B.RAMAN
An important lesson from 2008 having a bearing on national, regional and global economic security is the need for a global co-ordinated counter-piracy strategy.
2. This need was highlighted by the dramatic surge in the activities of pirates of Somalian and Yemeni origin in the seas to the West ofIndia----particularly in the Gulf of Aden. It has been estimated that pirates ---predominantly from Somalia ---- carried out more than 112attacks in the key shipping lanes of the Gulf of Aden, located between the south of Yemen and the north of Somalia, and the Indian Ocean east of Somalia during 2008. They had in their custody at the end of the year about 20 ships, including an Ukrainian ship called "Faina"carrying over 30 tanks to Kenya and a Saudi super-tanker called "Sirius Star" with crude oil worth about an estimated US $ 100 million. The pirates have since released the super-tanker and the ship with tanks after the alleged payment of ransom by the owners of the ships.The surge reportedly pushed up insurance costs and earned the Somali pirates tens of millions of dollars in ransom.
3. This surge was comparable to the dramatic surge in aircraft hijackings in the 1970s particularly after the Arab-Israeli war of 1967.Different non-State actors carried out the hijackings for different reasons---- some for political reasons such as demanding the release ofterrorists and other criminals in custody and some for mercenary economic motives such as demanding ransom payments by threatening tokill the passengers and the crew.
4. Apart from stepped up physical security at airports and on board aircraft, another step that contributed to effectively dealing with theproblem was a series of measures taken by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) in Montreal and its member-countries to putdown hijacking. Among these measures was an agreement not to pay ransom or concede other demands of the hijackers and on the grantof mutual legal assistance for the arrest and prosecution of the hijackers.
5. There have been instances of non-compliance with such measures. Among such instances, one could cite the repeated refusal ofPakistan to hand over to India the Khalistani hijackers of the 1980s and India's succumbing to the pressure of the Pakistani terrorists whohijacked an aircraft of the Indian Airlines to Kandahar in December 1999, releasing three terrorists from custody and handing them over tothe hijackers in Kandahar. However, such instances of non-compliance have been rare.
6. While taking a strong line of not succumbing to the demands of the hijackers, many countries also raised special intervention forces tofree a hijacked plane from the custody of the hijackers even at the risk of some casualties among the passengers and the crew if they wereleft with no other way of terminating a hijack situation.
7. An agreement not to pay ransom to pirates under any conditions should be an important building block of any meaningful counter-piracystrategy. Instances of daring piracy by some Somalis increased during 2008 apparently because some of the shipping companies secretlypaid ransom to get their ships and crew released. This made piracy a very lucrative occupation for the Somalis and Yemenis. A firmdecision not to pay ransom is important not only for counter-piracy, but also for counter-terrorism. Since Somalia is an important base forthe activities of Al Qaeda and its associates, it would be reasonable to apprehend that some of this ransom money could be going into thecoffers of these jihadi terrorist organisations.
8. An agreement not to pay ransom has to be complimented by the raising of a special intervention force to get hijacked ships released.While there have been many instances of the pirates' attempts to hijack ships being thwarted by the intervention of naval ships onanti-piracy patrol, there has been practically no instance of any hijacked ship taken to a Somali port being freed from the custody of pirates.This would be possible only with the help of special intervention forces. The recent mandate for one year given to the UN member-countriesby the Securitry Council to intervene against piracy originating from Somalia through land or sea-based measures should enable suchspecial intervention forces to operate under an international legal cover. Who will raise such special intervention forces---by the oft-affectedcountries or by regional organisations or other multilateral bodies? These are questions which need to be decided and acted upon.
9.Strengthening physical security for ships is another important component of any counter-piracy strategy . Such physical security could bedivided into two categories---- ship security and sea or maritime security. The US and other Western countries have been repeatedly sayingthat ship security is the responsibility of the company owning the ships and that shipping companies should engage commercial securityguards to play a role similar to sky marshals on board aircraft. While it is correct that Governments have no role in providing security toprivate ships, they could help in strengthening security by laying down an anti-hijacking drill for ships which could be included in thesyllabus of the training institutions training commercial seamen.
10. After the hijacking of the Ukrainian ship in September ,2008, a number of countries, including India and China, has despatched some oftheir naval ships to the Gulf of Aden region to deter piracy and, if deterrence fails, to intervene in the high seas to thwart attempted hijackings. While these anti-piracy patrols are meant to escort commercial ships of their countries, if need be, as they transit through thepiracy-affected areas, and also to escort ships of other countries employing a large number of their nationals in their crew, they have nothesitated to go to the help of commercial ships of other countries too when they are attacked by pirates.
11. A Malaysian naval ship twice beat back pirates attempting to hijack a Chinese ship on December 18,2008, and an Indian ship on January1,2009. While in the case of the Indian ship the Malaysian naval personnel beat back the pirates before they could board the ship, in thecase of the Chinese ship, Malaysian intervenion forced the pirates to run away after they had boarded the ship.The number of suchsuccessful interventions has been on the rise and this could have a downward effect on instances of piracy in this area during 2009. Manyof these successful preventions or interventions were made possible by helicopter patrols or by the ready availability of copters to respondto distress messages. A study of some of these successful interventions also indicates that the sight of an approaching naval coptercreates greater fear in the minds of the pirates than the sight of a naval ship approaching them. For strengthening maritime security----eitherin high seas or in coastal waters---- there is a need for increasing helicopter patrols, which can detect suspicious vessels and movementsmore easily than a naval or coast guard ship.
12. While there are instances of prevention or thwarting of attempted hijackings of ships, there is no instance of a termination of ahijacking after a ship has been hijacked and taken to a Somali port. This is due to paucity of intelligence from Somalia and its ports wherethe ships are taken after hijacking. Successful termination depends on precise intelligence on the port where the ship has been taken andconditions on board and around the ship. No intelligence agency----not even the agencies of the US--- has the capability for the collection ofsuch intelligence from Somalia through land-based operations.
13.According to a Reuters' report of December 13,2008, Robert Gates, the US Defence Secretary, admitted during a regional securityconference in Bahrain that the US lacked the intelligence needed to pursue the fight against pirates to the Somali soil. The Reuters'despatch added: Quote With the level of information we have at the moment, we’re not in a position to do that kind of land-based operation,”Gates told a regional security conference in Bahrain. “Our first need is intelligence, (to know) who is behind it.” Referring to media reportsthat “two to three clans or extended families” were behind the pirate attacks on ships off the Somali coast, Gates said: “If we can identifywho those clans are then we can operate on land under the auspices of the United Nations and seek out ways to minimise collateraldamage.” Vice Admiral Bill Gortney, who commands the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet in Bahrain and oversees a coalition of navies fighting piracyoff Somalia, also expressed concern about the difficulty in identifying the pirates. He said firms should use armed security guards muchmore to protect their vessels. Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, an expert for maritime security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, saidadding land operations to those at sea is crucial to an effective military response to pirate attacks. “The single most difficult problem theforces are facing is that they don’t ... have the jurisdiction to chase them into their natural habitat on land and to deal with them there,” saidRoy-Chaudhury. Unquote
14.So long as terrorism is not defeated in Somalia and political stability not restored there, the virtual impossibility of freeing a hijackedship will continue. So long as this continues, shipping companies will continue to pay ransom to get their ships released. So long as ransomamounts continue to flow into the hands of Somali pirates, the danger of part of these payments going into the coffers of Al Qaeda and itsassociates will continue. So long as the money flow continues, terrorism will continue. This is a vicious circle to which no answer has beenfound so far.
15. The only short-term solution till things improve in Somalia enabling land-based intelligence-collection and termination operations is ajoint campaign of attrition against the pirates by the naval patrols of different countries by luring the pirates into a trap and neutralisingthem. Who will take legal action to have the captured pirates prosecuted and jailed since there is no Government in Somalia capable ofdoing this? Unless there is a legal machinery to deal with the pirates after they are captured, they will manage to get back into circulationand indulge in more acts of piracy.
16. The stepped-up anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden area and the escorting of commercial ships transiting through the area is havingan effect on the piracy. But, this is only one important component of what should be a co-ordinated anti-piracy strategy. There are othercomponents which need attention. These have to be identified and follow-up action has to be taken. The Indian Navy should take theinitiative in organising a brain-storming session of officers of different navies participating in the anti-piracy patrols in order to lay thefoundation for such a co-ordinated strategy. The present efforts are piecemeal and ad hoc. They are more in the nature of fire-fightingmeasures than in the nature of a strategic response. (19-2-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, February 18, 2009
Monday, February 16, 2009
SWAT: GROPING FOR PEACE
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO.497
B.RAMAN
The Tehrik-e-Nifaz-a-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM---- the Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Laws), founded by Sufi Mohammad, aresident of the Malakand Division of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan, came into existence in 1992 two years before thebirth of the Taliban of Afghanistan, headed by Mulla Mohammad Omar. Sufi Mohammad used to be a member of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI)before he left it and founded the TNSM to fight for the enforcement of the Islamic laws in the entire Malakand Division, of which Swat is apart.
2. Benazir Bhutto was the Prime Minister of Pakistan in her second term (1993-96) during the period when both these organisations cameinto existence. Whereas the Taliban was brought into existence by Pakistan's intelligence agencies to replace the different warringMujahideen groups of the 1980s vintage, they played little role in the birth of the TNSM. During Benazir's prime ministership, Sufi Mohammadorganised huge road blocades in the Malakand Division to demand the enforcement of the Islamic laws in the area. Benazir bought peace byaccepting all his demands except one. Sufi Mohammad wanted that the Islamic courts to be set up in the Malakand Division should betotally autonomous with the appellate courts in Peshawar, the capital of the NWFP, and Islamabad having no jurisdiction over them. She didnot accept this demand. Her acceptance of the other demands of the TNSM was not reversed by her successor Nawaz Sharif or by PervezMusharraf, who seized power in 1999.
3. There were allegations by Sufi Mohammad that even the demands accepted by Benazir were not properly implemented. Till 9/11, theTNSM remained essentially a religious fundamentalist organisation with close links to the Afghan Taliban, but with no pronounced anti-US oranti-Army feelings. The US military strikes in Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom turned it into an anti-US and anti-Armyorganisation. Sufi Mohammad issued a fatwa calling upon his followers to go to Afghanistan to fight against the US troops along with theAfghan Taliban. A large number of his followers led personally by him crossed over into Afghanistan. Many of them were mowed down by USair strikes. The survivors, including Sufi Mohammad, fled back into the Pakistani territory.
4. Musharraf had Sufi Mohammad arrested and kept in preventive detention and banned the TNSM as a terrorist organisation on January15,2002. Maulana Fazlullah, a son-in-law of Sufi Mohammad, assumed the leadership of the TNSM and resumed the struggle for theimplementation of the promises made by Benazir and for abolishing the appellate jurisdiction of the courts in Peshawar and Islamabad overthe Islamic courts in the Malakand Division.
5. In the elections held towards the end of 2002, Musharraf had the polls manipulated in order to have the Awami National Party (ANP), aprogressive Pashtun party, which used to be led by Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan, known as the Frontier Gandhi, and the Pakistan People's Party(PPP) of Benazir Bhutto defeated. A coalition of six religious fundamentalist parties known as the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) came topower in Peshawar after the elections.
6. The MMA Government closed its eyes to the activities of the TNSM and Fazlullah. From a purely religious organisation, the TNSM grewinto a qasi political organisation and expanded its agenda to include not only an autonomous Islamic criminal justice system, but also anIslamic system of education with girls barred from higher education and with a strict code of conduct for all Muslims. Its agenda becamelargely a carbon copy of the agenda of the Taliban of Afghanistan. It extended its full support to the Afghan Taliban leaders, who had takensanctuary in Balochistan, in their preparations to strike back at the Americans in Afghanistan.
7. As a result of the inaction of the MMA Government in Peshawar and the federal Government headed by Musharraf, the TNSM became thede facto ruling power of the Swat Valley. However, despite its periodic oral condemnation of what it saw as the pro-US policies of Musharraf,it avoided any confrontation with the Pakistani Army and the para-military forces such as the Frontier Corps (FC). By the beginning of 2007, ade facto diarchy came into existence in the Swat Valley---- with Maulana Fazlullah and his Mullas running the civil administration and thecriminal justice system and the army and the FC remaining in charge of internal security. The Army avoided stepping on the toes ofFazlullah.
8. This position of an uneasy co-existence between the Mulla rule of the TNSM and a limited administrative power still taking orders fromPeshawar and Islamabad changed after the Army commando raid in the Lal Masjid in Islamabad in July,2007, ordered by Musharraf. The LalMasjid had two madrasas---one for boys and the other for girls. The madrasa for boys was located outside the masjid campus and themadrasa for girls inside the campus. While the boys surrendered to the commandoes without much resistance, the girls egged on by theMullas of the Masjid resisted the commandoes ferociously. A large number of them were killed. Many of those killed came from tribalfamilies of the Swat Valley.
9. Angered by the alleged massacre of the girls by the commandoes, Fazlullah issued a fatwa calling for a jihad against the Army.Simultaneously, similar calls for a jihad against the Army were issued by different tribal leaders and Mullas of the Federally-AdministeredTribal Areas (FATA). Among those killed in the girls' madrasa of the Lal Masjid were also children of some of the tribal families of the FATA.All these tribal leaders and Mullas decided to form the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Mehsud tribe inSouth Waziristan, was designated the Amir of the TTP. The constituent units of the TTP in different areas selected their own Amirs to workunder the over-all co-ordination of Baitullah. The TNSM joined the TTP.Many in Pakistan believe that the assassination of Benazir atRawalpindi on December 27,2007, was carried out by the followers of Baitullah Mehsud in revenge for her alleged support to the commandoraid in the Lal Masjid.
10. The intense anger across the Pashtin tribal belt in the FATA and in the Swat Valley over the Lal Masjid incidents led to a wave of suicideterrorism not only in the tribal areas, but also in non-tribal areas, including Islamabad, Rawalpindi and Lahore. The suicide terrorism of theTNSM was directed not only against the security forces deployed in the Swat Valley, but also against the establishments and personnel ofthe Armed Forces and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in the non-tribal areas of the country. Faced with this anger, Musharraf orderedthe Army and the Frontier Corps to go into action against the TNSM in the Swat Valley in October,2007. The military operations initiallysucceeded in pushing back the TNSM cadres from the areas controlled by them.
11. The TNSM followed the same tactics as the Taliban in Afghanistan. Faced with the might of the Pakistan Army and the FC, it avoided afrontal confrontation with them. On Fazlullah's orders, his followers dispersed and went back to their villages. After the electedGovernment led by the PPP came to power in Islamabad in March,2008, the TNSM re-grouped and staged a spectacular come-back, pushedthe army and Frontier Corps out of the areas recovered by them and re-established its control over nearly 80 per cent of the territory of Swat.
12. In the elections of February,2008, the constituent parties of the MMA did badly. The ANP and the PPP, which had been marginalised byMusharraf in 2002, recovered their lost position in the electoral map of the NWFP. The ANP, which emerged as the largest single party in theNWFP, formed a coalition Government in Peshawar along with the PPP and other like-minded groups. The ANP was, in turn, accommodatedby Asif Ali Zardari in the federal coalition at Islamabad led by the PPP.
13. Even though the ANP has joined the PPP-led coalition, its views on the so-called war against terrorism have more in common with theviews of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) of Nawaz Sharif than with those of Zardari. The ANP believes, like the PML does, that the surgein terrorism in the Pashtun tribal belt was mainly due to the pro-US policies of Musharraf and that there has to be political accommodationwith various units of the TTP in different tribal areas in order to restore the writ of the Government in the Swat Valley and the FATA. The ANPadvocates marking a distance from the US operations in Afghanistan and entering into a dialogue with elements in the TNSM and the TTPwith which, it feels, the Government can do business.
14. Zardari was hesitant to openly support the moves of the ANP lest there be any misunderstanding with the US, but did not rise anyobjections to the ANP entering into a dialogue not with Fazlullah, who had taken to arms against the Army, but with Sufi Mohammad, whohad been released from detention in April, 2008, even when Musharraf was still the President in the hope of using him to create a split in theTNSM and undermine the position of Fazlullah.Following intense negotiations with Sufi Mohammad lasting over several weeks, the ANP-ledGovernment in Peshawar, with a reported nod of approval from Zardari, has signed an agreement with him on February 16,2009, under whichit has conceded all the demands of the TNSM relating to an autonomous Islamic criminal justice system in the Malakand Division as a wholenot subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the courts in Peshawar and Islamabad. The Government is hoping that in return for its acceptingthe primacy of the Mullas of the TNSM in matters pertaining to criminal justice, Sufi Mohammad will be able to persuade Fazlullah and hisadvisers to stop confronting the security forces and withdraw into their masjids, thereby allowing the writ of the civil administration andthe army in all other matters to be re-established.
