INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.503
B.RAMAN
In our preoccupation with what is happening and what could happen in Pakistan, we should not overlook the urgent need for having arelook at our physical security architecture in sensitive establishments such as the nuclear establishments, oil refineries, gas productioninfrastructure, road, rail and air transport, critical information infrastructure etc. As I have emphasised repeatedly in the past, physicalsecurity is the most important component of counter-terrorism. If it is strong, a terrorist attack can be thwarted even if the intelligenceagencies fail. If it is weak, even the best of intelligence may not be able to thwart a terrorist attack. In both India and Pakistan, we have aweak culture of physical security. The main reason why the US has been able thus far to prevent a repeat of 9/11 is the strengthening of thephysical security apparatus by the newly-created Department of Homeland Security.
2. What happened at Mumbai, Kabul and Lahore---namely, commando-style surprise attacks by small groups of well-trained terroristswielding lethal hand-held weapons--- could happen again in India.We should not think that only Pakistan is vulnerable to such attacks.Wetoo are vulnerable as demonstrated so tragically at Mumbai. Our security architecture may not be as bad as that of Pakistan, but Mumbaiclearly showed that it is not as good as it should be.
3. There is an urgent need for two actions. Firstly, an audit of the physical security measures at all sensitive establishments----whether runby the Government or the private sector ---- in order to determine whether any physical security enhancements are called for.There is a needfor dividing all sensitive establishments into two categories-----those where a single-layer of physical security would be enough and thosewhere a double or multiple-layer of physical security would be necessary . The idea of a double or multiple-layer of physical security is thateven if the terrorists manage to beat the outside gate or perimeter security, they will not have a free run of the establishment due to asecond or more layers of armed physical security. To counter determined terrorists such as those one saw at Mumbai, Kabul and Lahore asingle-layer of physical security may not be sufficient in sensitive establishments.
4. The second action required is to have a relook at our consequence management capabilities to deal with a situation should, despiterevamped physical security, the terrorists manage to have access to sensitive establishments. The consequence management drill shouldtake into account various issues such as control over media coverage, prevention of panic, minimisation of damage and lethality etc. It isimportant to associate the consequence management set-ups of the States with this exercise because it is ultimately they who would actas the protector of first resort through their consequence management capabilities till there is intervention by the consequencemanagement community of the Govt. of India.
5. In Mumbai, the terrorists succeeded so dramatically because they targeted private establishments with no physical security measuresexcept some anti-explosive capability. Since the security guards of these establishments were unarmed, they were helpless before theterrorists wielding sophisticated hand-held weapons. Once the terrorists managed to gain access to these establishments and take themunder their control, the special intervention forces of the Govt. of India such as the National Security Guards (NSGs) found themselvesunable to act fast enough without causing too many loss of lives.
6. Situated as we are in the sub-continental region where terrorism will continue to be a fact of life at least for another 10 years or more andkeeping in view our ambition of emerging as a major economic power, we just cannot afford to take up the stand that the physical securityof the private sector is its responsibility and that the Government's role will be limited to issuing periodic advisories regarding likely threats.The Government has to play a more proactive role in encouraging and helping at least establishments of a strategic nature such as thoseassociated with the tourism industry, the information technology companies etc in improving their physical security.They already havesome capability for checks for explosives, but the methods used by them are primitive and do not take into account dangers from suicidebombers and vehicle-borne suicide terrorists.
7. Their weakest capability----which is almost non-existent--- is in facing a commando-style surprise attack by small groups of terrorists withmodern hand-held weapons. The only way of thwarting them is by having well-armed and well-trained guards. Do the present laws allow theemployment of such guards? If not, should the laws be modified to permit them to employ such well-armed guards? Who is going tosupervise their training and keep them under control to prevent the arms issued to them finding their way into the hands of terrorists?These are questions, which need urgent attention.
8. From the point of view of the physical security architecture. the distinction between the public and the private sector is disappearing.Many private companies are already in the fields of oil refining and gas exploration, production and transport. An increasing number ofairports is now privately managed. We intend allowing private companies into the field of nuclear power production. The Governmentcannot evade the responsibility for ensuring that such private establishments have a high level of physical security. There is a need for ajoint task force consisting of the representatives of the intelligence and security agencies and professional organisations of privateindustries such as the FICCI (Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industries), the CII ( the Confederation of Indian Industries) etc aswell as representatives of foreign business organisations to go into the question of physical security enhancements for privateestablishments of strategic significance.
9. Practically all major private establishments----Indian as well as foreign--- have their own physical security set-up. It is important for seniorintelligence and security officials at the State and Central levels to regularly interact with them to exchange threat and vulnerability perceptions and ideas as to how to strengthen physical security.
10. In an important article titled "The Coming Swarm" in the "New York Times" of February 15,2009, which should be required reading for allour physical security experts, John Acquilla, who teaches in the special operations program at the Naval Postgraduate School at Montereyin California, wrote as follows: "It seems that a new “Mumbai model” of swarming, smaller-scale terrorist violence is emerging. The basicconcept is that hitting several targets at once, even with just a few fighters at each site, can cause fits for elite counterterrorist forces thatare often manpower-heavy, far away and organized to deal with only one crisis at a time. This approach certainly worked in Mumbai. TheIndian security forces, many of which had to be flown in from New Delhi, simply had little ability to strike back at more than one site at atime. While it’s true that the assaults in Kabul seem to be echoes of Mumbai, the fact is that Al Qaeda and its affiliates have been usingthese sorts of swarm tactics for several years...... How are swarms to be countered? The simplest way is to create many more units able torespond to simultaneous, small-scale attacks and spread them around the country. This means jettisoning the idea of overwhelming force infavor of small units that are not “elite” but rather “good enough” to tangle with terrorist teams. In dealing with swarms, economizing onforce is essential. ....For the defense of American cities against terrorist swarms, the key would be to use local police officers as the firstline of defense instead of relying on the military. The first step would be to create lots of small counterterrorism posts throughout urbanareas instead of keeping police officers in large, centralized precinct houses. This is consistent with existing notions of community-basedpolicing...... At the federal level, we should stop thinking in terms of moving thousands of troops across the country and instead distributesmall response units far more widely. Cities, states and Washington should work out clear rules in advance for using military forces in acounterterrorist role, to avoid any bickering or delay during a crisis. Reserve and National Guard units should train and field many more unitsable to take on small teams of terrorist gunmen and bombers. Think of them as latter-day Minutemen.Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey andYemen all responded to Qaeda attacks with similar “packetizing” initiatives involving the police and armed forces; and while that hasn’teliminated swarm attacks, the terrorists have been far less effective and many lives have been saved."
11.Jihadi terrorism in India outside Jammu & Kashmir is essentially an urban phenomenon. We cannot use against it the techniques learntby us in dealing with the insurgency in the North-East and with Maoist terrorism in Central India, which is essentially a rural phenomenon.We need a different system of response, which is comprehensive enough to cover all likely targets of strategic significane----whether in the Government or private sector.
12. Even if we do not create an independent Ministry of Internal Security,we should create a separate Department of Physical Security in theMinistry of Home Affairs, which is, inter alia, responsible for counter-terrorism, to act as the nodal agency for all physical security measureson the pattern of the Department of Homeland Security of the US. This newly-created department should interact continuously with its UScounterpart to pick its brains and profit from its expertise and experience. (7-3-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, March 6, 2009
Thursday, March 5, 2009
HOW SECURE IS PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR ARSENAL FROM A COMMANDO-STYLE ATTACK?
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO.502
B.RAMAN
How secure is Pakistan's nuclear arsenal from a commando-style attack by jihadi terrorists operating from sanctuaries inside Pakistan?
2. That is the question which should be worrying security experts all over the world as they learn with horror----based on visual evidencefrom closed circuit TV (CCTV) cameras and oral evidence from members of the Sri Lankan cricket team and the British match umpires andreferees--- how the 12 or so terrorists who attacked the SL cricket team had the Liberty Square of Lahore at their disposal for about 30minutes and walked away after the attack without the least fear of being chased and caught either by the security forces or the public.
3. It was as if they were walking away from a golf green after a game of golf---unhurried, unconcerned and totally relaxed..
4. Seven police officers, who were in the escort party of the convoy, died in the exchange of fire. Their bravery must be acknowledged andsaluted. But how about the dozens of other police officers, who were supposed to be on route security to prevent an ambush of the convoy?The British match officials have said that not a policeman was to be seen on the road. This, despite the Presidential-scale securityreportedly promised by President Asif Ali Zardari to the SL team.
5. How about the staff of the police station located near the Square? Why didn't they rush out and confront the terrorists? How about thepolice vehicles, which were supposed to be on patrol along the route to look out for suspicious movements and characters? How about therapid response commando teams, which were supposed to be there in the stadium and at the LIberty Square, which was known as avulnerable point since all vehicular movements had to slow down there?
6. They just disappeared or were not posted at all. In all the CCTV footage, the only sign of police one sees is a police vehicle crossing aterrorist and not taking any action as if it was crossing a normal pedestrian.
7. How about the road blocks all over Lahore which were supposed to have been put up after a terrorist strike to prevent the terrorists fromgetting away?
8. Many compelling questions arise as one gets details of what happened and what did not happen in Lahore on March 3,2009? Were thereinsiders in the security establishment, who had played a role in the conspiracy? Were there accomplices or jihadi sympathisers in thesecurity establishment, who facilitated the terrorist strike? Do the political and military leaders of Pakistan realise the total security vacuumin their country, which has made it a safehaven to jihadi terrorists from all over the world, who are able to operate at will without any fear ofthe consequences?
9. It has become a cliche to say that the Pakistani leaders are in a denial mode. So was former President Megawati Sukarnoputri ofIndonesia till the Bali terrorist strike of October,2002. Thereafter, she realised the gravity of the situation and made amends for her pastnegligence. So was former President Begum Khalida Zia of Bangladesh till the the nearly 400 synchronised explosions organised by theJamiat-ul-Mujahideen (JUM) in August, 2005. Thereafter, she realised the gravity of the situation and acted against the JUM.
10.Pakistan has been the scene of repeated terrorist strikes and the spawning ground of jihadi terrorism of various hues directed againstother countries since 1981. Till today, neither the political nor the military leaders of Pakistan are prepared to admit this. After the Lahoreattack on the SL team, Ilyas Khan, of the Islamabad Bureau of the British Broadcasting Corporation, reported as follows the same day:"Militant attacks in all parts of the world have been investigated and solved, but Pakistan is yet to solve even one out of the hundreds ofattacks it has suffered since the 1980s."
11. In every major terrorist strike of Pakistan, there was evidence of insider involvement. Some junior officers of the Pakistani Air Forcewere found to have been involved in the conspiracy to kill former President Pervez Musharraf at Rawalpindi in December,2003. Theinvestigation brought out the startling fact that the conspirators had met in the staff quarters of one of the PAF officers in a PAF complex inthe Islamabad-Rawalpindi area to finalise their attack.
