A VISIT TO PAKISTAN BY PM

B.RAMAN

While advocating a strong counter-terrorism strategy towards Pakistan, including the selective use of covert action against the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and other Pakistani terrorist organisations operating against India from Pakistani territory, I have been suggesting for over a year now greater  contacts between the policy-makers of the two countries so that they know each other in flesh and blood instead of assessing each other on the basis of media and intelligence reports.

2. Among the suggestions I have been making in this regard is a no-frills,no-emotions visit by the Prime Minister to Pakistan in response to the visit to India by former Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani last year and President Asif Ali Zardari  earlier this year. I have also been suggesting an exchange of visits by the chiefs of the Army and the intelligence agencies of the two countries. My hope is that such personal interactions at the political, military and intelligence levels could lead to a gradual change of the present strategic mind-set  in the policy-making circles in Pakistan, which is based on feelings of insecurity arising from the war of 1971, suspicions  and hostility. Without a change of mindset, the various bilateral problems will continue to defy a mutually satisfactory solution.

3.I have even been saying that a visit by our Prime Minister should be without expectations of a break-through and without any pre-conditions. In this context, I welcome the invitation reportedly extended by President Asif Ali Zardari to Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh to visit his native village in Pakistani Punjab and worship at the Sikh holy shrines in Lahore and nearby areas. The visit could also be availed of for renewing contacts with the political leaders of Pakistan, who are engaged in a confrontation with their Supreme Court over the question of the supremacy of the Parliament elected by the people in a democracy.

4.People’s sovereignty is sacred for the survival of democracy. Till recently, the concept of people’s sovereignty was being challenged only by the religious fundamentalists who argue that in an Islamic State Allah and not the people is sovereign and it should be ruled according to the will of Allah as interpreted by the clergy. That is why they are against liberal democracy.

5. Now, the application and operation of this concept is sought to be restricted and distorted by the Supreme Court headed by Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhury in the name of the supremacy of the Constitution as interpreted by the judiciary. In their own different ways, the religious fundamentalists and the Supreme Court have been conducting themselves in a manner which wittingly or unwittingly seeks to dilute the sovereignty of the people and their will as expressed during the elections.

6. While it is not for India to interfere in the internal affairs of Pakistan, it is important that we do not fight shy of political gestures which would lend strength to the votaries of liberal democracy based on the sovereignty of the people in Pakistan. A goodwill visit by our Prime Minister will be one such gesture.

7. While welcoming Mr.Zardari’s invitation, I am at the same time disturbed by his suggestion, apparently made in good faith, that the Prime Minister visit  the Sikh holy shrines in and around Lahore in November coinciding with the birth anniversary of Guru Nanakdev. A visit to the Sikh holy shrines , specially to the Nankana Sahib, in November is the dream and desire of every Sikh. I could, therefore, understand the attraction which such a proposal could have for Dr.Manmohan Singh.

8. Unfortunately, November coincides with the anniversary of the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai organised by the LET whose headquarters are based at Muridke, near Lahore. To visit Lahore in November, even in fulfilment of a religious obligation, could be seen as an act of disrespect to the memories of the over 160 innocent civilians and members of the security forces killed by the LET and an act of insensitivity to the feelings of grief of the relatives and their outrage over Pakistan’s failure to act against the Pakistan-based conspirators of the terrorist attack.

9. Instead of creating goodwill between the people of the two countries, such an unwise and insensitive visit in November will shock large sections of Indian public opinion and add to the rigidity of the mind-set towards Pakistan in India. A visit in November could prove counter-productive.

10. I would, therefore, strongly urge the Prime Minister to plan his visit either in October or December. If he decides to go, he has to go this year. From January, the Pakistani leaders will get busy with the next general elections to their National Assembly due next year.

11. It is hoped that the Prime Minister and his advisers will realise the likely negative implications of a November visit and decide on a visit in October or December. He could still visit the Sikh holy shrines though it can’t coincide with the birth anniversary of Guru Nanakdev. ( 5-8-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

COUNTER-TERRORISM ALIBIS

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO.760

B.RAMAN

Counter-terrorism agencies and the Police are taken by surprise when terrorists strike for the first time using a new modus operandi (MO). This is natural. We had seen this happen in Mumbai in March,1993, in the US on 9/11, in Madrid in 2004, in London in 2005 and some other places.

