B.RAMAN
Slowly and steadily, the Army-propped civilian regime in Myanmar headed by President Thein Sein and Aung San Suu Kyi, the democracy icon, are coming to terms with each other to avoid a confrontation and to pave the way for a Government, which would enjoy her support from outside, if not association, and thereby enjoy a greater credibility in the eyes of the people.
2. The Government has not imposed any restrictions on her travels outside Yangon. Despite this, she has been avoiding any travels, in an attempt not to create any embarrassing law and order situation for the Government. The change ---whether in her tactics or attitude to the Government--- figured in a question posed to her during her weekly radio interview on November 8,2011.Her reply was interesting.
3.She said: “ I would like to clarify that it is not true that I have made trips around the country whenever I was released from house arrest. In 1995 and in 2000, when I was released for the second time, I never made trips around the country, because of restrictions. Between 2002 and 2003, I did make trips around the country. But this time, since my trip to Pegu, although I have thought about making trips around the country I have been unable to do so because there is a lot of work to be done in Rangoon. Plans have already been made for the NLD to distribute rice to the flood victims as much as possible. I think that it would be better to distribute rice in this manner than to spend money to travel across the country.”
4. Similarly, questions are being asked by sections of the people as to why she is not opposing the construction of the gas pipeline from the Arakan area to Yunnan in China. She had strongly opposed on environmental grounds the construction of a big hydel project by a Chinese company in the Kachin State. Her opposition combined with the opposition from the Kachin leaders and people forced the Government to suspend the project, leading to protests from Beijing.
5. The gas pipeline project too is being opposed by the local people on various grounds such as payment of inadequate compensation for the land acquired for the project , taking the gas away to China instead of utilising it for the benefit of the local people and environmental damage. Despite this, she has not been as active in opposing the gas pipeline project in the Arakan area as she was in opposing the hydel project in the Kachin State.
6.She was asked about it during her weekly radio interview of October 28. In another interesting reply, she said: “Although one cannot say that a nationwide boycott (of the pipeline project) could not happen, I don’t think it would be easy. But it is necessary for the whole country, including the government, to be aware of matters that are really giving trouble to the people. Only then will we be able to find solutions to such issues. However, while we are protecting the interests of the people, we must at the same time be aware of—and take care to maintain—good relations with our neighbouring countries.”
7. The gas pipeline being constructed is more important to the Chinese than the suspended hydel project. It is designed to carry not only gas found locally, but also gas brought from the Gulf by Chinese tankers in order to reduce the Chinese dependence on the Malacca Strait. Suu Kyi has been avoiding any opposition to the gas pipeline project lest it add to the difficulties already being faced by the Government in its relations with China after the suspension of the hydel project.
8. In carefully calibrated steps, she and the Government have been trying to pave the way for her election to the Parliament, which seems to be the present priority of both. An amendment to the law on political parties, endorsed by President Thein Sein on November 4, removed the condition that all parties must agree to "preserve" the country's 2008 constitution.
9.In a significant interview to the “Yangon Times”, Khin Aung Myint, the Speaker of the Parliament, who used to be the Director of Public Relations and PSYWAR in the Ministry of Defence, was quoted as saying: “I recognize the result of the 1990 election, which the NLD won with a vast majority of the votes. The results cannot be reversed and I have no intention to do so.”
10.On November 8, a spokesman of her party the National League For Democracy (NLD) announced after a meeting at her residence in Yangon that more than 100 senior members of the party would meet at Yangon on November 18 to decide whether, in view of the change introduced by the Government, the NLD should re-register itself as a political party. Though he did not say so, its re-registration would make it, including Suu Kyi, eligible to stand for election to the Parliament. The speculation is that there is already an unwritten understanding between her and the President that a bye-election would be held before the year-end in which she could be elected.
11. What one has been seeing is a recognition of the victory of her Party in the 1990 elections by the Government. In return, she has agreed not to question the validity of last year’s elections to the present Parliament under the supervision of the Army. The NLD has apparently agreed to end its boycott of the present Parliament and the Government has agreed to pave the way for the election of some NLD leaders, including Suu Kyi, to the Parliament.
12. What then: Will Suu Kyi and her party work from outside the Government or will they join the Government? An answer to this question is not yet available. She said in her November 8 radio interview: “If the people are active and enthusiastic, the government will also become active and the country will develop. If all of you are active in this manner, the road toward political change will be smooth, and our cooperation will be more effective.”
13. Co-operation and national reconciliation and not political confrontation seems to be her objective. As part of this, she is prepared not to create any more difficulties for the Government in Myanmar’s relations with China. It is clear that she does not want to support the movement of the people of the Arakan region against the Chinese gas pipeline to Yunnan and the construction of a modern port at Kyaukpu to transport gas brought by Chinese tankers from the Gulf to Yunnan. (12-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Friday, November 11, 2011
Thursday, November 10, 2011
INDIA-PAKISTAN : MOVING FORWARD
B.RAMAN
This may please be read in continuation of the following articles of mine bearing on the same subject:
(a). My paper of March 15, 2011, titled "Is it Possible to Visualise A Shared Future for India & Pakistan?" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers44/paper4380.html
(b).Article of March 31,2011, titled “India-Pakistan: Re-Discovering Each Other” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers45/paper4402.html
( c ).Article of June 27,2011, titled “Introspection in Pakistan: Will it Endure?” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers46/paper4572.html
(d). Article of July 9,2011, titled “INDIA-PAKISTAN: LEARNING TO LIKE EACH OTHER” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers46/paper4591.html
( e ). Article of July 27,2011, titled “INDIA-PAKISTAN: A Breath of Fresh Air” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers47/paper4625.html
(f ).Article of October 24,2011, titled “Chopper Release Speaks Well of Gen. Kayani” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers48/paper4745.html
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
During his visit to Pakistan in December,1996, Mr. Jiang Zemin, the then Chinese President, made a speech titled "CARRYING FORWARD GENERATIONS OF FRIENDLY AND GOOD-NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND ENDEAVORING TOWARDS A BETTER TOMORROW FOR ALL" in Islamabad on December 2, 1996.
2.He highlighted five points which, according to him, governed China's foreign policy towards the South Asian countries. He explained one of these points in the following words: "We should look at the differences or disputes from a long perspective, seeking a just and reasonable settlement through consultations and negotiations while bearing in mind the larger picture. If certain issues cannot be resolved for the time being, they may be shelved temporarily so that they will not affect the normal state-to-state relations."
3.Even though he did not make any specific reference to India or Pakistan, his highlighting this point was widely interpreted in Pakistan as a hint to it that it should emulate China, which has not allowed its long-standing border dispute with India to come in the way of the development of economic and other relations between the countries. It was seen as an advice to Pakistan that while negotiating with India on the Kashmir issue, it should not allow it to come in the way of normal economic and other relations with India.