12. Before and after the unsuccessful terrorist strike on her at Karachi on October 18,2007, Benazir Bhutto had alleged that Qari SaifullahAkhtar, the Amir of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), and some serving and retired officers of the Pakistan Intelligence Bureau andInter-Services Intelligence (ISI) were involved in the conspiracy to kill her. Saifullah was detained for some weeks for interrogation, butthereafter released without any action being taken against him. No action was taken against the officers named by her. Not even a formalenquiry.
13. After addressing a public meeting at Rawalpindi on December 27,2007, she left for her home in her car. Neither the police escort partynor Rehman Malik, the present Internal Security Adviser, who was at that time the co-ordinator of her physical security, followed her. Theyleft for home by a different route after the meeting was over. Benazir was shot dead as her car came out of the ground. Malik and otherofficers came to know only after they reached home that she had been shot dead.
14. One can go on giving such instances, which show a total lack of control over the security establishment, which has become a law untoitself and disturbing indicators of the extent and depth of penetration of the security set-up by the jihadi terrorists. Many countries in theworld, including India, are badly affected by terrorism. In many countries of the world, including India, there are inefficiencies andinadequacies in the counter-terrorism apparatus. But in no country of the world is the security establishment so badly penetrated by thejihadi terrorists as it is in Pakistan.
15. The Pakistani leaders not only refuse to admit this. Even more alarming, they live in a world of self-delusion which makes them think thatall these realities are the figments of imagination of others ill-disposed towards them.
16. If this is the real state of affairs, one has very valid reasons to worry about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Pakistani politicaland military leaders repeatedly assure the international community that their nuclear arsenal has tight physical security and that noterrorist can penetrate it and get hold of nuclear weapons or material. After seeing what has happened in Lahore, the internationalcommunity cannot afford to accept the Pakistani assurances at their face value. It must subject the physical security of the arsenal togreater scrutiny by independent outside experts. Even if this is done, a 100 per cent security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal cannot beassured so long as the terrorist safehavens and infrastructure in Pakistan are not removed. Pakistan must be forced to do so throughinternational pressure. (6-3-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For topical Studies,Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
How secure is Pakistan's nuclear arsenal from a commando-style attack by jihadi terrorists operating from sanctuaries inside Pakistan?
2. That is the question which should be worrying security experts all over the world as they learn with horror----based on visual evidencefrom closed circuit TV (CCTV) cameras and oral evidence from members of the Sri Lankan cricket team and the British match umpires andreferees--- how the 12 or so terrorists who attacked the SL cricket team had the Liberty Square of Lahore at their disposal for about 30minutes and walked away after the attack without the least fear of being chased and caught either by the security forces or the public.
3. It was as if they were walking away from a golf green after a game of golf---unhurried, unconcerned and totally relaxed..
4. Seven police officers, who were in the escort party of the convoy, died in the exchange of fire. Their bravery must be acknowledged andsaluted. But how about the dozens of other police officers, who were supposed to be on route security to prevent an ambush of the convoy?The British match officials have said that not a policeman was to be seen on the road. This, despite the Presidential-scale securityreportedly promised by President Asif Ali Zardari to the SL team.
5. How about the staff of the police station located near the Square? Why didn't they rush out and confront the terrorists? How about thepolice vehicles, which were supposed to be on patrol along the route to look out for suspicious movements and characters? How about therapid response commando teams, which were supposed to be there in the stadium and at the LIberty Square, which was known as avulnerable point since all vehicular movements had to slow down there?
6. They just disappeared or were not posted at all. In all the CCTV footage, the only sign of police one sees is a police vehicle crossing aterrorist and not taking any action as if it was crossing a normal pedestrian.
7. How about the road blocks all over Lahore which were supposed to have been put up after a terrorist strike to prevent the terrorists fromgetting away?
8. Many compelling questions arise as one gets details of what happened and what did not happen in Lahore on March 3,2009? Were thereinsiders in the security establishment, who had played a role in the conspiracy? Were there accomplices or jihadi sympathisers in thesecurity establishment, who facilitated the terrorist strike? Do the political and military leaders of Pakistan realise the total security vacuumin their country, which has made it a safehaven to jihadi terrorists from all over the world, who are able to operate at will without any fear ofthe consequences?
9. It has become a cliche to say that the Pakistani leaders are in a denial mode. So was former President Megawati Sukarnoputri ofIndonesia till the Bali terrorist strike of October,2002. Thereafter, she realised the gravity of the situation and made amends for her pastnegligence. So was former President Begum Khalida Zia of Bangladesh till the the nearly 400 synchronised explosions organised by theJamiat-ul-Mujahideen (JUM) in August, 2005. Thereafter, she realised the gravity of the situation and acted against the JUM.
10.Pakistan has been the scene of repeated terrorist strikes and the spawning ground of jihadi terrorism of various hues directed againstother countries since 1981. Till today, neither the political nor the military leaders of Pakistan are prepared to admit this. After the Lahoreattack on the SL team, Ilyas Khan, of the Islamabad Bureau of the British Broadcasting Corporation, reported as follows the same day:"Militant attacks in all parts of the world have been investigated and solved, but Pakistan is yet to solve even one out of the hundreds ofattacks it has suffered since the 1980s."
11. In every major terrorist strike of Pakistan, there was evidence of insider involvement. Some junior officers of the Pakistani Air Forcewere found to have been involved in the conspiracy to kill former President Pervez Musharraf at Rawalpindi in December,2003. Theinvestigation brought out the startling fact that the conspirators had met in the staff quarters of one of the PAF officers in a PAF complex inthe Islamabad-Rawalpindi area to finalise their attack.
12. Before and after the unsuccessful terrorist strike on her at Karachi on October 18,2007, Benazir Bhutto had alleged that Qari SaifullahAkhtar, the Amir of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), and some serving and retired officers of the Pakistan Intelligence Bureau andInter-Services Intelligence (ISI) were involved in the conspiracy to kill her. Saifullah was detained for some weeks for interrogation, butthereafter released without any action being taken against him. No action was taken against the officers named by her. Not even a formalenquiry.
13. After addressing a public meeting at Rawalpindi on December 27,2007, she left for her home in her car. Neither the police escort partynor Rehman Malik, the present Internal Security Adviser, who was at that time the co-ordinator of her physical security, followed her. Theyleft for home by a different route after the meeting was over. Benazir was shot dead as her car came out of the ground. Malik and otherofficers came to know only after they reached home that she had been shot dead.
14. One can go on giving such instances, which show a total lack of control over the security establishment, which has become a law untoitself and disturbing indicators of the extent and depth of penetration of the security set-up by the jihadi terrorists. Many countries in theworld, including India, are badly affected by terrorism. In many countries of the world, including India, there are inefficiencies andinadequacies in the counter-terrorism apparatus. But in no country of the world is the security establishment so badly penetrated by thejihadi terrorists as it is in Pakistan.
15. The Pakistani leaders not only refuse to admit this. Even more alarming, they live in a world of self-delusion which makes them think thatall these realities are the figments of imagination of others ill-disposed towards them.
16. If this is the real state of affairs, one has very valid reasons to worry about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Pakistani politicaland military leaders repeatedly assure the international community that their nuclear arsenal has tight physical security and that noterrorist can penetrate it and get hold of nuclear weapons or material. After seeing what has happened in Lahore, the internationalcommunity cannot afford to accept the Pakistani assurances at their face value. It must subject the physical security of the arsenal togreater scrutiny by independent outside experts. Even if this is done, a 100 per cent security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal cannot beassured so long as the terrorist safehavens and infrastructure in Pakistan are not removed. Pakistan must be forced to do so throughinternational pressure. (6-3-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For topical Studies,Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Sunday, March 1, 2009
CARNAGE OF BD ARMY OFFICERS
B.RAMAN
Reliable details of the two-day (February 25 and 26, 2009) mutiny of some junior ranks of the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) against Army officersare still scanty. However, even the limited details available so far indicate that the situation was and continues to be much more seriousthan was originally thought. It could flare up again if not handled with care by the Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, the Army Chief , GeneralMoeen U Ahmed, and the new Director-General of the BDR, Brig Gen Moinul Hossain.
2.Sheikh Hasina and the Army chief are till now acting in tandem in dealing with the sequel to the mutiny, but the critics of Sheikh Hasinaare already turning their guns on her as the holder of the defence portfolio for not reacting promptly to the mutiny in order to put it down andprevent the massacre of a large number of senior officers of the Army by the jawans (soldiers) and other junior ranks of the BDR. While theArmy chief himself has reiterated his faith in the civilian leadership, individual senior officers have been critical of Sheikh Hasina forallegedly not allowing the Army to intervene on February 25 itself after the mutiny broke out and for trying to deal with the situation throughher Home Minister, Sahara Khatun, under whom the BDR comes.
3. The constitution of two parallel probe committees-----one by the Home Minister and the other by the Army--- speaks of the lack ofconfidence of the army in the thoroughness of any probe by the committee set up by the Home Minister. Reports indicate that only those,who did not participate in the mutiny, have so far surrendered to the Army or the police and that many---if not most---of those whoparticipated in the mutiny have managed to go underground. The Army is focussing its enquiries on those , who held the peace talks withthe Home Minister in a local restaurant in response to his appeal before the talks broke down. The suspected ring leaders are four DeputyAssistant Directors (DAD) of the BDR-----Touhidul Alam, Nasiruddin Khan, Mirza Habibur Rahman and Abdul Jalil, --- sepoy Md Selim and Abdur Rahim, whose rank in the BDR is not known.
4. The National Standing Committee of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) of Begum Khalida Zia,in a statement on February 28,2009, alleged that the 'action and reaction' in the wake of the killings in the mutiny proved the Government's total failure to resolve the crisis.“Narrow mentality and controversial steps and statements of the Government made the situation more complex,” it said and added: "TheGovernment could not take timely steps to prevent the killing of army officers and their family members, and torture on women andchildren.The Prime Minister, who is also the Defence Minister, cannot avoid responsibility for the failure to take effective measures toprotect arms and ammunition, and prevent escape of criminals.”
5. From the details available so far, the following reconstruction is possible: Maj Gen Shakil Ahmed, who was the Director-General of the BDR,and his wife were extremely unpopular with the jawans of the BDR, who used to accuse them of being corrupt and of misusing or misappropriating funds meant for providing relief to the families of poor jawans.The BDR was observing the BDR Week from February24,2009, to mark its raising day. About 6300 personnel of the BDR were to participate in the various functions organised in this connection.About 3300 of them belonged to BDR battalions stationed in Dhaka. The remaining came from the various field units. Sheikh Hasina inaugurated the Week at a function in the Darbar (conference) hall of the BDR headquarters in their campus at Pilkana on February 24.Some directly-recruited junior officers and other ranks of the BDR had requested Maj.Gen.Shakil Ahmed to allow them to meet her separatelyafter the inaugural function to express their grievances to her. He turned down their request. On coming to know of this, she wanted to meetthem. He advised her not to do so on the ground that it might weaken the discipline. She did not insist on meeting them.