15.Fazlullah has announced a 10-day ceasefire and ordered the release of a Chinese engineer, who had been kidnapped by the TNSM lastyear, as goodwil gesture towards the Government. It has been reported that the release of the Chinese engineer followed the release by theGovernment of some TNSM activists, who had been arrested under the Anti-Terrorism Act. The release of the Chinese engineer came a fewdays before the planned departure of Zardari to China on February 20,2009, on an official visit.
16. Whether the temporary ceasefire becomes permanent and whether Fazlullah agrees to the re-establishment of the Government writ inthe Swat Valley would depend on the success of Sufi Mohammad in persuading Fazlullah to accept the agreement reached by him with theANP-led Government and call off the fighting.
17. As mentioned earlier, the TNSM, under Sufi Mohammad, had originally a single-point agenda of enforcing the Islamic criminal justicesystem. Under Fazlullah's leadership, it has acquired a multi-point agenda--- enforcing an autonomous criminal justice system in theMalakand Division of the NWFP as a whole, releasing all those arrested during the commando raid in the Lal Masjid, restoring the authority ofthe Mullas of the masjid, re-establishment of the madrasas of the masjid, action against those responsible for the alleged massacre in thegirls madrasa, recognition of the right of the Pashtuns of Pakistan to go to Afghanistan to help the Afghan Pashtuns in their fight against theUS-led coalition, the discontinuance of the US Predator (unamanned aircraft) strikes in the Pakistani territory and withdrawal of the Army from the Swat Valley making the Frontier Corps , which consists largely of Pashtuns, exclusively responsible for internal security.
18. Will Fazlullah give up the other demands in return for the Government accepting the demands relating to the Islamic criminal justice system? The likelihood of the restoration of peace in the Swat Valley with the Government once again in command and control will dependupon the answer to this question. (17-2-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
The Tehrik-e-Nifaz-a-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM---- the Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Laws), founded by Sufi Mohammad, aresident of the Malakand Division of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan, came into existence in 1992 two years before thebirth of the Taliban of Afghanistan, headed by Mulla Mohammad Omar. Sufi Mohammad used to be a member of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI)before he left it and founded the TNSM to fight for the enforcement of the Islamic laws in the entire Malakand Division, of which Swat is apart.
2. Benazir Bhutto was the Prime Minister of Pakistan in her second term (1993-96) during the period when both these organisations cameinto existence. Whereas the Taliban was brought into existence by Pakistan's intelligence agencies to replace the different warringMujahideen groups of the 1980s vintage, they played little role in the birth of the TNSM. During Benazir's prime ministership, Sufi Mohammadorganised huge road blocades in the Malakand Division to demand the enforcement of the Islamic laws in the area. Benazir bought peace byaccepting all his demands except one. Sufi Mohammad wanted that the Islamic courts to be set up in the Malakand Division should betotally autonomous with the appellate courts in Peshawar, the capital of the NWFP, and Islamabad having no jurisdiction over them. She didnot accept this demand. Her acceptance of the other demands of the TNSM was not reversed by her successor Nawaz Sharif or by PervezMusharraf, who seized power in 1999.
3. There were allegations by Sufi Mohammad that even the demands accepted by Benazir were not properly implemented. Till 9/11, theTNSM remained essentially a religious fundamentalist organisation with close links to the Afghan Taliban, but with no pronounced anti-US oranti-Army feelings. The US military strikes in Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom turned it into an anti-US and anti-Armyorganisation. Sufi Mohammad issued a fatwa calling upon his followers to go to Afghanistan to fight against the US troops along with theAfghan Taliban. A large number of his followers led personally by him crossed over into Afghanistan. Many of them were mowed down by USair strikes. The survivors, including Sufi Mohammad, fled back into the Pakistani territory.
4. Musharraf had Sufi Mohammad arrested and kept in preventive detention and banned the TNSM as a terrorist organisation on January15,2002. Maulana Fazlullah, a son-in-law of Sufi Mohammad, assumed the leadership of the TNSM and resumed the struggle for theimplementation of the promises made by Benazir and for abolishing the appellate jurisdiction of the courts in Peshawar and Islamabad overthe Islamic courts in the Malakand Division.
5. In the elections held towards the end of 2002, Musharraf had the polls manipulated in order to have the Awami National Party (ANP), aprogressive Pashtun party, which used to be led by Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan, known as the Frontier Gandhi, and the Pakistan People's Party(PPP) of Benazir Bhutto defeated. A coalition of six religious fundamentalist parties known as the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) came topower in Peshawar after the elections.
6. The MMA Government closed its eyes to the activities of the TNSM and Fazlullah. From a purely religious organisation, the TNSM grewinto a qasi political organisation and expanded its agenda to include not only an autonomous Islamic criminal justice system, but also anIslamic system of education with girls barred from higher education and with a strict code of conduct for all Muslims. Its agenda becamelargely a carbon copy of the agenda of the Taliban of Afghanistan. It extended its full support to the Afghan Taliban leaders, who had takensanctuary in Balochistan, in their preparations to strike back at the Americans in Afghanistan.
7. As a result of the inaction of the MMA Government in Peshawar and the federal Government headed by Musharraf, the TNSM became thede facto ruling power of the Swat Valley. However, despite its periodic oral condemnation of what it saw as the pro-US policies of Musharraf,it avoided any confrontation with the Pakistani Army and the para-military forces such as the Frontier Corps (FC). By the beginning of 2007, ade facto diarchy came into existence in the Swat Valley---- with Maulana Fazlullah and his Mullas running the civil administration and thecriminal justice system and the army and the FC remaining in charge of internal security. The Army avoided stepping on the toes ofFazlullah.
8. This position of an uneasy co-existence between the Mulla rule of the TNSM and a limited administrative power still taking orders fromPeshawar and Islamabad changed after the Army commando raid in the Lal Masjid in Islamabad in July,2007, ordered by Musharraf. The LalMasjid had two madrasas---one for boys and the other for girls. The madrasa for boys was located outside the masjid campus and themadrasa for girls inside the campus. While the boys surrendered to the commandoes without much resistance, the girls egged on by theMullas of the Masjid resisted the commandoes ferociously. A large number of them were killed. Many of those killed came from tribalfamilies of the Swat Valley.
9. Angered by the alleged massacre of the girls by the commandoes, Fazlullah issued a fatwa calling for a jihad against the Army.Simultaneously, similar calls for a jihad against the Army were issued by different tribal leaders and Mullas of the Federally-AdministeredTribal Areas (FATA). Among those killed in the girls' madrasa of the Lal Masjid were also children of some of the tribal families of the FATA.All these tribal leaders and Mullas decided to form the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Mehsud tribe inSouth Waziristan, was designated the Amir of the TTP. The constituent units of the TTP in different areas selected their own Amirs to workunder the over-all co-ordination of Baitullah. The TNSM joined the TTP.Many in Pakistan believe that the assassination of Benazir atRawalpindi on December 27,2007, was carried out by the followers of Baitullah Mehsud in revenge for her alleged support to the commandoraid in the Lal Masjid.
10. The intense anger across the Pashtin tribal belt in the FATA and in the Swat Valley over the Lal Masjid incidents led to a wave of suicideterrorism not only in the tribal areas, but also in non-tribal areas, including Islamabad, Rawalpindi and Lahore. The suicide terrorism of theTNSM was directed not only against the security forces deployed in the Swat Valley, but also against the establishments and personnel ofthe Armed Forces and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in the non-tribal areas of the country. Faced with this anger, Musharraf orderedthe Army and the Frontier Corps to go into action against the TNSM in the Swat Valley in October,2007. The military operations initiallysucceeded in pushing back the TNSM cadres from the areas controlled by them.
11. The TNSM followed the same tactics as the Taliban in Afghanistan. Faced with the might of the Pakistan Army and the FC, it avoided afrontal confrontation with them. On Fazlullah's orders, his followers dispersed and went back to their villages. After the electedGovernment led by the PPP came to power in Islamabad in March,2008, the TNSM re-grouped and staged a spectacular come-back, pushedthe army and Frontier Corps out of the areas recovered by them and re-established its control over nearly 80 per cent of the territory of Swat.
12. In the elections of February,2008, the constituent parties of the MMA did badly. The ANP and the PPP, which had been marginalised byMusharraf in 2002, recovered their lost position in the electoral map of the NWFP. The ANP, which emerged as the largest single party in theNWFP, formed a coalition Government in Peshawar along with the PPP and other like-minded groups. The ANP was, in turn, accommodatedby Asif Ali Zardari in the federal coalition at Islamabad led by the PPP.
13. Even though the ANP has joined the PPP-led coalition, its views on the so-called war against terrorism have more in common with theviews of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) of Nawaz Sharif than with those of Zardari. The ANP believes, like the PML does, that the surgein terrorism in the Pashtun tribal belt was mainly due to the pro-US policies of Musharraf and that there has to be political accommodationwith various units of the TTP in different tribal areas in order to restore the writ of the Government in the Swat Valley and the FATA. The ANPadvocates marking a distance from the US operations in Afghanistan and entering into a dialogue with elements in the TNSM and the TTPwith which, it feels, the Government can do business.
14. Zardari was hesitant to openly support the moves of the ANP lest there be any misunderstanding with the US, but did not rise anyobjections to the ANP entering into a dialogue not with Fazlullah, who had taken to arms against the Army, but with Sufi Mohammad, whohad been released from detention in April, 2008, even when Musharraf was still the President in the hope of using him to create a split in theTNSM and undermine the position of Fazlullah.Following intense negotiations with Sufi Mohammad lasting over several weeks, the ANP-ledGovernment in Peshawar, with a reported nod of approval from Zardari, has signed an agreement with him on February 16,2009, under whichit has conceded all the demands of the TNSM relating to an autonomous Islamic criminal justice system in the Malakand Division as a wholenot subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the courts in Peshawar and Islamabad. The Government is hoping that in return for its acceptingthe primacy of the Mullas of the TNSM in matters pertaining to criminal justice, Sufi Mohammad will be able to persuade Fazlullah and hisadvisers to stop confronting the security forces and withdraw into their masjids, thereby allowing the writ of the civil administration andthe army in all other matters to be re-established.
15.Fazlullah has announced a 10-day ceasefire and ordered the release of a Chinese engineer, who had been kidnapped by the TNSM lastyear, as goodwil gesture towards the Government. It has been reported that the release of the Chinese engineer followed the release by theGovernment of some TNSM activists, who had been arrested under the Anti-Terrorism Act. The release of the Chinese engineer came a fewdays before the planned departure of Zardari to China on February 20,2009, on an official visit.
16. Whether the temporary ceasefire becomes permanent and whether Fazlullah agrees to the re-establishment of the Government writ inthe Swat Valley would depend on the success of Sufi Mohammad in persuading Fazlullah to accept the agreement reached by him with theANP-led Government and call off the fighting.
17. As mentioned earlier, the TNSM, under Sufi Mohammad, had originally a single-point agenda of enforcing the Islamic criminal justicesystem. Under Fazlullah's leadership, it has acquired a multi-point agenda--- enforcing an autonomous criminal justice system in theMalakand Division of the NWFP as a whole, releasing all those arrested during the commando raid in the Lal Masjid, restoring the authority ofthe Mullas of the masjid, re-establishment of the madrasas of the masjid, action against those responsible for the alleged massacre in thegirls madrasa, recognition of the right of the Pashtuns of Pakistan to go to Afghanistan to help the Afghan Pashtuns in their fight against theUS-led coalition, the discontinuance of the US Predator (unamanned aircraft) strikes in the Pakistani territory and withdrawal of the Army from the Swat Valley making the Frontier Corps , which consists largely of Pashtuns, exclusively responsible for internal security.
18. Will Fazlullah give up the other demands in return for the Government accepting the demands relating to the Islamic criminal justice system? The likelihood of the restoration of peace in the Swat Valley with the Government once again in command and control will dependupon the answer to this question. (17-2-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, February 13, 2009
PAKISTAN: WHAT I REPORTED IN AUGUST LAST & WHAT LA TIMES REPORTS TODAY
B.RAMAN
WHAT LOS ANGELES TIMES REPORTED ON FEB.13,2009
Feinstein comment on U.S. drones likely to embarrass Pakistan
The Predator planes that launch missile strikes against militants are based in Pakistan, the senator says.
That suggests a much deeperrelationship with the U.S. than Islamabad would like to admit.
By Greg Miller
February 13, 2009
Reporting from Washington — A senior U.S. lawmaker said Thursday that unmanned CIA Predator aircraft operating in Pakistan are flownfrom an air base in that country, a revelation likely to embarrass the Pakistani government and complicate its counter-terrorismcollaboration with the United States.
The disclosure by Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, marked the first time a U.S. official hadpublicly commented on where the Predator aircraft patrolling Pakistan take off and land.
At a hearing, Feinstein expressed surprise over Pakistani opposition to the campaign of Predator-launched CIA missile strikes againstIslamic extremist targets along Pakistan's northwestern border.
"As I understand it, these are flown out of a Pakistani base," she said.
The basing of the pilotless aircraft in Pakistan suggests a much deeper relationship with the United States on counter-terrorism mattersthan has been publicly acknowledged. Such an arrangement would be at odds with protests lodged by officials in Islamabad, the capital,and could inflame anti-American sentiment in the country.
The CIA declined to comment, but former U.S. intelligence officials, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of theinformation, confirmed that Feinstein's account was accurate.
WHAT I REPORTED IN AUGUST & SEPTEMBER LAST YEAR
"Even though the US does not rate highly Zardari's leadership qualities, it prefers him to Nawaz because of his willingness to maintainMusharraf's policy of co-operation with the US in its so-called war against terrorism in Afghanistan and his perceived amenability to pressureby the US because of its role in persuading Musharraf, when he was the President, to issue the NRO ( National Reconciliation Ordinance).The US is also hopeful that, unlike Nawaz, Zardari will avoid any humiliation of Musharraf and will let him continue to live in Pakistan withoutfearing any harassment by the Government. Well-informed PPP sources say that the entire scenario has been proceeding according to atacit understanding reached with US officials during the visit of Yousef Raza Gilani, the Prime Minister, and Rehman Malik, his Advisor onInternal Security, to Washington DC, in the last week of July, 2008. According to these sources, this understanding provided for: launching ofa special land-cum-air operation by the Pakistan military against Al Qaeda and Taliban sanctuaries in the Bajaur Agency, permission to beaccorded by the Gilani Government for continuing unmanned Predator strikes by the US intelligence agencies on terrorist hide-outs in theFederally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and US pressure on Musharraf to resign thus paving the way for the election of Zardari. Theobject of the entire exercise was to keep Nawaz out of power, marginalise him and keep up the present level of US-Pakistan co-operationagainst terrorism. ...... After 9/11, the US tried to project Musharraf as its frontline ally in the war against terrorism. He did co-operate, but notwhole-heartedly. It is now hoping that if elected as the President, Zardari will co-operate with it without reservations. Zardari is giving theimpression that he will. It is most likely that he will turn out to be as insincere as Musharraf. He will give the impression of co-operating whileavoiding it in effect. "
Extract from my article of August 27, 2008, titled "AFTER TRICKY MUSH, TRICKY ZARDARI" athttp://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers29/paper2824.html
"The same well-informed sources of the Pakistan People's Party cited in the above-mentioned article of August 27, 2008, say that it iscorrect that Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani and President Asif Ali Zardari had been kept in the picture by officials of the Bush administration, including President George Bush himself, about the new rules of engagement approved by Bush in July before the visit ofGilani to Washington DC. Under these new rules of engagement, the US has been allowed to step up aerial attacks on suspected terroristhide-outs in Pakistani territory by the Predator pilotless planes and undertake ground operations through special forces within a depth ofnot more than five kms if warranted by precise intelligence without informing the Pakistan Army beforehand. According to them, these rulesof engagement also lay down that ground operations would be undertaken in such a manner as not to involve an accidental confrontationwith the Pakistani security forces. As against three Predator strikes and no ground strike during the whole of last year when PervezMusharraf was the President and the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), there have already been 12 Predator strikes and one ground strikesince the Gilani Government came to office on March 18, 2008."
Extract from my article of September 13,2008 titled PAK-US SNAFU http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers29/paper2843.html
(13-2-2009)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
WHAT LOS ANGELES TIMES REPORTED ON FEB.13,2009
Feinstein comment on U.S. drones likely to embarrass Pakistan
The Predator planes that launch missile strikes against militants are based in Pakistan, the senator says.
That suggests a much deeperrelationship with the U.S. than Islamabad would like to admit.
