B.RAMAN
Dear Mr.Fareed Zakaria,
I read with considerable interest extracts from your interview to the CNN-IBN on counter-terrorism in which, inter alia, you have compared the track record of the Indian counter-terrorism community with that of the US.
2. Rediff.com has reported on your CNN-IBN interview as follows: “
“ When looking at the capacity and talents of intelligence agencies around the world, I don't think anyone has spoken highly about the Indian intelligence agencies.
“As a matter of reporting, India's counter-terrorism operations are not regarded very high. This is an area India has not focused on a great deal.
“India has not done good because as it has a large Muslim population, but again India's police force is pathetic. Look at Mumbai -- India's police force is not a police force -- it is a patronage job that is given to people to support communities, they don't know how to police.”
3. Before I comment substantively on your observations, I must introduce myself: I was an officer of the Indian Police Service (IPS). I joined the IPS in 1961 and retired in August,1994, after having served for about four years in the Madhya Pradesh Police, one year in the Intelligence Bureau (IB) of the Government of India and 26 years in the Research & Analysis Wing ( R&AW), India’s external intelligence agency. When I was in service, the R&AW had two divisions dealing with terrorism----one with indigenous terrorism --- what many now call home-grown terrorism--- and the other with international terrorism. I headed the Division dealing with indigenous terrorism from 1981 to 1985 and headed both the Divisions from 1988 till my retirement in 1994. Between 1991 and 1994, I used to wear a second hat as the head of the division responsible for intelligence liaison with foreign intelligence agencies. In that capacity, I had interacted closely with the intelligence agencies of the US and the UK----particularly in matters relating to counter-terrorism.”
4. The Indian track-record in counter-terrorism is not one of abysmal failure. We have had remarkable success stories particularly against Khalistani terrorism in Punjab and against the terrorism of Al Umma in Tamil Nadu. In both these instances, it was the local police force which led the counter-terrorism operations and won final victory despite all the handicaps suffered by it. In Jammu and Kashmir too--- though final victory has not yet been won--- the Indian counter-terrorism forces led by the Army have succeeded remarkably in bringing what we call cross-border terrorism under control.
5. The poor track-record of the Indian counter-terrorism community has been mainly against jihadi terrorism in North India.
6. We have had instances of jihadi terrorism in the South too in places such as Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh and Bengaluru. In the 1990s, we had the Al Umma phenomenon in Tamil Nadu and Kerala.
7.The police in South India has generally done better against terrorism emanating from the Muslim community than the Police in North/West India because the political class and the media in the South have generally refrained from demonising the Police and the intelligence agencies whenever they have acted against Muslims who have taken to terrorism. The Police in the South has, therefore, the confidence that it can do whatever is legally permissible in order to bring terrorism involving the participation of some Muslims under control.
8. Thankfully, in the South, there has been no politicisation till now of counter-terrorism which affected some members of the Muslim community. Unfortunately, there was politicisation of counter-terrorism directed against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). We paid a heavy price for it in May 1991, when Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by the LTTE in Chennai. Since then, this politicisation too has come down.
9. In North and West India, the admittedly poor record of the counter-terrorism community against jihadi terrorism---whether of the home-grown or Pakistani variety--- has been considerably due to the reluctance of the political class to act against the terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan and its equal reluctance to act against those members of the Muslim community who take to terrorism.
10. It is very unfair on your part to have compared the track-record of the Indian counter-terrorism community with that of the US. Many things which are permitted against Muslims in the US will not be permitted in India and we in the counter-terrorism community feel should not be permitted by the political leadership. Examples of what we in India do not do and will never do are:
• Treating a Muslim as a suspect by virtue of his religion and appearance unless proved otherwise. Shah Rukh Khan, the famous Indian film actor, was treated as a suspect in the US. Such things will not happen in India.
• Treating jihadi suspects as “war criminals” and keeping them in a military camp (Guantanamo Bay) and subjecting them to trials by military tribunals.
• Use of air strikes against terrorists and their sanctuaries, killing a large number of innocent Muslims. Since India became independent in 1947, we have used the Air Force only once in Mizoram in 1966 when the Mizo insurgents over-ran almost the entire State.
• The so-called rendition flights by which the US counter-terrorism agencies kept flying Muslim suspects arrested abroad from country to country in order to avoid having to produce them before a court of law.
• The extraordinary methods of torture sanctified by the US Justice department that were used against Muslim suspects---whether in Guantanamo Bay or elsewhere.
11. I am proud to say that neither the Indian political class nor the Indian counter-terrorism community would ever think of resorting to such diabolical methods. Even if we thought of them, the Indian media would have been the first to start a campaign against them.
12.Mr.Zakaria, how many of you in the US media world raised your voice against these methods when these were being used in the years after 9/11. Did you raise your voice against them, Mr.Zakaria? You all believed that any method is a good method against Muslim suspects till Al Qaeda is brought under control.
13. We have a self-denying counter-terrorism policy. We consciously deny to ourselves many practices which you in the US permit to yourselves in your counter-terrorism against Muslim suspects. We are proud of such self-denying provisions in our counter-terrorism policy.
14.One last point, I should make. India is next door neighbour to Pakistan. Much of our jihadi terrorism emanates from Pakistan. The US is thousands of KMs away from Pakistan. We face a terrorist threat from Pakistan every day. You face a threat sporadically. And yet, the kind of methods that you have used against Pakistan we have never used. We fight against terrorism emanating from Pakistan with one hand tied in the back.
15. It is not only because our political leadership will not permit it, but it is also because of the hypocrisy of the US Government which will use any methods against Pakistan in order to protect the US Homeland and American lives, but never hesitates to come in the way of India following a similar policy to protect the Indian Homeland and Indian lives.
With regards,
B.Raman
Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com. Twitter” @SORBONNE75 .
Mr.Fareed Zakaria,
Editor-at-large,
Time Magazine,
New York
Friday, September 9, 2011
SOME PAST ACTIVITIES OF HUJI ( B ) IN INDIA
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO 737
B.RAMAN
It has been reported that two claims of responsibility have been received by the investigating authorities in the wake of the explosion outside the Delhi High Court on September 7,2011. Both claims have been made through E-mails sent from cyber cafes. The first E-mail purports to be from the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) and the second from the Indian Mujahideen (IM). The authenticity of the two E-mails has not so far been established.
