MARINES:AN OVER-ANXIETY TO OBLIGE THE ITALIAN GOVT

 

B.RAMAN

 

An over-anxiety on the part of the Government of India to oblige the Italian Government on the issue of the two Italian Marines, who have been charged with killing two Kerala fishermen wrongly mistaking them for pirates in an incident that took place on February 15,2012, has created suspicions in public mind on the bona fides of the Government of India. The Italian Marines were posted as sentries on board a private Italian tanker at the time of the incident.

2.The following two questions arose as a result of the incident: (a). Was the Italian contention that the fishermen approached their ship in an aggressive manner thereby giving the impression that they were pirates corroborated by other evidence? (b)Did the incident take place in Indian territorial waters or outside?

3.The Italian contention was that the incident took place outside Indian territorial waters and that the fishermen definitely appeared to be approaching the Italian tanker with hostile intention, which gave the Marines the right to open fire in self-defence.

4.The Indian contention was that the incident took place in Indian waters and that the Kerala fishermen were unarmed. Hence, the question of their approaching the Italian vessel in a hostile manner did not arise.

5. India rejected Italy’s demand that the case should be tried before an Italian court in Italy. Having rejected the Italian contention, India should have vigorously gone ahead in prosecuting the Italian Marines. It did not do so.

6.On the contrary, special facilities were given to the accused Italian Marines and there was a definite half-heartedness in proceeding against them. They were released on bail and allowed to stay in a hotel at the expense of the Italian Embassy. They were allowed to go to Italy to spend Christmas with their families---an extraordinary gesture to under-trials in a murder case. Even though they were supposed to be in Indian judicial custody, they were not accompanied to Italy by Indian guards. However, they returned from Italy after Christmas as promised by the Italian Embassy in New Delhi.

7. On January 18, 2013, the Indian Supreme Court had ruled that the  Kerala Government had no jurisdiction to prosecute the marines and had directed the Union government to constitute a special court in consultation with the Chief Justice of India (CJI) for fresh trial.

8. There was a delay in constituting the special court, which led the Supreme Court to observe as follows: "Why is the Centre dragging its feet over the matter? Nobody has initiated any consultation process till now."

9. Even as the Government of India was dragging its feet on setting up the special court, applications from the Marines for permission to go to Italy again to cast their votes in the Italian elections on February 22 came up for hearing before the Supreme Court. The Government of India did not vigorously oppose the applications on the ground that the Marines could exercise their postal ballot or vote in the Italian Embassy. The Italian Embassy’s contention that postal ballot was not possible was accepted and on a commitment made by the Embassy that they would return after casting their ballots they were allowed to travel to Italy.

10.Even though the elections were over on February 22, they did not return till March 11. Nobody in Delhi appeared to have noticed this delay till the Italian Foreign office informed the Government of India on March 11 that the Marines would not return since the Government of India had no jurisdiction to try them. A new Government, which advocated a stronger line against the Government of India on this issue, had come to power after the February 22 elections and it had no qualms about breaking the commitment made by the previous Government to the Indian Supreme Court. This time too,  the Marines travelled to Italy as free individuals and not as under-trials in Indian judicial custody

11.The credibility of the Government of India in the eyes of the Indian public has taken a beating as a result of the seeming over-anxiety of the Government to oblige Italy instead of asserting on its right to have them tried before a special court as ordered by the Supreme Court.

12. The half-heartedness of the Government of India in prosecuting the Marines is likely to be interpreted by the detractors of the Government as an indicator of the influence exercised by Italy over the Government of India’s actions n this case.

13. Apart from the usual drama of diplomatic protests, the Government has placed the country in a position of having very few options to uphold the country’s self-respect and honour. ( 12-3-2013)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. Twitter : @SORBONNE75)

ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN BD: A SET-BACK, BUT NOT YET A DEFEAT

B.RAMAN

The Shabag movement of  Dhaka, which is also referred to as Bangladesh Spring, has been like the Tahrir Square movement of Egypt (2010), a spontaneous uprising of the youth of Dhaka demanding the death penalty for leaders of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) of Bangladesh presently under trial before an international criminal tribunal for their role in opposing the liberation movement of Bangladesh in 1971, collaborating with Pakistan and carrying out the massacre of a large number of civilians, including well-known intellectuals, for supporting the liberation.