2. In other countries after such surprises, the Police and other investigating agencies manage to do a thorough investigation, reconstruct the crime, identify deficiencies that facilitated the successful terrorist strikes and strengthen preventive measures to see that similar strikes are not repeated.

3. India is a country where the terrorists manage to strike again and again using the same MO and often similar material without the police being able to prevent this happening. Since 1993, when Ramzi Yousef tried to blow up the New York World Trade Centre with a truckload of ammonium nitrate, a commonly used fertiliser, terrorists in different parts of the world started using ammonium nitrate as the explosive base if they are not able to lay hand on military-grade explosives. Instances of such use of ammonium nitrate have been considerably prevented in other countries through an effective regulatory mechanism to control the sale of ammonium nitrate and its pilferage from the stocks of agriculturists authorised to buy them.

4. Even though terrorists in India have also been repeatedly using ammonium nitrate mixed with fuel oil in their improvised explosive devices (IEDs), our police and counter-terrorism agencies have not so far been able to put in place an effective regulatory mechanism to prevent the use of ammonium nitrate for acts of terrorism. According to media reports, ammonium nitrate was the explosive base used in the Pune blasts of August 1,2012.

5. Many of our terrorist strikes remain inadequately investigated and unsuccessfully prosecuted. The two major exceptions to this were the March 1993 serial explosions in Mumbai and the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. The arrests of some members of the Memon family when they returned to India from Karachi and their interrogation contributed to the successful investigation and prosecution of the Indian perpetrators of the March 1993 explosions. The capture of Ajmal  Kasab, one of the Pakistani perpetrators of the 26/11 strikes, led to the successful detection and prosecution. If Kasab had also been killed, it is doubtful whether there would have been a successful prosecution.

6. The so-called Indian Mujahideen (IM) has carried out a number of strikes using IEDs at least since 2007, if not earlier, in different cities of  India. None of these cases has so far led to a successful prosecution though many arrests were made. An alibi often advanced by our police and agencies for the inadequate investigation of these cases is that the three leaders of the IM operate from sanctuaries in Pakistan.

7.This alibi does not explain why we are not able to investigate thoroughly and completely what has been happening in our territory. The fact that the leaders operate from sanctuaries in Pakistan can explain our not being able to collect information and evidence about their activities and their contacts with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence and the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET). But, this cannot explain our inability to collect details regarding their foot jihadis in India, their accomplices, their sleeper cells and their sources of material required for IEDs.

8. The IM has often been using the MO of planting the IEDs in bicycles. All we are able to find out is wherefrom they procured the cycles, which is easy to find out and does not require special investigative skills. But we seem to be still in the dark about their sources of procurement of detonators, which can normally be procured only from quarries, mines and construction companies and the storage depots of the security forces which stock detonators for professional use.

9. There have been very few instances of an IM perpetrator being caught red-handed as Kasab was. Most of our reconstruction is, therefore, based on statements of suspects arrested and interrogated after the commission of an act of terrorism.Their interrogation is apparently not able to provide a continuous and unbroken narrative of how the terrorist strike was planned and executed, resulting in inadequate detection and prosecution.

10. These deficiencies in our counter-terrorism preventive and investigation machinery cannot be removed merely by setting-up the proposed National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC). There is a need for a determined attempt to improve the investigation skills of the Police in terrorism-related cases in the States. ( 3-8-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

ANNA HAZARE: THE OPTIONS

B.RAMAN

In an excellent analysis on the morning of August 2,2012, under the title “Dismissive Congress In No Mood To Engage With Anna”, Smita Gupta, the "Hindu's" New Delhi correspondent, wrote: “ A year-and-a-half after Mr.Hazare placed the issue of corruption in the public domain, striking a chord with a middle class unhappy with the slowdown in the economy, the movement appears to have fizzled out.”

2.The fact that Anna and his Team had themselves realised that their movement had reached a dead-end became obvious a few hours later when a group of eminent persons released a statement appealing to the fasting Anna and his colleagues to end their fast and continue their struggle by building an alternate political force.

3.This appeal was seen by many as the beginning of a search for a face-saving by a group of civil society leaders to salvage the movement from an embarrassing second fizzle-out after the one of last year in Mumbai. The Government’s dismissive attitude and the poor response from the students of Delhi to the appeal of Shri Arvind Kejriwal to miss their classes for a week and come to Jantar Mantar seemed to have turned the scale against those who were in favour of continuing the fast and keeping up the confrontation against the Government.