2. The HUJI, which came into existence during the Afgfhan jihad against the Soviet troops in the 1980s, has a presence in Pakistan as well as Bangladesh. The Pakistani branch is referred to by terrorism experts as HUJI and the Bangladesh branch as HUJI ( B ).
3.The HUJI, with which Ilyas Ibrahim of the so-called 313 Brigade used to be associated, was active in Jammu & Kashmir, but not in Indian territory outside J&K. HUJI (B) was active in the Indian territory outside J&K, but not in J & K.
4.The Special Task Force of the Uttar Pradesh (UP) Police, which investigated two explosions at a Hindu temple and a local railway station at Varanasi on March 7,2006, announced on April 5,2006, that its investigation had established that the two explosions were carried out by three terrorists of the HUJI (B), with local help provided by one Walilullah, the Imam of a mosque at Phulpur in Allahabad, and five other Indian Muslims.
5.While Walilullah and the five other Indian Muslims, who had helped the three terrorists from Bangladesh, were arrested, the three terrorists, who actually carried out the explosions, managed to escape to Bangladesh after carrying out the terrorist strikes. Twenty innocent civilians were killed in the two explosions. The UP Police described Walilullah as the Eastern UP Area Commander of HUJI (B).
6.In a confessional statement, Walilullah reportedly cited the demolition of the Babri Masjid in UP in December 1992 by a Hindu mob and the anti-Muslim riots in Gujarat in February,2002, as the reasons for the terrorist strikes against the temple and at the railway station. He projected the twin blasts as acts of reprisal terrorism. He gave the names of the three persons, who came from Bangladesh to carry out the explosions, as Bashiruddin alias Bashir,Mustafiz and Zakaria, all Bangladeshi nationals. According to his version, they had studied along with him at the Deoband seminary in UP some years ago and he had been in touch with them since then.
7.Walilullah had once been arrested by the Allahabad Police in 2001 on suspicion of his links with the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) of Pakistan. He was released after eight months without being prosecuted. Bashiruddin took him to Bangladesh in June 2004 and introduced him to one Maulana Asadullah of HUJI (B), who enrolled him into the organisation and appointed him as its Area Commander for Eastern UP.
8. The other five Indian Muslims arrested were Syed Shuib and Farhaan (Lucknow), Mohammad Rizwan Siddiqui and Mohammad Saad Ali (Amroha) and Shahid (Allahabad). They were working in a power loom in Bhiwandi near Mumbai. All the arrested Indian Muslims were reported to have confessed that they had visited Pakistan via Bangladesh for training in jihadi terrorism, organised by Maulana Asadullah.
9. A child was killed in an explosion in Varanasi on December 7, 2010, a day after the anniversary of the demolition of the Babri Masjid. An e-mailed message purporting to be from the IM--- carrying the December 6 dateline, but sent on December 7--- claimed responsibility for the attack. It projected the attack as in reprisal against a court judgement relating to the ownership of the land on which the Babri Masjid stood. The Muslims felt aggrieved by the judgement which they saw as based on Hindu religious beliefs and not on provable evidence. They expressed their determination to have it set aside by a higher court.
10.Incidents of violence were feared by the UP police on the day the judgement was delivered by the court, but nothing untoward happened. A delayed violent act of reprisal came on December 7, 2010, from unidentified elements claiming to be from the IM. The message purporting to be from the IM expressed the determination of the IM to keep up its fight on the Babri Masjid issue.
11.The HUJI (B) came into existence in 1992 after the Afghan Mujahideen captured power in Kabul in April,1992, after overthrowing the then Afghan President Najibullah. It was set up by a group of Bangladeshi nationals, who had fought against the forces of the Najibullah Government after having undergone jihadi training in Pakistan. The formation of the HUJI (B) was announced at a press conference in April 1992 by a group of Afghan war veterans. It was projected as a successor to a first Bangladeshi Mujahideen group that had been formed in 1984 by Commander Abdur Rahman, for fighting against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. He later reportedly died in the Afghan War in 1989.
12.Instructors from the HUJI (B) used to be attached to the training camps of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) near the Tirupura border. It was suspected that the attack on the security guards outside the US Consulate at Kolkata in January,2002, was orchestrated by HUJI (B), in collaboration with the JEM and the Lashkar-e-Toiba, under the name the Asif Reza Commando Force (ARCF). Aftab Ansari alias Aftab Ahmed alias Farhan Malik, the prime accused in the attack, was in touch not only with the office-bearers of these organisations in Pakistan, but also with Omar Sheikh, who had masterminded the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl, the US journalist.
13. While there has so far been no evidence of institutional contacts between the HUJI (B ) and the IM, some members of the Muslim community in UP had facilitated the terrorist strikes of HUJI ( B ) in Varanasi in March 2006. The present contacts of HUJI ( B ) in India---particularly in UP -- need to be re-examined in the light of the nine terrorist strikes since 26/11 which have remained undetected. ( 9-9-11)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd ), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies.. E-mail: seventyone2gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75)
B.RAMAN
It has been reported that two claims of responsibility have been received by the investigating authorities in the wake of the explosion outside the Delhi High Court on September 7,2011. Both claims have been made through E-mails sent from cyber cafes. The first E-mail purports to be from the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) and the second from the Indian Mujahideen (IM). The authenticity of the two E-mails has not so far been established.
2. The HUJI, which came into existence during the Afgfhan jihad against the Soviet troops in the 1980s, has a presence in Pakistan as well as Bangladesh. The Pakistani branch is referred to by terrorism experts as HUJI and the Bangladesh branch as HUJI ( B ).
3.The HUJI, with which Ilyas Ibrahim of the so-called 313 Brigade used to be associated, was active in Jammu & Kashmir, but not in Indian territory outside J&K. HUJI (B) was active in the Indian territory outside J&K, but not in J & K.
