B.RAMAN
The ability to read and understand the adversary’s
mind and message is a vital component of strategic decision-making. When
decisions that could lead to military conflicts are made without such an
ability, surprise and possible disaster are often the outcome.
2. The truth of this was illustrated during the
Korean war of the late 1940s and the 1950s and the Sino-Indian war of 1962.
3.During the initial months of the Korean war, as
the defeated North Korean Army was retreating towards the Yalu river marking
North Korea’s border with China, there were repeated warnings from Beijing
directly and indirectly that it would not be a silent spectator of the UN
troops commanded by the US reaching the river that could pose a threat to
China’s security and that the PLA might be forced to intervene to prevent such
an eventuality.
4. Gen.Douglas MacArthur of the US Army, who then commanded
the Far East Command, was so confident of final and decisive victory over the
North Korean Army and so dismissive of Beijing’s warnings and its ability to
have them executed on the ground that he kept up the advance unmindful of the
dangers of a Chinese intervention.
5. As the UN troops neared the Yalu river, the PLA
intervened massively and with determination and threw the UN troops back with
heavy casualties. Gen.MacArthur had underestimated the strength and fighting
capability of not only the PLA, but also the PLA (Air Force).
6. Fifty years later, a study of the lessons of the
massive Chinese intervention carried out in the U.S. Army Centre of Military
History by Richard W. Stewart came to the following conclusions regarding the
Chinese intervention in the war:
“The period from early November 1950 to late
January 1951 was in many ways the most heartbreaking of the Korean War. During
the previous summer the North Korean attack had been a total surprise, and the
disastrous retreat to the Pusan Perimeter was painful in the extreme. However,
the series of defeats could be explained by the necessarily haphazard and slow
reinforcement of the outnumbered U.S. and South Korean forces. Moreover, these
defeats were followed by elation as the Inchon landings reversed the situation
and the UN forces seemed on the verge not just of victory in South Korea but of
total victory, including the liberation of North Korea and the reunification of
the peninsula. All these dreams were swept away by the massive intervention of
the Chinese Army in late November 1950. There would be no homecoming victory
parade by Christmas.
“The initial warning attacks and diplomatic hints
by the Chinese were ignored by the overconfident Far Eastern Command under
General MacArthur. MacArthur’s failure to comprehend the reality of the
situation led the entire United Nations army to near disaster at the Chongchon River
and the Chosin Reservoir. Only the grit and determination of the individual
American soldiers and marines as they fought the three major enemies of cold,
fear, and isolation held the UN line together during the retreats from North
Korea. Once tied together into a coherent defensive line, under new and dynamic
leadership, these same soldiers and marines showed their determination to
continue the fight. Hard battles lay ahead, but the period of headlong retreats
from an attacking, unsuspected foe, was finally over.”
7.The mistakes committed by Gen.MacArthur which led
to the massive Chinese intervention could be summed up as follows:
Over-confidence and over-estimation of the strength of his own forces,
under-estimation of the strength and determination of the Chinese, an inability
to read the Chinese mind, and treating lightly and dismissively Chinese
warnings regarding the likely consequences of the UN forces reaching the Yalu
river, thereby posing a threat to China.
8. Similar mistakes were committed---in a much
larger measure--- by our political and military leadership before the
Sino-Indian war of 1962 leading to the humiliating defeat of our Army at the
hands of the PLA. There have been very few comprehensive studies available to
the public in India on the reasons for our defeat. As we observe the 50th
anniversary of the defeat, many articles have been appearing in the media, but
they are largely a collection of wishful
thinking, unverified assumptions, breast-beatings and claims unsupported by
concrete facts. Such studies do not serve any purpose in enabling us to learn
the right lessons so that such mistakes are not repeated.
9.One such unverifiable claim made recently is that
if we had used our Air Force our Army might not have suffered a humiliating
defeat. Such claims have not been supported by a factual analysis of the state
of the Air Force of the two countries in 1962. Many of the analyses that have
appeared recently have not brought out the fact that barring the military
conflict with Pakistan in Jammu & Kashmir in 1947-48, our Armed Forces had not fought a major war since
we became independent in 1947 .