4.Later that day, Anna announced the decision of the team to give up the fast at 5 PM on August 3 and discuss what next. From his remarks, it is not clear that he has now come round to the view that forming an alternate political party to contest the 2014 elections on a plank of clean, people-friendly, honest Government was the only option left to him. In media interviews given by him before the fast, he had indicated that while he might be inclined to back some members of his team with a good track record if they decided to contest the elections, he was disinclined to contest himself or form a political party of his own. Many have assumed after his remarks on the termination of the fast that he has now veered in favour of a new political party to enter the electoral fray. It is yet to be seen whether this is so.

5. The movement against corruption has not failed. The moral and intellectual support enjoyed by Anna from large sections of the middle class of this country has not dwindled. At the same time, there is a fatigue with the tactics adopted by the movement to achieve its objective of a corruption-free India. The frequent resort to dramatic fasts and attempts to coerce the Government through various pressure tactics to concede its demands were having less and less takers. The law of diminishing returns had set in, highlighting the need for a change of tactics. Most discouraging was the fact that Anna and his movement had failed to electrify the common people in the rest of the country. It remained largely an elitist-cum  middle class movement.

6. Forming an alternative political party that can deliver within the two years that remain before the elections is not going to be easy. Apart from the lack of funds, the lack of political cadres who can carry its electoral  fight to different parts of the country would stand in the way of its political exercise succeeding. Moreover, having thus far projected the movement as a moral crusade not owing its inspiration to any political party, it cannot now seek to join hands with existing political parties for carrying the movement forward. That will result in a further dilution of the credibility of the movement and make Team Anna appear as a group of political opportunists incognito from the beginning.

7. A better option will be a nation-wide campaign by Anna to convert what has remained an elitist middle class movement into a mass movement of the people based on three slogans: “Say No To Bribe”,”Bring in Jan Lokpal” and “Free the CBI From Govt Clutches”. Till now, the people were being brought to New Delhi to demonstrate  the people’s power of the movement. Now, it is time for Anna to go to the masses of this country to demonstrate his concerns for them because of the cancer of corruption and rally them in support of his cause.

8. What Anna needs is a movement  patterned after the Bhoodan movement of Acharya Vinoba Bhave. Vinobaji did not place his faith in Delhi. He placed it in the masses in the rest of India. He undertook a padayatra from village to village, from town to town to disseminate his message of “land for the landless peasant”. He did not have to go to Delhi from time to time to demonstrate his coercive power. Delhi went to him wherever he was in recognition of his moral and spiritual force. He did not succeed in achieving his objective of re-distribution of land, but he succeeded in creating a mass  awareness of the economic and social discrimination against the peasants.

9. Unless the people are made aware of the need to fight corruption by refusing to give bribe for whatever reason, the movement will remain without moral force. It will be a show-off movement as it has remained till now without  moral attraction. If Anna can persuade large sections of the people of this country to refuse to pay bribe, the movement can achieve half its objective.

10. His emphasis on the need for a Jan Lokpal and independence for the CBI is important. But, as rightly pointed out by Justice Katju, some of the ideas underlining these measures as conceived by him and his team are impractical. They will create a new bureaucracy as oppressive as the one existing and create new avenues for harassment.

11.How to make the CBI professionally independent and accountable without letting it become a rogue elephant not amenable to any political control? Should it be converted into a constitutional institution under a collective leadership consisting of two or three Directors equally empowered and required to decide and act in unison? Such questions have not been debated by Anna and his team. It is time to have an eminent persons group to examine such questions, revisit their idea and come out with alternate institutional formulations that could be placed before the people and the political parties.

12. The country needs a rejuvenated movement against corruption led by Anna and carried forward by his young followers. That rejuvenation has to come from new models of corruption-free governance to be aimed at, new ways of achieving it and mass participation in the movement. Its power has to come not from threats of fasts, but the backing of the masses. ( 3-8-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

PUNE’S VULNERABILITY TO TERRORISM

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO.759

B.RAMAN

In the light of the four  low-intensity blasts in Pune on August 1,2012, there is a need for a co-ordinated revisit to  reports being received from time to time since 2002 on the attraction of Pune for terrorist elements----indigenous as well as foreign.