6. That night, pamphlets criticising Shakil Ahmed, his wife and other army officers circulated in the campus. Either the army officers andmilitary and civilian intelligence agencies were not aware of it or they ignored it under the impression that this was one of those thingswhich keep happening in the BDR. On February 25, a conference was held in the Darbar Hall, which was addressed by by Shakil Ahmed. Ashe was interacting with the staff, some persons wearing red head bands and wielding machine guns forced their way into the hall andstarted shouting slogans against him and opened fire indiscriminately.
7. There are two versions as to what happened to him. According to one version, he was shot dead inside the darbar hall itself. According tothe other version, he and other Army officers ran out of the hall in panic and fled to their residences or offices located inside the campus.Shakil Ahmed himself ran to his house. Some of the mutineers chased him there and killed him and his wife, Some other mutineers chasedthe other officers to their offices or residences and killed them.
8. A number of other jawans and junior officers of the BDR, who initially did not participate in the mutiny, took guns from the BDR armouryand joined the mutineers in their killing spree. Thousands of bullets were fired indiscriminately all over the campus by rampaging personnelof the BDR. When Sheikh Hasina heard of the mutiny and the firing, she thought that the mutineers had taken some Army officers hostage.She, therefore, asked her Home Minister to establish contact with the mutineers and persuade them to release the hostages. She wasreportedly not aware that the mutineers had started massacring the officers the moment the mutiny started. It is understood that even theArmy chief was not aware of this.
9. The moment the mutiny broke out, there was an almost total black-out of communications between the Army officers caught inside theBDR headquarters and their superiors in the Army headquarters. Before the mutiny, the mutineers had disrupted all land line telephones.All the army officers caught inside had mobile telephones. Only one of them managed to send out a distress message. Others could notcommunicate. It is not known why this was so. Some reports suggest that the mutineers had seized all mobile telephones from the officersinside. Thus, while the mutineers were able to remain in touch with their colleagues all over Bangladesh, the Army officers caught insidewere unable to communicate with anybody. The Army sent an armed group to the BDR campus to find out what was happening. It also senttwo helicopters to fly over the campus. They all withdrew when the mutineers opened fire on them.
10.Only by the morning of February 26,2009,did the extent of the savagery become evident to Sheikh Hasina and the Army. She authorisedthe Army to intervene and broadcast a warning message to the mutineers. The sight of the deployment of Army tanks and heavy artilleryaround the campus unnerved the mutineers and they called off the mutiny. It is not yet known how many of them managed to escape fromDhaka and how many surrendered.
11. When the Army entered the campus and started looking for the Army officers caught inside, it realised with shock the extent of thesavagery perpetrated by the BDR mutineers. So far, the Army has recovered the badly mutilated bodies of 73 army officers and somecivilians including wives and other family members of the killed officers. It is repored that there were 137 Army officers of various ranksinside the BDR campus when the mutiny broke out. The remaining are missing and feared killed. Their bodies have not yet been recovered.Many of the recovered bodies carried bullet as well as bayonet injuries. The bodies of the wives of some of the killed officers had beendisfigured. Neither Pakistan nor Bangladesh, where miitary revolts and rule are common, had seen a savagery of this kind since the Britishleft the sub-continent in 1947.
12.Brigadier General Mahmud Hossain, Director of Military Intelligence, told a press conference in Dhaka on the night of February 28,2009,that the army was ready to storm the headquarters of the BDR soon after the mutiny erupted, but heeded Sheikh Hasina's advice at thelast minute to resolve the issue politically."The Prime Minister directed that the crisis should be solved politically and it has been resolved inthat manner." He described the incidents as "possibly the worst massacre of army officers in Bangladesh's history", and added that theanger among the armed forces was "very natural". He said the army has begun its own probe into the killings of its officers during the mutinyeven as the investigation ordered by a government-constituted committee continues.
13. One of those missing is Colonel Gulzar Uddin Ahmed, of the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), who had played an active role in the driveagainst the jihadi organisations such as the Jamia'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB).Before being promoted as Additional DG of the RAB, hewas in its intelligence wing and had commanded the operation that had led to the capture and execution of JMB operations commanderSiddiqul Islam alias Bangla Bhai.
14.The belief in Bangladesh official circles is that the BDR mutiny was triggered off partly by the unaddressed grievances over the living andservice conditions and partly by anger over the action of the Army chief in carrying out the death sentences awarded to Bangla Bhai andother jihadi leaders in 2007. There has reportedly been a penetration of the BDR by the Hizbut Tehrir which was very critical of theexecutions which were projected by it as carried out under US pressure.(2-3-09).
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com.)
Reliable details of the two-day (February 25 and 26, 2009) mutiny of some junior ranks of the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) against Army officersare still scanty. However, even the limited details available so far indicate that the situation was and continues to be much more seriousthan was originally thought. It could flare up again if not handled with care by the Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, the Army Chief , GeneralMoeen U Ahmed, and the new Director-General of the BDR, Brig Gen Moinul Hossain.
2.Sheikh Hasina and the Army chief are till now acting in tandem in dealing with the sequel to the mutiny, but the critics of Sheikh Hasinaare already turning their guns on her as the holder of the defence portfolio for not reacting promptly to the mutiny in order to put it down andprevent the massacre of a large number of senior officers of the Army by the jawans (soldiers) and other junior ranks of the BDR. While theArmy chief himself has reiterated his faith in the civilian leadership, individual senior officers have been critical of Sheikh Hasina forallegedly not allowing the Army to intervene on February 25 itself after the mutiny broke out and for trying to deal with the situation throughher Home Minister, Sahara Khatun, under whom the BDR comes.
3. The constitution of two parallel probe committees-----one by the Home Minister and the other by the Army--- speaks of the lack ofconfidence of the army in the thoroughness of any probe by the committee set up by the Home Minister. Reports indicate that only those,who did not participate in the mutiny, have so far surrendered to the Army or the police and that many---if not most---of those whoparticipated in the mutiny have managed to go underground. The Army is focussing its enquiries on those , who held the peace talks withthe Home Minister in a local restaurant in response to his appeal before the talks broke down. The suspected ring leaders are four DeputyAssistant Directors (DAD) of the BDR-----Touhidul Alam, Nasiruddin Khan, Mirza Habibur Rahman and Abdul Jalil, --- sepoy Md Selim and Abdur Rahim, whose rank in the BDR is not known.
4. The National Standing Committee of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) of Begum Khalida Zia,in a statement on February 28,2009, alleged that the 'action and reaction' in the wake of the killings in the mutiny proved the Government's total failure to resolve the crisis.“Narrow mentality and controversial steps and statements of the Government made the situation more complex,” it said and added: "TheGovernment could not take timely steps to prevent the killing of army officers and their family members, and torture on women andchildren.The Prime Minister, who is also the Defence Minister, cannot avoid responsibility for the failure to take effective measures toprotect arms and ammunition, and prevent escape of criminals.”
5. From the details available so far, the following reconstruction is possible: Maj Gen Shakil Ahmed, who was the Director-General of the BDR,and his wife were extremely unpopular with the jawans of the BDR, who used to accuse them of being corrupt and of misusing or misappropriating funds meant for providing relief to the families of poor jawans.The BDR was observing the BDR Week from February24,2009, to mark its raising day. About 6300 personnel of the BDR were to participate in the various functions organised in this connection.About 3300 of them belonged to BDR battalions stationed in Dhaka. The remaining came from the various field units. Sheikh Hasina inaugurated the Week at a function in the Darbar (conference) hall of the BDR headquarters in their campus at Pilkana on February 24.Some directly-recruited junior officers and other ranks of the BDR had requested Maj.Gen.Shakil Ahmed to allow them to meet her separatelyafter the inaugural function to express their grievances to her. He turned down their request. On coming to know of this, she wanted to meetthem. He advised her not to do so on the ground that it might weaken the discipline. She did not insist on meeting them.
6. That night, pamphlets criticising Shakil Ahmed, his wife and other army officers circulated in the campus. Either the army officers andmilitary and civilian intelligence agencies were not aware of it or they ignored it under the impression that this was one of those thingswhich keep happening in the BDR. On February 25, a conference was held in the Darbar Hall, which was addressed by by Shakil Ahmed. Ashe was interacting with the staff, some persons wearing red head bands and wielding machine guns forced their way into the hall andstarted shouting slogans against him and opened fire indiscriminately.
7. There are two versions as to what happened to him. According to one version, he was shot dead inside the darbar hall itself. According tothe other version, he and other Army officers ran out of the hall in panic and fled to their residences or offices located inside the campus.Shakil Ahmed himself ran to his house. Some of the mutineers chased him there and killed him and his wife, Some other mutineers chasedthe other officers to their offices or residences and killed them.
8. A number of other jawans and junior officers of the BDR, who initially did not participate in the mutiny, took guns from the BDR armouryand joined the mutineers in their killing spree. Thousands of bullets were fired indiscriminately all over the campus by rampaging personnelof the BDR. When Sheikh Hasina heard of the mutiny and the firing, she thought that the mutineers had taken some Army officers hostage.She, therefore, asked her Home Minister to establish contact with the mutineers and persuade them to release the hostages. She wasreportedly not aware that the mutineers had started massacring the officers the moment the mutiny started. It is understood that even theArmy chief was not aware of this.
9. The moment the mutiny broke out, there was an almost total black-out of communications between the Army officers caught inside theBDR headquarters and their superiors in the Army headquarters. Before the mutiny, the mutineers had disrupted all land line telephones.All the army officers caught inside had mobile telephones. Only one of them managed to send out a distress message. Others could notcommunicate. It is not known why this was so. Some reports suggest that the mutineers had seized all mobile telephones from the officersinside. Thus, while the mutineers were able to remain in touch with their colleagues all over Bangladesh, the Army officers caught insidewere unable to communicate with anybody. The Army sent an armed group to the BDR campus to find out what was happening. It also senttwo helicopters to fly over the campus. They all withdrew when the mutineers opened fire on them.
10.Only by the morning of February 26,2009,did the extent of the savagery become evident to Sheikh Hasina and the Army. She authorisedthe Army to intervene and broadcast a warning message to the mutineers. The sight of the deployment of Army tanks and heavy artilleryaround the campus unnerved the mutineers and they called off the mutiny. It is not yet known how many of them managed to escape fromDhaka and how many surrendered.
11. When the Army entered the campus and started looking for the Army officers caught inside, it realised with shock the extent of thesavagery perpetrated by the BDR mutineers. So far, the Army has recovered the badly mutilated bodies of 73 army officers and somecivilians including wives and other family members of the killed officers. It is repored that there were 137 Army officers of various ranksinside the BDR campus when the mutiny broke out. The remaining are missing and feared killed. Their bodies have not yet been recovered.Many of the recovered bodies carried bullet as well as bayonet injuries. The bodies of the wives of some of the killed officers had beendisfigured. Neither Pakistan nor Bangladesh, where miitary revolts and rule are common, had seen a savagery of this kind since the Britishleft the sub-continent in 1947.