10. As against this, the Chinese Armed Forces had
fought a major war against the UN troops led by the US in Korea, almost giving
a bloody nose to them. And their Air Force had played a very important and
creditable role against the UN Air Force. No authentic assessment of the
Chinese air power and capability as exhibited during the Korean war is available, but according to one Chinese
claim they managed to shoot down 320 UN aircraft and lost 220 of their own.
Their account of their losses indicate their already massive aircraft holdings
in the 1950s, thanks to the assistance from the USSR. According to Western
analysts as cited by GlobalSecurity.org, even in 1953, the PLA ( Air Force) had
a total holding of 1500 combat aircraft of different types.
11. The 1962 war with India took place long after
the Korean war was over. Even if there was no need for the Chinese to shift their Army units from the Korean border to the
Indian border, they were in a position to shift a large number of their
aircraft to Sichuan and Yunnan for possible use against India. Our Armed Forces
with no experience of having fought a major war since 1947 were forced by our
political leadership to confront the PLA whose self-confidence, experience and
war-fighting capabilities had been enhanced by the experiences gained by it
against the UN troops led by the US in Korea.
12. Our political leadership forced our armed
forces to engage in a confrontation with the PLA thinking that the PLA of 1962
would be no different from the PLA of 1949 which had captured control of China
from the KMT. Before we embarked on our so-called forward policy which led to a
military confrontation, two intelligence assessments should have been
made----firstly, an assessment of the Chinese strength and capabilities in
Tibet and Xinjiang and secondly, an assessment of their military and air power,
fighting capabilities and generalship as exhibited during the war in Korea.
13. Our Intelligence Bureau (IB) did the first
assessment, however inadequate it might have been. It was not in a position to
undertake the second since its area of focus was limited to the peripheral countries.
Thus, we went to war with China in 1962 largely unaware of the advances made by
the Chinese Armed Forces during the 1950s and of their professional qualities
as exhibited in Korea.
14. Fifty years after the 1962 war, we still have
limited mental horizons in matters strategic. Our horizons are largely limited
by Pakistan, its ISI, the Lashkar-e-Toiba and its Amir Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed.
There is a huge panoply of threats arising from China which have not received
our attention. It is Pakistan, Pakistan and Pakistan all the time.
15.As an example of how our mental horizons in
matters strategic continue to be limited, let me narrate the following: We had
a military conflict with Pakistan in the Kargil heights in 1999. After the
conflict, the Government of Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee, the then Prime Minister,
set up a committee headed by the late
K.Subrahmaniam to identify the inadequacies noticed in the conduct of the war
and to recommend steps for removing
them.
16. On the basis of its recommendations, a number
of Task Forces were set up to examine weaknesses in our national security
structure and recommend action for removing them. These Task Forces dealt with
Defence Management, Intelligence Revamp, Border Management and Internal Security.
Their reports were vetted by a Group of Ministers nominated by the Prime Minister
and the national security architecture was modified.
17.Since the GOM and its Task Forces were the
outcome of the Kargil war with Pakistan, their terms of reference mostly
related to likely threats from Pakistan. Most of their recommendations were Pakistan-centric.
So was the modified national security architecture that came into being. Some
of their recommendations did collaterally strengthen our capabilities with
regard to China, but the focus of their study was not China.
18. Ten years later, Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan
Singh set up a blue ribbon Task Force on National Security chaired by Shri
Naresh Chandra, former Cabinet Secretary. Since it was not the outcome of any
war with Pakistan with restricted terms of reference, it was expected to cover
a much larger strategic depth, with a greater focus on the examination of our
capabilities vis-à-vis those of China.
19. “The Hindu” of October 9,2012, has carried a
moving tribute to Shri Brajesh Mishra, the National Security Adviser under Shri
Vajpayee, who passed away recently, by Shri Shivshankar Menon, the present NSA.
He has said that when the national
security structures built up under Mishra ‘were reviewed after 10 years by a
Task Force, they actually suggested more of the same, rather than a radical
restructuring.” He is referring to the Task Force chaired by Shri Naresh
Chandra.
