B.RAMAN
( This is a post-seminar expansion of introductory observations made by me at a seminar on Police and Media at Hyderabad on December 15 and 16,2011)
Concepts keep evolving. When I was in service, one used to talk of media management by the police. It is now a hated concept. After I left service in August,1994, one started talking of perception management. This too has now fallen into disfavour. One now talks of perception correction. It is a politically neutral concept acceptable both to the police and the media.
2. Police officers have a right and a responsibility to identify wrong perceptions created by the media either consciously or unconsciously and have them corrected. For that, continuous interaction between the police and the media is necessary---- not only in times of crisis, but also in normal times.
3. Cordial relations with the media is not just a question of entertaining it from time to time. It is a question of respecting it as playing a useful role in keeping its spotlight on the police and winning its respect through our professionalism.
4. A good professional doesn’t have to all the time strut around projecting himself as one. He will be sensed from a distance by the media and the public. Professionalism is a combination of various factors---your competence, your efficiency, your record, your integrity and your ability to earn respect by giving respect.
5. The media expects from us respect, accessibility and a willingness to share correct information that can be shared for the benefit of the media and the public and in the interest of the public and the nation. If these factors are kept in mind, one can more effectively than at present prevent the emergence of wrong perceptions and correct wrong perceptions that arise despite the best efforts of the police to prevent them.
6.Not only concepts evolve, but the media landscape also keeps evolving. When I was in service, dealing with the media was simple. Today, it has become difficult and complex. In those days, we had to deal only with the print media and the Government-run electronic media. The media landscape has since changed beyond recognition due to the mushrooming of privately-run TV and radio networks, the easy availability of foreign channels for the viewers due to satellite TV, the blooming of the new media which has enabled any individual with the required motivation and energy to become a virtual journalist.
7. The rapid advance of media-related technologies has further empowered the media and given the police the impression and feeling of having been disempowered. The police, like other wings of the Government, does not know how to deal with this phenomenon of an aggressive and assertive media and equally aggressive and assertive citizens. Those who understand this phenomenal change in the media landscape and use it for their benefit are the driving force of today. Those, who do not, find themselves left far behind by the march of the new forces and new ideas in the real and virtual world of the media.
8. Without a proper understanding of the new forces and the new ideas sweeping across the media world, the police, like other wings of the Government, will not be able to deal with the multiplying complexities of media relations today.
9. The journalist profile has also been evolving. When I was in service, I had to deal with journos who were in their late 40s or early 50s. They were reverential to senior Government servants, they were respecters of persons and they knew and respected the Laxman Rekha in the relations between the media and the Government.
10. Today, while the media continues to be driven commercially by people in their middle ages, it is driven professionally by journos in their 20s and 30s. There has been a spectacular bloom of young journos, who respect no age, who respect no person, who respect no authority and who observe no Laxman Rekha. For them, getting at the news and reporting it as they think it should be reported is the end-all and be-all of their profession.
11. Today’s young journos, unlike their predecessors, are risk-takers and risk-seekers. Their predecessors used to come to us for advice and briefing before they undertook any dangerous reporting assignment. Today’s journos don’t care. The moment they decide to go somewhere to get the news, they make a dash for it without worrying about the risks and dangers. A new generation of journos has come up since the Kargil conflict driven by a fearsome passion to get at the news even if they have to ruffle the feathers of those in authority. I call it the Barkha generation---- full of determination, drive and courage. Look at the way Barkha dashed into rebel-controlled Libya without worrying about the consequences for her.
12. The Barkha generation has its positive and negative qualities. Look at the way it complicated the handling of the Kandahar hijacking in December 1999. Look at the way Barkha, in alleged disregard of the difficulties of the police and other security forces, covered the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. I am yet to come across a single IPS officer who does not talk critically of the way she covered the 26/11 strikes. Look at the way she went after a blogger who chose to criticise her style of news coverage. She would expect the Police to understand and be responsive to her style of news coverage, but she could not understand and be responsive to a blogger’s criticism---however immoderate—of her style of reporting. This brought out the double standards adopted by some of the young journos of today.
13. We have not yet found an answer to the question as to how to cope with this new generation of journos with its insatiable hunger for the Breaking News because many of us are not even aware that the media world of today and the ever-bubbling journos of today are unrecognisably different from those of yesterday. This question has to be debated carefully in our search for an answer.
14.Look how poorly we understand the mind-boggling reach and potential of the new media. How many of us have thought of ways of using the new media for disseminating the correct news, for projecting the police point of view and for correcting wrong perceptions? Improving the conventional ways and style of relationship with the media alone is not sufficient. The police has to be proactive in the world of the new media. Instead of understanding the new media and its social networks and benefitting from them, we are thinking of curbing and even suppressing them. This shows that while the mindset of Generation Next in the media world is galloping forward, our mindset remains shackled to the past. It is time to break this. (18-12-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Saturday, December 17, 2011
Tuesday, December 13, 2011
INDIAN OCEAN REGION: CHINESE STRATEGIC THINKING
B.RAMAN
China’s official Xinhua news agency disseminated the following report on December 12,2011:
“China said on Monday that its naval fleet may seek supplies or recuperate at appropriate harbors in Seychelles or other countries as needed during escort missions.
“It is international practice for naval fleets to resupply at the closest port of a nearby state during long-distance missions, the Ministry of National Defense said in a press release commenting on a recent report stating that China will establish a military base in Seychelles to crack down on piracy.
“Chinese naval fleets have resupplied at harbors in Djibouti, Oman and Yemen since the country sent its first convoy to the Gulf of Aden in 2008, according to the ministry
“Defense Minister Liang Guanglie paid an official goodwill visit to Seychelles earlier this month.
“During Liang's visit, the two sides exchanged views on their countries' and armies' cooperation, as well as on the global and regional situation.
“Seychelles appreciates China's efforts to maintain safe navigation on the Indian Ocean, as well as the support it has granted to Seychelles, the ministry said.
“Seychelles also invited China's navy to resupply and recuperate in the country during escort missions, the ministry said.”
2. An article carried the next day by the “China Daily” said:
“The navy is considering taking on supplies in the Seychelles while conducting escort missions to tackle piracy.
“Military experts stressed that the move did not equate to establishing military bases.
“"According to escort needs and the needs of other long-range missions, China will consider seeking supply facilities at appropriate harbors in the Seychelles or other countries," the Ministry of Defense said in a statement on its website on Monday.
“The statement was in response to a recent report that the Seychelles invited China to establish a military base in the Indian Ocean archipelago to crack down on piracy during a visit by Defense Minister Liang Guanglie, the first by a Chinese defense minister, earlier this month.
“The Press Trust of India news agency later interpreted this as Beijing reneging on its promise not to build military bases abroad.
“Li Jie, a professor at the Naval Military Studies Research Institute, told China Daily "as China will not send troops to protect the supply stop in the Seychelles, by no means can it be called an overseas military base".
“Beijing has repeatedly confirmed that its policy of not stationing troops abroad will not be altered. It stands alone among the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council in not having overseas bases.
“Due to anti-piracy missions off the coast of Somalia, it is only natural for Beijing to ensure naval supplies, Li said.”
“Peng Guangqian, a Beijing-based military strategist, said facilities allowing ships to take on supplies cannot be called military bases because "China respects the host's sovereignty and internal politics, and no political conditions are attached".
“"Besides, it will be solely used for logistics and supplies," he added.
“Li Qinggong, deputy secretary of the China Council for National Security Policy Studies, said that any arrangements over the use of facilities will be mutually beneficial with jobs provided for people in the Seychelles and the navy better able to protect China's growing overseas interests.”
3. MY COMMENTS: Chinese naval ships on long-range anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden area do need ports of call for re-stocking, re-fuelling and rest and recreation facilities. Initially, they were using the Karachi port. They have stopped doing so for some months now due to the poor security situation in Karachi, which was highlighted by a terrorist attack on the Pakistani naval air base in May last. They are not going ahead with their original plans for the upgradation of the Gwadar port into a naval base due to the poor security situation in Balochistan.
4.They are, therefore, now looking for such facilities in safe Gulf ports and may start using Hambantota in Sri Lanka once it is ready for receiving Chinese naval vessels. The Chinese have never made any secret of their interest in port calls in the Indian Ocean area for availing of such facilities. Because of the long distance involved from the waters of China to the patrolling areas in the Gulf of Aden their requirements for re-stocking, re-fuelling and rest and recreation are natural and genuine.
