B.RAMAN
We have seen how the human rights violation issue is often used by terrorist and insurgent organisations and their supporters to demoralise the security forces.
2. We had seen how after the Khalistani terrorism was defeated in Punjab, dozens of police officers were sought to be harassed in Punjab on the ground that they had allegedly violated the human rights of the people while putting down terrorism. A senior Indian Police Service officer, who was harassed by human rights activists, even committed suicide. He was unable to bear the humiliation and the mental harassment.
3. We had also seen how India was sought to be reprimanded before the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva in 1994 for allegedly violating the human rights of the Kashmiris. Pakistan, which spearheaded the campaign against India, failed to have India rebuked due to lack of support from Iran and other countries.
4. We should keep our past experience in mind while taking a decision on what should be our stand on the resolution which is proposed to be moved by the US and some other countries in the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva against Sri Lanka for alleged violations of the human rights of the Tamils by the Sri Lankan Army while putting down the terrorism and insurgency of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 2009.
5. Certain issues need to be underlined. Firstly, the Sri Lankan Army had every right and obligation to crush the LTTE, which had carried out innumerable acts of horrendous terrorism in Sri Lankan and Indian territory, including the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, our former Prime Minister, in May 1991.
6. Secondly, there were serious violations of the human rights of Tamil civilians by the Sri Lankan Army during its anti-LTTE operations. These violations were partly due to the disproportionate use of force by the Sri Lankan Army and partly due to the deliberate use of civilians by the LTTE in order to protect itself.
7. Thirdly, disproportionate use of force during counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations had taken place in Iraq and Afghanistan too, but they were not considered as amounting to war crimes. It will be absurd and unfair to treat the violations in Sri Lanka as amounting to war crimes, as demanded by the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora which has been in the forefront of the campaign against the Sri Lankan Government.
8. Fourthly, the fact that the LTTE had indulged in horrible acts of terrorism against the civilian population is not an excuse for the violations of the human rights of the Tamils by the Sri Lankan security forces. These violations call for a full-fledged enquiry and follow-up action against those responsible. Instead of doing so, the Sri Lankan Government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa has been conducting itself in an unsophisticated and crude manner while evading its responsibility for holding enquiries that would carry conviction to the Tamils living in Sri Lanka, whose conviction is more important than that of the Tamil diaspora.
9. Fifthly, the credibility of the Rajapaksa Government has been further undermined by its wriggling out of the commitments to India and other States of the international community for finding a satisfactory political solution to meet the aspirations of the Tamils. After having crushed the LTTE, it has been trying to impose a dictated political solution on the Tamils and has disregarded all the promises that it had made to India in this regard.
10. Sixthly, the Government of India finds itself in a dilemma as a result of the duplicity of the Rajapaksa Government after it succeeded against the LTTE.
11.Despite India’s justified dissatisfaction against the Rajapaksa Government, it would be counter-productive for it to join the US and other countries in having Sri Lanka condemned before the UN HRC. It is totally incorrect and unwise on the part of the Tamil Nadu political parties to exercise undue pressure on an increasingly weakening Manmohan Singh Government to join the US and others in having Sri Lanka condemned.
12. While standing against the condemnation of Sri Lanka by the UNHRC, India should use all means of political and economic pressure at its disposal to make the Rajapaksa Government hold credible enquiries into the human rights violations with follow-up action against those responsible and to meet its commitments to the Tamil people.
13. India should not hesitate to use the big stick against the Rajapaksa Government due to fears that it might drive it into the arms of China and Pakistan. Indian unhappiness can hurt Sri Lanka and it should be made clear that we would not hesitate to hurt it if it continues to follow its present policy of duplicity.
14. Our present dilemma in Sri Lanka is due to our inability and unwillingness to talk and act tough when the time for it has come. The time to use the big stick has come.( 15-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Wednesday, March 14, 2012
TIBETAN UNREST SPREADS FROM SICHUAN TO QINGHAI: STUDENTS JOIN PROTESTS IN LARGE NUMBERS
B.RAMAN
The Tibetan unrest against the repressive policies of the Chinese authorities has spread from the Tibetan areas of Western Sichuan to Qinghai. According to details received late, Qinghai has been in a state of growing unrest since the beginning of February with large numbers of Tibetan monks and students frequently protesting in the streets---separately as well as jointly. The situation in Qinghai since February last is slowly getting to resemble that in Western Sichuan since March last year.
2. The spreading wave of unrest started in the Nangchen county in Qinghai province's Yulshul prefecture on February 8, 2012. At a local stadium, a large number of students and other civilians gathered and shouted slogans such as "Freedom for Tibet" and "Long Live the Dalai Lama." The same day, another large group of Tibetans, including many monks, gathered in the main monastery in Nangchen town, and chanted prayers for the return of His Holiness.
3.The Chinese authorities did not intervene against the protesters, but allowed the demonstrations to take place, but subsequently they have been rounding up people who participated in the demonstrations. They have also circulated leaflets calling on people who joined the demonstrations to voluntarily surrender to the police.
4. On March 13,2012, about 4,000 middle school students held demonstrations in Rebkong and in neighboring Tsekhog (in Chinese, Zeku) county in protest against the replacement of Tibetan by Chinese as the medium of instruction in the local schools. Similar demonstrations on the same issue had taken place in October 2010.The Chinese authorities have reportedly closed down the schools where demonstrations took place on March 13 and detained the suspected participants in the school premises pending investigation by the police.
5. The next day, a 30-year-old Tibetan monk tried to commit self-immolation at a monastery in Qinghai's Rebkong (in Chinese, Tongren) county in the Malho (in Chinese, Huangnan) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture. The Chinese intervened and put out the fire. He survived with severe burns.
6. According to one report, when the Chinese tried to take him to a local hospital for admission, hundreds of Tibetans rescued him from Chinese custody and took him back to his monastery. Demonstrations against the Chinese authorities were held in the town. Further details are awaited.
7. In the meanwhile, the Chinese have reportedly expelled about 100 out of the 200 monks in the Karma monastery in Chamdo county in the Tibet Autonomous Region on the ground that they did not have valid identification papers. They have been asked to go home and the remaining 100 monks who have been allowed to stay in the monastery have been forced to attend re-education classes to re-affirm their loyalty to the Chinese Government and Communist Party. The Chinese have stepped up surveillance of the monastery since October last when there was an explosion in a local Government building. (15-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The Tibetan unrest against the repressive policies of the Chinese authorities has spread from the Tibetan areas of Western Sichuan to Qinghai. According to details received late, Qinghai has been in a state of growing unrest since the beginning of February with large numbers of Tibetan monks and students frequently protesting in the streets---separately as well as jointly. The situation in Qinghai since February last is slowly getting to resemble that in Western Sichuan since March last year.
2. The spreading wave of unrest started in the Nangchen county in Qinghai province's Yulshul prefecture on February 8, 2012. At a local stadium, a large number of students and other civilians gathered and shouted slogans such as "Freedom for Tibet" and "Long Live the Dalai Lama." The same day, another large group of Tibetans, including many monks, gathered in the main monastery in Nangchen town, and chanted prayers for the return of His Holiness.
3.The Chinese authorities did not intervene against the protesters, but allowed the demonstrations to take place, but subsequently they have been rounding up people who participated in the demonstrations. They have also circulated leaflets calling on people who joined the demonstrations to voluntarily surrender to the police.
4. On March 13,2012, about 4,000 middle school students held demonstrations in Rebkong and in neighboring Tsekhog (in Chinese, Zeku) county in protest against the replacement of Tibetan by Chinese as the medium of instruction in the local schools. Similar demonstrations on the same issue had taken place in October 2010.The Chinese authorities have reportedly closed down the schools where demonstrations took place on March 13 and detained the suspected participants in the school premises pending investigation by the police.