By Greg Miller
February 13, 2009
Reporting from Washington — A senior U.S. lawmaker said Thursday that unmanned CIA Predator aircraft operating in Pakistan are flownfrom an air base in that country, a revelation likely to embarrass the Pakistani government and complicate its counter-terrorismcollaboration with the United States.
The disclosure by Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, marked the first time a U.S. official hadpublicly commented on where the Predator aircraft patrolling Pakistan take off and land.
At a hearing, Feinstein expressed surprise over Pakistani opposition to the campaign of Predator-launched CIA missile strikes againstIslamic extremist targets along Pakistan's northwestern border.
"As I understand it, these are flown out of a Pakistani base," she said.
The basing of the pilotless aircraft in Pakistan suggests a much deeper relationship with the United States on counter-terrorism mattersthan has been publicly acknowledged. Such an arrangement would be at odds with protests lodged by officials in Islamabad, the capital,and could inflame anti-American sentiment in the country.
The CIA declined to comment, but former U.S. intelligence officials, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of theinformation, confirmed that Feinstein's account was accurate.
WHAT I REPORTED IN AUGUST & SEPTEMBER LAST YEAR
"Even though the US does not rate highly Zardari's leadership qualities, it prefers him to Nawaz because of his willingness to maintainMusharraf's policy of co-operation with the US in its so-called war against terrorism in Afghanistan and his perceived amenability to pressureby the US because of its role in persuading Musharraf, when he was the President, to issue the NRO ( National Reconciliation Ordinance).The US is also hopeful that, unlike Nawaz, Zardari will avoid any humiliation of Musharraf and will let him continue to live in Pakistan withoutfearing any harassment by the Government. Well-informed PPP sources say that the entire scenario has been proceeding according to atacit understanding reached with US officials during the visit of Yousef Raza Gilani, the Prime Minister, and Rehman Malik, his Advisor onInternal Security, to Washington DC, in the last week of July, 2008. According to these sources, this understanding provided for: launching ofa special land-cum-air operation by the Pakistan military against Al Qaeda and Taliban sanctuaries in the Bajaur Agency, permission to beaccorded by the Gilani Government for continuing unmanned Predator strikes by the US intelligence agencies on terrorist hide-outs in theFederally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and US pressure on Musharraf to resign thus paving the way for the election of Zardari. Theobject of the entire exercise was to keep Nawaz out of power, marginalise him and keep up the present level of US-Pakistan co-operationagainst terrorism. ...... After 9/11, the US tried to project Musharraf as its frontline ally in the war against terrorism. He did co-operate, but notwhole-heartedly. It is now hoping that if elected as the President, Zardari will co-operate with it without reservations. Zardari is giving theimpression that he will. It is most likely that he will turn out to be as insincere as Musharraf. He will give the impression of co-operating whileavoiding it in effect. "
Extract from my article of August 27, 2008, titled "AFTER TRICKY MUSH, TRICKY ZARDARI" athttp://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers29/paper2824.html
"The same well-informed sources of the Pakistan People's Party cited in the above-mentioned article of August 27, 2008, say that it iscorrect that Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani and President Asif Ali Zardari had been kept in the picture by officials of the Bush administration, including President George Bush himself, about the new rules of engagement approved by Bush in July before the visit ofGilani to Washington DC. Under these new rules of engagement, the US has been allowed to step up aerial attacks on suspected terroristhide-outs in Pakistani territory by the Predator pilotless planes and undertake ground operations through special forces within a depth ofnot more than five kms if warranted by precise intelligence without informing the Pakistan Army beforehand. According to them, these rulesof engagement also lay down that ground operations would be undertaken in such a manner as not to involve an accidental confrontationwith the Pakistani security forces. As against three Predator strikes and no ground strike during the whole of last year when PervezMusharraf was the President and the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), there have already been 12 Predator strikes and one ground strikesince the Gilani Government came to office on March 18, 2008."
Extract from my article of September 13,2008 titled PAK-US SNAFU http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers29/paper2843.html
(13-2-2009)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Thursday, February 12, 2009
MUMBAI 26/11: ASSESSING PAKISTAN'S CHANGE OF STANCE
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO.495
B.RAMAN
In the wake of the terrorist attack by 10 Pakistani members of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008, India hasto use three yard-sticks to decide on the genuiness and adequacy of any Pakistani co-operation. These are:
Does its co-operation help in bringing to justice the operatives of the LET in Pakistan and any others, who were involved in the planning and execution of the terrorist strike?
Does its co-operation help in a better reconstruction and understanding of the terrorist strike in order to find out answers to some important questions such as why the terrorists targeted Israeli and other foreign nationals, for example? The answers to such questions will be available only with the master-minds of the LET in Pakistan. Ajmal Amir Kasab, the surviving Pakistani perpetrator, now in the custody of the Mumbai Police, may not be privy to the objectives of the LET.
Does the Pakistani co-operation help India in preventing any more terrorist strike mounted from Pakistani territory----by the LET, the other anti-India terrorist organisations and Al Qaeda by eradicating their terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory and destroying their capabilities?
2.There was some forward movement with regard to the first question on February 12,2009, when Rehman Malik, Pakistan's InternalSecurity Adviser, who is known to be closer to President Asif Ali Zardari than to Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani and who enjoys thestatus of a Cabinet Minister though not so designated, handed over to the Indian High Commissioner in Islamabad the salient points of thePakistani investigation and action taken so far with a list of 30 questions for India to answer to enable them to take the investigation furtherforward. These salient points were revealed by him to the media at a special press conference held the same day. Annexed are the reportscarried by the "News" and the "Daily Times" of Pakistan on his disclosures at the press conference.
3.A careful study of the Pakistani media reports would show that Pakistan has been more forthcoming now than it was since 26/11 and hasbeen keen to demonstrate to the international community that in investigating the case "Pakistan means business" as Malik repeatedlyemphasised. One should not grudge conceding that there has definitely been a shift from a position of total denial of the involvement ofanyone in Pakistani territory to partial acceptance of the conclusion of Indian and Western investigators that the conspiracy for the terroristattack originated in Pakistani territory and that the key answers to various questions coming to the fore during the investigation are to befound in Pakistan, which only Pakistani investigators can do.
4. At the same time, there was an undisguised attempt by Malik to project the conspiracy as trans-national and not uni-national only inPakistan. He repeatedly said that only a part of the conspiracy took place in Pakistani territory. To underline the trans-national dimensionsof the conspiracy he referred to the role played by some members of the Pakistani diaspora in Spain and Italy and to Pakistan's suspicion ofa role by some elements in India as seen, according to him, from the fact that the perpetrators had used SIM cards procured in India.
5. Pakistan's attempt is to project the conspiracy as mounted by non-State elements of which the Pakistani intelligence agencies had noinkling till after the attack. There has been a reluctance on the part of Indian analysts to accept that all the recruitment, planning andtraining could have been carried out by the LET in Pakistani territory without the Pakistani intelligence agencies becoming aware of it.Malik has prepared the ground for meeting this argument if and when it acquires force by pointing out that if the intelligence agencies ofIndia, Italy and Spain had missed noticing the preparations being made in their territory, how can they blame the Pakistani agencies forsimilarly missing them.
6. There were two significant points in the press briefing of Malik. The first is the absence of any reference to Indian allegations that agroup of 32 potential perpetrators was trained by the LET initially in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) and subsequently in Karachi before10 of them were finally selected and sent to Mumbai by sea. The second is his repeated use of the word "alleged" while refering to the roleof the LET operatives, who have been detained and against whom investigation has been launched in pursuance of the two First InformationReports (FIRs) registered by the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA). He did not use the word "alleged" while referring to those whoseinvolvement Pakistan claims to have unearthed.This would indicate a possible attempt by them to show their investigation against someLET opetratives as warranted by the Indian "allegations" against them and not by any evidence so far uncovered by the FIA. Thus, whileregistering two FIRs against the LET operatives named by India, they have kept open the possibility of giving a free chit to the LET after theinternational pressure and interest subside and releasing their operatives on the ground that the investigation did not bring out anycredible evidence against them.
7. This was exactly the same modus operandi (MO) which the Pakistanis had followed after the thwarted attack by a group of terroristsbelonging to the LET and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) on the Parliament House in New Delhi in December,2001. Musharraf banned theseorganisations on January 15,2002, arrested their leaders and ordered an enquiry into their activities. A few months later, the arrestedpersons were got released by courts on the ground that the investigation did not bring out any evidence of wrong doing against them.
8. While we are right in welcoming the changed Pakistani stance--- even if it be only a change in tactics--- as seen on February 12,2009, weshould avoid nursing illusions that the seeming change in the Pakistani stance marked a watershed in Pakistani attitude to anti-Indiaterrorism. We have to wait and see whether Pakistan really means business this time, or is it merely pretending to co-operate while notsincerely co-operating as it has always done in the past---- whether against anti-India terrorism or against the Neo Taliban of Afghanistan orwith regard to the investigation into the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl, the US journalist, or the investigation into the proliferationactivities of A.Q.Khan or the investigation into the involvement of Rashid Rauf, a British citizen of Pakistani origin, in the conspiracy to blowup some US-bound planes in 2006.
9. Welcome the seeming change in its stance, but avoid over-assessing its significance and keep the pressure on Pakistan. That should beour operating principle.
10. Pakistan's new stance does not respond to the remaining two questions posed in Para one above. There are no indications at all that itis having second thoughts about the wisdom or inadvisability of continuing to use terrorism as a strategic weapon against India and that itmight now act against the anti-India terrorist infrastructure in its territory and the role of the ISI in keeping this terrorism sustained. Threatsof new terriorist attacks against Indian and foreign targets in Indian territory mounted from Pakistan remain as high as before.
11. There has been a debate as to why this sudden change of stance by Pakistan on February 12,2009. In this connection, the visit ofRichard Holbrooke, the US Special Representative to Pakistan and Afghanistan, to Islamabad from February 9 to 11,2009, and the first telephone call of President Barack Obama to President Asif Ali Zardari on February 11 have been cited by many analysts. There are twoother elements, which also need to be noted. The first was the brutal beheading of a Polish engineer working in Pakistan by the PakistaniTaliban on February 6. There has been a wave of anger and revulsion against Pakistan in Poland ever since the Taliban announced hisbeheading. The anger in Poland against Pakistan is as intense as the anger in India after 26/11.The second is the Mumbai-style attacks onthe offices of the prison department and the Justice Ministry in Kabul by the Taliban on February 11 which has set off concerns that theMumbai attack is already having a copy-cat effect. These are likely to have increased the pressure on the Pakistan Government to showthat they really business in going after terrorism and they are not playing games with the international community.One has to wait and seewhat further action the Pakistani authorities take in the weeks to come. This is the time for keeping up the pressure on Pakistan. (13-2-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute Fior TopicalStrudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
By Mobarik A Virk ( "News of February 13,2009)
ISLAMABAD: Pakistan on Thursday acknowledged for the first time that the Mumbai attacks were partly planned in Pakistan and that it hasarrested six suspects, including the “main operator”.
In its first detailed response to the dossier provided by India, Pakistan said criminal cases had been registered against nine suspects oncharges of “abetting, conspiracy and facilitation” of a terrorist act. However, it said more evidence is required from India, including DNAsamples of Ajmal Kasab, to establish his identity.
Addressing a press conference at the interior ministry, Interior Adviser Rehman Malik told the media FIR No: 01/009 had been lodged withthe Special Investigation Group (SIG) in the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) against nine suspects. The Pakistani investigators haveidentified Hammad Amin Sadiq as the alleged ‘mastermind’ of the whole conspiracy.
Malik said the cases against nine persons had been registered under the Anti-Terror Act (ATA) and the Cyber Crime Act and they would betried under these two sets of laws. He said six of the nine accused named in the FIR have already been arrested and being interrogated, twohave been identified but not arrested so far while investigations are still under way into the possible involvement of the ninth accused.
He identified those taken into custody as Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, a Lashkar-e-Taiba (LT) commander who was arrested from Muzaffarabadsoon after the Indian government alleged that the LT was behind the Mumbai attacks, Javed Iqbal, who was arrested from Barcelona, Spain,Hammad Amin Sadiq, believed to be the main operator belonging to southern Punjab, Zarar Shah, Mohammad Ashfaq and Abu Hamza. Thename of the lone surviving terrorist now in the custody of India, Ajmal Kasab, is not included in the FIR.
He also said some of those arrested by the security agencies of Pakistan for possible involvement in the Mumbai attacks belong to the LT.Malik said Javed Iqbal, who was based in Barcelona, Spain, was the person who paid $200 for the ‘Internet Domain’ that was also used forcommunication and planning for the Mumbai attacks. “Having ascertained the involvement of Javed Iqbal, we somehow lured him intocoming to Pakistan and he was arrested on his arrival,” Malik said.
He also said the e-mail sent by ‘Deccan Mujahideen’ claiming responsibility for the Mumbai attacks was believed to be prepared and sent byZarar Shah, who was responsible for communication link in the whole operation.
The adviser disclosed that the money to fund these attacks was transferred from Pakistan and was received in Italy. This moneytransaction was made through a Pakistani bank. He also said after thorough investigations by the Pakistani security and intelligenceagencies it was learnt that these alleged terrorists operated from two bases — one inside Karachi and the other outside but not very faraway from Karachi.
He also disclosed that the people involved in the Mumbai attacks used three boats for travelling to Mumbai, one named ‘Al-Hussaini’ and theother ‘Al-Ghaus’. For communication, these culprits used ‘Call Phonic’ system and they also bought Indian cell phone SIMs forcommunication from inside India.
Malik said the findings have already been shared with the Indian government. The Indian high commissioner in Islamabad was called to theforeign office and the report was handed over to him officially.
“We also have forwarded a set of 30 questions for which we would need answers as early as possible to support and further theinvestigation process on our side. We have asked the Indian government to provide us the DNA samples of the lone surviving terrorist, AjmalKasab, to ascertain his nationality, as we don’t have any record of the individual with Nadra (National Database Registration Authority).”
“At the same time,” he said, “we would like to have the statement given by Ajmal Kasab to the Indian investigators, how this group ofterrorists managed to sneak past the Indian security and intelligence agencies guarding their coastal lines, and how these nine personsmanaged to travel in a small boat and reach the Indian coast”.
He also pointed out that the satellite phone connection that was used for communication during the Mumbai attack was registered in theMiddle East and not in Pakistan. He also said forensic reports of the arms and ammunition used in the attack have been sought from theIndian authorities.
The adviser on interior said to make a solid case against all these people who have been arrested or for whose arrest the Pakistaniauthorities are making all-out efforts, meaningful cooperation from India would be most important.
Agencies add: Malik said the breakthrough in the investigation had resulted from tracing the fishing vessel used by the militants, purchasesof equipment like life jackets and the engine for the rubber dinghy that militants came ashore in Mumbai.
He said only nine of the 10 gunmen came ashore in the dinghy, and the fishing boat they had used to sail from Karachi had refuelled on thecoast of India’s Gujarat state. The Pakistani official said one suspect was allegedly involved in the 2007 bomb attack on the SamjhautaExpress in India that killed 68 people as the train headed for Lahore, and India has been requested for more information. NEWS 13-2-09
Islamabad hands over Mumbai probe report to New Delhi
By Sajjad Malik/Tahir Niaz ( " Daily Times" of February 13,2009)
ISLAMABAD: Pakistan has formally handed over the details of its investigation into the Mumbai terror attacks to India, the Foreign Officesaid on Thursday as Adviser to the Prime Minister on Interior Rehman Malik admitted that the attacks were ‘partially planned’ in Pakistan.
“The Indian high commissioner was ... [on Thursday given] material pertaining to the Mumbai terror attacks probe by the FederalInvestigation Agency (FIA), by the foreign secretary,” said Foreign Office spokesman Abdul Basit.
Arrests: Meanwhile at a press conference, Rehman Malik announced ‘breakthrough’ arrests in the Mumbai probe, and admitted that theMumbai attacks were partially planned in Pakistan. He said some of the suspects were linked to Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LT). Rehman said acase was registered on Thursday under the Anti-Terrorism Act against eight suspects – including LT’s Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, Hammad Aminand Zarar Shah – on charges of “abetting, directing, conspiring and facilitating a terrorist act”. Six of these suspects are in the custody ofintelligence agencies, and all will be tried under Pakistani law.
“Some funds for the attacks were transferred from Spain and Italy,” he said.
Karachi: Rehman said the suspects used three boats, all of which have been seized, to sail from Karachi to Mumbai between November 26and 28, 2008.
More information: Rehman, however, said these findings were not final and Pakistan needed more information from India. He said the Indianauthorities had been asked to answer 30 questions raised by the Pakistani investigators.