4.The Special Task Force of the Uttar Pradesh (UP) Police, which investigated two explosions at a Hindu temple and a local railway station at Varanasi on March 7,2006, announced on April 5,2006, that its investigation had established that the two explosions were carried out by three terrorists of the HUJI (B), with local help provided by one Walilullah, the Imam of a mosque at Phulpur in Allahabad, and five other Indian Muslims.
5.While Walilullah and the five other Indian Muslims, who had helped the three terrorists from Bangladesh, were arrested, the three terrorists, who actually carried out the explosions, managed to escape to Bangladesh after carrying out the terrorist strikes. Twenty innocent civilians were killed in the two explosions. The UP Police described Walilullah as the Eastern UP Area Commander of HUJI (B).
6.In a confessional statement, Walilullah reportedly cited the demolition of the Babri Masjid in UP in December 1992 by a Hindu mob and the anti-Muslim riots in Gujarat in February,2002, as the reasons for the terrorist strikes against the temple and at the railway station. He projected the twin blasts as acts of reprisal terrorism. He gave the names of the three persons, who came from Bangladesh to carry out the explosions, as Bashiruddin alias Bashir,Mustafiz and Zakaria, all Bangladeshi nationals. According to his version, they had studied along with him at the Deoband seminary in UP some years ago and he had been in touch with them since then.
7.Walilullah had once been arrested by the Allahabad Police in 2001 on suspicion of his links with the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) of Pakistan. He was released after eight months without being prosecuted. Bashiruddin took him to Bangladesh in June 2004 and introduced him to one Maulana Asadullah of HUJI (B), who enrolled him into the organisation and appointed him as its Area Commander for Eastern UP.
8. The other five Indian Muslims arrested were Syed Shuib and Farhaan (Lucknow), Mohammad Rizwan Siddiqui and Mohammad Saad Ali (Amroha) and Shahid (Allahabad). They were working in a power loom in Bhiwandi near Mumbai. All the arrested Indian Muslims were reported to have confessed that they had visited Pakistan via Bangladesh for training in jihadi terrorism, organised by Maulana Asadullah.
9. A child was killed in an explosion in Varanasi on December 7, 2010, a day after the anniversary of the demolition of the Babri Masjid. An e-mailed message purporting to be from the IM--- carrying the December 6 dateline, but sent on December 7--- claimed responsibility for the attack. It projected the attack as in reprisal against a court judgement relating to the ownership of the land on which the Babri Masjid stood. The Muslims felt aggrieved by the judgement which they saw as based on Hindu religious beliefs and not on provable evidence. They expressed their determination to have it set aside by a higher court.
10.Incidents of violence were feared by the UP police on the day the judgement was delivered by the court, but nothing untoward happened. A delayed violent act of reprisal came on December 7, 2010, from unidentified elements claiming to be from the IM. The message purporting to be from the IM expressed the determination of the IM to keep up its fight on the Babri Masjid issue.
11.The HUJI (B) came into existence in 1992 after the Afghan Mujahideen captured power in Kabul in April,1992, after overthrowing the then Afghan President Najibullah. It was set up by a group of Bangladeshi nationals, who had fought against the forces of the Najibullah Government after having undergone jihadi training in Pakistan. The formation of the HUJI (B) was announced at a press conference in April 1992 by a group of Afghan war veterans. It was projected as a successor to a first Bangladeshi Mujahideen group that had been formed in 1984 by Commander Abdur Rahman, for fighting against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. He later reportedly died in the Afghan War in 1989.
12.Instructors from the HUJI (B) used to be attached to the training camps of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) near the Tirupura border. It was suspected that the attack on the security guards outside the US Consulate at Kolkata in January,2002, was orchestrated by HUJI (B), in collaboration with the JEM and the Lashkar-e-Toiba, under the name the Asif Reza Commando Force (ARCF). Aftab Ansari alias Aftab Ahmed alias Farhan Malik, the prime accused in the attack, was in touch not only with the office-bearers of these organisations in Pakistan, but also with Omar Sheikh, who had masterminded the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl, the US journalist.
13. While there has so far been no evidence of institutional contacts between the HUJI (B ) and the IM, some members of the Muslim community in UP had facilitated the terrorist strikes of HUJI ( B ) in Varanasi in March 2006. The present contacts of HUJI ( B ) in India---particularly in UP -- need to be re-examined in the light of the nine terrorist strikes since 26/11 which have remained undetected. ( 9-9-11)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd ), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies.. E-mail: seventyone2gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75)
Thursday, September 8, 2011
TERROR WITHOUT TRAIL
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR—PAPER NO 736
B.RAMAN
The terrorism situation on the ground is more and more worrying. It is not just because the terrorists have become smarter than they were before. They have, of course, but that should not be the main cause of worry.
2. It is because they have become more invisible, more inaudible and more unquantifiable than before. After nine terrorist strikes since 26/11, three each in Mumbai and Delhi and one each in Pune, Bengaluru and Varanasi, we still do not have an idea of who they are, what is their ideology, what are their demands, how strong they are, how are they organised, are they home-grown or externally sponsored, where are their roots etc etc
3.After nearly three years, we are not in a position to make a meaningful assessment of the new post-26/11 terror threat faced by us for want of essential data. You get the data from the network of your human agents spread across the country and abroad, from your TECHINT set-up inside the country and along the international borders, from your interrogation and surveillance of suspects, from your local enquiries and from your interactions with different communities.
4. How come not one of these means of collecting data seems to be functioning? Our HUMINT was generally below par, but deficiencies in our HUMINT coverage used to be made up by our above par TECHINT coverage. Many sleeper cells of terrorist organisations were detected and neutralised before 26/11 and many terrorists were identified and arrested after the commission of a terrorist strike by intercepting their electronic chatter.
5. Why there has been no worthwhile electronic chatter after 26/11? Have the terrorists stopped using modern means of communication or are they using more modern means of communication which our TECHINT set-up is not able to identify and break through?
6. You could see that the counter-terrorism capability of our TECHINT set-up seems to have weakened from the fact that there have been very few instances---if at all there are any--- of new sleeper cells being tracked down and neutralised and new suspects being rounded up and interrogated.