5. The next day, a 30-year-old Tibetan monk tried to commit self-immolation at a monastery in Qinghai's Rebkong (in Chinese, Tongren) county in the Malho (in Chinese, Huangnan) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture. The Chinese intervened and put out the fire. He survived with severe burns.
6. According to one report, when the Chinese tried to take him to a local hospital for admission, hundreds of Tibetans rescued him from Chinese custody and took him back to his monastery. Demonstrations against the Chinese authorities were held in the town. Further details are awaited.
7. In the meanwhile, the Chinese have reportedly expelled about 100 out of the 200 monks in the Karma monastery in Chamdo county in the Tibet Autonomous Region on the ground that they did not have valid identification papers. They have been asked to go home and the remaining 100 monks who have been allowed to stay in the monastery have been forced to attend re-education classes to re-affirm their loyalty to the Chinese Government and Communist Party. The Chinese have stepped up surveillance of the monastery since October last when there was an explosion in a local Government building. (15-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Friday, March 9, 2012
A LOW PROFILE OFFICER TO HEAD ISI
B.RAMAN
Lt.Gen.Mohammed Zahir-ul-Islam, a low profile officer of the Pakistan Army, has been chosen by President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani as the new chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to succeed Lt.Gen Ahmed Shuja Pasha on March 19.
2. Has appointment, which was announced by Gilani on March 9, was made out of a short list of three Lts.Gen recommended by Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Chief of the Army Staff (COAS). The names were reportedly discussed by Zardari and Gilani with Kayani last week and Zahir-ul-Islam was chosen. His appointment was the outcome of a consensus between the political and military leadership and could contribute to a lowering of the present high trust deficit between the two.
3.Zahir-ul-Islam, who is reported to have done one training course in the US as a middle level officer, has had the least exposure to the US as a senior Army officer. At the same time, of all the senior officers, he was the least suspected of having had any role in facilitating the clandestine stay of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad from 2005 till his death at the hands of the US Special Forces on May 2,2011.During this period, he was the GOC of Murree, then Deputy Director-General in charge of Counter-Intelligence in the ISI from September 2008 to October 2010, when he was posted as the Corps Commander of Karachi, the post that he now holds.
4. The civilian leadership has no reason to distrust him because he was not considered a protégé of Pervez Musharraf and his name had not figured in the suspicions of the leadership of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) relating to the failure of the Musharraf regime to protect Benazir Bhutto.If at all, he is a protégé of Kayani under whom he earned his promotion as Lt.Gen.
5.All indications are that the civilian leadership is keen to mend fences with the US. Zahir-ul-Islam could be the right man for the job because he was never very close to the US and, at the same time, was never suspected by the US of being mixed up with the jihadi terrorists.
6. As the Deputy DG, Counter-Intelligence, his job in the ISI was to keep a surveillance on the activities of foreign diplomats in Pakistan---particularly Indian and US diplomats--- and to prevent the infiltration of the Armed Forces by extremist organisations such as the Hizbut Tehrir. He was also handling internal security situations like those in Balochistan and Karachi. While there was considerable ham-handedness in Balochistan, he avoided strong-arm methods in Karachi as the Deputy DG of the ISI and subsequently as the Karachi Corps Commander. He was not very effective in dealing with the situations either in Balochistan or in Karachi.
7.At Karachi, he won high praise from the Chinese for the smooth way he assisted the medical relief team of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which was deputed to Sindh for flood relief work.
8.Like many senior officers of the Pakistan Army, Zahir-ul-Islam comes from a family which has contributed many officers to the Army. His father is a retired Colonel of the Army and three of his brothers had also joined the Army. His sister is married to an Army officer.
9. The 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai by the ISI-sponsored Lashkar-e-Toiba took place seven weeks after Pasha had taken over as the DG of the ISI and Zahir-ul-Islam as his No.2.It is generally believed by well-informed sources that the terrorist attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul and the 26/11 strikes in Mumbai had the signature of Lt.Gen.Nadeem Taj, the predecessor of Pasha as the ISI Chief. If Pasha and Zahir-ul-Islam had wanted they could have called off the terrorist strikes in Mumbai, but they didn’t. ( 10-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
Lt.Gen.Mohammed Zahir-ul-Islam, a low profile officer of the Pakistan Army, has been chosen by President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani as the new chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to succeed Lt.Gen Ahmed Shuja Pasha on March 19.
2. Has appointment, which was announced by Gilani on March 9, was made out of a short list of three Lts.Gen recommended by Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Chief of the Army Staff (COAS). The names were reportedly discussed by Zardari and Gilani with Kayani last week and Zahir-ul-Islam was chosen. His appointment was the outcome of a consensus between the political and military leadership and could contribute to a lowering of the present high trust deficit between the two.
3.Zahir-ul-Islam, who is reported to have done one training course in the US as a middle level officer, has had the least exposure to the US as a senior Army officer. At the same time, of all the senior officers, he was the least suspected of having had any role in facilitating the clandestine stay of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad from 2005 till his death at the hands of the US Special Forces on May 2,2011.During this period, he was the GOC of Murree, then Deputy Director-General in charge of Counter-Intelligence in the ISI from September 2008 to October 2010, when he was posted as the Corps Commander of Karachi, the post that he now holds.
4. The civilian leadership has no reason to distrust him because he was not considered a protégé of Pervez Musharraf and his name had not figured in the suspicions of the leadership of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) relating to the failure of the Musharraf regime to protect Benazir Bhutto.If at all, he is a protégé of Kayani under whom he earned his promotion as Lt.Gen.
5.All indications are that the civilian leadership is keen to mend fences with the US. Zahir-ul-Islam could be the right man for the job because he was never very close to the US and, at the same time, was never suspected by the US of being mixed up with the jihadi terrorists.
6. As the Deputy DG, Counter-Intelligence, his job in the ISI was to keep a surveillance on the activities of foreign diplomats in Pakistan---particularly Indian and US diplomats--- and to prevent the infiltration of the Armed Forces by extremist organisations such as the Hizbut Tehrir. He was also handling internal security situations like those in Balochistan and Karachi. While there was considerable ham-handedness in Balochistan, he avoided strong-arm methods in Karachi as the Deputy DG of the ISI and subsequently as the Karachi Corps Commander. He was not very effective in dealing with the situations either in Balochistan or in Karachi.
7.At Karachi, he won high praise from the Chinese for the smooth way he assisted the medical relief team of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which was deputed to Sindh for flood relief work.
8.Like many senior officers of the Pakistan Army, Zahir-ul-Islam comes from a family which has contributed many officers to the Army. His father is a retired Colonel of the Army and three of his brothers had also joined the Army. His sister is married to an Army officer.
9. The 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai by the ISI-sponsored Lashkar-e-Toiba took place seven weeks after Pasha had taken over as the DG of the ISI and Zahir-ul-Islam as his No.2.It is generally believed by well-informed sources that the terrorist attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul and the 26/11 strikes in Mumbai had the signature of Lt.Gen.Nadeem Taj, the predecessor of Pasha as the ISI Chief. If Pasha and Zahir-ul-Islam had wanted they could have called off the terrorist strikes in Mumbai, but they didn’t. ( 10-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
Wednesday, March 7, 2012
MY THOUGHTS ON NON-TRADITIONAL THREATS TO SECURITY
B.RAMAN
( Paper prepared for delivery at the third Asian Relations Conference being organised by the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) at Sapru House, New Delhi, on March 9 and 10,2012)
There has been a steady expansion of the list of non-traditional threats to human security ever since this subject started receiving serious attention in 2001.From about 10 threats identified in the past, it has expanded to over 50 since then---including new additions such as threats to information security, threats to economic development due to corruption etc. I notice that some Chinese scholars have included threats to economic stability arising from financial turmoil also as a non-traditional threat to human security.
