B.RAMAN
As I read the late night communication of the Election Commission to Varun Gandhi, son of Sanjay and Maneka Gandhi and grandson ofIndira Gandhi, and his reply to the Election Commission, I was reminded of the exchange of midnight missives between his illustriousgrandmother and the so-called Syndicate in the Congress before the Presidential elections in the late 1960s in which V.V.Giri, supported byher, was elected and Sanjiva Reddy, supported by the Syndicate, was defeated.
2. Indira Gandhi rightly viewed the machinations of the Syndicate as an attempt to marginalise her in the Congress Party and put a stop toher political aspirations. She fought back ferociously and ultimately prevailed. The Syndicate did not forgive her for this. When the Congresslost the elections after the lifting of the Emergency in 1977, the Syndicate had its moments of revenge. It got Sanjiva Reddy elected as thePresident and sought to humiliate her in every way possible. She ferociously fought back again and returned to power in 1980. Nobodyremembers the Syndicate. Its members have been consigned to the dustbin of history. Everybody remembers Indira Gandhi.
3.A grand-son of Indira Gandhi is now fighting ferociously against what he apparently sees as an attempt by a syndicate of so-calledsecularists to discredit him and crush his political aspirations even before he could take his first firm steps in politics. He has every right tofight. His grand-mother must be watching from heaven her grand-son fighting as ferociously as she did against what he perceives to be thedenial of the right of natural justice to him.
4.The extremely objectionable remarks alleged to have been made by Varun Gandhi during two pre-election meetings in the Philbitconstituency should be strongly condemned by all right-thinking persons as distasteful, irresponsible and unworthy of a political leader if itis established that he did make those remarks.
5. If he had not contested those remarks and, on the contrary, if he had tried to justify them, there would have been no need for a furtherenquiry before condemning him. But he has contested the remarks which he is supposed to have made and he has not justified them. Hehas challenged the genuineness of the tapes and alleged that the tapes have been doctored.
6. In TV interviews, he has given a number of arguments as to why he contended that the tapes had been doctored. Many of his arguments could be dismissed as after-thoughts but not one, namely, his contention that in a tape he is shown as referring to a sister of his whereashe had no sister. If what he says about the contents of the tapes is correct, there is a serious mistake of fact in the remarks which he isshown as making. Where there is such a serious mistake of fact, there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. He has notbeen given the benefit of this presumption.
7. There are certain procedural infirmities in the way the Election Commission has passed its order of March 22,2009, against Varun. Thefirst infirmity arises from the fact that the Commission has passed an ex-parte order without giving Varun an opportunity to appear beforethe Commission and explain his conduct. An ex-parte order is permissible if a person against whom an enquiry is being made was given anopportunity to appear before the enquiry body and explain his conduct, but he did not do so. When a person fails to respond to a summonsto appear before an enquiry body and explain his conduct, he is presumed to be avoiding the due process of the rules or the law. There is anautomatic presumption of guilt against him.
8. All of us, including the distinguished members of the Election Commission, had served as bureaucrats. We had all done our training before we started our career. We had all attended courses in how to hold an enquiry and about the importance of being fair in an enquiry.There are detailed departmental orders in the Govt. of India and the States as to how to hold a fair enquiry. All these orders lay down thatevery person against whom an enquiry is held has a right for a personal hearing before the enquiry officer twice----- before the enquiry startsand again before an adverse ruling is pronounced by the enquiry officer. If Varun Gandhi is to be believed, these dos and don'ts of a fairenquiry were not followed in his case.
9. The second infirmity arises with regard to Varun's contention that the tapes seem to have been doctored. The Election Commission hasheld that it was for him to prove this. How could he have explained to the Commission as to why he thought that the tapes might have beendoctored if he was not given an opportunity for a personal hearing. There are two ways of proving that a tape must have been doctored----forensically or by pointing out serious mistakes of fact in the contents of the tape, which are glaring and could not have been made by him.It would have been but fair that he was given an opportunity to appear before the Commission and explain why he contended that the tapesmust have been doctored.
10.Priyanka Gandhi, another grand-child of Indira Gandhi, has reportedly advised Varun to read and understand the Gita better. She shouldtoo. In fact, all of us, who consider ourselves proud Hindus, should. In the Gita, Lord Krishna advises and convinces Arjun as to why oneshould sometimes fight even against one's kith and kin if there were strong moral grounds for doing so.
11. That is why Indira Gandhi fought ferociously against the Syndicate of the Congress.
12. If Varun thinks that he should emulate his illustrious grand-mother and fight ferociously against what he sees as the unfair attitude ofthe syndicate of so-called secularists against him, he has every right to do so.
13. Incidentally, if Varun is guilty of inciting hatred against the members of another community--- a charge that he denies strongly--- LordKrishna was guilty of inciting hatred among members of the same family. (24-3-09)
(The writer is former Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi )
Monday, March 23, 2009
Sunday, March 22, 2009
CIA CHIEF'S VISIT TO INDIA & PAKISTAN
B.RAMAN
Leon Panetta, who took over as the 19th Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on February 13,2009, is presently on his firstoverseas tour. After having visited India from March 18 to 20,2009, he proceeded to Pakistan for discussions with Pakistani Army andintelligence officers and political leaders.
2.Panetta, who chose India for his first overseas visit since assuming office, arrived in New Delhi, along with Peter Burleigh, a 67-year-oldretired American career diplomat, who has been designated as the "Interim Ambassador" of the US to India . It has been reported that hewill act as the Charge d' Affaires (CDA) in the US Embassy in New Delhi till an Ambassador is nominated by President Barack Obama and hisnomination is confirmed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
3. The Obama Administration is understood to have put all major decisions relating to India including political-level bilateral visits at Cabinetlevel and the designation of the new Ambassador on hold till the elections to the Lok Sabha, the lower House of the Indian Parliament, are over and a new Government is in position in New Delhi by May-end. However, this decision would not affect exchange of visits at the seniorlevel of bureaucrats. Moreover, Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh is due to meet President Barrack Obama for the first time in the marginsof the G-20 summit at London next month.
4. Panetta, whose parents had migrated to California from Italy, had served as a member of the House of Representatives from one of theconstituencies of California, from 1977 to 1993. He served as the Chairman of the Budget Committee of the House for the last four years ofhis term in the House. He then became Director of the Office of Management and Budget. From July 1994 to January 1997, he served as theChief of Staff to the then President Bill Clinton.
5. As the White House Chief of Staff, he became close to Bill and Hillary Clinton. It is believed that he stilll maintains this close personalfriendship with the Clintons and that Bill Clinton played a role in the surprise decision of Obama in January last to nominate him as the newDirector of the CIA, despite the fact that the 70-year-old Panetta, who has become the oldest chief of the CIA in its history, has never hadany exposure to professional intelligence work except for three years from 1964 to 66 when he had served as an army intelligence officer.His area expertise is limited to Iraq. He had served as a member of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group set up by the Congress in 1996 to makean independent assessment of the war in Iraq.
6. Obama's nomination of a non-professional with no past exposure to the work of the CIA as the new Director came in for criticism not onlyfrom some retired officers of the US intelligence community, but also from some members of the Congressional Intelligence OversightCommittees. Despite this, his nomination was confirmed and he took over as the new Director. In his first address to the CIA officers aftertaking over, Panetta, who has a keen sense of humour, referred jocularly to references to him in some sections of the media as the oldest Director of the CIA and reportedly pointed out that the dog, which won a popular annual dog show this year, was 10 years old.
7. It is believed that Obama chose him as the Director because of his excellent reputation in the past as a good manager. Knowledgablepeople say that Obama, who is keen to tone up administration and man management in the CIA and rid it of unethical practices in the waragainst terrorism, felt that only an outsider would be able to do it without covering up past unethical practices. Moreover, under GeorgeTenet as the Director during the invasion and occupation of Iraq, the CIA had come in for criticism for avoiding projecting the true groundsituation to President George Bush. It allegedly told Bush and his Vice-President Dick Cheney what they liked to be told and not what theyought to have been told. Panetta is expected to correct the analytical methods of the CIA in order not to let its reports and analyses beinfluenced by the preconceptions of the President.
8. In his first message to the CIA officers, Panetta has been quoted as saying: "When President Obama asked if I would accept thisassignment, he said he wanted someone he could trust, who was independent, and who would call them as he sees them. Throughout my40-year career in government, I have made it a point to speak honestly to my colleagues, my coworkers, my constituents, and my President.I hope that we can speak honestly to each other and to those we serve."
9. Till 2004, the Director of the CIA was also the Director, Central Intelligence, and in that capacity, in addition to running theCIA,co-ordinated the working of the entire intelligence community. In 2004, acting on a recommendation of the National Commission, whichenquired into the 9/11 terrorist strikes, Bush separated the two functions and created a separate and a higher level post of Director NationalIntelligence to handle the work of co-ordination. From the pre-2004 status of the first among equals, Director CIA has now become oneamong equals in the intelligence community. Despite this, he occupies a very high position in policy-making relating to national securityand in that capacity, Panetta will be in the inner core of Obama's advisers.
10. If Obama chose Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, to pay the first overseas visit at the Cabinet level to Japan, South Korea, Indonesiaand China to underline the importance attached by his administration to this region, it is significant that the first overseas visit of an innercore policy adviser has been to India and Pakistan. This underlines the importance attached by Obama to the US relations with India and tothe importance of Pakistan from the point of the fight against terrorism.
11. It is interesting that the CIA, India's Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) and Intelligence Bureau (IB) are having new heads who took overduring the course of the last 11 weeks.Rajiv Mathur, a career intelligence officer, took over as the Director of the IB, on January 1,2009, K.C.Verma, as Secretary (R), the head of the R&AW, on February 1,2009, and Panetta as the Director of the CIA on February 13,2009. WhereasPanetta is totally new to the profession, Mathur and Verma have over two decades of exposure to professional intelligence work. Theywould have got going from the moment they took over, but Panetta will take time to get a hang of the operatuional work before he is able toimpart his stamp.
12. It is equally interesting to note that just as Obama nominated Panetta as the chief of the CIA to tone up its man management andadministration and to rid it of unhealthy practices, the Manmohan Singh Government reportedly inducted K.C.Verma from the IB to the R&AWwith a similar objective. There has been as much criticism of the internal functioning of the R&AW as there was of the CIA.
13. One could assess without fear of contradiction that the New Delhi visit of Panetta, who is still to find his feet as an intelligence chief,would have had a much larger political objective for Obama. Firstly, to reassure Indian leaders that the first visit of Hillary Clinton to Chinadoes not mean the downgrading of the US relations with India. Secondly, to reassure India of continued US assistance in the investigationof the 26/11 terrorist strike in Mumbai and continued US pressure on Pakistan to investigate the case seriously and sincerely. Thirdly, toassess the pre-election political scene in India for his President.