2. Like the Tahrir Square movement, the Shabag movement, named after a locality in Dhaka where it started on February 5,2013, is an iconless movement triggered off by spontaneous public (mainly the youth) anger and outrage over the non-award of the death penalty to a prominent leader of the JEI and imparted momentum through social media networks. But, whereas the Tahrir Square movement was against the dictatorial rule of the Hosni Mubarak Government and not against Islamic extremism, the Shabag movement has been against the JEI and other Islamic extremist groups, which tried to impose their stamp on the liberal society of Bangladesh.

3.Whereas the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt has been an ultimate political beneficiary of the Tahrir Square movement, if the Shabag movement maintains its momentum and succeeds, it could mark the triumph of liberal political forces in Bangladesh over the Islamic extremist elements with close links with Pakistan.

4. Even the mainstream political parties of Bangladesh, including the Awami League of Sheikh Hasina, which has been a relentless opponent of the JEI, and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party of Begum Khalida Zia, which has been a political ally of the JEI, were taken by surprise by the spontaneous Shabag movement and the demand of the youth not only for  death penalty to the war criminals of the JEI, but even for a ban on the JEI and other Islamic extremist groups.

5.The mainstream political parties had totally underestimated the depth of the hatred of the youth of Dhaka for the Islamic extremists. Their ill-concealed attempts to take advantage of the mass uprising for their political benefit have been rebuffed by the youth, who are not prepared to be co-opted by any of these parties.

6. While traditional liberal forces in Bangladesh and in the international community, including India, have reasons to be gratified by the mass movement spearheaded by the enlightened youth of Dhaka against Islamic extremism and for justice to those who were butchered by these elements in pre-1971 East Pakistan, it is still uncertain how the movement will evolve and where it will ultimately lead Bangladesh to.

7.While wishing success to the movement, one should avoid wishful-thinking that the movement will finally bury the JEI and other Islamic extremist forces which have managed to survive 1971.It is still largely a Dhaka movement confined to the intellectuals and the working class. The JEI never enjoyed much popularity among these elements.

8.The JEI drew its following largely from among the peasants in rural Bangladesh. There are no reports of the rural youth rallying against the JEI. The JEI’s support base in the rural areas consists not only of the little-educated and impoverished peasant class, but also of the die-hard core of jihadi elements belonging to organizations such as the Harkat-ul-Jihad-Al-Islami (BD), which had fought along with the Afghan Mujahideen, the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan before 9/11. The successes scored by the BD intelligence and security forces against the jihadi forces after Sheikh Hasina returned to power have definitely weakened them, but not rooted them out of rural Bangladesh. The JEI, which is not presently in a position to retaliate against the youth of the Shabag movement on the ground, will focus on rallying its rural supporters and cells in order to maintain Islamic extremism as a relevant force in BD. It is already trying to discredit the Shabag movement psychologically in the minds of the people by projecting the youth organizers as anti-Islam and atheists.

9.The JEI will also try to target the Hindu minorities in order to create a diversionary movement. One can be reasonably certain that the Government of Sheikh Hasina and her intelligence agencies and security forces would be aware of the tactics that the JEI would use to tire out the Shabag movement and create new pockets of polarization in the BD society. It is a matter of gratification that the security forces have been confronting the JEI and other extremist forces with determination in the rural areas. This would indicate that the JEI and its allies have not been able to penetrate the security forces so far in any substantial degree.

10.BD society has extremist forces of two vintages--- the pre-1971 vintage constituted by the pro-Pakistan JEI and its allies and the post-1971 vintage constituted by  new Islamic organizations such as the Hizbut Tehrir (HT), which advocate an Islamic Caliphate to be achieved through penetration and not through violence. The HT has been active in BD too, but it has been lying low in the present situation. It will try to benefit ideologically from the present movement against the JEI.

11.The liberal forces in BD society have asserted themselves dramatically, but one cannot take for granted their ultimate success. Islamic extremism of different hues will continue to be a danger to be reckoned with in BD society. Any over-confidence of the liberal forces that they have given a death-blow to the Islamic extremists will be unwise. The extremists have suffered a set-back, but not a defeat. ( 7-3-13)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

MALDIVES:KEEPING NASHEED ALIVE

B.RAMAN

India has a moral obligation to see that former President Mohammad Nasheed, who was arrested by Maldivian Commandoes on March 5,2013, in alleged response to a court order to face trial in a case pending against him, remains alive and is not shown by the Maldivian Government of President Mohammad Waheed as killed in an encounter while trying to escape from custody.

