B.RAMAN
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China has banned the use of blogs, microblogs and other social web sites by Chinese military personnel. It has described the ban as part of its grim Internet struggle.
2. A report on this carried by the Party-owned “People’s Daily” on June 2,2001, is annexed below. ( 3-6-11)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail” seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
China's PLA bans soldiers from social websites
Making online friends could play into the hands of the "enemy", according to China's People's Liberation Army, which has said its roughly 2.3 million soldiers will be banned from using social media.
The world's largest military force has notified service men and women that it will strictly enforce the ban to "safeguard military secrets and the purity and solidarity" of the PLA, state media said this week.
The People's Liberation Daily, the armed forces' official newspaper, said passing on personal details such as a soldier's address, duties or contact details could risk revealing the location of military bases.
It added that particular risks exist in users posting photos of themselves, such as during training, which could divulge military capabilities and equipment.
The ban was included in regulations announced last year that proscribed soldiers from launching websites or writing blogs, the paper added.
But in a sign that the ban was apparently being ignored in a country where social media are wildly popular, the military brass has taken the step of re-emphasizing the restriction, warning of a "grim struggle" on the Internet.
Officers and soldiers must be made to understand the "real dangers" of making friends online and to "strengthen their knowledge of the enemy situation," it said, without elaborating.
China has nearly half a billion online users, according to official figures, and Chinese-language social media sites similar to Facebook and Twitter - which are blocked by the country's censors - count hundreds of millions of users.
Defense News
Thursday, June 2, 2011
INSIDE PAKISTANI SECURITY FORCES
( Reproduced from "Friday Times" of Lahore, dated June 3,2011)
Inside the armed forces
Radicals in ranks
Abdullah Malik
Takes a look at incidents of support for terrorists from within the armed forces and police
Institutionally, religion might be used as a motivational tool, but it is not allowed to guide the organisational strategy or goals
During the trial of Raymond Davis, a policeman was proudly wearing a militant organisation's badge. Even after being admonished by the judge, the policeman refused to remove the badge
Despite Gen Zia’s Islamisation, the promotion of piety in the barracks, and the support for puritanical movements that were allowed to organise sermons, the armed forces have still essentially retained a secular outlook. Institutionally, religion might be used as a motivational tool, but it is not allowed to guide the organisational strategy or goals. Intelligence networks help purge out the radical members of the forces.
But there have been many instances when radical Islamists have penetrated the armed forces and other law-enforcement agencies and threatened the state security mechanism. It is very well known that the lower ranks of the Punjab Police in district of Southern Punjab suffer from an infestation of sympathisers of militant organisation and this hurts the policing ability of the force. That was evident in the 1990s, when the Punjab Police was at the forefront of the war against sectarian terrorism and lower ranking officials had collaborated with the banned outfits on numerous occasions to tip them off or facilitate counter-attacks. An offshoot of the Shia militant organisation Sipah-e-Muhammad was led by a retired major, Ashraf Ali Shah.
In the two assassination attempts on former president Gen Pervez Musharraf, the PAF arrested 57 soldiers (Dawn June 25, 2009), five were awarded death sentences (mostly corporals, junior technicians), one army jawan (from the DSG) was hanged. Others, awarded sentences of varying lengths, included two soldiers of the SSG. Explosives used in the first attempt were in fact stolen from a PAF depot by one of the convicted airmen (Daily Times February 25, 2005). Some of the airmen were sermoned to radicalisation in-house and others “got a one-year leave on the pretext of accompanying the preaching groups, but when they were later arrested, it transpired that they had in fact been training with different militant groups” (The News May 24, 2011). Another three young airmen were sentenced for association with the banned Jaish-e-Muhammad in the arrests that followed (Oct 19, 2005).
The assassination of ex-GOC of SSG Maj Gen Ameer Faisal Alavi was plotted by a retired major, Haroon Ashiq. After joining the Lashkar-e-Tayyba, he moved on to work with Ilyas Kashmiri of the Brigade 313 linked with Al Qaeda. Ashiq’s own brother, Captain (r) Khurram, had retired from the army only to join Taliban and other fighters in Afghanistan. He was killed in 2007 in Helmand province. Various other retired soldiers, many of whom had liasioned with the Taliban during the ‘90s, returned to Afghanistan to fight on voluntary basis too.
Maj (r) Ashiq is not the only officer with links with Al Qaeda. In 2003, Major Adil Qudoos of 45 Signals was arrested and later sentenced for being linked to the militant network. The infamous Khalid Sheikh Muhammad was arrested from the house of his brother in Rawalpindi. Linked to this web of militants were Lt Col Khalid Mahmood Abbasi of Signals, Lt Col Abdul Ghaffar posted at the Army Aviation Command Rawalpindi, Maj Ataullah Khan Mahmood from the Judge Advocate General (JAG) branch, Major Rohail Sarfraz of HQ II Corps and Capt Dr Usman Zafar. The first three were given various sentences while the latter were dismissed from service.