4.Ever since Pakistan became independent in 1947, successive Governments have been following a policy of not agreeing to a normalisation of trade relations with India till the so-called Kashmir dispute was resolved to mutual satisfaction. While the Pakistani authorities always cited the pending Kashmir issue as standing in the way of normal trade relations, another reason was their fear that their industries might not be able to compete with their Indian counterparts if trade was normalised.
5.It was reported at that time that Mr. Jiang had raised this point more explicitly with the Pakistani authorities and suggested that Pakistan should emulate China's example by normalising its trade relations with India without allowing them to remain frozen till the Kashmir issue was resolved. They reportedly did not accept his advice.
6.Pakistan's past policy on the question of normalising its trade relations with India consisted of the following:
( a ).Not reciprocating India's action in granting the Most Favoured Nation Status to Pakistan till the Kashmir issue was resolved.
( b ).Allowing a strictly limited bilateral trade only in respect of certain commodities included in a positive list without accepting India's suggestion of having a limited negative list mentioning commodities which cannot be traded and allowing restriction-free trade in respect of all commodities not figuring in the list.
( c ).Not allowing Indian investments in Pakistan.
( d ).Not allowing banks to open branches in each other's territory.
7. Signs of a new thinking in Pakistan on the question of moving towards a normalisation of trade relations with India despite persisting differences on the so-called Kashmir dispute became evident during the third round of the bilateral talks on economic co-operation held by the Commerce Secretaries of the two Governments at New Delhi on August 2 and 3, 2007.
8.The meeting reportedly took a significant decision to work for an increase in the value of the bilateral trade from US $ 1.7 billion as it was in 2006-07 to US $ 10 billion by 2010. Among other important decisions taken were allowing specified banks of the two countries to open branches in each other's territory, expanding the trade basket, improving transportation links, reducing tariffs and mutual technical assistance in capacity building.
9. It became obvious that even while continuing to stick to the stand that there cannot be a normalisation of trade relations till the Kashmir issue is resolved, the Pakistani authorities had started quietly allowing a movement towards a de facto normalisation. De jure restrictions, but de facto normalisation seemed to be the direction in which the bilateral economic relations started moving.
10. This trend towards a normalisation of economic and trade relations between the two countries seemed to have lost momentum after the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, when attitude towards each other became hardened once again. Since the beginning of this year, there are again signs of a thaw despite continuing Indian dissatisfaction over the perceived slowness of the Pakistani authorities in taking action against the Pakistan-based masterminds of the 26/11 terrorist strikes and renewed Pakistani concerns over perceived Indian activism in Afghanistan---which seemed to have moved from the economic to the military field.
11. This thaw became evident during the meeting in March last between Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh and Yousef Raza Gilani at Mohali in Punjab in the margins of the World Cup Cricket semi-final between the teams of the two countries and the subsequent meeting between Foreign Ministers S.M.Krishna and Hina Rabbani Khar at New Delhi in July last.
12. This process of thaw has since resulted in two positive moves by the two countries. The first is the reported decision of the Government of Pakistan to grant the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to India without linking it to the progress in the bilateral talks on the Kashmir issue. The reported decision is yet to be formalised, but what is significant is that there are no signs of any opposition to it from the Pakistani Foreign Office and the Army. In the past it was the opposition from Pakistan’s Foreign Office and the Army that stood in the way of a forward movement on this issue. The economic Ministries of the Government of Pakistan had been in favour of this since 1996 onwards.
13. The lifting of opposition to the grant of the MFN status by the Army is a tentative indication that it has started looking at India through a less hostile prism. It is important to encourage any sign of new thinking in the Pakistani Army by taking the first steps towards building a military-military relationship by inviting Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan’s Chief of the Army Staff, to visit New Delhi at the invitation of his Indian counterpart. I have been advocating this for quite some time and reiterate my continued support for it.
14. The second significant move has come from Dr.Manmohan Singh during his meeting with Mr.Gilani on November 10,2011, in the margins of the SAARC summit in the Maldives. “The Hindu” has reported that Dr.Singh said that India had decided to move towards a Preferential Trade Agreement with Pakistan and a liberal visa regime for Pakistani nationals. His announcements were apparently meant to reassure Pakistan that its decision to grant the MFN status to India would have economic dividends to it.
15. Apart from the Kashmir issue, past Pakistani reluctance to grant the MFN status to India had strong economic reasons too---namely, its fears that the MFN status would be more beneficial to India than to Pakistan and could reduce Pakistan to a position of economic dependence on India. It is important to remove these fears from the mind of Pakistan.
16. Pakistan continues to take a rigid stand on one economic issue of considerable interest to India---- that is, the right of transit through Pakistani territory of Indian goods moving overland to Afghanistan. This rigidity might continue for some time till the fears in the minds of Pakistan regarding the implications of India’s strategic relations with Afghanistan are diluted. We should not allow this to stand in the way of a forward movement in respect of other economic and trade issues.
17. The SAARC summit provided an opportunity for meetings between the Foreign Secretaries, Foreign Ministers and Prime Ministers of the two countries. Even in the absence of any substantive movement on the question of Pakistani action against anti-India terrorists operating from its territory, one is gratified to note the evolution of a new vocabulary between the two countries, which highlights the positive more than the negative and which reflects a budding feel good atmosphere in the relations between the political leaderships and civilian bureaucracies of the two countries.
18.This feel good atmosphere is yet to percolate to the armies and intelligence agencies of the two countries. There are as yet no signs of any dilution in the ranks of the die-hard hawks in the analytical communities of the two countries. It is important to bring the Armies, the intelligence agencies and analytical hawks on board if this feel good trend is to be sustained and strengthened.
19.The only way of doing this is by encouraging greater interactions at different levels. Nothing like personal interactions to reduce suspicion and distrust. In this connection, I reiterate what I wrote after the Mohali meeting between the two Prime Ministers.