2. If we have to deal with non-traditional threats effectively through national and multilateral action, we have to be careful in identifying such threats, prioritising them for attention and action and promoting multilateral co-operation where necessary and possible and avoid politicising the concept for exterior purposes.
3.We have to make a clear distinction between issues of core concern relating to human security and clearly identified and universally perceived non-traditional threats to human security. Everything which is of concern need not necessarily be a threat. A clear example is corruption which has been figuring since 2003 in the expanded agenda of Western scholars as a non-traditional threat to human security because it stands in the way of economic development and effective governance. Corruption has been sought to be included in the list ostensibly for benign reasons, but its inclusion also provides the Western countries with a malign stick with which to beat States whose economic and other policies are not in consonance with the desires of these States.
4. I would divide the constantly expanding list of non- traditional threats to human security into three categories:
( a ).Firstly, threats that are universally accepted as such and in meeting which there can be regional and international co-operation. I would place in this category threats arising from natural and man-made disasters, industrial accidents with catastrophic and/or trans-national consequences, nuclear accidents, epidemics, environmental damage on land as well as in the sea and piracy. There is already considerable multilateral co-operation in dealing with such threats in the form of advance information sharing, joint action, crisis management and mutual assistance in capacity building. This co-operation needs to be further encouraged and enhanced by setting up regional consultancy and brain-storming mechanisms so that we constantly improve our state of preparedness for dealing with such threats when they materialise.
( b ).Secondly, non-traditional threats over which there was some inter-State consensus till some years ago, but it has been steadily weakening due to the tendency of some States to use non-traditional means of creating problems for their adversaries and weakening them internally. Two such threats that can be clearly identified are trans-national terrorism and trans-national crime. The use by certain States of trans-national terrorists and criminals as a strategic weapon against their adversaries has created a new category of para-military threats to security---- that is, threats that are neither traditional or conventional in the sense of being military in origin nor non-traditional in the sense of being not military in origin. Whereas there is growing acceptance of the need for regional and international co-operation in dealing with trans-national terrorism, efforts towards co-operation have been stymied by the use of such non-traditional means by certain States against their adversaries. The UN Security Council Resolutions adopted after 9/11 had clearly called upon member-states to act against this evil. But very few States that sponsor terrorism have done so.
( c ).Thirdly, new areas of concern such as threats to computer networks of critical infrastructure, corruption, and lack of transparency in the policies of foreign companies setting up industrial projects of a potentially hazardous nature in other countries. While threats to computer networks of critical infrastructure from non-State hackers are increasingly recognised as a new non-traditional threat to human security with potentially catastrophic implications, the debates over the scope for multilateral co-operation in meeting this threat have been desultory. This needs serious attention and calls for a meaningful debate. The dangers of the lack of transparency in the policies of foreign companies setting up potentially hazardous industrial projects in foreign countries were dramatically illustrated by the accident in the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal in 1984, which led to the death of thousands of innocent persons. Neither the local Government nor the local population had been kept informed by the company of the threats that could arise from an accident and the precautions to be taken in the event of an accident. While transparency in the policies of the private sector has certainly improved, it is not yet totally satisfactory. Companies whose manufacturing involves hazardous products and/or processes still avoid total sharing of knowledge of the dangers. This affects the effectiveness of the state of preparedness. Improving transparency in the policies and practices of the private sector needs priority attention.
5. I am still not convinced about the wisdom of including corruption as a non-traditional threat to human security calling for multilateral action to combat it. Corruption has been a major evil in India retarding our economic development. Since last year, there has been a groundswell of public opinion in India against corruption. But it is an evil that has to be countered nationally. Action against corruption should not be allowed to be used as a political weapon against inconvenient States.
6.Finally, there is an unfortunate and disquieting tendency on the part of some non-governmental organisations and experts to create a paranoia about non-traditional threats to human security. They do not understand that this tendency to create paranoia is itself affecting human security. A typical example is the campaign unleashed by some motivated NGOs and individual activists against a nuclear power station constructed at Koodankulam in Tamil Nadu. Even though the people of the State have been suffering from acute power shortages, these NGOs and activists have prevented the commissioning of the power station on the ground that it could pose serious threats to human security and the environment. The Government has taken all the precautions mandated by various national and international protocols on nuclear safety. It had appointed experts’ committees to certify that all necessary precautions had been taken. Despite this, the agitators have till now prevented the commissioning of the power station. This is a clear attempt to misuse the idea of non-traditional threats to human security to create irrational fears in the minds of the people for non-professional reasons and prevent the development of nuclear power. Such ill-motivated attempts need to be decried. ( 8-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
( Paper prepared for delivery at the third Asian Relations Conference being organised by the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) at Sapru House, New Delhi, on March 9 and 10,2012)
There has been a steady expansion of the list of non-traditional threats to human security ever since this subject started receiving serious attention in 2001.From about 10 threats identified in the past, it has expanded to over 50 since then---including new additions such as threats to information security, threats to economic development due to corruption etc. I notice that some Chinese scholars have included threats to economic stability arising from financial turmoil also as a non-traditional threat to human security.
2. If we have to deal with non-traditional threats effectively through national and multilateral action, we have to be careful in identifying such threats, prioritising them for attention and action and promoting multilateral co-operation where necessary and possible and avoid politicising the concept for exterior purposes.
3.We have to make a clear distinction between issues of core concern relating to human security and clearly identified and universally perceived non-traditional threats to human security. Everything which is of concern need not necessarily be a threat. A clear example is corruption which has been figuring since 2003 in the expanded agenda of Western scholars as a non-traditional threat to human security because it stands in the way of economic development and effective governance. Corruption has been sought to be included in the list ostensibly for benign reasons, but its inclusion also provides the Western countries with a malign stick with which to beat States whose economic and other policies are not in consonance with the desires of these States.
4. I would divide the constantly expanding list of non- traditional threats to human security into three categories:
( a ).Firstly, threats that are universally accepted as such and in meeting which there can be regional and international co-operation. I would place in this category threats arising from natural and man-made disasters, industrial accidents with catastrophic and/or trans-national consequences, nuclear accidents, epidemics, environmental damage on land as well as in the sea and piracy. There is already considerable multilateral co-operation in dealing with such threats in the form of advance information sharing, joint action, crisis management and mutual assistance in capacity building. This co-operation needs to be further encouraged and enhanced by setting up regional consultancy and brain-storming mechanisms so that we constantly improve our state of preparedness for dealing with such threats when they materialise.
( b ).Secondly, non-traditional threats over which there was some inter-State consensus till some years ago, but it has been steadily weakening due to the tendency of some States to use non-traditional means of creating problems for their adversaries and weakening them internally. Two such threats that can be clearly identified are trans-national terrorism and trans-national crime. The use by certain States of trans-national terrorists and criminals as a strategic weapon against their adversaries has created a new category of para-military threats to security---- that is, threats that are neither traditional or conventional in the sense of being military in origin nor non-traditional in the sense of being not military in origin. Whereas there is growing acceptance of the need for regional and international co-operation in dealing with trans-national terrorism, efforts towards co-operation have been stymied by the use of such non-traditional means by certain States against their adversaries. The UN Security Council Resolutions adopted after 9/11 had clearly called upon member-states to act against this evil. But very few States that sponsor terrorism have done so.
