B.RAMAN
President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan, who paid a bilateral visit to China from October 14 to 17,2008, was to return to Pakistan on October17 and go back to Beijing on October 23 to attend the summit of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) being held in Beijing on October 24 and25,2008. It remains to be seen whether he goes back himself as originally scheduled or deputes Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani to attendit.
2. Coinciding with his visit, one of the Chinese engineers kidnapped by the Swat branch of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on August29,2008, reportedly managed to escape from custody and was picked up by a helicopter of the Pakistan Army before the TTP couldre-capture him. However, the other engineer, who also managed to escape, was reportedly re-captured by the TTP before he could bepicked up by the Pakistan Army.
3. This kidnapping incident, coming in the wake of three other incidents directed against Chinese nationals in Pakistan last year, is learnt tohave figured prominently in the one-to-one discussions of Zardari with important Chinese investors and businessmen during which heinvited them to invest more in Pakistan. Among those who called on him were Ma Zhigeng, Chairman of the NORINCO, Zhang Liansheng,Chairman of the Poly Technologies, Liu Minkang, Chairman, Chinese Banking and Regulatory Authority, and Fan Jixiang, President of the Sinohydro.
4.In an interview to the "People's Daily", Zardari claimed that the Chinese business executives, who met him, had expressed no securityconcerns about Pakistan. “I met with heads of many companies and 99.9 per cent told me how secure they were feeling,” he said. He addedthat though Pakistan had some problems, the Government was giving full attention to address the situation. He also said that he wastrying to convince everyone that terrorism was a regional as well as an international problem and that the international community shouldcome forward as Pakistan could not fight it alone. “We are looking towards the world for cooperation in curbing this menace.”
5. Jin Zheping, the Deputy General Manager of the China International Water and Electricity Corporation (CWE), is reported to have assuredZardari that the CWE would invest $1.7 billion for generating low-cost hydel electricity in Pakistan. A memorandum of understanding hasalready been signed for CWE assistance to one hydel project (the Bhasa dam) and CWE assistance for another (the Kohala dam) is undernegotiation.
6. The visit also saw the announcement of Chinese assistance for launching a telecommunication satellite, named PakSat-1R, for Pakistanin 2011. The assistance will be provided by the China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC).
7. Among important Chinese leaders whom Zardari met were President Hu Jintao, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, Jia Qinglin, Chairman of theChinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and Wu Bannguo, Chairman of the National People's Congress. While the atmosphere ofthe visit and meetings had the usual warmth and friendliness marking China-Pakistan bilateral exchanges, in terms of concrete outcome thevisit was not quite satisfactory from the Pakistani point of view.
8. Zardari was expecting three concrete results relating to an immediate Chinese credit to enable Pakistan meet its payment difficulties andavoid default of its international obligations due early next year, a Chinese initiative to get for Pakistan a waiver of the restrictions onnuclear trade from the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) similar to the initiative taken by the US to get a waiver for India and a firm declarationof Chinese interest in the three pending proposals for a petrochemical complex in Gwadar and a railway line and a gas pipeline connectingGwadar with the Xinjiang region of China.
9. Briefing the media after Zardari's meeting with Wen Jiabao on October 16, Qin Gang, a spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Office, said:"As a long friend of Pakistan, China understands it is facing some financial difficulties.We’re ready to support and help Pakistan within ourcapability.” But he did not mention any specific figure of the credit which China would be prepared to extend. China had agreed to provide$500 million in a concessional loan to help Pakistan meet its balance of payment needs in April last.
10.Before Zardari's arrival in Beijing, Masood Khan, Pakistan's Ambassador to China, had claimed that an agreement on civilian nuclearco-operation with China could be reached during the visit. No such agreement figures in the list of agreements signed by the two countriesduring the visit as released by the Xinhua, the Chinese New Agency. (Annexure).
11. It is, however, learnt from reliable sources that while the Chinese reiterated their commitment in principle made to Pervez Musharraf tosupply two more nuclear power stations (Chashmas III and IV ), they avoided any commitment on Pakistan's request for a Chinese initiative to get an NSG waiver. Without such a waiver, Chashmas III and IV would remain non-starters. In view of the expected US opposition to anywaiver till Pakistan allows the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to have Dr.A.Q.Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist, interrogatedby an independent team of investigators on his non-proliferation activities, China is not confident of a waiver in favour of Pakistan till theA.Q. Khan issue is resolved. It reportedly does not want to take any initiative in this matter lest it face an embarrassment if its proposal isrejected by the NSG. The present Government in Pakistan, like the previous Government of Musharraf, is opposed to any IAEA interrogationof Khan. The Chinese are also not very keen on that since Khan knows a lot not only about the proliferation activities of Pakistan, but also ofChina.
12. Farhan Bokhari, the Islamabad correspondent of the CBS News of the US, has reported as follows: "China has privately agreed to followa "step-by-step" approach to fulfilling Pakistan’s aspiration for an expanded nuclear energy program, rather than sign an ambitious civilnuclear program of the kind recently struck between the U.S. and India, senior Pakistani and Western officials said on Thursday (October16). Private discussions are believed to have been held on expanded nuclear cooperation between Pakistan’s president Asif Ali Zardari andChinese leaders during Zardari’s four-day visit to China.A senior Pakistani government official, familiar with discussions between Zardari andChinese officials, claimed Thursday that China had agreed to “consider further nuclear power reactors to fulfill our needs. The relationship(on the nuclear issue) remains intact”. Speaking to CBS News on condition of anonymity, the official added, “there is now a completeunderstanding on our future cooperation”. However, a second Pakistani official who spoke to CBS News on condition of anonymity saidChina is eager to avoid a direct confrontation with the West on its nuclear energy cooperation with Pakistan. “China is not seeking ahead-on clash with anyone. It wants to broaden its relations with Pakistan but without the risk of a stiff U.S. reaction,” said the official. U.S. reluctance to offer a civil nuclear power agreement to Pakistan stems mainly from revelations in 2004 that Abdul Qadeer Khan, thefounder of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, traded nuclear secrets and technology with Iran, Libya and North Korea. Khan hasremained effectively under house arrest since then. Requests from the Western officials, notably the U.S., to interview Khan have all beendenied by the Pakistani government."
13. There was no reference to the pending Gwadar proposals during the visit. The bilateral trade between the two countries touched US$7billion last year ($ 30 billion between India and China). It was agreed that the two countries would try to increase it to US$15 billion by2011.(18-10-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
Text of Pakistan-China joint statement
The following is the text of the joint statement between China and Pakistan issued on October 16, 2008, after the end of the formal talksbetween the leaders of the two countries.
“On the invitation of President Hu Jintao, President Asif Ali Zardari paid a state visit to China on 14-17 October 2008.
President Hu Jintao held talks with President Zardari. Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress,Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council, and Jia Qinglin, Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, met Zardari respectively.
Talks between the two presidents and Zardari’s meetings with other Chinese state leaders were characterized by traditional warmth,friendship and mutual understanding. The two leaders reached broad agreement on strengthening China-Pakistan strategic partnership of co-operation and on international and regional issues of mutual interest under the new circumstances. The Pakistani president also heldwide-ranging discussions with the leaders of Chinese corporations and financials institutions.
The leaders of the two countries reviewed with satisfaction the growth of China-Pakistan relations over the past 57 years since the twocountries established diplomatic ties. They agreed that the friendship between China and Pakistan has withstood the test of time andpractice, notwithstanding changes in the international, regional and domestic environments.
The all-weather friendship and all-round cooperation have become the distinctive features of China-Pakistan relations.
Both sides agreed that it is essential that the two sides make continuous efforts to strengthen good neighbourly relations and friendship,develop mutually beneficial cooperation and deepen strategic partnership of co-operation between China and Pakistan which serves thefundamental interests of the two peoples and contributes to peace and development in the region.
Both sides agreed that the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Good-neighbourly Relations between the People’s Republic of China andthe Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Treaty) signed in April 2005 is of great historic and immediate significance, laying a solid legal foundationfor the long-term, stable and healthy growth of China-Pakistan relations. Both sides decided to abide by the policies and principlesenshrined in the Treaty, earnestly implement the bilateral legal documents signed since the two countries established diplomatic ties andfurther intensify cooperation in the areas of economy, defence, science and technology, people to people contact, thus constantlyadvancing the China-Pakistan strategic partnership of co-operation.
China stressed that Pakistan is China’s good neighbour, close friend, dear brother and trusted partner. China will continue to viewChina-Pakistan relations from a strategic and long-term perspective, and make joint efforts with Pakistan to lift China-Pakistan Strategicpartnership of co-operation to a new high.
Pakistan stressed that Pakistan-China relationship is the cornerstone of its foreign policy, and friendship with China represents the commondesire of all Pakistani people. Pakistan appreciated the strong support and assistance provided by the Government and people of China toPakistan in its economic development. Pakistan remained committed to continuing its policy of friendship towards China and makingunremitting efforts to promote the healthy and steady growth of relations between the two countries.
Pakistan unequivocally upholds the one-China policy and considers Taiwan as an inseparable part of the People’s Republic of China andsupports all efforts made by the Chinese government to realize national reunification.
China appreciated Pakistan’s long-term and staunch support to China on issues concerning China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,reaffirmed its support for Pakistan’s effort to uphold its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and appreciated Pakistan’simportant role in promoting regional peace, stability and security and strengthening international counter-terrorism efforts.
Both sides opposed to all forms of terrorism, extremism and separatism, resolved to co-operate with each other to fight theabove-mentioned three forces. China conveyed its complete support to Pakistan’s commitment and efforts to fight terrorism andappreciated the sacrifices made by the government and people of Pakistan in this regard.
The two sides agreed that economic co-operation is an important part in the strategic partnership between the two countries. The twocountries enjoy great economic complementarity and should fully tap the potential and comprehensively deepen mutually beneficial co-operation in the economic field.
Both sides agreed to fast track the implementation of the Five Year Development Programme on Economic Co-operation and make full useof the Free Trade Agreement in Goods and Investment and Pakistan-China Joint Investment Company. In this regard, they agreed toconvene a meeting of Pakistan-China Economic Co-operation Group under the Five Year Development Programme on Economic Co-operationat an early date. They also agreed to hold the next meeting of the Joint Economic Commission at the convenience of both countries.
Both sides agreed to enhance co-operation to further develop and boost Pakistan’s Mineral and Energy sectors as well as broaden financialand banking sector co-operation. They also agreed to further enhance ‘connectivity’ by developing new communication links including fibreoptic links. They agreed to explore the concept of Integrated Border Management, overland trade and development of trans-bordereconomic zones.
Both sides agreed to maintain communication and co-ordination on major international and regional issues to safeguard their commoninterests. Both sides agreed to continue to co-operate closely on issues such as the reform of the United Nations, climate change andenergy and food security to promote world peace and development.
Zardari offered congratulations to the Chinese government and people on the successful hosting of the Beijing Olympic Games and thesuccessful completion of Shenzhou VII’s mission. Hu Jintao congratulated Zardari on his election as the president of Pakistan and thankedPakistan for its valuable assistance in the wake of the devastating earthquake in Wenchuan, China. He also appreciated Pakistan’s supportto ensure the success of the Beijing Olympics and Paralympics Games. Pakistan applauded the outstanding achievements China has madein the 30 years of reform and opening-up and believes that China’s development will contribute to world peace and prosperity.
Zardari invited Hu Jintao to visit Pakistan once again at his convenience. Chinese president thanked Pakistani president for his kind invitation.
Both sides signed the following agreements and memoranda of understandings (MoUs) during the visit:
1. Agreement on economic and technical co-operation between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Government ofthe People’s Republic of China.
2. Amending protocol to free trade agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the IslamicRepublic of Pakistan.
3. Framework Agreement on co-operation in the field of minerals between the national development and reforms committee of the People’sRepublic of China and the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources of Pakistan.
4. MoU on co-operation between the Ministry of Land Resources of the People’s Republic of China and the Ministry of Petroleum and NaturalResources of Pakistan.
5. Agreement on environmental protection co-operation between the Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People’s Republic of Chinaand the Ministry of Environment of Pakistan.
6. Framework agreement for co-operation in the field of radio and television between the state administration of radio, film and television,Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of the Islamic Republic ofPakistan.
7. Paksat-1R satellite procurement contract by and between China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) and Pakistan Space and UpperAtmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO).