7. What is this apparent weakening of our counter-terrorism TECHINT capability due to? Turf battles? Non-recruitment of qualified and motivated TECHINT experts? Non-investment in equipment?
8.Whatever be the reason, it is a worrisome development. HUMINT and TECHINT work in tandem. If one is weak, the other makes up for it. If both become weak simultaneously, we start groping in the dark unable to see or hear the terrorists and sense their furtive movements and actions across the country.
9.Counter-terrorism has three components---prevention through timely and actionable intelligence, prevention through effective physical security and attrition of the terrorists’ capability through successful investigation and prosecution.
10. The physical security should be so tight that even if intelligence fails or is not up to the mark, we are still able to thwart the terrorists. Physical security cannot be blamed for seven of the nine terrorist strikes that have taken place since 26/11.But, poor physical security has definitely contributed to the two strikes outside the Delhi High court in May and on September 7,2011.
11. Since November,2007, the Indian Mujahideen (IM) had been repeatedly criticising the Indian judiciary and on November 23,2007, it had carried out seven explosions outside courts in three cities of Uttar Pradesh. Yet, for four years, we do not have seem to have made any physical security audit of important courts---particularly in Delhi and Mumbai --- and taken necessary action to strengthen their physical security---either through governmental means or by putting private physical security agencies on the job.
12. It used to be said and believed before 26/11 that while our preventive capability was weak, our ability to cause attrition in the ranks and capability of terrorist organisations through good investigation and prosecution was high. Even this capability, about which we used to boast before 26/11, seems to have weakened with the result that we have not made much headway in the investigation of the post-26/11 terrorist incidents.
13.The series of terrorist strikes carried out by the Indian Mujahideen (IM) and Pakistani organisations across India outside Jammu & Kashmir since the Mumbai blasts of March,1993, made us realise that jihadi terrorism---whether home-grown or imported from abroad—had become a pan-Indian threat and that it cannot be dealt with in the same manner as we were dealing with cross-border terrorism in J&K, which was a different kettle of fish.
14. It was this realisation which brought into existence post-26/11 the National Investigation Agency (NIA), which functions under the control of the Home Minister of the Government of India. But the NIA as it has evolved is neither a donkey nor a mule. One does not know what it is.
15.Many of us---like me--- who had been advocating a new counter-terrorism investigation machinery to deal with the new pan-Indian terrorism, wanted some set-up similar to the counter-terrorism division of the USA’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The FBI is exclusively responsible for all preliminary enquiries, investigation and prosecution in all terrorism incidents of a federal dimension.
16.It is for the Director of the FBI to assess whether an incident of violence amounted to an act of terrorism. Once he decides so, he asks the FBI to take over the investigation. He does not require any prior permission from the President or from any Governor of any State. The decision is his and his alone. As a result of this, the FBI has a total picture of the terrorism situation in the US.
17.The decision to set up the NIA in India was taken in haste after the traumatic events of November 26-28, 2008, in India. As a result, neither the ruling coalition nor the opposition carefully debated as to what kind of investigation mechanism we need to deal with this pan-Indian threat, what powers and responsibilities it should have and how to persuade the States to accept the creation of a pan-Indian investigation agency with teeth.
18. Under the procedure laid down, it is the Home Minister who decides what cases need to be entrusted to
the NIA and what cases need not be. Eight of the terrorist strikes after 26/11 were not entrusted to the NIA. Only the latest strike of September 7 has been. Why the previous cases were not entrusted to the NIA? How can the NIA investigate pan-Indian terrorism in an integrated manner if the MHA picks and chooses as to what cases will be investigated by the NIA and what cases need not be?
19. These are some of the issues that need crying attention after the terrorist strike of September 9. It is hoped at least now the Government and the opposition will start thinking of pan-Indian terrorism in an integrated and professional manner and not in a manner marked more by considerations of partisan politics than professionalism. ( 9-9-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com. Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
B.RAMAN
The terrorism situation on the ground is more and more worrying. It is not just because the terrorists have become smarter than they were before. They have, of course, but that should not be the main cause of worry.
2. It is because they have become more invisible, more inaudible and more unquantifiable than before. After nine terrorist strikes since 26/11, three each in Mumbai and Delhi and one each in Pune, Bengaluru and Varanasi, we still do not have an idea of who they are, what is their ideology, what are their demands, how strong they are, how are they organised, are they home-grown or externally sponsored, where are their roots etc etc
3.After nearly three years, we are not in a position to make a meaningful assessment of the new post-26/11 terror threat faced by us for want of essential data. You get the data from the network of your human agents spread across the country and abroad, from your TECHINT set-up inside the country and along the international borders, from your interrogation and surveillance of suspects, from your local enquiries and from your interactions with different communities.
4. How come not one of these means of collecting data seems to be functioning? Our HUMINT was generally below par, but deficiencies in our HUMINT coverage used to be made up by our above par TECHINT coverage. Many sleeper cells of terrorist organisations were detected and neutralised before 26/11 and many terrorists were identified and arrested after the commission of a terrorist strike by intercepting their electronic chatter.
5. Why there has been no worthwhile electronic chatter after 26/11? Have the terrorists stopped using modern means of communication or are they using more modern means of communication which our TECHINT set-up is not able to identify and break through?
6. You could see that the counter-terrorism capability of our TECHINT set-up seems to have weakened from the fact that there have been very few instances---if at all there are any--- of new sleeper cells being tracked down and neutralised and new suspects being rounded up and interrogated.
7. What is this apparent weakening of our counter-terrorism TECHINT capability due to? Turf battles? Non-recruitment of qualified and motivated TECHINT experts? Non-investment in equipment?
8.Whatever be the reason, it is a worrisome development. HUMINT and TECHINT work in tandem. If one is weak, the other makes up for it. If both become weak simultaneously, we start groping in the dark unable to see or hear the terrorists and sense their furtive movements and actions across the country.
9.Counter-terrorism has three components---prevention through timely and actionable intelligence, prevention through effective physical security and attrition of the terrorists’ capability through successful investigation and prosecution.