20. I wrote as follows: “ To prevent an attempt to derail the "re-engagement" process by elements which are against it, it is important that the "wide-ranging conversations" initiated at Mohali are kept moving forward by the two Prime Ministers by taking an early decision by our Prime Minister on his acceptance of the invitation from Gilani and by quick follow-up on the visits of parliamentary delegations. The goodwill and the benign interest in each other generated by the World Cup cricket semi-final was taken advantage of by our Prime Minister to make the "re-engagement" and "re-connecting" process possible. He should readily accept the reported suggestion of Gilani for a friendly cricket match between the two teams in Pakistan in the near future and visit Pakistan to keep this process of strategic discovery of each other going forward.” (11-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
This may please be read in continuation of the following articles of mine bearing on the same subject:
(a). My paper of March 15, 2011, titled "Is it Possible to Visualise A Shared Future for India & Pakistan?" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers44/paper4380.html
(b).Article of March 31,2011, titled “India-Pakistan: Re-Discovering Each Other” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers45/paper4402.html
( c ).Article of June 27,2011, titled “Introspection in Pakistan: Will it Endure?” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers46/paper4572.html
(d). Article of July 9,2011, titled “INDIA-PAKISTAN: LEARNING TO LIKE EACH OTHER” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers46/paper4591.html
( e ). Article of July 27,2011, titled “INDIA-PAKISTAN: A Breath of Fresh Air” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers47/paper4625.html
(f ).Article of October 24,2011, titled “Chopper Release Speaks Well of Gen. Kayani” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers48/paper4745.html
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
During his visit to Pakistan in December,1996, Mr. Jiang Zemin, the then Chinese President, made a speech titled "CARRYING FORWARD GENERATIONS OF FRIENDLY AND GOOD-NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND ENDEAVORING TOWARDS A BETTER TOMORROW FOR ALL" in Islamabad on December 2, 1996.
2.He highlighted five points which, according to him, governed China's foreign policy towards the South Asian countries. He explained one of these points in the following words: "We should look at the differences or disputes from a long perspective, seeking a just and reasonable settlement through consultations and negotiations while bearing in mind the larger picture. If certain issues cannot be resolved for the time being, they may be shelved temporarily so that they will not affect the normal state-to-state relations."
3.Even though he did not make any specific reference to India or Pakistan, his highlighting this point was widely interpreted in Pakistan as a hint to it that it should emulate China, which has not allowed its long-standing border dispute with India to come in the way of the development of economic and other relations between the countries. It was seen as an advice to Pakistan that while negotiating with India on the Kashmir issue, it should not allow it to come in the way of normal economic and other relations with India.
4.Ever since Pakistan became independent in 1947, successive Governments have been following a policy of not agreeing to a normalisation of trade relations with India till the so-called Kashmir dispute was resolved to mutual satisfaction. While the Pakistani authorities always cited the pending Kashmir issue as standing in the way of normal trade relations, another reason was their fear that their industries might not be able to compete with their Indian counterparts if trade was normalised.
5.It was reported at that time that Mr. Jiang had raised this point more explicitly with the Pakistani authorities and suggested that Pakistan should emulate China's example by normalising its trade relations with India without allowing them to remain frozen till the Kashmir issue was resolved. They reportedly did not accept his advice.
6.Pakistan's past policy on the question of normalising its trade relations with India consisted of the following:
( a ).Not reciprocating India's action in granting the Most Favoured Nation Status to Pakistan till the Kashmir issue was resolved.
( b ).Allowing a strictly limited bilateral trade only in respect of certain commodities included in a positive list without accepting India's suggestion of having a limited negative list mentioning commodities which cannot be traded and allowing restriction-free trade in respect of all commodities not figuring in the list.
( c ).Not allowing Indian investments in Pakistan.
( d ).Not allowing banks to open branches in each other's territory.
7. Signs of a new thinking in Pakistan on the question of moving towards a normalisation of trade relations with India despite persisting differences on the so-called Kashmir dispute became evident during the third round of the bilateral talks on economic co-operation held by the Commerce Secretaries of the two Governments at New Delhi on August 2 and 3, 2007.
8.The meeting reportedly took a significant decision to work for an increase in the value of the bilateral trade from US $ 1.7 billion as it was in 2006-07 to US $ 10 billion by 2010. Among other important decisions taken were allowing specified banks of the two countries to open branches in each other's territory, expanding the trade basket, improving transportation links, reducing tariffs and mutual technical assistance in capacity building.
9. It became obvious that even while continuing to stick to the stand that there cannot be a normalisation of trade relations till the Kashmir issue is resolved, the Pakistani authorities had started quietly allowing a movement towards a de facto normalisation. De jure restrictions, but de facto normalisation seemed to be the direction in which the bilateral economic relations started moving.
10. This trend towards a normalisation of economic and trade relations between the two countries seemed to have lost momentum after the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, when attitude towards each other became hardened once again. Since the beginning of this year, there are again signs of a thaw despite continuing Indian dissatisfaction over the perceived slowness of the Pakistani authorities in taking action against the Pakistan-based masterminds of the 26/11 terrorist strikes and renewed Pakistani concerns over perceived Indian activism in Afghanistan---which seemed to have moved from the economic to the military field.
11. This thaw became evident during the meeting in March last between Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh and Yousef Raza Gilani at Mohali in Punjab in the margins of the World Cup Cricket semi-final between the teams of the two countries and the subsequent meeting between Foreign Ministers S.M.Krishna and Hina Rabbani Khar at New Delhi in July last.
12. This process of thaw has since resulted in two positive moves by the two countries. The first is the reported decision of the Government of Pakistan to grant the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to India without linking it to the progress in the bilateral talks on the Kashmir issue. The reported decision is yet to be formalised, but what is significant is that there are no signs of any opposition to it from the Pakistani Foreign Office and the Army. In the past it was the opposition from Pakistan’s Foreign Office and the Army that stood in the way of a forward movement on this issue. The economic Ministries of the Government of Pakistan had been in favour of this since 1996 onwards.
13. The lifting of opposition to the grant of the MFN status by the Army is a tentative indication that it has started looking at India through a less hostile prism. It is important to encourage any sign of new thinking in the Pakistani Army by taking the first steps towards building a military-military relationship by inviting Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan’s Chief of the Army Staff, to visit New Delhi at the invitation of his Indian counterpart. I have been advocating this for quite some time and reiterate my continued support for it.
14. The second significant move has come from Dr.Manmohan Singh during his meeting with Mr.Gilani on November 10,2011, in the margins of the SAARC summit in the Maldives. “The Hindu” has reported that Dr.Singh said that India had decided to move towards a Preferential Trade Agreement with Pakistan and a liberal visa regime for Pakistani nationals. His announcements were apparently meant to reassure Pakistan that its decision to grant the MFN status to India would have economic dividends to it.
15. Apart from the Kashmir issue, past Pakistani reluctance to grant the MFN status to India had strong economic reasons too---namely, its fears that the MFN status would be more beneficial to India than to Pakistan and could reduce Pakistan to a position of economic dependence on India. It is important to remove these fears from the mind of Pakistan.
16. Pakistan continues to take a rigid stand on one economic issue of considerable interest to India---- that is, the right of transit through Pakistani territory of Indian goods moving overland to Afghanistan. This rigidity might continue for some time till the fears in the minds of Pakistan regarding the implications of India’s strategic relations with Afghanistan are diluted. We should not allow this to stand in the way of a forward movement in respect of other economic and trade issues.
17. The SAARC summit provided an opportunity for meetings between the Foreign Secretaries, Foreign Ministers and Prime Ministers of the two countries. Even in the absence of any substantive movement on the question of Pakistani action against anti-India terrorists operating from its territory, one is gratified to note the evolution of a new vocabulary between the two countries, which highlights the positive more than the negative and which reflects a budding feel good atmosphere in the relations between the political leaderships and civilian bureaucracies of the two countries.