More recently, retired Maj Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed has been found to be conclusively involved in planning of the November 26, 2008 Mumbai attacks in some way and planning attacks on a Danish newspaper. Connected to the LeT, he was arrested by the authorities, but his current status remains unknown.
Another case of high level militant infiltration involved Col Shahid Bashir, retired Sq Ldr Nadeem Ahmed Shah (a member of the Rawalpindi bar) and a civilian employee of the Air Weapons Complex (AWC). Associated with the proscribed Hizbut Tehrir that is gaining membership amongst private university students across the country in alarming numbers, they are accused of spying on, leaking info about and planning attacks on the Shamsi Air Field. Muhammad Altaf, a civilian employee of the National Development Complex (NDC) that comes under NESCOM and deals with ballistic missile development was similarly arrested for alleged links with a banned outfit. His status remains that of a “missing person” (Dawn News TV “Gumshuda”).
Radicalisation at the highest levels has been witnessed earlier too, in the failed 1995 “Operation Khilafa” coup attempt. Led by DG Infantry at the GHQ, Major General Zaheerul Islam Abbasi, the plan involved taking over the GHQ at the time of the Corps Commander Conference, killing the high ranking officers and then taking over the country to impose a Taliban-esque radical Sunni government. Convicted or dismissed alongwith Maj Gen Abbasi were Brig Mustansar Billah, Col Inayatullah Khan, Col Azad Minhas, Col Abdul Hamid, Col Muhammad Iqbal, Lt Col Shamsul Islam Tahir and Lt Col Liaquat Ali Raja amongst others.
One of the most alarming factors is that the approver for the prosecution, who was the militant given the duty to provide raiders for the attack, was none other than Qari Saifullah Akhtar, an ex Harkatul Jihad Al Islami militant who is now linked to Al Qaeda and was named by Benazir Bhutto as being involved in the attacks on her life.
Radicalization in the lower ranks is equally worrying. Investigation by Dawn in May, 2010 showed that the deadly Jundullah that carried out the assassination attempt on V Corps Commander, later VCOAS Gen Ahsan Saleem Hayat, was raised by serving and ex-soldiers of the army and the PAF. Jundullah has become famous as a small but deadly force.
Constable Sheikh Muhammad Adil of the Sindh Police Special Branch was convicted in 2002 of being involved in the murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl. A member of the HuJI whilst serving in the police, Adil assisted in the act of kidnapping. More recently, the section in-charge of the Computer Section at the Special Branch of the Punjab Police was found to have militant links. Accused Junior Clerk Zahid Bajwa had been recruited on a fake domicile and had a case pending against him for possession of explosives. Posted at the HQ of the Special Branch, he had access to intelligence reports and security plans, a cause of extreme worry. A constable was arrested in 2004 for being linked to the network of militants that aided Al Qaeda operative Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani in Gujrat.
These cases are just the tip of the iceberg. While the armed forces have been somewhat successful in purging militant sympathisers from within their ranks, the case of police has been extremely worrying. The case of Mumtaz Qadri alone is sufficient to become a cause for worry. During the trial of the CIA contractor Raymond Davis, one of the policemen from the escort that brought Davis to court was proudly wearing the badge of a militant organisation on his chest. Even after being furiously admonished by the judge, the policeman refused to remove the badge from his uniform and nobody was able to do anything. Such cases are a cause for fear and should not be taken lightly.
The author is a free lance contributor based in Illinois, USA.
Inside the armed forces
Radicals in ranks
Abdullah Malik
Takes a look at incidents of support for terrorists from within the armed forces and police
Institutionally, religion might be used as a motivational tool, but it is not allowed to guide the organisational strategy or goals
During the trial of Raymond Davis, a policeman was proudly wearing a militant organisation's badge. Even after being admonished by the judge, the policeman refused to remove the badge
Despite Gen Zia’s Islamisation, the promotion of piety in the barracks, and the support for puritanical movements that were allowed to organise sermons, the armed forces have still essentially retained a secular outlook. Institutionally, religion might be used as a motivational tool, but it is not allowed to guide the organisational strategy or goals. Intelligence networks help purge out the radical members of the forces.