5. I understand that as a confidence-building measure, the Indian Navy had also invited Chinese naval vessels returning from anti-piracy patrols to make a port call at Kochi. This was a good initiative which I support. While we must carefully monitor the movements and interests of the Chinese Navy in the Indian Ocean area, we should avoid the kind of paranoia created by the ill-advised PTI report.
6. In a paper presented at a seminar organised by the National Maritime Foundation at Vizag in July last, I had stated as follows: “The indications are that China’s interest in helping the countries of the South Asian region in the development of their port infrastructure is related to its need to ensure the security of its energy supplies from West Asia and Africa. It has no naval power projection dimension at present.
7. Till now, the main driver of China’s strategic interest in Gwadar, Hambantota and Chittagong has been the perceived need for refuelling, re-stocking and rest and recreation facilities for its oil/gas tankers and naval ships deputed for anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden area. China is not yet interested in an overseas naval base, but is interested in overseas logistic facilities for its oil/gas tankers and for its naval vessels.
8.Individual retired officers of the People’s Liberation Army (Navy) have been talking of the likely long-term need for an overseas naval base in the Indian Ocean area, but the Communist Party of China (CPC) has been discouraging such talk. Presently, the Chinese interest in playing a role in the development of the port infrastructure is not designed to place its Navy in a position as to be able to challenge the primacy presently enjoyed by the Navies of the US and India in the Indian Ocean region.
9. China has seen as to how the over-assertiveness of its Navy in the South China Sea has had a negative impact on the comfort level of its relations with the ASEAN countries. The Indian Ocean is not comparable to the South China Sea. China has no territorial claims to islands in the Indian Ocean area. It has no disputes relating to fishing and exploration of oil and gas with any of the countries of the Indian Ocean region. China and its Navy are, therefore, welcomed by the countries of the region. This comfortable position could change if China graduates from energy security to power projection in its strategic planning for the Indian Ocean region.
10. I do not expect this to happen in the short and medium terms (five to 10 years). However, if the Chinese strategic thinking changes in the long-term, what could be the new threats to India and what will be the options for our Navy? We have to start thinking on this.( http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers46%5Cpaper4595.html
11. While reiterating this assessment, I must highlight that there has recently been important statements and comments by President Hu Jintao and Chinese analysts on the need to give priority to further strengthening the Chinese Navy. My present assessment is that these comments are related to the recent re-assertion of the US primacy in the Pacific and the greater interest taken by the US in the South China Sea. They do not seem to be related to Chinese perceptions of any new core interests they may develop in the Indian Ocean region.
12. Presently, they have core concerns in the Indian Ocean area arising from the activities of the Somali pirates and likely threats to their energy security from pirates and terrorists. They have no core interests in the Indian Ocean area, but developing a capability for power projection in the Indian Ocean to counter the renewed US power projection in the Pacific could become a driving force of their strategic vision in the Indian Ocean region. We need to closely monitor the evolution of Chinese strategic thinking in this regard. ( 14-12-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
China’s official Xinhua news agency disseminated the following report on December 12,2011:
“China said on Monday that its naval fleet may seek supplies or recuperate at appropriate harbors in Seychelles or other countries as needed during escort missions.
“It is international practice for naval fleets to resupply at the closest port of a nearby state during long-distance missions, the Ministry of National Defense said in a press release commenting on a recent report stating that China will establish a military base in Seychelles to crack down on piracy.
“Chinese naval fleets have resupplied at harbors in Djibouti, Oman and Yemen since the country sent its first convoy to the Gulf of Aden in 2008, according to the ministry
“Defense Minister Liang Guanglie paid an official goodwill visit to Seychelles earlier this month.
“During Liang's visit, the two sides exchanged views on their countries' and armies' cooperation, as well as on the global and regional situation.
“Seychelles appreciates China's efforts to maintain safe navigation on the Indian Ocean, as well as the support it has granted to Seychelles, the ministry said.
“Seychelles also invited China's navy to resupply and recuperate in the country during escort missions, the ministry said.”
2. An article carried the next day by the “China Daily” said:
“The navy is considering taking on supplies in the Seychelles while conducting escort missions to tackle piracy.
“Military experts stressed that the move did not equate to establishing military bases.
“"According to escort needs and the needs of other long-range missions, China will consider seeking supply facilities at appropriate harbors in the Seychelles or other countries," the Ministry of Defense said in a statement on its website on Monday.
“The statement was in response to a recent report that the Seychelles invited China to establish a military base in the Indian Ocean archipelago to crack down on piracy during a visit by Defense Minister Liang Guanglie, the first by a Chinese defense minister, earlier this month.
“The Press Trust of India news agency later interpreted this as Beijing reneging on its promise not to build military bases abroad.
“Li Jie, a professor at the Naval Military Studies Research Institute, told China Daily "as China will not send troops to protect the supply stop in the Seychelles, by no means can it be called an overseas military base".
“Beijing has repeatedly confirmed that its policy of not stationing troops abroad will not be altered. It stands alone among the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council in not having overseas bases.
“Due to anti-piracy missions off the coast of Somalia, it is only natural for Beijing to ensure naval supplies, Li said.”
“Peng Guangqian, a Beijing-based military strategist, said facilities allowing ships to take on supplies cannot be called military bases because "China respects the host's sovereignty and internal politics, and no political conditions are attached".
“"Besides, it will be solely used for logistics and supplies," he added.
“Li Qinggong, deputy secretary of the China Council for National Security Policy Studies, said that any arrangements over the use of facilities will be mutually beneficial with jobs provided for people in the Seychelles and the navy better able to protect China's growing overseas interests.”
3. MY COMMENTS: Chinese naval ships on long-range anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden area do need ports of call for re-stocking, re-fuelling and rest and recreation facilities. Initially, they were using the Karachi port. They have stopped doing so for some months now due to the poor security situation in Karachi, which was highlighted by a terrorist attack on the Pakistani naval air base in May last. They are not going ahead with their original plans for the upgradation of the Gwadar port into a naval base due to the poor security situation in Balochistan.
4.They are, therefore, now looking for such facilities in safe Gulf ports and may start using Hambantota in Sri Lanka once it is ready for receiving Chinese naval vessels. The Chinese have never made any secret of their interest in port calls in the Indian Ocean area for availing of such facilities. Because of the long distance involved from the waters of China to the patrolling areas in the Gulf of Aden their requirements for re-stocking, re-fuelling and rest and recreation are natural and genuine.
5. I understand that as a confidence-building measure, the Indian Navy had also invited Chinese naval vessels returning from anti-piracy patrols to make a port call at Kochi. This was a good initiative which I support. While we must carefully monitor the movements and interests of the Chinese Navy in the Indian Ocean area, we should avoid the kind of paranoia created by the ill-advised PTI report.
6. In a paper presented at a seminar organised by the National Maritime Foundation at Vizag in July last, I had stated as follows: “The indications are that China’s interest in helping the countries of the South Asian region in the development of their port infrastructure is related to its need to ensure the security of its energy supplies from West Asia and Africa. It has no naval power projection dimension at present.
7. Till now, the main driver of China’s strategic interest in Gwadar, Hambantota and Chittagong has been the perceived need for refuelling, re-stocking and rest and recreation facilities for its oil/gas tankers and naval ships deputed for anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden area. China is not yet interested in an overseas naval base, but is interested in overseas logistic facilities for its oil/gas tankers and for its naval vessels.
8.Individual retired officers of the People’s Liberation Army (Navy) have been talking of the likely long-term need for an overseas naval base in the Indian Ocean area, but the Communist Party of China (CPC) has been discouraging such talk. Presently, the Chinese interest in playing a role in the development of the port infrastructure is not designed to place its Navy in a position as to be able to challenge the primacy presently enjoyed by the Navies of the US and India in the Indian Ocean region.
9. China has seen as to how the over-assertiveness of its Navy in the South China Sea has had a negative impact on the comfort level of its relations with the ASEAN countries. The Indian Ocean is not comparable to the South China Sea. China has no territorial claims to islands in the Indian Ocean area. It has no disputes relating to fishing and exploration of oil and gas with any of the countries of the Indian Ocean region. China and its Navy are, therefore, welcomed by the countries of the region. This comfortable position could change if China graduates from energy security to power projection in its strategic planning for the Indian Ocean region.