8. MoU on scientific collaboration in agricultural research and technical co-operation between Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciencesand Agricultural Research Council of Pakistan.
9. Agreement on properties exchange between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China and the Ministry of ForeignAffairs of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
10. Co-operation agreement between Beijing Museum of Natural History of the People’s Republic of China and the Museum of Natural Historyof the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
11. MoU on co-operation between the cricket association of the People’s Republic of China and the Cricket Board of the Islamic Republic ofPakistan.
12. MoU regarding the project of x-ray container and vehicle inspection system between NUCTECH Company Limited, Tsinghua University,the Ministry of Education of the Peoples Republic of China and the Ministry of Interior of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
Friday, October 17, 2008
Tuesday, October 14, 2008
TALIBAN'S SHADOW OVER ZARDARI'S CHINA VISIT
B.RAMAN
President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan is leaving Islamabad on October 14,2008, on an official visit to China. Thereafter, he will be attending the Asia Europe Summit, whis is being hosted by China this year before returning home. He is to meet Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in the margins of the summit for bilateral discussions during which he is expected to take up, inter alia, Pakistani allegations of a decrease in the supply of water from the Chenab river by India. There have been complaints in Pakistan that its farmers have been affected because of the alleged diversion of the waters by India to fill up the reservoir of the Baglihar hydel power station in Jammu & Kashmir, which was inaugurated by Manmohan Singh last week.
2.The fact that Zardari’s first bilateral visit as the President has been to China has been highlighted by spokesmen of both the countries as indicative of the continuing importance attached by Pakistan to its relations with China. Zardari has said that he intended visiting China every three months to learn from the Chinese development experience.
3.Pakistan’s efforts to have the two Chinese engineers kidnapped by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on August 29,2008, released before Zardari’s visit have not succeeded. These engineers are believed to be in the custody of the TTP in the Swat Valley of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). They were working in a project of a Chinese mobile telephone company in the Dir District of the NWFP. The TTP has been demanding, inter alia, the release of its members in the custody of the Pakistani authorities. The Pakistani authorities have not agreed to this. Nor have they been able to mount an operation to rescue them. This incident, coming in the wake three other instances last year of targeted attacks on Chinese nationals working in Pakistan, have added to the concerns of the Chinese authorities regarding the security of their personnel working in Pakistan. This is one of the subjects, which the Chinese are expected to take up with Zardari.
4.Of major interest to Pakistan is the possibility of Chinese assistance in helping Pakistan acquire a waiver of the restrictions on nuclear trade with it by the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG), similar to the waiver granted to India by the NSG at the instance of the US on September 5,2008. Before the visit of President Hu Jintao to India and Pakistan in November 2006, the then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf had taken up with China the question of Chinese assistance for the construction of more nuclear power stations in Pakistan.
5. China has already supplied one 300 MW nuclear power station to Pakistan named Chashma I. This is already functioning. A second power station named Chashma II, also of 300 MW, is presently under construction. The NSG restrictions did not apply to them. It has reportedly agreed in principle to supply two more to be named Chashma III and Chashma IV, provided the NSG grants a waiver to Pakistan from the restrictions. Zardari is expected to discuss with the Chinese the adoption of the same procedure as was followed by the US and India, with China taking the initiative for getting a waiver from the NSG. The problem will be whether the US would be willing to support a waiver in view of Pakistan’s continuing unwillingness to allow the interrogation of Dr.A.Q.Khan, its nuclear scientist involved in nuclear proliferation to North Korea, iran and Libya, by a team of investigators of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at Vienna.
6. The other major issue that would come up for discussion relates to the Gwadar commercial port on the Makran Coast in Balochistan constructed by China and already handed over to Pakistan. Musharraf was keen that the Chinese should construct a petrochemical complex at Gwadar and a gas pipeline and a railway line connecting Gwadar with the Xinjiang province of China. The idea was this would enable China to use the port for its external trade from western China and also get some of its gas tankers to Gwadar and from there have the gas taken by the proposed pipeline to Xinjiang.
7. It is more than a year since the Gwadar port was commissioned by Musharraf. Its performance has been disappointing. It has been reported that only one ocean-going ship used it during its first year. The poor security situation in the area due to the activities of the Baloch freedom-fighters of the Baloch Liberation Army and the failure of the Pakistani engineers to construct in time the road and other infrastructure connecting Gwadar with the rest of Pakistan have come in the way of the port taking off. The expectations that some of the ocean-going trade could be diverted from Karachi to Gwadar have been belied so far. Shippers and businessmen continue to prefer Karachi in spite of the delays in cargo handling there because of the better security situation there and the better infrastructure connecting Karachi with the rest of the country.
8.Till now, the Chinese have not shown much enthusiasm for the proposals for the construction of a petrochemical complex, a pipeline and a railway line. One reason for their lack of enthusiasm is the poor security situation in Balochistan. Another reason is the poor security situation in Xinjiang due to the activities of the Uighur militants. Till the security situation improves in Xinjiang, the Chinese are reported to be not too keen to encourage too much trans-border movement with Pakistan. Moreover, it has been reported that the Chinese have not been convinced of the economic viability of these proposals. In the meanwhile, Pakistan has been trying to make the Chinese take interest in the extension of the proposed Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline to Xinjiang, if India continues to drag its feet on the project. (14-10-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
.taliban's
President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan is leaving Islamabad on October 14,2008, on an official visit to China. Thereafter, he will be attending the Asia Europe Summit, whis is being hosted by China this year before returning home. He is to meet Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in the margins of the summit for bilateral discussions during which he is expected to take up, inter alia, Pakistani allegations of a decrease in the supply of water from the Chenab river by India. There have been complaints in Pakistan that its farmers have been affected because of the alleged diversion of the waters by India to fill up the reservoir of the Baglihar hydel power station in Jammu & Kashmir, which was inaugurated by Manmohan Singh last week.
2.The fact that Zardari’s first bilateral visit as the President has been to China has been highlighted by spokesmen of both the countries as indicative of the continuing importance attached by Pakistan to its relations with China. Zardari has said that he intended visiting China every three months to learn from the Chinese development experience.
3.Pakistan’s efforts to have the two Chinese engineers kidnapped by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on August 29,2008, released before Zardari’s visit have not succeeded. These engineers are believed to be in the custody of the TTP in the Swat Valley of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). They were working in a project of a Chinese mobile telephone company in the Dir District of the NWFP. The TTP has been demanding, inter alia, the release of its members in the custody of the Pakistani authorities. The Pakistani authorities have not agreed to this. Nor have they been able to mount an operation to rescue them. This incident, coming in the wake three other instances last year of targeted attacks on Chinese nationals working in Pakistan, have added to the concerns of the Chinese authorities regarding the security of their personnel working in Pakistan. This is one of the subjects, which the Chinese are expected to take up with Zardari.
4.Of major interest to Pakistan is the possibility of Chinese assistance in helping Pakistan acquire a waiver of the restrictions on nuclear trade with it by the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG), similar to the waiver granted to India by the NSG at the instance of the US on September 5,2008. Before the visit of President Hu Jintao to India and Pakistan in November 2006, the then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf had taken up with China the question of Chinese assistance for the construction of more nuclear power stations in Pakistan.
5. China has already supplied one 300 MW nuclear power station to Pakistan named Chashma I. This is already functioning. A second power station named Chashma II, also of 300 MW, is presently under construction. The NSG restrictions did not apply to them. It has reportedly agreed in principle to supply two more to be named Chashma III and Chashma IV, provided the NSG grants a waiver to Pakistan from the restrictions. Zardari is expected to discuss with the Chinese the adoption of the same procedure as was followed by the US and India, with China taking the initiative for getting a waiver from the NSG. The problem will be whether the US would be willing to support a waiver in view of Pakistan’s continuing unwillingness to allow the interrogation of Dr.A.Q.Khan, its nuclear scientist involved in nuclear proliferation to North Korea, iran and Libya, by a team of investigators of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at Vienna.
6. The other major issue that would come up for discussion relates to the Gwadar commercial port on the Makran Coast in Balochistan constructed by China and already handed over to Pakistan. Musharraf was keen that the Chinese should construct a petrochemical complex at Gwadar and a gas pipeline and a railway line connecting Gwadar with the Xinjiang province of China. The idea was this would enable China to use the port for its external trade from western China and also get some of its gas tankers to Gwadar and from there have the gas taken by the proposed pipeline to Xinjiang.
7. It is more than a year since the Gwadar port was commissioned by Musharraf. Its performance has been disappointing. It has been reported that only one ocean-going ship used it during its first year. The poor security situation in the area due to the activities of the Baloch freedom-fighters of the Baloch Liberation Army and the failure of the Pakistani engineers to construct in time the road and other infrastructure connecting Gwadar with the rest of Pakistan have come in the way of the port taking off. The expectations that some of the ocean-going trade could be diverted from Karachi to Gwadar have been belied so far. Shippers and businessmen continue to prefer Karachi in spite of the delays in cargo handling there because of the better security situation there and the better infrastructure connecting Karachi with the rest of the country.
8.Till now, the Chinese have not shown much enthusiasm for the proposals for the construction of a petrochemical complex, a pipeline and a railway line. One reason for their lack of enthusiasm is the poor security situation in Balochistan. Another reason is the poor security situation in Xinjiang due to the activities of the Uighur militants. Till the security situation improves in Xinjiang, the Chinese are reported to be not too keen to encourage too much trans-border movement with Pakistan. Moreover, it has been reported that the Chinese have not been convinced of the economic viability of these proposals. In the meanwhile, Pakistan has been trying to make the Chinese take interest in the extension of the proposed Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline to Xinjiang, if India continues to drag its feet on the project. (14-10-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
.taliban's
Saturday, October 11, 2008
SEVEN YEARS OF OP ENDURING FREEDOM: NO LIGHT YET
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--- PAPER NO.455
B.RAMAN
A bleeding stalemate on the ground in Afghanistan, a bleeding Pakistan tottering towards a possible collapse of the State and a total policy confusion in the corridors of power in Washington DC and other NATO capitals.
2. That has been the outcome of seven years of Operation Enduring Freedom, which was launched by the US on October 7,2001, in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist strikes by Al Qaeda in the US.
3.In Afghanistan, the US and the other NATO forces and the Afghan National Army (ANA) control Kabul, the Capital, and other major towns and the Neo Taliban, resurrected from the pre-10/7 Taliban , controls the rural areas. Neither is in a position to dislodge the other from the areas controlled by it, but each is able to inflict bloody casualties on the other--- the US and other NATO forces through the use of heavy artillery and air strikes and the Taliban through weapons of Pakistani origin and through the inexhaustible flow of suicide terrorists.
4.In Pakistan, a Pakistan-version of the Taliban called the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has arisen post-2002 and has been operating in tandem with the remnants of Al Qaeda, including Osama bin Laden and his No.2 Ayman al-Zawahiri, who are now reported to be based in the North Waziristan area of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). It is a coalition of jihadis, which has been operating in the FATA and in the Swat Valley of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP)---- Afghan Pashtuns, Pakistani Pashtuns and Punjabis, Uzbeks of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), Chechens of the 1980s vintage who had deserted from the Soviet Army, Uighurs of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement in the Xinjiang province of China and Muslims of different ethnicities from the Muslim immigrant diaspora in the West----jihadis of Pakistani origin from the UK, Spain and Denmark, Turks and Uighurs from Germany and some others.
5. The post-2002 Pakistani version of the Taliban has proved to be even more deadly than its Afghan counterpart. The Pakistani Taliban carried out 56 attacks of suicide terrorism in the tribal and non tribal areas in 2007 and it has already carried out 40 so far this year. The number is just one-third of what the Afghan Taliban has carried out, but strategically more significant and deadly----- attacking carefully chosen military and intelligence targets in heavily-protected cities and cantonments----even in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, where the General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army are located.