2.Pune as a possible centre for jihadi activities came to notice in March 2002, when Abu Zubaidah, the then No.3 to Osama bin Laden, was arrested by the Pakistani authorities acting at the instance of the USA's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in the house of an activist of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) at Faislabad in Pakistani Punjab and handed over to the FBI. He is now in the Guantanamo Bay Detention Centre in Cuba. Sections of the Pakistani media had reported at that time that Abu Zubaidah, a Palestinian, had studied computer science in Pune before crossing over into Pakistan and joining Al Qaeda.

3.In September-October,2008, the Mumbai Police had arrested   four  IT-savvy members of the Indian Mujahideen ( IM), who had played a role in  sending  E-mail messages in the name of the IM before and after the Ahmedabad blasts of July, 2008, and before the New Delhi blasts of September,2008, by hacking into Wi-fi networks in Mumbai and Navin Mumbai. Three of them were from Pune. The four persons were:

    Mohammed Mansoor Asgar Peerbhoy aka Munawar aka Mannu. A 31-year-old resident of Pune, who was allegedly working for an American Internet company in its Indian office as a well-paid executive.

    Mubin Kadar Shaikh, a 24-year-old  graduate of computer science from Pune.

    Asif Bashir Shaikh, a 22-year-old mechanical engineer from Pune. In addition to helping in sending the E-mail messages, he also reportedly played a role in planting 18 Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Surat, all of which failed to explode.

    Mohammed Ismail Chaudhary, a 28-year-old   computer mechanic, who was also suspected to have helped in planting the IEDs in Surat.

4. Peerbhoy was reported to have joined the IM while he was studying Arabic in Pune's Quran Foundation, which seemed to have served as a favourite recruiting ground for jihadi terrorism.  In this connection, reference is invited to my note titled INDIA AS POSSIBLE WEB OF CYBER TERRORISM at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers29/paper2873.html

5. Pune and its Chabad House  figured prominently in  reports on the visits to India by David Coleman Headley of the Chicago cell of the LET presently  in jail in Chicago. Among the targets of interest to Headley in Pune were the local Chabad House, a Jewish cultural-cum-religious centre, which is frequented by Jewish visitors to Pune and the local Rajneesh Ashram frequented by the Western followers of Rajneesh, an Indian spiritual guru, who used to live in the US and was the mentor of some sections of Western youth. Both these places reconnoitred by Headley were near the German Bakery, but neither of them was attacked on February 13, 2010. Instead, the German Bakery was targeted.

6. The IM was reported to have been involved in the explosion in the German Bakery. Pune’s educational institutions attract many foreign students from the Arab countries as well as Iran for studying computer science and other subjects. Since there were reportedly facilities for the study of Arabic in Pune, many Indian Muslims also go there.

7.One has the impression that the investigations made so far by the Maharashtra Police and its Anti-Terrorism Squad as well as by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) into the activities of terrorism-prone elements in Pune after the arrest of some IT experts of the IM originating from Pune in 2008 have been disjointed focussing mainly on solving the instant cases without trying to see whether there were any linkages with other and past cases.

8. Now that Pune figures in the terror map of India, it is important to make a co-ordinated assessment of Pune’s vulnerability to terrorism of various kinds, including identification of pockets of possible Hindu extremism in the city. ( 2-8-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

MY INITIAL TAKE ON PUNE BLASTS

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO.758

B.RAMAN

There were four minor blasts at Pune on the evening of August 1,2012, which did not cause any fatalities. They injured two persons. The injuries do not appear to be of a serious nature.

2. According to information available so far, the four blasts took place one after the other----not simultaneously---within an interval  of about 10 minutes. This might have required more than one perpetrator.

3.I am inclined to believe as of now that the blasts were not meant to be mass casualty strikes. If the perpetrators had wanted to cause more casualties or large-scale panic they would have used either a lethal explosive mixed with splinters or a large quantity of low-lethality explosive with splinters. They do not appear to have done so.

4. The indications till now are that the four were carefully-timed explosions that would have required some knowledge and prior experience in assembling the improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

5.My assessment on the basis of evidence available till now is that the blasts were meant to convey a message to the police that the organisation to which the perpetrators belonged was still alive and active. They were also meant to pep up the morale of the members of the organisation by demonstrating that the organisation is in a position to strike again and that they should not get demoralised.

6. While it would be very early to say which organisation might have been responsible, the initial needle of suspicion would point to the Indian Mujahideen (IM), which had in the past recruited some of its cadres in the Pune area and was alleged to have played a role in the Pune Bakery blast of February,2010.

7.There has been no terrorist act attributable to the IM since September last year. The IM would have wanted to remove any impression in the minds of the police and its followers that the absence of any act of terrorism since last September probably indicated an irreparable damage to the membership and infrastructure of the organisation.

8. One should be disinclined to connect the blasts with Shri S.K.Shinde taking over as the Home Minister yesterday. Though the blasts were not sophisticated, selecting the perpetrators, assembling the devices, identifying the spots and having the IEDs planted could not have been done so fast after Shri Shinde took over as the Home Minister.

9. A point to be investigated is whether the blasts could have been linked to Abu Jundal, of the  IM, who had helped the Lashkar-e-Toibha in organising the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, being brought to Mumbai for interrogation by the Maharashtra Police ( 1-8-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

CHANGE OF GUARD IN HOME MINISTRY

B.RAMAN

There has been a change of guard in the Union Home Ministry since July 31,2012. Shri Sushil Kumar Shinde, till now in charge of Power, has been shifted as the Home Minister in place of Shri P.Chidambaram, till now the Home Minister, who has been moved to the Finance Ministry to fill the vacancy caused by the election of Shri Pranab Mukherjee as the President of India.

2. While there is no doubt that Shri Chidambaram will do well in the Finance Ministry where he had served before, the suitability of Shri Shinde as the Home Minister has been questioned by many.

3. Shri Chidambaram took over as the Home Minister immediately after the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. He took charge of the nation’s internal security at a time when the stewardship of the Ministry under his predecessor, Shri Shivraj Patil, had come in for severe criticism because of his perceived poor handling of terrorism and insurgency.

4. Under the internal security mismanagement of Shri Patil, the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Pakistani terrorist organisation, spread its network of sleeper cells across North and Western India and carried out a catastrophic act of terrorism in Mumbai in November,2008, which shook the confidence of the Indian public in the capability of our intelligence and security agencies to deal with Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. The Indian Mujahideen (IM) made its appearance and carried out a series of  terrorist strikes in different cities of the country. The threat posed by the Maoist insurgents increased in the tribal areas of central India.

5.Many critics kept pointing out the poor professional management of the MHA by Shri Patil which was contributing to a weakening of our internal security machinery. Despite their criticism, Shri Patil was allowed to continue as the Home Minister without being held accountable for his poor performance .

6. The devastating terrorist strikes of 26/11 in Mumbai made his continuance as the Home Minister untenable and he was replaced by Shri Chidambaram, who had earlier held charge creditably as the Minister of State for Internal Security  during the Prime Ministership of the late Shri Rajiv Gandhi.

7.Shri Chidambaram’s tenure of almost four years as the Home Minister saw a noticeable improvement in the professional management of our internal security apparatus. He rapidly identified the deficiencies that had contributed to the 26/11 strikes and took action to remove them. He decentralised the deployment of the National Security Guards, set up the National Investigation Agency to investigate serious cases of terrorism with a pan-Indian dimension and considerably strengthened co-ordination among the intelligence and security agencies in collecting, analysing and assessing intelligence and taking the required follow-up action.

8. Shri Chidambaram was a man of considerable physical and intellectual vigour and he had his vigour transmitted across the internal security machinery. The morale of the counter-terrorism component of the internal security machinery improved remarkably. For the first time since the days of the late Shri Rajesh Pilot as the Minister of State for Internal Security and Shri L.K.Advani as the Home Minister, the team work in the counter-terrorism apparatus improved and the heads of the intelligence and security agencies had the confidence that if they took their professional and institutional problems to the Home Minister they will be attended to immediately. They looked forward to their daily co-ordination meetings with their Minister-in-charge.

9. Like Shri Advani, Shri Chidambaram realised the importance of close co-operation with the intelligence and security agencies of other countries, particularly the USA and Israel, for improving our counter-terrorism management. The increased co-operation was in the form of greater sharing of intelligence and professional knowledge.

10.Shri Chidambaram had a better understanding of the mindset and machinations of Pakistan’s intelligence community and its Interior Ministry headed by Mr.Rehman Malik and kept up the pressure on Mr.Malik to act against the Pakistan-based conspirators of the 26/11 terrorist strikes, though his pressure did not produce satisfactory results.

11.Shri Chidambaram’s counter-terrorism record was creditable despite his failure to set in motion the proposed National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) due to the misgivings of some Chief Ministers. Apart from the terrorist attack on an Israeli national outside the Israeli Embassy in New Delhi in February last---- attributed to Iranian agencies and the Hizbollah--- there has been no strike by Pakistan sponsored or inspired elements since September last year.

12.His contribution to the creation of near-normalcy in Jammu & Kashmir and a relaxed relationship between the Central and State Governments has to be recognised.

13. Shri Chidambaram’s contribution to improving our counter-insurgency management, particularly against the Maoists in the tribal belt of central India, was not that satisfactory. His automatic reflex of supporting the security forces after incidents involving large collateral casualties even before properly enquiring into allegations of excesses stood in danger of driving  more people into the hands of the insurgents.

14. The Maoist insurgents are our people from the poor and under-privileged tribal communities and dealing with them called for a more imaginative, sensitive and empathetic approach. They can’t be treated like we treat the jihadi terrorists from Pakistan. Such an approach was missing in his counter-insurgency management. Rightly or wrongly, one had an impression that whereas he led from the front in counter-terrorism, he let himself be led by the security agencies in counter-insurgency. His counter-insurgency record left much to be desired.

15.The Union Home Minister wears two hats. He is responsible for political as well as professional management. Whereas Shri Chidambaram’s professional management was very good despite reservations over the way he handled counter-insurgency, his political management, which depends on his equation with State leaders from different parties and civil society groups, was patchy. One noticed this in the way he mishandled the fasts of Swami Ramdev and Anna Hazare in New Delhi last year. His action in having Anna arrested and detained on flimsy grounds in the Tihar jail  and his inability to get the support of some of the  Chief Ministers for setting up the NCTC did not speak well of his political understanding and reflexes.

16. Shri Chidambaram was a man of ideas. He gave public expression to his ideas in his speeches and statements. Two of his worthwhile ideas related to the setting-up of the NCTC on the pattern of its US counterpart and the creation of a separate Ministry of Internal Security to deal with internal security management. His exercise to create the NCTC came to a screeching halt because of suspicions that he might be planning to use the NCTC as a political weapon against the State Governments headed by opposition parties. His idea of an independent Ministry of Internal Security, on the pattern of the post-9/11 US Homeland Security Department, remained a non-starter reportedly because of lack of enthusiasm for the idea in his own party and among his Cabinet colleagues.

17. There is palpable anxiety as to whether Shri Shinde will be able to adequately step into the shoes of Shri Chidambaram or whether he will turn out to be another Shri Patil letting the good work done by Shri Chidambaram start rusting. As Power Minister, his management was mediocre. He did not give indication of the kind of mental and intellectual rigour that Shri Chidambaram exhibited. This is the first time Shri Shinde is going to be exposed to serious internal security problems. His understanding of the complexity of the tasks is uncertain.

18. Shri Shinde has taken over as the Home Minister in the midst of an exercise in the MHA for the vetting of the important recommendations of the Naresh Chandra Task Force on National Security relating to internal security and strengthening the capability of  the Intelligence Bureau. Those recommendations were made after detailed discussions, among others, with Shri Chidambaram and his senior officers in the MHA. Will Shri Shinde be able to push through the vetting and implementation process with the same understanding and energy as Shri Chidambaram would have done?

19.One has an impression that dictates of political accommodation rather  than dictates of professional management of internal security have influenced his appointment as the Home Minister. There is a question mark over his ability to hold his own during interactions with foreign counterparts and with his Pakistani counterpart.

20. This is not the first time one has a Home Minister not well-versed in the professional  skills of internal security management. One had one in Shri Bhuta Singh who was the Home Minister under Rajiv Gandhi. Rajiv compensated for it by appointing  Shri Chidambaram as his Minister of State for Internal Security with direct access to the PM.

21.One had another in S.B.Chavan who was the Home Minister under Narasimha Rao.  Rao compensated for the deficiencies of Chavan by appointing Shri Rajesh Pilot as the Minister of State for Internal Security with direct access to the PM.

22. Shri Advani and Shri Chidambaram were strong and professionally competent Home Ministers and hence did not need a strong No.2.  Shri Patil was weak in his understanding and professional skills which was not compensated by a strong and energetic No.2. The nation paid dearly for that.

23. The Prime Minister, Dr.Manmohan Singh, should emulate the examples of Rajiv and Rao and appoint a competent and energetic Minister of State For  Internal Security under Shri Shinde and give him right of direct access to the PM. ( 1-8-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

MAJ ( RETD) RABINDER SINGH, THE CIA MOLE IN R&AW

 I have been in receipt of a pseudonymous E-Mail forwarding what the person, who has sent the mail, claims to be the proceedings in a US court on  a petition for political asylum filed by one Surender Jeet Singh on November 1,2004. The petitioner claimed to have been working in the Khalistan Division of the R&AW and alleged that he fled from India because he was asked to assassinate someone. The person who has forwarded this to me by E-Mail feels that this Surender Jeet Singh is identical with Rabinder Singh. Rabinder Singh, who was working as a CIA agent controlled by the CIA station chief in Kathmandu, fled to the US along with his wife in May,2004, when he was under surveillance by the R&AW.I would be grateful if any of my readers in the US can throw further light on this at my E-Mail address seventyone2@gmail.com ---B.Raman, 31-7-12

393 F.3d 903

Surender Jeet SINGH, Petitioner,

v.

John ASHCROFT, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 03-71868.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted November 1, 2004.

Filed December 23, 2004.

Joseph Siguenza, Ashwani Bhakhri, Burlingame, CA, for the petitioner.

Jennifer Levings, Assistant United States Attorney, Washington, DC, for the respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Agency No. Aeg-iyq-lfk.

Before B. FLETCHER, NOONAN, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

NOONAN, Circuit Judge.

1

Surender Jeet Singh petitions for review of the decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (the Board), denying him asylum, withholding of deportation, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Holding that the Board's credibility determination cannot be sustained, we remand.

FACTS

2

Singh, a native of India, was raised as a Sikh and practices the Sikh religion. According to his testimony, he was recruited by an organ of the government of India known as the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), situated in the office of the Prime Minister. Its functions, he testified, were like those of the CIA. As an agent of the RAW, he made reports on individuals believed to be Sikhs working to establish the separate Sikh state of Khalistan. He investigated about three persons a year over a period of thirteen years. He submitted postal receipts that he said showed his mailings to the RAW. He quit when ordered to aid in the assassination of a very religious person he had investigated. After hiding with friends for a year, he used his own passport to come to the United States. He testified that he would be killed if returned to India.

3

Finding him not credible, the Immigration Judge denied Singh's application. Singh appealed. The Board, acting through a single member, affirmed the decision of the immigration judge finding him not credible. The Board stated as to the RAW:

4

... the respondent has presented no corroborative evidence whatsoever of the existence of this Indian government agency that is similar to the CIA and operates internationally. Despite the secrecy surrounding the operations of the CIA and other security agencies worldwide, it is not difficult to find evidence of their existence. Yet the respondent would have the Immigration Judge or the Board grant asylum based simply on his tale of being an agent for an organization that spies on and assassinates religious minorities, perhaps worldwide.

5

Singh appeals.

ANALYSIS

6

We review the Board's decision. That decision did not address the possible statutory bar to Singh's asylum. It focused on the absence of proof of the existence of the RAW as necessary corroboration of Singh's story. The "tale," the Board said, lacked corroboration. The Board did not acknowledge that the RAW existed.

7

The RAW does exist. It is under the office of the Prime Minister of India. It does engage in counterterrorism.

8

It has been suggested that we cannot take notice of the RAW's existence and operations because we are limited in our review to the administrative record upon which the deportation order is based and the Attorney General's findings of fact. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4); Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir.1996) (en banc) (citing the predecessor statute 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4)). But it is nonsense to suppose that we are so cabined and confined that we cannot exercise the ordinary power of any court to take notice of facts that are beyond dispute. We can notice that the government of India exists. We can notice that the office of the Prime Minister of India exists. We can notice that a part of the Prime Minister of India's office is the RAW.

9

Federal Rule of Evidence 201 permits us to take notice of any "adjudicative" fact "not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned." As a matter of course we have taken judicial notice that Japan has a constitution, a legislature that creates statutes, and a court system that gives judicial decisions and operates by means of lawyers. Dulles v. Katamoto, 256 F.2d 545, 547 (9th Cir.1958); cf. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 813 (9th Cir.1986) ("We do not ignore the constitutional, legal, and military relationship between England and Northern Ireland. The ties are so well established, see generally 1 Europa Year Book 1984, at 991-96; 14 World Book Encyclopedia 403-06b (1985 ed.), that had evidence of the relationship not been presented to the magistrate, judicial notice would have been appropriate.").

10

The statutory authorization, already broad, has been interpreted even more extensively in the context of appellate review of an agency. Under the heading "Judicial Notice is Expanded in Administrative Proceedings," the magisterial textbook of Judge Jack B. Weinstein states:

11

When a court reviews an administrative determination to find if it is adequately supported by the record, the court should use the scope of administrative notice authorized, rather than its own more narrowly subscribed notice. The court should place itself in the same position as the administrative board.

12

Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 201.02[4] (2d ed.2004) (footnotes omitted).

13

Every case "involves the use of hundreds or thousands of non-evidence facts." Fed.R.Evid. 201 advisory committee's note (proposed draft 1972) (paraphrasing Kenneth Culp Davis, "A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience," in Perspectives of Law 69, 72-73 (Roscoe Pound et al., 1964)). Administrative cases and the review of administrative decisions are no exception to this universal truth. An agency or an appeals court could not function if it had to depend on proof in the record of facts "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned." Fed.R.Evid. 201(b).

14

The language of the statute speaking of the administrative record must be interpreted in the context of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the general practice of administrative review,Dulles and the common practice of the courts. The language in Fisher repeats the statutory language and does not enhance its range. Its thrust is to exclude from our consideration the kind of facts contained in the country reports of the State Department unless the reports have been introduced into the record. See Fisher, 79 F.3d at 963 (citing cases and overruling some cases and parts of other cases that took judicial notice of country conditions reports).

15

The existence and operations of the RAW are readily known by the employment of an accessory tool as familiar in legal research today as Shephard's Citations were half a century ago. A simple Lexis search reveals over 1,500 articles on the RAW from reputable international media sources including the BBC. Its situation in the office of the Prime Minister is a matter of common knowledge. See Ejaz Akran, A Comparison of the Structures and Functions of Intelligence Organizations in Israel and India, 23 Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 59, 70 (Spring 2000). As early as 1987, the New York Times,reporting on the Indian Army's unsuccessful incursion into Sri Lanka, ended its report from New Delhi: "Military analysts here say the main failure was that of the Research and Analysis Wing, India's intelligence agency." Steven R. Weisman, Toll in Sri Lanka Shakes India Aides, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1987, Sec. 1 at 4. Even the Encyclopedia Britannica acknowledges the existence of the RAW: "India's most important intelligence agency is a civilian service, the Research and Analysis Wing ("RAW"). The RAW's operations are primarily aimed at the Indian subcontinent, though it also has directed efforts in the United States aimed at influencing that government's foreign policy." 21 Encyclopaedia Britannica787 (15th ed.2003).

16

A former member of the Cabinet Secretariat and of the National Security Advisory Board of India, Bahukutumbi Raman, has testified at length to Congress on terrorism to which India has been subjected from 1956 to the present and the measures taken by India against it. Raman's biographical data, submitted to Congress, identified him as moving from the Indian Police Service in 1984 to a permanent post in the Cabinet Secretariat and as serving from 1988 to 1994 as "head of the Counter-terrorism division of the Research & Analysis Wing (R & AW), India's external intelligence agency." The Challenge of Terrorism in Asia and the Pacific: Joint Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations, 108th Cong. 21 (2003) (statement submitted by Bahukutumbi Raman).

17

If this case had involved an agent's claimed membership in an agency more well-known in the United States, such as Interpol or the KGB, the IJ or BIA would not have required evidence of their existence. The issue simply would not have arisen because the IJ or BIA would have unconsciously taken notice of the fact of those agencies' existence. Judicial notice is appropriate in exactly this circumstance — to ensure that administrative or judicial ignorance is not insulated from review through hyper-technical application of the general rule that the court can consider only evidence considered by the Board. Fisher, 79 F.3d at 964.

18

We are compelled to reverse an adverse credibility finding by the Board whose centerpiece is lack of evidence of the existence of the RAW.

19

Petition GRANTED. The case is REMANDED to the Board