10. The physical security should be so tight that even if intelligence fails or is not up to the mark, we are still able to thwart the terrorists. Physical security cannot be blamed for seven of the nine terrorist strikes that have taken place since 26/11.But, poor physical security has definitely contributed to the two strikes outside the Delhi High court in May and on September 7,2011.
11. Since November,2007, the Indian Mujahideen (IM) had been repeatedly criticising the Indian judiciary and on November 23,2007, it had carried out seven explosions outside courts in three cities of Uttar Pradesh. Yet, for four years, we do not have seem to have made any physical security audit of important courts---particularly in Delhi and Mumbai --- and taken necessary action to strengthen their physical security---either through governmental means or by putting private physical security agencies on the job.
12. It used to be said and believed before 26/11 that while our preventive capability was weak, our ability to cause attrition in the ranks and capability of terrorist organisations through good investigation and prosecution was high. Even this capability, about which we used to boast before 26/11, seems to have weakened with the result that we have not made much headway in the investigation of the post-26/11 terrorist incidents.
13.The series of terrorist strikes carried out by the Indian Mujahideen (IM) and Pakistani organisations across India outside Jammu & Kashmir since the Mumbai blasts of March,1993, made us realise that jihadi terrorism---whether home-grown or imported from abroad—had become a pan-Indian threat and that it cannot be dealt with in the same manner as we were dealing with cross-border terrorism in J&K, which was a different kettle of fish.
14. It was this realisation which brought into existence post-26/11 the National Investigation Agency (NIA), which functions under the control of the Home Minister of the Government of India. But the NIA as it has evolved is neither a donkey nor a mule. One does not know what it is.
15.Many of us---like me--- who had been advocating a new counter-terrorism investigation machinery to deal with the new pan-Indian terrorism, wanted some set-up similar to the counter-terrorism division of the USA’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The FBI is exclusively responsible for all preliminary enquiries, investigation and prosecution in all terrorism incidents of a federal dimension.
16.It is for the Director of the FBI to assess whether an incident of violence amounted to an act of terrorism. Once he decides so, he asks the FBI to take over the investigation. He does not require any prior permission from the President or from any Governor of any State. The decision is his and his alone. As a result of this, the FBI has a total picture of the terrorism situation in the US.
17.The decision to set up the NIA in India was taken in haste after the traumatic events of November 26-28, 2008, in India. As a result, neither the ruling coalition nor the opposition carefully debated as to what kind of investigation mechanism we need to deal with this pan-Indian threat, what powers and responsibilities it should have and how to persuade the States to accept the creation of a pan-Indian investigation agency with teeth.
18. Under the procedure laid down, it is the Home Minister who decides what cases need to be entrusted to
the NIA and what cases need not be. Eight of the terrorist strikes after 26/11 were not entrusted to the NIA. Only the latest strike of September 7 has been. Why the previous cases were not entrusted to the NIA? How can the NIA investigate pan-Indian terrorism in an integrated manner if the MHA picks and chooses as to what cases will be investigated by the NIA and what cases need not be?
19. These are some of the issues that need crying attention after the terrorist strike of September 9. It is hoped at least now the Government and the opposition will start thinking of pan-Indian terrorism in an integrated and professional manner and not in a manner marked more by considerations of partisan politics than professionalism. ( 9-9-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com. Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Wednesday, September 7, 2011
PAST THREATS OF INDIAN MUJAHIDEEN ( IM) AGAINST JUDICIARY
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR—PAPER NO 735
B.RAMAN
( To be read in connection with the bomb blast outside the Delhi High Court on September 7 in which nine persons were reported to have been killed. )
Thirteen persons were killed in seven well-synchronised explosions near court premises in three cities of Uttar Pradesh---Lucknow, Varanasi and Faizabad---on the afternoon of November 23, 2007.
2.The explosions came in the wake of the judgements delivered in respect of the Mumbai serial blasts of March 1993 and the Coimbatore serial blasts of February,1998. In both the cases, a number of jihadi terrorists had been found guilty and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment.
3.The explosions also came after the arrest of three suspected members of the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) in UP, who were alleged to have planned to kidnap a dignitary in order to secure the release of Afzal Guru, who has been sentenced to death for his role in the attack on the Indian Parliament in December,2001. The arrested JEM terrorists were alleged to have been beaten up by some lawyers when they were brought to court. The local lawyers had also reportedly refused to defend terrorists in future.
4. An E-mail message purported to be from "Indian Mujahideen" received by some TV channels before the explosions indicated that these explosions were about to take place.
5.The message referred to the severe penalties awarded to the accused in the Mumbai blasts of March,1993, and the lack of action against Hindu police officers, who committed atrocities on Muslims. It also referred to the Gujrat riots of 2002 and the assault on arrested JEM suspects by some lawyers. The message which the sender sought to convey was that the Indian criminal justice system treated the Muslims severely, but was lenient to the Hindus.
6.Last year, there were two messages purported to have been issued by the Indian Mujahideen (IM) warning of its plans to carry out terrorist strikes.
7. The first message was disseminated by E-mail on September 19,2010. It was shown as having been signed by one Al Arbi the same day. It referred to certain anti-Muslim incidents which allegedly took place in Ratlam in Madhya Pradesh on the day of Eid (September 11). It also referred to the day( September 17) when the total number of people allegedly killed by the security forces in Jammu & Kashmir crossed 100.
8. Many of the religious allusions in the message had been taken from some past messages of Osama bin Laden, but bin Laden was not mentioned by name.
9. The statement did not directly claim responsibility on behalf of the IM for the attack in Delhi on September 19 in which two Taiwanese tourists were injured. However, it indirectly hinted at its responsibility by saying: "In the name of Allah we dedicate this attack of retribution...."
10. While over 75 per cent of the statement was about alleged atrocities against Muslims in Jammu & Kashmir, there were also condemnatory references to the death of two IM suspects during a raid by the Delhi police on September 19,2008, to the arrests of some alleged members of the IM by the Anti-Terrorism Squad of the Maharashtra Police in connection with the Pune Bakery blast of February 13 last and some alleged anti-Muslim incidents in Ratlam in Madhya Pradesh on Eid day. (http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers41/paper4051.html)
11. A message dated December 6, 2010, purporting to be from the IM indirectly claiming responsibility for the explosion in Varanasi on December 7,2010, was received by some media outlets to which it was addressed after the explosion had taken place. It avoided any allusions to the messages of Osama bin Laden and was free of bin Laden like language and rhetoric. It had not borrowed from the past messages of bin Laden.
