B.RAMAN
Mr.Liang Guanglie, the Chinese Defence Minister,
who is in Sri Lanka since August 29,2012, on an official visit at the head of a
23-member delegation, is reaching New Delhi on September 2,2012, for a
three-day official visit before proceeding to Laos from where he will return
home.
2. His visit to India has aroused considerable interest in India and
outside. After a gap of eight years, a Chinese Defence Minister will be
visiting India. The visit will be taking place on the eve of the forthcoming
leadership changes in the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Chinese
Government after the present leadership completes his 10-year-term.The changes
in the party leadership will be taking place in October and the Government
leadership in March next year.
3. In Mao Dze-dong and Deng Xiao-ping China had
produced commanding individual leaders who imparted their personal stamp to
policy-making----Mao in respect of foreign policy and Deng in respect of
economic policies. After the departure of Deng, China has not produced a leader
of similar commanding presence and influence. Amongst the expected leaders of
the coming decade, one does not see anyone, who might play such a commanding role and impart far-reaching
changes to policy-making.
4.Collective leadership will continue to be the
norm in the coming decade with important policies being decided collectively by
the party leadership and implemented by the Government. It is, therefore,
unlikely that the Chinese Defence Minister will give any indications of
possible policy changes under the coming new leadership.
5. The visit will mark an improvement in the
military-military relationship between the Armed Forces and the Defence
Ministries of the two countries. This relationship, which had improved between
2004 and 2008 after the last visit of a Chinese Defence Minister, suffered a set-back after some actions taken
by China which indicated a possible identification of Chinese thinking and
policies with those of Pakistan in matters relating to Jammu & Kashmir.
6. The first of these actions was the Chinese
reluctance to issue a normal visa to a senior officer of the Indian Army posted
in Jammu & Kashmir to visit China at the head of a delegation for one of
the routine talks with their Chinese counterparts. This was the first time
India had nominated a senior Army officer posted in J&K to head a military
delegation for bilateral talks in China.
7. The Chinese reportedly took up the stand that
India should either nominate an officer posted outside J&K or if it
insisted on sending this particular officer, it would issue to him a special
visa on a plain piece of paper and not the normal visa on his Indian passport.
India rightly did not agree to this and as a result the normal Army-Army
exchanges were downgraded by India, if
not suspended. It has been reported that the Chinese have since given up their
hesitation to issue normal visas to officers of the Indian Armed Forces posted
in J&K for official visits to China. As a result, military exchanges have
again resumed and started improving.
8. The second Chinese action relating to J&K
that has caused concern in India is their de facto and officially unannounced
recognition of Pakistani claims of sovereignty over Gilgit-Baltistan (GB),
which is still a disputed territory with conflicting claims of sovereignty by
India and Pakistan. This de facto recognition could be seen in their acceptance
without any objection of leaders and officials of the Gilgit-Baltistan
administration in official delegations headed by President Asif Ali Zardari and
Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani visiting China. The Chinese have never raised
the issue of any special visas for Pakistani officials, civilian or military,
posted in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) and Gilgit-Baltistan who are required
to visit China.
9.The third Chinese action relating to J&K that
has caused concern in Indian military circles relates to the reported induction
of a number of personnel of the engineering divisions of the PLA into the POK
and GB for the upgradation of the Karakoram Highway and additional personnel
from their infantry divisions for providing protection to their engineering
units.
10.In such issues relating to J&K, the Chinese
Defence Ministry and Armed forces play
an important role in guiding policy-making. The Chinese actions in going ahead
with these moves unmindful of the sensitivities and concerns of India indicate certain
pro-Pakistani constants in Chinese strategic policy-making relating to its
relations with India and Pakistan.
11. The Chinese have reportedly sought to address
Indian sensitivities relating to the issue of visas to Indian military officers
posted in J & K, but they have not shown any willingness to address the
Indian sensitivities and concerns over their actions in the POK and GB. However,
the Government of India has apparently decided not to let this come in the way
of the resumption of military-military exchanges and confidence-building
measures between the two countries. The visit of the Chinese Defence Minister will
impart the political stamp of approval to various steps being considered for
further strengthening the exchanges and CBMs. Among such measures being
speculated about are the resumption of
the joint counter-terrorism exercises which are in a state of suspension since
2008, a possible joint air force exercise,
the upgradation of the level of military representation in the Embassies
of the two countries in each other’s
capital and greater co-ordination of the anti-Somali piracy operations of the
Navies of the two countries. It has been reported by “The Hindu” that the
Chinese are keen to have separate Attaches from their Navy and Air Force in
their Embassy in New Delhi on a reciprocal basis and that New Delhi may agree
to this.