But there have been many instances when radical Islamists have penetrated the armed forces and other law-enforcement agencies and threatened the state security mechanism. It is very well known that the lower ranks of the Punjab Police in district of Southern Punjab suffer from an infestation of sympathisers of militant organisation and this hurts the policing ability of the force. That was evident in the 1990s, when the Punjab Police was at the forefront of the war against sectarian terrorism and lower ranking officials had collaborated with the banned outfits on numerous occasions to tip them off or facilitate counter-attacks. An offshoot of the Shia militant organisation Sipah-e-Muhammad was led by a retired major, Ashraf Ali Shah.
In the two assassination attempts on former president Gen Pervez Musharraf, the PAF arrested 57 soldiers (Dawn June 25, 2009), five were awarded death sentences (mostly corporals, junior technicians), one army jawan (from the DSG) was hanged. Others, awarded sentences of varying lengths, included two soldiers of the SSG. Explosives used in the first attempt were in fact stolen from a PAF depot by one of the convicted airmen (Daily Times February 25, 2005). Some of the airmen were sermoned to radicalisation in-house and others “got a one-year leave on the pretext of accompanying the preaching groups, but when they were later arrested, it transpired that they had in fact been training with different militant groups” (The News May 24, 2011). Another three young airmen were sentenced for association with the banned Jaish-e-Muhammad in the arrests that followed (Oct 19, 2005).
The assassination of ex-GOC of SSG Maj Gen Ameer Faisal Alavi was plotted by a retired major, Haroon Ashiq. After joining the Lashkar-e-Tayyba, he moved on to work with Ilyas Kashmiri of the Brigade 313 linked with Al Qaeda. Ashiq’s own brother, Captain (r) Khurram, had retired from the army only to join Taliban and other fighters in Afghanistan. He was killed in 2007 in Helmand province. Various other retired soldiers, many of whom had liasioned with the Taliban during the ‘90s, returned to Afghanistan to fight on voluntary basis too.
Maj (r) Ashiq is not the only officer with links with Al Qaeda. In 2003, Major Adil Qudoos of 45 Signals was arrested and later sentenced for being linked to the militant network. The infamous Khalid Sheikh Muhammad was arrested from the house of his brother in Rawalpindi. Linked to this web of militants were Lt Col Khalid Mahmood Abbasi of Signals, Lt Col Abdul Ghaffar posted at the Army Aviation Command Rawalpindi, Maj Ataullah Khan Mahmood from the Judge Advocate General (JAG) branch, Major Rohail Sarfraz of HQ II Corps and Capt Dr Usman Zafar. The first three were given various sentences while the latter were dismissed from service.
More recently, retired Maj Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed has been found to be conclusively involved in planning of the November 26, 2008 Mumbai attacks in some way and planning attacks on a Danish newspaper. Connected to the LeT, he was arrested by the authorities, but his current status remains unknown.
Another case of high level militant infiltration involved Col Shahid Bashir, retired Sq Ldr Nadeem Ahmed Shah (a member of the Rawalpindi bar) and a civilian employee of the Air Weapons Complex (AWC). Associated with the proscribed Hizbut Tehrir that is gaining membership amongst private university students across the country in alarming numbers, they are accused of spying on, leaking info about and planning attacks on the Shamsi Air Field. Muhammad Altaf, a civilian employee of the National Development Complex (NDC) that comes under NESCOM and deals with ballistic missile development was similarly arrested for alleged links with a banned outfit. His status remains that of a “missing person” (Dawn News TV “Gumshuda”).
Radicalisation at the highest levels has been witnessed earlier too, in the failed 1995 “Operation Khilafa” coup attempt. Led by DG Infantry at the GHQ, Major General Zaheerul Islam Abbasi, the plan involved taking over the GHQ at the time of the Corps Commander Conference, killing the high ranking officers and then taking over the country to impose a Taliban-esque radical Sunni government. Convicted or dismissed alongwith Maj Gen Abbasi were Brig Mustansar Billah, Col Inayatullah Khan, Col Azad Minhas, Col Abdul Hamid, Col Muhammad Iqbal, Lt Col Shamsul Islam Tahir and Lt Col Liaquat Ali Raja amongst others.
One of the most alarming factors is that the approver for the prosecution, who was the militant given the duty to provide raiders for the attack, was none other than Qari Saifullah Akhtar, an ex Harkatul Jihad Al Islami militant who is now linked to Al Qaeda and was named by Benazir Bhutto as being involved in the attacks on her life.
Radicalization in the lower ranks is equally worrying. Investigation by Dawn in May, 2010 showed that the deadly Jundullah that carried out the assassination attempt on V Corps Commander, later VCOAS Gen Ahsan Saleem Hayat, was raised by serving and ex-soldiers of the army and the PAF. Jundullah has become famous as a small but deadly force.