14. The nomination of Burleigh as an "interim Ambassador" and CDA and his travelling together with Panetta to New Delhi underline the USinterest in monitoring and assessing the pre-election political scene. The Obama Administration's avoidance of any major policy initiativesand pronouncements with regard to India is motivated by its desire to keep its options open and not to burn in advance its bridges with anydispensation coming to office in New Delhi after the elections. The US has many retired diplomats , who had spent many years of theircareer in the sub-continent. All of them are quite knowledgeable on India--- but each only on some aspects of India.Some are knowledgeableon the Congress Party, some on the BJP and its Hindutva group amd some others, who had served in the sub-continent in the cold waryears, are knowledgeable on the communist parties and their suspected links with the then USSR and China.
15. Burleigh belongs to the third category. He had his first exposure to the sub-continent as a Peace Corps volunteer in Nepal in the early1960s. From the Peace Corps, he gravitated to the State Department and spent some years of his diplomatic career in Nepal, India and SriLanka. As a junior diplomat, he had served in the US Embassy in Colombo from 1968 to 1970 and in New Delhi from 1973 to 1975. He alsoserved as the US Ambassador to Sri Lanka from 1995 to 1997. In one of the web sites of the old Peace Corps volunteers, he had enteredthe following post about himself: "After graduating from Colgate in 1963, I spent two years as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Nepal, then a yearof graduate study in South Asian affairs at the University of Pennsylvania, and another year in Nepal on a student Fulbright grant. On returning from Nepal in 1967, I joined the State Department and was assigned -- you guessed it -- to Sri Lanka, where I was a junior officer trainee until 1970. I learned the language, Sinhala, at that time and, courtesy of Senator Jesse Helms (who, as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, held up final confirmation of 35 of us), was able to spend another seven months in 1995 resurrecting that language ability. I use the language a lot, with Buddhist monks and village people in particular. English is widely used in government and the commercial sector of the economy. Between 1970 and December 1995 I served in India, Bahrain and Nepal in positions of increasingseniority, and for the past 13 years I was in Washington in a series of jobs. These included three deputy assistant secretary positions aswell as coordinator for counter-terrorism. The last position carried with it ambassadorial rank, though I was based in Washington. "
16. When he was posted in the US Embassy in New Delhi from 1973 to 75, the Indian communists and anti-US magazines like the "Blitz"used to accuse him of being a CIA officer working under a diplomatic cover. While it is difficult to prove this, it needs to be noted that hehad served as the Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator in the US State Department in Washington DC in 1991-92. Past holders of this post had aCIA or FBI background,
17. It is intriguing that the Obama Administration should have taken an old cold warrior such as Burleigh out of the circuit of retireddiplomats and sent him to New Delhi to hold the fort in the US Embassy during the pre-poll interregnum. Has he been sent to monitor andassess the chances of the Third Front and the likely impact on India's policy towards the US should the Third Front which has thecommunists as partners come to power? A valid question, but difficult to answer. The Congress (I) and the BJP are known quantities to theState Department and the US wouldn't be unduly concerned if either of them comes to power at the head of a coalition. But the Third Frontwith its Communists is an unknown kettle of fish.
18. Panetta's visit to New Delhi during which he had publicised meetings with P.Chidambram, the Home Minister, in addition to meetingswith M.K.Narayanan, the National Security Adviser,K.C.Verma,and Rajeev Mathur, has been criticised by the Communist Party of India(Marxist).In a statement, the party’s Polit Bureau said this was the first time that the CIA chief was accorded a meeting with the Union HomeMinister. Apart from meeting his intelligence counterparts in India, Panetta was received at the political level, signalling the new status ofthe CIA in India. It added: “The CIA is notorious for its interventions in the political affairs of various countries including destabilisinggovernments considered inimical to U.S. interests.The development is a pointer to how things have changed under the Manmohan SinghGovernment. India is fast becoming like Pakistan where the CIA and the FBI chiefs meet with the Interior Minister and Prime Minister. The role being played by the U.S. security and military agencies in the country and the manner in which the Congress-led Government ispromoting such ties should be a matter of serious concern for all those who wish to protect national sovereignty and the integrity of thecountry’s democratic system."
19.The Indian intelligence has been having a liaison relationship with the CIA since the days of Jawaharlal Nehru. This was handled by theIB till September,1968, and thereafter by the R&AW. Many CIA chiefs had visited India in the past. Their visits used to be graded as topsecret. Their programme in New Delhi used to be restricted to professional discussions with the heads of the IB and the R&AW and acourtesy call on the Prime Minister.
20. This was for security and political reasons. Before international terrorism became a majour source of concern, the securty reasonsmainly related to possible threats to the physical security of the visiting CIA chief from the intelligence agencies of the communistcountries. After the collapse of the USSR and other communist regimes in East Europe and after the normalisation of the US relations withChina, this concern is no longer there. But, since the late 1980s, terrorism has become a major source of concern. CIA officials responsiblefor the security of their Director and their officials posted in India for liaison purposes used to prefer that the visits be kept secret. Indianagencies too preferred secrecy because they were rightly concerned that if the visits were open, jihadi terrorist threats to India and to USnationals and interests in India, including to the US diplomatic and consular missions in India, might increase.
21. This position started changing when Atal Behari Vajpayee was the Prime Minister. The visit of George Tenet, the then Director of theCIA, to India was kept a secret, but the visits of the No.2 to Tenet subsequenly were publicised. L.K.Advani, the then Home Minister, cameto be associated with the visits of CIA officials to New Delhi. Their programmes included a courtesy call on the Home Minister. Not only that,Advani too, during his visit to the US in 2002, reportedly called on Tenet in his office. This caused some eyebrow-raising because while it isnormal for a visiting bureaucrat --- as a CIA Director is---to call on important political leaders of the host country, it is unusual for a seniorpolitical leader ranking No.2 in the Government to call on a bureaucrat of the host country. Pakistani leaders, in their eagerness to cultivatethe US, do it often, but Indian leaders had not done it in the past. There was some unhappiness in sections of the Indian intelligencecommunity that this could downgrade the importance and status of Indian intelligence chiefs in the eyes of their US counterparts. If US intelligence officials have easy access to our senior Ministers, why should they bother about our intelligence chiefs?
22. Panetta's visit to Pakistan is evidently related to the messy political situation there and to the on-going review by the ObamaAdministration of its strategy to counter Al Qaeda and the Taliban. There is a general acceptance among the advisers of Obama that nostrategy can succeed without the co-operation of Pakistan and that, at the same time, exercising too much pressure on Pakistan can provecounter-productive and add to the political instability. The search for a credible policy of carrots (enhanced military and economic aid) andsticks (continuing Predator strikes and threats of more if the Pakistan Army does not act) is still continuing. The CIA plays an important rolein this search. The Predator strikes----over 30 since last September and 6 of them since Obama assumed office---- are handled by the CIA.Obama has not yet taken a policy decision on the recommendation by his advisers to extend the Predator strikes to attack the hide-outs ofthe Neo Taliban of Afghanistan in Balochistan. There has been strong opposition to this extension not only from Pakistani political andmilitary leaders, but also from some US analysts and Congressmen, who fear this could turn messy and add to the political instability inPakistan. If Obama ultimately decides to extend the strikes to Balochistan, the CIA will have to co-ordinate them. One of the purposes ofPanetta's visit will be to make an on-the-spot assessment of the implications before a final decision is taken. (22-3-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Leon Panetta, who took over as the 19th Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on February 13,2009, is presently on his firstoverseas tour. After having visited India from March 18 to 20,2009, he proceeded to Pakistan for discussions with Pakistani Army andintelligence officers and political leaders.
2.Panetta, who chose India for his first overseas visit since assuming office, arrived in New Delhi, along with Peter Burleigh, a 67-year-oldretired American career diplomat, who has been designated as the "Interim Ambassador" of the US to India . It has been reported that hewill act as the Charge d' Affaires (CDA) in the US Embassy in New Delhi till an Ambassador is nominated by President Barack Obama and hisnomination is confirmed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
3. The Obama Administration is understood to have put all major decisions relating to India including political-level bilateral visits at Cabinetlevel and the designation of the new Ambassador on hold till the elections to the Lok Sabha, the lower House of the Indian Parliament, are over and a new Government is in position in New Delhi by May-end. However, this decision would not affect exchange of visits at the seniorlevel of bureaucrats. Moreover, Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh is due to meet President Barrack Obama for the first time in the marginsof the G-20 summit at London next month.
4. Panetta, whose parents had migrated to California from Italy, had served as a member of the House of Representatives from one of theconstituencies of California, from 1977 to 1993. He served as the Chairman of the Budget Committee of the House for the last four years ofhis term in the House. He then became Director of the Office of Management and Budget. From July 1994 to January 1997, he served as theChief of Staff to the then President Bill Clinton.
5. As the White House Chief of Staff, he became close to Bill and Hillary Clinton. It is believed that he stilll maintains this close personalfriendship with the Clintons and that Bill Clinton played a role in the surprise decision of Obama in January last to nominate him as the newDirector of the CIA, despite the fact that the 70-year-old Panetta, who has become the oldest chief of the CIA in its history, has never hadany exposure to professional intelligence work except for three years from 1964 to 66 when he had served as an army intelligence officer.His area expertise is limited to Iraq. He had served as a member of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group set up by the Congress in 1996 to makean independent assessment of the war in Iraq.
6. Obama's nomination of a non-professional with no past exposure to the work of the CIA as the new Director came in for criticism not onlyfrom some retired officers of the US intelligence community, but also from some members of the Congressional Intelligence OversightCommittees. Despite this, his nomination was confirmed and he took over as the new Director. In his first address to the CIA officers aftertaking over, Panetta, who has a keen sense of humour, referred jocularly to references to him in some sections of the media as the oldest Director of the CIA and reportedly pointed out that the dog, which won a popular annual dog show this year, was 10 years old.
7. It is believed that Obama chose him as the Director because of his excellent reputation in the past as a good manager. Knowledgablepeople say that Obama, who is keen to tone up administration and man management in the CIA and rid it of unethical practices in the waragainst terrorism, felt that only an outsider would be able to do it without covering up past unethical practices. Moreover, under GeorgeTenet as the Director during the invasion and occupation of Iraq, the CIA had come in for criticism for avoiding projecting the true groundsituation to President George Bush. It allegedly told Bush and his Vice-President Dick Cheney what they liked to be told and not what theyought to have been told. Panetta is expected to correct the analytical methods of the CIA in order not to let its reports and analyses beinfluenced by the preconceptions of the President.