6. In the "News" of October 10, 2008, Dr Muzaffar Iqbal, a Pakistani analyst, wrote: "With an average of three suicide attacks per week in which at least thirty persons die, there will be 1,560 dead Pakistanis within a year. Add to this approximately 15 "extremists" being killed daily in the northern region, and we have a total of 7,035 dead. Further: for every hamlet, village, and hideout bombed, and with every "extremist" killed, we have an average of ten families displaced. So within a year, northern Pakistan will be a huge graveyard and there will be several thousand internally displaced persons living in makeshift camps in the rest of the country. In addition, there will be thousands of emotionally and mentally unstable persons available to anyone who can convince them that life is not worth living anymore, so come on and die for this or that cause. The net result will be an escalation of violence in all parts of the country and the spiral of violence and death reaching all corners of the country. How did we get here? "
7. A more difficult question engaging the attention of military commanders and policy-makers of the NATO countries is---- is a mid-course correction necessary and how to carry it out? Senior military officers of the NATO have started telling their policy-makers that the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan is unwinnable. Better make a deal with the Taliban to bring the war to an honourable end where there will be neither winners nor losers. However, they are not yet saying that the war against the Taliban in Pakistan is unwinnable. They think that if the Pakistan Army steadily maintains its present offensive in the tribal belt with discreet air support from US Drones (pilotless planes), the TTP can still be defeated.
8. It is a policy nightmare. What one has been seeing in the Pashtun tribal belt on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghan border is three wars in one---- against the Afghan Neo Taliban, against the Pakistani Taliban and against Al Qaeda. The war against the Afghan Taliban is not vital for the security of the West and for preventing new terrorist strikes in the West. No Afghan Pashtun has ever travelled outside his country to indulge in an act of terrorism in foreign territory. The Afghan Pashtuns, who never indulged in suicide terrorism in the past, look upon their present fight against the US and other NATO forces and their wave of suicide terrorism as part of their resistance struggle against the occupation of their country by foreign forces. They are just not interested in another 9/11 in the US homeland or another Madrid or London or Bali or Mumbai.
9. The war against Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban is vital for the security of the rest of the world, including the US, other NATO countries, India, China, Russia and the Central Asian Republics. The tribals, whom the Pakistani Army used in Jammu & Kashmir in 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and 1999, were brought from the FATA. Many of the jihadis, who had indulged in acts of terrorism in different parts of the world after 2001, were trained in the training camps of Al Qaeda and its allies in the FATA. If the Pakistani Taliban and Al Qaeda are not defeated, the world will have to live constantly under the fear of another 9/11 or another Madrid or London or Bali or Mumbai.
10. Is it possible to reach a separate peace with the Afghan Taliban, while continuing the war against Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban? The US is in the forefront of the war against the Afghan Taliban. It can take a decision, whether to continue fighting or whether to reach a peace and, if so, under what terms.The outcome of the war against Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban depends more on the sincerity and willingness of the Pakistani security forces to fight the war to the finish, with US assistance. It is the Pakistan Army, which has to be in the forefront of this war. It has been fighting sporadically and with varying spells of intensity, but the determination to win the war is not there.
11. Just as US officers have come to the conclusion that the war against the Afghan Taliban is unwinnable and hence calls for a mix of the military and political approaches, the Pakistani officers too are coming to the conclusion that the war against the TTP is unwinnable on the ground and hence a different approach is called for in order to protect their population and security forces from the wave of suicide terrorism.
12. Is it possible to make peace with the Taliban on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghan border without weakening the war against the FATA-based Al Qaeda? With whome to negotiate? On the Afghan side, there are two vintages of the Taliban---the pre 10/7 vintage, which consists essentially of the political advisers of Mulla Mohammad Omar, the Amir, before 10/7 and the post-2002 vintage which consists of the remnants of the pre-10/7 commanders such as Jalalludin Haqqani and his son Serjuddin and the new commanders who have come to the fore in the recent fighting. The recent interactions between the representatives of the Government of Hamid Karzai and the Taliban under the auspices of the King of Saudi Arabia in Saudi Arabia during September were essentially with the Taliban of the pre-10/7 vintage.
13. Among those who reportedly attended the dinner were Mullah Muhammad Ghaus, a former Foreign Minister under the Taliban Government, Abdel Hakim Mujahed, former unofficial Taliban representative in the United Nations, Abdul Salaam Hashimi, former director of finance of the Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Heckmatyar, Maulvi Arsala Rahmani, a former Deputy Minister, Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil, another former Foreign Minister, and Mullah Abdul Salaam Zaif, former Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan. The influence of these leaders on Mulla Omar was limited even before 10/7. Before 10/7, the Saudi Intelligence had repeatedly tried through them to persuade Mulla Omar to hand over bin Laden to Saudi Arabia in order to avoid an American military strike. They could not succeed. Some of them were either captured by the Americans or surrendered to them after the war began and were in US custody for some months before they were released. They are, therefore, viewed with suspicion by the Taliban commanders.
14. Moreover, the US and other NATO forces may want a political face-saving because they are not doing well in the fighting, but why should the Taliban Commanders want one when they think they are winning? The same is the situation on the Pakistan side of the border. The TTP thinks it is doing well against the Pakistani security forces. Why should it agree to a compromise without achieving its objective?
15.Gen . David Petraeus, who was till recently the Commander of the US forces in Iraq, is shortly taking over as the Commander of the US Central Command. In that capacity, he will be responsible for the strategy in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. In Iraq, he successfully drove a wedge between the secular Iraqi resistance fighters and the Wahabised Arab terrorists of Al Qaeda. There is a talk that he might try a similar approach in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region by driving a wedge between the Taliban on both sides of the border and the Al Qaeda remnants. He succeeded in Iraq because the former Baathists of Saddam Hussein's Army, who constituted the resistance fighters, were secular and did not like the Wahabised Al Qaeda. But, in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, Wahabism provides the binding ties which strongly unite the Talibans with Al Qaeda. They all feel that the future of Islam is going to be decided in the fight against the US-led NATO forces. They have two common objectives--- the defeat and withdrawal of the NATO forces and the proclamation of an Islamic sharia-based rule in the entire region. So long as these objectives unite them, the Talibans are unlikely to agree to separate peace with the NATO forces. Media reports of a split between the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda have not been substantiated.
16. Unless and until the US is able to hunt down and kill at least bin Laden, Zawahiri and Mulla Omar, there is unlikely to be a change in the ground situation. Instead of nursing illusions of engineering a split between Al Qaeda and the Taliban and negotiating a separate peace with the Taliban, the US should focus on eliminating the Al Qaeda leadership. That was the main objective of Op Enduring Freedom and that should continue to be its main objective. (11-10-08)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
A bleeding stalemate on the ground in Afghanistan, a bleeding Pakistan tottering towards a possible collapse of the State and a total policy confusion in the corridors of power in Washington DC and other NATO capitals.
2. That has been the outcome of seven years of Operation Enduring Freedom, which was launched by the US on October 7,2001, in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist strikes by Al Qaeda in the US.
3.In Afghanistan, the US and the other NATO forces and the Afghan National Army (ANA) control Kabul, the Capital, and other major towns and the Neo Taliban, resurrected from the pre-10/7 Taliban , controls the rural areas. Neither is in a position to dislodge the other from the areas controlled by it, but each is able to inflict bloody casualties on the other--- the US and other NATO forces through the use of heavy artillery and air strikes and the Taliban through weapons of Pakistani origin and through the inexhaustible flow of suicide terrorists.
4.In Pakistan, a Pakistan-version of the Taliban called the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has arisen post-2002 and has been operating in tandem with the remnants of Al Qaeda, including Osama bin Laden and his No.2 Ayman al-Zawahiri, who are now reported to be based in the North Waziristan area of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). It is a coalition of jihadis, which has been operating in the FATA and in the Swat Valley of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP)---- Afghan Pashtuns, Pakistani Pashtuns and Punjabis, Uzbeks of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), Chechens of the 1980s vintage who had deserted from the Soviet Army, Uighurs of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement in the Xinjiang province of China and Muslims of different ethnicities from the Muslim immigrant diaspora in the West----jihadis of Pakistani origin from the UK, Spain and Denmark, Turks and Uighurs from Germany and some others.
5. The post-2002 Pakistani version of the Taliban has proved to be even more deadly than its Afghan counterpart. The Pakistani Taliban carried out 56 attacks of suicide terrorism in the tribal and non tribal areas in 2007 and it has already carried out 40 so far this year. The number is just one-third of what the Afghan Taliban has carried out, but strategically more significant and deadly----- attacking carefully chosen military and intelligence targets in heavily-protected cities and cantonments----even in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, where the General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army are located.
6. In the "News" of October 10, 2008, Dr Muzaffar Iqbal, a Pakistani analyst, wrote: "With an average of three suicide attacks per week in which at least thirty persons die, there will be 1,560 dead Pakistanis within a year. Add to this approximately 15 "extremists" being killed daily in the northern region, and we have a total of 7,035 dead. Further: for every hamlet, village, and hideout bombed, and with every "extremist" killed, we have an average of ten families displaced. So within a year, northern Pakistan will be a huge graveyard and there will be several thousand internally displaced persons living in makeshift camps in the rest of the country. In addition, there will be thousands of emotionally and mentally unstable persons available to anyone who can convince them that life is not worth living anymore, so come on and die for this or that cause. The net result will be an escalation of violence in all parts of the country and the spiral of violence and death reaching all corners of the country. How did we get here? "
7. A more difficult question engaging the attention of military commanders and policy-makers of the NATO countries is---- is a mid-course correction necessary and how to carry it out? Senior military officers of the NATO have started telling their policy-makers that the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan is unwinnable. Better make a deal with the Taliban to bring the war to an honourable end where there will be neither winners nor losers. However, they are not yet saying that the war against the Taliban in Pakistan is unwinnable. They think that if the Pakistan Army steadily maintains its present offensive in the tribal belt with discreet air support from US Drones (pilotless planes), the TTP can still be defeated.
8. It is a policy nightmare. What one has been seeing in the Pashtun tribal belt on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghan border is three wars in one---- against the Afghan Neo Taliban, against the Pakistani Taliban and against Al Qaeda. The war against the Afghan Taliban is not vital for the security of the West and for preventing new terrorist strikes in the West. No Afghan Pashtun has ever travelled outside his country to indulge in an act of terrorism in foreign territory. The Afghan Pashtuns, who never indulged in suicide terrorism in the past, look upon their present fight against the US and other NATO forces and their wave of suicide terrorism as part of their resistance struggle against the occupation of their country by foreign forces. They are just not interested in another 9/11 in the US homeland or another Madrid or London or Bali or Mumbai.
9. The war against Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban is vital for the security of the rest of the world, including the US, other NATO countries, India, China, Russia and the Central Asian Republics. The tribals, whom the Pakistani Army used in Jammu & Kashmir in 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and 1999, were brought from the FATA. Many of the jihadis, who had indulged in acts of terrorism in different parts of the world after 2001, were trained in the training camps of Al Qaeda and its allies in the FATA. If the Pakistani Taliban and Al Qaeda are not defeated, the world will have to live constantly under the fear of another 9/11 or another Madrid or London or Bali or Mumbai.
10. Is it possible to reach a separate peace with the Afghan Taliban, while continuing the war against Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban? The US is in the forefront of the war against the Afghan Taliban. It can take a decision, whether to continue fighting or whether to reach a peace and, if so, under what terms.The outcome of the war against Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban depends more on the sincerity and willingness of the Pakistani security forces to fight the war to the finish, with US assistance. It is the Pakistan Army, which has to be in the forefront of this war. It has been fighting sporadically and with varying spells of intensity, but the determination to win the war is not there.
11. Just as US officers have come to the conclusion that the war against the Afghan Taliban is unwinnable and hence calls for a mix of the military and political approaches, the Pakistani officers too are coming to the conclusion that the war against the TTP is unwinnable on the ground and hence a different approach is called for in order to protect their population and security forces from the wave of suicide terrorism.
12. Is it possible to make peace with the Taliban on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghan border without weakening the war against the FATA-based Al Qaeda? With whome to negotiate? On the Afghan side, there are two vintages of the Taliban---the pre 10/7 vintage, which consists essentially of the political advisers of Mulla Mohammad Omar, the Amir, before 10/7 and the post-2002 vintage which consists of the remnants of the pre-10/7 commanders such as Jalalludin Haqqani and his son Serjuddin and the new commanders who have come to the fore in the recent fighting. The recent interactions between the representatives of the Government of Hamid Karzai and the Taliban under the auspices of the King of Saudi Arabia in Saudi Arabia during September were essentially with the Taliban of the pre-10/7 vintage.
