Friday, March 22, 2013

THE CASE OF SANJAY DUTT




B.RAMAN

I have been in receipt of many tweets and E-Mails criticizing me for advocating that the case of Sanjay Dutt, who has been convicted under the Arms Act for having been found in illegal possession of two fire-arms and sentenced to five years of imprisonment, should be treated differently and any petition from him for a lenient view of his guilt should be considered sympathetically.

2.In my first tweet after his conviction by a bench of the Supreme Court, I had said that, as in the US, there is a need for a provision in our laws under which a court can allow a convicted criminal in certain cases to do compulsory community service in lieu of imprisonment to cover cases like that of Sanjay.

3.Subsequently, I had tweeted my agreement with the view of retired Justice Katju, Chairman of the Press Council of India, that Sanjay’s case deserves pardon in view of the good service to the community that he and his parents had done in the past. However, I had differed from Justice Katju in respect of the community service. I am of the view that Sanjay could be considered for pardon  not for his good service of the past, but for the community service that he promises to do in future in lieu of the imprisonment. His performance has to be closely monitored by someone designated by the Governor to ensure that he carries out his solemn commitment. If he violates his commitment, his pardon should be cancelled.

4.My views have been strongly criticized on the following grounds .Firstly, he has committed a heinous offence by accepting a gift of arms from a person allegedly connected with Mumbai’s mafia. Secondly, if any special consideration is shown to him by virtue of his celebrity status, it would be a violation of the sacred principle of equality before law. Thirdly, there are many others who are languishing in jail despite their good service to the community. When the law has not shown them any special consideration, why should it show a special consideration only to Sanjay.

5. Sanjay is a confirmed convict under the Arms Act against whom a minimum sentence of five years as provided in the Arms Act has been awarded by the Supreme Court. Taking into consideration the 18 months that Sanjay had already spent in jail during the trial, the court has ordered that he should spend another  three and a half years.

6.I  argue for a lenient view in his case on the following grounds

·      Even though Sanjay has been found guilty of illegal possession of arms, no evidence has been forthcoming to show that he was aware that these arms were part of a consignment that had been smuggled in from Pakistan for use in the Mumbai serial blasts of March 1993. If he was aware of this fact, as a law-abiding citizen, he should have immediately alerted the police and his failure to do so would have amounted to complicity in an act of terrorism. Since there is no evidence to show that he was aware of this fact, he cannot be accused of complicity in an act of terrorism.

·      No other evidence has been forthcoming to show that he was part of the conspiracy relating to the Mumbai blasts. He has not been found guilty of an act of terrorism.

·      Despite the absence of any evidence to show his involvement, he was treated as a suspect under the TADA along with the members of the conspiracy. As a result, he was not tried separately under the Arms Act, but along with the conspirators and perpetrators of the Mumbai blasts. The trial went on for 20 years. Had he been tried separately under the Arms Act and not with others, his case might have concluded a long time ago and by now he might have completed his sentence

·      His case being clubbed along with the cases against others has resulted in his having to wait for 20 years for the final judgment and he has to go to jail now after this long delay, spending another three and a half years in custody. This is unfair to him and is contrary to the principles of natural justice.

7.Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances relating to the conviction of Sanjay I had suggested that he should be treated differently and a sympathetic view should be taken if he petitions for pardon. It will not be a violation of the principle of equality before law. My views have nothing to do with his celebrity status or his family and social connections.

8. If there are others with similar facts and circumstances, their cases have to be examined in the light of those facts and circumstances without any prejudice. In my view, Sanjay had to suffer unfairly because of his case being clubbed along with the cases of the conspirators and perpetrators of the blasts in the absence of credible evidence to warrant it.

9. I will be happy to stand corrected if I have failed to consider any other relevant fact relating to him. (23-3-13)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and , presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

 

Thursday, March 21, 2013

CBI AGAIN UNDER FOCUS



B.RAMAN

The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the Government of Dr.Manmohan Singh have come under criticism for the perceived ham-handedness of the CBI in the investigation of a complaint regarding irregularities in the import of some foreign cars involving suspected evasion in the payment of duty.

2.In connection with the preliminary enquiry into the complaint, which precedes the registration of a First Information Report  (FIR), the CBI allegedly raided the houses of Shri M.K.Stalin and Shri M.K.Alagiri, senior DMK leaders and sons of Shri M.Karunanidhi on the morning of March 21,2113, while looking for the suspected cars.