12.Brigadier General Mahmud Hossain, Director of Military Intelligence, told a press conference in Dhaka on the night of February 28,2009,that the army was ready to storm the headquarters of the BDR soon after the mutiny erupted, but heeded Sheikh Hasina's advice at thelast minute to resolve the issue politically."The Prime Minister directed that the crisis should be solved politically and it has been resolved inthat manner." He described the incidents as "possibly the worst massacre of army officers in Bangladesh's history", and added that theanger among the armed forces was "very natural". He said the army has begun its own probe into the killings of its officers during the mutinyeven as the investigation ordered by a government-constituted committee continues.
13. One of those missing is Colonel Gulzar Uddin Ahmed, of the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), who had played an active role in the driveagainst the jihadi organisations such as the Jamia'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB).Before being promoted as Additional DG of the RAB, hewas in its intelligence wing and had commanded the operation that had led to the capture and execution of JMB operations commanderSiddiqul Islam alias Bangla Bhai.
14.The belief in Bangladesh official circles is that the BDR mutiny was triggered off partly by the unaddressed grievances over the living andservice conditions and partly by anger over the action of the Army chief in carrying out the death sentences awarded to Bangla Bhai andother jihadi leaders in 2007. There has reportedly been a penetration of the BDR by the Hizbut Tehrir which was very critical of theexecutions which were projected by it as carried out under US pressure.(2-3-09).
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com.)
Friday, February 27, 2009
PAKISTAN BACK TO BEING PAKISTAN
B.RAMAN
Cunning, devious, erratic.
2.These are the allegations increasingly being used about President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan inside the coalition formed by BenazirBhutto before her assassination in order to fight for the restoration of democracy as well as inside his own Pakistan People's Party (PPP).
3. Well-informed sources in the PPP say that ever since he took over as the President in September last year, he has sought to marginalisethe loyalists of Benazir Bhutto and have them replaced by loyalists of the Zardari family. The Bhutto loyalists have been shocked by thedisinterest allegedly shown by him in pursuing vigorously the investigation into the assassination of his wife. Instead of doing so, he hasallegedly asked Rehman Malik, the Internal Security Adviser, to suspend any further investigation on the ground that the UNSecretary-General has already initiated action for the case to be investigated by a team appointed by him. It is alleged that anyone, whoraises the question of the lack of progress in the investigation, incurs Zardari's wrath and is subjected to harassment by the police. A typicalexample is that of Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, of the Sindh National Front (SNF), who is a cousin of the late Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto and a founding-fatherof the PPP. The police have allegedly been set after him and other members of the SNF after they raised the issue of the investigation inpublic.
4. These PPP sources claim that Bhutto loyalists have started raising doubts about the genuineness of the so-called political will of BenazirBhutto on the basis of which Zardari took over the interim leadership of the PPP till their son Bilawal, designated in the so-called will as herultimate successor, came of age to be able to take over the leadership. There has been no demand so far for an enquiry into thegenuineness of the will, but there are increasing insinuations that the so-called will was the idea of Rehman Malik. Malik used to be incharge of co-ordinating physical security arrangements for Benazir Bhutto and many in the party accuse him of negligence which, accordingto them, contributed to her assassination. To the surprise of many, who were close to Benazir, not only no action was taken against him byZardari, but he was appointed as the Internal Security Adviser with the rank of a Cabinet Minister and has emerged as a close personaladviser of Zardari. It is alleged in party circles that Malik, himself a retired police officer, has been misusing the police officers of theFederal Investigation Agency (FIA) in which he had served during Benazir Bhutto's second tenure (1993-96) as the Prime Minister formonitoring the activities of the critics of Zardari.
5. Speculation about differences between Zardari and Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani continue to gain currency despite repeated denialsby both. These PPP sources say that Gilani is unhappy that important decisions are being taken by Zardari and his close group of adviserswithout consulting him or keeping him in the picture and instructions issued directly over his head to senior bureaucrats to have thedecisions executed. Gilani was also excluded from the committee set up by Zardari for selecting Party candidates for the elections to fillup vacancies in the Senate, the upprer House of the Parliament.It is said that Gilani was taken by surprise by the press conference held byRehman Malik at which he admitted that there was partial involvement by certain elements in Pakistan in the conspiracy for the Mumbaiterrorist attack. Only a day before Malik's press conference, the Cabinet Committee on Defence had discussed the Indian allegations and itwas reportedly decided that a set of questions should be sent to India and that Pakistan should await India's replies before deciding on thenext step.
6. It is alleged that Zardari, who was under tremendous pressure from the US to co-operate with India, advised Malik to admit partialinvolvement without awaiting India's replies to the questions. The PPP sources claim that even Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of theArmy Staff (COAS), who was present at the meeting of the Cabinet Committee, was surprised by Malik's press conference.
7. During Benazir Bhutto's second tenure as the Prime Minister, many PPP workers known for their loyalty to Zardari had been recruited intoGovernment Departments, including the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the FIA. After dismissing her in 1996, Farooq Leghari, the thenPresident, had sacked all these people who had been recruited without following the civil service recruitment rules. It is said that Zardarihas been keen to have these people re-taken into the jobs from which they were sacked by Leghari, but Gilani has been strongly resistingthis.
8. Senior officials of the Foreign Office are mystified by Zardari's decision to visit Wuhan and Shanghai in China from February 20 to 24,2009, without an official invitation from the Chinese Government. He did not visit Beijing. Nor did he meet any Chinese leaders. He onlyspoke to President Hu Jintao over phone from Shanghai before returning to Islamabad. The Chinese had reportedly told Zardari that sincethey would be busy in connection with the first visit of Mrs.Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, to China after assuming office, theywould not be in a position to receive him in Beijing during February. In spite of this, he decided to go ahead with his visit and restrict his visitto Wuhan and Shanghai only. His advisers projected his decision as part of the plan announced by him after taking over as the President tovisit different provinces of China once a quarter to learn from China's experience in economic development. Foreign Office officials havebeen saying that it is not in keeping with the dignity of the office of the President of Pakistan to keep travelling to other countries----even ifit be to China---- without a formal invitation and without taking into account the convenience of the hosts.They project this as an indicator ofwhat they allege as the erratic and flippant streak in him.
9. Zardari has also come in for strong criticism inside his own party as well as inside the ruling coalition for what they see as the lack oftransparency in matters relating to co-operation with the US in its fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Reports carried by sections of theUS media alleging that the increasing Predator air strikes on suspected Al Qaeda and Taliban hide-outs in Pakistani territory are beingcarried out with the knowledge and tacit consent of Zardari have added to the suspicions that he has a huge debt to pay to the US for itsrole in persuading Gen. Pervez Musharraf, when he was the President, to issue the National Reconciliation Ordinance to withdraw thepending cases against him and Benazir to enable them to return to Pakistan from political exile and contest the elections.
10. His decision not to take any action against Musharraf for his repeated violations of the Constitution when he was in power and not toreinstate former Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury, who was sacked by Musharraf, are also seen by many of his critics asmotivated partly by his own interests and partly by US desires. It is alleged that Zardari is worried that if he reinstated the former ChiefJustice, the latter might question the validity of the National Reconciliation Ordinance and order a retrial of the case relating to the allegedmurder of Murtaza Ali Bhutto, the younger brother of Benazir, at Karachi in September 1996. Zardari was an accused in the case, which hassince been closed. The US also feels uncomfortable with the former Chief Justice because of the interest taken by him in looking into thecases of a large number of Pakistanis, who were picked up by the Pakistani intelligence agencies and handed over to the US intelligencewithout following the due process of the law because the US suspected that they were involved with Al Qaeda. Many of them are reported tobe in the Guantanamo Bay detention centre.
11. Nawaz Sharif is bitter with Zardari for the way he has gone back on every commitment made by him before the elections to the NationalAssembly in February last year. He first went back on the commitment made regarding the reinstatement of the former Chief Justice. He then took Nawaz Sharif by surprise by manipulating to have himself nominated and elected as the President and then went back on thecommitment to do away with the various constitutional amendments introduced through decree by Musharraf to restore to the Presidentthe powers to dismiss the Prime Minister and dissolve the National Assembly. He also went back on the commitment to review the variousaspects of co-operation with the US in its so-called war against terrorism in order to remove those aspects which were not in Pakistan'snational interests.
12. When Nawaz Sharif announced his support for a fresh agitation by the lawyers to demand the reinstatement of sacked Chief JusticeIftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury, Zardari allegedly sent Rehman Malik to meet him and his brother Shabaz Sharif, till recently the ChiefMinister of Punjab, to warn them that if Nawaz Sharif supported the fresh agitation by the lawyers, he (Zardari) would not oppose any rulingby a bench of the Supreme Court to disqualify Nawaz and his brother from contesting any election and holding any public office.
13. Whereas Zardari and Benazir were the accused in many criminal cases which had not ended in any conviction, Nawaz Sharif had beenconvicted on a charge of attempted hijacking of the aircraft in which Musharraf was travelling from Colombo to Karachi in October 1999,which provoked the coup against Nawaz. His brother was the accused in two criminal cases, but not a convict. While the US-supportedNational Reconciliation Ordinance led to the withdrawal of the cases against Benazir and Zardari, it did not affect the conviction of Nawazand the cases against his brother.
14. Despite this, the Election Commission allowed Shabaz Sharif to contest the election. He became the Chief Minister of Punjab with thesupport of the PPP. Nawaz was not able to contest the election because of his conviction. He was hopeful that if Iftikhar MohammadChaudhury was reinstated as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court he would have his conviction reviewed and set aside. Zardari hadreportedly promised Nawaz that the Government would take the initiative to have his conviction set aside, but he went back on the promise.Nawaz and his brother refused to appear before a bench consisting of Judges appointed by Musharraf to argue their case. The result: thebench's ruling on February 25,2009, declaring them as ineligible to contest elections and to hold any public office.Shabaz Sharif hasresigned as the Chief Minister and Governor's rule has been proclaimed in the province for two months. The PPP hopes to form the provincialGovernment with the help of Musharraf loyalists in the PML ( Qaide Azam) and possible defectors from the PML of Nawaz.
15. Though Zardari's advisers have been strongly denying that he had anything to do with the ruling, Nawaz and Shabaz are convinced thatthe ruling was induced by Zardari. There has already been public agitation on this issue. Presuming that Zardari had a role in inducing thisruling by the bench of the Supreme Court, this could prove to be as unwise and as damaging as the decision of Musharraf in 2007 to haveIftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury sacked. Zardari is not Benazir. He is seen by many in his own party as a political upstart. His confrontationwith Nawaz could set in motion a chain of events which may ultimately discredit once again the political class in Pakistan and prepare theground for another spell of military rule.
16.The US has reasons to be concerned over the developments in Pakistan. There is a trust deficit between it and Nawaz. It continues toback Zardari who has shown himself to be as amenable to US wishes as Musharraf, if not even more. It continues to encourage Gen.Kayanito back Zardari. But Zardari's mishandling of the political situation could come in the way of the US operations against Al Qaeda and theTaliban at a time when the Obama Administration is re-tooling its Afghan strategy. (28-2-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institue For Topical Studies,Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Cunning, devious, erratic.