10. I do not expect this to happen in the short and medium terms (five to 10 years). However, if the Chinese strategic thinking changes in the long-term, what could be the new threats to India and what will be the options for our Navy? We have to start thinking on this.( http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers46%5Cpaper4595.html
11. While reiterating this assessment, I must highlight that there has recently been important statements and comments by President Hu Jintao and Chinese analysts on the need to give priority to further strengthening the Chinese Navy. My present assessment is that these comments are related to the recent re-assertion of the US primacy in the Pacific and the greater interest taken by the US in the South China Sea. They do not seem to be related to Chinese perceptions of any new core interests they may develop in the Indian Ocean region.
12. Presently, they have core concerns in the Indian Ocean area arising from the activities of the Somali pirates and likely threats to their energy security from pirates and terrorists. They have no core interests in the Indian Ocean area, but developing a capability for power projection in the Indian Ocean to counter the renewed US power projection in the Pacific could become a driving force of their strategic vision in the Indian Ocean region. We need to closely monitor the evolution of Chinese strategic thinking in this regard. ( 14-12-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
COUNTER-TERRORISM: WANTED AN IRON FIST
B.RAMAN
There have been four mass fatality attacks (with fatalities of more than 100 ) on Indian nationals or foreign nationals of Indian origin by terrorists enjoying sanctuaries in Pakistani territory. Three of these attacks carried out by jihadi terrorists were in Mumbai ( in March 1993,July 2006 and November 2008)and one involved the blowing-up of the Kanishka aircraft of Air India off the Irish coast in June 1985 by Khalistani terrorists.
2. The jihadi attacks in Mumbai were carried out by terrorists who came from sanctuaries and training camps of their organisations in Pakistani territory. Talwinder Singh Parmar of the Babbar Khalsa, who orchestrated the blowing-up of the Kanishka aircraft, came from Vancouver and took sanctuary in Pakistan after having the attack carried out. He was subsequently killed in August 1992 when he crossed over into Indian territory.
3.The two Indian masterminds of the March 1993 terrorist attack in Mumbai----Dawood Ibrahim and Tiger Memon---- continue to live in Karachi without any action being taken against them by the Pakistani authorities. Those involved in the July 2006 terrorist attacks on suburban trains have not been definitively identified, but they are believed to have taken sanctuary with the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in Pakistani territory. The LET masterminds of the November,2008 attacks---- all Pakistani nationals--- are still in Pakistani territory---some facing a make-believe trial and others untouched by the Pakistani authorities.
4. The potentially catastrophic attack on the Indian Parliament by the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM), with the suspected complicity of the LET, on December 13,2001,was designed to be a decapitation strike directed at India’s parliamentary leadership, but the alertness and bravery of the Indian security forces guarding the Parliament thwarted their designs. They were prevented from shooting their way into the Parliament and killed. There were no mass fatalities of civilians.
5.The capability of the terrorists to carry out repeated mass fatality attacks or potentially catastrophic attacks was facilitated by the connivance of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and by the availability of sanctuaries and training facilities in Pakistani territory.
6.A repeatedly demonstrated lesson in the history of terrorism is that when terrorists operate with the complicity of a foreign intelligence agency from foreign sanctuaries it would not be possible to eliminate their terrorism unless the intelligence agency and/or the sanctuaries are targeted and irreparable damages are inflicted on them.
7.The US air strikes in Libya ordered by President Reagan in 1986 in retaliation for a bomb attack on US soldiers in Berlin was an example of a justified attack on a foreign State assisting terrorists. The US special forces attack in Abbottabad in Pakistan on May 2,2011, to kill Osama bin Laden was an example of an attack targeting sanctuaries and those given sanctuaries without targeting the State which provided sanctuary. The US has also been using its Drone (pilotless plane) strikes in North and South Waziristan as part of its counter-sanctuaries strategy.
8.Since the mass fatality attacks started in 1985, we have refrained from targeting either the State of Pakistan and its ISI or the terrorists and their sanctuaries in Pakistani territory. Even if we don’t want to exercise a counter-State policy against Pakistan, unless we exercise the counter-sanctuaries policy against the terrorist organisations and their sanctuaries in Pakistani territory, we will be destined to see a periodic recurrence of such attacks on our nationals.
9. There are two requirements for an effective counter-sanctuary strategy---- the political will to undertake targeted attacks against sanctuaries even at the risk of a possible military conflict with Pakistan and the clandestine capability called the covert action capability to translate the political will into action.
10. In India, we do not have either the political will or the covert action capability. Whatever limited covert action capability we had against Pakistan was ordered to be disbanded by Shri Inder Gujral when he was the Prime Minister in 1997. Neither Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee, who succeeded him, nor Dr.Manmohan Singh have shown a willingness to order a re-creation of our covert action capability because they did not have the political courage to order its use against the sanctuaries.
11. The ISI as well as the terrorists sponsored by it know that India does not have a retaliatory covert action capability and that fear of a military conflict degenerating into a nuclear one has stymied Indian decision-making on the inclusion of a counter-sanctuary component into our counter-terrorism strategy.
12. The Indian State finds itself in a state of not having the required covert action capability to act against the sanctuaries and not having the political will and courage to use that capability even if we re-create it.
13. We will never be able to deal with mass fatality terrorism emanating from Pakistani territory unless we get out of this self-created and self-imposed paralysis of the will of the Indian State to act.
14. I am all for talks with Pakistan to improve our relations, but the talks must be accompanied by the will to act against the sanctuaries. Talking alone without demonstrating a will to act will prove counter-productive.
15.As we observe the 10th anniversary of the attack on the Parliament and pay homage to our brave security personnel who died to thwart the attack, it is this question-----the resuscitation of the national will to act as demonstrated by Indira Gandhi in 1971 and the re-creation of the covert action capability to translate that will into action--- that should engage our attention.
16. Instead of doing so, the entire focus has been on the perceived delay in the execution of Afzal Guru, an Indian national, who has been sentenced to death by the court for his complicity with the terrorists who came from the sanctuaries in Pakistan. His execution is not going to put an end to the sanctuaries in Pakistan. Only the iron fist of the Indian State will do so. ( 13-12-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com .Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
There have been four mass fatality attacks (with fatalities of more than 100 ) on Indian nationals or foreign nationals of Indian origin by terrorists enjoying sanctuaries in Pakistani territory. Three of these attacks carried out by jihadi terrorists were in Mumbai ( in March 1993,July 2006 and November 2008)and one involved the blowing-up of the Kanishka aircraft of Air India off the Irish coast in June 1985 by Khalistani terrorists.
2. The jihadi attacks in Mumbai were carried out by terrorists who came from sanctuaries and training camps of their organisations in Pakistani territory. Talwinder Singh Parmar of the Babbar Khalsa, who orchestrated the blowing-up of the Kanishka aircraft, came from Vancouver and took sanctuary in Pakistan after having the attack carried out. He was subsequently killed in August 1992 when he crossed over into Indian territory.
3.The two Indian masterminds of the March 1993 terrorist attack in Mumbai----Dawood Ibrahim and Tiger Memon---- continue to live in Karachi without any action being taken against them by the Pakistani authorities. Those involved in the July 2006 terrorist attacks on suburban trains have not been definitively identified, but they are believed to have taken sanctuary with the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in Pakistani territory. The LET masterminds of the November,2008 attacks---- all Pakistani nationals--- are still in Pakistani territory---some facing a make-believe trial and others untouched by the Pakistani authorities.
4. The potentially catastrophic attack on the Indian Parliament by the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM), with the suspected complicity of the LET, on December 13,2001,was designed to be a decapitation strike directed at India’s parliamentary leadership, but the alertness and bravery of the Indian security forces guarding the Parliament thwarted their designs. They were prevented from shooting their way into the Parliament and killed. There were no mass fatalities of civilians.
5.The capability of the terrorists to carry out repeated mass fatality attacks or potentially catastrophic attacks was facilitated by the connivance of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and by the availability of sanctuaries and training facilities in Pakistani territory.