3.Since the raids came a day after Shri Karunanidhi announced the withdrawal of the DMK from the ruling coalition in protest against the Government’s policy on the violation of the human and political rights of the Sri Lankan Tamils by the Sri Lankan Government, there have been allegations that the raids were politically motivated to teach the DMK a lesson for its action.

4.Dr.Manmohan Singh and some senior Ministers from the Congress (I) have dissociated themselves from any responsibility for the controversial raid and found fault with the CBI action. There has been professional as well as political ham-handedness in the entire affair.

5. The CBI has the duty and the responsibility to take cognizance of reports of illegalities and investigate them if such investigation falls within its charter, irrespective of the political and other background of the persons against whom complaints have been made.

6.The timing of the investigation  is in the hands of the CBI. Action has to be immediate where heinous offences such as murder or terrorism are involved or where there are reasons to apprehend tampering with the evidence by the wrong-doers if the investigation is delayed.

7.The investigation in connection with irregularities in the import of foreign cars did not come under any of these categories. It was not a heinous offence. Nor were there grounds to apprehend attempts to tamper with evidence.

8.The CBI could have chosen its timing keeping in view the possibility of misrepresentations and misprojections to attribute political motives to the raids in order to discredit the CBI as well as the Government. If it had delayed the raids by a few days till the heat of the controversy over the withdrawal of the DMK from the ruling coalition has died down, heavens would not have fallen. This is where sound professional   judgment  comes in. While one could not fault the CBI for the raids, one could fault its judgment in rushing with them.

9. There is so far no evidence to believe that the raids were undertaken at the instance of anyone in the Government or the Congress. It would seem that the Prime Minister and some senior Ministers were taken unawares by the raid. There were panic reactions due to a fear that the raids may further complicate the relations of the Congress with the DMK  at a time when the  Congress had not given up hopes of finding a face-saver that might enable the DMK to at least support the Government from outside.

10. In the resulting panic, the Prime Ministers and the senior Ministers handled the sequel to the raids with lack of political finesse---not only criticizing the CBI, but also giving the impression of asking the CBI to discontinue the raids. They forgot they had no powers to do so.

11.As a result of the mishandling  by the Government, the CBI has been put in an embarrassing position. It will be suspected if it went ahead with the investigation and even more suspected if it did not.

12. Building up the credibility of the CBI as an independent organization known for its professionalism depends not only on its officers, but also on the political leadership which should refrain from actions or inactions that could impact on the prestige of the CBI.

13.In the final analysis, we will get the CBI we deserve. There is no point in blaming it all the time----right or wrong .(22-3-13)

 

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. Twitter: @SORBONNE75)

 

Wednesday, March 20, 2013

XI JINPING ON SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS




B.RAMAN

In his first visit abroad as the President of China since assuming office on March 14,2013, Mr.Xi Jinping is scheduled to visit Russia, Tanzania, South Africa and the Republic of Congo from March 22-30 and attend the fifth BRICS( Brazil,Russia,India,China and South Africa) summit on March 26-27 in Durban, South Africa. In the margins of the summit, he is scheduled to have bilateral talks with Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh.

2. The PLA Daily of March 21 has carried a report disseminated by the official Xinhua news agency the previous day on an interaction which Xi had before his visit with representatives of the Chinese media as well as media representatives of the BRICS countries based in Beijing.

3.In addition to Xi’s views on the importance of BRICs as an economic co-operation organization, the Xinhua report as published by the PLA Daily highlights the views expressed by Xi on Sino-Indian relations.

4. To quote from the Xinhua report as published by the PLA Daily:

  On Sino-Indian ties, Xi said, to jointly follow a path of peaceful development and development through cooperation not only meets the common interests of China and India, the two largest developing countries in the world, but also does a great service to Asia and the world at large.

  Speaking highly of the important headway in bilateral ties in recent years thanks to concerted efforts of the two sides, Xi urged both countries that are pursuing development at a faster pace to seize the opportunities and take solid steps to bolster cooperation and exchanges in all fields, accommodate each other's core concerns and properly handle their problems and differences.

  On the boundary problem, Xi said it is a complex issue left from history, and solving the issue won't be easy. But he said he believes "as long as we keep up our friendly consultations, we can eventually arrive at a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement."