8. In his first message to the CIA officers, Panetta has been quoted as saying: "When President Obama asked if I would accept thisassignment, he said he wanted someone he could trust, who was independent, and who would call them as he sees them. Throughout my40-year career in government, I have made it a point to speak honestly to my colleagues, my coworkers, my constituents, and my President.I hope that we can speak honestly to each other and to those we serve."
9. Till 2004, the Director of the CIA was also the Director, Central Intelligence, and in that capacity, in addition to running theCIA,co-ordinated the working of the entire intelligence community. In 2004, acting on a recommendation of the National Commission, whichenquired into the 9/11 terrorist strikes, Bush separated the two functions and created a separate and a higher level post of Director NationalIntelligence to handle the work of co-ordination. From the pre-2004 status of the first among equals, Director CIA has now become oneamong equals in the intelligence community. Despite this, he occupies a very high position in policy-making relating to national securityand in that capacity, Panetta will be in the inner core of Obama's advisers.
10. If Obama chose Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, to pay the first overseas visit at the Cabinet level to Japan, South Korea, Indonesiaand China to underline the importance attached by his administration to this region, it is significant that the first overseas visit of an innercore policy adviser has been to India and Pakistan. This underlines the importance attached by Obama to the US relations with India and tothe importance of Pakistan from the point of the fight against terrorism.
11. It is interesting that the CIA, India's Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) and Intelligence Bureau (IB) are having new heads who took overduring the course of the last 11 weeks.Rajiv Mathur, a career intelligence officer, took over as the Director of the IB, on January 1,2009, K.C.Verma, as Secretary (R), the head of the R&AW, on February 1,2009, and Panetta as the Director of the CIA on February 13,2009. WhereasPanetta is totally new to the profession, Mathur and Verma have over two decades of exposure to professional intelligence work. Theywould have got going from the moment they took over, but Panetta will take time to get a hang of the operatuional work before he is able toimpart his stamp.
12. It is equally interesting to note that just as Obama nominated Panetta as the chief of the CIA to tone up its man management andadministration and to rid it of unhealthy practices, the Manmohan Singh Government reportedly inducted K.C.Verma from the IB to the R&AWwith a similar objective. There has been as much criticism of the internal functioning of the R&AW as there was of the CIA.
13. One could assess without fear of contradiction that the New Delhi visit of Panetta, who is still to find his feet as an intelligence chief,would have had a much larger political objective for Obama. Firstly, to reassure Indian leaders that the first visit of Hillary Clinton to Chinadoes not mean the downgrading of the US relations with India. Secondly, to reassure India of continued US assistance in the investigationof the 26/11 terrorist strike in Mumbai and continued US pressure on Pakistan to investigate the case seriously and sincerely. Thirdly, toassess the pre-election political scene in India for his President.
14. The nomination of Burleigh as an "interim Ambassador" and CDA and his travelling together with Panetta to New Delhi underline the USinterest in monitoring and assessing the pre-election political scene. The Obama Administration's avoidance of any major policy initiativesand pronouncements with regard to India is motivated by its desire to keep its options open and not to burn in advance its bridges with anydispensation coming to office in New Delhi after the elections. The US has many retired diplomats , who had spent many years of theircareer in the sub-continent. All of them are quite knowledgeable on India--- but each only on some aspects of India.Some are knowledgeableon the Congress Party, some on the BJP and its Hindutva group amd some others, who had served in the sub-continent in the cold waryears, are knowledgeable on the communist parties and their suspected links with the then USSR and China.
15. Burleigh belongs to the third category. He had his first exposure to the sub-continent as a Peace Corps volunteer in Nepal in the early1960s. From the Peace Corps, he gravitated to the State Department and spent some years of his diplomatic career in Nepal, India and SriLanka. As a junior diplomat, he had served in the US Embassy in Colombo from 1968 to 1970 and in New Delhi from 1973 to 1975. He alsoserved as the US Ambassador to Sri Lanka from 1995 to 1997. In one of the web sites of the old Peace Corps volunteers, he had enteredthe following post about himself: "After graduating from Colgate in 1963, I spent two years as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Nepal, then a yearof graduate study in South Asian affairs at the University of Pennsylvania, and another year in Nepal on a student Fulbright grant. On returning from Nepal in 1967, I joined the State Department and was assigned -- you guessed it -- to Sri Lanka, where I was a junior officer trainee until 1970. I learned the language, Sinhala, at that time and, courtesy of Senator Jesse Helms (who, as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, held up final confirmation of 35 of us), was able to spend another seven months in 1995 resurrecting that language ability. I use the language a lot, with Buddhist monks and village people in particular. English is widely used in government and the commercial sector of the economy. Between 1970 and December 1995 I served in India, Bahrain and Nepal in positions of increasingseniority, and for the past 13 years I was in Washington in a series of jobs. These included three deputy assistant secretary positions aswell as coordinator for counter-terrorism. The last position carried with it ambassadorial rank, though I was based in Washington. "
16. When he was posted in the US Embassy in New Delhi from 1973 to 75, the Indian communists and anti-US magazines like the "Blitz"used to accuse him of being a CIA officer working under a diplomatic cover. While it is difficult to prove this, it needs to be noted that hehad served as the Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator in the US State Department in Washington DC in 1991-92. Past holders of this post had aCIA or FBI background,
17. It is intriguing that the Obama Administration should have taken an old cold warrior such as Burleigh out of the circuit of retireddiplomats and sent him to New Delhi to hold the fort in the US Embassy during the pre-poll interregnum. Has he been sent to monitor andassess the chances of the Third Front and the likely impact on India's policy towards the US should the Third Front which has thecommunists as partners come to power? A valid question, but difficult to answer. The Congress (I) and the BJP are known quantities to theState Department and the US wouldn't be unduly concerned if either of them comes to power at the head of a coalition. But the Third Frontwith its Communists is an unknown kettle of fish.
18. Panetta's visit to New Delhi during which he had publicised meetings with P.Chidambram, the Home Minister, in addition to meetingswith M.K.Narayanan, the National Security Adviser,K.C.Verma,and Rajeev Mathur, has been criticised by the Communist Party of India(Marxist).In a statement, the party’s Polit Bureau said this was the first time that the CIA chief was accorded a meeting with the Union HomeMinister. Apart from meeting his intelligence counterparts in India, Panetta was received at the political level, signalling the new status ofthe CIA in India. It added: “The CIA is notorious for its interventions in the political affairs of various countries including destabilisinggovernments considered inimical to U.S. interests.The development is a pointer to how things have changed under the Manmohan SinghGovernment. India is fast becoming like Pakistan where the CIA and the FBI chiefs meet with the Interior Minister and Prime Minister. The role being played by the U.S. security and military agencies in the country and the manner in which the Congress-led Government ispromoting such ties should be a matter of serious concern for all those who wish to protect national sovereignty and the integrity of thecountry’s democratic system."
19.The Indian intelligence has been having a liaison relationship with the CIA since the days of Jawaharlal Nehru. This was handled by theIB till September,1968, and thereafter by the R&AW. Many CIA chiefs had visited India in the past. Their visits used to be graded as topsecret. Their programme in New Delhi used to be restricted to professional discussions with the heads of the IB and the R&AW and acourtesy call on the Prime Minister.
20. This was for security and political reasons. Before international terrorism became a majour source of concern, the securty reasonsmainly related to possible threats to the physical security of the visiting CIA chief from the intelligence agencies of the communistcountries. After the collapse of the USSR and other communist regimes in East Europe and after the normalisation of the US relations withChina, this concern is no longer there. But, since the late 1980s, terrorism has become a major source of concern. CIA officials responsiblefor the security of their Director and their officials posted in India for liaison purposes used to prefer that the visits be kept secret. Indianagencies too preferred secrecy because they were rightly concerned that if the visits were open, jihadi terrorist threats to India and to USnationals and interests in India, including to the US diplomatic and consular missions in India, might increase.
21. This position started changing when Atal Behari Vajpayee was the Prime Minister. The visit of George Tenet, the then Director of theCIA, to India was kept a secret, but the visits of the No.2 to Tenet subsequenly were publicised. L.K.Advani, the then Home Minister, cameto be associated with the visits of CIA officials to New Delhi. Their programmes included a courtesy call on the Home Minister. Not only that,Advani too, during his visit to the US in 2002, reportedly called on Tenet in his office. This caused some eyebrow-raising because while it isnormal for a visiting bureaucrat --- as a CIA Director is---to call on important political leaders of the host country, it is unusual for a seniorpolitical leader ranking No.2 in the Government to call on a bureaucrat of the host country. Pakistani leaders, in their eagerness to cultivatethe US, do it often, but Indian leaders had not done it in the past. There was some unhappiness in sections of the Indian intelligencecommunity that this could downgrade the importance and status of Indian intelligence chiefs in the eyes of their US counterparts. If US intelligence officials have easy access to our senior Ministers, why should they bother about our intelligence chiefs?
22. Panetta's visit to Pakistan is evidently related to the messy political situation there and to the on-going review by the ObamaAdministration of its strategy to counter Al Qaeda and the Taliban. There is a general acceptance among the advisers of Obama that nostrategy can succeed without the co-operation of Pakistan and that, at the same time, exercising too much pressure on Pakistan can provecounter-productive and add to the political instability. The search for a credible policy of carrots (enhanced military and economic aid) andsticks (continuing Predator strikes and threats of more if the Pakistan Army does not act) is still continuing. The CIA plays an important rolein this search. The Predator strikes----over 30 since last September and 6 of them since Obama assumed office---- are handled by the CIA.Obama has not yet taken a policy decision on the recommendation by his advisers to extend the Predator strikes to attack the hide-outs ofthe Neo Taliban of Afghanistan in Balochistan. There has been strong opposition to this extension not only from Pakistani political andmilitary leaders, but also from some US analysts and Congressmen, who fear this could turn messy and add to the political instability inPakistan. If Obama ultimately decides to extend the strikes to Balochistan, the CIA will have to co-ordinate them. One of the purposes ofPanetta's visit will be to make an on-the-spot assessment of the implications before a final decision is taken. (22-3-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Thursday, March 19, 2009
CHINESE ECONOMIC BLUES
B.RAMAN
The second session of the Second Plenary of the 11th National People's Congress (NPC) of China , which is its Parliament, was held atBeijing from March 3 to 12,2009. There were detailed discussions in the NPC on the state of the nation as reported by Prime Minister WenJiabo and other Ministers. President Hu Jintao, Wen and other important members of the Government and the Chinese Communist Party alsoavailed of the presence in Bejing for the NPC session of Government and party representatives from different provinces to discuss with therepresentatives from each province in the margins of the NPC session the state of the economy in each province. They explained to therepresentatives from the provinces the measures already taken by the Government to deal with the decrease in exports, the closing downof many factories and the consequent increase in unemployment and gave guidance as to how the provinces should deal with the situation.