6.A repeatedly demonstrated lesson in the history of terrorism is that when terrorists operate with the complicity of a foreign intelligence agency from foreign sanctuaries it would not be possible to eliminate their terrorism unless the intelligence agency and/or the sanctuaries are targeted and irreparable damages are inflicted on them.
7.The US air strikes in Libya ordered by President Reagan in 1986 in retaliation for a bomb attack on US soldiers in Berlin was an example of a justified attack on a foreign State assisting terrorists. The US special forces attack in Abbottabad in Pakistan on May 2,2011, to kill Osama bin Laden was an example of an attack targeting sanctuaries and those given sanctuaries without targeting the State which provided sanctuary. The US has also been using its Drone (pilotless plane) strikes in North and South Waziristan as part of its counter-sanctuaries strategy.
8.Since the mass fatality attacks started in 1985, we have refrained from targeting either the State of Pakistan and its ISI or the terrorists and their sanctuaries in Pakistani territory. Even if we don’t want to exercise a counter-State policy against Pakistan, unless we exercise the counter-sanctuaries policy against the terrorist organisations and their sanctuaries in Pakistani territory, we will be destined to see a periodic recurrence of such attacks on our nationals.
9. There are two requirements for an effective counter-sanctuary strategy---- the political will to undertake targeted attacks against sanctuaries even at the risk of a possible military conflict with Pakistan and the clandestine capability called the covert action capability to translate the political will into action.
10. In India, we do not have either the political will or the covert action capability. Whatever limited covert action capability we had against Pakistan was ordered to be disbanded by Shri Inder Gujral when he was the Prime Minister in 1997. Neither Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee, who succeeded him, nor Dr.Manmohan Singh have shown a willingness to order a re-creation of our covert action capability because they did not have the political courage to order its use against the sanctuaries.
11. The ISI as well as the terrorists sponsored by it know that India does not have a retaliatory covert action capability and that fear of a military conflict degenerating into a nuclear one has stymied Indian decision-making on the inclusion of a counter-sanctuary component into our counter-terrorism strategy.
12. The Indian State finds itself in a state of not having the required covert action capability to act against the sanctuaries and not having the political will and courage to use that capability even if we re-create it.
13. We will never be able to deal with mass fatality terrorism emanating from Pakistani territory unless we get out of this self-created and self-imposed paralysis of the will of the Indian State to act.
14. I am all for talks with Pakistan to improve our relations, but the talks must be accompanied by the will to act against the sanctuaries. Talking alone without demonstrating a will to act will prove counter-productive.
15.As we observe the 10th anniversary of the attack on the Parliament and pay homage to our brave security personnel who died to thwart the attack, it is this question-----the resuscitation of the national will to act as demonstrated by Indira Gandhi in 1971 and the re-creation of the covert action capability to translate that will into action--- that should engage our attention.
16. Instead of doing so, the entire focus has been on the perceived delay in the execution of Afzal Guru, an Indian national, who has been sentenced to death by the court for his complicity with the terrorists who came from the sanctuaries in Pakistan. His execution is not going to put an end to the sanctuaries in Pakistan. Only the iron fist of the Indian State will do so. ( 13-12-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com .Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Monday, December 12, 2011
GOOGLE’S CHINA STORY---AN UPDATE
B.RAMAN
July 19,2005: Kai-Fu Lee, a well-known Chinese computer expert working for Microsoft in the US, crossed over into Google to help it establish an office in China---reportedly on an annual salary of US $ 13 million. Lee announced his switch-over in his Chinese language web site as follows: “I choose Google. I choose China.” Microsoft filed a suit against Lee. The court ruled on September 13,2005, that while Lee could not share with Google the information acquired by him while serving in Microsoft, there would be no bar to his helping Google in setting up a presence in China. Under a compromise reached by Google and Microsoft in 2006, the latter agreed to lift restrictions imposed by it on Lee.
2.January 27,2006:Google’s China service called Google.cn was launched. Lee, who headed the office, helped Google in recruiting a large number of Chinese computer experts. It was reported at that time that in return for the Chinese permission to open its services in China, Google had agreed that it would abide by the rules of censorship laid down by the Chinese Government. Soon after Google.cn started functioning, frictions allegedly developed in its interactions with the Chinese authorities.
3.The “Fortune” magazine (April 15,2011) reported in a special article on Google in China as follows: “ Google had hoped that its decision to create a search engine in the .cn domain -- one that followed government rules of censorship -- would lead to a level playing field. But even as Google rolled out its .cn web address, there were indications that its compromise would not satisfy the Chinese government. Unexplained outages still occurred. (Meanwhile, Google's competitor Baidu seemed to hum along unscathed.) And not long after Google got its operating license in December 2005, the Chinese declared that the license was no longer valid, charging that it wasn't clear whether Google's activities made it an Internet service or a news portal. (Foreigners could not operate the latter.) Google then began a year-and-a-half-long negotiation to restore the license.”
4. In June 2007, the Chinese Government restored Google’s operating license. Neither the Chinese authorities nor Google shared with the public information regarding the conditions, if any, under which its licence was restored. Had Google agreed to continue to abide by Chinese internet censorship rules?
5.In the meanwhile, allegations started surfacing that Google’s management trusted its American employees more than its Chinese employees. It became apparent that Google recruited Lee to make use of his China knowledge and contacts, but did not allow him an unrestricted role in operational management. He was allegedly a glorified head subject to back-seat driving by Americans enjoying the confidence of the Google management in the US.
6. To quote from the “Fortune” article on how Google was coping with increasing Chinese demands for censorship: “A demand would come from a government ministry to take down 10 items; Google would typically take down seven and hope that the compromise resolved the matter. Sometimes after a few days or weeks Google would quietly restore links it had censored. Every five months Google's policy-review committee in China would meet to make sure it was filtering the minimum it could possibly get away with.”
7.“Fortune” added: “For all the progress, some Google executives were beginning to think that its great China compromise wasn't working. A turning point came in 2008, the year China hosted the Olympics. In the run-up to its turn in the international spotlight, China apparently decided to increase its restrictions. It demanded that in addition to censoring the .cn results, Google purge objectionable links from the Chinese-language version of Google.com. That, of course, was unacceptable to Google -- it would mean that it was acting as an agent of repression for Chinese-speaking people all over the world, including in the U.S. Other search engines, including Microsoft's, agreed to such demands. But Google stalled, hoping that after the Olympics the Chinese would back off. They did not. The demands for censorship became broader and more frequent.”
8.Towards the end of 2009, after discovering that the Chinese security services had been hacking into Google services for allegedly stealing personal data of Chinese using Google services, the Google management in the US decided not to accept any longer Chinese demands for censorship and to close down the services of Google.cn .
9.China responded firmly to Google’s decision not to accept any more censorship on its google.cn search engine and its threat to review and, if left with no other alternative, to close down its operations in China if the censorship and the alleged State-sponsored web snooping continued.
10.The Chinese response was to reiterate the right of the State to impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of security and stability while avoiding any statement or action that might result in a break with Google, which could be bad for the international image of the country. At the same time, the Chinese ruled out any major change in their Internet security policy just because of the threat held out by Google.
11.Jiang Yu, a spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said that China’s policy would continue to be one of encouragement of an open Internet under proper regulations. She added: “The Internet is open in China, where the Government always encourages its development and has created a favorable environment for its healthy development. China, like other countries, will regulate the Internet industry in line with the law. China welcomes international Internet companies to conduct business within the country according to law."
12.In a statement on its official blog site, David Drummond , Google's corporate development and chief legal officer, said that the company intended to "review the feasibility of our business operations in China." According to him, its disputes with the Chinese Government and unidentified attacks targeting Google's services in China forced the company to make the review and possibly to "shut down Google.cn" and potentially its China offices.
13.While reiterating the right of the State to impose reasonable restrictions, the Chinese authorities strongly denied that Governmental agencies had any hand in cyber attacks on Google. The spokesperson of the Foreign Office pointed out that Chinese laws "prohibit hacker attacks in any form."
14.Wang Chen, Director of China's State Council Information Office, said on January 14,2010, in an interview to the “People’s Daily”: “China firmly opposes cyber attacks because China itself is a victim of such attacks. Every country needs to effectively regulate the Internet and to make sure their own problems on the web do not affect other countries. Internet security has become a significant problem that does not only involve China but also other countries."