  "Pending the final settlement of the boundary question, the two sides should work together to maintain peace and tranquility in border areas and prevent the boundary question from affecting the overall development of bilateral relations," the President added.”

5. Two significant points in his observations need to be underlined. Firstly, he talks of China’s “core concerns” vis-à-vis India and not core interests. Xi and other Chinese leaders talk of “core interests and major concerns” when they talk of China’s relations with the US, Japan and the ASEAN countries. When they talk of core interests and major concerns, they have in mind Taiwan and sovereignty issues relating to the islands in the South and East China Seas.

6. While Xi has not spelt out what are the core concerns of China vis-à-vis India, one could assess that these probably relate to the activities of the Government-in-exile of His Holiness the Dalai Lama from Indian territory, China’s sovereignty claims relating to Arunachal Pradesh and India’s strategic relations with Vietnam and Japan.

7. Of late, the Chinese have been accusing the Dalai Lama’s set-up of orchestrating the self-immolations in the Tibetan areas of China. It is likely that the reported revival of the activities of the Tibetan Youth League (TYC) and other pro-independence elements in the Tibetan diaspora in the West could be interpreted by Beijing as adding to its concerns.

8.Even though the Chinese have not openly taken up these issues, the likely impact of the Chinese concerns on this subject on our bilateral relations with China has to be continuously monitored and assessed.

9. As I had pointed out in the past, the Chinese attitude on the border dispute with India has been less confrontational than their territorial sovereignty-related disputes with Japan and the ASEAN countries, particularly Vietnam. In the case of India, they have accepted over the years “mutual accommodation” as one of the principles that should be followed in any border settlement. While they are prepared for mutual accommodation in a border settlement with India, they never talk of mutual accommodation in their disputes with Japan and the ASEAN countries. It is this Chinese acceptance of mutual accommodation with India that should explain the absence of rhetoric when they talk of the border  dispute with India as contrasted with the rhetoric in their statements on the South and East China Seas.

10.China’s nuanced policy in matters relating to sovereignty disputes with India is evident from Xi’s recognition of the border issue as a complex problem on which the two countries should keep negotiating while maintaining peace and tranquility across the border and without allowing the dispute to affect the over-all development of the bilateral relations.

11. This is a formulation  with`  which India need have no quarrel. Neither India nor China has been transparent on the progress in the border talks. As a result, one does not know where the two countries are stuck up. The conventional belief is that the lack of progress is due to India’s opposition to China’s demand for the transfer of Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh to China.

12. In the absence of details regarding the present stage of the talks, there has been no contribution by the non-governmental community of analysts to the search for options to find a compromise solution. There is a need for the two Governments to be more forthcoming on the border talks so that the search for a compromise solution could be intensified. Ultimately, public and political opinion in India has to accept a border settlement .Keeping them in the picture will facilitate this. Since India too has accepted the principle of mutual accommodation, a compromise has to be found which will not seriously affect the national interests of the two countries. Why not the two Governments appoint a small core group of non-Governmental experts from the two countries to come up with alternate ideas that could be mutually acceptable?

13. On the question of China’s core concerns regarding India’s strategic relations with Vietnam and Japan, there is no reason for India to be defensive or apologetic about them. India’s relations with Vietnam and Japan do not pose a threat to China whereas the increasing presence of the Chinese Army in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) and Gilgit-Baltistan and of the Chinese Navy in Gwadar in Balochistan do pose a threat to India’s security. The Chinese have been indifferent to India’s core concerns on this. There is  no reason for India to be sensitive to Chinese concerns regarding its relations with Vietnam and Japan. (21-3-13)

 

( The writer is Additional Secretary ( retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre  for China Studies. Twitter: @SORBONNE75)

Tuesday, March 19, 2013

IS THERE A NEO-LTTE EMERGING ?




B.RAMAN

Is there a neo-LTTE emerging nearly four years after the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was wiped out in May, 2009, by the Sri Lankan Security Forces? That is a question that needs the attention of the intelligence agencies in the wake of the growing support for the Sri Lankan Tamils’ political and human rights in the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora abroad and among large sections of the international community.