2. Even though he might have been arrested ostensibly in pursuance of a court order, his arrest is a breach of faith on the part of the Waheed Government. He left the Indian High Commission, where he had taken sanctuary, in response to assurances regarding his safety and security. India, which played a role in the negotiations that led to his leaving his safe sanctuary  in the High Commission, is a guarantor of the assurances given by the Waheed Government regarding his safety and security.

3. India should immediately make it clear to former President Abdul Gayoom, who has allegedly been playing an active behind-the-scene role in advising the Government of Waheed, that it will hold him and Waheed personally and morally responsible for the safety and security of Nasheed and that should anything untoward happen to him while in custody India would act in the appropriate manner to ensure that solemn assurances given to India by the Government are not violated with impunity.

4. To underline the seriousness of the Government of India’s concerns, some ships of our Navy should take up position near the Maldivian capital so that they can mount an economic blockade should anything happen to Nasheed . (5-3-13)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. Twitter: @SORBONNE75)

PAKISTAN, AN EVOLVING STATE

 

B.RAMAN

In our preoccupation with the anti-India activities of the Pakistani jihadi organisations,  we should not overlook the positive factors that have brought a ray of hope not only to Pakistan, but to the region as a whole.

2. The most positive factor is the fact that the mainstream political class in Pakistan---with the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) of Mr.Nawaz Sharif in the forefront--- have been showing for the last five years since the last elections were held a greater sense of political balance and maturity than ever before in the history of Pakistan.

3. The past habit of political leaders of running to the Army as an institution or to individual Army officers for help in countering the activities of their political opponents is slowly fading away. There is a welcome realization in the mainstream political class that it cannot escape its share of responsibility for the Army acquiring the role of an arbiter in political matters.

4.All mainstream political parties now realize that to curb the political role of the Army and to promote genuine democracy,  it is important that the political parties fight out their differences in the legislatures and town halls and should not take them to the army for arbitration.

5. It is this balance, maturity and self-restraint that contributed to the present PPP-led coalition being able to complete its normal tenure of five years. The credit for the remarkable fact that the elected National Assembly and the civilian Government have been able to complete their tenure of five years should go not only to the mainstream political parties but also to the senior Army leadership headed by Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff, who resisted the temptation to intervene on occasions when they could have done so without creating a public outcry.

6. The controversy over the role of Mr.Hussain Haqqani as the Pakistani Ambassador to the US was one such occasion when the Army leadership was under considerable provocation to act to express its indignation over the back-channel assurances allegedly conveyed to the US by Haqqani regarding the steps which the Asif Zardari Government would be prepared to take in return for the US support to the civilian leadership.

7. The fact that Kayani resisted the temptation and urge to intervene reflected well on him and the senior officers under him. By exercising self-restraint, the Army under Kayani contributed to the continuance of the elected civilian leadership for its normal term of five years.

8. The Army still claims for itself the primacy of decision-making in matters concerning national security in general and relations with India in particular. It is still not prepared to allow the civilian leadership a role in monitoring and supervising the functioning of the Armed Forces. But, it is now prepared to keep away from politics if its primacy in decision-making in these matters is respected by the elected leadership.

9.This unwritten code of compromise between the political and military leadership can be an important first step towards the evolution of Pakistan as a genuine democracy.

10. Despite sectarian and jihadi violence, Pakistan is not a failed State. Despite its economic difficulties, Pakistan is not a failing State. The last five years have shown that Pakistan is an evolving State. It is still an ideological State. It is still attached to the ideology of its founding fathers. But it is an ideology tempered by political maturity, balance and pragmatism. It is in the interest of all of us to encourage this evolution. ( 3-3-13)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director. Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. Twitter @SORBONNE75 )

 

INDER GUJRAL & INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

B.RAMAN

‘The Hindu” of February 26,2013, has carried an article  titled “ No Solace In This Quantum of Accountability” written by Samir Saran, Vice-President, and Abhijit Iyer-Mitra, Programme Co-Ordinstor of the Observer Research Foundation (ORF).It is about the accountability of the intelligence agencies.

2. My views on accountability are well known and I do not feel the need to repeat them. I wanted to comment on the following observation by the two writers: “ If folklore has it right, if R&AW had a charter, it would have legally pre-empted a former Prime Minister’s order to abandon operations in Pakistan. It cost India 30 years worth of accumulated ground assets and priceless reach.”