15.Comments made by Chinese non-governmental analysts and Internet users made two points. Firstly, the decision of the Google’s executives to review the continuance of its operations in China appeared to have been triggered off by its failure to make a commercial breakthrough in China after nearly four years of its operations in China and by its inability to face the competition of Chinese search engines, which continued to enjoy a monopoly of the Chinese market. Instead of admitting its commercial inadequacies, it was trying to blame the alleged web censorship and snooping for its decision to review its future operations. They accused Google of looking for moral scapegoats to cover up its commercial failure. In this connection, they pointed out that the so-called censorship regulations were there even in 2006 when Google entered the Chinese market. It did not find anything morally wrong with them at that time, but after its failure to break through in the local market, it started talking of morality issues by making a hue and cry over censorship after having informally accepted censorship for nearly four years.
16. Secondly, they alleged that Google was guilty of double standards. They pointed out that there were regulations in the US prohibiting access to children to pornographic sites. Similarly, after 9/11, to prevent terrorists from having access to pictures and other information which could be useful for planning a terrorist strike, the US Government had been asking Google to remove certain photographs and other materials from the web. Google found nothing wrong in such requests or instructions emanating from the US security agencies and carried out their wishes, but when Chinese agencies issued similar instructions they were accused of coming in the way of the free use of the Internet.
17.The Chinese were hoping that ultimately Google would realise that it had over-reacted to the difficulties faced by it in China and would decide to continue its operations in China in its long-term business interests. However, if Google stuck to its threat and decided to wind up its operations after the proposed review, the Chinese were prepared to face it. They made it clear to Google that they would not be intimidated by its threats to close down its operations in China. They were confident that any decision of Google to wind up would not have any impact on China’s relations with the US and on the confidence of international companies in the business environment in China.
18.Both Google and Beijing started looking for a face-saving patch-up, which could enable Google to stay on in China if Beijing promised to undertake a review of its Internet censorship and security regulations, if not immediately, at least in the foreseeable future.
19.This was evident from the statements and comments that emanated from both sides. A spokesperson of Google was reported to have told the Bloomberg news agency on January 16, 2010, that it was operating business as usual in China, was still censoring search results on google.cn and its employees in China were still going to work. The Reuters news agency quoted Google's China office as saying that it would hold talks with the Chinese Government over the next few weeks.
20.The "Global Times", published by the party-owned "People's Daily" group, quoted Google as saying that its planned retreat from China was limited to google.cn, hinting that other services such as android phones and Gmail would not be affected. The "Global Times" further said: "A spokesman of the Google company who declined to be named said that Chinese users will possibly be able to continue using the search engine in Chinese through Google.com. "The only thing we have announced is this: We will be talking to the Chinese authorities about the possibility of operating an uncensored search service within China. If it is impossible to operate an uncensored service within the law, we will close Google.cn," said the spokesman. "We will obviously continue to offer Chinese-language search on our global search engine. Beyond that, we are making no announcements on any other aspect of our business."
21.An article carried by the "Global Times" on January 17, 2010, under the title "Google-China split would be loss for both sides" said: "Google CEO Eric Schmidt had a famous "5,000-year plan" for China, "We will take a long-term view to win in China. The Chinese have 5,000 years of history. Google has 5,000 years of patience in China." Yet Schmidt's promised patience for developing in China seems to be fading away now. The company's "threat" to pull out of China amid concerns over censorship and cyber attacks has shocked the world and brought down Google's share price by 1.3 per cent. The price dip reflects investors' worries over a huge potential business loss from the parting of ways. With its roughly 33.2 per cent share of China's $1 billion search market in 2009, Google's possible exit would signal that it is giving up a booming Chinese market with 350 million Web surfers. Its strategic loss would be greater than its business loss. While other search engines, Chinese and foreign, would predictably grab a slice of the business abandoned by Google, the Internet giant's inability to localize and tackle difficulties in China would be an incalculable loss to its long-term commitment to innovation. Google's "New approach to China," as spelled out in the title of its recent statement, would do no good to China, either. Should the world's most populous nation fail to provide a foothold to the world's top search engine, it would imply a setback to China and serious loss to China's Net culture. The information highway demands not only safe driving but also free flow of traffic. And, in the interests of the majority's right to know, free flow of information should take precedence in a civil society. In a transitional society like China, the existence of censorship can be justified, as allowing full play to multifarious and disorderly search results poses unprecedented risks to vulnerable netizens and social stability. But the Government must face up to the challenge of where and how to put the checkpoints on the highway. A sensitive and shrewd Government should have the vision and savvy to place the right kind of checkpoints at the right place and at the right time for ensuring the free flow of highway traffic as much as possible in the public interest. When Google entered China's market about five years ago, it named itself "Gu Ge" (Grain Song) in Chinese. Google and China going their separate ways would hurt both sides. Let the song of sowing and expectation continue to be heard in China, for a win-win situation. "
22.In an editorial on the subject the next day, the "Global Times" said: "The world's top search engine needs to reflect on why it is lagging behind a local rival in China and why it is not getting as much support from Chinese Web users as it had expected. .....Technology and business should not be affected by political interests and diplomatic concerns. Though Chinese people have called for further steps to be taken by the Government to ensure free flow of information, it is always in their interest to have any foreign company operating in China abide by Chinese laws. Certainly, Google cannot be an exception. A split between Google and China will hurt both sides. And the Internet giant would lose further ground among its supporters if it is made a political football. Conciliatory negotiation may help in solving any issue. The West's arrogance will not work."
23.Apparently, Google decided to close down its google.cn services due to the increasing censorship demands from the Chinese authorities, but to continue its other services. The conditions under which it took this decision were not made public. In the meanwhile, Lee was reported to have quit as the head of the google.cn office in China.
24.In March,2011, reports started circulating that G Mail too was facing difficulties due to alleged interference by the Chinese security agencies. In a press statement on March 21,2011, on difficulties allegedly faced by G Mail subscribers in China, Google said: “There is no technical issue on our side; we have checked extensively. This is a government blockage carefully designed to look like the problem is with Gmail.”
25.In its blog, Google also spoke of “politically motivated” attacks against users. It said: “We’ve noticed some highly targeted and apparently politically motivated attacks against our users. We believe activists may have been a specific target. We’ve also seen attacks against users of another popular social site.”
26.A report published by the “Wall Street Journal” on June 2,2011, indicated continued interference with G Mail services in China from sources allegedly associated with the People’s Liberation Army”.
27.The WSJ report said: “The city of Jinan, which Google described as the origin of the latest attack, sits 400 kilometers south of Beijing and is important technologically and militarily. Jinan houses the headquarters of one of China's eight regional military commands and is home to one of the PLA's technical reconnaissance bureaus. The bureaus serve as arms of China's equivalent to the U.S. National Security Agency, according to a 2009 report from a committee created by Congress to study China.”
28.The WSJ allegations have been denied by the Chinese authorities.
29. The position seems to be as follows: Google was operating two search engines for its users in China. Google.cn was using a server based in China. Google.com was using a server based in the US. From the beginning of its operations in China in 2006, Google was rejecting censorship demands relating to google.com, but informally complying with censorship demands relating to google.cn. When the Chinese censorship demands on google.cn increased and when the Chinese also started demanding censorship of the results of google.com, it decided to transfer google.cn to Hong Kong and to continue to reject censorship of google.com.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
July 19,2005: Kai-Fu Lee, a well-known Chinese computer expert working for Microsoft in the US, crossed over into Google to help it establish an office in China---reportedly on an annual salary of US $ 13 million. Lee announced his switch-over in his Chinese language web site as follows: “I choose Google. I choose China.” Microsoft filed a suit against Lee. The court ruled on September 13,2005, that while Lee could not share with Google the information acquired by him while serving in Microsoft, there would be no bar to his helping Google in setting up a presence in China. Under a compromise reached by Google and Microsoft in 2006, the latter agreed to lift restrictions imposed by it on Lee.
2.January 27,2006:Google’s China service called Google.cn was launched. Lee, who headed the office, helped Google in recruiting a large number of Chinese computer experts. It was reported at that time that in return for the Chinese permission to open its services in China, Google had agreed that it would abide by the rules of censorship laid down by the Chinese Government. Soon after Google.cn started functioning, frictions allegedly developed in its interactions with the Chinese authorities.