18.This feel good atmosphere is yet to percolate to the armies and intelligence agencies of the two countries. There are as yet no signs of any dilution in the ranks of the die-hard hawks in the analytical communities of the two countries. It is important to bring the Armies, the intelligence agencies and analytical hawks on board if this feel good trend is to be sustained and strengthened.
19.The only way of doing this is by encouraging greater interactions at different levels. Nothing like personal interactions to reduce suspicion and distrust. In this connection, I reiterate what I wrote after the Mohali meeting between the two Prime Ministers.
20. I wrote as follows: “ To prevent an attempt to derail the "re-engagement" process by elements which are against it, it is important that the "wide-ranging conversations" initiated at Mohali are kept moving forward by the two Prime Ministers by taking an early decision by our Prime Minister on his acceptance of the invitation from Gilani and by quick follow-up on the visits of parliamentary delegations. The goodwill and the benign interest in each other generated by the World Cup cricket semi-final was taken advantage of by our Prime Minister to make the "re-engagement" and "re-connecting" process possible. He should readily accept the reported suggestion of Gilani for a friendly cricket match between the two teams in Pakistan in the near future and visit Pakistan to keep this process of strategic discovery of each other going forward.” (11-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Tuesday, November 8, 2011
WE THE DISHONOURABLE---KEENAN-REUBEN MURDER
B.RAMAN
Shock and shame have greeted the news about an incident which took place in the Amboli area of Mumbai on October 20,2011, in which two honourable young men of Mumbai---Keenan Santos and Reuben Fernandes--- were surrounded and brutally killed by a group of hooligans and their supporters when Keenan and Reuben protested against their misbehaviour towards their girl friends and tried to defend themselves from attacks by the enraged hooligans.
2. We owe a debt of gratitude to Vidyut, a keen Tweeter activist of Mumbai, for her painstaking research into the incident from open source information and for posting the details in her blog titled “Aamjanata” at “ Facts of the Murder of Keenan and Reuben http://aamjanata.com/facts-of-the-murder-of-keenan-and-reuben/
3.Barkha Dutt, the Group Editor and President of the Board of Editors of the NDTV, telecast a special discussion on the incident under her “The Buck Stops Here” programme on November 8,2011.She had invited the families and girl friends of the brave men who were brutally killed, a cross-section of opinion-makers and members of the public for the discussion which was recorded in Mumbai on the night of November 7.
4. The stamp of high quality of Barkha’s programmes was there in this debate too. She needs to be complimented for taking the initiative in producing her unimaginably and unbearably poignant show. At the same time, I would be failing in my duty if I did not record my surprise over Barkha’s omission to invite Vidyut to be a member of the panel. Nobody had shown greater indignation than Vidyut over the murders and nobody has done a more painstaking research into the incident than Vidyut. She should have been the first choice for the panel.
5.The shocking incident highlights how dishonourable many of us are in our attitude to women and behaviour towards them. It has been reported that the people who misbehaved towards the girl friends of Keenan and Reuben come from the under-privileged and uneducated sections of our society, but we find instances of such shocking behaviour in all layers of our society---privileged or under-privileged, educated or uneducated, sophisticated or unsophisticated.
6. In our society, the word behaviour has two meanings. It has one meaning when it comes to behaviour towards men and another in respect of behaviour towards women. Large sections of our society tend to presume that in our behaviour towards women certain extra liberties---in words or action--- are understandable and even permissible. Words and actions which we may look down upon when employed against men, we treat as natural and rationalise them when employed against women.
7. It is this tendency to rationalise misbehaviour towards women and our reluctance to come down heavily on those misbehaving towards women that is responsible not only for the increasing number of incidents of misbehaviour towards them, but also for the shocking insensitivity and callousness of the police in dealing with such incidents.
8. I believe in what I often describe as an honour code in relation to women whom I take out. I consider myself morally responsible for their physical protection and honour. I am in a high state of tension till they reach home and inform me over phone that they have reached home safely. It is evident that Reuben and Keenan had a similar honour code. They considered themselves morally responsible for the protection and honour of their girl friends. They lost their lives in an act of extraordinary bravery after they tried to protect them from attempted misbehaviour by the hooligans.
9. They reacted according to their sense of honour. We should applaud them for their bravery and sense of honour and refrain from analysing whether their actions were wise or advisable. We should also salute the fortitude and sense of honour and pride of their families and girl friends for expressing their pride over the way Keenan and Reuben reacted. We need more such families, more such relatives and more such women.
10. The most shocking aspect of the incident was the utterly shameful and shocking and inhuman inaction of a group of about 40 bystanders, who watched the two boys being surrounded and murdered by the hooligans without the least attempt to go to their rescue. They watched as if they were watching a street play. I can understand --- but will not excuse--- if there were only one or two bystanders and they were afraid of intervening. There were about 40 of them. There was no excuse for their inaction. There were so many things they could have done. They could have raised an alarm and collected more people. They could have intervened physically. But they did nothing. They just watched--- not in horror, not with shock, but just with a sense of disinterested curiosity. They probably saw it as a quarrel between young men over women and as none of their business. Even the use of a knife by one of the hooligans for repeatedly stabbing did not make them intervene.
11. Even more shocking than the passive attitude of the bystanders was the attitude of some of the people in a nearby restaurant as narrated by one of the girl friends to Barkha. According to her, after the hooligans had run away, when she pleaded to the people in the restaurant to help her in taking care of the injured and dying, none of them came forward to help her. Can one imagine anything more inhuman and callous?
12. This inaction of the bystanders and others shows to what extent inhuman traits have seeped into our society. The only way of dealing with it is through education and creation of awareness of our duty as members of the society and citizens of this country. Under the law, watching a person being killed without going to his or her rescue is itself a crime. The police should prosecute not only the perpetrators, but also those bystanders who can be identified.
13. The incident also speaks very poorly of the state of our police. It shows the extent of the lack of fear of the police and the law in many sections of our society. The inability or reluctance of the Police to enforce the law effectively is responsible for the growing number of such incidents. I am myself an ex-police officer and I feel ashamed of myself for the kind of ineffective, shameless and prideless police that we have created. I was surprised by the attitude of a retired police officer in Barkha’s panel. I didn’t discern even the slightest trace of embarrassment, shame and indignation in his interventions during the debate.
14. It is important for our senior police officers to sit up and act to reverse the inexorable process of decay of our police force. How can the police blame the citizenry alone for such shocking incidents when the police itself has become a paragon of inaction? ( 9-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Shock and shame have greeted the news about an incident which took place in the Amboli area of Mumbai on October 20,2011, in which two honourable young men of Mumbai---Keenan Santos and Reuben Fernandes--- were surrounded and brutally killed by a group of hooligans and their supporters when Keenan and Reuben protested against their misbehaviour towards their girl friends and tried to defend themselves from attacks by the enraged hooligans.