2. A study of the proceedings of the NPC session and of the discussions in the various interactions held by Hu, Wen and others in themargins of the NPC session indicate that the just-concluded session was largely taken up by issues relating to the economy and internalsecurity. This was indicative of the concern of the Chinese leadership over the likely impact of the economic decline on the internalsecurity situation due to the increase in unemployment and fall in the prices of agricultural accommodities due to a decrease in thepurchasing power of the people.
3. On a rough estimate, a little more than 50 per cent of the discussions was devoted to the state of the economy and about 20 per cent tothe internal security situation, including the situation in Tibet. Only the remaining 30 per cent of the discussions was devoted to otherissues. The work of the Ministry of Public Security, which is responsible for internal security, received much greater attention than the workof other Ministries.
4. It must be said to the credit of the Chinese leaders that they were quite transparent during the discussions in the NPC session as well asin the margins of the NPC session. They frankly admitted the difficulties faced by the economy,without any attempt to cover them up. At thesame time, it was pointed out that the difficulties arose due to the US mismanagement of its financial sector, which has affected andcontinues to affect all global economies for no fault of their leaders. It was explained that the difficuilties faced by China were not due toany mismanagement by its policy-makers. It was also highlighted that the Chinese banks and other financial institutions are in a good stateof health and that China's problems are radiating from the manufacturing sector, which had become over-dependent on the externalmarket---particularly the US market.
5. While there is an understanding of the need for developing the domestioc market, which was neglected till now, the Chinesepolicy-makers do not seem to realise that this is difficult in a time of declining purchasing power of the Chinese families and the consequentdecline in demand. The decline in the purchasing power of the Chinese families is due to about 20 million Chinese, who were gainfullyemployed till November last, losing their jobs and another 7.1 million new entrants to the job market finding it difficult to get a job. TheChinese policy-makers are hoping to create nine million new jobs during 2009 under their stimulus package (US $ 585 billion) announced inNovember last. Even if they succeed in doing so, there will still be about 18 million unemployed left.
6. To transform the vast rural China into a consumer market, producers of automobiles, domestic appliances etc are being encouraged totake their accumulated stocks to the countryside and sell them to the rural people. But when people have less and less money to buy eventheir essential requirements, there are very few takers for such goods in the countryside.
7. The Chinese are juggling with two mutually contradictory objectives. Firstly, how to restructure their manufacturing sector in order toenable it to look more inwards than in the past? Secondly, how to retain China's present share of the global trade, which has enabled it overthe years to earn the money for its military expanasion and modernisaion? For the retention of China's newly-acquired status as a globalpower, it is important for it not to lose its share of the global trade. They have not come out with a satisfactory policy, which could meetboth these objectives.
8. There are two possible sources of social tensions which could have an impact on the internal security situation. The likelihood oftensions arising from the serious unemployment situation has already been noted by experts in China as well as outside. The otherlikelihood of tensions in the rural areas due to the income of the rural families being hit by the fall in commodity prices has not received therequired attention. There has been a lot of focus on the likelihood of urban tensions, but not enough focus on likely rural tensions. A studyof Chinese history would show that successful mass uprisings started from the rural areas.
9. The other question left undiscussed is how the decline in the flow of inputs such as fertilisers to farming would affect China's agriculturalproduction in the short and medium terms. Job security has already become a grave issue. Can food security emerge as an equallyworrisome issue?
10. The Chinese are gratified by the US request as conveyed by Mrs.Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, during her visit to Beijing fromFebruary 20 to 22,2009 that they should continue to invest their foreign exchange reserves in US Treasury Bonds. At the same time, theyhave made it clear that their decision in this matter will be decided by their national requirements. If the stimulus package announced lastNovember does not halt their economic decline, they may have to initiate another stimulus package. To fund it, they may have to dip intotheir foreign exchange reserves.This is not the time to divert more reserves to the US bond market. They have been making this pointrepeatedly even in the past weeks before Hillary Clinton's visit.
11. Briefing the media on the NPC session on March 13,2009, Prime Minister Wen indicated another reason for the Chinese caution on theissue of investing more in the US bonds---- namely, their misgivings about the continued stability of the US dollar. Wen said: " "We lent suchhuge fund to the United States and of course we're concerned about the security of our assets and, to speak truthfully, I am a little bitworried. On the foreign reserves issue, the first consideration is the national interest. But we also have to consider the stability of theoverall international financial system, as the two factors are interlinked. China is indeed the largest creditor of the United States, which isthe world's biggest economy. We are extremely interested in developments in the U.S. economy. We are watching the effect of themeasures taken by the U.S. Government to counter the international financial crisis."
12. US policy-makers have hastened to reassure Beijing about the stability of the US dollar. In a speech at the Brookings Institution inWashington DC on March 13,2009, immediately after Wen's press conference in Beijing, Larence Summers, Obama's top economic advisor inhis capacity as the Director of the National Economic Council (NEC), said: "The U.S. would be sound stewards of the money we invest. This is a commitment that the President has made very clear --we need to be sound stewards of the money we invest."
13. Are the Chinese leaders satisfied by this assurance? One has to wait and see. They would prefer to watch for the impact of Obama'spolicies on the US banking sector before taking any decision on an increase in investments in the US bonds. In November last, the totalvalue of the Chinese holdings of the US Bonds was estimated at US $ 681.9 billion.
14. While studying the remarks of the Chinese leaders during the NPC session, one could detect an under-current of concern that theconservative anti-reform elements in the party and the Government might try to exploit the current difficulties by blaming them not on theUS mismanagement of its banking sector, but on the Chinese policy of economic reforms and globalisation itself. It was repeatedly stressedthat there would be no going back on the reforms and that China should continue to adhere to its policy of opening up its economy. (20-3-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary(retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies,Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies, E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The second session of the Second Plenary of the 11th National People's Congress (NPC) of China , which is its Parliament, was held atBeijing from March 3 to 12,2009. There were detailed discussions in the NPC on the state of the nation as reported by Prime Minister WenJiabo and other Ministers. President Hu Jintao, Wen and other important members of the Government and the Chinese Communist Party alsoavailed of the presence in Bejing for the NPC session of Government and party representatives from different provinces to discuss with therepresentatives from each province in the margins of the NPC session the state of the economy in each province. They explained to therepresentatives from the provinces the measures already taken by the Government to deal with the decrease in exports, the closing downof many factories and the consequent increase in unemployment and gave guidance as to how the provinces should deal with the situation.
2. A study of the proceedings of the NPC session and of the discussions in the various interactions held by Hu, Wen and others in themargins of the NPC session indicate that the just-concluded session was largely taken up by issues relating to the economy and internalsecurity. This was indicative of the concern of the Chinese leadership over the likely impact of the economic decline on the internalsecurity situation due to the increase in unemployment and fall in the prices of agricultural accommodities due to a decrease in thepurchasing power of the people.
3. On a rough estimate, a little more than 50 per cent of the discussions was devoted to the state of the economy and about 20 per cent tothe internal security situation, including the situation in Tibet. Only the remaining 30 per cent of the discussions was devoted to otherissues. The work of the Ministry of Public Security, which is responsible for internal security, received much greater attention than the workof other Ministries.
4. It must be said to the credit of the Chinese leaders that they were quite transparent during the discussions in the NPC session as well asin the margins of the NPC session. They frankly admitted the difficulties faced by the economy,without any attempt to cover them up. At thesame time, it was pointed out that the difficulties arose due to the US mismanagement of its financial sector, which has affected andcontinues to affect all global economies for no fault of their leaders. It was explained that the difficuilties faced by China were not due toany mismanagement by its policy-makers. It was also highlighted that the Chinese banks and other financial institutions are in a good stateof health and that China's problems are radiating from the manufacturing sector, which had become over-dependent on the externalmarket---particularly the US market.
5. While there is an understanding of the need for developing the domestioc market, which was neglected till now, the Chinesepolicy-makers do not seem to realise that this is difficult in a time of declining purchasing power of the Chinese families and the consequentdecline in demand. The decline in the purchasing power of the Chinese families is due to about 20 million Chinese, who were gainfullyemployed till November last, losing their jobs and another 7.1 million new entrants to the job market finding it difficult to get a job. TheChinese policy-makers are hoping to create nine million new jobs during 2009 under their stimulus package (US $ 585 billion) announced inNovember last. Even if they succeed in doing so, there will still be about 18 million unemployed left.
6. To transform the vast rural China into a consumer market, producers of automobiles, domestic appliances etc are being encouraged totake their accumulated stocks to the countryside and sell them to the rural people. But when people have less and less money to buy eventheir essential requirements, there are very few takers for such goods in the countryside.
7. The Chinese are juggling with two mutually contradictory objectives. Firstly, how to restructure their manufacturing sector in order toenable it to look more inwards than in the past? Secondly, how to retain China's present share of the global trade, which has enabled it overthe years to earn the money for its military expanasion and modernisaion? For the retention of China's newly-acquired status as a globalpower, it is important for it not to lose its share of the global trade. They have not come out with a satisfactory policy, which could meetboth these objectives.
8. There are two possible sources of social tensions which could have an impact on the internal security situation. The likelihood oftensions arising from the serious unemployment situation has already been noted by experts in China as well as outside. The otherlikelihood of tensions in the rural areas due to the income of the rural families being hit by the fall in commodity prices has not received therequired attention. There has been a lot of focus on the likelihood of urban tensions, but not enough focus on likely rural tensions. A studyof Chinese history would show that successful mass uprisings started from the rural areas.
9. The other question left undiscussed is how the decline in the flow of inputs such as fertilisers to farming would affect China's agriculturalproduction in the short and medium terms. Job security has already become a grave issue. Can food security emerge as an equallyworrisome issue?
10. The Chinese are gratified by the US request as conveyed by Mrs.Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, during her visit to Beijing fromFebruary 20 to 22,2009 that they should continue to invest their foreign exchange reserves in US Treasury Bonds. At the same time, theyhave made it clear that their decision in this matter will be decided by their national requirements. If the stimulus package announced lastNovember does not halt their economic decline, they may have to initiate another stimulus package. To fund it, they may have to dip intotheir foreign exchange reserves.This is not the time to divert more reserves to the US bond market. They have been making this pointrepeatedly even in the past weeks before Hillary Clinton's visit.
11. Briefing the media on the NPC session on March 13,2009, Prime Minister Wen indicated another reason for the Chinese caution on theissue of investing more in the US bonds---- namely, their misgivings about the continued stability of the US dollar. Wen said: " "We lent suchhuge fund to the United States and of course we're concerned about the security of our assets and, to speak truthfully, I am a little bitworried. On the foreign reserves issue, the first consideration is the national interest. But we also have to consider the stability of theoverall international financial system, as the two factors are interlinked. China is indeed the largest creditor of the United States, which isthe world's biggest economy. We are extremely interested in developments in the U.S. economy. We are watching the effect of themeasures taken by the U.S. Government to counter the international financial crisis."