3. The reference is apparently to former Prime Minister Inder Gujral. It is not correct that Gujral ordered the R&AW operations in Pakistan to be abandoned. The R&AW had two kinds of operations in Pakistan---- for intelligence collection and covert action.

4.He ordered only the operations for covert action to be closed since he felt that such a gesture might facilitate his efforts to improve relations with Pakistan under the so-called Gujral Doctrine. He did not order the intelligence collection operations to be discontinued. It would have been stupid on his part  to have done so. He, like all our Prime Ministers before and after him, understood the importance of a good intelligence collection capability in Pakistan. What he ordered to be closed accounted for only about 15 per cent of the R&AW’s operations in Pakistan. He encouraged the remaining 85 per cent to continue.

5. There was a debate in the intelligence community over the wisdom of his order to wind up the covert action operations. Many senior officers met him and explained to him that building a covert action capability took a long time. If one day the Government felt the need for resuming covert actions, there would be no trained and experienced assets on the ground. It was suggested to him that if he felt strongly on the subject, the covert action operations should be suspended, but not discontinued. He could not be convinced.

6. When the NDA Government under Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee came to office, the intelligence community was hoping that he would cancel Gujral’s decision and order  the resumption of covert action operations in Pakistan. To their surprise, they found that Vajpayee too, like Gujral, wanted the R&AW to focus on intelligence collection in Pakistan and avoid operations for covert action.

7. Some serving officers, who felt disappointed by the reluctance of Vajpayee to  resume covert actions, arranged a meeting for me with Brajesh Mishra, the then National Security Adviser. I met him in his office in New Delhi, and explained to him the importance of resuming our covert action operations in Pakistan.

8. He gave me a patient hearing and said: “ I am already convinced. You don’t have to convince me. But the Prime Minister (Vajpayee) thinks otherwise. We have to carry out his wishes.”

9.There the matter ended. Even if the R&AW had a charter, there was no question of its being able to pre-empt Gujral’s orders. As R.N.Kao used to say, the R&AW and the IB are the two clandestine swords of the Prime Minister. It is upto him to decide how they will be used. His desires and orders have to be observed. No intelligence chief can overlook them---charter or no charter. (26-2-13)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India)

DECLINE IN COUNTER-TERRORISM LEADERSHIP

B.RAMAN

( Written at the request of the Economic Times, New Delhi, and carried by it on February 23,2013)

The two blasts in the Dilsukhnagar area of Hyderabad on February 21,2013, in which 14 persons are reported to have died, cannot be categorized as mass fatality terrorism. The blasts were directed at soft targets in a crowded area. Details available so far do not indicate what could have been the motive or who might have been the perpetrators. The police as well as the public should refrain from speculation that could mislead and distort the investigation.

2. The improvised explosive devices (IEDs) did not have any unique signature. The explosive used does not appear to have been of a sophisticated kind . Fertiliser-based ammonium nitrate, which is easy to procure and which can be lethal when mixed with certain chemicals, is the main suspect for the present. For many years now, terrorists in many countries have been using ammonium nitrate-based IEDs, for their acts of terrorism.

3. Expertise in the fabrication of IEDS using ammonium nitrate as the core material is available in many web sites run by terrorist organisations. No special training is required in the matter. In Western countries, the counter-terrorism agencies have been able to reduce the use of ammonium nitrate by terrorists by imposing strict regulations on their storage and sale to persons who are not genuine farmers. We are yet to impose and enforce similar regulations in India.

4. If it turns out that ammonium nitrate has been used once again for an act of terror, priority should be given to measures for imposing such regulations in India.

5. Our counter-terrorism agencies continue to face the threat of sporadic acts of terrorism carried out by individuals or groups wanting to give vent to their anger against the State or other communities. While our police and intelligence agencies are able to collect intelligence regarding sustained acts of terrorism by groups with known objectives, targets and modus operandi, they face difficulty in monitoring the activities of individuals and groups indulging in sporadic acts of terrorism triggered by anger of the moment due to some reason or the other.

6.While sustained domestic terrorism of the kind witnessed before 2008 is by and large under control, sporadic attacks of the kind witnessed in Mumbai, Pune and Hyderabad pose a problem for our intelligence and counter-terrorism agencies.

7. The State Police have to play a more active role in preventing sporadic acts of terrorism and they have to be assisted by the central agencies. The National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), which has remained a non-starter due to reservations from some States ruled by non-Congress parties, might have strengthened the joint capability of the Centre and the States for preventing sporadic terrorism. The absence of a political consensus on the NCTC leaves a big gap in our counter-terrorism architecture.