( c ).Thirdly, new areas of concern such as threats to computer networks of critical infrastructure, corruption, and lack of transparency in the policies of foreign companies setting up industrial projects of a potentially hazardous nature in other countries. While threats to computer networks of critical infrastructure from non-State hackers are increasingly recognised as a new non-traditional threat to human security with potentially catastrophic implications, the debates over the scope for multilateral co-operation in meeting this threat have been desultory. This needs serious attention and calls for a meaningful debate. The dangers of the lack of transparency in the policies of foreign companies setting up potentially hazardous industrial projects in foreign countries were dramatically illustrated by the accident in the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal in 1984, which led to the death of thousands of innocent persons. Neither the local Government nor the local population had been kept informed by the company of the threats that could arise from an accident and the precautions to be taken in the event of an accident. While transparency in the policies of the private sector has certainly improved, it is not yet totally satisfactory. Companies whose manufacturing involves hazardous products and/or processes still avoid total sharing of knowledge of the dangers. This affects the effectiveness of the state of preparedness. Improving transparency in the policies and practices of the private sector needs priority attention.
5. I am still not convinced about the wisdom of including corruption as a non-traditional threat to human security calling for multilateral action to combat it. Corruption has been a major evil in India retarding our economic development. Since last year, there has been a groundswell of public opinion in India against corruption. But it is an evil that has to be countered nationally. Action against corruption should not be allowed to be used as a political weapon against inconvenient States.
6.Finally, there is an unfortunate and disquieting tendency on the part of some non-governmental organisations and experts to create a paranoia about non-traditional threats to human security. They do not understand that this tendency to create paranoia is itself affecting human security. A typical example is the campaign unleashed by some motivated NGOs and individual activists against a nuclear power station constructed at Koodankulam in Tamil Nadu. Even though the people of the State have been suffering from acute power shortages, these NGOs and activists have prevented the commissioning of the power station on the ground that it could pose serious threats to human security and the environment. The Government has taken all the precautions mandated by various national and international protocols on nuclear safety. It had appointed experts’ committees to certify that all necessary precautions had been taken. Despite this, the agitators have till now prevented the commissioning of the power station. This is a clear attempt to misuse the idea of non-traditional threats to human security to create irrational fears in the minds of the people for non-professional reasons and prevent the development of nuclear power. Such ill-motivated attempts need to be decried. ( 8-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Tuesday, March 6, 2012
UP: MR.EARNEST VS MR.GIMMICK
B.RAMAN
The most significant aspect of the elections to the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly the results for which were announced on March 6,2012, was not even the rout of the Congress Party, but the humiliation suffered by Sonia Gandhi, Rahul Gandhi and Priyanka Gandhi in what has been described as their pocket boroughs of Rae Bareli and Amethi.
2.The Lucknow correspondent of the “Deccan Herald” has described this humiliation in the following words: “None, not even the “Nehru-Gandhi family,” would have expected such a drubbing even on its home turf of Rae Bareli and Amethi, represented in the Lok Sabha by Congress president Sonia Gandhi and Rahul respectively. The entire “family” had descended on the twin constituencies to ensure a smooth sailing for party candidates. Yet, the party’s performance was “pathetic.” The Congress, which had secured seven of the ten assembly seats in Rae Bareli and Amethi, could win only two seats this time—Jagadishpur and Tiloi in the Amethi Lok Sabha constituency. In Rae Bareli, it ceded all five seats to SP candidates by good margins. In three seats, the Congress nominees finished third, compounding its agony. The signals were ominous for the party from the very beginning of the campaign. Priyanka was initially greeted by angry crowds, which complained that the local MLAs did not take any interest in the area’s development.”
3.The message that has come out loud and clear from UP as a whole as well as from these pocket boroughs is that the decline of the political influence of Sonia Gandhi has started and that the personality cult built around her, Rahul Gandhi and Priyanka Gandhi by the party functionaries has started dissipating.
4.The decline of the political influence of Sonia Gandhi could be attributed to various factors--- the decline in her health and the consequent public perception that she is already a leader of the passee and not of the future, the failure of Rahul Gandhi to compensate for the decline in her political influence by building a political image and a political connectivity of his own, his tendency to depend on political gimmicks rather than on exciting ideas and a vision for the future which failed to establish an empathetic vibration with the people and the failure of the Congress Government in the Centre headed by Dr.Manmohan Singh and the local Congress leaders in UP to come up to the expectations of the people.
5.The people wanted new policies, new ideas and exciting new faces and brains. Instead what they got was the same old faces of Sonia, Rahul and Priyanka, endless repetition of the same old devotion to the family and the same old bankruptcy in thinking and strategizing. It has come out clearly that neither the magic of the family name nor personal charisma---particularly in the case of Priyanka--- nor gimmicks could attract the electorate any longer.
6. The emergence of Akhilesh Yadav, son of Mulayam Singh Yadav, the leader of the Samajwadi Party which has won a spectacular victory on its own, as the new shining star of UP politics was totally unexpected by large sections of the public and the Congress Party. The electorate tired of old faces and old style of politics and gimmicks was looking for a Mr.Different and they saw Mr.Different in Akhilesh. Whereas they found Rahul young in looks, but old in thinking and articulation, they found Akhilesh young in looks and young and refreshingly different in his thinking and articulation.
7.When one saw Akhilesh and Rahul on the TV screen, the difference between the two young personalities was striking. What came out in the case of Akhilesh was his earnestness, seriousness, sincerity and his ability to articulate in a manner that could carry conviction to the public. What came out in the case of Rahul was a lack of such qualities. Akhilesh’s ability to connect instantly with the public and the media stood in refreshing contrast to the inability of Rahul to do so.
8. Whether Congress functionaries admit it or not, the UP elections clearly marked the beginning of at least a temporary eclipse of Rahul as an up and coming political leader of Prime Ministerial calibre. He is not even of provincial calibre. The electorate in UP, his home State, has not taken him seriously. Will he be able to make the rest of the country take him seriously before the next Parliamentary elections whenever they are held----in 2014 as scheduled or before that if the Manmohan Singh Government as a result of the after-shocks of the UP’s political quake falls?
9.Political eclipses tend to be temporary when the affected leader has merits of his own and does not seek to shine through the reflected glory of his family. Rahul has still to convince large section of the public of this country that he has merits of his own. He has to project himself before the people as an intelligent, well-informed, articulate and thinking leader bubbling with new ideas and not just new gimmicks. He has to make the party jettison the remnants of the personality cult built around his mother. He has to encourage GenNext leaders in the party to come to the forefront and empower them to compete in equal terms with him and Priyanka. He should convert the Congress into a party of the people and not a party of the family.
10. As the party prepares itself for the next parliamentary elections, the Government led by it at the Centre has to be led by someone with a positive image. Dr.Manmohan Singh has developed a negative image which he will not be able to discard easily. Pranab Mukherjee, the Finance Minister. has a positive image. He is respected by large sections of the people. He has sharp professional and political instincts. The time has come for him to take over as the Prime Minister. If petty memories and petty suspicions of the family continue to keep him out, it is the party which will suffer.
11. Akhilesh is a promising and exciting young find, but he has won only the first lap of his political race by contributing significantly to the success of his party in the elections. Proving himself to be a good campaigner is only the beginning. He has to prove himself to be a good administrator and a wise policy-maker. Will he be able to do it? ( 7-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The most significant aspect of the elections to the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly the results for which were announced on March 6,2012, was not even the rout of the Congress Party, but the humiliation suffered by Sonia Gandhi, Rahul Gandhi and Priyanka Gandhi in what has been described as their pocket boroughs of Rae Bareli and Amethi.
2.The Lucknow correspondent of the “Deccan Herald” has described this humiliation in the following words: “None, not even the “Nehru-Gandhi family,” would have expected such a drubbing even on its home turf of Rae Bareli and Amethi, represented in the Lok Sabha by Congress president Sonia Gandhi and Rahul respectively. The entire “family” had descended on the twin constituencies to ensure a smooth sailing for party candidates. Yet, the party’s performance was “pathetic.” The Congress, which had secured seven of the ten assembly seats in Rae Bareli and Amethi, could win only two seats this time—Jagadishpur and Tiloi in the Amethi Lok Sabha constituency. In Rae Bareli, it ceded all five seats to SP candidates by good margins. In three seats, the Congress nominees finished third, compounding its agony. The signals were ominous for the party from the very beginning of the campaign. Priyanka was initially greeted by angry crowds, which complained that the local MLAs did not take any interest in the area’s development.”