12.Chinese intentions and capabilities in the Tibet
Autonomous Region (TAR) and in those areas of Xinjiang adjoining J&K continue to be a matter of concern to
Indian military circles. In addition to strengthening their military-related
infrastructure and deployments in the TAR, the Chinese have been stepping up
the level, diversity, frequency and complexity of their military exercises in
the TAR since October 2010. These exercises have a domestic as well as an
India-focussed dimension.
13. The domestic dimension relates to strengthening
their capability for putting down any disturbances after the death of His
Holiness the Dalai Lama. Last month, the Chinese internal security agencies
held joint counter-terrorism exercises in the Lhasa region. They are trying to
strengthen the helicopter-lift capability of their Army in the plateau areas.
They are extending their rail and road networks and constructing more airfields
in the TAR. All these at present seem to be related to strengthening their
capability to prevent any instability in Tibet after His Holiness, but these
value-additions could also help them in any military operations against India
in the Arunachal Pradesh sector.
14. The India-focussed dimension is about the
increasing participation of the Chinese Air Force in military exercises in the
TAR. Why this increasing importance to the role of the Air Force in Tibet? It
cannot be to meet internal instability. It has to be to meet eventualities in
the event of a military conflict with India.
15.In the past, some Indian analysts were of the
view that the Indian Army might not have suffered a humiliation at the hands of
the Chinese Army in 1962 if India had used its Air Force to disrupt the Chinese
lines of communications. It is now mentally accepted in both the countries that
if there is another conventional military conflict between the two countries,
the two Air Forces will play an active role. It should be evident from the
recent exercises with the active participation of the Chinese Air Force that
the Chinese are improving the training of their Army and Air Force for eventual
joint operations if there is a military conflict with India
16. The importance of such high-level visits lies
not only in the formalities of the discussions and exchanges across the table,
but also in the informalities of the brain-picking during the opportunities for
informal interactions provided by the visits. Indian military officials will
definitely try to find out what exactly is the Chinese military thinking
relating to operations mounted from Tibet, but they are unlikely to get an
answer. The answer has to come from our intelligence agencies.
17.The prevailing wisdom presently is that if there
is another military conflict with China, it will be an Army-Air Force joint
operation from both sides across the border with no involvement by the Navies. Has
the time come to revisit that wisdom and re-examine the likely role of the two
Navies? It is in this context that the Indian Navy ought to be viewing and
assessing the growing Chinese military interest in countries such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and
Seychelles.
18. The Chinese military’s interest in these countries has two dimensions. The first is
strengthening the military supply relationship in order to create a dependence
on Chinese military equipment. The second is to strengthen the Chinese role in port development and to
improve the Navy-Navy exchanges. The strategic implications of the second
dimension ought to be a matter of growing concern for the Indian Navy. At
present, the seeming Chinese interest is in protecting their supplies of energy
and other essential goods for which their Navy requires a presence in countries
en route.
19. What could be the impact of the Navy-related
capabilities in the Indian Ocean region that they are developing on a future
military conflict between India and China? That is a question that has to be
seriously examined by us.
20. The Chinese are puzzled and worried by the
visibles and invisibles of our developing strategic relationship with the US.Is
it purely an ad hoc and one-night courting or is there a strategic durability
to the Indo-US coming together? Does it purely have an ocean-related dimension
relating to jointly protecting the respective interests of India and the US in
the Indian Ocean region or does it have a South China Sea dimension too? What
is the extent of the strategic co-operation between the Armies and Air Forces
of India and the US? What kind of scenarios warranting ground co-operation they
are discussing? Is the possibility of an opportunistic foray into Tibet in the
event of instability there one of the scenarios being discussed?
21.These are questions to which the Chinese have
been trying to find an answer. It is likely that during the informal discussions
between the two delegations, the Chinese will try to pick our brains on these
questions bothering them. It will be in our interest to keep them guessing and
worried.
22. A conventional wisdom at present in thinking
and analytical circles in both India and the US is that the Chinese are mighty
worried over the possibility of India and the US coming together to contain
China. I do not subscribe to this. Their first worry now is the implications of the India-US military
co-operation for their attempts to pacify Tibet and in any military conflict
between India and China over the unresolved border issue. We should keep this
constantly in mind in our strategic planning.( 1-9-12)
(The writer
is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi,
and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate
of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter @SORBONNE75)