13. Among those who reportedly attended the dinner were Mullah Muhammad Ghaus, a former Foreign Minister under the Taliban Government, Abdel Hakim Mujahed, former unofficial Taliban representative in the United Nations, Abdul Salaam Hashimi, former director of finance of the Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Heckmatyar, Maulvi Arsala Rahmani, a former Deputy Minister, Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil, another former Foreign Minister, and Mullah Abdul Salaam Zaif, former Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan. The influence of these leaders on Mulla Omar was limited even before 10/7. Before 10/7, the Saudi Intelligence had repeatedly tried through them to persuade Mulla Omar to hand over bin Laden to Saudi Arabia in order to avoid an American military strike. They could not succeed. Some of them were either captured by the Americans or surrendered to them after the war began and were in US custody for some months before they were released. They are, therefore, viewed with suspicion by the Taliban commanders.
14. Moreover, the US and other NATO forces may want a political face-saving because they are not doing well in the fighting, but why should the Taliban Commanders want one when they think they are winning? The same is the situation on the Pakistan side of the border. The TTP thinks it is doing well against the Pakistani security forces. Why should it agree to a compromise without achieving its objective?
15.Gen . David Petraeus, who was till recently the Commander of the US forces in Iraq, is shortly taking over as the Commander of the US Central Command. In that capacity, he will be responsible for the strategy in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. In Iraq, he successfully drove a wedge between the secular Iraqi resistance fighters and the Wahabised Arab terrorists of Al Qaeda. There is a talk that he might try a similar approach in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region by driving a wedge between the Taliban on both sides of the border and the Al Qaeda remnants. He succeeded in Iraq because the former Baathists of Saddam Hussein's Army, who constituted the resistance fighters, were secular and did not like the Wahabised Al Qaeda. But, in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, Wahabism provides the binding ties which strongly unite the Talibans with Al Qaeda. They all feel that the future of Islam is going to be decided in the fight against the US-led NATO forces. They have two common objectives--- the defeat and withdrawal of the NATO forces and the proclamation of an Islamic sharia-based rule in the entire region. So long as these objectives unite them, the Talibans are unlikely to agree to separate peace with the NATO forces. Media reports of a split between the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda have not been substantiated.
16. Unless and until the US is able to hunt down and kill at least bin Laden, Zawahiri and Mulla Omar, there is unlikely to be a change in the ground situation. Instead of nursing illusions of engineering a split between Al Qaeda and the Taliban and negotiating a separate peace with the Taliban, the US should focus on eliminating the Al Qaeda leadership. That was the main objective of Op Enduring Freedom and that should continue to be its main objective. (11-10-08)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, October 10, 2008
RENEWED SUPPORT FOR SRI LANKAN TAMIL CAUSE IN TAMIL NADU
B.RAMAN
There have been signs of renewed support for the cause of the Sri Lankan Tamils across the political spectrum in Tamil Nadu, except from the Congress (I), which continues to adopt an ambivalent attitude. This support has come not only from the traditional supporters of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), but also from other parties such as the ruling Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) of M.Karunanidhi and J.Jayalalitha of the Anna DMK, the main opposition party. Even the Tamil Nadu branch of the Communist Party of India (CPI) has come out in support of the Sri Lankan Tamils.
2.Karunanidhi, who is generally not given to using strong or emotional language, has given emotional expression to his anguish over what he perceives as the continuing policy of the Government of Mahinda Rajapaksa of suppressing the Tamils. He has conveyed his concerns to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and stressed upon him the need to take up the matter strongly with Rajapaksa in order to stress upon him the importance of finding a political solution to the problems of the Tamils. He has convened an all-party meeting in Chennai on October 14,2008, to work out a common political approach to the Government of India.Jayalalitha has expressed her support to the right of self-determination of the Sri Lankan Tamils, but made it clear at the same time that her support to the Tamil cause should not be misconstrued to mean any change in her policy of strong opposition to the LTTE as a terrorist organisation.
3. It would be incorrect to view this renewed support as dictated by electoral considerations in view of the elections to the Lok Sabha which are expected in the next few months. Despite the increasing concern in Tamil Nadu over what is perceived as the anti-Tamil policies of the Rajapaksa Government, the Sri Lankan Tamil issue is unlikely to play any role in influencing the voters. Economic and internal security issues are likely to play a predominant role in the elections .
4. It would be equally incorrect for the LTTE leadership to view this as indicating a softening of the hostility to the LTTE after its role in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in May,1991. The attitude towards an LTTE led by Prabhakaran continues to be as negative as it has always been since 1991. Any wishful-thinking by Prabhakaran that he and others who were responsible for the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi are likely to be rehabilitated in the eyes of vast sections of the people of Tamil Nadu, who are now hostile to them, will be belied. All political leaders except some die-hard supporters of the LTTE, who have taken up the cause of the Sri Lankan Tamils with the Government of India, have made it clear that their support is for the cause of the Sri Lankan Tamils and not for the LTTE headed by Prabhakaran.
5. The LTTE has been gratified by this renewed support for the Tamil cause and has been playing it up. However, there is no evidence to show that either the LTTE or its supporters in Tamil Nadu, who are in a small minority, had any role in this renewed support. This support has been triggered off spontaneously by heightened concerns over the policies of the Rajapaksa Government and by the statements of some officials serving under him such as Lt.Gen.Sarath Fonseka, the Chief of the Sri Lankan Army, Gothbaya Rajapakse, his brother, who is also the Defence Secretary, and Rohitha Bogollagama, the Foreign Minister, as well as by sorrow over what is perceived in Tamil Nadu as the double-faced policy of the Government of India on the plight of the Sri Lankan Tamils and over the lack of interest shown by Manmohan Singh in taking up the issue more vigorously with the Rajapaksa Government.
6. The continuing use of indiscriminate air strikes by the Rajapaksa Government against the Tamil civilian population in order to intimidate it into stop supporting the LTTE has come in for strong criticism. The closing of the doors by it for a political solution reached through talks with the LTTE has added to the anger in Tamil Nadu against the Rajapaksa Government. As the Sri Lankan Army presses its offensive to re-capture the territory still under the control of the LTTE in the Northern Province, increasingly disturbing statements have been coming from officials such as Fonseka highlighting the rights of the Sinhalese majority and playing down the legitimate rights of the Tamil minority. All these developments have caused concern in Tamil Nadu that under the pretext of crushing the LTTE as a terrorist organisation, the Rajapaksa Government, whose policies are seen as largely influenced by Sinhalese hawks, is seeking to crush the Tamils as a community by exploiting the favourable ground situation and the lack of interest in the international community in the developments in Sri Lanka. Very few in Tamil Nadu take seriously the assurances of Rajapaksa that after neutralising the LTTE as a terrorist organisation, his Government will initiate political measures for meeting the legitimate aspirations of the Tamil people.
7. At the same time, there has been a perceptible disenchantment in Tamil Nadu over what is seen as the lack of interest shown by Manmohan Singh in the problems of the Sri Lankan Tamils. He is being compared unfavourably with Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, who took a keen interest in the problems of the Tamils and did not hesitate to take up the matter strongly with the Governments then in power in Colombo. This disenchantment has turned into shock following reports of two Indian radar technicians being injured when two planes of the LTTE's air wing bombed on September 9, 2008, a Sri Lankan military base in Vavuniya, which has been co-ordinating the military operations against the LTTE.
8. The Government of India had repeatedly assured the Government of Tamil Nadu that it would give only non-lethal military equipment to the Sri Lankan Armed Forces, which could not be used in offensive operations against the LTTE. It had justified its supply of radars to the Sri Lankan Air Force on the ground that these radars were meant for use to protect strategic targets in Colombo against LTTE air strikes. There was initial opposition in Tamil Nadu's political circles to the supply of even the radars, but ultimately they were reconciled to it.
9. The information that the radars supplied by the Government of India were actually being used in the frontline areas and that two Indian technicians were helping the SLAF in their maintenance added to the concerns in Tamil Nadu and created a suspicion that New Delhi was not telling the truth to the Government of Tamil Nadu about the extent of the Indian assistance to the Sri Lankan Armed Forces in their operations against the LTTE.
10. The fact that despite the entreaties of Karunanidhi, who has been a loyal supporter of the Manmohan Singh Government, the Prime Minister did not directly take up the concerns of the people and the political leaders of Tamil Nadu with the Rajapaksa Government and that he left it to M.K.Narayanan, his National Security Adviser, to handle the matter has further damaged the image of Manmohan Singh in the eyes of sections of the political class of Tamil Nadu.
11. The revival of support for the cause of the Sri Lankan Tamils is still largely confined to the political class. This has not yet found vigorous articulation among large sections of the public. It would be unwise to interpret this as indicating that public support for the Sri Lankan Tamil cause remains limited and can be managed.
12. Any fresh humanitarian disaster consequent upon the military offensive in the Northern Province could create in Tamil Nadu a situation similar to what had prevailed in the 1980s when Tamil Nadu became a rear base for supporting the struggle of the Sri Lankan Tamils against the Sinhalese. If this happens, any success of the Sri Lankan Army in its current operations to crush the LTTE might see only the end of one phase of the Tamil struggle and the beginning of another.
13. It is important for the Government of India to show a more visible and vigorous interest in working for ending at least the ruthless air strikes against the Tamils and for ensuring that the Tamil cause is not lost sight of. The Sri Lankan Government has every right to press ahead with its counter-insurgency operations in order to restore the Government writ in the areas now under the control of the LTTE, but its use of air strikes and its perceived indifference to the legitimate concerns of India and other members of the international community should not be accepted. (10-10-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
There have been signs of renewed support for the cause of the Sri Lankan Tamils across the political spectrum in Tamil Nadu, except from the Congress (I), which continues to adopt an ambivalent attitude. This support has come not only from the traditional supporters of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), but also from other parties such as the ruling Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) of M.Karunanidhi and J.Jayalalitha of the Anna DMK, the main opposition party. Even the Tamil Nadu branch of the Communist Party of India (CPI) has come out in support of the Sri Lankan Tamils.
2.Karunanidhi, who is generally not given to using strong or emotional language, has given emotional expression to his anguish over what he perceives as the continuing policy of the Government of Mahinda Rajapaksa of suppressing the Tamils. He has conveyed his concerns to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and stressed upon him the need to take up the matter strongly with Rajapaksa in order to stress upon him the importance of finding a political solution to the problems of the Tamils. He has convened an all-party meeting in Chennai on October 14,2008, to work out a common political approach to the Government of India.Jayalalitha has expressed her support to the right of self-determination of the Sri Lankan Tamils, but made it clear at the same time that her support to the Tamil cause should not be misconstrued to mean any change in her policy of strong opposition to the LTTE as a terrorist organisation.
3. It would be incorrect to view this renewed support as dictated by electoral considerations in view of the elections to the Lok Sabha which are expected in the next few months. Despite the increasing concern in Tamil Nadu over what is perceived as the anti-Tamil policies of the Rajapaksa Government, the Sri Lankan Tamil issue is unlikely to play any role in influencing the voters. Economic and internal security issues are likely to play a predominant role in the elections .
4. It would be equally incorrect for the LTTE leadership to view this as indicating a softening of the hostility to the LTTE after its role in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in May,1991. The attitude towards an LTTE led by Prabhakaran continues to be as negative as it has always been since 1991. Any wishful-thinking by Prabhakaran that he and others who were responsible for the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi are likely to be rehabilitated in the eyes of vast sections of the people of Tamil Nadu, who are now hostile to them, will be belied. All political leaders except some die-hard supporters of the LTTE, who have taken up the cause of the Sri Lankan Tamils with the Government of India, have made it clear that their support is for the cause of the Sri Lankan Tamils and not for the LTTE headed by Prabhakaran.
5. The LTTE has been gratified by this renewed support for the Tamil cause and has been playing it up. However, there is no evidence to show that either the LTTE or its supporters in Tamil Nadu, who are in a small minority, had any role in this renewed support. This support has been triggered off spontaneously by heightened concerns over the policies of the Rajapaksa Government and by the statements of some officials serving under him such as Lt.Gen.Sarath Fonseka, the Chief of the Sri Lankan Army, Gothbaya Rajapakse, his brother, who is also the Defence Secretary, and Rohitha Bogollagama, the Foreign Minister, as well as by sorrow over what is perceived in Tamil Nadu as the double-faced policy of the Government of India on the plight of the Sri Lankan Tamils and over the lack of interest shown by Manmohan Singh in taking up the issue more vigorously with the Rajapaksa Government.