3.The message that has come out loud and clear from UP as a whole as well as from these pocket boroughs is that the decline of the political influence of Sonia Gandhi has started and that the personality cult built around her, Rahul Gandhi and Priyanka Gandhi by the party functionaries has started dissipating.
4.The decline of the political influence of Sonia Gandhi could be attributed to various factors--- the decline in her health and the consequent public perception that she is already a leader of the passee and not of the future, the failure of Rahul Gandhi to compensate for the decline in her political influence by building a political image and a political connectivity of his own, his tendency to depend on political gimmicks rather than on exciting ideas and a vision for the future which failed to establish an empathetic vibration with the people and the failure of the Congress Government in the Centre headed by Dr.Manmohan Singh and the local Congress leaders in UP to come up to the expectations of the people.
5.The people wanted new policies, new ideas and exciting new faces and brains. Instead what they got was the same old faces of Sonia, Rahul and Priyanka, endless repetition of the same old devotion to the family and the same old bankruptcy in thinking and strategizing. It has come out clearly that neither the magic of the family name nor personal charisma---particularly in the case of Priyanka--- nor gimmicks could attract the electorate any longer.
6. The emergence of Akhilesh Yadav, son of Mulayam Singh Yadav, the leader of the Samajwadi Party which has won a spectacular victory on its own, as the new shining star of UP politics was totally unexpected by large sections of the public and the Congress Party. The electorate tired of old faces and old style of politics and gimmicks was looking for a Mr.Different and they saw Mr.Different in Akhilesh. Whereas they found Rahul young in looks, but old in thinking and articulation, they found Akhilesh young in looks and young and refreshingly different in his thinking and articulation.
7.When one saw Akhilesh and Rahul on the TV screen, the difference between the two young personalities was striking. What came out in the case of Akhilesh was his earnestness, seriousness, sincerity and his ability to articulate in a manner that could carry conviction to the public. What came out in the case of Rahul was a lack of such qualities. Akhilesh’s ability to connect instantly with the public and the media stood in refreshing contrast to the inability of Rahul to do so.
8. Whether Congress functionaries admit it or not, the UP elections clearly marked the beginning of at least a temporary eclipse of Rahul as an up and coming political leader of Prime Ministerial calibre. He is not even of provincial calibre. The electorate in UP, his home State, has not taken him seriously. Will he be able to make the rest of the country take him seriously before the next Parliamentary elections whenever they are held----in 2014 as scheduled or before that if the Manmohan Singh Government as a result of the after-shocks of the UP’s political quake falls?
9.Political eclipses tend to be temporary when the affected leader has merits of his own and does not seek to shine through the reflected glory of his family. Rahul has still to convince large section of the public of this country that he has merits of his own. He has to project himself before the people as an intelligent, well-informed, articulate and thinking leader bubbling with new ideas and not just new gimmicks. He has to make the party jettison the remnants of the personality cult built around his mother. He has to encourage GenNext leaders in the party to come to the forefront and empower them to compete in equal terms with him and Priyanka. He should convert the Congress into a party of the people and not a party of the family.
10. As the party prepares itself for the next parliamentary elections, the Government led by it at the Centre has to be led by someone with a positive image. Dr.Manmohan Singh has developed a negative image which he will not be able to discard easily. Pranab Mukherjee, the Finance Minister. has a positive image. He is respected by large sections of the people. He has sharp professional and political instincts. The time has come for him to take over as the Prime Minister. If petty memories and petty suspicions of the family continue to keep him out, it is the party which will suffer.
11. Akhilesh is a promising and exciting young find, but he has won only the first lap of his political race by contributing significantly to the success of his party in the elections. Proving himself to be a good campaigner is only the beginning. He has to prove himself to be a good administrator and a wise policy-maker. Will he be able to do it? ( 7-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
COUNTER-TERRORISM: THE NCTC CONTROVERSY
( Written at the request of Editor, Tribune, Chandigarh)
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2012/20120306/edit.htm#12
B.RAMAN
India has been facing the evil of terrorism since 1971 when two members of the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) hijacked an Indian Airlines plane to Lahore and set it on fire after asking the passengers and crew to leave the plane.
Except in J&K and the North-East, where the Army had to be asked to take over the leadership of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations, in the rest of the country, the responsibility for dealing with terrorism vested with the State Police. In Punjab, it was the Police under the able leadership of K.P.S.Gill, the Director-General of Police, that effectively brought the so-called Khalistani terrorism under control.
In Tamil Nadu, it was again the Police that brought the activities of the so-called Al Umma, a local terrorist organisation, under control. The Police also dealt with the activities of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
In Mumbai, the successful investigation of the 1993 serial blasts was carried out by the Police. Thus between 1971 and 1993, the Police forces in different States were able to deal effectively with terrorism with the help of intelligence inputs and guidance, where necessary, from the central intelligence agencies.
The infiltration of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and other Pakistani terrorist organisations into India----firstly into J&K and subsequently into other States of India--- from 1993 onwards gave a new pan-Indian dimension to the evil of terrorism and made Indian counter-terrorism experts realise that the Police alone, however capable, would not be able to deal with the jihadi octopus of Pakistani origin. The problem was aggravated by the emergence of the so-called Indian Mujahideen in 2007.
The need for a pan-Indian counter-terrorism doctrine and architecture was increasingly felt in the post-1993 years, but unfortunately no action has been taken to evolve such a doctrine and architecture. Despite terrorism of the jihadi kind, originating from Pakistan, assuming a pan-Indian and global dimension, we continued to deal with it in an ad hoc manner with the help of the Police in different States.
The Task Force for the Revamping of the Intelligence Apparatus, headed by G.C.Saxena, former chief of the R&AW, which was set up by the Atal Behari Vajpayee Government in 2000, drew attention to our failure to address the problem of pan-Indian terrorism in a professional manner and suggested the creation of a Counter-Terrorism Centre (CTC) in the Intelligence Bureau to deal with terrorism in a coordinated manner.
The CTC suggested by it was patterned after the CTC of the USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which was then responsible for counter-terrorism in the US, since the terrorist threats to the US before 9/11 mainly emanated from abroad and were largely directed at US nationals and interests abroad. Since terrorism in India---whether regional or pan-Indian—was largely directed at homeland targets, the Saxena Task Force, of which I was a member, suggested that the proposed CTC should be part of the Intelligence Bureau and should work under the direction of the Director, Intelligence Bureau (DIB).
The CTC, as proposed by the Saxena Task Force, was essentially a preventive architecture responsible for introducing the principle of jointness in preventing terrorism. Jointness meant counter-terrorism experts from different agencies of the Government of India working together under the leadership of the DIB for analysing and assessing the intelligence collected by different agencies and the Police and giving directions for follow-up action.
The idea was that the follow-up action would still be taken by the State Police, but on the guidance and directions of the CTC, which was not given any executive powers of its own. The Vajpayee Government set up the CTC in the IB, but named it the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC). Since it was not given any executive powers to act independently on its own in the jurisdiction of the State Police, there was no objection to its creation from the States.
Before his death in January 2002, R.N.Kao, the founding father of the R&AW, met Vajpayee and told him that without the co-operation of the State Police, the Government of India would not be able to deal with terrorism effectively. He also expressed the view that the National Security Adviser, being an officer of the Indian Foreign Service, with no exposure to the State Police, would not be able to command the required co-operation from the State Police. He, therefore, suggested the creation of a post of Deputy NSA to be manned by a senior officer of the Indian Police Service either from the States or the IB.