Other countries: The adviser said “the system of various other countries” was also used to plan the attacks. Rehman said two more menwere being held, and identified them only as Khan and Riaz. Other leads pointed to Europe and the US, and Malik said Pakistan would askthe FBI for help. DAILY TIMES 13-2-09
LT slams Islamabad for Mumbai charges
SRINAGAR: The banned Lashkar-e-Tayyaba angrily condemned Islamabad on Thursday for filing a case against some of the group’s topoperatives. Pakistan lodged a first information report against eight suspects, including the presumed mastermind Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi.“We strongly condemn the lodging of the FIR against LT,” Lashkar spokesman Abdullah Ghaznavi told AFP over the telephone. The case wasbrought to ‘win appreciation’ from India and the US and to “implement India’s agenda of suppressing the people’s struggle for freedom inKashmir”, said Ghaznavi. afp DAILY TIMES 13-2-09
Islamabad forex company involved
LAHORE: Interior Adviser Rehman Malik has claimed that a money exchange company in Islamabad was involved in transferring money to asuspect of the Mumbai attacks in Spain, said a private TV channel. The money was transferred through Paracha International Exchange’sEuro 2005 branch in Islamabad to Javed Iqbal in Barcelona. The branch was later found sealed. Representatives of other branches havedenied that such a transaction took place. But one of the two owners confirmed the transaction, and blamed his partner for it. daily timesmonitor DAILY TIMES 13-2-09
B.RAMAN
In the wake of the terrorist attack by 10 Pakistani members of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008, India hasto use three yard-sticks to decide on the genuiness and adequacy of any Pakistani co-operation. These are:
Does its co-operation help in bringing to justice the operatives of the LET in Pakistan and any others, who were involved in the planning and execution of the terrorist strike?
Does its co-operation help in a better reconstruction and understanding of the terrorist strike in order to find out answers to some important questions such as why the terrorists targeted Israeli and other foreign nationals, for example? The answers to such questions will be available only with the master-minds of the LET in Pakistan. Ajmal Amir Kasab, the surviving Pakistani perpetrator, now in the custody of the Mumbai Police, may not be privy to the objectives of the LET.
Does the Pakistani co-operation help India in preventing any more terrorist strike mounted from Pakistani territory----by the LET, the other anti-India terrorist organisations and Al Qaeda by eradicating their terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory and destroying their capabilities?
2.There was some forward movement with regard to the first question on February 12,2009, when Rehman Malik, Pakistan's InternalSecurity Adviser, who is known to be closer to President Asif Ali Zardari than to Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani and who enjoys thestatus of a Cabinet Minister though not so designated, handed over to the Indian High Commissioner in Islamabad the salient points of thePakistani investigation and action taken so far with a list of 30 questions for India to answer to enable them to take the investigation furtherforward. These salient points were revealed by him to the media at a special press conference held the same day. Annexed are the reportscarried by the "News" and the "Daily Times" of Pakistan on his disclosures at the press conference.
3.A careful study of the Pakistani media reports would show that Pakistan has been more forthcoming now than it was since 26/11 and hasbeen keen to demonstrate to the international community that in investigating the case "Pakistan means business" as Malik repeatedlyemphasised. One should not grudge conceding that there has definitely been a shift from a position of total denial of the involvement ofanyone in Pakistani territory to partial acceptance of the conclusion of Indian and Western investigators that the conspiracy for the terroristattack originated in Pakistani territory and that the key answers to various questions coming to the fore during the investigation are to befound in Pakistan, which only Pakistani investigators can do.
4. At the same time, there was an undisguised attempt by Malik to project the conspiracy as trans-national and not uni-national only inPakistan. He repeatedly said that only a part of the conspiracy took place in Pakistani territory. To underline the trans-national dimensionsof the conspiracy he referred to the role played by some members of the Pakistani diaspora in Spain and Italy and to Pakistan's suspicion ofa role by some elements in India as seen, according to him, from the fact that the perpetrators had used SIM cards procured in India.
5. Pakistan's attempt is to project the conspiracy as mounted by non-State elements of which the Pakistani intelligence agencies had noinkling till after the attack. There has been a reluctance on the part of Indian analysts to accept that all the recruitment, planning andtraining could have been carried out by the LET in Pakistani territory without the Pakistani intelligence agencies becoming aware of it.Malik has prepared the ground for meeting this argument if and when it acquires force by pointing out that if the intelligence agencies ofIndia, Italy and Spain had missed noticing the preparations being made in their territory, how can they blame the Pakistani agencies forsimilarly missing them.
6. There were two significant points in the press briefing of Malik. The first is the absence of any reference to Indian allegations that agroup of 32 potential perpetrators was trained by the LET initially in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) and subsequently in Karachi before10 of them were finally selected and sent to Mumbai by sea. The second is his repeated use of the word "alleged" while refering to the roleof the LET operatives, who have been detained and against whom investigation has been launched in pursuance of the two First InformationReports (FIRs) registered by the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA). He did not use the word "alleged" while referring to those whoseinvolvement Pakistan claims to have unearthed.This would indicate a possible attempt by them to show their investigation against someLET opetratives as warranted by the Indian "allegations" against them and not by any evidence so far uncovered by the FIA. Thus, whileregistering two FIRs against the LET operatives named by India, they have kept open the possibility of giving a free chit to the LET after theinternational pressure and interest subside and releasing their operatives on the ground that the investigation did not bring out anycredible evidence against them.
7. This was exactly the same modus operandi (MO) which the Pakistanis had followed after the thwarted attack by a group of terroristsbelonging to the LET and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) on the Parliament House in New Delhi in December,2001. Musharraf banned theseorganisations on January 15,2002, arrested their leaders and ordered an enquiry into their activities. A few months later, the arrestedpersons were got released by courts on the ground that the investigation did not bring out any evidence of wrong doing against them.
8. While we are right in welcoming the changed Pakistani stance--- even if it be only a change in tactics--- as seen on February 12,2009, weshould avoid nursing illusions that the seeming change in the Pakistani stance marked a watershed in Pakistani attitude to anti-Indiaterrorism. We have to wait and see whether Pakistan really means business this time, or is it merely pretending to co-operate while notsincerely co-operating as it has always done in the past---- whether against anti-India terrorism or against the Neo Taliban of Afghanistan orwith regard to the investigation into the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl, the US journalist, or the investigation into the proliferationactivities of A.Q.Khan or the investigation into the involvement of Rashid Rauf, a British citizen of Pakistani origin, in the conspiracy to blowup some US-bound planes in 2006.
9. Welcome the seeming change in its stance, but avoid over-assessing its significance and keep the pressure on Pakistan. That should beour operating principle.
10. Pakistan's new stance does not respond to the remaining two questions posed in Para one above. There are no indications at all that itis having second thoughts about the wisdom or inadvisability of continuing to use terrorism as a strategic weapon against India and that itmight now act against the anti-India terrorist infrastructure in its territory and the role of the ISI in keeping this terrorism sustained. Threatsof new terriorist attacks against Indian and foreign targets in Indian territory mounted from Pakistan remain as high as before.
11. There has been a debate as to why this sudden change of stance by Pakistan on February 12,2009. In this connection, the visit ofRichard Holbrooke, the US Special Representative to Pakistan and Afghanistan, to Islamabad from February 9 to 11,2009, and the first telephone call of President Barack Obama to President Asif Ali Zardari on February 11 have been cited by many analysts. There are twoother elements, which also need to be noted. The first was the brutal beheading of a Polish engineer working in Pakistan by the PakistaniTaliban on February 6. There has been a wave of anger and revulsion against Pakistan in Poland ever since the Taliban announced hisbeheading. The anger in Poland against Pakistan is as intense as the anger in India after 26/11.The second is the Mumbai-style attacks onthe offices of the prison department and the Justice Ministry in Kabul by the Taliban on February 11 which has set off concerns that theMumbai attack is already having a copy-cat effect. These are likely to have increased the pressure on the Pakistan Government to showthat they really business in going after terrorism and they are not playing games with the international community.One has to wait and seewhat further action the Pakistani authorities take in the weeks to come. This is the time for keeping up the pressure on Pakistan. (13-2-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute Fior TopicalStrudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
By Mobarik A Virk ( "News of February 13,2009)
ISLAMABAD: Pakistan on Thursday acknowledged for the first time that the Mumbai attacks were partly planned in Pakistan and that it hasarrested six suspects, including the “main operator”.
In its first detailed response to the dossier provided by India, Pakistan said criminal cases had been registered against nine suspects oncharges of “abetting, conspiracy and facilitation” of a terrorist act. However, it said more evidence is required from India, including DNAsamples of Ajmal Kasab, to establish his identity.
Addressing a press conference at the interior ministry, Interior Adviser Rehman Malik told the media FIR No: 01/009 had been lodged withthe Special Investigation Group (SIG) in the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) against nine suspects. The Pakistani investigators haveidentified Hammad Amin Sadiq as the alleged ‘mastermind’ of the whole conspiracy.
Malik said the cases against nine persons had been registered under the Anti-Terror Act (ATA) and the Cyber Crime Act and they would betried under these two sets of laws. He said six of the nine accused named in the FIR have already been arrested and being interrogated, twohave been identified but not arrested so far while investigations are still under way into the possible involvement of the ninth accused.
He identified those taken into custody as Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, a Lashkar-e-Taiba (LT) commander who was arrested from Muzaffarabadsoon after the Indian government alleged that the LT was behind the Mumbai attacks, Javed Iqbal, who was arrested from Barcelona, Spain,Hammad Amin Sadiq, believed to be the main operator belonging to southern Punjab, Zarar Shah, Mohammad Ashfaq and Abu Hamza. Thename of the lone surviving terrorist now in the custody of India, Ajmal Kasab, is not included in the FIR.
He also said some of those arrested by the security agencies of Pakistan for possible involvement in the Mumbai attacks belong to the LT.Malik said Javed Iqbal, who was based in Barcelona, Spain, was the person who paid $200 for the ‘Internet Domain’ that was also used forcommunication and planning for the Mumbai attacks. “Having ascertained the involvement of Javed Iqbal, we somehow lured him intocoming to Pakistan and he was arrested on his arrival,” Malik said.
He also said the e-mail sent by ‘Deccan Mujahideen’ claiming responsibility for the Mumbai attacks was believed to be prepared and sent byZarar Shah, who was responsible for communication link in the whole operation.
The adviser disclosed that the money to fund these attacks was transferred from Pakistan and was received in Italy. This moneytransaction was made through a Pakistani bank. He also said after thorough investigations by the Pakistani security and intelligenceagencies it was learnt that these alleged terrorists operated from two bases — one inside Karachi and the other outside but not very faraway from Karachi.
He also disclosed that the people involved in the Mumbai attacks used three boats for travelling to Mumbai, one named ‘Al-Hussaini’ and theother ‘Al-Ghaus’. For communication, these culprits used ‘Call Phonic’ system and they also bought Indian cell phone SIMs forcommunication from inside India.
Malik said the findings have already been shared with the Indian government. The Indian high commissioner in Islamabad was called to theforeign office and the report was handed over to him officially.
“We also have forwarded a set of 30 questions for which we would need answers as early as possible to support and further theinvestigation process on our side. We have asked the Indian government to provide us the DNA samples of the lone surviving terrorist, AjmalKasab, to ascertain his nationality, as we don’t have any record of the individual with Nadra (National Database Registration Authority).”
“At the same time,” he said, “we would like to have the statement given by Ajmal Kasab to the Indian investigators, how this group ofterrorists managed to sneak past the Indian security and intelligence agencies guarding their coastal lines, and how these nine personsmanaged to travel in a small boat and reach the Indian coast”.
He also pointed out that the satellite phone connection that was used for communication during the Mumbai attack was registered in theMiddle East and not in Pakistan. He also said forensic reports of the arms and ammunition used in the attack have been sought from theIndian authorities.
The adviser on interior said to make a solid case against all these people who have been arrested or for whose arrest the Pakistaniauthorities are making all-out efforts, meaningful cooperation from India would be most important.
Agencies add: Malik said the breakthrough in the investigation had resulted from tracing the fishing vessel used by the militants, purchasesof equipment like life jackets and the engine for the rubber dinghy that militants came ashore in Mumbai.
He said only nine of the 10 gunmen came ashore in the dinghy, and the fishing boat they had used to sail from Karachi had refuelled on thecoast of India’s Gujarat state. The Pakistani official said one suspect was allegedly involved in the 2007 bomb attack on the SamjhautaExpress in India that killed 68 people as the train headed for Lahore, and India has been requested for more information. NEWS 13-2-09
Islamabad hands over Mumbai probe report to New Delhi
By Sajjad Malik/Tahir Niaz ( " Daily Times" of February 13,2009)
ISLAMABAD: Pakistan has formally handed over the details of its investigation into the Mumbai terror attacks to India, the Foreign Officesaid on Thursday as Adviser to the Prime Minister on Interior Rehman Malik admitted that the attacks were ‘partially planned’ in Pakistan.
“The Indian high commissioner was ... [on Thursday given] material pertaining to the Mumbai terror attacks probe by the FederalInvestigation Agency (FIA), by the foreign secretary,” said Foreign Office spokesman Abdul Basit.
Arrests: Meanwhile at a press conference, Rehman Malik announced ‘breakthrough’ arrests in the Mumbai probe, and admitted that theMumbai attacks were partially planned in Pakistan. He said some of the suspects were linked to Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LT). Rehman said acase was registered on Thursday under the Anti-Terrorism Act against eight suspects – including LT’s Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, Hammad Aminand Zarar Shah – on charges of “abetting, directing, conspiring and facilitating a terrorist act”. Six of these suspects are in the custody ofintelligence agencies, and all will be tried under Pakistani law.
“Some funds for the attacks were transferred from Spain and Italy,” he said.
Karachi: Rehman said the suspects used three boats, all of which have been seized, to sail from Karachi to Mumbai between November 26and 28, 2008.
More information: Rehman, however, said these findings were not final and Pakistan needed more information from India. He said the Indianauthorities had been asked to answer 30 questions raised by the Pakistani investigators.
Other countries: The adviser said “the system of various other countries” was also used to plan the attacks. Rehman said two more menwere being held, and identified them only as Khan and Riaz. Other leads pointed to Europe and the US, and Malik said Pakistan would askthe FBI for help. DAILY TIMES 13-2-09
LT slams Islamabad for Mumbai charges
SRINAGAR: The banned Lashkar-e-Tayyaba angrily condemned Islamabad on Thursday for filing a case against some of the group’s topoperatives. Pakistan lodged a first information report against eight suspects, including the presumed mastermind Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi.“We strongly condemn the lodging of the FIR against LT,” Lashkar spokesman Abdullah Ghaznavi told AFP over the telephone. The case wasbrought to ‘win appreciation’ from India and the US and to “implement India’s agenda of suppressing the people’s struggle for freedom inKashmir”, said Ghaznavi. afp DAILY TIMES 13-2-09
Islamabad forex company involved
LAHORE: Interior Adviser Rehman Malik has claimed that a money exchange company in Islamabad was involved in transferring money to asuspect of the Mumbai attacks in Spain, said a private TV channel. The money was transferred through Paracha International Exchange’sEuro 2005 branch in Islamabad to Javed Iqbal in Barcelona. The branch was later found sealed. Representatives of other branches havedenied that such a transaction took place. But one of the two owners confirmed the transaction, and blamed his partner for it. daily timesmonitor DAILY TIMES 13-2-09
Sunday, February 8, 2009
INDIA'S SRI LANKA PROBLEM: KEEPING THE FINGERS CROSSED
B.RAMAN
( Written exclusively for the online journal of a US university at their request. Cannot be reproduced till they publish it—B.Raman, 9-2-09)
The success of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces in inflicting a series of defeats on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) since the middle of 2006 and in restoring the writ of the State over 95 per cent of the territory in the Tamil majority Eastern and Northern provinces, which was under the control of the LTTE, has been greeted in India with a mix of satisfaction and concern.
The satisfaction arises from the expected total defeat of the LTTE’s insurgent force, which had succeeded in virtually establishing a State within a State with its paraphernalia of an administrative structure and a so-called Army, Navy and Air Force. Its naval and air capabilities posed a threat not only to the national security of Sri Lanka, but also to the security of India and the region as a whole.
India’s concerns over the naval and air capabilities of the LTTE were magnified after the terrorist attack in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008, by a group of 10 sea-borne terrorists from Pakistan belonging to the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET). The success of the LET terrorists in Mumbai brought to India’s mind the similar success of a group of sea-borne terrorists of the LTTE who clandestinely landed in India’s southern coast in 1991, found their way to Chennai and assassinated Rajiv Gandhi, the former Prime Minister of India, at the venue of an election meeting In May ,1991.