6. The continuing use of indiscriminate air strikes by the Rajapaksa Government against the Tamil civilian population in order to intimidate it into stop supporting the LTTE has come in for strong criticism. The closing of the doors by it for a political solution reached through talks with the LTTE has added to the anger in Tamil Nadu against the Rajapaksa Government. As the Sri Lankan Army presses its offensive to re-capture the territory still under the control of the LTTE in the Northern Province, increasingly disturbing statements have been coming from officials such as Fonseka highlighting the rights of the Sinhalese majority and playing down the legitimate rights of the Tamil minority. All these developments have caused concern in Tamil Nadu that under the pretext of crushing the LTTE as a terrorist organisation, the Rajapaksa Government, whose policies are seen as largely influenced by Sinhalese hawks, is seeking to crush the Tamils as a community by exploiting the favourable ground situation and the lack of interest in the international community in the developments in Sri Lanka. Very few in Tamil Nadu take seriously the assurances of Rajapaksa that after neutralising the LTTE as a terrorist organisation, his Government will initiate political measures for meeting the legitimate aspirations of the Tamil people.
7. At the same time, there has been a perceptible disenchantment in Tamil Nadu over what is seen as the lack of interest shown by Manmohan Singh in the problems of the Sri Lankan Tamils. He is being compared unfavourably with Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, who took a keen interest in the problems of the Tamils and did not hesitate to take up the matter strongly with the Governments then in power in Colombo. This disenchantment has turned into shock following reports of two Indian radar technicians being injured when two planes of the LTTE's air wing bombed on September 9, 2008, a Sri Lankan military base in Vavuniya, which has been co-ordinating the military operations against the LTTE.
8. The Government of India had repeatedly assured the Government of Tamil Nadu that it would give only non-lethal military equipment to the Sri Lankan Armed Forces, which could not be used in offensive operations against the LTTE. It had justified its supply of radars to the Sri Lankan Air Force on the ground that these radars were meant for use to protect strategic targets in Colombo against LTTE air strikes. There was initial opposition in Tamil Nadu's political circles to the supply of even the radars, but ultimately they were reconciled to it.
9. The information that the radars supplied by the Government of India were actually being used in the frontline areas and that two Indian technicians were helping the SLAF in their maintenance added to the concerns in Tamil Nadu and created a suspicion that New Delhi was not telling the truth to the Government of Tamil Nadu about the extent of the Indian assistance to the Sri Lankan Armed Forces in their operations against the LTTE.
10. The fact that despite the entreaties of Karunanidhi, who has been a loyal supporter of the Manmohan Singh Government, the Prime Minister did not directly take up the concerns of the people and the political leaders of Tamil Nadu with the Rajapaksa Government and that he left it to M.K.Narayanan, his National Security Adviser, to handle the matter has further damaged the image of Manmohan Singh in the eyes of sections of the political class of Tamil Nadu.
11. The revival of support for the cause of the Sri Lankan Tamils is still largely confined to the political class. This has not yet found vigorous articulation among large sections of the public. It would be unwise to interpret this as indicating that public support for the Sri Lankan Tamil cause remains limited and can be managed.
12. Any fresh humanitarian disaster consequent upon the military offensive in the Northern Province could create in Tamil Nadu a situation similar to what had prevailed in the 1980s when Tamil Nadu became a rear base for supporting the struggle of the Sri Lankan Tamils against the Sinhalese. If this happens, any success of the Sri Lankan Army in its current operations to crush the LTTE might see only the end of one phase of the Tamil struggle and the beginning of another.
13. It is important for the Government of India to show a more visible and vigorous interest in working for ending at least the ruthless air strikes against the Tamils and for ensuring that the Tamil cause is not lost sight of. The Sri Lankan Government has every right to press ahead with its counter-insurgency operations in order to restore the Government writ in the areas now under the control of the LTTE, but its use of air strikes and its perceived indifference to the legitimate concerns of India and other members of the international community should not be accepted. (10-10-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Thursday, October 9, 2008
PRESIDENT ZARDARI---FORWARD & BACKWARD
B.RAMAN
An ability for fresh thinking on Pakistan's relations with India and an inability to initiate a change of policy in line with the new thinking have been the defining characteristics of Asif Ali Zardari ever since he took over the leadership of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto on December 27,2007.
2. The first sign of his ability for fresh thinking came in an interview given by him to Karan Thapar, the TV journalist, (reported on March 1,2008), in which he spoke of the need to break with Pakistan's past policy of linking the issue of bilateral trade with India with the Kashmir issue so that the continuing deadlock over the Kashmir issue did not come in the way of the normalisation of the trade relations between the two countries. The business class in Pakistan has long been in favour of delinking the trade issue from the Kashmir issue. During the second tenure of Benazir as the Prime Minister (1993-96), this had also been recommended by a committee of officials of Pakistan's Ministry of Commerce, but it recommendations remained a non-starter due to strong opposition not only from the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) of Nawaz Sharif, but also from the Pakistan Foreign Office.
3. Zardari's interview was followed by the usual criticism from the political class. An attempt was made to create an impression as if he was planning to dilute the traditional Pakistani stand on the Kashmir issue. As a result, his remarks on the subject were portrayed by his own party as misinterpreted and any intention to break with the past policy was vehemently denied.
4. The second sign of his ability for fresh thinking came with regard to any role for India on the Afghanistan issue. The policy till now has been to question the legitimacy of any Indian interests in Afghanistan, to project the growing Indian economic and other non-military assistance to Afghanistan as directed against Pakistan, to oppose India's request for rights of transit trade with Afghanistan through Pakistan and to rule out any role for India in any multilateral talks on Afghanistan.
5. In comments made by him before his election as the President, he spoke of the desirability of a regional conference on Afghanistan to restore peace in that country and, in that context, mentioned India as one of the possible participants in such a conference if it materialises. His references to Afghanistan came in the context of what he projects as the need for a multi-pronged policy in the fight against jihadi terrorism of the Taliban-Al Qaeda kind emanating from this region.
6. A careful study of his statements and remarks on Afghanistan and the fight against terrorism would indicate the following nuances:
He agrees on the need for close counter-terrorism co-operation with the US, but wants this co-operation to be recrafted and re-projected in such a manner as not to aggravate the growing wave of jihadi terrorism in Pakistani territory---whether by Pakistani or foreign groups.
He understands the need for effective action against jihadi terrorism in Pakistani territory, but wants such action to be seen by his people as the outcome of Pakistani initiatives through Pakistani forces and capabilities and not as at the behest of the US with the help of US assistance and with US operational co-operation. He does not want Pakistani action against its own terrorists to be perceived by its people as influenced by the US and as part of any regional initiative. In his perception, the jihadi terrorism in Pakistani territory is a Pakistani problem and not a regional or international problem.
At the same time, he views the continuing terrorism of the Taliban and Al Qaeda against the US and other NATO forces in Afghan territory as not just an Afghan problem, but as also a regional and even an international problem. It is also his view that without the restoration of peace in Afghanistan, Pakistan's own counter-terrorism efforts in its territory will not succeed. It is in that context that he talks of a regional conference on Afghanistan to discuss various options and is prepared to consider the participation of India in such a conference.
7. Surprisingly, his remarks on possible Indian participation in a regional conference on Afghanistan did not create in Pakistan the kind of criticism that his remarks on Kashmir did. At the same time, they were not welcomed either. His ideas have remained without a follow-up---either positive or negative.
8. The latest sign of his ability for fresh thinking was seen in a report carried by the "Wall Street Journal" (October 5,2008) on a discussion which he had with one of its journalists. He made a number of positive observations on relations with India during the discussion. To quote from the report carried by the paper:
'India has never been a threat to Pakistan. I, for one, and our democratic government is not scared of Indian influence abroad."
"He spoke of the militant groups operating in Kashmir as 'terrorists'."
"Replying to a question, Zardari said he had no objection to the India-US nuclear cooperation pact so long as Pakistan is treated 'at par'.'Why would we begrudge the largest democracy in the world getting friendly with one of the oldest democracies,' he asked."
"While seeking better ties with New Delhi he noted, 'There is no other economic survival for nations like us. We have to trade with our neighbours first.'He imagines Pakistani cement factories being constructed to provide for India's huge infrastructure needs, Pakistani textile mills meeting Indian demand for blue jeans, Pakistani ports being used to relieve the congestion at Indian ones."
9.In response to criticism from the PML and some sections of the ruling coalition, the Ministry of Information, apparently with his approval, stepped in the next day and ruled out any change in Pakistan's policy towards India on the Kashmir issue. A statement issued by Sherry Rehman, the Minister For Information, said: "Pakistan is committed to the Kashmiri people's right for self-determination. The President had made it very clear that the just cause of Kashmir and its struggle for self-determination has been a consistent central position of the (ruling) Pakistan People's Party for the last 40 years. There has been no change in this policy.The President has never called the legitimate struggle of Kashmiris an expression of terrorism, nor has he downplayed the sufferings of the Kashmiris. All his statements on India should be viewed in the context of Pakistan's current bilateral relations with that country. The Government is firmly committed to extending moral and diplomatic support to the just cause of Kashmiris for their right of self-determination".
10. What to make of this flip-flop? It would be incorrect to interpret it as indicative of his insincerity. What it does indicate is that while his instincts in relation to India seem to be refreshingly different from those of his predecessors----even from those of Benazir who instigated terrorism in Kashmir when she was the Prime Minister---- his grasp of the ground realities in Pakistan is weak. The ground realities are determined by four entrenched mindsets, which have always been opposing any fresh thinking on the relations with India. These entrenched mindsets are those of the Army, the intelligence community, the Foreign Office and sections of the political class with a close nexus to the Army and the intelligence community.
11. Unless these entrenched mindsets are made to change, new thinking alone, however welcome, will remain just loud-thinking without any follow-up action. To be able to translate any new thinking into action, Zardari has tro stabilise his position as the President, acquire a popular image and acquire the ability to enforce his will on these entrenched mindsets. No previous political leader of Pakistan was able to acquire such an ability and had to ultimately bow to pressure from the Army, the intelligence community and the Foreign Office.
12. In India too, we have had such entrenched mindsets in the Army, the intelligence community and the Foreign Office. It goes to the credit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that he has gradually been able to bring about a change in these mindsets whether in relation to India's ties with Pakistan or the US----though not yet in relation to China.
13. Zardari has been the President hardly for a month and it is too early to say whether he would be able to bring about such a change in the mindsets. India has to keep patience with him without expecting quick policy changes. At the same time, it should not lower its guard till the ultimate reality emerges---- is it refreshingly new or more of the same as seen in the past?
14. The current position in Pakistan is complicated by the emergence of a fourth important power ---- Al Qaeda. The future of Pakistan is going to be determined by a configuration of four As---Allah, the Army, America and Al Qaeda. The outcome of the fight between the Army and America on the one side and Al Qaeda on the other will determine whether Zardari's tenure will see a change for the better or the worse in Pakistan.(9-10-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
An ability for fresh thinking on Pakistan's relations with India and an inability to initiate a change of policy in line with the new thinking have been the defining characteristics of Asif Ali Zardari ever since he took over the leadership of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto on December 27,2007.
2. The first sign of his ability for fresh thinking came in an interview given by him to Karan Thapar, the TV journalist, (reported on March 1,2008), in which he spoke of the need to break with Pakistan's past policy of linking the issue of bilateral trade with India with the Kashmir issue so that the continuing deadlock over the Kashmir issue did not come in the way of the normalisation of the trade relations between the two countries. The business class in Pakistan has long been in favour of delinking the trade issue from the Kashmir issue. During the second tenure of Benazir as the Prime Minister (1993-96), this had also been recommended by a committee of officials of Pakistan's Ministry of Commerce, but it recommendations remained a non-starter due to strong opposition not only from the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) of Nawaz Sharif, but also from the Pakistan Foreign Office.
3. Zardari's interview was followed by the usual criticism from the political class. An attempt was made to create an impression as if he was planning to dilute the traditional Pakistani stand on the Kashmir issue. As a result, his remarks on the subject were portrayed by his own party as misinterpreted and any intention to break with the past policy was vehemently denied.
4. The second sign of his ability for fresh thinking came with regard to any role for India on the Afghanistan issue. The policy till now has been to question the legitimacy of any Indian interests in Afghanistan, to project the growing Indian economic and other non-military assistance to Afghanistan as directed against Pakistan, to oppose India's request for rights of transit trade with Afghanistan through Pakistan and to rule out any role for India in any multilateral talks on Afghanistan.