Kao told me that Vajpayee reacted positively to his advice and said that he would initiate action for the creation of a post of DyNSA to be manned by a Police officer, who was an expert in internal security and who commanded the confidence of the State Police. By the time this post came into being, Kao passed away. When this post was created, it was filled up by another IFS officer who was an unknown quantity in the States and who had very little expertise in internal security matters.
The 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US Homeland brought out inadequacies in the functioning of the CTC of the CIA. It was decided by the George Bush Administration in 2004 to set up an independent organisation called the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) for ensuring jointmanship in dealing with terrorism and place it under the Director, National Intelligence. It also modified the counter-terrorism architecture in the US by creating a Homeland Security Council, which was distinct from the NSC, and placing it under a Homeland Security Adviser, distinct from the NSA.
When the Dr.Manmohan Singh Government came to office in 2004, it created a separate post of Internal Security Adviser on the pattern of the USA’s Homeland Security Adviser and made him exercise leadership in all internal security matters, including counter-terrorism. M.K.Narayanan, former DIB, was appointed to this post.
In 2005, after the death of J.N Dixit, the then National Security Adviser, Narayanan was designated as the NSA and asked to perform both the tasks of co-ordinating external and internal security duties. He was not able to devote adequate attention to internal security matters because of his preoccupation with the negotiation with the US on civil nuclear co-operation.
Internal Security Management in the Centre consequently suffered. The progress in the implementation of the Saxena Task Force’s recommendation on counter-terrorism was slow and no attempt was made to draw up a co-ordinated Counter-Terrorism Doctrine and revamp our counter-terrorism architecture.
The result: The 26/11 terrorist strikes, which dramatically exposed the poor state of our preventive architecture. There was no co-ordinated follow-up action even on the limited intelligence that reportedly came from the US through the R&AW regarding the plans of the LET to launch sea-borne terrorist strikes in Mumbai.
After taking over as the Home Minister post-26/11, Chidambaram, who has assumed total responsibility for counter-terrorism management, has sought to revamp the counter-terrorism architecture. He initiated in particular four steps. Firstly, he decentralised the deployment of the National Security Guards and created the National Investigation Agency (NIA) to improve our investigation capabilities. Secondly, he instituted a system of daily meetings of the intelligence chiefs under his chairmanship to discuss the available intelligence and assess the evolving threats. Thirdly, he speeded up the implementation of the Saxena Task Force recommendation for the Multi-Agency Centre, which had gone into doldrums under Shiv Raj Patil, his predecessor. And fourthly, after a visit to the US, he decided to set up an NCTC partly---not totally--- on the pattern of the USA’s counterpart.
While his first three steps did not meet with any opposition from the States, his attempt to create the NCTC has met with serious opposition because of his decision to keep it as part of the IB and give it independent executive powers of arrest and searches without the prior knowledge of the State Police. His idea probably was that to meet situations where a State Police dragged its feet for making an arrest, the NCTC should have its own powers of arrest so that it could make an arrest, produce the suspect before the Police and direct it to act against him.
This was a major encroachment on the powers of the State Police without the prior concurrence of the States. In his NCTC architecture, Chidambaram has made two significant departures from existing practices in countries such as the US. Instead of making the NCTC an independent institution, he has made it a part of the IB. By giving the NCTC independent powers of arrest, he has violated the widely held principle in other democracies that a clandestine intelligence agency should not have police powers of arrest which could be misused for political purposes.
His failure to consult the States beforehand and his attempt to confront the States with a fait accompli which would have definitely infringed on their rights have created so much opposition that the very principle of jointmanship in preventing terrorism through a body like the NCTC, now stands suspected as a politicised measure to circumvent the States.
Apparently, there were inadequate consultations even at the Centre as one could see from the opposition expressed by an increasing number of ex-R&AW officers to the move to make the NCTC a part of the IB. The controversy has not only become a Centre vs State issue, but is also threatening to become an IB Vs R&AW issue.
At a time when there is an urgent need for unity of action against terrorism, creation of a preventive architecture against terrorism has become a highly contentious and politicised issue. While one has to welcome Chidambaram’s decision to postpone the implementation till belated consultations are held with the States, it is doubtful whether the opposition-ruled States, whose suspicions have been aroused, will now agree to the creation of the NCTC at all even if it is not given executive powers. The whole concept, which is necessary, has become suspect in their eyes. It is very unfortunate.
There is no hurry to create the NCTC now. The MAC could continue to handle the tasks of follow-up action on the intelligence collected and prevention. The States have not objected to the MAC and got used to it. Instead, Chidambaram should focus on revamping the counter-terrorism architecture by making the NCTC an independent institution without executive powers working under the direction of the DIB, who could wear two hats as the head of the IB and of the NCTC. The NCTC could work under the DIB but without becoming a part of the IB. It would be similar to the R&AW and the Directorate-General of Security, which are independent institutions working under Secretary (R ), who wears two hats.
In his address to IB officers in 2010, Chidambaram had suggested the creation of a Ministry of Internal Security to focus exclusively on the operational aspects of Internal Security Management. There has been no follow-up on this since then. The time has come to consider this proposal as part of the over-all revamping. None of these ideas would work unless he manages to reach a political consensus with other political parties and the States. Prior consultations with the States should be sincere and serious and not just a gimmick.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), R&AW, Cabinet Secretariat )
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2012/20120306/edit.htm#12
B.RAMAN
India has been facing the evil of terrorism since 1971 when two members of the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) hijacked an Indian Airlines plane to Lahore and set it on fire after asking the passengers and crew to leave the plane.
Except in J&K and the North-East, where the Army had to be asked to take over the leadership of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations, in the rest of the country, the responsibility for dealing with terrorism vested with the State Police. In Punjab, it was the Police under the able leadership of K.P.S.Gill, the Director-General of Police, that effectively brought the so-called Khalistani terrorism under control.
In Tamil Nadu, it was again the Police that brought the activities of the so-called Al Umma, a local terrorist organisation, under control. The Police also dealt with the activities of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
In Mumbai, the successful investigation of the 1993 serial blasts was carried out by the Police. Thus between 1971 and 1993, the Police forces in different States were able to deal effectively with terrorism with the help of intelligence inputs and guidance, where necessary, from the central intelligence agencies.
The infiltration of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and other Pakistani terrorist organisations into India----firstly into J&K and subsequently into other States of India--- from 1993 onwards gave a new pan-Indian dimension to the evil of terrorism and made Indian counter-terrorism experts realise that the Police alone, however capable, would not be able to deal with the jihadi octopus of Pakistani origin. The problem was aggravated by the emergence of the so-called Indian Mujahideen in 2007.
The need for a pan-Indian counter-terrorism doctrine and architecture was increasingly felt in the post-1993 years, but unfortunately no action has been taken to evolve such a doctrine and architecture. Despite terrorism of the jihadi kind, originating from Pakistan, assuming a pan-Indian and global dimension, we continued to deal with it in an ad hoc manner with the help of the Police in different States.
The Task Force for the Revamping of the Intelligence Apparatus, headed by G.C.Saxena, former chief of the R&AW, which was set up by the Atal Behari Vajpayee Government in 2000, drew attention to our failure to address the problem of pan-Indian terrorism in a professional manner and suggested the creation of a Counter-Terrorism Centre (CTC) in the Intelligence Bureau to deal with terrorism in a coordinated manner.