2.These are the allegations increasingly being used about President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan inside the coalition formed by BenazirBhutto before her assassination in order to fight for the restoration of democracy as well as inside his own Pakistan People's Party (PPP).
3. Well-informed sources in the PPP say that ever since he took over as the President in September last year, he has sought to marginalisethe loyalists of Benazir Bhutto and have them replaced by loyalists of the Zardari family. The Bhutto loyalists have been shocked by thedisinterest allegedly shown by him in pursuing vigorously the investigation into the assassination of his wife. Instead of doing so, he hasallegedly asked Rehman Malik, the Internal Security Adviser, to suspend any further investigation on the ground that the UNSecretary-General has already initiated action for the case to be investigated by a team appointed by him. It is alleged that anyone, whoraises the question of the lack of progress in the investigation, incurs Zardari's wrath and is subjected to harassment by the police. A typicalexample is that of Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, of the Sindh National Front (SNF), who is a cousin of the late Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto and a founding-fatherof the PPP. The police have allegedly been set after him and other members of the SNF after they raised the issue of the investigation inpublic.
4. These PPP sources claim that Bhutto loyalists have started raising doubts about the genuineness of the so-called political will of BenazirBhutto on the basis of which Zardari took over the interim leadership of the PPP till their son Bilawal, designated in the so-called will as herultimate successor, came of age to be able to take over the leadership. There has been no demand so far for an enquiry into thegenuineness of the will, but there are increasing insinuations that the so-called will was the idea of Rehman Malik. Malik used to be incharge of co-ordinating physical security arrangements for Benazir Bhutto and many in the party accuse him of negligence which, accordingto them, contributed to her assassination. To the surprise of many, who were close to Benazir, not only no action was taken against him byZardari, but he was appointed as the Internal Security Adviser with the rank of a Cabinet Minister and has emerged as a close personaladviser of Zardari. It is alleged in party circles that Malik, himself a retired police officer, has been misusing the police officers of theFederal Investigation Agency (FIA) in which he had served during Benazir Bhutto's second tenure (1993-96) as the Prime Minister formonitoring the activities of the critics of Zardari.
5. Speculation about differences between Zardari and Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani continue to gain currency despite repeated denialsby both. These PPP sources say that Gilani is unhappy that important decisions are being taken by Zardari and his close group of adviserswithout consulting him or keeping him in the picture and instructions issued directly over his head to senior bureaucrats to have thedecisions executed. Gilani was also excluded from the committee set up by Zardari for selecting Party candidates for the elections to fillup vacancies in the Senate, the upprer House of the Parliament.It is said that Gilani was taken by surprise by the press conference held byRehman Malik at which he admitted that there was partial involvement by certain elements in Pakistan in the conspiracy for the Mumbaiterrorist attack. Only a day before Malik's press conference, the Cabinet Committee on Defence had discussed the Indian allegations and itwas reportedly decided that a set of questions should be sent to India and that Pakistan should await India's replies before deciding on thenext step.
6. It is alleged that Zardari, who was under tremendous pressure from the US to co-operate with India, advised Malik to admit partialinvolvement without awaiting India's replies to the questions. The PPP sources claim that even Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of theArmy Staff (COAS), who was present at the meeting of the Cabinet Committee, was surprised by Malik's press conference.
7. During Benazir Bhutto's second tenure as the Prime Minister, many PPP workers known for their loyalty to Zardari had been recruited intoGovernment Departments, including the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the FIA. After dismissing her in 1996, Farooq Leghari, the thenPresident, had sacked all these people who had been recruited without following the civil service recruitment rules. It is said that Zardarihas been keen to have these people re-taken into the jobs from which they were sacked by Leghari, but Gilani has been strongly resistingthis.
8. Senior officials of the Foreign Office are mystified by Zardari's decision to visit Wuhan and Shanghai in China from February 20 to 24,2009, without an official invitation from the Chinese Government. He did not visit Beijing. Nor did he meet any Chinese leaders. He onlyspoke to President Hu Jintao over phone from Shanghai before returning to Islamabad. The Chinese had reportedly told Zardari that sincethey would be busy in connection with the first visit of Mrs.Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, to China after assuming office, theywould not be in a position to receive him in Beijing during February. In spite of this, he decided to go ahead with his visit and restrict his visitto Wuhan and Shanghai only. His advisers projected his decision as part of the plan announced by him after taking over as the President tovisit different provinces of China once a quarter to learn from China's experience in economic development. Foreign Office officials havebeen saying that it is not in keeping with the dignity of the office of the President of Pakistan to keep travelling to other countries----even ifit be to China---- without a formal invitation and without taking into account the convenience of the hosts.They project this as an indicator ofwhat they allege as the erratic and flippant streak in him.
9. Zardari has also come in for strong criticism inside his own party as well as inside the ruling coalition for what they see as the lack oftransparency in matters relating to co-operation with the US in its fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Reports carried by sections of theUS media alleging that the increasing Predator air strikes on suspected Al Qaeda and Taliban hide-outs in Pakistani territory are beingcarried out with the knowledge and tacit consent of Zardari have added to the suspicions that he has a huge debt to pay to the US for itsrole in persuading Gen. Pervez Musharraf, when he was the President, to issue the National Reconciliation Ordinance to withdraw thepending cases against him and Benazir to enable them to return to Pakistan from political exile and contest the elections.
10. His decision not to take any action against Musharraf for his repeated violations of the Constitution when he was in power and not toreinstate former Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury, who was sacked by Musharraf, are also seen by many of his critics asmotivated partly by his own interests and partly by US desires. It is alleged that Zardari is worried that if he reinstated the former ChiefJustice, the latter might question the validity of the National Reconciliation Ordinance and order a retrial of the case relating to the allegedmurder of Murtaza Ali Bhutto, the younger brother of Benazir, at Karachi in September 1996. Zardari was an accused in the case, which hassince been closed. The US also feels uncomfortable with the former Chief Justice because of the interest taken by him in looking into thecases of a large number of Pakistanis, who were picked up by the Pakistani intelligence agencies and handed over to the US intelligencewithout following the due process of the law because the US suspected that they were involved with Al Qaeda. Many of them are reported tobe in the Guantanamo Bay detention centre.
11. Nawaz Sharif is bitter with Zardari for the way he has gone back on every commitment made by him before the elections to the NationalAssembly in February last year. He first went back on the commitment made regarding the reinstatement of the former Chief Justice. He then took Nawaz Sharif by surprise by manipulating to have himself nominated and elected as the President and then went back on thecommitment to do away with the various constitutional amendments introduced through decree by Musharraf to restore to the Presidentthe powers to dismiss the Prime Minister and dissolve the National Assembly. He also went back on the commitment to review the variousaspects of co-operation with the US in its so-called war against terrorism in order to remove those aspects which were not in Pakistan'snational interests.
12. When Nawaz Sharif announced his support for a fresh agitation by the lawyers to demand the reinstatement of sacked Chief JusticeIftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury, Zardari allegedly sent Rehman Malik to meet him and his brother Shabaz Sharif, till recently the ChiefMinister of Punjab, to warn them that if Nawaz Sharif supported the fresh agitation by the lawyers, he (Zardari) would not oppose any rulingby a bench of the Supreme Court to disqualify Nawaz and his brother from contesting any election and holding any public office.
13. Whereas Zardari and Benazir were the accused in many criminal cases which had not ended in any conviction, Nawaz Sharif had beenconvicted on a charge of attempted hijacking of the aircraft in which Musharraf was travelling from Colombo to Karachi in October 1999,which provoked the coup against Nawaz. His brother was the accused in two criminal cases, but not a convict. While the US-supportedNational Reconciliation Ordinance led to the withdrawal of the cases against Benazir and Zardari, it did not affect the conviction of Nawazand the cases against his brother.
14. Despite this, the Election Commission allowed Shabaz Sharif to contest the election. He became the Chief Minister of Punjab with thesupport of the PPP. Nawaz was not able to contest the election because of his conviction. He was hopeful that if Iftikhar MohammadChaudhury was reinstated as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court he would have his conviction reviewed and set aside. Zardari hadreportedly promised Nawaz that the Government would take the initiative to have his conviction set aside, but he went back on the promise.Nawaz and his brother refused to appear before a bench consisting of Judges appointed by Musharraf to argue their case. The result: thebench's ruling on February 25,2009, declaring them as ineligible to contest elections and to hold any public office.Shabaz Sharif hasresigned as the Chief Minister and Governor's rule has been proclaimed in the province for two months. The PPP hopes to form the provincialGovernment with the help of Musharraf loyalists in the PML ( Qaide Azam) and possible defectors from the PML of Nawaz.
15. Though Zardari's advisers have been strongly denying that he had anything to do with the ruling, Nawaz and Shabaz are convinced thatthe ruling was induced by Zardari. There has already been public agitation on this issue. Presuming that Zardari had a role in inducing thisruling by the bench of the Supreme Court, this could prove to be as unwise and as damaging as the decision of Musharraf in 2007 to haveIftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury sacked. Zardari is not Benazir. He is seen by many in his own party as a political upstart. His confrontationwith Nawaz could set in motion a chain of events which may ultimately discredit once again the political class in Pakistan and prepare theground for another spell of military rule.
16.The US has reasons to be concerned over the developments in Pakistan. There is a trust deficit between it and Nawaz. It continues toback Zardari who has shown himself to be as amenable to US wishes as Musharraf, if not even more. It continues to encourage Gen.Kayanito back Zardari. But Zardari's mishandling of the political situation could come in the way of the US operations against Al Qaeda and theTaliban at a time when the Obama Administration is re-tooling its Afghan strategy. (28-2-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institue For Topical Studies,Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
TIBETAN MOURNING PERIOD STARTS
B.RAMAN
Tibetans in China and abroad have started a boycott of the Tibetan New Year (Losar) fortnight, which started on February 25,2009. They are observing the fortnight as a period of mourning in homage to the Tibetans who were killed by the Chinese security forces during the uprising in the Tibetan-inhabited areas of China in March and April last year. Their observance of the period of mourning consisted of prayers and processions. In some places, they also burnt the effigies of the Chinese leaders in keeping with the Tibetan tradition of burning the effigies of demons during the New Year.
2. In the Qinghai province, over 100 Tibetan monks of the Lutsang monastery took out a silent procession in the Mangra ( the Chinese call it Guinan) county on February 25,2009. The procession terminated at the country centre, where the local Government offices are located. They presented a petition to a representative of the local Government calling, inter alia, for an international enquiry into the violent incidents of last year. The petition also appealed to the Chinese leaders to respect the wishes and feelings of the Tibetan youth. After observing silence for 30 minutes at the county centre, they went back to their monastery peacefully. The local Chinese authorities did not try to prevent the procession and accepted their petition.
3. However, on February 26,2009, vans of the Public Security Bureau went round the county asking the leaders of the procession to surrender to the police and the local population to help the police in the identification and arrest of the leaders. They warned of legal action against those not carrying out the orders and not co-operating with the police. A few hours later, a contingent of the People's Armed Police (PAP) raided the monastery and took away a number of monks for interrogation at the police station.