20. I interpret this as an implied criticism of the report of the Naresh Chandra Task Force
submitted to the Prime Minister on May 24,2012, which is presently under
examination. The report went into greater details than the reports of the GOM
regarding likely concerns arising from China, but these concerns have not been adequately
reflected in suggesting a further modification and modernisation of our
national security architecture.
21.Attention on Pakistan continues to be important.
It continues to target our jugular vein. But in our preoccupation with Pakistan,
we should not lose sight of the fact that an architecture created for dealing
with Pakistan, will not be able to deal satisfactorily with China. To deal with
China we need a different mindset, a different ability to read its mind and message,
a different military and intelligence capability etc. The focus of the Task
Force should have been on them.
22. Some other countries had in the past undertaken
comprehensive studies of the Sino-Indian war of 1962 in order to see what
lessons it has for them. A very useful study released in April 1984 was by Lt.Commander James Barnard Calvin of the US Navy on behalf
of the Marine Corps and Staff College of the US. His interesting conclusions are annexed. They
are quite valid even today (13-10-2012)
(The writer
is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi,
and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate
of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter @SORBONNE75)
ANNEXURE
CONCLUSIONS OF A STUDY ON THE SINO-INDIAN WAR OF
OCTOBER,1962, MADE IN 1984 BY THE US MARINE CORPS AND STAFF COLLEGE
There may well have been room for compromise, but
stubbornness and India's aggressive forward policy resulted in armed conflict. World
leaders must heed other nations' stated vital strategic objectives.
Assumptions are dangerous. Nehru's assumption that China would not
confront Indian troops and would passively retreat caused Nehru to pursue a
very assertive forward policy of thrusting troops and border patrols into-and
sometimes even beyond--disputed frontier areas.
His assumptions and resulting policy eventually brought retaliation from
China. Assumptions are still dangerous;
hypotheses about one's enemy must be validated by accurate intelligence.
Ignoring the advice of senior, experienced army
officers was disastrous for India. Many
officers had warned Nehru that India was poorly prepared for war with China:
they were relieved or replaced, their advice ignored. Leaders may believe what they want to
believe, but foolishly discounting the counsel of experts may lead them to
disaster.
Intelligence and appropriate interpretation of
intelligence is vital; only valid information--not assumptions—is important to
military planning. India seemed almost
totally unaware that she was heavily outnumbered along the border and that
China (unlike India) was well prepared logistically and well versed in alpine
warfare tactics. Both sides used reconnaissance
patrols, but battle results would indicate that China had good intelligence and
used it to good advantage. One must "know your enemy."
Logistic readiness is vital to any military operation.
India was very poorly prepared logistically, especially for cold weather and
mountain operations. On several
occasions, India ran out of ammunition or was otherwise unable to sustain herself. The Chinese had stockpiled supplies in Tibet,
and had the manpower to keep the front well supplied. The Border War's mountain operations were
relatively slow moving. Today, high
mobility will make proper logistic support even more crucial.
Similarly, India was neither trained nor prepared
for alpine warfare. Until Nehru's
assertive forward policy was initiated, few Indian soldiers had operated in
mountain areas. Altitudes above 14,000 feet can be frigid even in summer. In October and November, many Indian soldiers
had only summer uniforms and jackets to warm them. Many Indians died not from combat, but from
exposure. Today's military forces must
be prepared for operations in any locale or climate, from hot arid deserts to
frozen mountain slopes.
Generalship, leadership, command and control are
always important. Even though defeated
in Aksai Chin, the Indian forces in Western Command always deemed well
organized and led. But in NEFA, there
was often confusion; numerous command changes resulted in disorganization and
poor combat readiness. Poor communications and control resulted in troop
movements which were totally inappropriate, such as sending out Forces to
positions which had already been overrun.
General Kaul often ignored or disputed the advice
of his junior generals; further, he was often indecisive, changing orders
minutes after they had been issued. Immediately after the ceasefire, General Kaul
was relieved; days later, he would resign from the army.
Today's lethal firepower and high mobility make
command, control and communications more vital than ever. Hopefully, future
military and political leaders will study the causes and the lessons learned
from this Border War. And hopefully, they will learn.