Constable Sheikh Muhammad Adil of the Sindh Police Special Branch was convicted in 2002 of being involved in the murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl. A member of the HuJI whilst serving in the police, Adil assisted in the act of kidnapping. More recently, the section in-charge of the Computer Section at the Special Branch of the Punjab Police was found to have militant links. Accused Junior Clerk Zahid Bajwa had been recruited on a fake domicile and had a case pending against him for possession of explosives. Posted at the HQ of the Special Branch, he had access to intelligence reports and security plans, a cause of extreme worry. A constable was arrested in 2004 for being linked to the network of militants that aided Al Qaeda operative Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani in Gujrat.
These cases are just the tip of the iceberg. While the armed forces have been somewhat successful in purging militant sympathisers from within their ranks, the case of police has been extremely worrying. The case of Mumtaz Qadri alone is sufficient to become a cause for worry. During the trial of the CIA contractor Raymond Davis, one of the policemen from the escort that brought Davis to court was proudly wearing the badge of a militant organisation on his chest. Even after being furiously admonished by the judge, the policeman refused to remove the badge from his uniform and nobody was able to do anything. Such cases are a cause for fear and should not be taken lightly.
The author is a free lance contributor based in Illinois, USA.
Wednesday, June 1, 2011
CHINA’S INNER MONGOLIA: A JASMINE REVOLUTION WITH A DIFFERENCE
B.RAMAN
China’s Inner Mongolia, where Mongolians are in a minority of only 20 per cent of the total population of 23 million, has been going through a Jasmine type Revolution with a difference since May 10. There have been widespread protests in different towns following the death of a herdsman by name Mergen who was allegedly killed by a Han Chinese truck driver when local herdsmen protested against mining operations in their area. Mergen was among a group of Mongolians who attempted to block a caravan of coal-hauling trucks in Xilingol.
2. The protests, which started spontaneously in a fit of rage over his death, have not so far seen demands for political reforms or independence. The protests till now have been against the modern way of life imposed on the Mongolians, a nomadic people who love their grasslands, by the Chinese craze for development.
3.The Mongolian youth, who came out of their universities and schools to protest against the death of Mergen, are now protesting against the widespread damage to their environment, grasslands and nomadic way of life due to the large scale exploitation of coal in the area through open-cast mining to feed the power stations in the rest of China.
4. There has been large scale destruction of their grasslands due to mining and infrastructure development. Their nomadic way of life is being destroyed by the modern way of life brought in by the Han Chinese who have come from outside the province and settled down there.
5. As it happened in Tibet, the Chinese calculation that the economic development of the province and prosperity would make the Mongolians reconcile themselves to the loss of their nomadic way of life have proved wrong.
6. Western sources see in the reports of the protests from Inner Mongolia the beginning of an anti-Han political revolt. It does not appear to be so----at least not till now. The protests have been not against Han political and economic domination, but against Beijing’s attempts to impose on Inner Mongolia a development model not suited to them and which is proving detrimental to the Mongolian way of life.
7. Mongolian exiles living outside China---particularly in the West---are hoping that the protests will take a political turn and create one more pocket of alienation along China’s periphery--- with the Mongolians joining the ranks of the Tibetans and the Uighurs in protesting against the Han colonisation of Inner Mongolia, which Mongolian exiles call Southern Mongolia to link it in the minds of the people with the independent Republic of Mongolia, where His Holiness the Dalai Lama has a large following.
8. It is too late in the day for the Mongolians to hope for separation from China. The Hans are in a crushing majority in Inner Mongolia. No separatist movement can hope to succeed. Will it be possible to protect and preserve the Mongolian way of life based on their in-born love of their grasslands? That is a question that needs to be addressed in dealing with the protest movement. Beijing does not seem to be doing so. It is viewing it purely as a law and order and an internal security problem.
9. However, the Xinhua news agency reported that Inner Mongolia's Communist Party chief Hu Chunhua said on May 27 that "public anger has been immense" and that he would meet with students. He added: "We must correctly handle the relationship between the exploration of resources and the protection of the interests of people in Inner Mongolia.”
10.The unrest has involved thousands of protesters in different areas. Hundreds of students and herdsmen took to the streets of Chifeng on May 28, according to the US-based Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Centre. Police and para-military reinforcements have been rushed by the authorities to Hohhot, the provincial capital, and Universities have been sealed off in the cities of Tongliao and Ordos.
11.The Information Centre has reportedly called for a province-wide protest "to demand that the Government of China respect the human rights, life and dignity of the Mongols in China and to resolve the case of Mergen in a just and fair manner."