Whatever ambivalence might have been there in India’s policy-making circles over the advisability of openly supporting the counter-insurgency operations of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces was removed after the Mumbai terrorist attack. There was a realization that terrorism in any form by any group for any reason should not be tolerated and that double standards in dealing with terrorism would only play into the hands of the terrorists. When India was demanding that Pakistan should act strongly against terrorists operating from its territory, it could not have criticized the counter-insurgency operations of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces against the LTTE.
No tears have been shed in India over the defeat of the LTTE as an insurgent force. Even before the Mumbai terrorist attack, India had been quietly helping the Sri Lankan Armed Forces by supplying defensive equipment such as radars and by training Sri Lankan personnel in the use of this equipment. Indian intelligence, which has a long history of co-operation with its Sri Lankan counterpart since the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, stepped up this co-operation further since 2006 and willingly shared with the Sri Lankan authorities intelligence of value in dealing with the LTTE. The Sri Lankan Armed Forces should be the first to acknowledge that their success in severely damaging, if not destroying, the commercial shipping capability of the LTTE was to a considerable extent facilitated by precise intelligence from India. One of the reasons for the defeat of the LTTE was its inability to replenish its stocks of arms and ammunition through clandestine shipments from abroad. Intelligence supplied by India contributed significantly to disrupting these clandestine shipments.
Indian policy-makers have no reasons to regret such limited assistance provided by them. This assistance was in mutual interest. India, which has itself faced serious insurgent situations in its North-East and in Jammu & Kashmir and has dealt with them strongly and effectively, could not have viewed with equanimity the success of a dreaded insurgent-cum-terrorist force such as the LTTE in its neighbourhood. The LTTE is now a dying horse, but not yet a dead horse. Its final demise as an insurgent-cum-terrorist organization, when it comes about, should be a matter of satisfaction to all those opposed to terrorism.
India’s concerns are not over the impending demise of the LTTE. They are over what next. Many questions ought to be bothering the minds of Indian policy-makers. It has been India’s experience since its independence in 1947 that whenever any Government in Colombo felt itself strong enough not to need Indian assistance in any matter, it has shown a troubling insensitivity to India’s security concerns. One saw this before and after the Sino-Indian war of 1962. While pretending to take a neutral stand in the border dispute between India and China, it took a position which was perceived in India as more sympathetic to China than India. In the months preceding the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, which facilitated the birth of Bangladesh, Indira Gandhi, in retaliation for the hijacking of an Indian Airlines plane to Lahore by two Pakistan-instigated terrorists from J&K, banned all Pakistani flights to the then East Pakistan over Indian territory. Sri Lanka went to the help of Pakistan by allowing Pakistan Air Force planes carrying troops and equipment to East Pakistan to refuel at the Katunayake airport. A furious Indira Gandhi warned the Sri Lankan Government that she considered this an unfriendly act and threatened to retaliate against Sri Lanka. It was only after this that Sri Lanka stopped the refueling of the PAF planes. After the Indian nuclear test of 1974, India was concerned over a reported move of the US to set up a huge set-up of the Voice of America in Sri Lankan territory. Indian intelligence had told her that the US intelligence agency, which is responsible for technical intelligence, would have a presence in the VOA set-up to collect intelligence about India’s nuclear and space establishments in Tamil Nadu and Kerala. When the Sri Lankan Government repeatedly ignored Indian concerns on this subject, Indira Gandhi decided to teach it a lesson by extending political, moral and diplomatic support to the Sri Lankan Tamils.
In recent years, successive Sri Lankan Governments have been showing sensitivity to India’s security and strategic concerns because they had been rendered weak by the success of the LTTE in establishing its control over large parts of the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Now that they are on the verge of defeating the LTTE after re-establishing their writ over the Tamil areas, will they continue to show the same sensitivity in future or will they go back to their past reflexes of playing India against Pakistan and China, whenever it suited them. Even during its present counter-insurgency operations, the Sri Lankan Government has expanded its economic and military supply relations with Pakistan and China. This trend could pick up momentum after they succeed totally in their operations against the LTTE.
The other Indian concern arises from the emotional dimension of the problem. Tamils constitute the overwhelming majority of Tamil Nadu, the southern coastal province of India. Ethnically, linguistically and culturally, they are close to the Sri Lankan Tamils. The political aspirations of the Sri Lankan Tamils and their difficulties in the unitary state that Sri Lanka is have an echo in Tamil Nadu. India had never supported the LTTE’s objective of an independent Tamil State in the Northern and Eastern Provinces to be called Tamil Eelam, but it has strongly favoured since 1987 the transformation of Sri Lanka into a genuine federal State with a separate State for the Tamils with considerable political and economic powers similar to the powers enjoyed by the States in the Indian Federation.
Successive Sri Lankan Governments have repeatedly assured their own Tamils as well as India of their intention for the devolution of powers to the Tamil provinces and to grant the Tamils the same status as enjoyed by the majority Sinhalese community with no discrimination on ethnic grounds. Will the Government in Colombo honour this promise once it feels it has destroyed the LTTE once and for all. The LTTE was the strongest of the Tamil political movements. Other Tamil political organizations, which are presently collaborating with the Government against the LTTE, are weak with limited following. Presently, the Government is giving them importance as proof of its intention to treat the Tamils as equals of the Sinhalese in all respects. Will it continue to do so once it succeeds in defeating the LTTE?
Policy-makers in India also ought to be concerned over the already evident signs of the recrudescence of Sinhalese extremism and intolerance not only in the civil society, but even in the Government and the Armed Forces. The intemperate remarks of Lt.Gen.Sarath Fonseka,the army commander, highlighting the Sinhalese character of the State (though denied subsequently), the attacks on journalists, who criticize the military operations and the criticism of humanitarian relief organizations which highlight the plight of the Tamil civilians are disturbing indicators of the revival of Sinhalese extremism as the Armed Forces near their final victory over the LTTE. This does not bode well for the future.
India is keeping its fingers crossed as it awaits the final defeat of the LTTE.
(The writer served as an analyst in the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW), India’s external intelligence agency, from 1968 to 1994 and in the National Security Advisory Board of the Govt. of India from 2000 to end-2002. He is presently Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. He is the author of four books---- “Intelligence---Past, Present and Future” published in 2001, “ A Terrorist State as A Frontline Ally” published in 2001, “The Kaoboys of R&AW---Down Memory Lane” published in 2007 and “Terrorism--- Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow” published in 2008. All the four have been published by the Lancer Publishers of Delhi---www.lancerpublishers.com . E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
( Written exclusively for the online journal of a US university at their request. Cannot be reproduced till they publish it—B.Raman, 9-2-09)
The success of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces in inflicting a series of defeats on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) since the middle of 2006 and in restoring the writ of the State over 95 per cent of the territory in the Tamil majority Eastern and Northern provinces, which was under the control of the LTTE, has been greeted in India with a mix of satisfaction and concern.
The satisfaction arises from the expected total defeat of the LTTE’s insurgent force, which had succeeded in virtually establishing a State within a State with its paraphernalia of an administrative structure and a so-called Army, Navy and Air Force. Its naval and air capabilities posed a threat not only to the national security of Sri Lanka, but also to the security of India and the region as a whole.
India’s concerns over the naval and air capabilities of the LTTE were magnified after the terrorist attack in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008, by a group of 10 sea-borne terrorists from Pakistan belonging to the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET). The success of the LET terrorists in Mumbai brought to India’s mind the similar success of a group of sea-borne terrorists of the LTTE who clandestinely landed in India’s southern coast in 1991, found their way to Chennai and assassinated Rajiv Gandhi, the former Prime Minister of India, at the venue of an election meeting In May ,1991.
Whatever ambivalence might have been there in India’s policy-making circles over the advisability of openly supporting the counter-insurgency operations of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces was removed after the Mumbai terrorist attack. There was a realization that terrorism in any form by any group for any reason should not be tolerated and that double standards in dealing with terrorism would only play into the hands of the terrorists. When India was demanding that Pakistan should act strongly against terrorists operating from its territory, it could not have criticized the counter-insurgency operations of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces against the LTTE.
No tears have been shed in India over the defeat of the LTTE as an insurgent force. Even before the Mumbai terrorist attack, India had been quietly helping the Sri Lankan Armed Forces by supplying defensive equipment such as radars and by training Sri Lankan personnel in the use of this equipment. Indian intelligence, which has a long history of co-operation with its Sri Lankan counterpart since the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, stepped up this co-operation further since 2006 and willingly shared with the Sri Lankan authorities intelligence of value in dealing with the LTTE. The Sri Lankan Armed Forces should be the first to acknowledge that their success in severely damaging, if not destroying, the commercial shipping capability of the LTTE was to a considerable extent facilitated by precise intelligence from India. One of the reasons for the defeat of the LTTE was its inability to replenish its stocks of arms and ammunition through clandestine shipments from abroad. Intelligence supplied by India contributed significantly to disrupting these clandestine shipments.
Indian policy-makers have no reasons to regret such limited assistance provided by them. This assistance was in mutual interest. India, which has itself faced serious insurgent situations in its North-East and in Jammu & Kashmir and has dealt with them strongly and effectively, could not have viewed with equanimity the success of a dreaded insurgent-cum-terrorist force such as the LTTE in its neighbourhood. The LTTE is now a dying horse, but not yet a dead horse. Its final demise as an insurgent-cum-terrorist organization, when it comes about, should be a matter of satisfaction to all those opposed to terrorism.
India’s concerns are not over the impending demise of the LTTE. They are over what next. Many questions ought to be bothering the minds of Indian policy-makers. It has been India’s experience since its independence in 1947 that whenever any Government in Colombo felt itself strong enough not to need Indian assistance in any matter, it has shown a troubling insensitivity to India’s security concerns. One saw this before and after the Sino-Indian war of 1962. While pretending to take a neutral stand in the border dispute between India and China, it took a position which was perceived in India as more sympathetic to China than India. In the months preceding the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, which facilitated the birth of Bangladesh, Indira Gandhi, in retaliation for the hijacking of an Indian Airlines plane to Lahore by two Pakistan-instigated terrorists from J&K, banned all Pakistani flights to the then East Pakistan over Indian territory. Sri Lanka went to the help of Pakistan by allowing Pakistan Air Force planes carrying troops and equipment to East Pakistan to refuel at the Katunayake airport. A furious Indira Gandhi warned the Sri Lankan Government that she considered this an unfriendly act and threatened to retaliate against Sri Lanka. It was only after this that Sri Lanka stopped the refueling of the PAF planes. After the Indian nuclear test of 1974, India was concerned over a reported move of the US to set up a huge set-up of the Voice of America in Sri Lankan territory. Indian intelligence had told her that the US intelligence agency, which is responsible for technical intelligence, would have a presence in the VOA set-up to collect intelligence about India’s nuclear and space establishments in Tamil Nadu and Kerala. When the Sri Lankan Government repeatedly ignored Indian concerns on this subject, Indira Gandhi decided to teach it a lesson by extending political, moral and diplomatic support to the Sri Lankan Tamils.
In recent years, successive Sri Lankan Governments have been showing sensitivity to India’s security and strategic concerns because they had been rendered weak by the success of the LTTE in establishing its control over large parts of the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Now that they are on the verge of defeating the LTTE after re-establishing their writ over the Tamil areas, will they continue to show the same sensitivity in future or will they go back to their past reflexes of playing India against Pakistan and China, whenever it suited them. Even during its present counter-insurgency operations, the Sri Lankan Government has expanded its economic and military supply relations with Pakistan and China. This trend could pick up momentum after they succeed totally in their operations against the LTTE.
The other Indian concern arises from the emotional dimension of the problem. Tamils constitute the overwhelming majority of Tamil Nadu, the southern coastal province of India. Ethnically, linguistically and culturally, they are close to the Sri Lankan Tamils. The political aspirations of the Sri Lankan Tamils and their difficulties in the unitary state that Sri Lanka is have an echo in Tamil Nadu. India had never supported the LTTE’s objective of an independent Tamil State in the Northern and Eastern Provinces to be called Tamil Eelam, but it has strongly favoured since 1987 the transformation of Sri Lanka into a genuine federal State with a separate State for the Tamils with considerable political and economic powers similar to the powers enjoyed by the States in the Indian Federation.
Successive Sri Lankan Governments have repeatedly assured their own Tamils as well as India of their intention for the devolution of powers to the Tamil provinces and to grant the Tamils the same status as enjoyed by the majority Sinhalese community with no discrimination on ethnic grounds. Will the Government in Colombo honour this promise once it feels it has destroyed the LTTE once and for all. The LTTE was the strongest of the Tamil political movements. Other Tamil political organizations, which are presently collaborating with the Government against the LTTE, are weak with limited following. Presently, the Government is giving them importance as proof of its intention to treat the Tamils as equals of the Sinhalese in all respects. Will it continue to do so once it succeeds in defeating the LTTE?
Policy-makers in India also ought to be concerned over the already evident signs of the recrudescence of Sinhalese extremism and intolerance not only in the civil society, but even in the Government and the Armed Forces. The intemperate remarks of Lt.Gen.Sarath Fonseka,the army commander, highlighting the Sinhalese character of the State (though denied subsequently), the attacks on journalists, who criticize the military operations and the criticism of humanitarian relief organizations which highlight the plight of the Tamil civilians are disturbing indicators of the revival of Sinhalese extremism as the Armed Forces near their final victory over the LTTE. This does not bode well for the future.
India is keeping its fingers crossed as it awaits the final defeat of the LTTE.
(The writer served as an analyst in the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW), India’s external intelligence agency, from 1968 to 1994 and in the National Security Advisory Board of the Govt. of India from 2000 to end-2002. He is presently Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. He is the author of four books---- “Intelligence---Past, Present and Future” published in 2001, “ A Terrorist State as A Frontline Ally” published in 2001, “The Kaoboys of R&AW---Down Memory Lane” published in 2007 and “Terrorism--- Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow” published in 2008. All the four have been published by the Lancer Publishers of Delhi---www.lancerpublishers.com . E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Saturday, February 7, 2009
A.Q.KHAN LET LOOSE AGAIN: DANGERS AHEAD
B.RAMAN
( To be read in continuation of my article of July 6,2008, titled "A. Q. KHAN GAGGED, THREATENED WITH IN CAMERA TRIAL" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers28/paper2760.html )
How trustworthy is Pakistan? This question, which has always been bothering the mind of the international community, should acquire evengreater compelling urgency after the news broke out in Islamabad that Chief Justice Sardar Muhammad Aslam of the Islamabad High Courthas freed on February 6,2009, A.Q.Khan, Pakistan's nuclear scientist, from the house-arrest in which he was placed by former PresidentPervez Musharraf in 2004 after the US and other Western countries gathered evidence of his involvement in the proliferation of nucleartechnology and equipment to Libya, Iran and North Korea.
2. While repeatedly turning down requests from the Western countries and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna forpermission to have him interrogated by an independent team of international experts, Musharraf had him placed under house arrest afterextracting a confession from him regarding his involvement in proliferation activities. Musharraf had been repeatedly saying that he and theother scientists, who had collaborated with him in his proliferation activities, had been thoroughly interrogated and that the details obtainedfrom them shared with the IAEA and the Western Governments. He also maintained consistently that this was a rogue operation by A.Q.Khanand a small number of scientists close to him and that the State of Pakistan and its rulers were not involved in it.
3. The restrictions imposed on A.Q.Khan by Musharraf applied to his movements anywhere in the country and banned any interactions byKhan with journalists. Musharraf's action came in for strong criticism not only from the Islamic fundamentalist and jihadi organisations, butalso from sections of mainstream political opinion like the followers of Nawaz Sharif, the chief of the main faction of the Pakistan MuslimLeague. The Jamiat-ul-Ulema Islam (JUI), headed by Maulana Fazlur Rahman, which is a member of the present ruling coalition headed byPrime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani, was among those demanding Khan's unconditional release.
4. Before her assassination on December 27,2007, Benazir Bhutto, the leader of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), had been saying that ifshe came to power she might allow Khan to be interrogated by IAEA experts if they had strong evidence which justified such a step.Surprisingly, after her assassination there were no more references to this issue either from President Asif Ali Zardari or Gilani or otherleaders of the coalition. One of the issues taken up by the Islamic fundamentalist parties, including the JUI, during the election campaign,which preceded the February 18,2008, elections to the National Assembly, was the removal of the restrictions imposed on Khan.