12. US policy-makers have hastened to reassure Beijing about the stability of the US dollar. In a speech at the Brookings Institution inWashington DC on March 13,2009, immediately after Wen's press conference in Beijing, Larence Summers, Obama's top economic advisor inhis capacity as the Director of the National Economic Council (NEC), said: "The U.S. would be sound stewards of the money we invest. This is a commitment that the President has made very clear --we need to be sound stewards of the money we invest."
13. Are the Chinese leaders satisfied by this assurance? One has to wait and see. They would prefer to watch for the impact of Obama'spolicies on the US banking sector before taking any decision on an increase in investments in the US bonds. In November last, the totalvalue of the Chinese holdings of the US Bonds was estimated at US $ 681.9 billion.
14. While studying the remarks of the Chinese leaders during the NPC session, one could detect an under-current of concern that theconservative anti-reform elements in the party and the Government might try to exploit the current difficulties by blaming them not on theUS mismanagement of its banking sector, but on the Chinese policy of economic reforms and globalisation itself. It was repeatedly stressedthat there would be no going back on the reforms and that China should continue to adhere to its policy of opening up its economy. (20-3-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary(retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies,Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies, E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, March 17, 2009
CLIMB-DOWN BY ZARDARI: FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
B.RAMAN
In an apparent last-minute, late-night climb-down, President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan agreed on March 16,2009, to reinstate as the Chief Justice of the Pakistan Supreme Court Iftikhar Muhammed Chaudhury who was twice removed from office by the then President Pervez Musharraf in March and November,2007. His reinstatement will take effect after the present Pervez Musharraf-appointed Chief Justice Abdul Hameed Dogar reaches the age of superannuation on March 21,2009.
2. There were earlier reports that Zardari was contemplating to give Dogar an extension.The unprecedented support for Iftikhar Muhammed Chaudhury not only from the community of lawyers, but also from large sections of the people mobilized by the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), has forced him to accept the demand for his reinstatement. Pressure from the Army and the US to avoid a violent street confrontation on the issue has also forced his climb-down.
3. The events leading to this climb-down would strengthen the misgivings not only in Pakistan, but also in the US about Zardari’s leadership qualities. He brought this humiliation upon himself by his ill-advised attempts to undermine the political position of Nawaz, his brother Shahbaz Sharif and their PML (N) in Punjab. For this purpose, he allegedly manipulated a ruling by a bench of the Supreme Court consisting of judges appointed by Musharraf disqualifying Nawaz and Shahbaz from holding any elected office. The bench gave the ruling on the ground that Nawaz was a convict in a case filed against him by Musharraf after seizing power in October,1999, and that Shahbaz was a co-accused in a case relating to the death of a person at the hands of the police when he was the Chief Minister of Punjab before the 1999 coup.
4. Allegedly acting on the wrong advice of his cronies, Zardari tried to take advantage of the ruling to have the PML (N) removed from power in Punjab and to have an engineered coalition consisting of his Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the PML (Qaide Azam) created by Musharraf in 2002 to defeat the PPP and the PML (N) inducted into power. His attempts, made through Salman Tasheer, the Governor of Punjab, who is a crony of Zardari as well as Musharraf, boomeranged.
5. The fresh agitation by the lawyers for the reinstatement of Chaudhury, the date for which had been announced by them long before the events in Punjab, might not have assumed the dimensions of a people’s revolt against Zardari but for his failed attempt to capture power for his party in the Punjab through engineered defections from the ranks of the PML (N) and back room manipulations with the complicity of some sections of the Musharraf-appointed judiciary.
6. The last elections to the National Assembly held in February,2008, two months after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, surprisingly showed that the sympathy wave for her was confined to the rural constituencies of Sindh. The PPP failed to do well even in its traditional support bases in southern Punjab, largely inhabited by the Seraikis. The sympathy wave in Punjab was more for Nawaz because of the way he was sought to be humiliated by Musharraf after the coup. The PML (N) won many more seats in Punjab than the PPP. Even the Rawalpindi area, where Benazir was assassinated, voted for the PML (N).
7. The resulting polarization between Sindh, dominated by Altaf Hussain’s Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and the PPP, and Punjab dominated by the PML (N), set in motion the train of events which ultimately led to the humiliation of Zardari. The action of Zardari in going back on his pre-election commitments made to the PML (N) in matters relating to the reinstatement of the sacked Chief Justice and abolishing, through a constitutional amendment, the powers of the President to dismiss an elected Prime Minister and dissolve the National Assembly exacerbated his personal differences with Nawaz.
8. The old Bhutto loyalists in the PPP, including Yousef Raza Gilani, the Prime Minister, who is a Seraiki, were uncomfortable about the erratic decisions of Zardari on the advice of a small coterie of persons such as Rehman Malik, the Adviser for Internal Security, Salman Taseer and Farook H.Naek, his former lawyer in the corruption cases, whom Zardari made the Minister for Law and then had him elected as the Chairman of the Senate, the upper House of Parliament. The Bhutto loyalists were shocked by his action in choosing Naek for election as the Senate Chairman, overlooking the claims of Raza Rabbani, an old Bhutto loyalist, who was held in great respect in the party. Rabbani resigned in protest from his post of Minister For Inter-Provincial Co-ordination.
9. The people’s uprising on the issue of the reinstatement of the sacked Chief Justice and the growing discontent in his own Party over the way he sought to marginalize old Bhutto loyalists created a situation, where he found himself isolated. The erosion of whatever little support he had in his party and in the country as a whole and the growing unease in the Army and the US over the implications of his policies and actions for the stability of Pakistan and the fight against terrorism created a situation where his humiliating climb-down became inevitable.
10. Unfortunately, Zardari is not known to be a man who learns from his mistakes. He tends to repeat them. Comments by persons close to him show that he and his cronies look upon the concessions made by him not as a climb-down, but as a tactical retreat to avoid a street confrontation, which might have triggered off an intervention by the Army. While he may have no other option but to restore the PML (N) to power in Punjab, he is likely to resist the demand of the PML (N) and others for a constitutional amendment to abolish his powers to dismiss the Prime Minister and dissolve the National Assembly. As he did in the past, he would create an impression as if he is keen to abolish these powers, but is prevented from doing so by the lack of two-thirds support for a constitutional amendment in the National Assembly. What one saw on March 16 was only the end of Act I of the political drama in Pakistan. Act II could start over the issue of the abolition of the special powers of the President.
11. Pakistan is in for a spell of weak and manipulative leadership by a leader without much public support, but trying to survive through political manipulations. This will aggravate the already serious security vacuum in the country and give fresh oxygen to the various terrorist groups operating from the Pakistani territory. At a time when the Barack Obama administration is embarked on formulating a new strategy to end the political and security vacuum in Afghanistan, it is faced with the danger of a similar vacuum in Pakistan.
12. If Pakistani public opinion has to have a say as to who should be its ruler, its choice will be on Nawaz Sharif. After having seen the huge mess created by Zardari within six months of taking over as the President, the Army too would prefer Nawaz despite his attempts in October,1999, to humiliate Pervez Musharraf, his Chief of the Army Staff, by dismissing him while he was abroad and unsuccessfully trying to prevent his return.
13. US thinking will have a say in influencing the Army’s position. Zardari has given the US a free hand in the tribal belt to attack terrorist hide-outs with its fleet of Predator aircraft. Zardari is amenable to US advice on the fight against terrorism. There have even been reports that he and Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, his Chief of the Army Staff, have allowed the Central Intelligence Agency, to use bases of the Pakistan Air Force for launching the Predator strikes.
14. It is very likely that if Nawaz comes to power, he may not be as amenable to US requirements as Zardari has been. On more than one occasion, Nawaz has expressed the view that the present terms of the co-operation with the US need to be reconsidered without weakening the over-all fight against Al Qaeda. Zardari owes a huge debt to the US for persuading Musharraf to issue the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) under which the pending cases against him and his wife were withdrawn.
15. Nawaz owes no such debt to the US. He is likely to be more independent and less accommodating with the US. Would the US continue to facilitate the continuance of Zardari in power because he is willing to do its bidding or will it remove itself from the way of Nawaz coming to power, realizing that a stronger and more popular ruler would help US interests strategically than a weak and unpopular ruler who could prove to be detrimental to US interests tactically as well as strategically?
16. On the answers to this question would depend what happens under Act II of the Pakistani drama. A dark horse will be Prime Minister Gilani, who has emerged with an enhanced image from the present crisis by virtue of his having distanced himself from the decisions of Zardari relating to Punjab. If Gilani has to be built up into a more assertive ruler, the special powers of the President have to be abolished. This can be done only if the PML (N) and the Bhutto loyalists in the PPP join hands. The prospects of this happening are rather low now.
17. Pakistani co-operation with India in the investigation of the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai and in acting against the anti-India terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory will be even more uncertain than it has been hitherto. More terrorism against India by groups taking advantage of the huge mess and political and security vacuum in Pakistan is a distinct danger. (17-3-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
In an apparent last-minute, late-night climb-down, President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan agreed on March 16,2009, to reinstate as the Chief Justice of the Pakistan Supreme Court Iftikhar Muhammed Chaudhury who was twice removed from office by the then President Pervez Musharraf in March and November,2007. His reinstatement will take effect after the present Pervez Musharraf-appointed Chief Justice Abdul Hameed Dogar reaches the age of superannuation on March 21,2009.
2. There were earlier reports that Zardari was contemplating to give Dogar an extension.The unprecedented support for Iftikhar Muhammed Chaudhury not only from the community of lawyers, but also from large sections of the people mobilized by the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), has forced him to accept the demand for his reinstatement. Pressure from the Army and the US to avoid a violent street confrontation on the issue has also forced his climb-down.
3. The events leading to this climb-down would strengthen the misgivings not only in Pakistan, but also in the US about Zardari’s leadership qualities. He brought this humiliation upon himself by his ill-advised attempts to undermine the political position of Nawaz, his brother Shahbaz Sharif and their PML (N) in Punjab. For this purpose, he allegedly manipulated a ruling by a bench of the Supreme Court consisting of judges appointed by Musharraf disqualifying Nawaz and Shahbaz from holding any elected office. The bench gave the ruling on the ground that Nawaz was a convict in a case filed against him by Musharraf after seizing power in October,1999, and that Shahbaz was a co-accused in a case relating to the death of a person at the hands of the police when he was the Chief Minister of Punjab before the 1999 coup.