3.The “Fortune” magazine (April 15,2011) reported in a special article on Google in China as follows: “ Google had hoped that its decision to create a search engine in the .cn domain -- one that followed government rules of censorship -- would lead to a level playing field. But even as Google rolled out its .cn web address, there were indications that its compromise would not satisfy the Chinese government. Unexplained outages still occurred. (Meanwhile, Google's competitor Baidu seemed to hum along unscathed.) And not long after Google got its operating license in December 2005, the Chinese declared that the license was no longer valid, charging that it wasn't clear whether Google's activities made it an Internet service or a news portal. (Foreigners could not operate the latter.) Google then began a year-and-a-half-long negotiation to restore the license.”
4. In June 2007, the Chinese Government restored Google’s operating license. Neither the Chinese authorities nor Google shared with the public information regarding the conditions, if any, under which its licence was restored. Had Google agreed to continue to abide by Chinese internet censorship rules?
5.In the meanwhile, allegations started surfacing that Google’s management trusted its American employees more than its Chinese employees. It became apparent that Google recruited Lee to make use of his China knowledge and contacts, but did not allow him an unrestricted role in operational management. He was allegedly a glorified head subject to back-seat driving by Americans enjoying the confidence of the Google management in the US.
6. To quote from the “Fortune” article on how Google was coping with increasing Chinese demands for censorship: “A demand would come from a government ministry to take down 10 items; Google would typically take down seven and hope that the compromise resolved the matter. Sometimes after a few days or weeks Google would quietly restore links it had censored. Every five months Google's policy-review committee in China would meet to make sure it was filtering the minimum it could possibly get away with.”
7.“Fortune” added: “For all the progress, some Google executives were beginning to think that its great China compromise wasn't working. A turning point came in 2008, the year China hosted the Olympics. In the run-up to its turn in the international spotlight, China apparently decided to increase its restrictions. It demanded that in addition to censoring the .cn results, Google purge objectionable links from the Chinese-language version of Google.com. That, of course, was unacceptable to Google -- it would mean that it was acting as an agent of repression for Chinese-speaking people all over the world, including in the U.S. Other search engines, including Microsoft's, agreed to such demands. But Google stalled, hoping that after the Olympics the Chinese would back off. They did not. The demands for censorship became broader and more frequent.”
8.Towards the end of 2009, after discovering that the Chinese security services had been hacking into Google services for allegedly stealing personal data of Chinese using Google services, the Google management in the US decided not to accept any longer Chinese demands for censorship and to close down the services of Google.cn .
9.China responded firmly to Google’s decision not to accept any more censorship on its google.cn search engine and its threat to review and, if left with no other alternative, to close down its operations in China if the censorship and the alleged State-sponsored web snooping continued.
10.The Chinese response was to reiterate the right of the State to impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of security and stability while avoiding any statement or action that might result in a break with Google, which could be bad for the international image of the country. At the same time, the Chinese ruled out any major change in their Internet security policy just because of the threat held out by Google.
11.Jiang Yu, a spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said that China’s policy would continue to be one of encouragement of an open Internet under proper regulations. She added: “The Internet is open in China, where the Government always encourages its development and has created a favorable environment for its healthy development. China, like other countries, will regulate the Internet industry in line with the law. China welcomes international Internet companies to conduct business within the country according to law."
12.In a statement on its official blog site, David Drummond , Google's corporate development and chief legal officer, said that the company intended to "review the feasibility of our business operations in China." According to him, its disputes with the Chinese Government and unidentified attacks targeting Google's services in China forced the company to make the review and possibly to "shut down Google.cn" and potentially its China offices.
13.While reiterating the right of the State to impose reasonable restrictions, the Chinese authorities strongly denied that Governmental agencies had any hand in cyber attacks on Google. The spokesperson of the Foreign Office pointed out that Chinese laws "prohibit hacker attacks in any form."
14.Wang Chen, Director of China's State Council Information Office, said on January 14,2010, in an interview to the “People’s Daily”: “China firmly opposes cyber attacks because China itself is a victim of such attacks. Every country needs to effectively regulate the Internet and to make sure their own problems on the web do not affect other countries. Internet security has become a significant problem that does not only involve China but also other countries."
15.Comments made by Chinese non-governmental analysts and Internet users made two points. Firstly, the decision of the Google’s executives to review the continuance of its operations in China appeared to have been triggered off by its failure to make a commercial breakthrough in China after nearly four years of its operations in China and by its inability to face the competition of Chinese search engines, which continued to enjoy a monopoly of the Chinese market. Instead of admitting its commercial inadequacies, it was trying to blame the alleged web censorship and snooping for its decision to review its future operations. They accused Google of looking for moral scapegoats to cover up its commercial failure. In this connection, they pointed out that the so-called censorship regulations were there even in 2006 when Google entered the Chinese market. It did not find anything morally wrong with them at that time, but after its failure to break through in the local market, it started talking of morality issues by making a hue and cry over censorship after having informally accepted censorship for nearly four years.
16. Secondly, they alleged that Google was guilty of double standards. They pointed out that there were regulations in the US prohibiting access to children to pornographic sites. Similarly, after 9/11, to prevent terrorists from having access to pictures and other information which could be useful for planning a terrorist strike, the US Government had been asking Google to remove certain photographs and other materials from the web. Google found nothing wrong in such requests or instructions emanating from the US security agencies and carried out their wishes, but when Chinese agencies issued similar instructions they were accused of coming in the way of the free use of the Internet.
17.The Chinese were hoping that ultimately Google would realise that it had over-reacted to the difficulties faced by it in China and would decide to continue its operations in China in its long-term business interests. However, if Google stuck to its threat and decided to wind up its operations after the proposed review, the Chinese were prepared to face it. They made it clear to Google that they would not be intimidated by its threats to close down its operations in China. They were confident that any decision of Google to wind up would not have any impact on China’s relations with the US and on the confidence of international companies in the business environment in China.
18.Both Google and Beijing started looking for a face-saving patch-up, which could enable Google to stay on in China if Beijing promised to undertake a review of its Internet censorship and security regulations, if not immediately, at least in the foreseeable future.
19.This was evident from the statements and comments that emanated from both sides. A spokesperson of Google was reported to have told the Bloomberg news agency on January 16, 2010, that it was operating business as usual in China, was still censoring search results on google.cn and its employees in China were still going to work. The Reuters news agency quoted Google's China office as saying that it would hold talks with the Chinese Government over the next few weeks.
20.The "Global Times", published by the party-owned "People's Daily" group, quoted Google as saying that its planned retreat from China was limited to google.cn, hinting that other services such as android phones and Gmail would not be affected. The "Global Times" further said: "A spokesman of the Google company who declined to be named said that Chinese users will possibly be able to continue using the search engine in Chinese through Google.com. "The only thing we have announced is this: We will be talking to the Chinese authorities about the possibility of operating an uncensored search service within China. If it is impossible to operate an uncensored service within the law, we will close Google.cn," said the spokesman. "We will obviously continue to offer Chinese-language search on our global search engine. Beyond that, we are making no announcements on any other aspect of our business."