8. We face three kinds of terrorism--- state-sponsored terrorism emanating from Pakistan, domestic terrorism of a sustained nature  and domestic terrorism of a sporadic kind. While the threat of state-sponsored terrorism from Pakistan continues, it has not repeated itself after the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. Domestic terrorism of a sustained nature of the kind that we witnessed in 2007 and 2008 due to the activities of the Indian Mujahideen has been disrupted by the action taken by our central agencies and the State police to identify and disrupt their sleeper cells. Terrorism of the sporadic kind continues as seen in Mumbai, Pune and Hyderabad

9. Shri P.Chidambaram, who took over as the Home Minister after the 26/11 terrorist strikes, managed to strengthen our capabilities against all the three kinds of terrorism. His drive, though sometimes controversial as in the case of the NCTC, kept our agencies on their toes. The kind of vigorous leadership that he provided to our counter-terrorism efforts, has been missing since Shri Sushil Kumar Shinde took over from him last year. Counter-terrorism leadership is once again in a state of  decline as it was before 26/11.

10. Terrorists---whether the Pakistan State-sponsored or the domestic kind---- are looking for weaknesses in our counter-terrorism architecture which they can exploit to step up their activities. Incidents like those of Mumbai, Pune and Hyderabad and our inability to detect them and identify the perpetrators definitively, will enable them as well as Pakistan to take advantage of the weaknesses that seem to be re-emerging in our counter-terrorism capabilities.

11. Without effective and dynamic leadership, even the best of counter-terrorism machinery will fail to deliver. Such leadership and drive have been missing under Shri Shinde’s stewardship of the Ministry of Home Affairs.

12. The Prime Minister, assisted by his National Security Adviser and the National Security Council Secretariat, which is part of the PMO, has to play a more active role for reversing this decline. Otherwise, we may be in for another nasty surprise as we faced on 26/11.

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India. )

COUNTER-TERRORISM:NOTHING TO LEARN, NOTHING TO FORGET

B.RAMAN

It is less than 48 hours since the two blasts in the Dilsukhnagar area of Hyderabad on the evening of February 21,2013, resulted in the death of 16 innocent civilians.

2. The police and the intelligence agencies are still in the preliminary stages of the investigation. They have not yet done a reconstruction of the act of terrorism. The collection and examination of the forensic evidence have not yet been completed .No arrests and interrogation have been made yet.

3. Instead of waiting till the investigation makes substantial progress, the police and the agencies, with the help of sensation-hungry media, have already started pointing the finger at the Muslim community, the Indian Mujahideen and Pakistan.

4. If there is terror, it has to be a Muslim. If he is a Muslim, he has to be from the IM. If it is the IM, it must have acted at the instance of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). That seems to be the thinking reflex of the police and the agencies.

5. In October last, according to the Delhi Police, a Muslim suspect belonging to the IM told them during his interrogation that the IM had recced the Dilsukhnagar area as a possible target. From this, one could have reasonable suspicion that the IM might have carried out the attack. To strengthen the suspicion, one must have additional evidence which has not been forthcoming till now. Despite this, the police and the agencies in their mind have already  turned the suspicion into certainty. Almost the entire investigation is now focused on the IM, overlooking other possibilities.

6. One cannot think of a more unprofessional way of dealing with terrorism. Very often, our initial hasty conclusions remain unproved or uncorroborated. That is why the investigation of so many of our terrorism cases  has reached a dead end. Many of the cases  remain undetected or unprosecuted or unsuccessful even if prosecuted.

7. After every few months, we are taken by surprise by a new act of terrorism because we didn’t investigate professionally the previous acts of terrorism. Our track record has been one of hurtling from one hasty conclusion to another.

8. Instead of learning lessons from the past, we continue repeating the same mistakes. Imprecise intelligence, alerts not followed up by ground action to strengthen physical security, lack of beat patrolling by the police despite our talking about it for years, absence of professional reconstruction of an act of terrorism to determine how the terrorists managed to succeed, cover-up of the sins of commission and omission of our police and agencies----- that has been our track record. Unless we get out of this unprofessional rut, terrorists will continue to strike with impunity and innocent civilians will continue to die. ( 23-2-2013)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (Retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. Twitter: @SORBONNE75)