4. The Chinese authorities in Tibet and other areas having a large Tibetan population organised singing and dancing in public squares and street plays, showing how the Chinese vanquished serfdom and what was portrayed as the feudal rule of the Dalai Lama. A large number of Han Chinese living and working in these areas attended the State-sponsored celebrations, which were largely boycotted by the Tibetans despite the payment of a cash gift by the Chinese to Tibetans attending the celebrations. However, there are no reports of the Chinese forcing the Tibetans to attend the celebrations, which could have led to violence.
5. Coinciding with the beginning of the New Year fortnight, the Chinese authorities suspended the issue of permission to foreign tourists and journalists to visit Tibet and the Tibetan-inhabited areas. They have indicated that this ban could continue till the end of March.
6. However, Edward Wong of the "International Herald Tribune" managed to visit Qinghai--- presumably with a permit issued by the Chinese before the imposition of the temporary ban. His despatch, which was carried by the IHT on February 25,2009, stated as follows: "The most prominent act of Tibetan resistance to Chinese rule since an uprising last March, unfolded quietly in towns across western China on Wednesday (February 25), as monks, nomads and merchants refrained from holding festivities and instead used the occasion of Losar to memorialize Tibetans who suffered in China's military crackdown last year. Many Tibetans forsook dancing and dinner parties for the lighting of yak-butter lamps and the chanting of prayers. The result of a grassroots campaign that began months ago, the boycott of Losar signifies the discontent that many of China's six million Tibetans still feel toward domination by the ethnic Han Chinese nearly one year after the uprising and almost six decades after Mao Zedong's troops seized control of the high deserts and grasslands of Tibet. Although more passive than the protests and riots of last year, the boycott has raised tensions. Tibetans here (in Tongren) and in other towns, including Lhasa, the Tibetan capital, say Government officials have handed out money to Tibetans to spur them to celebrate. On Wednesday, the government was eager to show festive Tibetans on state-run television: It broadcast footage of Tibetans in Lhasa dancing, shooting off fireworks and feasting in their homes. But no such activities were in evidence in this part of Qinghai Province, near the birthplace of the Dalai Lama, the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader, except for a flurry of firecrackers set off at noon by Chinese officers outside a paramilitary compound. The boycott of festivities began even earlier, during Chinese New Year, which ran for two weeks from late January and which Tibetans here tend to observe alongside Losar. "The government thinks we should celebrate this holiday properly," said Shartsang, the abbot of Rongwo Monastery. "Certainly this year people haven't celebrated it in the same way they did in past years." The Government has stepped up security across Tibet and shut off access to foreigners. Here in the town of Tongren, called Rebkong by Tibetans, more than 300 security officers with riot shields were seen training in the stadium on Wednesday afternoon. On Monday night, a unit of officers marched in formation along a road cordoned off with yellow tape. Like most of the people interviewed for this article, the monk asked that his name not be used, for fear of government reprisal. The monastery is under tight surveillance: Cameras have been installed throughout, monks say, and security officers dressed in monk's robes wander the alleyways. Nevertheless, the monks have put photographs of the Dalai Lama back up in prayer halls and in their bedrooms. One monk from southern Qinghai held up an amulet of the Dalai Lama dangling from his neck. "The Chinese say this is all one country," the monk said. "What do we think? You don't know what's in our hearts. They don't know what's in our hearts," he said, and tapped his chest. Some of the greatest hostility comes from 30 or so monks from Drepung and Sera monasteries in Lhasa who have sought refuge here, even as some monks from Rongwo have tried fleeing across the Himalayas to India. Last spring, after the uprising, security forces in Lhasa cleared out monasteries and jailed monks for months. About 700 monks were sent to a camp in Golmud in Qinghai Province for four months of patriotic education, then ordered to return to their hometowns for three months, said three young monks who were shipped to the camp. The three are now studying here. "We want to go back to our monastery in Lhasa, but the police would check our ID cards and evict us," one of the monks said over tea in a bedroom stacked with Buddhist texts. "We came here because we wanted a good opportunity to study."
7.While the Chinese have prevented all foreign journalists from visiting Tibet, N.Ram, the Editor-in-Chief of "The Hindu" of Chennai, was a privileged visitor to Tibet for two days to observe how the Tibetans are observing Losar. The official Xinhua news agency (February 26) reported as follows after his visit: "Mr. Ram’s latest visit coincided with the run-up to the Tibetan New Year. He said: “We witnessed fewer people in work places as they went back home to celebrate the New Year.There was no sign of strain or suppression there as people were filled with excitement and the atmosphere was festive. There were plenty of signs of prosperity on my long drive from Lhasa to Nyingchi.The contrast between the old and the new is very powerful, demonstrating what the Chinese Government and the system have done for Tibet.”
8. On February 26,2009, "The Hindu" disseminated a report of the Xinhua describing how the Tibetans were celebrating the Losar. (27-2-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tibetans in China and abroad have started a boycott of the Tibetan New Year (Losar) fortnight, which started on February 25,2009. They are observing the fortnight as a period of mourning in homage to the Tibetans who were killed by the Chinese security forces during the uprising in the Tibetan-inhabited areas of China in March and April last year. Their observance of the period of mourning consisted of prayers and processions. In some places, they also burnt the effigies of the Chinese leaders in keeping with the Tibetan tradition of burning the effigies of demons during the New Year.
2. In the Qinghai province, over 100 Tibetan monks of the Lutsang monastery took out a silent procession in the Mangra ( the Chinese call it Guinan) county on February 25,2009. The procession terminated at the country centre, where the local Government offices are located. They presented a petition to a representative of the local Government calling, inter alia, for an international enquiry into the violent incidents of last year. The petition also appealed to the Chinese leaders to respect the wishes and feelings of the Tibetan youth. After observing silence for 30 minutes at the county centre, they went back to their monastery peacefully. The local Chinese authorities did not try to prevent the procession and accepted their petition.
3. However, on February 26,2009, vans of the Public Security Bureau went round the county asking the leaders of the procession to surrender to the police and the local population to help the police in the identification and arrest of the leaders. They warned of legal action against those not carrying out the orders and not co-operating with the police. A few hours later, a contingent of the People's Armed Police (PAP) raided the monastery and took away a number of monks for interrogation at the police station.
4. The Chinese authorities in Tibet and other areas having a large Tibetan population organised singing and dancing in public squares and street plays, showing how the Chinese vanquished serfdom and what was portrayed as the feudal rule of the Dalai Lama. A large number of Han Chinese living and working in these areas attended the State-sponsored celebrations, which were largely boycotted by the Tibetans despite the payment of a cash gift by the Chinese to Tibetans attending the celebrations. However, there are no reports of the Chinese forcing the Tibetans to attend the celebrations, which could have led to violence.
5. Coinciding with the beginning of the New Year fortnight, the Chinese authorities suspended the issue of permission to foreign tourists and journalists to visit Tibet and the Tibetan-inhabited areas. They have indicated that this ban could continue till the end of March.
6. However, Edward Wong of the "International Herald Tribune" managed to visit Qinghai--- presumably with a permit issued by the Chinese before the imposition of the temporary ban. His despatch, which was carried by the IHT on February 25,2009, stated as follows: "The most prominent act of Tibetan resistance to Chinese rule since an uprising last March, unfolded quietly in towns across western China on Wednesday (February 25), as monks, nomads and merchants refrained from holding festivities and instead used the occasion of Losar to memorialize Tibetans who suffered in China's military crackdown last year. Many Tibetans forsook dancing and dinner parties for the lighting of yak-butter lamps and the chanting of prayers. The result of a grassroots campaign that began months ago, the boycott of Losar signifies the discontent that many of China's six million Tibetans still feel toward domination by the ethnic Han Chinese nearly one year after the uprising and almost six decades after Mao Zedong's troops seized control of the high deserts and grasslands of Tibet. Although more passive than the protests and riots of last year, the boycott has raised tensions. Tibetans here (in Tongren) and in other towns, including Lhasa, the Tibetan capital, say Government officials have handed out money to Tibetans to spur them to celebrate. On Wednesday, the government was eager to show festive Tibetans on state-run television: It broadcast footage of Tibetans in Lhasa dancing, shooting off fireworks and feasting in their homes. But no such activities were in evidence in this part of Qinghai Province, near the birthplace of the Dalai Lama, the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader, except for a flurry of firecrackers set off at noon by Chinese officers outside a paramilitary compound. The boycott of festivities began even earlier, during Chinese New Year, which ran for two weeks from late January and which Tibetans here tend to observe alongside Losar. "The government thinks we should celebrate this holiday properly," said Shartsang, the abbot of Rongwo Monastery. "Certainly this year people haven't celebrated it in the same way they did in past years." The Government has stepped up security across Tibet and shut off access to foreigners. Here in the town of Tongren, called Rebkong by Tibetans, more than 300 security officers with riot shields were seen training in the stadium on Wednesday afternoon. On Monday night, a unit of officers marched in formation along a road cordoned off with yellow tape. Like most of the people interviewed for this article, the monk asked that his name not be used, for fear of government reprisal. The monastery is under tight surveillance: Cameras have been installed throughout, monks say, and security officers dressed in monk's robes wander the alleyways. Nevertheless, the monks have put photographs of the Dalai Lama back up in prayer halls and in their bedrooms. One monk from southern Qinghai held up an amulet of the Dalai Lama dangling from his neck. "The Chinese say this is all one country," the monk said. "What do we think? You don't know what's in our hearts. They don't know what's in our hearts," he said, and tapped his chest. Some of the greatest hostility comes from 30 or so monks from Drepung and Sera monasteries in Lhasa who have sought refuge here, even as some monks from Rongwo have tried fleeing across the Himalayas to India. Last spring, after the uprising, security forces in Lhasa cleared out monasteries and jailed monks for months. About 700 monks were sent to a camp in Golmud in Qinghai Province for four months of patriotic education, then ordered to return to their hometowns for three months, said three young monks who were shipped to the camp. The three are now studying here. "We want to go back to our monastery in Lhasa, but the police would check our ID cards and evict us," one of the monks said over tea in a bedroom stacked with Buddhist texts. "We came here because we wanted a good opportunity to study."
7.While the Chinese have prevented all foreign journalists from visiting Tibet, N.Ram, the Editor-in-Chief of "The Hindu" of Chennai, was a privileged visitor to Tibet for two days to observe how the Tibetans are observing Losar. The official Xinhua news agency (February 26) reported as follows after his visit: "Mr. Ram’s latest visit coincided with the run-up to the Tibetan New Year. He said: “We witnessed fewer people in work places as they went back home to celebrate the New Year.There was no sign of strain or suppression there as people were filled with excitement and the atmosphere was festive. There were plenty of signs of prosperity on my long drive from Lhasa to Nyingchi.The contrast between the old and the new is very powerful, demonstrating what the Chinese Government and the system have done for Tibet.”