2. We owe a debt of gratitude to Vidyut, a keen Tweeter activist of Mumbai, for her painstaking research into the incident from open source information and for posting the details in her blog titled “Aamjanata” at “ Facts of the Murder of Keenan and Reuben http://aamjanata.com/facts-of-the-murder-of-keenan-and-reuben/
3.Barkha Dutt, the Group Editor and President of the Board of Editors of the NDTV, telecast a special discussion on the incident under her “The Buck Stops Here” programme on November 8,2011.She had invited the families and girl friends of the brave men who were brutally killed, a cross-section of opinion-makers and members of the public for the discussion which was recorded in Mumbai on the night of November 7.
4. The stamp of high quality of Barkha’s programmes was there in this debate too. She needs to be complimented for taking the initiative in producing her unimaginably and unbearably poignant show. At the same time, I would be failing in my duty if I did not record my surprise over Barkha’s omission to invite Vidyut to be a member of the panel. Nobody had shown greater indignation than Vidyut over the murders and nobody has done a more painstaking research into the incident than Vidyut. She should have been the first choice for the panel.
5.The shocking incident highlights how dishonourable many of us are in our attitude to women and behaviour towards them. It has been reported that the people who misbehaved towards the girl friends of Keenan and Reuben come from the under-privileged and uneducated sections of our society, but we find instances of such shocking behaviour in all layers of our society---privileged or under-privileged, educated or uneducated, sophisticated or unsophisticated.
6. In our society, the word behaviour has two meanings. It has one meaning when it comes to behaviour towards men and another in respect of behaviour towards women. Large sections of our society tend to presume that in our behaviour towards women certain extra liberties---in words or action--- are understandable and even permissible. Words and actions which we may look down upon when employed against men, we treat as natural and rationalise them when employed against women.
7. It is this tendency to rationalise misbehaviour towards women and our reluctance to come down heavily on those misbehaving towards women that is responsible not only for the increasing number of incidents of misbehaviour towards them, but also for the shocking insensitivity and callousness of the police in dealing with such incidents.
8. I believe in what I often describe as an honour code in relation to women whom I take out. I consider myself morally responsible for their physical protection and honour. I am in a high state of tension till they reach home and inform me over phone that they have reached home safely. It is evident that Reuben and Keenan had a similar honour code. They considered themselves morally responsible for the protection and honour of their girl friends. They lost their lives in an act of extraordinary bravery after they tried to protect them from attempted misbehaviour by the hooligans.
9. They reacted according to their sense of honour. We should applaud them for their bravery and sense of honour and refrain from analysing whether their actions were wise or advisable. We should also salute the fortitude and sense of honour and pride of their families and girl friends for expressing their pride over the way Keenan and Reuben reacted. We need more such families, more such relatives and more such women.
10. The most shocking aspect of the incident was the utterly shameful and shocking and inhuman inaction of a group of about 40 bystanders, who watched the two boys being surrounded and murdered by the hooligans without the least attempt to go to their rescue. They watched as if they were watching a street play. I can understand --- but will not excuse--- if there were only one or two bystanders and they were afraid of intervening. There were about 40 of them. There was no excuse for their inaction. There were so many things they could have done. They could have raised an alarm and collected more people. They could have intervened physically. But they did nothing. They just watched--- not in horror, not with shock, but just with a sense of disinterested curiosity. They probably saw it as a quarrel between young men over women and as none of their business. Even the use of a knife by one of the hooligans for repeatedly stabbing did not make them intervene.
11. Even more shocking than the passive attitude of the bystanders was the attitude of some of the people in a nearby restaurant as narrated by one of the girl friends to Barkha. According to her, after the hooligans had run away, when she pleaded to the people in the restaurant to help her in taking care of the injured and dying, none of them came forward to help her. Can one imagine anything more inhuman and callous?
12. This inaction of the bystanders and others shows to what extent inhuman traits have seeped into our society. The only way of dealing with it is through education and creation of awareness of our duty as members of the society and citizens of this country. Under the law, watching a person being killed without going to his or her rescue is itself a crime. The police should prosecute not only the perpetrators, but also those bystanders who can be identified.
13. The incident also speaks very poorly of the state of our police. It shows the extent of the lack of fear of the police and the law in many sections of our society. The inability or reluctance of the Police to enforce the law effectively is responsible for the growing number of such incidents. I am myself an ex-police officer and I feel ashamed of myself for the kind of ineffective, shameless and prideless police that we have created. I was surprised by the attitude of a retired police officer in Barkha’s panel. I didn’t discern even the slightest trace of embarrassment, shame and indignation in his interventions during the debate.
14. It is important for our senior police officers to sit up and act to reverse the inexorable process of decay of our police force. How can the police blame the citizenry alone for such shocking incidents when the police itself has become a paragon of inaction? ( 9-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Monday, November 7, 2011
IRAN: ISRAELI PSYWAR INDICATES LACK OF CONFIDENCE
B.RAMAN
The stepped-up PSYWAR by Israel against Iran on the question of the possibility of a military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities indicates an underlying lack of confidence in Israel’s military and intelligence circles over the chances of success of any military strike against Iran.
2.One does not see in Israel of today the kind of confidence that it had in 1981 that it would be able to succeed with a clandestine air strike against Iraq’s OSIRAK nuclear reactor then under construction with French assistance and manage the consequences.
3. The Mossad--- the Israeli external intelligence agency---of today is not the Mossad of 1981. There has been a decline in its professionalism despite the success of some of its recent sabotage operations against Iran’s nuclear establishment. The public opposition by some of the retired senior intelligence officers such as Meir Dagan, former head of the Mossad, and Yuval Diskin, former head of the Shin Bet, the security agency, to any military action against Iran reflects the lack of confidence about the success of a military strike against Iran amongst officers who retired only recently and hence must be up-to-date in their knowledge of the Israeli capabilities against Iran.
4. There are conflicting reports about the stand of serving officers. While some reports say that the serving officers are confident that Israel can successfully carry out a military strike against Iran, other indicators are that even some serving officers share the misgivings of the retired officers. It is believed that the statements against a military strike issued by these retired officers reflects not only their lack of confidence in the success of a military strike, but also of some of the serving officers who had worked under them when they headed the agencies.
5.Unless there is an assessment backed by a majority of the serving military and intelligence officers that a military strike will be successful in neutralising Iran’s retaliatory capability and nuclear facilities, those in the political leadership in favour of immediate action headed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may find it difficult to go ahead with a military strike.