5. In comments made by him before his election as the President, he spoke of the desirability of a regional conference on Afghanistan to restore peace in that country and, in that context, mentioned India as one of the possible participants in such a conference if it materialises. His references to Afghanistan came in the context of what he projects as the need for a multi-pronged policy in the fight against jihadi terrorism of the Taliban-Al Qaeda kind emanating from this region.
6. A careful study of his statements and remarks on Afghanistan and the fight against terrorism would indicate the following nuances:
He agrees on the need for close counter-terrorism co-operation with the US, but wants this co-operation to be recrafted and re-projected in such a manner as not to aggravate the growing wave of jihadi terrorism in Pakistani territory---whether by Pakistani or foreign groups.
He understands the need for effective action against jihadi terrorism in Pakistani territory, but wants such action to be seen by his people as the outcome of Pakistani initiatives through Pakistani forces and capabilities and not as at the behest of the US with the help of US assistance and with US operational co-operation. He does not want Pakistani action against its own terrorists to be perceived by its people as influenced by the US and as part of any regional initiative. In his perception, the jihadi terrorism in Pakistani territory is a Pakistani problem and not a regional or international problem.
At the same time, he views the continuing terrorism of the Taliban and Al Qaeda against the US and other NATO forces in Afghan territory as not just an Afghan problem, but as also a regional and even an international problem. It is also his view that without the restoration of peace in Afghanistan, Pakistan's own counter-terrorism efforts in its territory will not succeed. It is in that context that he talks of a regional conference on Afghanistan to discuss various options and is prepared to consider the participation of India in such a conference.
7. Surprisingly, his remarks on possible Indian participation in a regional conference on Afghanistan did not create in Pakistan the kind of criticism that his remarks on Kashmir did. At the same time, they were not welcomed either. His ideas have remained without a follow-up---either positive or negative.
8. The latest sign of his ability for fresh thinking was seen in a report carried by the "Wall Street Journal" (October 5,2008) on a discussion which he had with one of its journalists. He made a number of positive observations on relations with India during the discussion. To quote from the report carried by the paper:
'India has never been a threat to Pakistan. I, for one, and our democratic government is not scared of Indian influence abroad."
"He spoke of the militant groups operating in Kashmir as 'terrorists'."
"Replying to a question, Zardari said he had no objection to the India-US nuclear cooperation pact so long as Pakistan is treated 'at par'.'Why would we begrudge the largest democracy in the world getting friendly with one of the oldest democracies,' he asked."
"While seeking better ties with New Delhi he noted, 'There is no other economic survival for nations like us. We have to trade with our neighbours first.'He imagines Pakistani cement factories being constructed to provide for India's huge infrastructure needs, Pakistani textile mills meeting Indian demand for blue jeans, Pakistani ports being used to relieve the congestion at Indian ones."
9.In response to criticism from the PML and some sections of the ruling coalition, the Ministry of Information, apparently with his approval, stepped in the next day and ruled out any change in Pakistan's policy towards India on the Kashmir issue. A statement issued by Sherry Rehman, the Minister For Information, said: "Pakistan is committed to the Kashmiri people's right for self-determination. The President had made it very clear that the just cause of Kashmir and its struggle for self-determination has been a consistent central position of the (ruling) Pakistan People's Party for the last 40 years. There has been no change in this policy.The President has never called the legitimate struggle of Kashmiris an expression of terrorism, nor has he downplayed the sufferings of the Kashmiris. All his statements on India should be viewed in the context of Pakistan's current bilateral relations with that country. The Government is firmly committed to extending moral and diplomatic support to the just cause of Kashmiris for their right of self-determination".
10. What to make of this flip-flop? It would be incorrect to interpret it as indicative of his insincerity. What it does indicate is that while his instincts in relation to India seem to be refreshingly different from those of his predecessors----even from those of Benazir who instigated terrorism in Kashmir when she was the Prime Minister---- his grasp of the ground realities in Pakistan is weak. The ground realities are determined by four entrenched mindsets, which have always been opposing any fresh thinking on the relations with India. These entrenched mindsets are those of the Army, the intelligence community, the Foreign Office and sections of the political class with a close nexus to the Army and the intelligence community.
11. Unless these entrenched mindsets are made to change, new thinking alone, however welcome, will remain just loud-thinking without any follow-up action. To be able to translate any new thinking into action, Zardari has tro stabilise his position as the President, acquire a popular image and acquire the ability to enforce his will on these entrenched mindsets. No previous political leader of Pakistan was able to acquire such an ability and had to ultimately bow to pressure from the Army, the intelligence community and the Foreign Office.
12. In India too, we have had such entrenched mindsets in the Army, the intelligence community and the Foreign Office. It goes to the credit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that he has gradually been able to bring about a change in these mindsets whether in relation to India's ties with Pakistan or the US----though not yet in relation to China.
13. Zardari has been the President hardly for a month and it is too early to say whether he would be able to bring about such a change in the mindsets. India has to keep patience with him without expecting quick policy changes. At the same time, it should not lower its guard till the ultimate reality emerges---- is it refreshingly new or more of the same as seen in the past?
14. The current position in Pakistan is complicated by the emergence of a fourth important power ---- Al Qaeda. The future of Pakistan is going to be determined by a configuration of four As---Allah, the Army, America and Al Qaeda. The outcome of the fight between the Army and America on the one side and Al Qaeda on the other will determine whether Zardari's tenure will see a change for the better or the worse in Pakistan.(9-10-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Sunday, October 5, 2008
INDIANS KILLING INDIANS
B.RAMAN
Indians killing Indians
2.There is no other way of describing the wave of jihadi terrorist strikes spreading death and destruction across India since July,2006, and the wave of anti-Christian violence being seen in Orissa and Karnataka since August, 2008.
3. The wave of jihadi terrorist strikes has affected many States--- ruled by the Congress (I), the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and others.
4.Anger against certain aggressive groups of evangelists indulging in a scurrilous campaign against the Hindu religion and converting the impoverished tribals of Central India into Christianty through the allurement of money has been widespread in many States of India, but this anger has been expressed in a civilized manner in most States. Only in the BJP ruled Karnataka and in Orissa ruled by an electoral ally of the BJP has this anger taken an ugly, uncivilized turn in the form of orchestrated attacks on Christians and their places of worship and even the alleged rape of a helpless nun. Large sections of public opinion in India and abroad cannot be blamed if they attribute this to the inaction of the local Governments in the face of the violence and view this as amounting to culpable complicity.
5. These two waves have given rise to antagonistic reflexes which should be of concern to any Indian interested in the unity, prosperity and strength of this nation. There is a disturbing denial mode in sections of both the Muslim and the Hindu communities. Sections of the Muslim community are not prepared to accept that their co-religionists are behind this wave of jihadi terrorism. An attempt is being made by these sections, supported by sections of the so-called secular community, either to deny the involvement of some Muslims in jihadi terrorism or to rationalise their involvement through various arguments. There is a simultaneous attempt to denigrate and demonise the police and other law-enforcing agencies by debunking their version of the terrorist strikes and by coming in the way of their investigation.
6. Sections of the Hindu community owing allegiance to the so-called Hindutva groups are not prepared to accept any blame on their community and tend to project the anti-Christian violence as an outcome of spontaneous tribal anger against Christian missionaries with which, according to them, the Hindutva organizations have nothing to do. The perceived inaction of the law-enforcing agencies in the face of the anti-Christian violence is sought to be rationalized and explained through various arguments such as the lack of road and other means of communications in the affected areas which rendered prompt police action difficult.
7. The history of Islam is replete with thousands of instances of destruction of places of worship of other religions. The Hindus used to be proud of the fact that their religion respected the places of worship of other religions and did not damage or destroy them. But, this is no longer so since 1992 when some Hindutva elements carried out a wanton destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya.
8. Hopes entertained by many that this was a one-time aberration caused by historic anger over the alleged demolition of a Ram temple in the same place for the erection of a masjid have been belied by reports of wanton destruction of Christian places of worship in Karnataka and Orissa. India has already been paying a heavy price for the Hindu anger caused by perceptions of the appeasement policies of the so-called secular elements towards the religious minorities and the Muslim anger due to perceptions of the failure of the State to protect them and to be fair to them.
9. To this will now be added pockets of Christian anger over the death, destruction and humiliation inflicted on their community by the Hindutva elements, with the State allegedly remaining a silent spectator. The Christians will be rendered even more angry by the attempts being made by some intellectuals and others close to the Hindutva groups to play down the enormous gravity of the anti-Christian violence.
10.Do the orchestrated acts of violence against the Christians and their places of worship amount to acts of terrorism similar to the ruthless killing of innocent civilians of various communities by the jihadi terrorists of the indigenous as well Pakistani and Bangladeshi kinds? Is the Hindutva Bajrang Dal, which is allegedly behind the attacks on Christians, a terrorist organization similar to the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and the so-called Indian Mujahideen? These questions are increasingly occupying the centre of the debate. Instead of maintaining a laser-sharp focus on our fight against jihadi terrorism, we find ourselves spending more and more time in countering and removing suspicions of acts of terrorism against the Christians.
11. There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism and what is a terrorist organization, but most definitions in common currency accept that there are some important components of terrorism--- repeated attacks of a pre-meditated nature on innocent civilians and their property to achieve an objective, which may be political, economic, social or religious. Spontaneous and isolated attacks in the heat of the moment, which are not repeated in an orchestrated manner, are crimes not amounting to terrorism.
12. The anti-Christian violence started as spontaneous, isolated attacks in the heat of the moment following the murder of a respected Hindu leader and some of his disciples in Orissa and the circulation of scurilous pamphlets denigrating the Hindu religion by a Christian organization in Karnataka. Law does not excuse even such isolated attacks in the heat of the moment, but views the heat of the moment argument as a mitigating circumstance while deciding the quantum of punishment. But repeated pre-meditated attacks of an orchestrated nature long after the heat of the moment has passed dangerously degenerate into the zone of terrorism.
13. If the Hindutva forces are not able to control the Frankenstein’s Monsters created by them in the form of the Bajrang Dal, it is only a question of time before it comes under the scanner of the terrorism experts of the Western countries. In the early 1990s, a US-based organization called the Jammat-ul-Fuqra, headed by a Pakistani cleric and with a large number of Afro-American Muslims as members, carried out a wave of arson attacks on Hindu and Jewish places of worship in the US and Canada and there were some attacks on the members of these religions too.
14.The Counter-Terrorism Division of the US State Department placed it in the list of terrorist organizations to be watched and included a brief note on its activities in its annual reports to the US Congress. This cleric has since returned to Pakistan and its activities in the US have ceased. It no longer figures in the list of terrorist organizations.
15. If repeated and pre-meditated attacks on Hindu and Jewish places of worship and on Hindus and Jews in the US can be viewed as amounting to terrorism, how can we argue that similar attacks on Christians and their places of worship in India do not amount to terrorism?
16. The Hindutva organizations should read the writing on the wall and mend themselves lest they come to be viewed by the international community as organizations of concern. If the Bajrang Dal comes to be viewed as a suspected terrorist organization, the first to feel the pressure and adverse effect will be the supporters of the organization in the Hindu diaspora abroad. It is in their interest to exercise pressure on the Bajrang Dal and drive some sense into it. (5-10-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Indians killing Indians
2.There is no other way of describing the wave of jihadi terrorist strikes spreading death and destruction across India since July,2006, and the wave of anti-Christian violence being seen in Orissa and Karnataka since August, 2008.
3. The wave of jihadi terrorist strikes has affected many States--- ruled by the Congress (I), the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and others.
4.Anger against certain aggressive groups of evangelists indulging in a scurrilous campaign against the Hindu religion and converting the impoverished tribals of Central India into Christianty through the allurement of money has been widespread in many States of India, but this anger has been expressed in a civilized manner in most States. Only in the BJP ruled Karnataka and in Orissa ruled by an electoral ally of the BJP has this anger taken an ugly, uncivilized turn in the form of orchestrated attacks on Christians and their places of worship and even the alleged rape of a helpless nun. Large sections of public opinion in India and abroad cannot be blamed if they attribute this to the inaction of the local Governments in the face of the violence and view this as amounting to culpable complicity.