2.India had reasons to be gratified with the total elimination of the LTTE, which had become a Frankenstein’s Monster, by the Sri Lankan security forces. Indian intelligence and security agencies  had played an active, but low profile role in helping in the counter-LTTE operations of the Sri Lankan security forces through means such as exchange of intelligence, monitoring the movement of LTTE's commercial ships used for smuggling arms and ammunition, strengthening the anti-aircraft defence of the Sri Lankan forces, training etc.

3.While one has to concede that the uprooting of the LTTE was largely due to the excellent counter-insurgency operations of the Sri Lankan Security Forces, the unadmitted contribution of India was not insignificant.

4. While the Governments of India and Sri Lanka were on the same wave length before the elimination of the LTTE in May 2009, nagging differences cropped up post-May 2009, due to various reasons. Firstly, the Government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa sought to impose a dictated peace on the Sri Lankan Tamil population in total breach of the various promises regarding political accommodation with the Tamils which the Rajapaksa Govdernment and its predecessors had made over a period of years. India’s counter-insurgency help to Sri Lanka was in the expectation that the Sri Lankan Government would implement these commitments.

5. Secondly, after the operations against the LTTE were over, evidence, at least some of it credible, started emerging regarding alleged disproportionate use of force by the Sri Lankan Security Forces not only against the LTTE, but also against the civilian Tamil population living in areas controlled by the LTTE. Instead of addressing these complaints and taking corrective action where required, the Rajapaksa Government started dragging its feet in the matter. Backed by countries like China and Pakistan, it became increasingly indifferent to nudgings not only from the US and the EU countries, but even India to attend to these complaints before they became a major international issue.

6. Thirdly, one found that the admiration of the world for the successful counter-insurgency operations of the Sri Lankan Government gave way to pressures from various quarters for attending to these complaints.

7. Fourthly, the successful counter-insurgency operations destroyed the LTTE’s support base in Sri Lankan territory, but not among the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora abroad. This diaspora had played a very important role in keeping the LTTE sustained through funds and clandestine supply of arms and ammunition. After lying low for a while after May 2009, the Sri Lankan Tamil political activists in the diaspora became active once again in giving fresh oxygen to the objective of an independent Tamil Eelam. The unaddressed complaints of serious violations of the human rights of the Sri Lankan Tamils were exploited by these elements to give a fresh lease of life to the movement with the help of Western human rights organisations which exercised pressure on their Governments to act against the Rajapaksa Government.

8. Fifthly, a new generation of Tamil activists mushroomed in Tamil Nadu, who acted in tandem with the activists in the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora, for reviving the Tamil Eelam objective. Growing number of members of GenNext in the Tamil Community in Tamil Nadu, which had become disillusioned with the opportunistic politics of the traditional Dravidian parties, found themselves attracted to the ranks of neo-Dravidian parties which sought to develop a political base in Tamil Nadu by taking up the cause of the Sri Lankan Tamils and by projecting Prabakaran once again as a Tamil icon.

9. Sixthly, unnerved by the support of GenNext for the neo-Dravidian parties, the traditional Dravidian parties found themselves obliged to indulge in competitive political extremism by taking up the cause of the Sri Lankan Tamils once again.

10. As a result of all these factors, the Government of India and the mainstream Indian political parties find themselves confronted with a welter of extremist forces, which have been exploiting  legitimate complaints and demands regarding the human rights of the Tamils, for creating a volatile situation across the Tamil belt in India and Sri Lanka.

11. The situation calls for deft handling by the Ministries of External Affairs and Home acting together. It has the germinating seeds of new political violence. In the past, whenever the Sri Lankan Tamil issue assumed importance in our policy-making, the political leadership in New Delhi had the benefit of sound advice and inputs from the Congress in Tamil Nadu which had its feet and ears close to the ground in Tamil Nadu as well as the Eastern and Northern Provinces of  Sri Lanka.

12. Today, the Congress is practically non-existent in Tamil Nadu.it has no leader of stature who attracts the GenNext. New Delhi’s handling of the post-May 2009  situation has been drifting from one faux pas to another, from one bungling to another. Only India can and should play the leadership role in dealing with the complex situation. Instead of dong so, the Manmohan Singh Government has surrendered all political initiative internationally to the US and the EU countries and locally to parties such as the DMK, motivated by political opportunism.