12.It projected the IM as a purely indigenous movement, but needing the support of the Islamic world. It warned the Hindus of continued attacks on Hindu holy places till all Masjids (mosques) belonging to the Muslims were restored to them. It was critical of the Indian criminal justice system, which was projected as anti-Muslim.
13.It criticised the Judiciary as follows: "The Supreme Court, the high courts, the lower courts and all the Commissions have utterly failed to play an impartial role regarding Muslim issues. Narendra Modi who presided over the 2002 massacres of Muslims in Gujarat is given a clean chit whereas the victims still run from pillar to post for justice. Even the 92 Mumbai culprits roam freely and enjoy Government security. All the anti-Muslim pre-planned riots, arson, rapes, losses of lives and properties are still awaiting justice. The list is endless!"
( 7-9-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
( To be read in connection with the bomb blast outside the Delhi High Court on September 7 in which nine persons were reported to have been killed. )
Thirteen persons were killed in seven well-synchronised explosions near court premises in three cities of Uttar Pradesh---Lucknow, Varanasi and Faizabad---on the afternoon of November 23, 2007.
2.The explosions came in the wake of the judgements delivered in respect of the Mumbai serial blasts of March 1993 and the Coimbatore serial blasts of February,1998. In both the cases, a number of jihadi terrorists had been found guilty and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment.
3.The explosions also came after the arrest of three suspected members of the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) in UP, who were alleged to have planned to kidnap a dignitary in order to secure the release of Afzal Guru, who has been sentenced to death for his role in the attack on the Indian Parliament in December,2001. The arrested JEM terrorists were alleged to have been beaten up by some lawyers when they were brought to court. The local lawyers had also reportedly refused to defend terrorists in future.
4. An E-mail message purported to be from "Indian Mujahideen" received by some TV channels before the explosions indicated that these explosions were about to take place.
5.The message referred to the severe penalties awarded to the accused in the Mumbai blasts of March,1993, and the lack of action against Hindu police officers, who committed atrocities on Muslims. It also referred to the Gujrat riots of 2002 and the assault on arrested JEM suspects by some lawyers. The message which the sender sought to convey was that the Indian criminal justice system treated the Muslims severely, but was lenient to the Hindus.
6.Last year, there were two messages purported to have been issued by the Indian Mujahideen (IM) warning of its plans to carry out terrorist strikes.
7. The first message was disseminated by E-mail on September 19,2010. It was shown as having been signed by one Al Arbi the same day. It referred to certain anti-Muslim incidents which allegedly took place in Ratlam in Madhya Pradesh on the day of Eid (September 11). It also referred to the day( September 17) when the total number of people allegedly killed by the security forces in Jammu & Kashmir crossed 100.
8. Many of the religious allusions in the message had been taken from some past messages of Osama bin Laden, but bin Laden was not mentioned by name.
9. The statement did not directly claim responsibility on behalf of the IM for the attack in Delhi on September 19 in which two Taiwanese tourists were injured. However, it indirectly hinted at its responsibility by saying: "In the name of Allah we dedicate this attack of retribution...."
10. While over 75 per cent of the statement was about alleged atrocities against Muslims in Jammu & Kashmir, there were also condemnatory references to the death of two IM suspects during a raid by the Delhi police on September 19,2008, to the arrests of some alleged members of the IM by the Anti-Terrorism Squad of the Maharashtra Police in connection with the Pune Bakery blast of February 13 last and some alleged anti-Muslim incidents in Ratlam in Madhya Pradesh on Eid day. (http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers41/paper4051.html)
11. A message dated December 6, 2010, purporting to be from the IM indirectly claiming responsibility for the explosion in Varanasi on December 7,2010, was received by some media outlets to which it was addressed after the explosion had taken place. It avoided any allusions to the messages of Osama bin Laden and was free of bin Laden like language and rhetoric. It had not borrowed from the past messages of bin Laden.
12.It projected the IM as a purely indigenous movement, but needing the support of the Islamic world. It warned the Hindus of continued attacks on Hindu holy places till all Masjids (mosques) belonging to the Muslims were restored to them. It was critical of the Indian criminal justice system, which was projected as anti-Muslim.
13.It criticised the Judiciary as follows: "The Supreme Court, the high courts, the lower courts and all the Commissions have utterly failed to play an impartial role regarding Muslim issues. Narendra Modi who presided over the 2002 massacres of Muslims in Gujarat is given a clean chit whereas the victims still run from pillar to post for justice. Even the 92 Mumbai culprits roam freely and enjoy Government security. All the anti-Muslim pre-planned riots, arson, rapes, losses of lives and properties are still awaiting justice. The list is endless!"
( 7-9-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Sunday, September 4, 2011
INFORMALITY OF STATE TO STATE INTERACTIONS: MAIN CASUALTY OF WIKILEAKS
B.RAMAN
Foreign offices and intelligence agencies of the world interact with each other and among themselves at two levels----formal and informal.
2. In the case of Foreign Offices, the formal component is much more than the informal. In the case of intelligence agencies, it is the other way round.
3. The formal component of Foreign Offices’ interactions consists of exchanges of notes verbales, memos, aides-memoires, non-papers etc. They remain as permanent records in the files of the respective Foreign Offices for purposes of future reference.
4. The informal component consists of chats between diplomats and officials and other interlocutors of the host Governments over a drink or a cup of tea. It does not involve exchanges of papers of any kind. The diplomat after going back to the Embassy will send a cable to his Foreign Office as to what transpired during such informal interactions.
5. Intelligence agencies having a liaison relationship also follow a similar procedure when exchanging intelligence, assessments etc. Certain exchanges do involve formal papers----for example, exchanges of forensic evidence and reports.