5. These two waves have given rise to antagonistic reflexes which should be of concern to any Indian interested in the unity, prosperity and strength of this nation. There is a disturbing denial mode in sections of both the Muslim and the Hindu communities. Sections of the Muslim community are not prepared to accept that their co-religionists are behind this wave of jihadi terrorism. An attempt is being made by these sections, supported by sections of the so-called secular community, either to deny the involvement of some Muslims in jihadi terrorism or to rationalise their involvement through various arguments. There is a simultaneous attempt to denigrate and demonise the police and other law-enforcing agencies by debunking their version of the terrorist strikes and by coming in the way of their investigation.
6. Sections of the Hindu community owing allegiance to the so-called Hindutva groups are not prepared to accept any blame on their community and tend to project the anti-Christian violence as an outcome of spontaneous tribal anger against Christian missionaries with which, according to them, the Hindutva organizations have nothing to do. The perceived inaction of the law-enforcing agencies in the face of the anti-Christian violence is sought to be rationalized and explained through various arguments such as the lack of road and other means of communications in the affected areas which rendered prompt police action difficult.
7. The history of Islam is replete with thousands of instances of destruction of places of worship of other religions. The Hindus used to be proud of the fact that their religion respected the places of worship of other religions and did not damage or destroy them. But, this is no longer so since 1992 when some Hindutva elements carried out a wanton destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya.
8. Hopes entertained by many that this was a one-time aberration caused by historic anger over the alleged demolition of a Ram temple in the same place for the erection of a masjid have been belied by reports of wanton destruction of Christian places of worship in Karnataka and Orissa. India has already been paying a heavy price for the Hindu anger caused by perceptions of the appeasement policies of the so-called secular elements towards the religious minorities and the Muslim anger due to perceptions of the failure of the State to protect them and to be fair to them.
9. To this will now be added pockets of Christian anger over the death, destruction and humiliation inflicted on their community by the Hindutva elements, with the State allegedly remaining a silent spectator. The Christians will be rendered even more angry by the attempts being made by some intellectuals and others close to the Hindutva groups to play down the enormous gravity of the anti-Christian violence.
10.Do the orchestrated acts of violence against the Christians and their places of worship amount to acts of terrorism similar to the ruthless killing of innocent civilians of various communities by the jihadi terrorists of the indigenous as well Pakistani and Bangladeshi kinds? Is the Hindutva Bajrang Dal, which is allegedly behind the attacks on Christians, a terrorist organization similar to the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and the so-called Indian Mujahideen? These questions are increasingly occupying the centre of the debate. Instead of maintaining a laser-sharp focus on our fight against jihadi terrorism, we find ourselves spending more and more time in countering and removing suspicions of acts of terrorism against the Christians.
11. There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism and what is a terrorist organization, but most definitions in common currency accept that there are some important components of terrorism--- repeated attacks of a pre-meditated nature on innocent civilians and their property to achieve an objective, which may be political, economic, social or religious. Spontaneous and isolated attacks in the heat of the moment, which are not repeated in an orchestrated manner, are crimes not amounting to terrorism.
12. The anti-Christian violence started as spontaneous, isolated attacks in the heat of the moment following the murder of a respected Hindu leader and some of his disciples in Orissa and the circulation of scurilous pamphlets denigrating the Hindu religion by a Christian organization in Karnataka. Law does not excuse even such isolated attacks in the heat of the moment, but views the heat of the moment argument as a mitigating circumstance while deciding the quantum of punishment. But repeated pre-meditated attacks of an orchestrated nature long after the heat of the moment has passed dangerously degenerate into the zone of terrorism.
13. If the Hindutva forces are not able to control the Frankenstein’s Monsters created by them in the form of the Bajrang Dal, it is only a question of time before it comes under the scanner of the terrorism experts of the Western countries. In the early 1990s, a US-based organization called the Jammat-ul-Fuqra, headed by a Pakistani cleric and with a large number of Afro-American Muslims as members, carried out a wave of arson attacks on Hindu and Jewish places of worship in the US and Canada and there were some attacks on the members of these religions too.
14.The Counter-Terrorism Division of the US State Department placed it in the list of terrorist organizations to be watched and included a brief note on its activities in its annual reports to the US Congress. This cleric has since returned to Pakistan and its activities in the US have ceased. It no longer figures in the list of terrorist organizations.
15. If repeated and pre-meditated attacks on Hindu and Jewish places of worship and on Hindus and Jews in the US can be viewed as amounting to terrorism, how can we argue that similar attacks on Christians and their places of worship in India do not amount to terrorism?
16. The Hindutva organizations should read the writing on the wall and mend themselves lest they come to be viewed by the international community as organizations of concern. If the Bajrang Dal comes to be viewed as a suspected terrorist organization, the first to feel the pressure and adverse effect will be the supporters of the organization in the Hindu diaspora abroad. It is in their interest to exercise pressure on the Bajrang Dal and drive some sense into it. (5-10-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, September 30, 2008
US, CHINESE UNHAPPINESS LEADS TO TRANSFER OF ISI CHIEF
B.RAMAN
The General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army announced on the night of September 29,2008, that Major-General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, theDirector-General of Military Operations (DGMO), has been promoted as Lt.General and posted as the Director-General of the Inter-ServicesIntelligence (ISI) in place of Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj, who has been transferred and posted as the Commander of the XXX Corps based atGujranwala.
2. The change at the top of the ISI was part of a reshuffle involving 14 senior officers of the Army initiated by Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, theChief of the Army Staff (COAS), after meeting Yousef Raza Gilani, the Prime Minister, shortly after Kayani's return from a week-long visit toChina. The announcement of the changes, which were projected by a spokesman of the army as routine changes necessitated by theimpending retirement of some senior officers, was made when President Asif Ali Zardari had not yet returned from his visit to the US. Underthe changes introducted by Gen.(retired) Pervez Musharraf, when he was the President and the COAS, the powers for the approval of allpromotions and postings in the ranks of Major-General and above are with the President. The COAS is competent to order all promotions andpostings upto the rank of Brigadier. Even though an impression has been sought to be given that all promotions and postings announced onSeptember 29,2008, were made with the approval of or in consultation with Prime Minister Gilani, it is very likely that Zardari's approval hadbeen obtained either before he left for New York or while he was there.
3. Among other important changes, Lt Gen Yousuf, present Vice-Chief of General Staff, has been appointed as Corps Commander Bahawalpurin place of Lt Gen Raza Khan, who has been shifted as DG Joint Staff Headquarters. Maj-General Javed Iqbal, presently posted as GOCJhelum, has been appointed as Director-General Military Operations (DG MO). Commander 10 Corps (Rawalpindi) Lt Gen Mohsin Kamal hasbeen moved to General Headquarters as Military Secretary (MS) and in his place newly promoted Lt-General Tahir Mehmood has beenappointed as Commander Rawalpindi Corps.
4.Maj-Gen Waheed Arshad has been appointed as the VCGS and the newly promoted Lt General Mustafa Khan has been posted as the Chiefof the General Staff (CGS) in place of Lt Gen Salahuddin Satti, who will retire from the Army next week. The reshuffle involved the promotionof seven Majors-General to the rank of Lieutenants-General. They are Major General Tahir Mahmood (Infantry - present Commander SpecialServices Group), Major-General Shahid Iqbal (Infantry - Chief Instructor National Defence University), Major General Tanvir Tahir (EME - DGC4Is), Major-General Zahid Hussain (Artillery - Commandant Pakistan Military Academy), Major General Ahmad Shuja Pasha (Infantry - DGMilitary Operations), Major-General Mohammad Mustafa Khan (Armoured Corps - ISI), and Major-General Ayyaz Saleem Rana (Armoured Corps- ISI). Major-Generals Nusrat Naeem (ISI), Asif Akhtar (ISI), Khalid Jaffari (Anti-Narcotics Force)), Shoukat Sultan (GOC Lahore) andMohammad Saddique (GHQ - former acting Chairman National Accountability Bureau ) have been superseded. They will, however, continueto serve as Majors-General.
5. Of the five senior officers in the ISI----one of the rank of Lt.General and four of the rank of Maj.Gen---Lt.Gen.Nadeem Taj has been movedout, Maj.Gen.Mustafa Khan has been promoted as Lt.Gen. and appointed as the CGS, who acts as the eyes and ears of the COAS in the GHQ,and Maj.Gen.Ayyaz Saleem has been promoted and posted as the Chairman of the heavy industry complex at Taxila.Majs.Gen.NusratNaeem and Asif Akhtar have been superseded. They have been allowed to continue till their superannuation as Majs.Gen., but it is notknown whether they will continue in the ISI or will be shifted out. Among other superseded Majs-Gen is Mohammad Saddique, who used tobe in the National Accountability Bureau and was handling the corruption cases against Benazir Bhutto and Zardari.
6. Gen.Kayani will have in the important posts of the CGS, the DG,ISI, and Corps Commander, Rawalpindi, persons, who owe their promotionas Lts.Gen. to him and not to Musharraf. The CGS, the DG ISI and the Corps Commander Rawalpindi constitute an informal triumviratewithout whom, according to conventional wisdom, no COAS can stage a coup. The persons appointed to these posts as well as to the postof the DGMO are generally viewed as confirmed loyalists of the COAS.
7. Lt.Gen.Nadeen Taj, who is distantly related to Musharraf, served as the DG ISI for less than a year. He took over as the DG, ISI, on October8, 2007,after his promotion to the rank of Lt.Gen. Till then, he served as the Commandant, Pakistan Military Academy, with the rank ofMaj.Gen.
8. Lt.Gen.Pasha, who was promoted from the rank of Brigadier to that of Maj.Gen. by Musharraf in January,2003, is due to retire onSeptember 29, 2012.He has commanded an infantry brigade, a mechanised infantry brigade and an infantry division and has served as theChief Instructor of the Command and Staff College.In 2001-2002, as a Brigadier, he served as a Contingent and Sector Commander with theUnited Nations Mission in Sierra Leone. In October,2007, Musharraf agreed to a request from Ban Ki-moon, the UN Secretary-General, torelieve Pasha from the post of the DGMO so that he could be appointed as the Military Adviser, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, inthe UN headquarters, in place of General Per Arne Five of Norway. An announcement on his posting in the UN headquarters was also madeby the office of the UN Secretary-General.
9. But, this posting did not materialise. In view of the Swat Valley in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) coming under the control of theTaliban-affiliated Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) headed by Maulana Fazlullah, Musharraf ordered a special military operationagainst the TNSM and asked Pasha in his capacity as the DGMO to co-ordinate it. Pasha got Sufi Mohammad, former chief of the TNSM, whowas in detention since 2002, released and sought his help in the operation. In January,2008, Pasha announced that his troops had defeatedthe TNSM and freed the Swat Valley from the control of the TNSM. His claim came to haunt him shortly thereafter when the TNSM, whichhad withdrawn into the hills, staged a come-back and re-established its control over large areas of the Swat. Fighting there is still going on.In August,2008, shortly after the return of Gilani from a visit to Washington DC, Gen.Kayani ordered another special operation against theTehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Al Qaeda in the Bajaur Agency of the Federally-Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and asked Pasha toco-ordinate it too. Despite repeated claims of the Army having inflicted heavy casualties on the TTP and Al Qaeda, the two have beenputting up a determined fight against the Army and the Frontier Corps .
10. The "Dawn" of Karachi reported on September 29 as follows: "Military operations against militants have been a mixed bag of successesand setbacks; however no timeframe could be given with regard to the ongoing campaigns, sources in the military said. ‘It is a continualoperation. It is not going to end in 2008 and it is not going to end in 2009. Don’t be optimistic, as far as the timeframe is concerned. It is adifferent ground and it will take some time’, military sources said in a media briefing." Thus, as the DGMO, Pasha has had a colourlessrecord. That, despite this, he has been posted as the DG,ISI, shows his closeness and loyalty to Kayani, who had taken him for his secretmeeting with Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, on board a US Aircraft Carrier, on August 26,2008, and notLt.Gen.Nadeem Taj.