21.An article carried by the "Global Times" on January 17, 2010, under the title "Google-China split would be loss for both sides" said: "Google CEO Eric Schmidt had a famous "5,000-year plan" for China, "We will take a long-term view to win in China. The Chinese have 5,000 years of history. Google has 5,000 years of patience in China." Yet Schmidt's promised patience for developing in China seems to be fading away now. The company's "threat" to pull out of China amid concerns over censorship and cyber attacks has shocked the world and brought down Google's share price by 1.3 per cent. The price dip reflects investors' worries over a huge potential business loss from the parting of ways. With its roughly 33.2 per cent share of China's $1 billion search market in 2009, Google's possible exit would signal that it is giving up a booming Chinese market with 350 million Web surfers. Its strategic loss would be greater than its business loss. While other search engines, Chinese and foreign, would predictably grab a slice of the business abandoned by Google, the Internet giant's inability to localize and tackle difficulties in China would be an incalculable loss to its long-term commitment to innovation. Google's "New approach to China," as spelled out in the title of its recent statement, would do no good to China, either. Should the world's most populous nation fail to provide a foothold to the world's top search engine, it would imply a setback to China and serious loss to China's Net culture. The information highway demands not only safe driving but also free flow of traffic. And, in the interests of the majority's right to know, free flow of information should take precedence in a civil society. In a transitional society like China, the existence of censorship can be justified, as allowing full play to multifarious and disorderly search results poses unprecedented risks to vulnerable netizens and social stability. But the Government must face up to the challenge of where and how to put the checkpoints on the highway. A sensitive and shrewd Government should have the vision and savvy to place the right kind of checkpoints at the right place and at the right time for ensuring the free flow of highway traffic as much as possible in the public interest. When Google entered China's market about five years ago, it named itself "Gu Ge" (Grain Song) in Chinese. Google and China going their separate ways would hurt both sides. Let the song of sowing and expectation continue to be heard in China, for a win-win situation. "
22.In an editorial on the subject the next day, the "Global Times" said: "The world's top search engine needs to reflect on why it is lagging behind a local rival in China and why it is not getting as much support from Chinese Web users as it had expected. .....Technology and business should not be affected by political interests and diplomatic concerns. Though Chinese people have called for further steps to be taken by the Government to ensure free flow of information, it is always in their interest to have any foreign company operating in China abide by Chinese laws. Certainly, Google cannot be an exception. A split between Google and China will hurt both sides. And the Internet giant would lose further ground among its supporters if it is made a political football. Conciliatory negotiation may help in solving any issue. The West's arrogance will not work."
23.Apparently, Google decided to close down its google.cn services due to the increasing censorship demands from the Chinese authorities, but to continue its other services. The conditions under which it took this decision were not made public. In the meanwhile, Lee was reported to have quit as the head of the google.cn office in China.
24.In March,2011, reports started circulating that G Mail too was facing difficulties due to alleged interference by the Chinese security agencies. In a press statement on March 21,2011, on difficulties allegedly faced by G Mail subscribers in China, Google said: “There is no technical issue on our side; we have checked extensively. This is a government blockage carefully designed to look like the problem is with Gmail.”
25.In its blog, Google also spoke of “politically motivated” attacks against users. It said: “We’ve noticed some highly targeted and apparently politically motivated attacks against our users. We believe activists may have been a specific target. We’ve also seen attacks against users of another popular social site.”
26.A report published by the “Wall Street Journal” on June 2,2011, indicated continued interference with G Mail services in China from sources allegedly associated with the People’s Liberation Army”.
27.The WSJ report said: “The city of Jinan, which Google described as the origin of the latest attack, sits 400 kilometers south of Beijing and is important technologically and militarily. Jinan houses the headquarters of one of China's eight regional military commands and is home to one of the PLA's technical reconnaissance bureaus. The bureaus serve as arms of China's equivalent to the U.S. National Security Agency, according to a 2009 report from a committee created by Congress to study China.”
28.The WSJ allegations have been denied by the Chinese authorities.
29. The position seems to be as follows: Google was operating two search engines for its users in China. Google.cn was using a server based in China. Google.com was using a server based in the US. From the beginning of its operations in China in 2006, Google was rejecting censorship demands relating to google.com, but informally complying with censorship demands relating to google.cn. When the Chinese censorship demands on google.cn increased and when the Chinese also started demanding censorship of the results of google.com, it decided to transfer google.cn to Hong Kong and to continue to reject censorship of google.com.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Sunday, December 11, 2011
NATION IN CRISIS: OPEN LETTER TO SHRI PRANAB MUKHERJEE
B.RAMAN
Dear Shri Mukherjee,
The nation is in a very serious crisis the like of which we had not seen before since we became independent in 1947.
2.As someone who had served in the Government of India for 27 years under Indira Gandhi, Morarji Desai, Charan Singh,Indira Gandhi again, Rajiv Gandhi, V.P.Singh, Chandra Sekhar and Narasimha Rao, I feel concerned over the depressing state of affairs marked by perceptions of uncontrolled corruption, policy mismanagement, inept governance and a total lack of political and administrative acumen at all levels of the political leadership and the bureaucracy.
3. My depression is rendered even more acute by the intellectual sclerosis that seems to prevail in Governmental and political circles in New Delhi marked by utter insensitivity to people’s anger and incomprehension of the implications of the dangerous drift leading the nation towards a precipice with no return.
4. The youth of the nation is totally alienated. There is no inspiring, wise leadership that can give them cause for hope for the future.
5.A nation without hope is a nation without a future. Nothing illustrates more dramatically and more shockingly the total lack of leadership and wisdom than the manner in which the political leadership has dealt with the anticorruption agitation of Anna Hazare, which has wide support among the youth of the country.
6. Instead of understanding and appreciating the depth of public anger reflected in the Anna movement and taking action to mitigate the anger, the political leadership has been playing games with it, making solemn commitments to persuade Anna to break his fast in August and then ignoring those commitments.
7. One embarrassment after another---the 2 G scam, the Commonwealth Games Scam, the mishandling of the appointment of the Central Vigilance Commissioner, the failure to do the political homework before taking the important decision on allowing foreign direct investment in the retail sector etc--- has not only severely damaged the credibility of the Government, but has also earned for it the contempt of large sections of the people.
8. The shocking nonchalance of the Congress leadership in the face of the spreading confusion reminds one of the Bourbon Kings of France before the 1789 Revolution---having had nothing to learn and nothing to forget.
9. This is the time for robust and wise leadership activism. Instead we find a semi-comatose leadership in the party and the Government. The Prime Minister and the Congress leader Mrs.Sonia Gandhi--- instead of acting to dissipate the darkness engulfing the country--- have chosen to live inside a well where others can't see and hear them and they can't see and hear others.
10. There is a total drought of communications between the leadership and the people. Instead of interacting transparently and vigorously with the people, the media, Team Anna and the youth supporting them, Dr.Manmohan Singh and Mrs.Sonia Gandhi have withdrawn into a shell looking over their shoulders suspiciously at each other worrying what the other is up to.
11. Jawaharlal Nehru often used to speak of administering a shock treatment to a nation in crisis. The time for such a shock treatment has come. Only you can---- with your vast political wisdom, courage and experience--- encourage such a shock treatment in the form of a national coalition to deal with the immediate crisis before things get out of hand and pave the way for fresh, premature elections.
12. The citizens of this country with no axe to grind look up to you to lead.
With warm regards,
Yours sincerely,
B.Raman, Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi.
Dear Shri Mukherjee,
The nation is in a very serious crisis the like of which we had not seen before since we became independent in 1947.
2.As someone who had served in the Government of India for 27 years under Indira Gandhi, Morarji Desai, Charan Singh,Indira Gandhi again, Rajiv Gandhi, V.P.Singh, Chandra Sekhar and Narasimha Rao, I feel concerned over the depressing state of affairs marked by perceptions of uncontrolled corruption, policy mismanagement, inept governance and a total lack of political and administrative acumen at all levels of the political leadership and the bureaucracy.
3. My depression is rendered even more acute by the intellectual sclerosis that seems to prevail in Governmental and political circles in New Delhi marked by utter insensitivity to people’s anger and incomprehension of the implications of the dangerous drift leading the nation towards a precipice with no return.
4. The youth of the nation is totally alienated. There is no inspiring, wise leadership that can give them cause for hope for the future.
5.A nation without hope is a nation without a future. Nothing illustrates more dramatically and more shockingly the total lack of leadership and wisdom than the manner in which the political leadership has dealt with the anticorruption agitation of Anna Hazare, which has wide support among the youth of the country.
6. Instead of understanding and appreciating the depth of public anger reflected in the Anna movement and taking action to mitigate the anger, the political leadership has been playing games with it, making solemn commitments to persuade Anna to break his fast in August and then ignoring those commitments.
7. One embarrassment after another---the 2 G scam, the Commonwealth Games Scam, the mishandling of the appointment of the Central Vigilance Commissioner, the failure to do the political homework before taking the important decision on allowing foreign direct investment in the retail sector etc--- has not only severely damaged the credibility of the Government, but has also earned for it the contempt of large sections of the people.
8. The shocking nonchalance of the Congress leadership in the face of the spreading confusion reminds one of the Bourbon Kings of France before the 1789 Revolution---having had nothing to learn and nothing to forget.