8. On February 26,2009, "The Hindu" disseminated a report of the Xinhua describing how the Tibetans were celebrating the Losar. (27-2-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Thursday, February 26, 2009
BAD OMENS FROM BANGLADESH
B.RAMAN
"In an assessment on Bangladesh disseminated in January, 1997, this writer had observed as follows: " There are individual officers in theBangladesh intelligence community and in its security forces, who feel positively towards Sheikh Hasina (Prime Minister) and her father, butone cannot say the same thing of these organisations as institutions. Institutionally, they may not share with her the same enthusiasm forcloser relations with India and for assisting it in dealing with the insurgency (in the North-East). It would take her and her party considerable time to understand and assess the intricacies of their working and the labyrinthine relationships which they have built up withtheir Pakistani counterparts during the last 21 years. She, therefore, has to move with caution."
"The savage manner in which 15 members of India's Border Security Force (BSF) were reportedly abducted, tortured, killed and their bodiesmutilated beyond recognition last week shows that even after almost five years in power, Sheikh Hasina is apparently not in total commandof her military and intelligence establishment, which like its counterpart in Pakistan, has been infected by the fundamentalist virus of Afghan vintage and is probably developing an agenda of its own vis-Ã -vis India."
---Extract from my article dated 23-4-2001 titled BANGLADESH: A BENGALI ABBASI LURKING SOMEWHERE? athttp://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers3/paper232.html
-----------------------------------------------
The current mutiny across Bangladesh by directly-recruited junior officers and other ranks of the Bangladesh Rifles (BD) bodes ill for therecently-elected (in December,2008) Government headed by Sheikh Hasina. Their mutiny, which started in Dhaka on February 25,2009, and has since spread to other parts of the country, including Chittagong, ostensibly over long-pending grievances regarding pay and allowancesand food rations, is directed till now not against the political leadership but against the senior army officers----serving and retired---ondeputation to the BDR.
2.The targeted Army officers occupy senior positions in the command and control of the BDR and their pay and allowances and other perksare governed by those applicable to the army officers and not by those applicable to the directly-recruited officers of the BDR. Resentmentover what is perceived by the direct recruits as the step-motherly treatment meted out to them by the deputationists and re-employedofficers of the Army seem to have acted as the trigger for the mutiny. The spreading mutiny, during which a number of senior army officersserving on deputation in the BDR, are reported to have been either killed or held hostage, seems to have taken the Army and politicalleadership by surprise. It was the outcome of a secret conspiracy well-planned and well-executed by the junior officers and other ranks.The intelligence wing of the Bangladesh Police and the Army-dominated Directorate-General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) seem to havebeen taken by surprise. If the DGFI had advance information, it would have at least tried to alert the senior army officers so that they did notbecome targets and victims of the mutineers. The fact that it did not do so suggests that the DGFI was not aware.
3. The fact that the mutineers were able to plan and execute this conspiracy in total secrecy with even the grass-roots political cadres ofdifferent parties not getting scent of it, speaks of a well-organised anti-army network inside the BDR. The identities of the ring leaders of theconspiracy remain unclear. A question of major concern both to the BD political and military leadership as well as to India should be---- wasthe mutiny purely due to bread and butter issues or is there something more to it?
4. As in the case of the BD Army, in the case of the BDR too, many of the recruits at the lower levels come from the villages and quite a fewof them are products of the mushrooming madrasas across the country funded by money from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Pakistan. The ruralareas of Bangladesh and the madrasas there are the main recruiting and brainwashing grounds of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI-B) andother jihadi organisations. While the international community has paid considerable attention to monitoring the infiltration of the PakistaniArmed Forces by fundamentalist and jihadi elements since the days of the late Gen.Zia-ul-Haq, similar attention has not been paid tomonitoring the presence of fundamentalist and jihadi elements in the BD Armed Forces and the BDR.
5. Senior officers' relationship with the junior ranks has always been the Achilles' heel of the BDR, which used to be known before the birthof BD in 1971 as the East Pakistan Rifles (EPR). The EPR consisted largely of Bengali direct recruits officered by Punjabi and Pashtundeputationists from the Pakistan Army. Resentment over the humiliating attitude of the Pakistani Army officers towards the Bengali juniorranks was an important factor, which had contributed to the desertion of large sections of the Bengali junior ranks from the EPR and theirjoining the freedom struggle under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.
6. After the birth of Bangladesh those members of the EPR, who had deserted and joined the freedom struggle, were reconstituted into thehard-core of the newly-created BDR. The force at the lower and middle levels has grown around this hard core. It now has a strength ofaround 70,000 and its role is mainly trans-border security in times of peace. In Bangladesh territory bordering India, which has been thehotbed of the activities of the HUJI and where many of its training camps are located, the BDR is responsible for security. Its role in thisregard often brings it into contact with the HUJI and other jihadi elements.
7. The unfriendly attitude of sections of the lower ranks of the BDR to India became evident from the savage manner in which 15 members ofIndia's Border Security Force (BSF) were abducted, tortured, killed and their bodies mutilated beyond recognition by elements from the BDRin April,2001. Sheikh Hasina, who was in power at that time too, did not or could not take action against those responsible for this savagerydespite her professed friendship for India.The BD Press had quoted the then BD Foreign Secretary, Syed Muazzem Ali, as telling journalistsat Dacca on April 20,2001, as follows: "The border force has standing responsibility of protecting the frontier from any external attacks. BDRare there to repulse any attack on the country’s frontier. There are some situations when decisions are taken instantly. It does not requireto send file to Dhaka, get order and then start firing. It is the charter duty of BDR to protect our frontier from any attack on our border. Ifquestion of war comes, then the orders from top level may come." He thus tried to justify the action by the BDR.
8. The mutiny and the consequent confrontation between the junior elements of the BDR and the Army has placed Sheikh Hasina in a tricklysituation. The Army seems determined to act against the BDR mutineers and crush their revolt by using tanks and other heavy weaponsagainst them. It should be able to crush them in Dhaka and other big towns. Its ability to do so in the rural areas and particularly near theborder with India remains to be seen. If the mutineers realise the lack of wisdom of their action and surrender without further resistance,the situation may be controlled. If they put up a resistance in the rural areas, many HUJI and other jihadi elements might join them in thehope of exploiting the situation to their benefit.
9. In the past, the BDR had remained loyal to Sheikh Hasina and other political leaders. They preferred to depend on the police andpara-military forces for their personal security than on the Army, which they distrusted. Now she has no other option but to back the army inits confrontation with the mutineers and authorise it to take whatever action it considers necessary to quell the mutiny. The political fall-outof the confrontation could be unpredictable for her Government. The ultimate beneficiaries of any political instability resulting from it couldbe the jihadis.
10. The developing situation has to be closely watched by India and the rest of the international community. (26-2-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
"In an assessment on Bangladesh disseminated in January, 1997, this writer had observed as follows: " There are individual officers in theBangladesh intelligence community and in its security forces, who feel positively towards Sheikh Hasina (Prime Minister) and her father, butone cannot say the same thing of these organisations as institutions. Institutionally, they may not share with her the same enthusiasm forcloser relations with India and for assisting it in dealing with the insurgency (in the North-East). It would take her and her party considerable time to understand and assess the intricacies of their working and the labyrinthine relationships which they have built up withtheir Pakistani counterparts during the last 21 years. She, therefore, has to move with caution."
"The savage manner in which 15 members of India's Border Security Force (BSF) were reportedly abducted, tortured, killed and their bodiesmutilated beyond recognition last week shows that even after almost five years in power, Sheikh Hasina is apparently not in total commandof her military and intelligence establishment, which like its counterpart in Pakistan, has been infected by the fundamentalist virus of Afghan vintage and is probably developing an agenda of its own vis-Ã -vis India."
---Extract from my article dated 23-4-2001 titled BANGLADESH: A BENGALI ABBASI LURKING SOMEWHERE? athttp://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers3/paper232.html
-----------------------------------------------
The current mutiny across Bangladesh by directly-recruited junior officers and other ranks of the Bangladesh Rifles (BD) bodes ill for therecently-elected (in December,2008) Government headed by Sheikh Hasina. Their mutiny, which started in Dhaka on February 25,2009, and has since spread to other parts of the country, including Chittagong, ostensibly over long-pending grievances regarding pay and allowancesand food rations, is directed till now not against the political leadership but against the senior army officers----serving and retired---ondeputation to the BDR.
2.The targeted Army officers occupy senior positions in the command and control of the BDR and their pay and allowances and other perksare governed by those applicable to the army officers and not by those applicable to the directly-recruited officers of the BDR. Resentmentover what is perceived by the direct recruits as the step-motherly treatment meted out to them by the deputationists and re-employedofficers of the Army seem to have acted as the trigger for the mutiny. The spreading mutiny, during which a number of senior army officersserving on deputation in the BDR, are reported to have been either killed or held hostage, seems to have taken the Army and politicalleadership by surprise. It was the outcome of a secret conspiracy well-planned and well-executed by the junior officers and other ranks.The intelligence wing of the Bangladesh Police and the Army-dominated Directorate-General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) seem to havebeen taken by surprise. If the DGFI had advance information, it would have at least tried to alert the senior army officers so that they did notbecome targets and victims of the mutineers. The fact that it did not do so suggests that the DGFI was not aware.
3. The fact that the mutineers were able to plan and execute this conspiracy in total secrecy with even the grass-roots political cadres ofdifferent parties not getting scent of it, speaks of a well-organised anti-army network inside the BDR. The identities of the ring leaders of theconspiracy remain unclear. A question of major concern both to the BD political and military leadership as well as to India should be---- wasthe mutiny purely due to bread and butter issues or is there something more to it?
4. As in the case of the BD Army, in the case of the BDR too, many of the recruits at the lower levels come from the villages and quite a fewof them are products of the mushrooming madrasas across the country funded by money from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Pakistan. The ruralareas of Bangladesh and the madrasas there are the main recruiting and brainwashing grounds of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI-B) andother jihadi organisations. While the international community has paid considerable attention to monitoring the infiltration of the PakistaniArmed Forces by fundamentalist and jihadi elements since the days of the late Gen.Zia-ul-Haq, similar attention has not been paid tomonitoring the presence of fundamentalist and jihadi elements in the BD Armed Forces and the BDR.
5. Senior officers' relationship with the junior ranks has always been the Achilles' heel of the BDR, which used to be known before the birthof BD in 1971 as the East Pakistan Rifles (EPR). The EPR consisted largely of Bengali direct recruits officered by Punjabi and Pashtundeputationists from the Pakistan Army. Resentment over the humiliating attitude of the Pakistani Army officers towards the Bengali juniorranks was an important factor, which had contributed to the desertion of large sections of the Bengali junior ranks from the EPR and theirjoining the freedom struggle under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.
6. After the birth of Bangladesh those members of the EPR, who had deserted and joined the freedom struggle, were reconstituted into thehard-core of the newly-created BDR. The force at the lower and middle levels has grown around this hard core. It now has a strength ofaround 70,000 and its role is mainly trans-border security in times of peace. In Bangladesh territory bordering India, which has been thehotbed of the activities of the HUJI and where many of its training camps are located, the BDR is responsible for security. Its role in thisregard often brings it into contact with the HUJI and other jihadi elements.