6. The unusual high-octane PSYWAR mounted by Israeli leaders talking and threatening from roof-top regarding the likelihood of a military strike reflects not Israeli confidence in its ability to carry out a successful strike, but the persisting misgivings in the national security decision-making circles as to whether a strike would be successful.
7. Israeli national security and intelligence culture forbids public airing of military plans and debates before an imminent military action. The fact that such a public airing is being done now by the Government as part of its PSYWAR and that retired senior intelligence officers no longer feel bound by their culture of discretion and self-restraint are indicators of a lack of confidence in the political and professional circles regarding the chances of success of a military strike.
8. There would have been little opposition to a military strike if there was total confidence that it would succeed. The lack of unanimity of support for a strike is an indicator of the lack of such total confidence.
9. Israel of today is not the Israel of 1981. It no longer has the confidence that it can prevail in having its national security will and interests enforced. Iran is counting on this in going ahead with its nuclear plans, but it will be committing a serious mistake if it underestimates Israel’s penchant to take risks and act if its leaders and people feel that their national survival is at stake. (8-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
The stepped-up PSYWAR by Israel against Iran on the question of the possibility of a military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities indicates an underlying lack of confidence in Israel’s military and intelligence circles over the chances of success of any military strike against Iran.
2.One does not see in Israel of today the kind of confidence that it had in 1981 that it would be able to succeed with a clandestine air strike against Iraq’s OSIRAK nuclear reactor then under construction with French assistance and manage the consequences.
3. The Mossad--- the Israeli external intelligence agency---of today is not the Mossad of 1981. There has been a decline in its professionalism despite the success of some of its recent sabotage operations against Iran’s nuclear establishment. The public opposition by some of the retired senior intelligence officers such as Meir Dagan, former head of the Mossad, and Yuval Diskin, former head of the Shin Bet, the security agency, to any military action against Iran reflects the lack of confidence about the success of a military strike against Iran amongst officers who retired only recently and hence must be up-to-date in their knowledge of the Israeli capabilities against Iran.
4. There are conflicting reports about the stand of serving officers. While some reports say that the serving officers are confident that Israel can successfully carry out a military strike against Iran, other indicators are that even some serving officers share the misgivings of the retired officers. It is believed that the statements against a military strike issued by these retired officers reflects not only their lack of confidence in the success of a military strike, but also of some of the serving officers who had worked under them when they headed the agencies.
5.Unless there is an assessment backed by a majority of the serving military and intelligence officers that a military strike will be successful in neutralising Iran’s retaliatory capability and nuclear facilities, those in the political leadership in favour of immediate action headed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may find it difficult to go ahead with a military strike.
6. The unusual high-octane PSYWAR mounted by Israeli leaders talking and threatening from roof-top regarding the likelihood of a military strike reflects not Israeli confidence in its ability to carry out a successful strike, but the persisting misgivings in the national security decision-making circles as to whether a strike would be successful.
7. Israeli national security and intelligence culture forbids public airing of military plans and debates before an imminent military action. The fact that such a public airing is being done now by the Government as part of its PSYWAR and that retired senior intelligence officers no longer feel bound by their culture of discretion and self-restraint are indicators of a lack of confidence in the political and professional circles regarding the chances of success of a military strike.
8. There would have been little opposition to a military strike if there was total confidence that it would succeed. The lack of unanimity of support for a strike is an indicator of the lack of such total confidence.
9. Israel of today is not the Israel of 1981. It no longer has the confidence that it can prevail in having its national security will and interests enforced. Iran is counting on this in going ahead with its nuclear plans, but it will be committing a serious mistake if it underestimates Israel’s penchant to take risks and act if its leaders and people feel that their national survival is at stake. (8-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
COMMENTS FROM A WELL-PLACED & WELL-INFORMED READER
B.RAMAN
I have received the following comments on my article "If Israel Attacks Iran" from a well-placed and well-informed reader:
It appears that Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain [monarchy], Kuwait, Oman are lobbying for an IDF (Israeli Defence Force) strike. [since they appear to have failed to persuade the US and Europeans to strike against Iran's nuclear program.]
What role Saudi Arabia might play in a strike on Iran, even if they deny their role?
According to several military analysts, Iran lacks the ability to disrupt the port of Hormuz. As a practical matter, how can they do it?
Iran's air defense capability is extremely limited. And their fighter aircraft lack functional avionics and electronics. Iran lacks accurate long range rockets. Their primary ability to strike at Israel is Hezbollah. But would Hezbollah risk a war with most Lebanese to help Khamenei? Both Khamenei and Nasrallah are focusing their limited resources on helping Assad survive. [Assad is apparently using Hezbollah Arab fighters inside Syria against the Syrian resistance.]
Their priority is to help Assad survive. This will be more important to them than retaliating for an Israeli strike [or a joint Israeli, Saudi strike.]
You seem to think the US and Europeans won't support a military strike on Iran. Before the attempted assasination of the Saudi ambassador inside the US, you were 100% right. But the failed assasination has changed things. There is now serious talk about military action in Europe and the US, which the Sunni Arab countries are exploiting with their powerful lobbies.
More than 80% of Sunni Arabs have a negative view of Iran in recent Arab public opinion polls. This is the highest negative rating ever recorded. Much of this is because of the role of IRGC in helping Assad against the Syrian resistance. This increases the odds of a military strike against Iran.
I have received the following comments on my article "If Israel Attacks Iran" from a well-placed and well-informed reader:
It appears that Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain [monarchy], Kuwait, Oman are lobbying for an IDF (Israeli Defence Force) strike. [since they appear to have failed to persuade the US and Europeans to strike against Iran's nuclear program.]
What role Saudi Arabia might play in a strike on Iran, even if they deny their role?
According to several military analysts, Iran lacks the ability to disrupt the port of Hormuz. As a practical matter, how can they do it?
Iran's air defense capability is extremely limited. And their fighter aircraft lack functional avionics and electronics. Iran lacks accurate long range rockets. Their primary ability to strike at Israel is Hezbollah. But would Hezbollah risk a war with most Lebanese to help Khamenei? Both Khamenei and Nasrallah are focusing their limited resources on helping Assad survive. [Assad is apparently using Hezbollah Arab fighters inside Syria against the Syrian resistance.]
Their priority is to help Assad survive. This will be more important to them than retaliating for an Israeli strike [or a joint Israeli, Saudi strike.]
You seem to think the US and Europeans won't support a military strike on Iran. Before the attempted assasination of the Saudi ambassador inside the US, you were 100% right. But the failed assasination has changed things. There is now serious talk about military action in Europe and the US, which the Sunni Arab countries are exploiting with their powerful lobbies.
More than 80% of Sunni Arabs have a negative view of Iran in recent Arab public opinion polls. This is the highest negative rating ever recorded. Much of this is because of the role of IRGC in helping Assad against the Syrian resistance. This increases the odds of a military strike against Iran.