4. Allegedly acting on the wrong advice of his cronies, Zardari tried to take advantage of the ruling to have the PML (N) removed from power in Punjab and to have an engineered coalition consisting of his Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the PML (Qaide Azam) created by Musharraf in 2002 to defeat the PPP and the PML (N) inducted into power. His attempts, made through Salman Tasheer, the Governor of Punjab, who is a crony of Zardari as well as Musharraf, boomeranged.
5. The fresh agitation by the lawyers for the reinstatement of Chaudhury, the date for which had been announced by them long before the events in Punjab, might not have assumed the dimensions of a people’s revolt against Zardari but for his failed attempt to capture power for his party in the Punjab through engineered defections from the ranks of the PML (N) and back room manipulations with the complicity of some sections of the Musharraf-appointed judiciary.
6. The last elections to the National Assembly held in February,2008, two months after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, surprisingly showed that the sympathy wave for her was confined to the rural constituencies of Sindh. The PPP failed to do well even in its traditional support bases in southern Punjab, largely inhabited by the Seraikis. The sympathy wave in Punjab was more for Nawaz because of the way he was sought to be humiliated by Musharraf after the coup. The PML (N) won many more seats in Punjab than the PPP. Even the Rawalpindi area, where Benazir was assassinated, voted for the PML (N).
7. The resulting polarization between Sindh, dominated by Altaf Hussain’s Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and the PPP, and Punjab dominated by the PML (N), set in motion the train of events which ultimately led to the humiliation of Zardari. The action of Zardari in going back on his pre-election commitments made to the PML (N) in matters relating to the reinstatement of the sacked Chief Justice and abolishing, through a constitutional amendment, the powers of the President to dismiss an elected Prime Minister and dissolve the National Assembly exacerbated his personal differences with Nawaz.
8. The old Bhutto loyalists in the PPP, including Yousef Raza Gilani, the Prime Minister, who is a Seraiki, were uncomfortable about the erratic decisions of Zardari on the advice of a small coterie of persons such as Rehman Malik, the Adviser for Internal Security, Salman Taseer and Farook H.Naek, his former lawyer in the corruption cases, whom Zardari made the Minister for Law and then had him elected as the Chairman of the Senate, the upper House of Parliament. The Bhutto loyalists were shocked by his action in choosing Naek for election as the Senate Chairman, overlooking the claims of Raza Rabbani, an old Bhutto loyalist, who was held in great respect in the party. Rabbani resigned in protest from his post of Minister For Inter-Provincial Co-ordination.
9. The people’s uprising on the issue of the reinstatement of the sacked Chief Justice and the growing discontent in his own Party over the way he sought to marginalize old Bhutto loyalists created a situation, where he found himself isolated. The erosion of whatever little support he had in his party and in the country as a whole and the growing unease in the Army and the US over the implications of his policies and actions for the stability of Pakistan and the fight against terrorism created a situation where his humiliating climb-down became inevitable.
10. Unfortunately, Zardari is not known to be a man who learns from his mistakes. He tends to repeat them. Comments by persons close to him show that he and his cronies look upon the concessions made by him not as a climb-down, but as a tactical retreat to avoid a street confrontation, which might have triggered off an intervention by the Army. While he may have no other option but to restore the PML (N) to power in Punjab, he is likely to resist the demand of the PML (N) and others for a constitutional amendment to abolish his powers to dismiss the Prime Minister and dissolve the National Assembly. As he did in the past, he would create an impression as if he is keen to abolish these powers, but is prevented from doing so by the lack of two-thirds support for a constitutional amendment in the National Assembly. What one saw on March 16 was only the end of Act I of the political drama in Pakistan. Act II could start over the issue of the abolition of the special powers of the President.
11. Pakistan is in for a spell of weak and manipulative leadership by a leader without much public support, but trying to survive through political manipulations. This will aggravate the already serious security vacuum in the country and give fresh oxygen to the various terrorist groups operating from the Pakistani territory. At a time when the Barack Obama administration is embarked on formulating a new strategy to end the political and security vacuum in Afghanistan, it is faced with the danger of a similar vacuum in Pakistan.
12. If Pakistani public opinion has to have a say as to who should be its ruler, its choice will be on Nawaz Sharif. After having seen the huge mess created by Zardari within six months of taking over as the President, the Army too would prefer Nawaz despite his attempts in October,1999, to humiliate Pervez Musharraf, his Chief of the Army Staff, by dismissing him while he was abroad and unsuccessfully trying to prevent his return.
13. US thinking will have a say in influencing the Army’s position. Zardari has given the US a free hand in the tribal belt to attack terrorist hide-outs with its fleet of Predator aircraft. Zardari is amenable to US advice on the fight against terrorism. There have even been reports that he and Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, his Chief of the Army Staff, have allowed the Central Intelligence Agency, to use bases of the Pakistan Air Force for launching the Predator strikes.
14. It is very likely that if Nawaz comes to power, he may not be as amenable to US requirements as Zardari has been. On more than one occasion, Nawaz has expressed the view that the present terms of the co-operation with the US need to be reconsidered without weakening the over-all fight against Al Qaeda. Zardari owes a huge debt to the US for persuading Musharraf to issue the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) under which the pending cases against him and his wife were withdrawn.
15. Nawaz owes no such debt to the US. He is likely to be more independent and less accommodating with the US. Would the US continue to facilitate the continuance of Zardari in power because he is willing to do its bidding or will it remove itself from the way of Nawaz coming to power, realizing that a stronger and more popular ruler would help US interests strategically than a weak and unpopular ruler who could prove to be detrimental to US interests tactically as well as strategically?
16. On the answers to this question would depend what happens under Act II of the Pakistani drama. A dark horse will be Prime Minister Gilani, who has emerged with an enhanced image from the present crisis by virtue of his having distanced himself from the decisions of Zardari relating to Punjab. If Gilani has to be built up into a more assertive ruler, the special powers of the President have to be abolished. This can be done only if the PML (N) and the Bhutto loyalists in the PPP join hands. The prospects of this happening are rather low now.
17. Pakistani co-operation with India in the investigation of the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai and in acting against the anti-India terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory will be even more uncertain than it has been hitherto. More terrorism against India by groups taking advantage of the huge mess and political and security vacuum in Pakistan is a distinct danger. (17-3-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, March 16, 2009
THE PAKISTANI DRAMA: THE DRAMATIS PERSONAE--- WHAT I WROTE ON THEM
ASIF ALI ZARDARI
B.RAMAN
Extract from my article dated August 27,2008, titled "After Tricky Mush, Tricky Zardari" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers29/paper2824.html
The US and Musharraf, in their own ways, have been trying to ensure that Zardari is elected (as the President) and Nawaz is marginalised. Like Zardari, the US does not want the reinstatement of Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury since he was keen to enquire into the cases of missing Pakistanis, many of whom were informally and illegally handed over by Musharraf to the US intelligence on suspicion that they were having contacts with Al Qaeda. The US feels uncomfortable with Nawaz for the reason that he has been calling for major changes in the policy of co-operation with the US against Al Qaeda and the Taliban followed by Musharraf.
Even though the US does not rate highly Zardari's leadership qualities, it prefers him to Nawaz because of his willingness to maintain Musharraf's policy of co-operation with the US in its so-called war against terrorism in Afghanistan and his perceived amenability to pressure by the US because of its role in persuading Musharraf, when he was the President, to issue the NRO ( National Reconciliation Ordinance). The US is also hopeful that, unlike Nawaz, Zardari will avoid any humiliation of Musharraf and will let him continue to live in Pakistan without fearing any harassment by the Government.
Musharraf has not been inactive since his resignation. According to well-informed MQM sources, he played a role in persuading Altaf Hussain to support Zardari as the President. Musharraf has similarly been trying to persuade the PML (QA---Qaide Azam)) to withdraw its candidate and support Zardari.
After 9/11, the US tried to project Musharraf as its frontline ally in the war against terrorism. He did co-operate, but not whole-heartedly. It is now hoping that if elected as the President, Zardari will co-operate with it without reservations. Zardari is giving the impression that he will. It is most likely that he will turn out to be as insincere as Musharraf. He will give the impression of co-operating while avoiding it in effect.
Extract from my article dated October 9,2008, titled "President Zardari---Forward & Backward" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers29/paper2874.html
While his (Zardari's ) instincts in relation to India seem to be refreshingly different from those of his predecessors----even from those of Benazir who instigated terrorism in Kashmir when she was the Prime Minister---- his grasp of the ground realities in Pakistan is weak. The ground realities are determined by four entrenched mindsets, which have always been opposing any fresh thinking on the relations with India. These entrenched mindsets are those of the Army, the intelligence community, the Foreign Office and sections of the political class with a close nexus to the Army and the intelligence community.
Unless these entrenched mindsets are made to change, new thinking alone, however welcome, will remain just loud-thinking without any follow-up action. To be able to translate any new thinking into action, Zardari has tro stabilise his position as the President, acquire a popular image and acquire the ability to enforce his will on these entrenched mindsets. No previous political leader of Pakistan was able to acquire such an ability and had to ultimately bow to pressure from the Army, the intelligence community and the Foreign Office.
Zardari has been the President hardly for a month and it is too early to say whether he would be able to bring about such a change in the mindsets. India has to keep patience with him without expecting quick policy changes. At the same time, it should not lower its guard till the ultimate reality emerges---- is it refreshingly new or more of the same as seen in the past?
The current position in Pakistan is complicated by the emergence of a fourth important power ---- Al Qaeda. The future of Pakistan is going to be determined by a configuration of four As---Allah, the Army, America and Al Qaeda. The outcome of the fight between the Army and America on the one side and Al Qaeda on the other will determine whether Zardari's tenure will see a change for the better or the worse in Pakistan.
Extract from my article dated February 28,2009, titled " PAKISTAN BACK TO BEING PAKISTAN" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers31/paper3074.html
The US has reasons to be concerned over the developments in Pakistan. There is a trust deficit between it and Nawaz. It continues to back Zardari who has shown himself to be as amenable to US wishes as Musharraf, if not even more. It continues to encourage Gen.Kayani to back Zardari. But Zardari's mishandling of the political situation could come in the way of the US operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban at a time when the Obama Administration is re-tooling its Afghan strategy
Extract from my article dated March 14,2009, titled "ASIF ALI ZARDARI : WHAT A MESS! " at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers31/paper3098.html
No other leader of Pakistan has ever created such a huge political mess in such a short time as President Asif Ali Zardari has. What the late Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto took six years to destroy, Zardari has destroyed in six months as the President----- namely, the credibility of Pakistan as a State, its institutions and its unity as a country and as a people.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
Extract from my article dated August 27,2008, titled "After Tricky Mush, Tricky Zardari" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers29/paper2824.html
The US and Musharraf, in their own ways, have been trying to ensure that Zardari is elected (as the President) and Nawaz is marginalised. Like Zardari, the US does not want the reinstatement of Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury since he was keen to enquire into the cases of missing Pakistanis, many of whom were informally and illegally handed over by Musharraf to the US intelligence on suspicion that they were having contacts with Al Qaeda. The US feels uncomfortable with Nawaz for the reason that he has been calling for major changes in the policy of co-operation with the US against Al Qaeda and the Taliban followed by Musharraf.