13.If the Government of India does not play a more proactive role in this matter, a neo-LTTE is waiting to take over the ground situation. ( 20-3-13)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

Monday, March 18, 2013

TIBETAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT SPREADS


 



B.RAMAN

The Tibetan independence (Rangzen) movement, started on November 23, 2001, by Thubten Jigme Norbu, former Abbot of the Kumbum monastery and Professor Emeritus at the Indiana University in the US,  has been slowly spreading.

2. The movement, which was launched by a group of Tibetans who constituted themselves into what was called the Rangzen Alliance, describes its objectives as follows: “The Rangzen Alliance is a movement of committed Tibetans and friends, world-over, who have joined together to provide a common platform of action for the realization of three goals:

a.     The restoration of Tibetan independence.

b.     The return of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to Tibet as the sovereign head-of-state of an independent nation.

c.     The establishment of a fully democratic system of government in exile Tibetan society and in free Tibet – based on the rule of law and the primacy of individual freedom.”

3.     The Rangzen movement enjoys the support of the Tibetan Youth League (TYC) and many members of the Tibetan diaspora spread across the world. While the movement has reservations about the middle road policy advocated by His Holiness the Dalai Lama envisaging autonomy for all the Tibetan areas of China in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan and Yunnan, it has been strongly backing the leadership of His Holiness.

4.     The movement, which had lost some momentum after the brutal suppression of the Tibetans by the People’s Liberation Army after the anti-Chinese riots of March 2008, is again showing signs of gathering strength as resentment builds up among the Tibetans of China and the diaspora over the Chinese indifference to the continuing self-immolation of Tibetan monks and others in the Tibetan areas since March 2009. 108 Tibetans have so far committed self-immolation, the majority of them in the Sichuan province.

 5.The total Chinese indifference to the self-immolations and their attempts to arrest and persecute relatives and friends of those committing self-immolation on charges of complicity have added to the resentment and injected fresh oxygen into the Rangzen movement. On February 13, 2013, the  TYC organised a two-day Rangzen Conference , which was attended by around 35 independence activists.

6.The  Rangzen Conference also marked 100 years of His Holiness the 13th Dalai Lama’s Proclamation of Tibetan Independence. Speaking at the Conference, Dhondup Lhadar, vice-president of TYC, stressed that every Tibetan had the responsibility to “preserve the legacy of the 13th Dalai Lama and uphold the truth of an independent and sovereign Tibet.”

7.“More than a hundred Tibetans have given the ultimate non-violent sacrifice of setting themselves on fire protesting China’s occupation,” Lhadar said. “It is our sacred duty to repeat history a 100 years later and realise the return of our most beloved leader His Holiness the Dalai Lama.”

8.The same day, activists of the Tibetan diaspora in New York and Paris announced the formation of a   Tibetan National Congress (TNC)  to disseminate the views of independence-minded Tibetans in the Tibetan community and in Tibet’s  democratic government in exile.

9.A  spokesman of the TNC Jigme Ugen told Radio Free Asia in an interview as follows:“Naturally there will be different viewpoints about what is the best course to take, but I believe that Tibetan democracy is ready at this point for those viewpoints to be respectfully and openly debated through constructive political participation.”

 10.“We expect more members to come out from other organizations and from the broader Tibetan society who really believe not just in Rangzen [independence] but in democracy. TNC will help form a common platform.” 

11.The supporters of the TNC plan to hold a global conference in September next to work out their programme of action.The total silence of Xi Jinping, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, who took over as the President of China on March 14,2013, on the Tibetan issue has added to the determination of the independence activists to strengthen their movement even if its goals are at variance with the Middle Road policy of His Holiness.

12.His Holiness has not yet expressed his views on the emergence of the TNC, but he may not discourage any movement that uses non-violent means for asserting the rights of the Tibetans---whether the rights are for autonomy or independence. The Chinese calculations that somehow the Tibetan struggle will peter out as they forge ahead with their programme for economic development have been belied so far. The fact that the new generation of Tibetans is even more determined than the older generation to assert Tibetan rights indicates that the Chinese may not be able to suppress the Tibetans. ( 19-3-13)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Friday, March 15, 2013

NEW CHINESE LEADERSHIP: CAUTIOUS & POLITICALLY CONSERVATIVE


 


B.RAMAN

China’s new State leadership was formally installed in office at the 12th National People’s Congress (NPC), which concluded in Beijing after a fortnight’s session on March 16,2013.