7. The unfriendly attitude of sections of the lower ranks of the BDR to India became evident from the savage manner in which 15 members ofIndia's Border Security Force (BSF) were abducted, tortured, killed and their bodies mutilated beyond recognition by elements from the BDRin April,2001. Sheikh Hasina, who was in power at that time too, did not or could not take action against those responsible for this savagerydespite her professed friendship for India.The BD Press had quoted the then BD Foreign Secretary, Syed Muazzem Ali, as telling journalistsat Dacca on April 20,2001, as follows: "The border force has standing responsibility of protecting the frontier from any external attacks. BDRare there to repulse any attack on the country’s frontier. There are some situations when decisions are taken instantly. It does not requireto send file to Dhaka, get order and then start firing. It is the charter duty of BDR to protect our frontier from any attack on our border. Ifquestion of war comes, then the orders from top level may come." He thus tried to justify the action by the BDR.
8. The mutiny and the consequent confrontation between the junior elements of the BDR and the Army has placed Sheikh Hasina in a tricklysituation. The Army seems determined to act against the BDR mutineers and crush their revolt by using tanks and other heavy weaponsagainst them. It should be able to crush them in Dhaka and other big towns. Its ability to do so in the rural areas and particularly near theborder with India remains to be seen. If the mutineers realise the lack of wisdom of their action and surrender without further resistance,the situation may be controlled. If they put up a resistance in the rural areas, many HUJI and other jihadi elements might join them in thehope of exploiting the situation to their benefit.
9. In the past, the BDR had remained loyal to Sheikh Hasina and other political leaders. They preferred to depend on the police andpara-military forces for their personal security than on the Army, which they distrusted. Now she has no other option but to back the army inits confrontation with the mutineers and authorise it to take whatever action it considers necessary to quell the mutiny. The political fall-outof the confrontation could be unpredictable for her Government. The ultimate beneficiaries of any political instability resulting from it couldbe the jihadis.
10. The developing situation has to be closely watched by India and the rest of the international community. (26-2-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Saturday, February 21, 2009
TIBETAN YOUTH DISAPPOINTED WITH OBAMA & MRS.CLINTON
B.RAMAN
Tibetan youth organizations in Tibet and other Tibetan-inhabited areas of China have kept up their campaign for the observance of the Tibetan New Year’s Day (Losar) on February 25,2009, as a day of mourning in homage to those killed by the Chinese security forces in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics of August,2008, and March 10,2009, as a day of the Tibetan resistance struggle to coincide with the 50th anniversary of the flight of His Holiness the Dalai Lama from Tibet and the completion of what they describe as the occupation of Tibet by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
2. Appeals have been issued to Tibetan youth all over the world to express their solidarity with the people of Tibet by observing these anniversaries in the manner indicated by them. While the Tibetan youth organizations in China as well as outside have been repeatedly saying that the observance of these two anniversaries will be peaceful and dignified, one cannot rule out the possibility of violent incidents as had happened last year.
3. The Chinese authorities in the Tibetan-inhabited areas of China are taking no chances. They have sent reinforcements of security forces from the adjoining provinces to Tibet and other Tibetan-inhabited areas and continue to make a large number of preventive arrests of Tibetan youth and monks suspected of being sympathetic to the Dalai Lama. House searches have been undertaken to seize and destroy pictures of the Dalai Lama.
4. Reports of sporadic public protests and alleged police excesses against Tibetan youth and monks continue to come in with increasing frequency as the two anniversaries approach. Apart from preventing any violent or embarrassing incident, the Chinese authorities are also trying to ensure that large numbers of Tibetans and Han Chinese participate in the celebration of Losar being organized by them. Boycott of these officially-organised Losar celebrations is being treated as a crime. There is a danger that the Chinese effort to force the Tibetan youth and monks to participate in the official celebrations may lead to street clashes .
5. This year, the situation is more unfavourable to the Tibetan youth and monks than it was last year as a result of the Maoists coming to power in Nepal. Last year, many Tibetan refugees from Nepal managed to cross over into Tibet and participate in the anti-Beijing protests. This year, in response to Chinese requests, the Maoist Government in Kathmandu has tightened up surveillance and movement restrictions on the Tibetan refugees to prevent their entering into Tibet. Telephone communications between Tibet and Nepal are being strictly controlled and watched to prevent any pre-Losar interactions between the Tibetan youth and monks in Nepal and Tibet. Internet links are also subject to similar controls.
6. Enterprising Tibetan youth in Western countries have been managing to circumvent these controls in order to remain in touch with the youth and monks in China. The Chinese security agencies have encouraged a number of Han Chinese co-operating with the Government agencies to start their own blogspots and chat groups by posing as alienated Tibetans and interact with foreign-based Tibetans in order to identify them and collect information about the plans for the protests.
7. Overseas Tibetan youth organizations have started web broadcasts to the Tibetans in China. These broadcasts, which have managed to evade jamming or other technical disruptions by the Chinese, have been disseminating messages for the observance of the two anniversaries as days of mourning. They say that March 14,2008, saw the beginning of a new phase of the Tibetan resistance struggle and assert that the Chinese will not be able to crush it.
8. In the run-up to the Losar, the most restive area has been the Kardze [in Chinese, Ganzi] Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of the Sichuan province. There are under-currents of social tensions in the Sichuan province due to the return to the province of a large number of Chinese who lost their jobs in the coastal areas due to the economic crisis. The tensions in the Tibetan community due to religious and ethnic reasons and those in the local Han Chinese community due to economic reasons could become a dangerous mix in the weeks to come.
9. While media reports that the Chinese authorities have imposed a curfew in Lhasa have not been confirmed, it has been reported by independent sources that Western parts of the Gansu, Sichuan, and Qinghai provinces, which have large Tibetan communities, are again closed to foreign tourists.
10. There is growing disenchantment among Tibetan youth and monks over what they see as the attempts by President Barack Obama and Mrs.Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, to play down the violations of the human rights of the Tibetans. Mrs.Clinton’s visit to Beijing from February 20 to 22,2009, came five days before the Losar. The Tibetan youth and monks were expecting that she would reiterate forcefully the US interest in ensuring respect for the human rights of the Tibetans. Her remarks on the human rights issue were very general and lacking forceful articulation. The Tibetans have been describing Obama as a two-issue President with his entire focus on setting right the economy and reversing the deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan. For the sake of Chinese co-operation in setting right the economy, Obama and Mrs.Clinton are prepared to close their eyes to the human rights situation in Tibet. So, they say.
11. Attempts may be made by angry Tibetan youth to create embarrassing situations outside Chinese diplomatic missions in India. Security for them needs to be tightened. (22-2-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tibetan youth organizations in Tibet and other Tibetan-inhabited areas of China have kept up their campaign for the observance of the Tibetan New Year’s Day (Losar) on February 25,2009, as a day of mourning in homage to those killed by the Chinese security forces in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics of August,2008, and March 10,2009, as a day of the Tibetan resistance struggle to coincide with the 50th anniversary of the flight of His Holiness the Dalai Lama from Tibet and the completion of what they describe as the occupation of Tibet by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
2. Appeals have been issued to Tibetan youth all over the world to express their solidarity with the people of Tibet by observing these anniversaries in the manner indicated by them. While the Tibetan youth organizations in China as well as outside have been repeatedly saying that the observance of these two anniversaries will be peaceful and dignified, one cannot rule out the possibility of violent incidents as had happened last year.
3. The Chinese authorities in the Tibetan-inhabited areas of China are taking no chances. They have sent reinforcements of security forces from the adjoining provinces to Tibet and other Tibetan-inhabited areas and continue to make a large number of preventive arrests of Tibetan youth and monks suspected of being sympathetic to the Dalai Lama. House searches have been undertaken to seize and destroy pictures of the Dalai Lama.
4. Reports of sporadic public protests and alleged police excesses against Tibetan youth and monks continue to come in with increasing frequency as the two anniversaries approach. Apart from preventing any violent or embarrassing incident, the Chinese authorities are also trying to ensure that large numbers of Tibetans and Han Chinese participate in the celebration of Losar being organized by them. Boycott of these officially-organised Losar celebrations is being treated as a crime. There is a danger that the Chinese effort to force the Tibetan youth and monks to participate in the official celebrations may lead to street clashes .
5. This year, the situation is more unfavourable to the Tibetan youth and monks than it was last year as a result of the Maoists coming to power in Nepal. Last year, many Tibetan refugees from Nepal managed to cross over into Tibet and participate in the anti-Beijing protests. This year, in response to Chinese requests, the Maoist Government in Kathmandu has tightened up surveillance and movement restrictions on the Tibetan refugees to prevent their entering into Tibet. Telephone communications between Tibet and Nepal are being strictly controlled and watched to prevent any pre-Losar interactions between the Tibetan youth and monks in Nepal and Tibet. Internet links are also subject to similar controls.
6. Enterprising Tibetan youth in Western countries have been managing to circumvent these controls in order to remain in touch with the youth and monks in China. The Chinese security agencies have encouraged a number of Han Chinese co-operating with the Government agencies to start their own blogspots and chat groups by posing as alienated Tibetans and interact with foreign-based Tibetans in order to identify them and collect information about the plans for the protests.
7. Overseas Tibetan youth organizations have started web broadcasts to the Tibetans in China. These broadcasts, which have managed to evade jamming or other technical disruptions by the Chinese, have been disseminating messages for the observance of the two anniversaries as days of mourning. They say that March 14,2008, saw the beginning of a new phase of the Tibetan resistance struggle and assert that the Chinese will not be able to crush it.
8. In the run-up to the Losar, the most restive area has been the Kardze [in Chinese, Ganzi] Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of the Sichuan province. There are under-currents of social tensions in the Sichuan province due to the return to the province of a large number of Chinese who lost their jobs in the coastal areas due to the economic crisis. The tensions in the Tibetan community due to religious and ethnic reasons and those in the local Han Chinese community due to economic reasons could become a dangerous mix in the weeks to come.
9. While media reports that the Chinese authorities have imposed a curfew in Lhasa have not been confirmed, it has been reported by independent sources that Western parts of the Gansu, Sichuan, and Qinghai provinces, which have large Tibetan communities, are again closed to foreign tourists.
10. There is growing disenchantment among Tibetan youth and monks over what they see as the attempts by President Barack Obama and Mrs.Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, to play down the violations of the human rights of the Tibetans. Mrs.Clinton’s visit to Beijing from February 20 to 22,2009, came five days before the Losar. The Tibetan youth and monks were expecting that she would reiterate forcefully the US interest in ensuring respect for the human rights of the Tibetans. Her remarks on the human rights issue were very general and lacking forceful articulation. The Tibetans have been describing Obama as a two-issue President with his entire focus on setting right the economy and reversing the deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan. For the sake of Chinese co-operation in setting right the economy, Obama and Mrs.Clinton are prepared to close their eyes to the human rights situation in Tibet. So, they say.
11. Attempts may be made by angry Tibetan youth to create embarrassing situations outside Chinese diplomatic missions in India. Security for them needs to be tightened. (22-2-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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