The CTC suggested by it was patterned after the CTC of the USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which was then responsible for counter-terrorism in the US, since the terrorist threats to the US before 9/11 mainly emanated from abroad and were largely directed at US nationals and interests abroad. Since terrorism in India---whether regional or pan-Indian—was largely directed at homeland targets, the Saxena Task Force, of which I was a member, suggested that the proposed CTC should be part of the Intelligence Bureau and should work under the direction of the Director, Intelligence Bureau (DIB).
The CTC, as proposed by the Saxena Task Force, was essentially a preventive architecture responsible for introducing the principle of jointness in preventing terrorism. Jointness meant counter-terrorism experts from different agencies of the Government of India working together under the leadership of the DIB for analysing and assessing the intelligence collected by different agencies and the Police and giving directions for follow-up action.
The idea was that the follow-up action would still be taken by the State Police, but on the guidance and directions of the CTC, which was not given any executive powers of its own. The Vajpayee Government set up the CTC in the IB, but named it the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC). Since it was not given any executive powers to act independently on its own in the jurisdiction of the State Police, there was no objection to its creation from the States.
Before his death in January 2002, R.N.Kao, the founding father of the R&AW, met Vajpayee and told him that without the co-operation of the State Police, the Government of India would not be able to deal with terrorism effectively. He also expressed the view that the National Security Adviser, being an officer of the Indian Foreign Service, with no exposure to the State Police, would not be able to command the required co-operation from the State Police. He, therefore, suggested the creation of a post of Deputy NSA to be manned by a senior officer of the Indian Police Service either from the States or the IB.
Kao told me that Vajpayee reacted positively to his advice and said that he would initiate action for the creation of a post of DyNSA to be manned by a Police officer, who was an expert in internal security and who commanded the confidence of the State Police. By the time this post came into being, Kao passed away. When this post was created, it was filled up by another IFS officer who was an unknown quantity in the States and who had very little expertise in internal security matters.
The 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US Homeland brought out inadequacies in the functioning of the CTC of the CIA. It was decided by the George Bush Administration in 2004 to set up an independent organisation called the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) for ensuring jointmanship in dealing with terrorism and place it under the Director, National Intelligence. It also modified the counter-terrorism architecture in the US by creating a Homeland Security Council, which was distinct from the NSC, and placing it under a Homeland Security Adviser, distinct from the NSA.
When the Dr.Manmohan Singh Government came to office in 2004, it created a separate post of Internal Security Adviser on the pattern of the USA’s Homeland Security Adviser and made him exercise leadership in all internal security matters, including counter-terrorism. M.K.Narayanan, former DIB, was appointed to this post.
In 2005, after the death of J.N Dixit, the then National Security Adviser, Narayanan was designated as the NSA and asked to perform both the tasks of co-ordinating external and internal security duties. He was not able to devote adequate attention to internal security matters because of his preoccupation with the negotiation with the US on civil nuclear co-operation.
Internal Security Management in the Centre consequently suffered. The progress in the implementation of the Saxena Task Force’s recommendation on counter-terrorism was slow and no attempt was made to draw up a co-ordinated Counter-Terrorism Doctrine and revamp our counter-terrorism architecture.
The result: The 26/11 terrorist strikes, which dramatically exposed the poor state of our preventive architecture. There was no co-ordinated follow-up action even on the limited intelligence that reportedly came from the US through the R&AW regarding the plans of the LET to launch sea-borne terrorist strikes in Mumbai.
After taking over as the Home Minister post-26/11, Chidambaram, who has assumed total responsibility for counter-terrorism management, has sought to revamp the counter-terrorism architecture. He initiated in particular four steps. Firstly, he decentralised the deployment of the National Security Guards and created the National Investigation Agency (NIA) to improve our investigation capabilities. Secondly, he instituted a system of daily meetings of the intelligence chiefs under his chairmanship to discuss the available intelligence and assess the evolving threats. Thirdly, he speeded up the implementation of the Saxena Task Force recommendation for the Multi-Agency Centre, which had gone into doldrums under Shiv Raj Patil, his predecessor. And fourthly, after a visit to the US, he decided to set up an NCTC partly---not totally--- on the pattern of the USA’s counterpart.
While his first three steps did not meet with any opposition from the States, his attempt to create the NCTC has met with serious opposition because of his decision to keep it as part of the IB and give it independent executive powers of arrest and searches without the prior knowledge of the State Police. His idea probably was that to meet situations where a State Police dragged its feet for making an arrest, the NCTC should have its own powers of arrest so that it could make an arrest, produce the suspect before the Police and direct it to act against him.
This was a major encroachment on the powers of the State Police without the prior concurrence of the States. In his NCTC architecture, Chidambaram has made two significant departures from existing practices in countries such as the US. Instead of making the NCTC an independent institution, he has made it a part of the IB. By giving the NCTC independent powers of arrest, he has violated the widely held principle in other democracies that a clandestine intelligence agency should not have police powers of arrest which could be misused for political purposes.
His failure to consult the States beforehand and his attempt to confront the States with a fait accompli which would have definitely infringed on their rights have created so much opposition that the very principle of jointmanship in preventing terrorism through a body like the NCTC, now stands suspected as a politicised measure to circumvent the States.
Apparently, there were inadequate consultations even at the Centre as one could see from the opposition expressed by an increasing number of ex-R&AW officers to the move to make the NCTC a part of the IB. The controversy has not only become a Centre vs State issue, but is also threatening to become an IB Vs R&AW issue.
At a time when there is an urgent need for unity of action against terrorism, creation of a preventive architecture against terrorism has become a highly contentious and politicised issue. While one has to welcome Chidambaram’s decision to postpone the implementation till belated consultations are held with the States, it is doubtful whether the opposition-ruled States, whose suspicions have been aroused, will now agree to the creation of the NCTC at all even if it is not given executive powers. The whole concept, which is necessary, has become suspect in their eyes. It is very unfortunate.
There is no hurry to create the NCTC now. The MAC could continue to handle the tasks of follow-up action on the intelligence collected and prevention. The States have not objected to the MAC and got used to it. Instead, Chidambaram should focus on revamping the counter-terrorism architecture by making the NCTC an independent institution without executive powers working under the direction of the DIB, who could wear two hats as the head of the IB and of the NCTC. The NCTC could work under the DIB but without becoming a part of the IB. It would be similar to the R&AW and the Directorate-General of Security, which are independent institutions working under Secretary (R ), who wears two hats.
In his address to IB officers in 2010, Chidambaram had suggested the creation of a Ministry of Internal Security to focus exclusively on the operational aspects of Internal Security Management. There has been no follow-up on this since then. The time has come to consider this proposal as part of the over-all revamping. None of these ideas would work unless he manages to reach a political consensus with other political parties and the States. Prior consultations with the States should be sincere and serious and not just a gimmick.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), R&AW, Cabinet Secretariat )
Saturday, March 3, 2012
CHINA: CONTINUED UNREST IN MINORITY AREAS
B.RAMAN
The unrest in the minority-inhabited areas of the Tibetan belt and the Xinjiang province of China continues unabated.
2. While the protest by the Buddhist Tibetans against the suppression of their religion and culture by the Han majority continues to take the forms of self-immolation by Tibetan monks---mainly in the Sichuan province--- and non-cooperation with the authorities and non-observance of their instructions, the protest by the Muslim Uighur minority in the Xinjiang province has been taking violent forms.
3. Despite their strong campaign against His Holiness the Dalai Lama whom they have accused of instigating the self-immolations and despite the mass round-up of Tibetans present at the scenes of self-immolations on charges of instigating suicides, the Chinese have not been able to stop the self-immolations.
4. Simultaneously, the Tibetan campaign for the assertion of their Tibetan identity in which a large number of GenNext are participating has been confronting the authorities with a new situation which they do not know how to handle. They do not want to suppress it lest they be accused of seeking to destroy the Tibetan identity. At the same time, they are worried that this novel form of protest might strengthen the demand for Tibetan independence right across the Tibetan belt.