11. The removal of Nadeem Taj has come in the wake of reports about US concerns and unhappiness over the alleged role of the ISI in theattempt to blow up the Indian Embassy in Kabul on July 7,2008, and over leakage of information shared by the US intelligence with the ISI tothe Taliban. President Bush was reported to have taken up this matter with Prime Minister Gilani, when he visited Washington DC in the lastweek of July as well as with Zardari whom he met in the margins of the current UN General Assembly session. While removing Taj from thepost of DG,ISI, Kayani has taken care not to create a feeling of humiliation in him by posting him as the Commander of an important Corps,but as the Corps Commander at Gujranwala he will not have much to do with Afghanistan or the ongoing military operations in the tribal belt.Kayani has removed him from any role in the operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
12. The removal of Taj from the ISI has also come in the wake of reports of Chinese unhappiness as expressed to Kayani during hisweek-long visit to China from September 21,2008, over the lack of a sense of urgency shown by the ISI in rescuing the two Chineseengineers kidnapped by the TTP on August 29. They were working for a Chinese cellular company in the Dir area of the NWFP. The TTPkidnapped them while they were travelling and removed them to the Swat valley. The TTP has been demanding the release of over 130Taliban members presently in the custody of the Pakistani security agencies in return for their release.
13. The Chinese Embassy in Islamabad and Chinese engineers working in Pakistan have also been reportedly expressing their unhappinessover the lack of a sense of urgency shown by the Gilani Government as a whole in getting the Chinese engineers released. They have beenpointing out as to how Musharraf always gave the first priority to requests from China for assistance and to the commando action orderedby him on the Lal Masjid of Islamabad when some of the students, including Uighurs, in the madrasas of the masjid, kidnapped someChinese women working in Islamabad, and comparing this to the lethargic response of Gilani and Zardari. They feel that Gilani and Zardarihave been giving a greater importance to US interests and concerns than to those of the Chinese.
14. In a report on the subject carried by the 'News" of September 24, 2008, Rahimullah Yusufzai, the well-informed Pakistani journalist, saidas follows: " A Chinese journalist, who requested anonymity, said the Pakistan Government hasn't shown any urgency in getting the twoyoung engineers freed. He recalled how the issue of the two Chinese engineers kidnapped by late Pakistani Taliban commander AbdullahMahsud's men in South Waziristan in 2004 was resolved within a few days. "The recent case of kidnapping of Chinese engineers hasn't beenresolved even after more than three weeks. We were hoping our citizens would have been freed by now, he said."
15. Before his election as the President, Zardari had stated that his first official visit as the President would be to China to underline theimportance attached by him to Pakistan's relations with China. He did not keep his word and instead went on a private visit to the UnitedArab Emirates and the UK and then on an official visit to New York to attend the UN General Assembly session. Pakistani officials have been explaining this away by claiming that his visit to New York was not a bilateral visit to the US and that his first official bilateral visit wouldstill be to China. (30-9-08)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army announced on the night of September 29,2008, that Major-General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, theDirector-General of Military Operations (DGMO), has been promoted as Lt.General and posted as the Director-General of the Inter-ServicesIntelligence (ISI) in place of Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj, who has been transferred and posted as the Commander of the XXX Corps based atGujranwala.
2. The change at the top of the ISI was part of a reshuffle involving 14 senior officers of the Army initiated by Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, theChief of the Army Staff (COAS), after meeting Yousef Raza Gilani, the Prime Minister, shortly after Kayani's return from a week-long visit toChina. The announcement of the changes, which were projected by a spokesman of the army as routine changes necessitated by theimpending retirement of some senior officers, was made when President Asif Ali Zardari had not yet returned from his visit to the US. Underthe changes introducted by Gen.(retired) Pervez Musharraf, when he was the President and the COAS, the powers for the approval of allpromotions and postings in the ranks of Major-General and above are with the President. The COAS is competent to order all promotions andpostings upto the rank of Brigadier. Even though an impression has been sought to be given that all promotions and postings announced onSeptember 29,2008, were made with the approval of or in consultation with Prime Minister Gilani, it is very likely that Zardari's approval hadbeen obtained either before he left for New York or while he was there.
3. Among other important changes, Lt Gen Yousuf, present Vice-Chief of General Staff, has been appointed as Corps Commander Bahawalpurin place of Lt Gen Raza Khan, who has been shifted as DG Joint Staff Headquarters. Maj-General Javed Iqbal, presently posted as GOCJhelum, has been appointed as Director-General Military Operations (DG MO). Commander 10 Corps (Rawalpindi) Lt Gen Mohsin Kamal hasbeen moved to General Headquarters as Military Secretary (MS) and in his place newly promoted Lt-General Tahir Mehmood has beenappointed as Commander Rawalpindi Corps.
4.Maj-Gen Waheed Arshad has been appointed as the VCGS and the newly promoted Lt General Mustafa Khan has been posted as the Chiefof the General Staff (CGS) in place of Lt Gen Salahuddin Satti, who will retire from the Army next week. The reshuffle involved the promotionof seven Majors-General to the rank of Lieutenants-General. They are Major General Tahir Mahmood (Infantry - present Commander SpecialServices Group), Major-General Shahid Iqbal (Infantry - Chief Instructor National Defence University), Major General Tanvir Tahir (EME - DGC4Is), Major-General Zahid Hussain (Artillery - Commandant Pakistan Military Academy), Major General Ahmad Shuja Pasha (Infantry - DGMilitary Operations), Major-General Mohammad Mustafa Khan (Armoured Corps - ISI), and Major-General Ayyaz Saleem Rana (Armoured Corps- ISI). Major-Generals Nusrat Naeem (ISI), Asif Akhtar (ISI), Khalid Jaffari (Anti-Narcotics Force)), Shoukat Sultan (GOC Lahore) andMohammad Saddique (GHQ - former acting Chairman National Accountability Bureau ) have been superseded. They will, however, continueto serve as Majors-General.
5. Of the five senior officers in the ISI----one of the rank of Lt.General and four of the rank of Maj.Gen---Lt.Gen.Nadeem Taj has been movedout, Maj.Gen.Mustafa Khan has been promoted as Lt.Gen. and appointed as the CGS, who acts as the eyes and ears of the COAS in the GHQ,and Maj.Gen.Ayyaz Saleem has been promoted and posted as the Chairman of the heavy industry complex at Taxila.Majs.Gen.NusratNaeem and Asif Akhtar have been superseded. They have been allowed to continue till their superannuation as Majs.Gen., but it is notknown whether they will continue in the ISI or will be shifted out. Among other superseded Majs-Gen is Mohammad Saddique, who used tobe in the National Accountability Bureau and was handling the corruption cases against Benazir Bhutto and Zardari.
6. Gen.Kayani will have in the important posts of the CGS, the DG,ISI, and Corps Commander, Rawalpindi, persons, who owe their promotionas Lts.Gen. to him and not to Musharraf. The CGS, the DG ISI and the Corps Commander Rawalpindi constitute an informal triumviratewithout whom, according to conventional wisdom, no COAS can stage a coup. The persons appointed to these posts as well as to the postof the DGMO are generally viewed as confirmed loyalists of the COAS.
7. Lt.Gen.Nadeen Taj, who is distantly related to Musharraf, served as the DG ISI for less than a year. He took over as the DG, ISI, on October8, 2007,after his promotion to the rank of Lt.Gen. Till then, he served as the Commandant, Pakistan Military Academy, with the rank ofMaj.Gen.
8. Lt.Gen.Pasha, who was promoted from the rank of Brigadier to that of Maj.Gen. by Musharraf in January,2003, is due to retire onSeptember 29, 2012.He has commanded an infantry brigade, a mechanised infantry brigade and an infantry division and has served as theChief Instructor of the Command and Staff College.In 2001-2002, as a Brigadier, he served as a Contingent and Sector Commander with theUnited Nations Mission in Sierra Leone. In October,2007, Musharraf agreed to a request from Ban Ki-moon, the UN Secretary-General, torelieve Pasha from the post of the DGMO so that he could be appointed as the Military Adviser, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, inthe UN headquarters, in place of General Per Arne Five of Norway. An announcement on his posting in the UN headquarters was also madeby the office of the UN Secretary-General.
9. But, this posting did not materialise. In view of the Swat Valley in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) coming under the control of theTaliban-affiliated Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) headed by Maulana Fazlullah, Musharraf ordered a special military operationagainst the TNSM and asked Pasha in his capacity as the DGMO to co-ordinate it. Pasha got Sufi Mohammad, former chief of the TNSM, whowas in detention since 2002, released and sought his help in the operation. In January,2008, Pasha announced that his troops had defeatedthe TNSM and freed the Swat Valley from the control of the TNSM. His claim came to haunt him shortly thereafter when the TNSM, whichhad withdrawn into the hills, staged a come-back and re-established its control over large areas of the Swat. Fighting there is still going on.In August,2008, shortly after the return of Gilani from a visit to Washington DC, Gen.Kayani ordered another special operation against theTehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Al Qaeda in the Bajaur Agency of the Federally-Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and asked Pasha toco-ordinate it too. Despite repeated claims of the Army having inflicted heavy casualties on the TTP and Al Qaeda, the two have beenputting up a determined fight against the Army and the Frontier Corps .
10. The "Dawn" of Karachi reported on September 29 as follows: "Military operations against militants have been a mixed bag of successesand setbacks; however no timeframe could be given with regard to the ongoing campaigns, sources in the military said. ‘It is a continualoperation. It is not going to end in 2008 and it is not going to end in 2009. Don’t be optimistic, as far as the timeframe is concerned. It is adifferent ground and it will take some time’, military sources said in a media briefing." Thus, as the DGMO, Pasha has had a colourlessrecord. That, despite this, he has been posted as the DG,ISI, shows his closeness and loyalty to Kayani, who had taken him for his secretmeeting with Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, on board a US Aircraft Carrier, on August 26,2008, and notLt.Gen.Nadeem Taj.
11. The removal of Nadeem Taj has come in the wake of reports about US concerns and unhappiness over the alleged role of the ISI in theattempt to blow up the Indian Embassy in Kabul on July 7,2008, and over leakage of information shared by the US intelligence with the ISI tothe Taliban. President Bush was reported to have taken up this matter with Prime Minister Gilani, when he visited Washington DC in the lastweek of July as well as with Zardari whom he met in the margins of the current UN General Assembly session. While removing Taj from thepost of DG,ISI, Kayani has taken care not to create a feeling of humiliation in him by posting him as the Commander of an important Corps,but as the Corps Commander at Gujranwala he will not have much to do with Afghanistan or the ongoing military operations in the tribal belt.Kayani has removed him from any role in the operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
12. The removal of Taj from the ISI has also come in the wake of reports of Chinese unhappiness as expressed to Kayani during hisweek-long visit to China from September 21,2008, over the lack of a sense of urgency shown by the ISI in rescuing the two Chineseengineers kidnapped by the TTP on August 29. They were working for a Chinese cellular company in the Dir area of the NWFP. The TTPkidnapped them while they were travelling and removed them to the Swat valley. The TTP has been demanding the release of over 130Taliban members presently in the custody of the Pakistani security agencies in return for their release.
13. The Chinese Embassy in Islamabad and Chinese engineers working in Pakistan have also been reportedly expressing their unhappinessover the lack of a sense of urgency shown by the Gilani Government as a whole in getting the Chinese engineers released. They have beenpointing out as to how Musharraf always gave the first priority to requests from China for assistance and to the commando action orderedby him on the Lal Masjid of Islamabad when some of the students, including Uighurs, in the madrasas of the masjid, kidnapped someChinese women working in Islamabad, and comparing this to the lethargic response of Gilani and Zardari. They feel that Gilani and Zardarihave been giving a greater importance to US interests and concerns than to those of the Chinese.
14. In a report on the subject carried by the 'News" of September 24, 2008, Rahimullah Yusufzai, the well-informed Pakistani journalist, saidas follows: " A Chinese journalist, who requested anonymity, said the Pakistan Government hasn't shown any urgency in getting the twoyoung engineers freed. He recalled how the issue of the two Chinese engineers kidnapped by late Pakistani Taliban commander AbdullahMahsud's men in South Waziristan in 2004 was resolved within a few days. "The recent case of kidnapping of Chinese engineers hasn't beenresolved even after more than three weeks. We were hoping our citizens would have been freed by now, he said."
15. Before his election as the President, Zardari had stated that his first official visit as the President would be to China to underline theimportance attached by him to Pakistan's relations with China. He did not keep his word and instead went on a private visit to the UnitedArab Emirates and the UK and then on an official visit to New York to attend the UN General Assembly session. Pakistani officials have been explaining this away by claiming that his visit to New York was not a bilateral visit to the US and that his first official bilateral visit wouldstill be to China. (30-9-08)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)