereafter. Will the Han residents of Urumqi remain quiet till then or will they resume their demand for sacking Wang immediately. If the Hans resume their demand for removing Wang and if Hu doesn't do so, there is a danger of the public anger turning against him.
9. In the meanwhile, there was relative calm in Urumqi on September 5. There was one attempt by a group of about 1000 young Hans to gather at the central square, but this was thwarted by the police without using force. The authorities allowed the local mosques to hold their Ramadan prayers. Many shops were open. However, there was a heavy presence of the People's Armed Police all over the city. Despite
this, more incidents of needle-stabbings were reported. There have been no fatalities due to the stabbings, but for the last three days rumours have been circulating in the city that the Uighurs have been trying to infect the Hans with the HIV virus. This has added to the panic. A team of Army doctors has been rushed to Urumqi from the PLA headquarters in Beijing to examine the persons injured by the
needle-stabbings and to dispel these rumours.
10.The local security agencies are totally non-plussed and do not know how to deal with the new modus operandi of the Uighurs, which amounts to the use of soft terror, that is, criminal intimidation, causing polarisation between Muslims and non-Muslims and discrediting the security agencies in the eyes of the public through means, which do not cause mass fatalities. Or are some local irrational elements, having
nothing to do with terrorism or extremism, causing a scare in the population similar to the anthrax scare in the US after 9/11? (5-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
TO STRIKE OR NOT TO STRIKE? A COUNTER-INSURGENCY DILEMMA
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO. 554
B.RAMAN
A NATO air strike of September 4,2009, in the Kunduz province in Northern Afghanistan on two fuel tankers hijacked by the Taliban in order to prevent the Taliban from making use of the fuel has caused a tremendous controversy over the collateral damage caused by the air strike.
2. These tankers were reportedly bringing fuel for NATO use via Tajikistan. In view of the repeated disruptions of logistic supplies to the NATO troops via Pakistani territory due to attacks by the Pakistani Taliban called the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the NATO troops have developed an alternate route for logistic supplies via Russia and the Central Asian Republics (CAR). There have been indications that the Afghan Taliban and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan ( IMU) were planning to disrupt this alternative route too by stepping up their activities in Northern Afghanistan and the CARs. There have already been indications of a revival of acts of terrorism by pro-Al Qaeda organisations in the CARs.
3. Two of these fuel tankers coming from or via Tajikistan were reportedly hijacked by the Neo Taliban of Afghanistan. It is not clear from available reports whether the hijacking was done in Tajik or Afghan territory. The reports say that after hijacking the tankers, the Neo Taliban group responsible for the hijacking beheaded the drivers and started driving them to the area controlled by it. On the way one of the tankers developed some technical trouble and stalled. Some members of the local community gathered round it, reportedly to help themselves to some of the fuel.After assessing the situation and satisfying itself that any collateral damage to civilians will be minimal, a NATO air strike was ordered on the tankers. There are conflicting reports of the fatalities caused by the exploding fuel tankers as a result of the air strike---- varying between 60 and 90.
4. In an operation of this kind, there are bound to have been civilian casualties. It would be difficult to quantify how many of those killed were from the Neo Taliban and how many were civilians.Even though an enquiry has been ordered by the NATO officials, they would find it difficult to arrive at an acceptable figure of civilian fatalities.It would be impossible to prove or disprove the contention of either side. The NATO's contention is that even if there were civilian fatalities, their number would be small and that the majority of those killed were from
the Neo Taliban. The contention of the Neo Taliban is that most of those killed were innocent civilians. In a situation such as this, the general population will always believe the insurgents and not the security forces. This is one of the inherent hazards in a counter-insurgency operation. The security forces have to live with it.
5. One could understand the factors which must have prompted the air strike. First, to prevent the Neo Taliban from using the fuel for adding to its capabilities. Second, to deter future attempts to disrupt supplies from or through the CARs. At the same time, air strikes on a fuel tanker----particularly if it is stationery--- carry with them the risk of unacceptable collateral damage, which would be exploited by the insurgents to the detriment of the security forces and their counter-insurgency operations.
6. One of the lessons from this incident could be to avoid air strikes on stationery fuel tankers. Air strikes on fuel tankers moving on country roads in an isolated or thinly-inhabited area normally will carry less danger of civilian fatalities. There are situations where the security forces should resist the urge to act. What happened on September 4 was one such situation. (5-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
A NATO air strike of September 4,2009, in the Kunduz province in Northern Afghanistan on two fuel tankers hijacked by the Taliban in order to prevent the Taliban from making use of the fuel has caused a tremendous controversy over the collateral damage caused by the air strike.
2. These tankers were reportedly bringing fuel for NATO use via Tajikistan. In view of the repeated disruptions of logistic supplies to the NATO troops via Pakistani territory due to attacks by the Pakistani Taliban called the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the NATO troops have developed an alternate route for logistic supplies via Russia and the Central Asian Republics (CAR). There have been indications that the Afghan Taliban and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan ( IMU) were planning to disrupt this alternative route too by stepping up their activities in Northern Afghanistan and the CARs. There have already been indications of a revival of acts of terrorism by pro-Al Qaeda organisations in the CARs.
3. Two of these fuel tankers coming from or via Tajikistan were reportedly hijacked by the Neo Taliban of Afghanistan. It is not clear from available reports whether the hijacking was done in Tajik or Afghan territory. The reports say that after hijacking the tankers, the Neo Taliban group responsible for the hijacking beheaded the drivers and started driving them to the area controlled by it. On the way one of the tankers developed some technical trouble and stalled. Some members of the local community gathered round it, reportedly to help themselves to some of the fuel.After assessing the situation and satisfying itself that any collateral damage to civilians will be minimal, a NATO air strike was ordered on the tankers. There are conflicting reports of the fatalities caused by the exploding fuel tankers as a result of the air strike---- varying between 60 and 90.
4. In an operation of this kind, there are bound to have been civilian casualties. It would be difficult to quantify how many of those killed were from the Neo Taliban and how many were civilians.Even though an enquiry has been ordered by the NATO officials, they would find it difficult to arrive at an acceptable figure of civilian fatalities.It would be impossible to prove or disprove the contention of either side. The NATO's contention is that even if there were civilian fatalities, their number would be small and that the majority of those killed were from
the Neo Taliban. The contention of the Neo Taliban is that most of those killed were innocent civilians. In a situation such as this, the general population will always believe the insurgents and not the security forces. This is one of the inherent hazards in a counter-insurgency operation. The security forces have to live with it.
5. One could understand the factors which must have prompted the air strike. First, to prevent the Neo Taliban from using the fuel for adding to its capabilities. Second, to deter future attempts to disrupt supplies from or through the CARs. At the same time, air strikes on a fuel tanker----particularly if it is stationery--- carry with them the risk of unacceptable collateral damage, which would be exploited by the insurgents to the detriment of the security forces and their counter-insurgency operations.
6. One of the lessons from this incident could be to avoid air strikes on stationery fuel tankers. Air strikes on fuel tankers moving on country roads in an isolated or thinly-inhabited area normally will carry less danger of civilian fatalities. There are situations where the security forces should resist the urge to act. What happened on September 4 was one such situation. (5-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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