5. The non-cooperation movement took a new form during the Tibetan New Year (Losar) holidays towards the end of February. Reports received from the Tibetan areas indicate that large numbers of Tibetans refrained from celebrating their New Year in protest against the Chinese policies. They observed it as a period of mourning in memory of those who committed self-immolation since March last year.
6. The attempts of the Chinese authorities to force the Tibetans to celebrate their New Year failed. They then organised New Year celebrations in parts of Lhasa and other places, which were largely attended by the Han Chinese. The Government and Party-controlled media disseminated stories that these celebrations were actually organised by the Tibetans.
7.The non-cooperation movement has remained remarkably non-violent except three incidents of violence in the Sichuan province involving clashes between the protesting Tibetans and the local Police. In two of these incidents, local police stations were attacked and in the third there was an explosion in a police building in which the office of the intelligence set-up was located. A Tibetan carrying an explosive device was allegedly killed due to a premature detonation.
8. The Chinese security authorities are used to dealing ruthlessly with violent outbreaks, but they are confused by the spread of the non-violent non-cooperation movement and do not know how to deal with it.
9. The spread of the non-cooperation movement seems to be the result of local initiatives with calls for non-cooperation disseminated through word of mouth, but the Chinese fear that there is a hitherto unidentified Tibetan group which has been orchestrating the protest movement.
10. The Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC), which was behind the violent upheaval of 2008, has been quiet. There has been no evidence of any role by it in the current non-violent protest movement.
11. This non-violent non-cooperation movement has been causing greater nervousness in Government and party circles in Beijing than the violent incidents of 2008. This nervousness was reflected in the speeches calling for strong action against the so-called Tibetan splittists inspired by His Holiness which were delivered at a conference on Tibet held at Beijing on March 1. The importance of safeguarding social harmony and stability in the Tibetan region extending across Tibet, Sichuan,Qinghai, Gansu and Yunnan was stressed by Jia Qinglin, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC).
12. The Party-owned “People’s Daily” quoted him as having said as follows: “Currently, the clique of the Dalai Lama are trying in vain to continuously create incidents in Tibet and the Tibetan-inhabited areas in the four provinces. Authorities should implement the prescribed measures well to resolutely crush the Dalai Lama clique's conspiracy of making Tibetan-inhabited areas unstable, thus making the masses able to live and work there comfortably."
13. While the Buddhist Tibetans thus continue to protest by following Gandhian methods of non-violent non-cooperation, the resentment of the Muslim Uighurs in the Xinjiang province has been taking violent forms. On the night of February 28, there were violent clashes between the Han Chinese and local Uighurs in the Kashgar area following some insulting remarks allegedly made by some Hans. The protesting Uighurs allegedly stabbed 13 Hans to death. The Police then intervened and shot dead seven Uighurs who had allegedly taken part in the violent incidents.
14. It has been reported that in recent months there has been a fresh Government-organised migration of Hans into Xinjiang and this has aggravated the anti-Han resentment of the Uighurs, who have already been reduced to a minority in their homeland.
15. As part of their pacification policy, the Chinese authorities have embarked on a crash economic development programme in the Tibetan belt and in Xinjiang, but the locals allege that the economic benefits of this programme have been mainly going to the Hans settled in these areas to whom priority is given in the matter of jobs. Moreover, under the pretext of facilitating economic development, more Hans are being settled in the minority areas. ( 4-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The unrest in the minority-inhabited areas of the Tibetan belt and the Xinjiang province of China continues unabated.
2. While the protest by the Buddhist Tibetans against the suppression of their religion and culture by the Han majority continues to take the forms of self-immolation by Tibetan monks---mainly in the Sichuan province--- and non-cooperation with the authorities and non-observance of their instructions, the protest by the Muslim Uighur minority in the Xinjiang province has been taking violent forms.
3. Despite their strong campaign against His Holiness the Dalai Lama whom they have accused of instigating the self-immolations and despite the mass round-up of Tibetans present at the scenes of self-immolations on charges of instigating suicides, the Chinese have not been able to stop the self-immolations.
4. Simultaneously, the Tibetan campaign for the assertion of their Tibetan identity in which a large number of GenNext are participating has been confronting the authorities with a new situation which they do not know how to handle. They do not want to suppress it lest they be accused of seeking to destroy the Tibetan identity. At the same time, they are worried that this novel form of protest might strengthen the demand for Tibetan independence right across the Tibetan belt.
5. The non-cooperation movement took a new form during the Tibetan New Year (Losar) holidays towards the end of February. Reports received from the Tibetan areas indicate that large numbers of Tibetans refrained from celebrating their New Year in protest against the Chinese policies. They observed it as a period of mourning in memory of those who committed self-immolation since March last year.
6. The attempts of the Chinese authorities to force the Tibetans to celebrate their New Year failed. They then organised New Year celebrations in parts of Lhasa and other places, which were largely attended by the Han Chinese. The Government and Party-controlled media disseminated stories that these celebrations were actually organised by the Tibetans.
7.The non-cooperation movement has remained remarkably non-violent except three incidents of violence in the Sichuan province involving clashes between the protesting Tibetans and the local Police. In two of these incidents, local police stations were attacked and in the third there was an explosion in a police building in which the office of the intelligence set-up was located. A Tibetan carrying an explosive device was allegedly killed due to a premature detonation.
8. The Chinese security authorities are used to dealing ruthlessly with violent outbreaks, but they are confused by the spread of the non-violent non-cooperation movement and do not know how to deal with it.
9. The spread of the non-cooperation movement seems to be the result of local initiatives with calls for non-cooperation disseminated through word of mouth, but the Chinese fear that there is a hitherto unidentified Tibetan group which has been orchestrating the protest movement.
10. The Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC), which was behind the violent upheaval of 2008, has been quiet. There has been no evidence of any role by it in the current non-violent protest movement.
11. This non-violent non-cooperation movement has been causing greater nervousness in Government and party circles in Beijing than the violent incidents of 2008. This nervousness was reflected in the speeches calling for strong action against the so-called Tibetan splittists inspired by His Holiness which were delivered at a conference on Tibet held at Beijing on March 1. The importance of safeguarding social harmony and stability in the Tibetan region extending across Tibet, Sichuan,Qinghai, Gansu and Yunnan was stressed by Jia Qinglin, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC).
12. The Party-owned “People’s Daily” quoted him as having said as follows: “Currently, the clique of the Dalai Lama are trying in vain to continuously create incidents in Tibet and the Tibetan-inhabited areas in the four provinces. Authorities should implement the prescribed measures well to resolutely crush the Dalai Lama clique's conspiracy of making Tibetan-inhabited areas unstable, thus making the masses able to live and work there comfortably."
13. While the Buddhist Tibetans thus continue to protest by following Gandhian methods of non-violent non-cooperation, the resentment of the Muslim Uighurs in the Xinjiang province has been taking violent forms. On the night of February 28, there were violent clashes between the Han Chinese and local Uighurs in the Kashgar area following some insulting remarks allegedly made by some Hans. The protesting Uighurs allegedly stabbed 13 Hans to death. The Police then intervened and shot dead seven Uighurs who had allegedly taken part in the violent incidents.
14. It has been reported that in recent months there has been a fresh Government-organised migration of Hans into Xinjiang and this has aggravated the anti-Han resentment of the Uighurs, who have already been reduced to a minority in their homeland.
15. As part of their pacification policy, the Chinese authorities have embarked on a crash economic development programme in the Tibetan belt and in Xinjiang, but the locals allege that the economic benefits of this programme have been mainly going to the Hans settled in these areas to whom priority is given in the matter of jobs. Moreover, under the pretext of facilitating economic development, more Hans are being settled in the minority areas. ( 4-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
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