5. After the coalition took over, in response to pressure from the JUI and others, the Government eased some of the restrictions imposed onhim by Musharraf, such as the curbs on his meetings with friends and journalists. Taking advantage of this, some journalists, includingthose of the Associated Press of the US and the Kyodo News Agency of Japan, managed to interview him in his house. He reportedly spokefreely and alleged that Musharraf and the Army were totally in the picture about his nuclear and missile dealings with North Korea.
6. This created considerable embarrassment for the Government and even alarm that he might similarly try to implicate other leaders. TheGovernment denied his allegations and reimposed the ban on his meeting the journalists. On November 20,2008, Khan had filed before theIslamabad High Court a quo warranto writ petition , requesting the court to direct the authorities to let him know under what grounds hehad been placed under house arrest and various restrictions had been imposed on him.In his writ petition, he denied that he had indulged inany criminal activities. The court forwarded the petition to the Interior Ministry for comments, which were submitted by the Ministry to thecourt on February 5,2009. It is understood that the Deputy Attorney-General of the Government of Pakistan told the court that theGovernment on its own was reconsidering the restrictions placed on Khan by Musharraf and was negotiating with him regarding certainconditions under which these could be removed or eased.
7. After studying the reply of the Interior Ministry and the oral submission of the Deputy Attorney-General, the Chief Justice ordered onFebruary 6,2009, the release of Khan from his house arrest since there was no evidence of any criminal activities against him. It isunderstood that in return for his release, Khan has given an undertaking to the court and the Government that he would not travel outsideIslamabad without the prior permission of the Government.
8. Welcoming the order of the court, Khan told journalists: "All this has happened because of the keen interest taken by the President, thePrime Minister and especially [Internal Security Adviser] Rehman Malik, who has looked into the case, reviewed it, discussed it with theGovernment and with the concerned authorities." This would clearly indicate that the initiative for his release and for easing the variousrestrictions on him came from the highest levels of the Government and that the Chief Justice would not have passed the order of releasewithout a prior nod of approval from the Government.
9. This development, which has taken the US and other Western Governments by surprise, came a day after Senator John Kerry, Chairmanof the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had spoken in Washington DC of a welcome transformation in the attitude of the Pakistanipolitical and military leaders with regard to co-operation in the fight against terrorism. One fails to understand on what basis Kerry came tothe conclusion that such a transformation has taken place. Kerry, according to agency despatches, was intervening in a discussion onAfghanistan. He said:"I have found that President Asif Ali Zardari is very committed to trying to increase the accountability and to move inthe direction of taking action against the terrorists.I also find that both the ISI Chief General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, and the Pakistan Army Chief General Ashfaq Kayani are likewise committed."
10. The manner in which Khan has been got released by an induced order of the judiciary and the restrictions on him eased, if not removed,show that the Government of Zardari is as deceptive and as insincere in its professions of its so-called keenness to act againstwrong-doers----whether terrorists or proliferators--- as the previous Governments and leaders were.
11. Khan is bitter against the West,particularly the US, for allegedly humiliating him all these years. Even in the past, he was known for hisclose friendship with Islamic fundamentalist leaders such as Maulana Fazlur Rahman and Qasi Hussein Ahmed, the Amir of theJamaat-e-Islami (JEI). He believes that he owes his release to their consistent support to him. He is also very close to anti-US officers of theInter-Services Intelligence and the Army---- serving as well as retired---- including Lt.Gen.Hamid Gul, former DG of the ISI. The danger infuture will be not so much about his helping other countries as about his helping the anti-US jihadi groups, including Al Qaeda, in acquiring amilitary nuclear or a dirty bomb capability. (7-2-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
( To be read in continuation of my article of July 6,2008, titled "A. Q. KHAN GAGGED, THREATENED WITH IN CAMERA TRIAL" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers28/paper2760.html )
How trustworthy is Pakistan? This question, which has always been bothering the mind of the international community, should acquire evengreater compelling urgency after the news broke out in Islamabad that Chief Justice Sardar Muhammad Aslam of the Islamabad High Courthas freed on February 6,2009, A.Q.Khan, Pakistan's nuclear scientist, from the house-arrest in which he was placed by former PresidentPervez Musharraf in 2004 after the US and other Western countries gathered evidence of his involvement in the proliferation of nucleartechnology and equipment to Libya, Iran and North Korea.
2. While repeatedly turning down requests from the Western countries and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna forpermission to have him interrogated by an independent team of international experts, Musharraf had him placed under house arrest afterextracting a confession from him regarding his involvement in proliferation activities. Musharraf had been repeatedly saying that he and theother scientists, who had collaborated with him in his proliferation activities, had been thoroughly interrogated and that the details obtainedfrom them shared with the IAEA and the Western Governments. He also maintained consistently that this was a rogue operation by A.Q.Khanand a small number of scientists close to him and that the State of Pakistan and its rulers were not involved in it.
3. The restrictions imposed on A.Q.Khan by Musharraf applied to his movements anywhere in the country and banned any interactions byKhan with journalists. Musharraf's action came in for strong criticism not only from the Islamic fundamentalist and jihadi organisations, butalso from sections of mainstream political opinion like the followers of Nawaz Sharif, the chief of the main faction of the Pakistan MuslimLeague. The Jamiat-ul-Ulema Islam (JUI), headed by Maulana Fazlur Rahman, which is a member of the present ruling coalition headed byPrime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani, was among those demanding Khan's unconditional release.
4. Before her assassination on December 27,2007, Benazir Bhutto, the leader of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), had been saying that ifshe came to power she might allow Khan to be interrogated by IAEA experts if they had strong evidence which justified such a step.Surprisingly, after her assassination there were no more references to this issue either from President Asif Ali Zardari or Gilani or otherleaders of the coalition. One of the issues taken up by the Islamic fundamentalist parties, including the JUI, during the election campaign,which preceded the February 18,2008, elections to the National Assembly, was the removal of the restrictions imposed on Khan.
5. After the coalition took over, in response to pressure from the JUI and others, the Government eased some of the restrictions imposed onhim by Musharraf, such as the curbs on his meetings with friends and journalists. Taking advantage of this, some journalists, includingthose of the Associated Press of the US and the Kyodo News Agency of Japan, managed to interview him in his house. He reportedly spokefreely and alleged that Musharraf and the Army were totally in the picture about his nuclear and missile dealings with North Korea.
6. This created considerable embarrassment for the Government and even alarm that he might similarly try to implicate other leaders. TheGovernment denied his allegations and reimposed the ban on his meeting the journalists. On November 20,2008, Khan had filed before theIslamabad High Court a quo warranto writ petition , requesting the court to direct the authorities to let him know under what grounds hehad been placed under house arrest and various restrictions had been imposed on him.In his writ petition, he denied that he had indulged inany criminal activities. The court forwarded the petition to the Interior Ministry for comments, which were submitted by the Ministry to thecourt on February 5,2009. It is understood that the Deputy Attorney-General of the Government of Pakistan told the court that theGovernment on its own was reconsidering the restrictions placed on Khan by Musharraf and was negotiating with him regarding certainconditions under which these could be removed or eased.
7. After studying the reply of the Interior Ministry and the oral submission of the Deputy Attorney-General, the Chief Justice ordered onFebruary 6,2009, the release of Khan from his house arrest since there was no evidence of any criminal activities against him. It isunderstood that in return for his release, Khan has given an undertaking to the court and the Government that he would not travel outsideIslamabad without the prior permission of the Government.
8. Welcoming the order of the court, Khan told journalists: "All this has happened because of the keen interest taken by the President, thePrime Minister and especially [Internal Security Adviser] Rehman Malik, who has looked into the case, reviewed it, discussed it with theGovernment and with the concerned authorities." This would clearly indicate that the initiative for his release and for easing the variousrestrictions on him came from the highest levels of the Government and that the Chief Justice would not have passed the order of releasewithout a prior nod of approval from the Government.
9. This development, which has taken the US and other Western Governments by surprise, came a day after Senator John Kerry, Chairmanof the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had spoken in Washington DC of a welcome transformation in the attitude of the Pakistanipolitical and military leaders with regard to co-operation in the fight against terrorism. One fails to understand on what basis Kerry came tothe conclusion that such a transformation has taken place. Kerry, according to agency despatches, was intervening in a discussion onAfghanistan. He said:"I have found that President Asif Ali Zardari is very committed to trying to increase the accountability and to move inthe direction of taking action against the terrorists.I also find that both the ISI Chief General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, and the Pakistan Army Chief General Ashfaq Kayani are likewise committed."
10. The manner in which Khan has been got released by an induced order of the judiciary and the restrictions on him eased, if not removed,show that the Government of Zardari is as deceptive and as insincere in its professions of its so-called keenness to act againstwrong-doers----whether terrorists or proliferators--- as the previous Governments and leaders were.
11. Khan is bitter against the West,particularly the US, for allegedly humiliating him all these years. Even in the past, he was known for hisclose friendship with Islamic fundamentalist leaders such as Maulana Fazlur Rahman and Qasi Hussein Ahmed, the Amir of theJamaat-e-Islami (JEI). He believes that he owes his release to their consistent support to him. He is also very close to anti-US officers of theInter-Services Intelligence and the Army---- serving as well as retired---- including Lt.Gen.Hamid Gul, former DG of the ISI. The danger infuture will be not so much about his helping other countries as about his helping the anti-US jihadi groups, including Al Qaeda, in acquiring amilitary nuclear or a dirty bomb capability. (7-2-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, February 6, 2009
JIHADI COCKTAIL AWAITING HOLBROOKE
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO. 492
( To be read in continuation of my article of January 1,2009, titled "Jihadi Terrorism--- 2008 & 2009: Part II & Last" available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers30/paper2998.html , article dated January 15,2009, titled "Fight Against Pak-SponsoredTerrorism---India Should Not Bank On Obama" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers31/paper3013.html and article dated January28,2009, titled "The Invisible Hyphens In Obama's Policy-Making" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers31/paper3027.html )
Richard Holbrooke, President Barack Obama's special representative for Pakistan and Afghanistan, is scheduled to undertake his first visitto the region from February 9,2009, after attending a security conference at Munich.M.K.Narayanan, India's National Security Adviser, toldKaran Thapar of the CNBC in an interview on February 2, 2009, that he would be meeting Holbrooke in Munich before he came to India. It isnot known whether the expected meeting at Munich materialised and if so what transpired at the meeting.
2.A Reuters' despatch dated February 4,2009, from Washington quoted unnamed US officials as saying that in addition to Pakistan andAfghanistan, Holbrooke would also be visiting India to discuss Afghanistan with Indian officials. The Reuters' report said: "The officials, whospoke on condition that they not be named, stressed that Holbrooke was going to India to discuss Afghanistan and not to mediate theKashmir dispute."
3. Holbrooke's first visit to the region as the Special Representative comes at a time when the new strategy of Obama with regard to themilitary operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghan as well as Pakistani territory is still to take shape. Apart from the decisionsto continue the Predator ( unmanned aircraft of the Central Intelligence Agency) air strikes against suspected Al Qaeda and Taliban targetsin Pakistani territory and to send 30,000 more US troops to Afghanistan in the coming months, no other decision has so far been taken.
4. The grim situation faced by the US in this region from which the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US homeland, the July,2005, terrorist strike inLondon and the July,2006, and the 26/11 (2008) terrorist strikes in Mumbai originated should be evident from the figures mentioned in aquarterly report submitted by the Pentagon to the US Congress on February 2,2009, reviewing the ground situation in Afghanistan. The highlights of the report are:
"The spring and summer of 2008 saw the highest levels of violence in Afghanistan since the US invasion in 2001."
"The Taliban regrouped after its fall from power and has coalesced into a resilient and evolving insurgency."
Between January 1 and December 10, 2008, 132 US personnel in Afghanistan died as the result of hostile action, as against 82 in 2007.
Attacks by the Taliban increased by a third.
Attacks along the country's major highway increased by 37 per cent.
"The security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated in several areas of the country since the previous report" .
The Taliban's surface-to-air fire increased by 67 per cent. Car bombs and attacks in Kabul have also increased.
The Taliban is challenging the Kabul government for control of the south and east of the country, "and increasingly in the west."
5.According to an assessment prepared by the International Council on Security and Development of London in January,2009, the Taliban"now holds a permanent presence in 72 per cent of Afghanistan, up from 54 per cent a year ago." Writing in the issue (dated February9,2009) of the "Newsweek", Fareed Zakaria, its Editor, said: "In 2004, the US Air Force flew 86 strike sorties against targets in Afghanistan.By 2007, the number was up to 2,926—and that doesn't count rocket or cannon fire from helicopters."
6.US Predator strikes on targets in Pakistani territory increased from 10 in 2006 and 2007 combined to over 30 in 2008. The more the airstrikes----whether in Afghan or Pakistani territory--- the more the civilian casualties. The more the civilian casualties, the more the angeragainst the US. The more the anger against the US, the more the volunteers joining the Taliban----- the Afghan as well as the Pakistani--- andthe more the instances of suicide terrorism -----63 in Pakistan as against 56 in 2007 and over 100 in Afghanistan.
7.While exact figures of suicide terrorism during 2008 in Afghanistan are not yet available, exact figures for Pakistan are available from areport of the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), extracts from which were published by the "Daily Times" of Lahore on January21,2009. To quote: "At least 2,267 people were killed and 4,558 injured in at least 2,148 terrorists attacks reported in 2008. At least 967people were killed and 2,108 others injured in 63 suicide attacks in the country during the last year. The NWFP faced 32 suicide attacks inwhich 389 people were killed and 688 injured, Punjab was second with 10 suicide attacks that claimed more than 201 lives and injured 508.Sixteen suicide attacks were reported in FATA due to which 263 people died and 497 were injured. More than 112 people were killed and321 injured in four suicide attacks in Islamabad while one suicide attack was reported in Balochistan in which two people were killed and22 others injured. The report said 381 rocket attacks, 46 incidents of beheading, 112 remote controlled bomb attacks, 110 landmineexplosions, 451 incidents of shooting and 373 blasts by improvised explosives were recorded during 2008. At least 4,113 suspectedterrorists including 30 from Al Qaeda, 3,759 affiliated with Taliban and other such groups, and 354 Baloch insurgents were arrested duringthe year."
8. There were three major developments of concern to the international community during 2008. The first was the consolidation of the holdof the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), now a wing of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan ( TTP), in the Swat Valley of theNorth-West Frontier Province (NWFP). Its name means the Movement For the Enforcement of the IslamicLaws. The TNSM, which is led byMaulana Fazlullah, initially took to arms in August,2007,against the Pakistan Army and the Frontier Corps, a para-military unit consisting ofPashtuns, in protest against the death of a large number of tribal children during the commando raid in the Lal Masjid of Islamabad inJuly,2007. While its anger over the Lal Maasjid raid has subsided, it has maintained its attacks on the Army and the FC in support of itsdemand for the introduction of the Islamic legal system in the Swat Valley. The TNSM, which now controls 80 per cent of the Swat Valley,has set up its own Islamic courts and banned education of girls beyond the fourth standard. Even though the Army went into action againstthe TNSM in October,2007, nearly 16 months after its operatins supported by helicopter gunships started, it has not been able to restore thewrit of the State in the Valley, which is just 160 Kms from Islamabad.
9.Making a statement in the Senate, the upper House of the Pakistan Parliament, on January 29,2009, Rehman Malik, Adviser on InternalSecurity, claimed that five organisations were responsible for the trouble in the Swat Vally. These were the TTP, Al Qaeda,Tanzeem-e-Islami,the Tora Bora Group and the Qari Mushtaq group.According to him, during 2008, about 1,200 civilians and 189 members of the securityforces were killed, 123 government schools and 10 private schools were destroyed and many CD shops and barbers’ salons set ablaze. Hesaid a so-called ‘Taliban court’ had ‘summoned’ 40 people for trial on various offences.There have also been reports that theJaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) of Maulana Masood Azhar is now operating jointly with Al Qaeda and the TTP, but Rehman Malik did not mentionthis. Rashid Rauf, a British citizen of Mirpuri origin, who was related by marriage to Massood Azhar, was killed in a Predator strike on an AlQaeda hide-out. The British suspected him of involvement in the August, 2006, plot to blow up a number of US-bound planes. According toan estimate of the "Dawn" of Karachi (February 5,2009), about 600,000 people have left the valley out of its total population of 1.5 million.
10.Writing in the"News" of January 21,2009, its correspondent Amir Mir quoted a spokesman of the Inter-Services Press RelationsDepartment as saying that the Army has deployed four brigades in Swat. He also quoted a spokesman at the Swat Media Centre (SMC) asstating as follows: "Since Oct 2007, around 15,000 military and paramilitary troops had killed 784 militants in Swat, while the number oftroops martyred during the same period stood at 189.Of the security forces people killed in the operation, 80 belonged to the Army, 61 werepolicemen, 35 staffers of the Frontier Constabulary while the remaining belonged to the Frontier Corps. The militants in Swat had carriedout 165 bomb attacks against the security forces since 2007, which included 17 suicide and 148 remote-controlled attacks. The militantshave destroyed 20 bridges, besides setting ablaze 165 girls schools, 80 video shops and 22 barber shops."
11.Amir Mir gave his own assessment of the situation as follows: "Around 10,000 TTP militants have been pitted against 15,000 Army troopssince Oct 22, 2007, when the operation was officially launched. Leading the charge against the Pakistan Army is Maulana Fazlullah, alsoknown as Mullah Radio for the illegal FM radio channel he operates. Through his FM broadcasts, still operational despite being banned bythe NWFP government, the firebrand keeps inspiring his followers to implement Shariah, fight the Army and establish his authority in thearea. Military authorities have repeatedly alleged that Fazlullah, who has thousands of armed supporters ready to challenge the securityforces on his command, has close links with the Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives. The cleric has already become a household name in Swat,as his Shaheen Commando Force is destroying and occupying government buildings, blowing up police stations, bridges, basic health unitsand hotels and burning girls’ schools.Extending the sphere of their activities aimed at enforcing Shariah, Fazlullah’s acolytes have directedlocal prayer leaders only to focus on the attributes of Jihad in their Friday sermons. They have also banned female education in Swat,besides asking parents of grown-up girls to marry them to militants. He had issued an edict in Dec 2008 to close hundreds of schools by Jan15. The Army is manning several police stations in Swat because the police force there had been decimated by desertions and killings. Thestate writ has shrunk from Swat’s 5,337 square kilometres to the limits of its regional Mingora headquarters, which is a city of just 36 squarekilometres. Some recent media reports say nearly 800 policemen, half of the total sanctioned strength of police in Swat, have eitherdeserted or proceeded on long leave on one pretext or the other. Therefore, the private army raised by Fazlullah literally rules the roost inmost parts of the valley, which is witnessing a dominance of the Wahabi doctrine.The Wahabi followers of Fazlullah are making a statewithin a state in Swat, having already established their own administration on the pattern of the Saudi monarchs, besides creating a privatearmy, equipped with the latest weapons and controlled by the militant leader’s trusted and loyal commanders . They have also establisheda parallel judicial system across the valley dealing with cases of different nature.'
12. Amir Mir gave the following background of Fazlullah:"The rise of Maulana Fazlullah, the man ruling Swat, has been like a roller-coasterride. Fazlullah, a resident of the Imam Dheri area, was born to Biladar Khan, a Pakhtun of Babakarkhel clan of the Yousufzai tribe of thedistrict. Biladar Khan was highly inspired by the TNSM and thus became one of the right-hand men of Maulana Sufi Mohammad. Findinghimself even more devoted to the enforcement of Shariah, the motto of the Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Mohammadi (TNSM), he sent his son, thethen Fazal Hayat, now Fazlullah, to his Madrassa at Qambar in Dir district. This long and equally close association between Sufi and Fazaleventually turned into matrimonial relationship when the young son of Biladar became the son-in-law of the TNSM chief. After SufiMohammad (who had actually formed the TNSM in 1992 after leaving the Jamaat-e-Islami) was awarded life imprisonment in 2002 by ananti-terrorism court on charges of inciting youngsters to illegally cross the Pak-Afghan border to wage a Jihad against the US-led AlliedForces in Afghanistan, Fazlullah made his native village Imam Dheri as TNSM headquarter and got it shifted from Qambar in Dir. Generallyreferred to as the Pakistani Taliban, primarily to distinguish itself from the Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Omar, the TNSM is a militant Wahabiorganisation which has fast emerged in the Malakand division and in the Bajaur Agency as a private army to reckon with. As far as the TNSMorganisational structure is concerned, Fazlullah is assisted by two Shuras, or councils. One is the Ulema Shura with several Swati clericswho advise him on religious policies of the group. Another Shura, which is also called the executive body, is the highest policy-making organof the TNSM, which has a large number of ex-servicemen, including retired commissioned officers, as its members. Always wearing blackturbans, the followers of Fazlullah are also called Black Turbans. He has never had his photograph taken, believing Islam forbids takingpictures of human beings lest it becomes the first step to idol worship. The essence of his agenda is in the motto: “Shariah ya Shahadat(Islamic laws or martyrdom)”.
13. Explaining the impact of the commando raid in the Lal Masjid on the mind of Fazlullah, Amir Mir wrote: "During the July 2007 Lal Masjidoperation against the fanatic Ghazi brothers, Fazlullah came into action against the government forces to avenge the military action. A largenumber of people armed with rifles, Kalashnikovs and small arms started gathering at his Madrassa as he announced it was time to go towar. His announcement that thousands of militants were ready to avenge the attack was followed by a series of suicide assaults on thesecurity forces. As many students belonging to the Red Mosque-linked seminaries were from this area, the Army action generated a wave ofsympathy for Fazlullah’s cause. Most of the anti-government rallies and demonstrations against the Lal Masjid operation were held in thisregion.Soon after the Lal Masjid operation, Fazlullah decided to join hands with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, led by Commander BaitullahMehsud, in a bid to provide an umbrella to all insurgent movements operating in several tribal agencies and settled areas of the NWFP. Since then, Fazlullah and his followers are toeing Baitullah’s line, whether they are issuing a decree, signing a peace deal with thegovernment or scrapping the same. Therefore, it appears by all accounts that the Fazlullah-led militants are working in the same mould asthe fire-spewing clerics of Lal Masjid did: to make Swat hostage to its rigid vision of militant Islam. And remember, the valley is hardly 160kilometres from Islamabad."
14. The second development of concern has been the mushrooming of individual Islamic warlords, who have established control in differentparts of the tribal belt and have been enforcing their own writ in support of some demand or the other. Thus, a group in the Khyber Agencyhas been repeatedly attacking NATO logistics convoys moving to Afgfhanistan from Karachi as they pass through the agency anddisrupting logistics supplies. In response to this, the US-led forces have already started working out alternate routes for logistics suppliesthrough Russia and the Central Asian Republics (CARs). Whether this would provide relief is uncertain because movement of convoys fromthe CARs to southern and eastern Afghanistan would be vulnerable to attacks by the Afghan Neo Taliban headed by Pakistan-based MullaMohamma Omar.
15. The third development of concern is the aggravation of the anti-Shia terrorism indulged in by the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ). While the pastattacks by the LEJ on Shias were caused by sectarian differences, allegations of co-operation of the Shias in the tribal belt with thePakistan Army in its operations against the Sunni TTP became an additional cause for anti-Shia anger. Many Shias in the Pashtun belt havejoined the anti-Taliban Lashkars (militias) set up by the Army. This has led to increased attacks on the Shias not only in the FATA and theNWFP, but also in Punjab and Balochistan. In the latest anti-Shia incident, more than 30 Shias were killed in an explosion in Dera Ghazi Khanin Punjab on February 5,2009.
16.While the Pakistan Army has been playing a more active role against the TTP in the Bajaur and Khyber Agencies and in the Swat Valley, ithas been taking no action against Al Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) in North Waziristanand against the TTP faction led by Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan. The only action against them has so far been from the US in theform of Predator strikes.
17. These gloomy figures should not obscure two positive developments. The first positive development has been that the US is no longergroping in the dark in its Predator operations in the FATA and once or twice in the NWFP. There is a greater flow of human intelligence afternearly seven years of practically nil intelligence. The flow is still inadequate, but much better than what it was till 2007. This would showthat there are elements in the tribal belt, which are prepared to help the US forces provided their identity is protected and their personalsecurity is guaranteed. The US anxiety to ensure this has come in the way of its sharing actionable intelligence with the Pakistani Army andInter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to guard against leaks. This trust deficit between the US intelligence and the ISI in matters relating to thesharing of intelligence has come in the way of joint operations. In an increasing number of instances, Al Qaeda and the TTP have beencapturing and beheading suspected collaborators of the US. Despite this, the flow of intelligence has not stopped
18. My estimate is that only about one-third of the reports received by the US intelligence during 2008 proved to be correct resulting insuccessful Predator strikes. Even these limited successful strikes have dented the middle-level leadership of Al Qaeda operating from thePakistani territory. Citing unidentified ISI officials and an unamed diplomat based in Islamabad, the "Newsweek" has reported that 11 ofthe top 20 “high-value targets” along the Afghan border have been eliminated in the past six months and that since September,2008, 140pro-Islamist officers have been sent out of the ISI. It may be recalled that reportedly under US pressure Lt.Gen.Nadeem Taj was replacedas the ISI chief on September 30,2008, by Lt-Gen.Ahmed Shuja Pasha. It was reported that the US suspected that Taj's was the brain behindthe car bomb explosion outside the Indian Embassy in Kabul in July, 2008, and that some sensitive information which the US intelligenceshared with him was leaked out to the Taliban.
19.Even before the planned surge of the US troops starts, Al Qaeda has started its own surge in Afghanistan. Reliable reports indicate thatforeign Arab volunteers for Al Qaeda----mainly from Saudi Arabia and Yemen--- are no longer going to Iraq. They are now going in their dozensto the Pakistan-Afghanistan region----either directly or via Iran. This has also been corroborated by the Afghan authorities. A Reuters reportof February 4,2009, has quoted the Afghan Defence Minister, Abdul Rahim Wardak, as saying as follows: "There are about 15,000 Talibanfighters in Afghanistan, but their numbers are being swelled by foreign insurgents moving in from Iraq, where violence has fallen after a U.S.troop "surge" and other measures. Since last year, as the result of the success of the surge in Iraq, there has been a flow of foreignterrorists into Afghanistan.There have been engagements in 2008, and in some of these engagements, actually 60 per cent of the total forcewhich we have encountered were foreign fighters."
20. This is the situation , which confronts Obama two weeks after he took over as the President and which is going to confront Holbrooke ashe undertakes his first visit to the region as Obama's Special Representative.While the new Pak-Afghan strategy is still taking shape, someideas of the kind of questions that are being addressed are already available from the testimony of Robert Gates, the Secretary of Defense,before the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 27, 2009, from an interview given by Obama over the NBC Channel on February2,2009, from various statements by senior US military officials regarding the ground situation and from leaked extracts of a strategy paperreportedly prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
21. Some of the questions which have come up are: Has the time come to stop calling the military operation in this region "a war on terror"and instead use some other less provocative (to Muslims) expression? What should be the US objective in this region? Should the objectivebe restricted to neutralising Al Qaeda so that it cannot pose a threat to the US homeland again? Has the time come to abandon grandioseobjectives such as the democratisation and modernisation of the Afghan society? Has the time come to give up projecting thecounter-terrorism operations in ideological terms? How to make Pakistan a more effective and sincere partner in these operations?
22. There is still considerable confusion in the Obama administration about the nature of the ground situation in the region. For example, inhis interview over the NBC Obama did not speak of Al Qaeda sanctuaries in Pakistan. Instead, he spoke of Al Qaeda sanctuaries inAfghanistan and made it appear that it was the situation in Afghanistan which was threatening to destabilise Pakistan and not vice versa.To quote him: “We are not gonna to be able to rebuild Afghanistan into a Jeffersonian democracy.What we can do is make sure that Afghanistan is not a safe haven for al-Qaeda. What we can do is make sure that it is not destabilising neighboring Pakistan, which has “nuclear weapons. "
23. However, there is no confusion in the statements of Pentagon officials. Addressing the Reserve Officers Association at Washington onFebruary 2,2009,Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, said: "We cannot accept that Al Qaeda leadership, which continues toplan against us every single day, has a safe haven in Pakistan and could resume one in Afghanistan."
24. Some analysts see significance in the appointment by Obama of Lt. Gen. Karl W. Eikenberry, described by the New York Times as a"highly unusual choice", as the new US Ambassador to Afghanistan. He had served twice as the US military commander in Afghanistan sincethe US military operations started on Octobrer 7,2001, and reportedly advocates more robust rules of engagement with Al Qaeda andTaliban elements operating from hide-outs in Pakistani territory.
25. Holbrooke is the only civilian in Obama's brains-trust on the region. The rest are all military officers. This would indicate a greater voicefor the military than was the case even under George Bush in policy-making on Afghanistan and Pakistan. How to deal with the jihadicocktail in Pakistan with a melange of anti-US, anti-Israel, anti-India, anti-Afghanistan, anti-Iran, anti-Russia, anti-Uzbekistan and anti-Chinagroups cooperating with each other in fanning the jihadi fire in different directions? That will be the most important question calling for animmediate answer.
26. This cocktail has to be eliminated with or without the co-operation of Pakistan. Pakistani rulers----political or military--- have become adept at exploiting the situation by constantly holding before the eyes of Washington the spectre of a jihadi deluge reaching up to itsnuclear arsenal if the US exercises too much pressure on them to act or cuts down its assistance to them. The time has come to make itclear to the Pakistani rulers that the fears of such a spectre will no longer influence their policy. ( 6-2-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies,Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
( To be read in continuation of my article of January 1,2009, titled "Jihadi Terrorism--- 2008 & 2009: Part II & Last" available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers30/paper2998.html , article dated January 15,2009, titled "Fight Against Pak-SponsoredTerrorism---India Should Not Bank On Obama" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers31/paper3013.html and article dated January28,2009, titled "The Invisible Hyphens In Obama's Policy-Making" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers31/paper3027.html )
Richard Holbrooke, President Barack Obama's special representative for Pakistan and Afghanistan, is scheduled to undertake his first visitto the region from February 9,2009, after attending a security conference at Munich.M.K.Narayanan, India's National Security Adviser, toldKaran Thapar of the CNBC in an interview on February 2, 2009, that he would be meeting Holbrooke in Munich before he came to India. It isnot known whether the expected meeting at Munich materialised and if so what transpired at the meeting.
2.A Reuters' despatch dated February 4,2009, from Washington quoted unnamed US officials as saying that in addition to Pakistan andAfghanistan, Holbrooke would also be visiting India to discuss Afghanistan with Indian officials. The Reuters' report said: "The officials, whospoke on condition that they not be named, stressed that Holbrooke was going to India to discuss Afghanistan and not to mediate theKashmir dispute."
3. Holbrooke's first visit to the region as the Special Representative comes at a time when the new strategy of Obama with regard to themilitary operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghan as well as Pakistani territory is still to take shape. Apart from the decisionsto continue the Predator ( unmanned aircraft of the Central Intelligence Agency) air strikes against suspected Al Qaeda and Taliban targetsin Pakistani territory and to send 30,000 more US troops to Afghanistan in the coming months, no other decision has so far been taken.
4. The grim situation faced by the US in this region from which the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US homeland, the July,2005, terrorist strike inLondon and the July,2006, and the 26/11 (2008) terrorist strikes in Mumbai originated should be evident from the figures mentioned in aquarterly report submitted by the Pentagon to the US Congress on February 2,2009, reviewing the ground situation in Afghanistan. The highlights of the report are:
"The spring and summer of 2008 saw the highest levels of violence in Afghanistan since the US invasion in 2001."
"The Taliban regrouped after its fall from power and has coalesced into a resilient and evolving insurgency."
Between January 1 and December 10, 2008, 132 US personnel in Afghanistan died as the result of hostile action, as against 82 in 2007.
Attacks by the Taliban increased by a third.
Attacks along the country's major highway increased by 37 per cent.
"The security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated in several areas of the country since the previous report" .
The Taliban's surface-to-air fire increased by 67 per cent. Car bombs and attacks in Kabul have also increased.
The Taliban is challenging the Kabul government for control of the south and east of the country, "and increasingly in the west."
5.According to an assessment prepared by the International Council on Security and Development of London in January,2009, the Taliban"now holds a permanent presence in 72 per cent of Afghanistan, up from 54 per cent a year ago." Writing in the issue (dated February9,2009) of the "Newsweek", Fareed Zakaria, its Editor, said: "In 2004, the US Air Force flew 86 strike sorties against targets in Afghanistan.By 2007, the number was up to 2,926—and that doesn't count rocket or cannon fire from helicopters."
6.US Predator strikes on targets in Pakistani territory increased from 10 in 2006 and 2007 combined to over 30 in 2008. The more the airstrikes----whether in Afghan or Pakistani territory--- the more the civilian casualties. The more the civilian casualties, the more the angeragainst the US. The more the anger against the US, the more the volunteers joining the Taliban----- the Afghan as well as the Pakistani--- andthe more the instances of suicide terrorism -----63 in Pakistan as against 56 in 2007 and over 100 in Afghanistan.