2.As expected, Xi Jinping, who had taken over as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the Party at the 18th Party Congress in November last, took over from Hu Jintao as the State President and the Chairman of the State CMC on March 14,2013.

3.Li Kequiang took over as the Prime Minister from Wen Jiabao the next day. In their personal qualities, the two leaders are a sharp contrast to Hu and Wen. Unlike Hu, who was formal, mostly unsmiling and withdrawn, Xi is relaxed, warm in his personal interactions with his colleagues and party functionaries and outgoing.

4.Wen was a warm and people friendly leader, who mixed easily with party functionaries and the ordinary people and came to be loved as “grandpa Wen”. Not much is yet known about his successor Li, but he seems to be modeled more after Hu.

5. Those who expected some winds of political change to blow from the NPC would have reasons to be disappointed. Despite being personally likeable, Xi came out as a cautious and politically conservative leader who is unlikely to take any major political initiatives.

6.His cautious approach was stamped on the proceedings and style of the NPC. Whereas the previous NPC sessions used to be lively with China’s growing community of netizens competing vigorously with the NPC to become the real voice of the people, the just-concluded NPC session was lack-lustre, carefully orchestrated and discouraged competitive debates from the online community.

7.Nothing brought out the change in style more dramatically than the unusually restrained role of Wen in the proceedings. Wen, who in the past used to be in the forefront of leaders advocating political reforms to follow economic reforms and who used to point out that Deng Xiao-Ping felt that economic reforms would not be sustainable unless ultimately followed by appropriate political reforms, was relatively inarticulate on this subject.

8. References to the need for political reforms took a back seat in the 12th NPC. Apart from the importance of revamping the Chinese economy, two other messages which came out loud and clear from the NPC were the inadvisability of experimenting with Western style political reforms and the importance of continuing the effective control of the CPC over the PLA.

9. The proposed revamping of the economy would stress quality growth with greater priority to encouraging domestic consumption and reducing the dependence on  foreign investment. It would also pay attention to measures for the removal of present ills in the economy such as corruption, inefficiency, inequality and environmental damage. The emphasis would still be on sustaining the Chinese economy as the second largest after that of the US, but livelihood issues and issues likely to impact political stability and social harmony  such as corruption and environmental pollution would receive greater attention.

10. The new leadership feels that the measures for the revamping of the economy cannot succeed without continuing political stability. It is in this context that any talk of political experimentation is sought to be discouraged. It was stressed that the present political system based on consultative inner party and inner State democracy without contentious public debates on policy issues has served the country well and would continue. This would mean the continued primacy of the CPC as the decision maker.  

11.Yu Zhengsheng,  the newly-elected chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), was quoted as telling a session of the CPPCC on March 12: “China will promote consultative democracy and will not copy Western political systems under any circumstances. We need to steadfastly uphold the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC), adhere to and improve the system of multiparty cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of the CPC….We need to more strictly follow the  socialist path of political development with Chinese characteristics, not imitate Western political systems under any circumstances, always adhere to the correct political orientation, and strengthen the CPPCC's ideological and political foundations of collective struggle."

12.The other message that came out of the NPC was the strengthening of China’s military power side by side with its economic power and the need to ensure the absolute loyalty of the PLA to the CPC. In a statement issued on March 12 after an address the previous day by Xi Jinping to a  panel meeting of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) delegation  to the NPC, the PLA’s General Political Department said: “All military staff must comprehend and implement the key points conveyed in Xi's speech and thoroughly understand the vital role of national defense and military building in realizing the "Chinese dream." They must  fully seize the opportunities and meet the challenges China is facing in safeguarding national security and sustaining development, and further enhance their sense of responsibility and mission.”

13.The statement called on military staff to follow the directions of Xi and ensure victories in any war. It also asked forces personnel to live frugal lifestyles and reject waste so as to make better use of military spending.

14. According to the Xinhua, Xi urged the armed forces to be "absolutely loyal" to the Party and bring the country's defense capacity and army building to new high.

15. China’s power projection in the economic as well as military fields was laid down as the primary tasks of the Party and the Government in the coming years and it was underlined that any political experimentation would come in the way of political stability and social harmony which were essential for achieving these goals.

16. Any expectation that the new leadership would take China on the road to a more liberal society would be premature. (16-3-13)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre for China Studies. Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )