B.RAMAN
Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) has won a landslide victory in bye-elections to the Parliament. It is reported to have won at least 40 of the 45 seats for which the bye-elections were held. It had contested 44 of them. Suu Kyi herself has comfortably won the seat for which she contested.
2. Suu Kyi, her party and international observers of the election campaign and the voting process have acknowledged the fairness of the elections. The fairness was even otherwise obvious in the number of seats won by the NLD which was up to its expectations.
3. The bye-elections were caused by the resignation of those elected in last November’s elections who were nominated to the Council of Ministers as was required under the Constitution. The NLD, which had boycotted last year’s elections, decided to register itself as a political party and contest the bye-elections to these seats after the Government decided to amend certain provisions of the Constitution and regulations regarding party registration to which the NLD had objected.
4. There was a certain lack of transparency regarding the talks or negotiations between Suu Kyi and President Thein Sein that preceded the agreement which facilitated the decision of the NLD to seek registration as a political party and contest the bye-elections. It was not clear whether it was an unconditional acceptance by the Government of the demands of Suu Kyi or whether there were concessions on both sides. If so, what were they?
5.Fears that the serving officers of the Army and other former Army strongmen like Than Shwe, who had ruled the country before last year’s elections, may force a reconsideration of the concessions made by Thein Sein have been belied so far. Serving officers and former Army strongmen have not come in the way of the implementation of the political reforms initiated by Thein Sein. The fact that they did not try to influence the results of the bye-polls to the detriment of the NLD is an indicator that they have accepted the reforms initiated so far.
6. The additional fact that China and Pakistan have taken the initiative for building up contacts with Suu Kyi and her party----- President Asif Ali Zardari had officially visited Myanmar and during his stay had met her---- was also an indicator that in the Chinese and Pakistani assessments there is no opposition to the reforms from the serving officers and former Army strongmen.
7. The Myanmar Army has always been worried over the possibility of internal political instability resulting in violence and a weakening of the Army’s counter-insurgency operations against the various insurgencies of the ethnic minorities. Whenever the serving officers have apprehended such threats they have not hesitated to intervene and strengthen their hold over the State and security apparatus.
8. In Suu Kyi’s post-victory statements advising her followers to observe restraint and moderation in celebrating the bye-poll victory, one could sense an anxiety to ensure that over-exuberance in celebrating the victory doesn’t lead to law and order situations that might be exploited by those unhappy with the reforms. She has been stressing the need for reconciliation and national unity.
9.Now that Suu Kyi and her party have won a significant victory, what next in the political process? Will she and her party be satisfied with playing the role of a constructive opposition till the next general elections in 2015 without prematurely trying to play a larger political role not warranted by their limited presence in the Parliament?
10. Will the Government try to co-opt her into the system by offering her an official role that she may find it difficult to resist such as the post of the Foreign Minister or Chairperson of an important Parliamentary Committee? If such an offer is made, will she accept it thereby running the risk of creating an impression that she has been softened by the regime and has let herself be co-opted or will she choose to maintain her political independence by not accepting any role under the present Government, which is still dominated by the Army? These are important questions to which answers are not available and will not be available for some weeks till the results are officially declared and the NLD members take their seats in the Parliament.
11.From a dogged and determined opponent of the Army and the military regime, Suu Kyi has mellowed down into a pragmatic leader who understands the Army’s determination to maintain a certain political role in the form of reservation of 25 per cent of the seats in the Parliament for the Armed Forces and to ensure that the various insurgencies do not lead to a disintegration of the country.
12. She also understands the geo-political and the geo-strategic considerations that make the Army follow a policy of equi-distance and equi-proximity in relation to China and India. While she has empathy for the West---which is reciprocated by the West--- she would most probably avoid any foreign and strategic policy initiatives or demands that could create alarm in China or among the large number of pro-Beijing officers in the Army.
13. There are indications that now that the bye-polls are over, our Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh has decided to visit Myanmar for two days next month. By then, a clearer indication of the vision of Suu Kyi should be available. Suu Kyi, who grew up in India and went to college in New Delhi, has been an admirer of Indian democracy and Indian political leaders of the independence struggle. At the same time, she has had reasons to be disappointed by India’s over-cautious attitude to the struggle for democracy led by her. It would be unrealistic to expect any overflow of bonhomie for India from her. She will be friendly and correct---nothing more. ( 3-4-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Monday, April 2, 2012
Sunday, April 1, 2012
PM WANTS TO ENCOURAGE WHAT HE HOPES IS BEGINNING OF CHANGE OF PAK MINDSET
B.RAMAN
The Prime Minister, Dr.Manmohan Singh, is keen to encourage what he hopes is the beginning of a change of the Pakistani mindset towards India----- at least in the political class if not in the Army. That is the message behind his decision to transform the planned religious pilgrimage of President Asif Ali Zardari to Ajmer into a soft political visit to add to the improving ambiance in bilateral relations.
2.According to present indications, President Zardari is expected to arrive by air in Delhi on April 8, have an early lunch with the PM, visit Ajmer and fly back to Islamabad from there. The programme is still tentative. There is unlikely to be any joint statement at the end of the lunch. It has not yet been decided whether there should be a joint interaction with the media.
3.Protocol demands that an important State personality should receive Mr.Zardari on his arrival at Ajmer, accompany him to the Ajmer Sharif and see him off. It has not yet been decided whether this would be done by the Governor of Rajasthan or somebody from Delhi should go to Ajmer.
4. The visit will reflect the improving comfort level between the leaderships of the two countries as noticed during the brief interactions between Dr.Manmohan Singh and Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani of Pakistan in the margins of the recent nuclear security summit in Seoul.
5.The Government of India has noted with interest the benign rhetoric in recent references of the Pakistani leadership towards India and the initiative taken by the Gilani Government for breaking the issue of bilateral trade relations with India from being a hostage to the Kashmir issue.
6. More significantly, there has been no evidence of any involvement of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in any of the jihadi terrorist strikes that have taken place in different cities of India since the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. It is too early to assess whether there would be any change in the ISI’s proxy war against India under its new chief Lt.Gen.Zahir-ul-Islam.
7. While reacting positively to Mr.Zardari’s planned pilgrimage to Ajmer, one has to note with concern indications of a further strengthening of Pakistan’s relations with China as seen during the current visit of Mr.Gilani to China to attend a regional security forum.
8. The Associated Press of Pakistan (APP) has reported that Gilani and the Chinese Vice-Premier Li Keqiang, who met on April 1 agreed to stand with each other “in all circumstances” and vowed to uphold their sovereignty and territorial integrity at all costs. Gilani was reported to have told the Chinese leader: “China’s friend is our friend and China’s enemy is our enemy.” The APP quoted the Chinese Vice-Premier as saying that China would also support Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in all situations. “No matter what changes take place at international level, we will uphold Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” he reportedly said. ( 2-4-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The Prime Minister, Dr.Manmohan Singh, is keen to encourage what he hopes is the beginning of a change of the Pakistani mindset towards India----- at least in the political class if not in the Army. That is the message behind his decision to transform the planned religious pilgrimage of President Asif Ali Zardari to Ajmer into a soft political visit to add to the improving ambiance in bilateral relations.
2.According to present indications, President Zardari is expected to arrive by air in Delhi on April 8, have an early lunch with the PM, visit Ajmer and fly back to Islamabad from there. The programme is still tentative. There is unlikely to be any joint statement at the end of the lunch. It has not yet been decided whether there should be a joint interaction with the media.
3.Protocol demands that an important State personality should receive Mr.Zardari on his arrival at Ajmer, accompany him to the Ajmer Sharif and see him off. It has not yet been decided whether this would be done by the Governor of Rajasthan or somebody from Delhi should go to Ajmer.
4. The visit will reflect the improving comfort level between the leaderships of the two countries as noticed during the brief interactions between Dr.Manmohan Singh and Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani of Pakistan in the margins of the recent nuclear security summit in Seoul.
5.The Government of India has noted with interest the benign rhetoric in recent references of the Pakistani leadership towards India and the initiative taken by the Gilani Government for breaking the issue of bilateral trade relations with India from being a hostage to the Kashmir issue.
6. More significantly, there has been no evidence of any involvement of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in any of the jihadi terrorist strikes that have taken place in different cities of India since the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. It is too early to assess whether there would be any change in the ISI’s proxy war against India under its new chief Lt.Gen.Zahir-ul-Islam.
7. While reacting positively to Mr.Zardari’s planned pilgrimage to Ajmer, one has to note with concern indications of a further strengthening of Pakistan’s relations with China as seen during the current visit of Mr.Gilani to China to attend a regional security forum.
8. The Associated Press of Pakistan (APP) has reported that Gilani and the Chinese Vice-Premier Li Keqiang, who met on April 1 agreed to stand with each other “in all circumstances” and vowed to uphold their sovereignty and territorial integrity at all costs. Gilani was reported to have told the Chinese leader: “China’s friend is our friend and China’s enemy is our enemy.” The APP quoted the Chinese Vice-Premier as saying that China would also support Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in all situations. “No matter what changes take place at international level, we will uphold Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” he reportedly said. ( 2-4-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Saturday, March 31, 2012
HAS TIME COME FOR A STRONG DA NOTICE SYSTEM IN INDIA?
B.RAMAN
The current controversy relating to Gen.V.K.Singh, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), has led to some worrisome aspects in the media coverage of the controversy. The likely impact on national security has not been kept in view not only by some sections of the media, but even by some retired public servants who have been commenting on the controversy in TV debates.
2. Some sections of the media and some individual journalists as well as some public servants, who have held senior positions in the Government, have crossed the Laxman Rekha in their reporting and panel comments.
3. The Government has also been a passive spectator of the way the controversy has crossed one Laxman Rekha after another. It is generally the tradition in other countries that when a sensitive document indicating deficiencies in defence preparedness leaks out, the Governments deny in public their authenticity, but enquire into the leakage in secret.
4. When the contents of the COAS’ letter of March 12, 2012, on the defence preparedness leaked out, the immediate reflex of a clued-up Government would have been to deny its authenticity in public and order a secret enquiry.
5. Instead, many responsible members of the Government including the Defence Minister and the COAS have made public comments tending to corroborate its authenticity, thereby providing official confirmation to our adversaries that the serious deficiencies mentioned in the letter are correct.
6. In the UK whenever serious controversies and leakages likely to affect National Security break out, the Defence Ministry immediately moves and issues what is called a Defence Advisory (DA) notice requesting the media, the journos and others to exercise restraint in reporting and commenting so that national security is not damaged.
7. The DA Notices cannot be legally enforced. Whoever doesn’t observe them does not commit any offence. But it is a strong reminder to all concerned of their ethical responsibility in the matter. Fears that they may fall foul of the public by not paying heed to the DA notices act as a check on the journos and others.
8. There are certain standing DA notices which are of a permanent nature. Some others are issued from time to time whenever a controversy breaks out.
9. The standing DA Notices relate to the following:
DA-Notice 01: Military Operations, Plans & Capabilities
DA-Notice 02: Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Weapons and Equipment
DA-Notice 03: Ciphers and Secure Communications
DA-Notice 04: Sensitive Installations and Home Addresses
DA-Notice 05: United Kingdom Security & Intelligence Special Services.
10. In recent years, DA Notices have also been issued relating to terrorism and documents leaked by Wikileaks.
11. The time has come for the Government to institute a DA Notice system in India. Australia follows a similar practice. ( 1-4-12 )
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The current controversy relating to Gen.V.K.Singh, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), has led to some worrisome aspects in the media coverage of the controversy. The likely impact on national security has not been kept in view not only by some sections of the media, but even by some retired public servants who have been commenting on the controversy in TV debates.
2. Some sections of the media and some individual journalists as well as some public servants, who have held senior positions in the Government, have crossed the Laxman Rekha in their reporting and panel comments.
3. The Government has also been a passive spectator of the way the controversy has crossed one Laxman Rekha after another. It is generally the tradition in other countries that when a sensitive document indicating deficiencies in defence preparedness leaks out, the Governments deny in public their authenticity, but enquire into the leakage in secret.
4. When the contents of the COAS’ letter of March 12, 2012, on the defence preparedness leaked out, the immediate reflex of a clued-up Government would have been to deny its authenticity in public and order a secret enquiry.
5. Instead, many responsible members of the Government including the Defence Minister and the COAS have made public comments tending to corroborate its authenticity, thereby providing official confirmation to our adversaries that the serious deficiencies mentioned in the letter are correct.
6. In the UK whenever serious controversies and leakages likely to affect National Security break out, the Defence Ministry immediately moves and issues what is called a Defence Advisory (DA) notice requesting the media, the journos and others to exercise restraint in reporting and commenting so that national security is not damaged.
7. The DA Notices cannot be legally enforced. Whoever doesn’t observe them does not commit any offence. But it is a strong reminder to all concerned of their ethical responsibility in the matter. Fears that they may fall foul of the public by not paying heed to the DA notices act as a check on the journos and others.
8. There are certain standing DA notices which are of a permanent nature. Some others are issued from time to time whenever a controversy breaks out.
9. The standing DA Notices relate to the following:
DA-Notice 01: Military Operations, Plans & Capabilities
DA-Notice 02: Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Weapons and Equipment
DA-Notice 03: Ciphers and Secure Communications
DA-Notice 04: Sensitive Installations and Home Addresses
DA-Notice 05: United Kingdom Security & Intelligence Special Services.
10. In recent years, DA Notices have also been issued relating to terrorism and documents leaked by Wikileaks.
11. The time has come for the Government to institute a DA Notice system in India. Australia follows a similar practice. ( 1-4-12 )
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Friday, March 30, 2012
ACTION TO REASSURE THE ARMED FORCES & THE PUBLIC
An Open Letter To The PM
Dear Mr.Prime Minister,
The Government needs to be complimented for maintaining its cool and dignity in the face of some of the recent ill-advised actions and public comments of Gen.V.K.Singh, the outgoing Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), who will be retiring on May 31,2012. Any hasty action against him or slanging match with him will lower the dignity of the office of the COAS. National interest demands that this dignity of this high office must be maintained in the eyes of the officers and jawans of the Army as well as the public. An Army marches and fights on its pride in itself, in its officers and in its chief and this pride should not be damaged.
2. Whatever be his ill-advised actions and comments, Gen.Singh enjoys a high reputation for his personal integrity and his professionalism. These positive qualities of his have to be recognised and respected. In the Government’s feelings of hurt over his ill-advised actions and public comments, his record as an officer in leading his men and serving the country should not be forgotten.
3. Certain worrisome issues have come to the fore during this controversy. These relate to the slowing down of the procurement process in the Armed Services as a whole which seems to have had an impact on the arms and ammunition and other equipment holdings of the Army and the casual and non-serious manner in which allegations of corruption are handled both in the Army Headquarters and the Defence Ministry. There have been serious sins of commission and omission in both and by both, which have at least partly contributed to the present controversy.
4.Not only members of the public, but also the soldiers and officers of the Armed Forces in their barracks and cantonments would be discussing and analysing the merits of some of the issues raised by the COAS, the validity of which cannot and should not be questioned. These issues have to be addressed seriously and the public and the Armed Forces convinced that the Government has not been and will not be indifferent to the serious and worrisome issues projected by the COAS----whatever might have been his motive in projecting them from the roof top instead of across the table within the confines of the offices of the South Block.
5.The Government should immediately initiate action to address the deficiencies in the state of our defence preparedness pointed out by the COAS. The action has to be two-fold--- immediate procurement on an emergency basis of the various items mentioned by the COAS in his letter of March 12 to you and short and medium term measures for removing the bottler-necks and speed-breakers that seem to have crept into our procurement process during the last 10 years.
6. I would strongly recommend the appointment of an Eminent Chiefs Group of the Armed Forces consisting of one past chief each of the Army, the Air Force and the Navy headed by the nominee of the Army to go into the contents of the COAS letter of March 12 and recommend a time-bound plan of action.
7. While it is important to establish how the contents of the letter leaked to the media and initiate disciplinary action against the person found responsible for the serious breach of security, the Government should not allow its anger and discomfiture over the leak to divert its attention from the need to address immediately the worrisome state of affairs pointed out by the COAS.
8. Another issue calling for action is to go into the procedure adopted by the Armed Forces Headquarters and the Defence Ministry for dealing with complaints of corruption so that the public and the three forces are reassured that there is no attempt to cover them up . This enquiry could be entrusted to an eminent retired Judge of the Supreme Court. He could go into various issues such as the role of the Central Vigilance Commissioner in checking corruption in the Armed Forces and the Defence Ministry, the existing vigilance mechanism in them and the trigger mechanism by which action is triggered when there is a complaint. While it is important to weed out corruption, it is equally important to ensure that motivated allegations and suspicions planted with an ulterior motive do not slow down the procurement process to the detriment of the Armed Forces.
9. During the course of the public debate on the sequel to L’Affaire COAS certain lingering issues from the past have also been raised---such as the non-implementation of the recommendations of the Arun Singh Task Force regarding the reorganisation and modernisation of defence management and an alleged disuse of the past practice of the Prime Minister personally interacting with the three chiefs on various issues relating to the three services and the state of our defence preparedness.
10. Shri Arun Singh is a highly regarded expert on matters relating to the modernisation of defence management and enjoys tremendous respect in the Armed Forces as well as among the civilian bureaucracy. I would suggest that he should be requested to go into this aspect once again and suggest remedial measures. It is important for the Prime Minister to take the initiative for periodically interacting with the three service chiefs.
11. Many countries including Japan and China have the practice of periodically issuing a White Paper on Defence to create greater transparency about defence matters. This is a practice which is worthy of emulation by us. The Government should quickly come out with a White Paper on the various measures already taken or proposed to be taken for the modernisation of the Armed Forces and the defence management.
12. I know personally that some of the allegations being made projecting the civilian bureaucracy as the villain of the piece in the tardy implementation of the recommendations of the Arun Singh Task Force are due to misperceptions for want of transparency and accurate information. The well-informed among us know that the non-implementation of some of the recommendations was not due to any stonewalling by the civilian bureaucracy, but because of a lack of consensus on the follow-up action among the three services.
13. A White Paper and a debate on it in the Parliament and outside would go some way in removing these misperceptions.
With warm regards,
Yours sincerely,
B.Raman,
Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India.
Dr.Manmohan Singh,
Prime Minister,
New Delhi.
Dear Mr.Prime Minister,
The Government needs to be complimented for maintaining its cool and dignity in the face of some of the recent ill-advised actions and public comments of Gen.V.K.Singh, the outgoing Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), who will be retiring on May 31,2012. Any hasty action against him or slanging match with him will lower the dignity of the office of the COAS. National interest demands that this dignity of this high office must be maintained in the eyes of the officers and jawans of the Army as well as the public. An Army marches and fights on its pride in itself, in its officers and in its chief and this pride should not be damaged.
2. Whatever be his ill-advised actions and comments, Gen.Singh enjoys a high reputation for his personal integrity and his professionalism. These positive qualities of his have to be recognised and respected. In the Government’s feelings of hurt over his ill-advised actions and public comments, his record as an officer in leading his men and serving the country should not be forgotten.
3. Certain worrisome issues have come to the fore during this controversy. These relate to the slowing down of the procurement process in the Armed Services as a whole which seems to have had an impact on the arms and ammunition and other equipment holdings of the Army and the casual and non-serious manner in which allegations of corruption are handled both in the Army Headquarters and the Defence Ministry. There have been serious sins of commission and omission in both and by both, which have at least partly contributed to the present controversy.
4.Not only members of the public, but also the soldiers and officers of the Armed Forces in their barracks and cantonments would be discussing and analysing the merits of some of the issues raised by the COAS, the validity of which cannot and should not be questioned. These issues have to be addressed seriously and the public and the Armed Forces convinced that the Government has not been and will not be indifferent to the serious and worrisome issues projected by the COAS----whatever might have been his motive in projecting them from the roof top instead of across the table within the confines of the offices of the South Block.
5.The Government should immediately initiate action to address the deficiencies in the state of our defence preparedness pointed out by the COAS. The action has to be two-fold--- immediate procurement on an emergency basis of the various items mentioned by the COAS in his letter of March 12 to you and short and medium term measures for removing the bottler-necks and speed-breakers that seem to have crept into our procurement process during the last 10 years.
6. I would strongly recommend the appointment of an Eminent Chiefs Group of the Armed Forces consisting of one past chief each of the Army, the Air Force and the Navy headed by the nominee of the Army to go into the contents of the COAS letter of March 12 and recommend a time-bound plan of action.
7. While it is important to establish how the contents of the letter leaked to the media and initiate disciplinary action against the person found responsible for the serious breach of security, the Government should not allow its anger and discomfiture over the leak to divert its attention from the need to address immediately the worrisome state of affairs pointed out by the COAS.
8. Another issue calling for action is to go into the procedure adopted by the Armed Forces Headquarters and the Defence Ministry for dealing with complaints of corruption so that the public and the three forces are reassured that there is no attempt to cover them up . This enquiry could be entrusted to an eminent retired Judge of the Supreme Court. He could go into various issues such as the role of the Central Vigilance Commissioner in checking corruption in the Armed Forces and the Defence Ministry, the existing vigilance mechanism in them and the trigger mechanism by which action is triggered when there is a complaint. While it is important to weed out corruption, it is equally important to ensure that motivated allegations and suspicions planted with an ulterior motive do not slow down the procurement process to the detriment of the Armed Forces.
9. During the course of the public debate on the sequel to L’Affaire COAS certain lingering issues from the past have also been raised---such as the non-implementation of the recommendations of the Arun Singh Task Force regarding the reorganisation and modernisation of defence management and an alleged disuse of the past practice of the Prime Minister personally interacting with the three chiefs on various issues relating to the three services and the state of our defence preparedness.
10. Shri Arun Singh is a highly regarded expert on matters relating to the modernisation of defence management and enjoys tremendous respect in the Armed Forces as well as among the civilian bureaucracy. I would suggest that he should be requested to go into this aspect once again and suggest remedial measures. It is important for the Prime Minister to take the initiative for periodically interacting with the three service chiefs.
11. Many countries including Japan and China have the practice of periodically issuing a White Paper on Defence to create greater transparency about defence matters. This is a practice which is worthy of emulation by us. The Government should quickly come out with a White Paper on the various measures already taken or proposed to be taken for the modernisation of the Armed Forces and the defence management.
12. I know personally that some of the allegations being made projecting the civilian bureaucracy as the villain of the piece in the tardy implementation of the recommendations of the Arun Singh Task Force are due to misperceptions for want of transparency and accurate information. The well-informed among us know that the non-implementation of some of the recommendations was not due to any stonewalling by the civilian bureaucracy, but because of a lack of consensus on the follow-up action among the three services.
13. A White Paper and a debate on it in the Parliament and outside would go some way in removing these misperceptions.
With warm regards,
Yours sincerely,
B.Raman,
Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India.
Dr.Manmohan Singh,
Prime Minister,
New Delhi.
Tuesday, March 27, 2012
FROM AN ISLAMIC BOMB TO A JIHADI BOMB
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.745
B.RAMAN
The second Nuclear Security Summit currently being held in Seoul, South Korea, would make a fresh evaluation , inter alia, of the security of nuclear materials in the possession of many countries.
2. Threats to nuclear security arise from two factors--- accidents in nuclear establishments arising from natural or man-made causes and illegal acquisitions of nuclear materials and technology by State as well as non-State actors.
3. While there is a laid down and frequently tested drill for coping with nuclear accidents, preventive and protective measures to prevent the illegal acquisition of nuclear materials and know-how by State and non-State actors have not been satisfactory.
4.While Pakistan and North Korea are two instances of State actors illegally acquiring nuclear capability, Iran is threatening to join their ranks as a result of past complicity of Pakistan and North Korea.
5. Fears of non-State actors clandestinely acquiring nuclear materials and technology acquired a new dimension in the late 1990s after the famous interviews given by Osama bin Laden to US journalists from Kandahar, where he was then based, justifying the right of Muslims to acquire a nuclear weapon and to use it, if necessary, to protect Islam.
6. Since then fears of Pakistan‘s Islamic bomb, as it is referred to by Pakistani Islamic fundamentalist organisations, being transformed into a jihadi bomb in the hands of Al Qaeda and its affiliates have been preoccupying the minds of nuclear security experts. These fears were aggravated after the US troops which defeated the Taliban after 9/11 unearthed evidence to show that Sultan Bashiruddin and Abdul Majid, two retired nuclear scientists of Pakistan, were in touch with OBL and had visited him in Kandahar. The two were arrested by the Pakistanis and interrogated by the Americans.
7. The interrogation did not unearth any incriminating evidence against them. Despite this, the fact that two Pakistani nuclear scientists, who had occupied important positions in its nuclear establishments, were in contact with OBL, showed that jihadi and other terrorist organisations might be able acquire a nuclear capability not only through theft or other illegal means, but also by the complicity of the personnel of Pakistan’s nuclear establishments. This fear would now extend to the personnel of Iran’s nuclear establishments. In the case of North Korea, the dangers of non-State actors getting hold of its capability are not rated high.
8.The death of OBL on May 2 last year has not removed or diluted the threat of jihadi terrorist organisations acquiring a nuclear capability. True, there has been no statement from Al Qaeda or its associates or their leaders after the initial statements of OBL in the 1990s, about the right of the Muslims to acquire a nuclear capability.
9. The absence of statements on this subject by jihadi leaders and their organisations cannot and should not be interpreted as indicating that these organisations and their present leaders did not attach the same priority to this jihadi task as OBL did.
10. Al Qaeda has definitely suffered a set-back as a result of the death of OBL and other leaders in the Af-Pak region and Yemen due to special operations undertaken by the US. Despite the decimation of its leadership, its GenNext continues to show a high level of motivation as was seen by the recent terrorist incidents in France. There has been a geographic spread of its activities.
11. The threat from Al Qaeda and its affiliates and the dangers of their acquiring a nuclear capability have to be factored into in any security planning for nuclear establishments and personnel. The discussions in conferences such as the first Nuclear Security Summit in Washington and the present one in Seoul focus on physical security measures to prevent acquisitions through thefts and other illegal means.
12. With countries such as Pakistan participating in their deliberations, it would not be possible for them to have any meaningful discussions to prevent acquisition of nuclear capability by terrorist organisations through the complicity of personnel in nuclear establishments. This is a matter that has to be discussed in more restricted meetings of experts of intelligence agencies from India, the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Russia and the EU countries. This would require a high level of HUMINT and TECHINT capability, joint operations to collect intelligence and arrangements for sharing and analysing the collected intelligence. India should take the leadership in working for such a mechanism if it has not already done so. (27-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
B.RAMAN
The second Nuclear Security Summit currently being held in Seoul, South Korea, would make a fresh evaluation , inter alia, of the security of nuclear materials in the possession of many countries.
2. Threats to nuclear security arise from two factors--- accidents in nuclear establishments arising from natural or man-made causes and illegal acquisitions of nuclear materials and technology by State as well as non-State actors.
3. While there is a laid down and frequently tested drill for coping with nuclear accidents, preventive and protective measures to prevent the illegal acquisition of nuclear materials and know-how by State and non-State actors have not been satisfactory.
4.While Pakistan and North Korea are two instances of State actors illegally acquiring nuclear capability, Iran is threatening to join their ranks as a result of past complicity of Pakistan and North Korea.
5. Fears of non-State actors clandestinely acquiring nuclear materials and technology acquired a new dimension in the late 1990s after the famous interviews given by Osama bin Laden to US journalists from Kandahar, where he was then based, justifying the right of Muslims to acquire a nuclear weapon and to use it, if necessary, to protect Islam.
6. Since then fears of Pakistan‘s Islamic bomb, as it is referred to by Pakistani Islamic fundamentalist organisations, being transformed into a jihadi bomb in the hands of Al Qaeda and its affiliates have been preoccupying the minds of nuclear security experts. These fears were aggravated after the US troops which defeated the Taliban after 9/11 unearthed evidence to show that Sultan Bashiruddin and Abdul Majid, two retired nuclear scientists of Pakistan, were in touch with OBL and had visited him in Kandahar. The two were arrested by the Pakistanis and interrogated by the Americans.
7. The interrogation did not unearth any incriminating evidence against them. Despite this, the fact that two Pakistani nuclear scientists, who had occupied important positions in its nuclear establishments, were in contact with OBL, showed that jihadi and other terrorist organisations might be able acquire a nuclear capability not only through theft or other illegal means, but also by the complicity of the personnel of Pakistan’s nuclear establishments. This fear would now extend to the personnel of Iran’s nuclear establishments. In the case of North Korea, the dangers of non-State actors getting hold of its capability are not rated high.
8.The death of OBL on May 2 last year has not removed or diluted the threat of jihadi terrorist organisations acquiring a nuclear capability. True, there has been no statement from Al Qaeda or its associates or their leaders after the initial statements of OBL in the 1990s, about the right of the Muslims to acquire a nuclear capability.
9. The absence of statements on this subject by jihadi leaders and their organisations cannot and should not be interpreted as indicating that these organisations and their present leaders did not attach the same priority to this jihadi task as OBL did.
10. Al Qaeda has definitely suffered a set-back as a result of the death of OBL and other leaders in the Af-Pak region and Yemen due to special operations undertaken by the US. Despite the decimation of its leadership, its GenNext continues to show a high level of motivation as was seen by the recent terrorist incidents in France. There has been a geographic spread of its activities.
11. The threat from Al Qaeda and its affiliates and the dangers of their acquiring a nuclear capability have to be factored into in any security planning for nuclear establishments and personnel. The discussions in conferences such as the first Nuclear Security Summit in Washington and the present one in Seoul focus on physical security measures to prevent acquisitions through thefts and other illegal means.
12. With countries such as Pakistan participating in their deliberations, it would not be possible for them to have any meaningful discussions to prevent acquisition of nuclear capability by terrorist organisations through the complicity of personnel in nuclear establishments. This is a matter that has to be discussed in more restricted meetings of experts of intelligence agencies from India, the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Russia and the EU countries. This would require a high level of HUMINT and TECHINT capability, joint operations to collect intelligence and arrangements for sharing and analysing the collected intelligence. India should take the leadership in working for such a mechanism if it has not already done so. (27-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Monday, March 26, 2012
A CASUAL, NON-SERIOUS HANDLING OF A CASE OF ATTEMPTED BRIBERY OF COAS
B.RAMAN
The disclosure made by Gen.V.K.Singh, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), in an interview to “The Hindu” ( March 26,2012) that he had refused an offer of a bribe of Rs.14 crores in connection with a commercial transaction relating to the purchase of vehicles for the Army some months ago and that he had reported it to Shri A.K.Antony, the Defence Minister, if correct, raises serious questions regarding the way corruption allegations are handled in the Government of India. Subsequent reports have alleged that the bribe was offered by a senior retired officer of the Army.
2. As per the normal procedures, the COAS should have immediately taken the following action:
( a ). Report the matter to the Minister.
( b ). Address a formal Demi-official letter to the Minister in confirmation of what he had reported orally and requesting for an enquiry.
( c ).Call from his office the file relating to this transaction and record a note that he (the COAS) was offered a bribe by a retired Army officer which he refused and that he had reported it to the Defence Minister orally and in writing and asked for an enquiry.
( d ). Address a note to his office that the retired Army officer who offered the bribe should not be issued a security pass in future to visit Army offices and that action should be initiated for suspending his pension payments till the final outcome of the enquiry.
3. Apart from orally reporting to the Defence Minister, the COAS does not appear to have taken any other action as expected under the normal office procedures when there is an attempted bribery. His disclosing the incident now in a media interview would naturally give rise to a strong suspicion that his belated disclosure two months before the end of the controversial final months of his career because of his differences with the MOD regarding his date of birth must have been motivated with a personal agenda.
4. When the COAS orally reported the matter to him, the Defence Minister should have immediately taken the following action:
( a ). Record a formal note in the relevant file of his office regarding the disclosure of the COAS and stating that he was ordering the Defence Secretary to refer the matter to the Director, Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), for a Preliminary Enquiry ( PE) to be followed by a formal investigation if found correct.
( b ) Address a formal DO letter to the Defence Secretary with copies to the Cabinet Secretary and the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister to refer the matter to the CBI for a PE.
5. The Defence Minister does not appear to have taken any of these actions. This related to a case of attempted bribery in an office of the Government of India. It did not require the concurrence of any State Government or any other authority for ordering a PE by the CBI. The Minister was competent to do so and should have done so.
6. There have been serious acts of omission by the COAS as well as by the Defence Minister and these amount to a serious case of dereliction of duty. Before the controversy gets dirtier due to allegations and counter-allegations and suspicions and counter-suspicions, the Prime Minister should ask the Cabinet Secretary to take over the responsibility for further enquiries to establish the truth. (27-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The disclosure made by Gen.V.K.Singh, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), in an interview to “The Hindu” ( March 26,2012) that he had refused an offer of a bribe of Rs.14 crores in connection with a commercial transaction relating to the purchase of vehicles for the Army some months ago and that he had reported it to Shri A.K.Antony, the Defence Minister, if correct, raises serious questions regarding the way corruption allegations are handled in the Government of India. Subsequent reports have alleged that the bribe was offered by a senior retired officer of the Army.
2. As per the normal procedures, the COAS should have immediately taken the following action:
( a ). Report the matter to the Minister.
( b ). Address a formal Demi-official letter to the Minister in confirmation of what he had reported orally and requesting for an enquiry.
( c ).Call from his office the file relating to this transaction and record a note that he (the COAS) was offered a bribe by a retired Army officer which he refused and that he had reported it to the Defence Minister orally and in writing and asked for an enquiry.
( d ). Address a note to his office that the retired Army officer who offered the bribe should not be issued a security pass in future to visit Army offices and that action should be initiated for suspending his pension payments till the final outcome of the enquiry.
3. Apart from orally reporting to the Defence Minister, the COAS does not appear to have taken any other action as expected under the normal office procedures when there is an attempted bribery. His disclosing the incident now in a media interview would naturally give rise to a strong suspicion that his belated disclosure two months before the end of the controversial final months of his career because of his differences with the MOD regarding his date of birth must have been motivated with a personal agenda.
4. When the COAS orally reported the matter to him, the Defence Minister should have immediately taken the following action:
( a ). Record a formal note in the relevant file of his office regarding the disclosure of the COAS and stating that he was ordering the Defence Secretary to refer the matter to the Director, Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), for a Preliminary Enquiry ( PE) to be followed by a formal investigation if found correct.
( b ) Address a formal DO letter to the Defence Secretary with copies to the Cabinet Secretary and the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister to refer the matter to the CBI for a PE.
5. The Defence Minister does not appear to have taken any of these actions. This related to a case of attempted bribery in an office of the Government of India. It did not require the concurrence of any State Government or any other authority for ordering a PE by the CBI. The Minister was competent to do so and should have done so.
6. There have been serious acts of omission by the COAS as well as by the Defence Minister and these amount to a serious case of dereliction of duty. Before the controversy gets dirtier due to allegations and counter-allegations and suspicions and counter-suspicions, the Prime Minister should ask the Cabinet Secretary to take over the responsibility for further enquiries to establish the truth. (27-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Sunday, March 25, 2012
CHINA: REAL WORLD VS VIRTUAL WORLD
B.RAMAN
Beijing seems as normal as ever. Widespread rumours disseminated by Chinese microblogs about a tussle for power and even an attempted coup after the March 15,2012, sacking of Bo Xilai , an informal, easily accessible and populist party functionary from his post of Party chief of Southwest China's Chongqing Municipality, have proved false.
2. According to some of these rumours, Bo enjoyed the support of Zhou Yongkang, the ninth-ranking member of the Standing Committee of the Politbureau of the Communist Party of China, who has been the head of the Party's powerful Political and Legal Affairs Committee, which oversees police and judicial matters, since 2007.
3.These rumours even alleged that there was an attempted coup by elements in the Ministry of Public Security associated with Zhou Yongkang and speculated that Zhou might also be on the way out.
4.These rumours spread by China’s 300 million strong Netizen community have proved false. Things have been normal in Beijing. President Hu Jintao arrived in Seoul on the afternoon of March 25 to attend the nuclear security summit and he is going ahead with his plans to visit New Delhi the coming week to attend the BRIC summit and to pay a bilateral visit to Cambodia. The Chinese have not suggested any changes in the programmes of foreign visitors to Beijing. Vice President Xi Jinping, who is expected to take over from Hu later this year, met former Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio in Beijing, on March 23.
5. Even Zhou, who has been in the centre of these rumours, has been visible and functioning normally. The State-owned Xinhua news agency disseminated on March 22, a letter reported to have been written by Zhou to a conference of police and public security officials stressing the importance of better interactions between law enforcement officials and the public in order to improve their public image.
6. In the meanwhile, Radio Free Asia, funded by the US State Department, has disseminated a report that over 3000 police and public security officials from the provinces have been called to Beijing to attend a re-training programme starting on March 26. The significance of this retraining programme is not clear. Is this connected to the removal of Bo, whose No 2 and police chief, had allegedly made an unsuccessful attempt to seek asylum in the US Consulate in Chengdu?
7. While the rumours have proved to be false, the fact that the rumours spread so fast and so widely should be a matter of concern to the Chinese leaders. This shows that anti-State and anti-Government elements have a capability for causing instability through orchestrated disinformation through the Net.
8. China’s real world seems to be normal, but not its virtual world which is being skilfully used by anti-State elements to create confusion. ( 25-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Beijing seems as normal as ever. Widespread rumours disseminated by Chinese microblogs about a tussle for power and even an attempted coup after the March 15,2012, sacking of Bo Xilai , an informal, easily accessible and populist party functionary from his post of Party chief of Southwest China's Chongqing Municipality, have proved false.
2. According to some of these rumours, Bo enjoyed the support of Zhou Yongkang, the ninth-ranking member of the Standing Committee of the Politbureau of the Communist Party of China, who has been the head of the Party's powerful Political and Legal Affairs Committee, which oversees police and judicial matters, since 2007.
3.These rumours even alleged that there was an attempted coup by elements in the Ministry of Public Security associated with Zhou Yongkang and speculated that Zhou might also be on the way out.
4.These rumours spread by China’s 300 million strong Netizen community have proved false. Things have been normal in Beijing. President Hu Jintao arrived in Seoul on the afternoon of March 25 to attend the nuclear security summit and he is going ahead with his plans to visit New Delhi the coming week to attend the BRIC summit and to pay a bilateral visit to Cambodia. The Chinese have not suggested any changes in the programmes of foreign visitors to Beijing. Vice President Xi Jinping, who is expected to take over from Hu later this year, met former Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio in Beijing, on March 23.
5. Even Zhou, who has been in the centre of these rumours, has been visible and functioning normally. The State-owned Xinhua news agency disseminated on March 22, a letter reported to have been written by Zhou to a conference of police and public security officials stressing the importance of better interactions between law enforcement officials and the public in order to improve their public image.
6. In the meanwhile, Radio Free Asia, funded by the US State Department, has disseminated a report that over 3000 police and public security officials from the provinces have been called to Beijing to attend a re-training programme starting on March 26. The significance of this retraining programme is not clear. Is this connected to the removal of Bo, whose No 2 and police chief, had allegedly made an unsuccessful attempt to seek asylum in the US Consulate in Chengdu?
7. While the rumours have proved to be false, the fact that the rumours spread so fast and so widely should be a matter of concern to the Chinese leaders. This shows that anti-State and anti-Government elements have a capability for causing instability through orchestrated disinformation through the Net.
8. China’s real world seems to be normal, but not its virtual world which is being skilfully used by anti-State elements to create confusion. ( 25-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
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