7.While exact figures of suicide terrorism during 2008 in Afghanistan are not yet available, exact figures for Pakistan are available from areport of the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), extracts from which were published by the "Daily Times" of Lahore on January21,2009. To quote: "At least 2,267 people were killed and 4,558 injured in at least 2,148 terrorists attacks reported in 2008. At least 967people were killed and 2,108 others injured in 63 suicide attacks in the country during the last year. The NWFP faced 32 suicide attacks inwhich 389 people were killed and 688 injured, Punjab was second with 10 suicide attacks that claimed more than 201 lives and injured 508.Sixteen suicide attacks were reported in FATA due to which 263 people died and 497 were injured. More than 112 people were killed and321 injured in four suicide attacks in Islamabad while one suicide attack was reported in Balochistan in which two people were killed and22 others injured. The report said 381 rocket attacks, 46 incidents of beheading, 112 remote controlled bomb attacks, 110 landmineexplosions, 451 incidents of shooting and 373 blasts by improvised explosives were recorded during 2008. At least 4,113 suspectedterrorists including 30 from Al Qaeda, 3,759 affiliated with Taliban and other such groups, and 354 Baloch insurgents were arrested duringthe year."
8. There were three major developments of concern to the international community during 2008. The first was the consolidation of the holdof the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), now a wing of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan ( TTP), in the Swat Valley of theNorth-West Frontier Province (NWFP). Its name means the Movement For the Enforcement of the IslamicLaws. The TNSM, which is led byMaulana Fazlullah, initially took to arms in August,2007,against the Pakistan Army and the Frontier Corps, a para-military unit consisting ofPashtuns, in protest against the death of a large number of tribal children during the commando raid in the Lal Masjid of Islamabad inJuly,2007. While its anger over the Lal Maasjid raid has subsided, it has maintained its attacks on the Army and the FC in support of itsdemand for the introduction of the Islamic legal system in the Swat Valley. The TNSM, which now controls 80 per cent of the Swat Valley,has set up its own Islamic courts and banned education of girls beyond the fourth standard. Even though the Army went into action againstthe TNSM in October,2007, nearly 16 months after its operatins supported by helicopter gunships started, it has not been able to restore thewrit of the State in the Valley, which is just 160 Kms from Islamabad.
9.Making a statement in the Senate, the upper House of the Pakistan Parliament, on January 29,2009, Rehman Malik, Adviser on InternalSecurity, claimed that five organisations were responsible for the trouble in the Swat Vally. These were the TTP, Al Qaeda,Tanzeem-e-Islami,the Tora Bora Group and the Qari Mushtaq group.According to him, during 2008, about 1,200 civilians and 189 members of the securityforces were killed, 123 government schools and 10 private schools were destroyed and many CD shops and barbers’ salons set ablaze. Hesaid a so-called ‘Taliban court’ had ‘summoned’ 40 people for trial on various offences.There have also been reports that theJaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) of Maulana Masood Azhar is now operating jointly with Al Qaeda and the TTP, but Rehman Malik did not mentionthis. Rashid Rauf, a British citizen of Mirpuri origin, who was related by marriage to Massood Azhar, was killed in a Predator strike on an AlQaeda hide-out. The British suspected him of involvement in the August, 2006, plot to blow up a number of US-bound planes. According toan estimate of the "Dawn" of Karachi (February 5,2009), about 600,000 people have left the valley out of its total population of 1.5 million.
10.Writing in the"News" of January 21,2009, its correspondent Amir Mir quoted a spokesman of the Inter-Services Press RelationsDepartment as saying that the Army has deployed four brigades in Swat. He also quoted a spokesman at the Swat Media Centre (SMC) asstating as follows: "Since Oct 2007, around 15,000 military and paramilitary troops had killed 784 militants in Swat, while the number oftroops martyred during the same period stood at 189.Of the security forces people killed in the operation, 80 belonged to the Army, 61 werepolicemen, 35 staffers of the Frontier Constabulary while the remaining belonged to the Frontier Corps. The militants in Swat had carriedout 165 bomb attacks against the security forces since 2007, which included 17 suicide and 148 remote-controlled attacks. The militantshave destroyed 20 bridges, besides setting ablaze 165 girls schools, 80 video shops and 22 barber shops."
11.Amir Mir gave his own assessment of the situation as follows: "Around 10,000 TTP militants have been pitted against 15,000 Army troopssince Oct 22, 2007, when the operation was officially launched. Leading the charge against the Pakistan Army is Maulana Fazlullah, alsoknown as Mullah Radio for the illegal FM radio channel he operates. Through his FM broadcasts, still operational despite being banned bythe NWFP government, the firebrand keeps inspiring his followers to implement Shariah, fight the Army and establish his authority in thearea. Military authorities have repeatedly alleged that Fazlullah, who has thousands of armed supporters ready to challenge the securityforces on his command, has close links with the Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives. The cleric has already become a household name in Swat,as his Shaheen Commando Force is destroying and occupying government buildings, blowing up police stations, bridges, basic health unitsand hotels and burning girls’ schools.Extending the sphere of their activities aimed at enforcing Shariah, Fazlullah’s acolytes have directedlocal prayer leaders only to focus on the attributes of Jihad in their Friday sermons. They have also banned female education in Swat,besides asking parents of grown-up girls to marry them to militants. He had issued an edict in Dec 2008 to close hundreds of schools by Jan15. The Army is manning several police stations in Swat because the police force there had been decimated by desertions and killings. Thestate writ has shrunk from Swat’s 5,337 square kilometres to the limits of its regional Mingora headquarters, which is a city of just 36 squarekilometres. Some recent media reports say nearly 800 policemen, half of the total sanctioned strength of police in Swat, have eitherdeserted or proceeded on long leave on one pretext or the other. Therefore, the private army raised by Fazlullah literally rules the roost inmost parts of the valley, which is witnessing a dominance of the Wahabi doctrine.The Wahabi followers of Fazlullah are making a statewithin a state in Swat, having already established their own administration on the pattern of the Saudi monarchs, besides creating a privatearmy, equipped with the latest weapons and controlled by the militant leader’s trusted and loyal commanders . They have also establisheda parallel judicial system across the valley dealing with cases of different nature.'
12. Amir Mir gave the following background of Fazlullah:"The rise of Maulana Fazlullah, the man ruling Swat, has been like a roller-coasterride. Fazlullah, a resident of the Imam Dheri area, was born to Biladar Khan, a Pakhtun of Babakarkhel clan of the Yousufzai tribe of thedistrict. Biladar Khan was highly inspired by the TNSM and thus became one of the right-hand men of Maulana Sufi Mohammad. Findinghimself even more devoted to the enforcement of Shariah, the motto of the Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Mohammadi (TNSM), he sent his son, thethen Fazal Hayat, now Fazlullah, to his Madrassa at Qambar in Dir district. This long and equally close association between Sufi and Fazaleventually turned into matrimonial relationship when the young son of Biladar became the son-in-law of the TNSM chief. After SufiMohammad (who had actually formed the TNSM in 1992 after leaving the Jamaat-e-Islami) was awarded life imprisonment in 2002 by ananti-terrorism court on charges of inciting youngsters to illegally cross the Pak-Afghan border to wage a Jihad against the US-led AlliedForces in Afghanistan, Fazlullah made his native village Imam Dheri as TNSM headquarter and got it shifted from Qambar in Dir. Generallyreferred to as the Pakistani Taliban, primarily to distinguish itself from the Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Omar, the TNSM is a militant Wahabiorganisation which has fast emerged in the Malakand division and in the Bajaur Agency as a private army to reckon with. As far as the TNSMorganisational structure is concerned, Fazlullah is assisted by two Shuras, or councils. One is the Ulema Shura with several Swati clericswho advise him on religious policies of the group. Another Shura, which is also called the executive body, is the highest policy-making organof the TNSM, which has a large number of ex-servicemen, including retired commissioned officers, as its members. Always wearing blackturbans, the followers of Fazlullah are also called Black Turbans. He has never had his photograph taken, believing Islam forbids takingpictures of human beings lest it becomes the first step to idol worship. The essence of his agenda is in the motto: “Shariah ya Shahadat(Islamic laws or martyrdom)”.
13. Explaining the impact of the commando raid in the Lal Masjid on the mind of Fazlullah, Amir Mir wrote: "During the July 2007 Lal Masjidoperation against the fanatic Ghazi brothers, Fazlullah came into action against the government forces to avenge the military action. A largenumber of people armed with rifles, Kalashnikovs and small arms started gathering at his Madrassa as he announced it was time to go towar. His announcement that thousands of militants were ready to avenge the attack was followed by a series of suicide assaults on thesecurity forces. As many students belonging to the Red Mosque-linked seminaries were from this area, the Army action generated a wave ofsympathy for Fazlullah’s cause. Most of the anti-government rallies and demonstrations against the Lal Masjid operation were held in thisregion.Soon after the Lal Masjid operation, Fazlullah decided to join hands with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, led by Commander BaitullahMehsud, in a bid to provide an umbrella to all insurgent movements operating in several tribal agencies and settled areas of the NWFP. Since then, Fazlullah and his followers are toeing Baitullah’s line, whether they are issuing a decree, signing a peace deal with thegovernment or scrapping the same. Therefore, it appears by all accounts that the Fazlullah-led militants are working in the same mould asthe fire-spewing clerics of Lal Masjid did: to make Swat hostage to its rigid vision of militant Islam. And remember, the valley is hardly 160kilometres from Islamabad."
14. The second development of concern has been the mushrooming of individual Islamic warlords, who have established control in differentparts of the tribal belt and have been enforcing their own writ in support of some demand or the other. Thus, a group in the Khyber Agencyhas been repeatedly attacking NATO logistics convoys moving to Afgfhanistan from Karachi as they pass through the agency anddisrupting logistics supplies. In response to this, the US-led forces have already started working out alternate routes for logistics suppliesthrough Russia and the Central Asian Republics (CARs). Whether this would provide relief is uncertain because movement of convoys fromthe CARs to southern and eastern Afghanistan would be vulnerable to attacks by the Afghan Neo Taliban headed by Pakistan-based MullaMohamma Omar.
15. The third development of concern is the aggravation of the anti-Shia terrorism indulged in by the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ). While the pastattacks by the LEJ on Shias were caused by sectarian differences, allegations of co-operation of the Shias in the tribal belt with thePakistan Army in its operations against the Sunni TTP became an additional cause for anti-Shia anger. Many Shias in the Pashtun belt havejoined the anti-Taliban Lashkars (militias) set up by the Army. This has led to increased attacks on the Shias not only in the FATA and theNWFP, but also in Punjab and Balochistan. In the latest anti-Shia incident, more than 30 Shias were killed in an explosion in Dera Ghazi Khanin Punjab on February 5,2009.
16.While the Pakistan Army has been playing a more active role against the TTP in the Bajaur and Khyber Agencies and in the Swat Valley, ithas been taking no action against Al Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) in North Waziristanand against the TTP faction led by Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan. The only action against them has so far been from the US in theform of Predator strikes.
17. These gloomy figures should not obscure two positive developments. The first positive development has been that the US is no longergroping in the dark in its Predator operations in the FATA and once or twice in the NWFP. There is a greater flow of human intelligence afternearly seven years of practically nil intelligence. The flow is still inadequate, but much better than what it was till 2007. This would showthat there are elements in the tribal belt, which are prepared to help the US forces provided their identity is protected and their personalsecurity is guaranteed. The US anxiety to ensure this has come in the way of its sharing actionable intelligence with the Pakistani Army andInter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to guard against leaks. This trust deficit between the US intelligence and the ISI in matters relating to thesharing of intelligence has come in the way of joint operations. In an increasing number of instances, Al Qaeda and the TTP have beencapturing and beheading suspected collaborators of the US. Despite this, the flow of intelligence has not stopped
18. My estimate is that only about one-third of the reports received by the US intelligence during 2008 proved to be correct resulting insuccessful Predator strikes. Even these limited successful strikes have dented the middle-level leadership of Al Qaeda operating from thePakistani territory. Citing unidentified ISI officials and an unamed diplomat based in Islamabad, the "Newsweek" has reported that 11 ofthe top 20 “high-value targets” along the Afghan border have been eliminated in the past six months and that since September,2008, 140pro-Islamist officers have been sent out of the ISI. It may be recalled that reportedly under US pressure Lt.Gen.Nadeem Taj was replacedas the ISI chief on September 30,2008, by Lt-Gen.Ahmed Shuja Pasha. It was reported that the US suspected that Taj's was the brain behindthe car bomb explosion outside the Indian Embassy in Kabul in July, 2008, and that some sensitive information which the US intelligenceshared with him was leaked out to the Taliban.
19.Even before the planned surge of the US troops starts, Al Qaeda has started its own surge in Afghanistan. Reliable reports indicate thatforeign Arab volunteers for Al Qaeda----mainly from Saudi Arabia and Yemen--- are no longer going to Iraq. They are now going in their dozensto the Pakistan-Afghanistan region----either directly or via Iran. This has also been corroborated by the Afghan authorities. A Reuters reportof February 4,2009, has quoted the Afghan Defence Minister, Abdul Rahim Wardak, as saying as follows: "There are about 15,000 Talibanfighters in Afghanistan, but their numbers are being swelled by foreign insurgents moving in from Iraq, where violence has fallen after a U.S.troop "surge" and other measures. Since last year, as the result of the success of the surge in Iraq, there has been a flow of foreignterrorists into Afghanistan.There have been engagements in 2008, and in some of these engagements, actually 60 per cent of the total forcewhich we have encountered were foreign fighters."
20. This is the situation , which confronts Obama two weeks after he took over as the President and which is going to confront Holbrooke ashe undertakes his first visit to the region as Obama's Special Representative.While the new Pak-Afghan strategy is still taking shape, someideas of the kind of questions that are being addressed are already available from the testimony of Robert Gates, the Secretary of Defense,before the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 27, 2009, from an interview given by Obama over the NBC Channel on February2,2009, from various statements by senior US military officials regarding the ground situation and from leaked extracts of a strategy paperreportedly prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
21. Some of the questions which have come up are: Has the time come to stop calling the military operation in this region "a war on terror"and instead use some other less provocative (to Muslims) expression? What should be the US objective in this region? Should the objectivebe restricted to neutralising Al Qaeda so that it cannot pose a threat to the US homeland again? Has the time come to abandon grandioseobjectives such as the democratisation and modernisation of the Afghan society? Has the time come to give up projecting thecounter-terrorism operations in ideological terms? How to make Pakistan a more effective and sincere partner in these operations?
22. There is still considerable confusion in the Obama administration about the nature of the ground situation in the region. For example, inhis interview over the NBC Obama did not speak of Al Qaeda sanctuaries in Pakistan. Instead, he spoke of Al Qaeda sanctuaries inAfghanistan and made it appear that it was the situation in Afghanistan which was threatening to destabilise Pakistan and not vice versa.To quote him: “We are not gonna to be able to rebuild Afghanistan into a Jeffersonian democracy.What we can do is make sure that Afghanistan is not a safe haven for al-Qaeda. What we can do is make sure that it is not destabilising neighboring Pakistan, which has “nuclear weapons. "
23. However, there is no confusion in the statements of Pentagon officials. Addressing the Reserve Officers Association at Washington onFebruary 2,2009,Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, said: "We cannot accept that Al Qaeda leadership, which continues toplan against us every single day, has a safe haven in Pakistan and could resume one in Afghanistan."
24. Some analysts see significance in the appointment by Obama of Lt. Gen. Karl W. Eikenberry, described by the New York Times as a"highly unusual choice", as the new US Ambassador to Afghanistan. He had served twice as the US military commander in Afghanistan sincethe US military operations started on Octobrer 7,2001, and reportedly advocates more robust rules of engagement with Al Qaeda andTaliban elements operating from hide-outs in Pakistani territory.
25. Holbrooke is the only civilian in Obama's brains-trust on the region. The rest are all military officers. This would indicate a greater voicefor the military than was the case even under George Bush in policy-making on Afghanistan and Pakistan. How to deal with the jihadicocktail in Pakistan with a melange of anti-US, anti-Israel, anti-India, anti-Afghanistan, anti-Iran, anti-Russia, anti-Uzbekistan and anti-Chinagroups cooperating with each other in fanning the jihadi fire in different directions? That will be the most important question calling for animmediate answer.
26. This cocktail has to be eliminated with or without the co-operation of Pakistan. Pakistani rulers----political or military--- have become adept at exploiting the situation by constantly holding before the eyes of Washington the spectre of a jihadi deluge reaching up to itsnuclear arsenal if the US exercises too much pressure on them to act or cuts down its assistance to them. The time has come to make itclear to the Pakistani rulers that the fears of such a spectre will no longer influence their policy. ( 6-2-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies,Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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