IF ISRAEL ATTACKS IRAN
B.RAMAN
Will Israel attack Iran’s nuclear capabilities? If so, how will it go about it? What will be the consequences?
2. A PSYWAR has been mounted from Israel regarding the strong likelihood and imminence of an attack on Iran’s nuclear enrichment capabilities should the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna report ---as it is widely expected to---- that Iran has repaired the damages suffered by the computer network of its enrichment complex as a result of a virus (Stuxnet) allegedly planted by the Israeli intelligence and has resumed its enrichment operations full steam with the objective of acquiring weapons grade enrichment capability.
3. Such a report would mean that Israel’s sabotage operations to paralyse the enrichment facilities on which it was relying as an alternative to direct military strikes have failed to produce the desired results leaving it with no other option but direct military strikes to destroy the enrichment facilities that Iran has built up.
4. Should Israel undertake a military strike and if so, when? This question is being debated now in Israeli political, military and intelligence circles. It is apparent that any Israeli military strike may have to be unilateral because the West----including the US--- are not prepared to support a military strike. They feel that paralysing sanctions should be given an opportunity to force Iran to see reason and make Iran give up its plans for achieving a capability for weapons grade enrichment.
5. Israel’s faith in sanctions and sabotage as options to neutralise Iran’s capabilities has weakened and there is growing conviction in Israeli political, military and intelligence circles that the time for a direct military strike against Iran has arrived. If Israel does not act before November-end, the onset of winter and the heavy cloud cover during winter may make precise missile strikes difficult.
6. Political and diplomatic pressure from the US and other Western countries is unlikely to have any impact on Israeli decision-making which will be influenced purely by the assessment of the military and the intelligence agencies regarding the likelihood of success of a military operation.
7. Success means success in destroying Iran’s enrichment capabilities and success in destroying Iran’s capability for retaliation against Israel. When Israeli aircraft bombed Iraq’s Osirak reactor under construction with French assistance in June,1981, the dangers of a retaliatory strike by Iraq against Israel were not a worrisome factor in the planning. It was known that Iraq did not have such a capability.
8. Iran has a strong retaliatory capability against Israel in the form of its missiles. Its Air Force is facing problems due to the reported unserviceability of many of its planes because of the sanctions. It, therefore, plans to rely on its missiles for a retaliatory strike on Israel. The Israeli forces will, therefore, have to either destroy the Iranian retaliatory capability in advance before attacking the nuclear facilities or attack the two simultaneously.
9. The final decision on a military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities will depend on the confidence of the Israeli military and intelligence leadership that it can destroy Iran’s retaliatory capability through a pre-emptive strike.
10. While serving officers of the Israeli intelligence seem to be confident that a neutralisation of Iran’s nuclear facilities and retaliatory capability will be doable, some retired officers of the Israeli intelligence such as Meir Dagan, former head of the Mossad, the Israeli external intelligence agency, and Yuval Diskin, former head of the Shin Bet, the security agency, have expressed misgivings on this. They have advised the Government against any adventurist impulses.
11. If Israel succeeds in destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities and retaliatory capability, Teheran will have two options----- block the Strait of Hormuz thereby creating serious dislocations in oil supply or undertake a long-term sabotage operation directed against the West without affecting the oil supply.
12. Blockage of the Strait of Hormuz will have an impact not only on the global economy, but also on Iran’s own economy at a time when its economy is already facing serious difficulties due to the economic sanctions. Success of a long-term sabotage operation will be doubtful since Iran is unlikely to enjoy the ground solidarity of the Sunni world. The Sunni countries are as worried as Israel over Iran’s nuclear aspirations. They will condemn Israeli military strikes, but will not do anything in support of Iran beyond that.
13. In view of what has been stated above,if Israel succeeds in neutralising Iran’s nuclear facilities and retaliatory capability, Iran may decide that it has no other option but to gulp it and keep sulking---- as Saddam Hussein did post-1981.
14. If an Israeli military strike is successful, the consequences for the region and the global economy may not be serious. If it is not successful, the consequences could be far-reaching. (7-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Will Israel attack Iran’s nuclear capabilities? If so, how will it go about it? What will be the consequences?
2. A PSYWAR has been mounted from Israel regarding the strong likelihood and imminence of an attack on Iran’s nuclear enrichment capabilities should the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna report ---as it is widely expected to---- that Iran has repaired the damages suffered by the computer network of its enrichment complex as a result of a virus (Stuxnet) allegedly planted by the Israeli intelligence and has resumed its enrichment operations full steam with the objective of acquiring weapons grade enrichment capability.
3. Such a report would mean that Israel’s sabotage operations to paralyse the enrichment facilities on which it was relying as an alternative to direct military strikes have failed to produce the desired results leaving it with no other option but direct military strikes to destroy the enrichment facilities that Iran has built up.
4. Should Israel undertake a military strike and if so, when? This question is being debated now in Israeli political, military and intelligence circles. It is apparent that any Israeli military strike may have to be unilateral because the West----including the US--- are not prepared to support a military strike. They feel that paralysing sanctions should be given an opportunity to force Iran to see reason and make Iran give up its plans for achieving a capability for weapons grade enrichment.
5. Israel’s faith in sanctions and sabotage as options to neutralise Iran’s capabilities has weakened and there is growing conviction in Israeli political, military and intelligence circles that the time for a direct military strike against Iran has arrived. If Israel does not act before November-end, the onset of winter and the heavy cloud cover during winter may make precise missile strikes difficult.
6. Political and diplomatic pressure from the US and other Western countries is unlikely to have any impact on Israeli decision-making which will be influenced purely by the assessment of the military and the intelligence agencies regarding the likelihood of success of a military operation.
7. Success means success in destroying Iran’s enrichment capabilities and success in destroying Iran’s capability for retaliation against Israel. When Israeli aircraft bombed Iraq’s Osirak reactor under construction with French assistance in June,1981, the dangers of a retaliatory strike by Iraq against Israel were not a worrisome factor in the planning. It was known that Iraq did not have such a capability.
8. Iran has a strong retaliatory capability against Israel in the form of its missiles. Its Air Force is facing problems due to the reported unserviceability of many of its planes because of the sanctions. It, therefore, plans to rely on its missiles for a retaliatory strike on Israel. The Israeli forces will, therefore, have to either destroy the Iranian retaliatory capability in advance before attacking the nuclear facilities or attack the two simultaneously.
9. The final decision on a military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities will depend on the confidence of the Israeli military and intelligence leadership that it can destroy Iran’s retaliatory capability through a pre-emptive strike.
10. While serving officers of the Israeli intelligence seem to be confident that a neutralisation of Iran’s nuclear facilities and retaliatory capability will be doable, some retired officers of the Israeli intelligence such as Meir Dagan, former head of the Mossad, the Israeli external intelligence agency, and Yuval Diskin, former head of the Shin Bet, the security agency, have expressed misgivings on this. They have advised the Government against any adventurist impulses.