6. The intelligence agencies of India and the US have been having a liaison relationship almost since 1947, but you will not find many papers formally exchanged between them. Officers responsible for liaison will meet informally over a drink in a safe house or in the lobby of a hotel, orally brief each other and then take leave of each other. When they do exchange intelligence documents, they will not indicate which agency prepared the document.
7. An examination of State-to-State relations between countries will reveal that often breakthroughs are achieved and policies are better understood during such informal interactions and not during formal meetings.
8.People tend to speak much more freely when there is no paper trail and when the meetings are informal than during formal interactions with a lot of possible paper trail.
9. One of the major casualties of the WikiLeaks would be such informal tete-a-tete exchanges. After seeing the damage caused by the Wikileaks, all public servants----whether political leaders or Foreign Office bureaucrats or intelligence officers---- will hesitate to agree to informal meetings and to speak freely during such meetings.
10. To illustrate my point, I will give the example of the Cable sent by Timothy Roemer, the then US Ambassador, to the State Department on December 17,2009, after an interaction---that was apparently informal--- with M.K.Narayanan, the then National Security Adviser, on the question of David Coleman Headley, of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), who was involved in the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai.
11. A careful reading of this cable would indicate that M.K. and the Ambassador were informally discussing the implications of an Indian request for his extradition. The Ambassador was hinting that this could create difficulties in the way of the FBI interrogating Headley and sharing the resulting intelligence with the Indian agencies.
12. MK, while showing some understanding of the point made by the Ambassador, was pointing out as to why India had to make a nam-ke-waste request for extradition. That is the way informal exchanges are conducted.
13. The US Ambassador then went back to his office and shot off a cable to the State Department. This cable has now been released by Julian Assange of WikiLeaks without editing the name of MK, thereby creating a personal embarrassment for MK and also for the Government of India in the eyes of the Indian public.
14. The cable shows the propensity of the GOI and its officials to exaggerate the usefulness of the Indo-US counter-terrorism co-operation when facts were otherwise. The leakage of the contents of an informal interaction would thus create political embarrassment for the host Government and the former NSA.
15. The result of such leakages would be a drying-up of informal interactions at the Foreign Office and intelligence agencies levels. State-to-State diplomacy and intelligence liaison would suffer as a result.
16. How to limit the damage and how to ensure that informal diplomatic exchanges do not suffer are questions that need to be discussed by all Foreign Offices.
17. An important ethical question is also involved. The media initially projected a wilful violator of the law (Assange) as a hero. Non-governmental organisations and the media created hurdles in the way of his arrest and prosecution for disseminating a large number of sensitive documents having implications for national security and State-to-State relations.
18. The hero has now turned a menace by releasing to the public hundreds of thousands of documents without editing them. He has become a Frankenstein’s monster. To discourage copy-cats of such monsters in future, the media and the non-Governmental organisations should at least now co-operate with the authorities to facilitate his arrest and prosecution. ( 5-9-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @ SORBONNE75 )
MY THOUGHTS ON EVE OF 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF 9/11
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR—PAPER NO 734
B.RAMAN
The late Osama bin Laden never believed in carrying out terrorist strikes to mark important anniversaries in the history of Al Qaeda such as the anniversary of the terrorist strikes outside the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam in August 1998, the attack on USS Cole, a US Navy ship, off Aden in October,2000, or the 9/11 strikes in the US Homeland.
2. According to a prevalent belief among tribal sources in Pakistan’s Pashtun belt, he believed tight physical security on important anniversaries such as these would make a successful strike very difficult.
3. It was, therefore, no surprise that he did not carry out any major terrorist strikes targeting the US on the anniversaries of 9/11 till now. Now that OBL is dead and has been succeeded by Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian, as the Amir of Al Qaeda, can the position change? Can there be a terrorist strike coinciding with the 10th anniversary of 9/11? Will Zawahiri order a strike on this occasion to establish his ability to strike at the US and to demonstrate that despite the death of OBL, Al Qaeda remains as motivated as ever and remains determined to make the US pay a heavy price for the clandestine raid by US naval commandos at Abbottabad on the night of May 2, which resulted in the death of OBL?
4. A major reprisal attack by Al Qaeda or its affiliates directed against the US such as the catastrophic strike against seven CIA officers at Khost in Afghanistan on December 30, 2009, remains a strong possibility to be guarded against. After the death of OBL, there has been a major terrorist strike on August 5,2011, directed against a group of helicopter-borne US troops in Afghanistan in which 30 US troops, 22 of them US Navy SEALS, reportedly from the same unit that had participated in the Abbottabad raid, were reported to have been killed. This attack, which bore the hallmark of Al Qaeda’s conception and planning, was, however, believed to have been carried out by the Afghan Taliban, which did not project it as in reprisal for the Abbottabad raid.
5. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) had projected the mysterious attack on the headquarters of the Pakistan naval air wing PNS Mehran in Karachi on May 22 as in reprisal for the death of OBL. Its claim could not be authenticated. Moreover, considering that Pakistani elements----governmental or non-Governmental or both--- had connived at OBL living in his Abbottabad hide-out for nearly five years, it is very unlikely that Al Qaeda would have targeted Pakistan in reprisal for the death of OBL.
6. The reprisal for the death of OBL is, therefore, yet to come and when it comes, Al Qaeda will ensure that it bears its signature and is worthy of it. When OBL was alive, it used to be believed that Zawahiri and some of his associates in Al Qaeda were unhappy over OBL’s decision to strike at the US in its homeland thereby inviting massive retaliation from the US in the Af-Pak region. They were reportedly of the view that Al Qaeda should have continued targeting the US outside its homeland as it did in Saudi Arabia in 1996 and in Nairobi, Dar-es-Salaam and Aden subsequently.
7. If Zawahiri continues to hold this view and if his close lieutenants also share this, the reprisal attack may not come in the US Homeland. It could come in an area that has a strategic US presence and where Al Qaeda feels confident of operating with success. Among such areas, one could think of the Af-Pak region, Aden once again, possibly India and Germany, where the Islamic Jihad Union had come to notice in the past for planning terrorist strikes against US military establishments that were thwarted by timely intelligence.