Even though the US does not rate highly Zardari's leadership qualities, it prefers him to Nawaz because of his willingness to maintain Musharraf's policy of co-operation with the US in its so-called war against terrorism in Afghanistan and his perceived amenability to pressure by the US because of its role in persuading Musharraf, when he was the President, to issue the NRO ( National Reconciliation Ordinance). The US is also hopeful that, unlike Nawaz, Zardari will avoid any humiliation of Musharraf and will let him continue to live in Pakistan without fearing any harassment by the Government.
Musharraf has not been inactive since his resignation. According to well-informed MQM sources, he played a role in persuading Altaf Hussain to support Zardari as the President. Musharraf has similarly been trying to persuade the PML (QA---Qaide Azam)) to withdraw its candidate and support Zardari.
After 9/11, the US tried to project Musharraf as its frontline ally in the war against terrorism. He did co-operate, but not whole-heartedly. It is now hoping that if elected as the President, Zardari will co-operate with it without reservations. Zardari is giving the impression that he will. It is most likely that he will turn out to be as insincere as Musharraf. He will give the impression of co-operating while avoiding it in effect.
Extract from my article dated October 9,2008, titled "President Zardari---Forward & Backward" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers29/paper2874.html
While his (Zardari's ) instincts in relation to India seem to be refreshingly different from those of his predecessors----even from those of Benazir who instigated terrorism in Kashmir when she was the Prime Minister---- his grasp of the ground realities in Pakistan is weak. The ground realities are determined by four entrenched mindsets, which have always been opposing any fresh thinking on the relations with India. These entrenched mindsets are those of the Army, the intelligence community, the Foreign Office and sections of the political class with a close nexus to the Army and the intelligence community.
Unless these entrenched mindsets are made to change, new thinking alone, however welcome, will remain just loud-thinking without any follow-up action. To be able to translate any new thinking into action, Zardari has tro stabilise his position as the President, acquire a popular image and acquire the ability to enforce his will on these entrenched mindsets. No previous political leader of Pakistan was able to acquire such an ability and had to ultimately bow to pressure from the Army, the intelligence community and the Foreign Office.
Zardari has been the President hardly for a month and it is too early to say whether he would be able to bring about such a change in the mindsets. India has to keep patience with him without expecting quick policy changes. At the same time, it should not lower its guard till the ultimate reality emerges---- is it refreshingly new or more of the same as seen in the past?
The current position in Pakistan is complicated by the emergence of a fourth important power ---- Al Qaeda. The future of Pakistan is going to be determined by a configuration of four As---Allah, the Army, America and Al Qaeda. The outcome of the fight between the Army and America on the one side and Al Qaeda on the other will determine whether Zardari's tenure will see a change for the better or the worse in Pakistan.
Extract from my article dated February 28,2009, titled " PAKISTAN BACK TO BEING PAKISTAN" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers31/paper3074.html
The US has reasons to be concerned over the developments in Pakistan. There is a trust deficit between it and Nawaz. It continues to back Zardari who has shown himself to be as amenable to US wishes as Musharraf, if not even more. It continues to encourage Gen.Kayani to back Zardari. But Zardari's mishandling of the political situation could come in the way of the US operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban at a time when the Obama Administration is re-tooling its Afghan strategy
Extract from my article dated March 14,2009, titled "ASIF ALI ZARDARI : WHAT A MESS! " at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers31/paper3098.html
No other leader of Pakistan has ever created such a huge political mess in such a short time as President Asif Ali Zardari has. What the late Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto took six years to destroy, Zardari has destroyed in six months as the President----- namely, the credibility of Pakistan as a State, its institutions and its unity as a country and as a people.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
THE PAKISTANI DRAMA: THE DRAMATIS PERSONAE--- WHAT I WROTE ON THEM
CHIEF JUSTICE IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY
B.RAMAN
Extract from my article dated July 22,2007, titled " PAKISTAN-Musharraf Bruised But Not Beaten" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers24/paper2310.html
Pakistan's judiciary was generally subservient to the executive, whether it was under political or military leadership. Political leaders suchas the late Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, Mrs.Benazir Bhutto and Mr.Nawaz Sharif were as arbitrary and as ruthless in imposing their will on thejudiciary as Gen.Zia-ul-Haq and Gen.Musharraf were.
It goes to the credit of Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry that he broke from this past habit of subservience. Even last year, he hadruled against the manner in which the Executive had privatised the Pakistan Steel Mills. He followed this up by entertaining public interestpetitions from the relatives of dozens of missing persons, many of whom were suspected to have been illegally arrested by theInter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and handed over to the US authorities on suspicion of their being terrorists.
It was his interest in the whereabouts of missing persons-----many of them allegedly in the US detention centre in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba---which set the alarm bells ringing in the offices of Musharraf and the ISI. Added to this was the fear that his repeatedly demonstratedindependence might come in the way of Musharraf getting himself re-elected as the President by the present National Assembly, whoseterm expires later this year, instead of seeking re-election after a new National Assembly has been elected. Musharraf was also afraid thatthe Chief Justice might debar him from giving himself another extension as the COAS when the present one expires in December next.Under Pakistan's electoral laws, a serving government servant cannot contest elections.Musharraf has repeatedly exempted himself fromthis provision in order to hold double charge as a serving COAS and an "elected" President, which is totally unconstitutional.
If the past subservience of the judiciary has been broken, the credit for this should entirely go to the Chief Justice. He refused to beintimidated by Musharraf, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and the heads of the Intelligence agencies. His defiance of Musharraf electrified thelawyer community and large sections of the public and he became an iconic figure for those demanding the restoration of democracy andthe exit of Musharraf and the Army from power. Successful defiance of a dictator has an infectious effect. Not only large sections of thepeople, but also many members of the judiciary started defying the executive and the army. Some resigned in solidarity with the ChiefJustice and some others stayed in office and expressed their defiance in other ways. It was this spread of the spirit of defiance to theserving judges of the Supreme Court, which has now resulted in the setting aside of Musharraf's orders suspending the Chief Justice andrestoring him to his high office.
Musharraf found himself with no other alternative, but to accept the verdict in seeming good grace. It is a blow to his prestige, but the blowneed not necessarily be fatal so long as he continues to enjoy the support of the senior officers of the Armed Forces and so long as publicmobilisation against him does not have a snowballing effect. The lawyers and other opponents of Musharraf managed to mobilise largesections of the public by exploiting the iconic figure of a Chief Justice arbitrarily thrown out of his job. With the Chief Justice now back in hisjob, they no longer have an iconic figure out in the streets whose image they can exploit. They now have to look for issues, which they canexploit for keeping the anti-Musharraf crowds mobilised.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail:seventyone2@gmail.com)
B.RAMAN
Extract from my article dated July 22,2007, titled " PAKISTAN-Musharraf Bruised But Not Beaten" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers24/paper2310.html
Pakistan's judiciary was generally subservient to the executive, whether it was under political or military leadership. Political leaders suchas the late Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, Mrs.Benazir Bhutto and Mr.Nawaz Sharif were as arbitrary and as ruthless in imposing their will on thejudiciary as Gen.Zia-ul-Haq and Gen.Musharraf were.
It goes to the credit of Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry that he broke from this past habit of subservience. Even last year, he hadruled against the manner in which the Executive had privatised the Pakistan Steel Mills. He followed this up by entertaining public interestpetitions from the relatives of dozens of missing persons, many of whom were suspected to have been illegally arrested by theInter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and handed over to the US authorities on suspicion of their being terrorists.
It was his interest in the whereabouts of missing persons-----many of them allegedly in the US detention centre in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba---which set the alarm bells ringing in the offices of Musharraf and the ISI. Added to this was the fear that his repeatedly demonstratedindependence might come in the way of Musharraf getting himself re-elected as the President by the present National Assembly, whoseterm expires later this year, instead of seeking re-election after a new National Assembly has been elected. Musharraf was also afraid thatthe Chief Justice might debar him from giving himself another extension as the COAS when the present one expires in December next.Under Pakistan's electoral laws, a serving government servant cannot contest elections.Musharraf has repeatedly exempted himself fromthis provision in order to hold double charge as a serving COAS and an "elected" President, which is totally unconstitutional.
If the past subservience of the judiciary has been broken, the credit for this should entirely go to the Chief Justice. He refused to beintimidated by Musharraf, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and the heads of the Intelligence agencies. His defiance of Musharraf electrified thelawyer community and large sections of the public and he became an iconic figure for those demanding the restoration of democracy andthe exit of Musharraf and the Army from power. Successful defiance of a dictator has an infectious effect. Not only large sections of thepeople, but also many members of the judiciary started defying the executive and the army. Some resigned in solidarity with the ChiefJustice and some others stayed in office and expressed their defiance in other ways. It was this spread of the spirit of defiance to theserving judges of the Supreme Court, which has now resulted in the setting aside of Musharraf's orders suspending the Chief Justice andrestoring him to his high office.
Musharraf found himself with no other alternative, but to accept the verdict in seeming good grace. It is a blow to his prestige, but the blowneed not necessarily be fatal so long as he continues to enjoy the support of the senior officers of the Armed Forces and so long as publicmobilisation against him does not have a snowballing effect. The lawyers and other opponents of Musharraf managed to mobilise largesections of the public by exploiting the iconic figure of a Chief Justice arbitrarily thrown out of his job. With the Chief Justice now back in hisjob, they no longer have an iconic figure out in the streets whose image they can exploit. They now have to look for issues, which they canexploit for keeping the anti-Musharraf crowds mobilised.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail:seventyone2@gmail.com)
THE PAKISTANI DRAMA: THE DRAMATIS PERSONAE--- WHAT I WROTE ON THEM
GEN. ASHFAQ PERVEZ KIYANI (ALSO WRITTEN AS KAYANI )
Extracts from my article dated November 28,2007, titled "Musharraf Minus the Uniform" available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers25/paper2479.html
Will Kiyani be able to deliver if not bin Laden and Zawahiri at least others such as Mulla Mohammad Omar, the Amir of the Neo Taliban, Baitullah Mehsud, who is the de facto ruler of South Waziristan, and Maulana FM Radio Fazlullah,the de facto ruler of the Swat Valley?