11. If Israel succeeds in destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities and retaliatory capability, Teheran will have two options----- block the Strait of Hormuz thereby creating serious dislocations in oil supply or undertake a long-term sabotage operation directed against the West without affecting the oil supply.
12. Blockage of the Strait of Hormuz will have an impact not only on the global economy, but also on Iran’s own economy at a time when its economy is already facing serious difficulties due to the economic sanctions. Success of a long-term sabotage operation will be doubtful since Iran is unlikely to enjoy the ground solidarity of the Sunni world. The Sunni countries are as worried as Israel over Iran’s nuclear aspirations. They will condemn Israeli military strikes, but will not do anything in support of Iran beyond that.
13. In view of what has been stated above,if Israel succeeds in neutralising Iran’s nuclear facilities and retaliatory capability, Iran may decide that it has no other option but to gulp it and keep sulking---- as Saddam Hussein did post-1981.
14. If an Israeli military strike is successful, the consequences for the region and the global economy may not be serious. If it is not successful, the consequences could be far-reaching. (7-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Wednesday, November 2, 2011
TIBETAN UNREST SHOWS SIGNS OF SPREADING FROM SICHUAN TO TIBET
B.RAMAN
The unrest of Tibetan monks, which has so far led to 10 attempts to commit self-immolation ---seven of them successful resulting in deaths--- in Western Sichuan, is now showing signs of spreading to Tibet. However, there are no reports so far of any attempted self-immolation in Tibet.
2. The unrest in Tibet is showing signs of taking a more violent form directed against Han targets instead of self-immolation. The Chinese authorities have banned all religious activities at the historic Karma monastery in Tibet's Chamdo prefecture following a bomb explosion at a government building there on October 26,2011. It has been reported that nearly all the monks at the monastery in the Dzagyu Karma township where the blast occurred have fled from the area, fearing that they might be arrested and detained in a military detention camp as the Chinese have done to a large number of monks of the Kirti monastery in Western Sichuan following the first incident of self-immolation of a young monk in March last.
3.For some week now, there have been reports of anger among the Tibetans in the Dzagyu Karma area over the re-settlement of a large number of Hans from other provinces in the rural areas under the pretext of undertaking development projects for the Tibetans. Before the blast, anonymous leaflets circulating in the area had warned as follows: "Anyone who settles in the rural area should speak Tibetan. Otherwise, we will not accept them. If this policy of settling Chinese in Tibetan rural areas is not stopped, we will protest and may be forced to resort to violence."
4. After the blast, Chinese security forces surrounded the Karma monastery, located on the eastern bank of the Dzachu River in Chamdo (in Chinese, Changdu) prefecture and founded in the 12th century. They allegedly suspected that monks in the monastery were behind the blast, which badly damaged the building but caused no casualties. The Chinese security forces claimed to have found in the area of the blast posters and leaflets calling for Tibetan independence.
5. Fearing that the Tibetan refugees in Nepal ( about 20,000) may play a role in spreading the unrest to Tibet from Nepalese territory, the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu is reported to have stepped up pressure on the Nepalese Government to arrest what the Embassy described as the splittist elements in the local Tibetan refugee community. Chinese concerns have increased following an attempt by some members of the Tibetan refugee community in Nepal to hold a prayer meeting in memory of those who committed self-immolation in Sichuan. Following pressure from the Chinese Embassy, the Nepalese authorities are reported to have arrested about 100 refugees who participated in the prayer meeting.
6.In the meanwhile, Lobsang Sangay , the newly-elected head of the Tibetan Government-in-exile in Dharamshala, has arrived in Washington DC to testify before a Congressional Committee on the human rights situation in the Tibetan areas of China. While expressing his readiness for talks with the Chinese authorities, he blamed the Chinese refusal to accept the reality of the ground situation in the Tibetan areas for the continuing unrest. He added: “The actions of Tibetans who pour gasoline over themselves are clear indications of their desperation and frustration and of the urgency of the situation inside Tibet.” ( 2-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
The unrest of Tibetan monks, which has so far led to 10 attempts to commit self-immolation ---seven of them successful resulting in deaths--- in Western Sichuan, is now showing signs of spreading to Tibet. However, there are no reports so far of any attempted self-immolation in Tibet.
2. The unrest in Tibet is showing signs of taking a more violent form directed against Han targets instead of self-immolation. The Chinese authorities have banned all religious activities at the historic Karma monastery in Tibet's Chamdo prefecture following a bomb explosion at a government building there on October 26,2011. It has been reported that nearly all the monks at the monastery in the Dzagyu Karma township where the blast occurred have fled from the area, fearing that they might be arrested and detained in a military detention camp as the Chinese have done to a large number of monks of the Kirti monastery in Western Sichuan following the first incident of self-immolation of a young monk in March last.
3.For some week now, there have been reports of anger among the Tibetans in the Dzagyu Karma area over the re-settlement of a large number of Hans from other provinces in the rural areas under the pretext of undertaking development projects for the Tibetans. Before the blast, anonymous leaflets circulating in the area had warned as follows: "Anyone who settles in the rural area should speak Tibetan. Otherwise, we will not accept them. If this policy of settling Chinese in Tibetan rural areas is not stopped, we will protest and may be forced to resort to violence."
4. After the blast, Chinese security forces surrounded the Karma monastery, located on the eastern bank of the Dzachu River in Chamdo (in Chinese, Changdu) prefecture and founded in the 12th century. They allegedly suspected that monks in the monastery were behind the blast, which badly damaged the building but caused no casualties. The Chinese security forces claimed to have found in the area of the blast posters and leaflets calling for Tibetan independence.
5. Fearing that the Tibetan refugees in Nepal ( about 20,000) may play a role in spreading the unrest to Tibet from Nepalese territory, the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu is reported to have stepped up pressure on the Nepalese Government to arrest what the Embassy described as the splittist elements in the local Tibetan refugee community. Chinese concerns have increased following an attempt by some members of the Tibetan refugee community in Nepal to hold a prayer meeting in memory of those who committed self-immolation in Sichuan. Following pressure from the Chinese Embassy, the Nepalese authorities are reported to have arrested about 100 refugees who participated in the prayer meeting.
6.In the meanwhile, Lobsang Sangay , the newly-elected head of the Tibetan Government-in-exile in Dharamshala, has arrived in Washington DC to testify before a Congressional Committee on the human rights situation in the Tibetan areas of China. While expressing his readiness for talks with the Chinese authorities, he blamed the Chinese refusal to accept the reality of the ground situation in the Tibetan areas for the continuing unrest. He added: “The actions of Tibetans who pour gasoline over themselves are clear indications of their desperation and frustration and of the urgency of the situation inside Tibet.” ( 2-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
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