8. Al Qaeda has never operated in India before. There was a suspicion of an Al Qaeda brain behind the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai by the Lashkar-e-Toiba. This remained without concrete evidence to back it. Neither Al Qaeda nor its ideology has had many takers in the Indian Muslim community.
9. But India has undetected sleeping cells of jihadis of unproven origin who had carried out two major terrorist strikes after 26/11---in Pune in February,2010, and in Mumbai in July 2011. None of the terrorist strikes---major or minor--- in Indian territory outside Jammu & Kashmir after 26/11 has been detected. All this shows that India has in its midst jihadi terrorist elements well-trained in planning and executing a terrorist strike and remaining undetected.
10. In the absence of its own jihadi foot soldiers, Al Qaeda could turn to such jihadi elements which are able to operate in India with ease like fish in troubled waters for its act of reprisal if it considers India as a possible theatre for its reprisal against the US.
11. In the absence of human and technical intelligence and interrogation data from detected and arrested cell members, one has to rely on circumstantial analysis.
12. Such analysis underlines the need for heightened alert by the Indian counter-terrorism agencies in the days to come. It also underlines the need for close interaction between the counter-terrorism agencies of India and the US. ( 4-9-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and , presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Friday, September 2, 2011
INDIA: IN FOR ANOTHER 26/11
B.RAMAN
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO.733
( Written at the request of the “Times of India”)
The soon-to-be 10-year war against Al Qaeda and its affiliates waged by the international community under US leadership has been partly successful and partly not so.
Its successes have been in eliminating Osama bin Laden and a number of other high value targets of Al Qaeda and its affiliates in the Af-Pak region, Yemen and Iraq and in repeatedly thwarting their attempts to mount another 9/11 style catastrophic terrorist strike in the US Homeland. The international community has also been able to prevent so far any major threat of maritime and weapons of mass destruction terrorism from materializing.
These successes could be attributed to the strengthening of physical security through improved national capabilities and international co-operation, modernization of counter-terrorism capabilities and techniques, improvement in the collection of human and technical intelligence and follow-up action thereon and stricter laws to deal with terrorism.
The failures have been in the inability of the international community to destroy the terrorist infrastructure in the Af-Pak region, Yemen and Iraq and in preventing its spread to other countries such as Algeria, Somalia and Indonesia. It has also failed thus far to counter the pernicious ideology of the terrorists and to prevent the flow of new recruits to the terrorist organizations. The successes in eliminating many leaders have not affected the morale of the organizations.
The morale, the infrastructure and the innovative and constantly improving modus operandi of the terrorists continue to pose a high level of threat, which is likely to continue in the short and medium terms. The terrorists might not have been able to mount another 9/11 style strike, but they have shown an ability to spread the areas of their operations and to take the intelligence and physical security agencies by surprise.
We saw proof of this in the terrorist strikes in Indonesia, India, the Af-Pak region, Spain and the UK. There has been a modernization of the techniques used by the terrorists----whether in respect of communication technologies, improvisation of explosive devices or finding ways of defeating improved physical security measures
Another development of concern has been in the availability to the terrorists of a much larger reservoir of potential recruits. In the initial years of the war against terrorism, terrorists for pan-global operations came mainly from amongst Arabs .Now they come increasingly from the Pakistani community in the Af-Pak region and in the West. International terrorism, which was largely an Arab phenomenon before 9/11, has now become a mixed Arab-Pak phenomenon with Pakistani organizations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) moving into the driving seat.
The successes in the ground and air-mounted counter-terrorism operations of the US have been mainly against the Arab and not the Pakistani component. Only after the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai have the US and the rest of the world come to share India’s concerns regarding the emergence of Pakistan- origin terrorism as a major threat to international security. The pan-global Arab terrorism has found a new and equally capable ally in the pan-global Pakistani terrorism. The action against Pakistan -origin terrorism has been half-hearted so far due to the still prevailing mistaken perception that this terrorism is still focused on India and the world is not yet its theatre of operations. The continuing ambivalence in the attitude to Pak-origin terrorism stands in the way of an effective conclusion to the war against terrorism.
If the international community has to finally prevail in the war against terrorism, counter-terrorism operations in the Af-Pak region have to be directed as much against the terrorist infrastructure as against its leaders. Terrorist operations against leaders such as OBL are spectacular, but final success will come only if the spectacular is combined with painstaking and surgical strikes against the infrastructure.
The decision of the US to start thinning out its presence in Afghanistan even before prevailing finally against Al Qaeda and the Taliban is likely to pose a new danger of a trained and well-motivated crop of Afghan veterans of Pashtun--Punjabi origin spreading out across the region, including India, and stepping up terrorism.
The Arab veterans of the Afghan war of the 1980s against the Soviet troops were behind the wave of terrorism of the last decade. The Pashtun-cum Punjabi- cum- Arab veterans of the wars of the last decade against the US-led NATO troops in Afghanistan and Iraq are likely to be behind a new wave of terrorism as the US troops withdraw.
India has to be seriously concerned over the possibility of this scenario. A new wave of Afghan veterans is likely to provide fresh oxygen to cross-border terrorism. The various terrorist strikes faced by India during the last decade have shown that while the cross-border counter-terrorism capabilities in Jammu & Kashmir might have improved, our pan-Indian capabilities outside J&K have not kept pace with the evolving nature and magnitude of terrorism.
While investigation, forensic and physical security capabilities in the rest of the world have improved after 9/11, ours seem to be stagnating as seen from our failure to prevent the 26/11 and 10/7 strikes in Mumbai and the terrorist strike in Pune in February last year. Our inability to successfully investigate any of the post-26/11 strikes despite the availability of greater international cooperation is a matter of serious concern.
Our intelligence machinery and counter-terrorism agencies continue to suffer from major deficiencies. Action to revamp our agencies and counter-terrorism infrastructure has been more in rhetoric than in action.
Counter-terrorism leadership has to flow from the Prime Minister downwards. This has not happened. The opposition has totally failed to keep the debate focused on our deficiencies. Our counter-terrorism debate has been reduced to a meaningless slanging match marked more by partisan agendas than thoughtful ideas.(3-9-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
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