Kiyani comes to office as the COAS (Chief of the Army Staff) with impeccable credentials. He has the distinction of being the first Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to be appointed as the COAS since Pakistan became independent in 1947.Ehsanul Haq was also the DG, ISI, before he became the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee. Kiyani is the son of a non-commissioned officer (NCO) of the Army. His humble background as the son of an NCO has endeared him to the junior ranks of the Army. At a time, when there are signs of some demoralisation in the junior ranks fighting against Al Qaeda and other jihadi organisations in the Pashtun belt, high hopes will be placed on him for reversing the process of demoralisation.
Kiyani is also a non-controversial officer, who had in the past not come to notice for any dubious association with the Taliban or Al Qaeda or any of Pakistan's fundamentalist organisations. He was liked by the political leaders, who were attracted by his unassuming nature and humble demeanour. A man of few words, he is quite a contrast to Musharraf, a braggart. His reputation as an apolitical officer went up during the recent controversy over Musharraf's suspension of Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury of the Pakistan Supreme Court. Knowledgeable sources said that at the meeting held at Musharraf's office in March, 2007, at which the decision to suspend him was taken, Kiyani was the only person, who kept quiet and did not utter a word either in support of Musharraf's decision or in criticism of the Chief Justice. It was also reported that he kept the ISI out of this unsavoury controversy and that it was the Directorate-General of Military Intelligence and the Intelligence Bureau, which played the leading role in the campaign to denigrate the former Chief Justice, which ultimately boomeranged on Musharraf.
Kiyani, who joined the Pakistan Army in 1970, started his career in the Baloch Regiment as an infantryman. He did not come to public notice till Mrs. Benazir Bhutto, during her first tenure as the Prime Minister (1988-90), chose him as her Deputy Military Secretary. The two have since maintained their personal friendship despite the ups and downs in her political career.
Kiyani is believed to have a wide network of contacts in the US Armed Forces, but he really attracted the attention of the US' political and military leadership at the time of the Indo-Pakistan military confrontation in 2002 after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001. He was the Director-General, Military Operations (DGMO), at that time and the US was reportedly impressed by the cool manner in which he handled the crisis.
In September 2003, he was appointed the Corps Commander of the X Corps at Rawalpindi. It was the X Corps that had launched the coup of October 1999 which brought Musharraf to power. No military coup in Pakistan could be successful without the X Corps being in the forefront of the coup. All military chiefs chose their most trusted officer to head it. The fact that Musharraf chose him for this key post spoke of his confidence in him as a trustworthy officer, who would do his bidding.
As Corps Commander, Musharraf made him responsible for co-ordinating the investigation into the two attempts to assassinate him in Rawalpindi in December, 2003. Apart from identifying some of the jihadi terrorists responsible for the attempts, Kiyani also managed to establish the involvement of some junior officers of the Army and the Air Force in the attempts and had them arrested.
In October next year, he was appointed the DG of the ISI and once again impressed the US by his success in having Abu Faraj al-Libbi, an al Al Qaeda operative allegedly involved in the attempts to assassinate Musharraf, arrested in the tribal belt. He was immediately handed over to the US without properly interrogating him in connection with the attempts to kill Musharraf. Many Pakistani sources, however, have not accepted the claim of the ISI and that of the US that Abu Faraj was the No.3 of Al Qaeda and had masterminded the attempts to kill Musharraf. Subsequent evidence has not proved their claims.
Even though Kiyani was projected as a highly successful DG of the ISI, facts speak otherwise. It was during his tenure as the DG of the ISI that the Neo Taliban staged a come-back with a bang, the Pakistan Army practically lost control over the Pashtun belt and Al Qaeda established its sanctuaries in Pakistani territory.
The US has strongly backed his elevation as the COAS because of his known loyalty to Musharraf, his friendship with Benazir Bhutto and its hopes that he would improve the morale of the Army and vigorously pursue Al Qaeda & co. Its hopes in him may ultimately be belied just as its hopes in Musharraf were. The US has never been a good judge of Pakistanis and particularly of Pakistani Army officers. Will it be different this time? Let us wait and see.
Since he took over as the Vice-Chief of the Army Staff on October 8, 2007, Kiyani has been co-ordinating the military operations to re-establish the writ of the Government over the Swat Valley. He has not been very successful so far. The tribals of the Swat Valley, ably led by Maulana Fazlullah and backed by Al Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Neo Taliban and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) have been putting up a stiff fight against the Pakistani Army, despite its use of helicopter gunships and heavy artillery. Kiyani's policy of over-relying on helicopter gunships and heavy artillery and avoiding ground confrontations has already come in for criticism in Pakistani military circles. Faced with this criticism, he has only now sent his troops to engage the terrorists in ground confrontations. Kiyani has promised that he would eject the terrorists from the Swat Valley before the elections and re-establish the writ of the state. If he does not succeed, his reputation as the COAS could take a beating.
As the dramatis personae in Islamabad play out the drama, there is a man up there in the tribal north waiting and watching, hoping that Pakistan and its nuclear arsenal would ultimately fall into his hands. His name is Osama bin Laden. He wears no hats and is not part of the triumvirate, but his threatening shadow will continue to hover over Pakistan till Al Qaeda is defeated and neutralised. That is not for tomorrow.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Extracts from my article dated November 28,2007, titled "Musharraf Minus the Uniform" available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers25/paper2479.html
Will Kiyani be able to deliver if not bin Laden and Zawahiri at least others such as Mulla Mohammad Omar, the Amir of the Neo Taliban, Baitullah Mehsud, who is the de facto ruler of South Waziristan, and Maulana FM Radio Fazlullah,the de facto ruler of the Swat Valley?
Kiyani comes to office as the COAS (Chief of the Army Staff) with impeccable credentials. He has the distinction of being the first Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to be appointed as the COAS since Pakistan became independent in 1947.Ehsanul Haq was also the DG, ISI, before he became the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee. Kiyani is the son of a non-commissioned officer (NCO) of the Army. His humble background as the son of an NCO has endeared him to the junior ranks of the Army. At a time, when there are signs of some demoralisation in the junior ranks fighting against Al Qaeda and other jihadi organisations in the Pashtun belt, high hopes will be placed on him for reversing the process of demoralisation.
Kiyani is also a non-controversial officer, who had in the past not come to notice for any dubious association with the Taliban or Al Qaeda or any of Pakistan's fundamentalist organisations. He was liked by the political leaders, who were attracted by his unassuming nature and humble demeanour. A man of few words, he is quite a contrast to Musharraf, a braggart. His reputation as an apolitical officer went up during the recent controversy over Musharraf's suspension of Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury of the Pakistan Supreme Court. Knowledgeable sources said that at the meeting held at Musharraf's office in March, 2007, at which the decision to suspend him was taken, Kiyani was the only person, who kept quiet and did not utter a word either in support of Musharraf's decision or in criticism of the Chief Justice. It was also reported that he kept the ISI out of this unsavoury controversy and that it was the Directorate-General of Military Intelligence and the Intelligence Bureau, which played the leading role in the campaign to denigrate the former Chief Justice, which ultimately boomeranged on Musharraf.
Kiyani, who joined the Pakistan Army in 1970, started his career in the Baloch Regiment as an infantryman. He did not come to public notice till Mrs. Benazir Bhutto, during her first tenure as the Prime Minister (1988-90), chose him as her Deputy Military Secretary. The two have since maintained their personal friendship despite the ups and downs in her political career.
Kiyani is believed to have a wide network of contacts in the US Armed Forces, but he really attracted the attention of the US' political and military leadership at the time of the Indo-Pakistan military confrontation in 2002 after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001. He was the Director-General, Military Operations (DGMO), at that time and the US was reportedly impressed by the cool manner in which he handled the crisis.
In September 2003, he was appointed the Corps Commander of the X Corps at Rawalpindi. It was the X Corps that had launched the coup of October 1999 which brought Musharraf to power. No military coup in Pakistan could be successful without the X Corps being in the forefront of the coup. All military chiefs chose their most trusted officer to head it. The fact that Musharraf chose him for this key post spoke of his confidence in him as a trustworthy officer, who would do his bidding.
As Corps Commander, Musharraf made him responsible for co-ordinating the investigation into the two attempts to assassinate him in Rawalpindi in December, 2003. Apart from identifying some of the jihadi terrorists responsible for the attempts, Kiyani also managed to establish the involvement of some junior officers of the Army and the Air Force in the attempts and had them arrested.
In October next year, he was appointed the DG of the ISI and once again impressed the US by his success in having Abu Faraj al-Libbi, an al Al Qaeda operative allegedly involved in the attempts to assassinate Musharraf, arrested in the tribal belt. He was immediately handed over to the US without properly interrogating him in connection with the attempts to kill Musharraf. Many Pakistani sources, however, have not accepted the claim of the ISI and that of the US that Abu Faraj was the No.3 of Al Qaeda and had masterminded the attempts to kill Musharraf. Subsequent evidence has not proved their claims.
Even though Kiyani was projected as a highly successful DG of the ISI, facts speak otherwise. It was during his tenure as the DG of the ISI that the Neo Taliban staged a come-back with a bang, the Pakistan Army practically lost control over the Pashtun belt and Al Qaeda established its sanctuaries in Pakistani territory.
The US has strongly backed his elevation as the COAS because of his known loyalty to Musharraf, his friendship with Benazir Bhutto and its hopes that he would improve the morale of the Army and vigorously pursue Al Qaeda & co. Its hopes in him may ultimately be belied just as its hopes in Musharraf were. The US has never been a good judge of Pakistanis and particularly of Pakistani Army officers. Will it be different this time? Let us wait and see.
Since he took over as the Vice-Chief of the Army Staff on October 8, 2007, Kiyani has been co-ordinating the military operations to re-establish the writ of the Government over the Swat Valley. He has not been very successful so far. The tribals of the Swat Valley, ably led by Maulana Fazlullah and backed by Al Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Neo Taliban and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) have been putting up a stiff fight against the Pakistani Army, despite its use of helicopter gunships and heavy artillery. Kiyani's policy of over-relying on helicopter gunships and heavy artillery and avoiding ground confrontations has already come in for criticism in Pakistani military circles. Faced with this criticism, he has only now sent his troops to engage the terrorists in ground confrontations. Kiyani has promised that he would eject the terrorists from the Swat Valley before the elections and re-establish the writ of the state. If he does not succeed, his reputation as the COAS could take a beating.
As the dramatis personae in Islamabad play out the drama, there is a man up there in the tribal north waiting and watching, hoping that Pakistan and its nuclear arsenal would ultimately fall into his hands. His name is Osama bin Laden. He wears no hats and is not part of the triumvirate, but his threatening shadow will continue to hover over Pakistan till Al Qaeda is defeated and neutralised. That is not for tomorrow.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
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