9. This is the time for robust and wise leadership activism. Instead we find a semi-comatose leadership in the party and the Government. The Prime Minister and the Congress leader Mrs.Sonia Gandhi--- instead of acting to dissipate the darkness engulfing the country--- have chosen to live inside a well where others can't see and hear them and they can't see and hear others.
10. There is a total drought of communications between the leadership and the people. Instead of interacting transparently and vigorously with the people, the media, Team Anna and the youth supporting them, Dr.Manmohan Singh and Mrs.Sonia Gandhi have withdrawn into a shell looking over their shoulders suspiciously at each other worrying what the other is up to.
11. Jawaharlal Nehru often used to speak of administering a shock treatment to a nation in crisis. The time for such a shock treatment has come. Only you can---- with your vast political wisdom, courage and experience--- encourage such a shock treatment in the form of a national coalition to deal with the immediate crisis before things get out of hand and pave the way for fresh, premature elections.
12. The citizens of this country with no axe to grind look up to you to lead.
With warm regards,
Yours sincerely,
B.Raman, Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi.
Saturday, December 10, 2011
CHINA’S STATE-SPONSORED TWEETERS & THEIR PAID TWEETS
B.RAMAN
On December 9,2011, Radio Free Asia, funded by the US State Department, disseminated a report attributed to the Agence France Presse (AFP) regarding how China has been trying to counter criticism of the State and the Communist Party of China and spread of undesirable “rumours” through the Internet by micro-bloggers and other netizens.
2. The text of the AFP report as disseminated by the Radio station is given below:
China's Online Propagandists Revealed
A pair of leaked receipts from a university in northwestern China that apparently shows the pay given to government-backed Internet commentators, known as the "50 cent army," has been circulating among netizens this week.
Sealed with the official stamp of "The Party Committee Propaganda Department of the Northwestern Polytechnic University of the Chinese Communist Party," the receipts confirm that money was paid to "Internet commentators."
An employee who answered the phone at the Xian-based university confirmed that such a job exists on campus.
"You mean a propaganda specialist," he said, when asked if there was such a job as "Internet commentator" at the college.
But he said he didn't know much about the job, and supplied a second phone number for more information.
The employee who answered this number also confirmed the job exists.
"Of course we do," he said. "The job is to write news ... for example, they might use their knowledge of scholarly articles."
"With editorial input from the team, they can produce something of great value," he said.
However, he hung up when pressed for further details.
China is stepping up media training for its officials, as well as an army of freelance commentators paid to direct public debate online, known as the "50 cent army," according to official media reports in recent months.
A news report from local television station, Hubei Xishui TV, said local officials from the Xishui county propaganda department had held training exercises for official spokespersons and "Internet commentators."
Media training courses for commentators and government officials include tips on how to influence coverage by the country's biggest news organizations, as well as numerous methods of using the Internet and social media to spread the government's message.
Internet commentators are expected to report "the truth" as fast as possible, to supplement their information with explanations for events, and to influence Internet debate in the "correct" direction, reports have said.
Veteran bloggers and online activists say that a typical workday for a 50-center would involve watching forum posts, microblog posts, and chatrooms for topics linked to a specific keyword allocated by their managers.
How much they are paid depends on the number of comments, tweets, and posts they make that steer the debate in the government's preferred direction.
According to the receipts currently circulating, which had the personal details of the 50-centers obscured, two commentaries were paid for by the university, one at 20 yuan, and one at 30 yuan.
The world of the government-backed online commentators is shadowy, with ordinary netizens left to infer how they operate from their behavior online or from the occasional leaked document.
Earlier this year, the news website Canyu leaked a document titled "Internal Work Handbook" allegedly written for 50-centers.
In it, hired commentators are instructed to track down the source of any online "rumors," and then to order the website that first posted it to delete the offending item.
One Chinese student who declined to be named said he had once written articles for the government online, to earn a little extra money.
"I saw that my classmates were doing it as well, and I didn't think anything of it," he said. "I didn't know that we were the so-called '50 cent army.'"
"I didn't really understand what I was doing, and I was somewhat lacking in values," he said. "Now I deeply regret going out to bat for them with comments like that."
He said he was able to earn around 100-120 yuan a month writing the articles.
Chinese Internet expert Li Li said that while the 50 cent army appears to be growing in numbers, their effectiveness is limited.
"If you do a lot of bad things, you will lose credibility ... and eventually no one will believe anything you say," Li said.
"Then there will be a backlash; everyone will know who the 50 cent army are, and the government's credibility will be at its lowest possible level."
Blogger Wen Yunchao, known by his online nickname Beifeng, said most netizens adopted a policy of ignoring 50-centers.
"We pretend we don't hear or see them," he said. "We treat them as if they weren't there, and never give any kind of reaction."
"This makes them much less effective."
On December 9,2011, Radio Free Asia, funded by the US State Department, disseminated a report attributed to the Agence France Presse (AFP) regarding how China has been trying to counter criticism of the State and the Communist Party of China and spread of undesirable “rumours” through the Internet by micro-bloggers and other netizens.
2. The text of the AFP report as disseminated by the Radio station is given below:
China's Online Propagandists Revealed
A pair of leaked receipts from a university in northwestern China that apparently shows the pay given to government-backed Internet commentators, known as the "50 cent army," has been circulating among netizens this week.
Sealed with the official stamp of "The Party Committee Propaganda Department of the Northwestern Polytechnic University of the Chinese Communist Party," the receipts confirm that money was paid to "Internet commentators."
An employee who answered the phone at the Xian-based university confirmed that such a job exists on campus.
"You mean a propaganda specialist," he said, when asked if there was such a job as "Internet commentator" at the college.
But he said he didn't know much about the job, and supplied a second phone number for more information.
The employee who answered this number also confirmed the job exists.
"Of course we do," he said. "The job is to write news ... for example, they might use their knowledge of scholarly articles."
"With editorial input from the team, they can produce something of great value," he said.
However, he hung up when pressed for further details.
China is stepping up media training for its officials, as well as an army of freelance commentators paid to direct public debate online, known as the "50 cent army," according to official media reports in recent months.
A news report from local television station, Hubei Xishui TV, said local officials from the Xishui county propaganda department had held training exercises for official spokespersons and "Internet commentators."
Media training courses for commentators and government officials include tips on how to influence coverage by the country's biggest news organizations, as well as numerous methods of using the Internet and social media to spread the government's message.
Internet commentators are expected to report "the truth" as fast as possible, to supplement their information with explanations for events, and to influence Internet debate in the "correct" direction, reports have said.
Veteran bloggers and online activists say that a typical workday for a 50-center would involve watching forum posts, microblog posts, and chatrooms for topics linked to a specific keyword allocated by their managers.
How much they are paid depends on the number of comments, tweets, and posts they make that steer the debate in the government's preferred direction.
According to the receipts currently circulating, which had the personal details of the 50-centers obscured, two commentaries were paid for by the university, one at 20 yuan, and one at 30 yuan.
The world of the government-backed online commentators is shadowy, with ordinary netizens left to infer how they operate from their behavior online or from the occasional leaked document.
Earlier this year, the news website Canyu leaked a document titled "Internal Work Handbook" allegedly written for 50-centers.
In it, hired commentators are instructed to track down the source of any online "rumors," and then to order the website that first posted it to delete the offending item.
One Chinese student who declined to be named said he had once written articles for the government online, to earn a little extra money.
"I saw that my classmates were doing it as well, and I didn't think anything of it," he said. "I didn't know that we were the so-called '50 cent army.'"
"I didn't really understand what I was doing, and I was somewhat lacking in values," he said. "Now I deeply regret going out to bat for them with comments like that."
He said he was able to earn around 100-120 yuan a month writing the articles.
Chinese Internet expert Li Li said that while the 50 cent army appears to be growing in numbers, their effectiveness is limited.
"If you do a lot of bad things, you will lose credibility ... and eventually no one will believe anything you say," Li said.
"Then there will be a backlash; everyone will know who the 50 cent army are, and the government's credibility will be at its lowest possible level."
Blogger Wen Yunchao, known by his online nickname Beifeng, said most netizens adopted a policy of ignoring 50-centers.
"We pretend we don't hear or see them," he said. "We treat them as if they weren't there, and never give any kind of reaction."
"This makes them much less effective."
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