12. Apprehending the use of the Internet by the protesting students and political exiles to spread disaffection against the authorities, the Chinese authorities have imposed controls on Internet cafes. (2-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
China’s Inner Mongolia, where Mongolians are in a minority of only 20 per cent of the total population of 23 million, has been going through a Jasmine type Revolution with a difference since May 10. There have been widespread protests in different towns following the death of a herdsman by name Mergen who was allegedly killed by a Han Chinese truck driver when local herdsmen protested against mining operations in their area. Mergen was among a group of Mongolians who attempted to block a caravan of coal-hauling trucks in Xilingol.
2. The protests, which started spontaneously in a fit of rage over his death, have not so far seen demands for political reforms or independence. The protests till now have been against the modern way of life imposed on the Mongolians, a nomadic people who love their grasslands, by the Chinese craze for development.
3.The Mongolian youth, who came out of their universities and schools to protest against the death of Mergen, are now protesting against the widespread damage to their environment, grasslands and nomadic way of life due to the large scale exploitation of coal in the area through open-cast mining to feed the power stations in the rest of China.
4. There has been large scale destruction of their grasslands due to mining and infrastructure development. Their nomadic way of life is being destroyed by the modern way of life brought in by the Han Chinese who have come from outside the province and settled down there.
5. As it happened in Tibet, the Chinese calculation that the economic development of the province and prosperity would make the Mongolians reconcile themselves to the loss of their nomadic way of life have proved wrong.
6. Western sources see in the reports of the protests from Inner Mongolia the beginning of an anti-Han political revolt. It does not appear to be so----at least not till now. The protests have been not against Han political and economic domination, but against Beijing’s attempts to impose on Inner Mongolia a development model not suited to them and which is proving detrimental to the Mongolian way of life.
7. Mongolian exiles living outside China---particularly in the West---are hoping that the protests will take a political turn and create one more pocket of alienation along China’s periphery--- with the Mongolians joining the ranks of the Tibetans and the Uighurs in protesting against the Han colonisation of Inner Mongolia, which Mongolian exiles call Southern Mongolia to link it in the minds of the people with the independent Republic of Mongolia, where His Holiness the Dalai Lama has a large following.
8. It is too late in the day for the Mongolians to hope for separation from China. The Hans are in a crushing majority in Inner Mongolia. No separatist movement can hope to succeed. Will it be possible to protect and preserve the Mongolian way of life based on their in-born love of their grasslands? That is a question that needs to be addressed in dealing with the protest movement. Beijing does not seem to be doing so. It is viewing it purely as a law and order and an internal security problem.
9. However, the Xinhua news agency reported that Inner Mongolia's Communist Party chief Hu Chunhua said on May 27 that "public anger has been immense" and that he would meet with students. He added: "We must correctly handle the relationship between the exploration of resources and the protection of the interests of people in Inner Mongolia.”
10.The unrest has involved thousands of protesters in different areas. Hundreds of students and herdsmen took to the streets of Chifeng on May 28, according to the US-based Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Centre. Police and para-military reinforcements have been rushed by the authorities to Hohhot, the provincial capital, and Universities have been sealed off in the cities of Tongliao and Ordos.
11.The Information Centre has reportedly called for a province-wide protest "to demand that the Government of China respect the human rights, life and dignity of the Mongols in China and to resolve the case of Mergen in a just and fair manner."
12. Apprehending the use of the Internet by the protesting students and political exiles to spread disaffection against the authorities, the Chinese authorities have imposed controls on Internet cafes. (2-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, May 31, 2011
WAS SALEEM SHAHZAD ON TRAIL OF ISI MEN BEHIND OBL’S STAY AT ABBOTTABAD?
B.RAMAN
The brutal murder of Syed Saleem Shahzad, the Pakistan Bureau Chief of Asia Times Online, is unlikely to be solved satisfactorily by the investigating agencies of Pakistan.
2. Shahzad went missing on the evening of May 29,2011, while going to the Islamabad studio of a private TV news channel and his car with his dead body was reportedly found at a place about 150 kms from Islamabad on May 31. His body reportedly had torture wounds, indicating he had been severely tortured in order to extract information from him.
3. What was that information? Who was interested in that? The widely believed suspicion in Pakistan is that the information sought to be extracted from him through torture must have had a bearing to the first part of a despatch which he had sent to Asia Times and was carried by it on May 27.
4. This related to the daring attack by some terrorists on PNS Mehran, the base of the Naval Air Arm of the Pakistan Navy, at Karachi on the night of May 22 during which the terrorists destroyed two US-supplied Orion maritime surveillance aircraft which were being used by the Navy to patrol the sea to prevent any Al Qaeda attack on ships bringing logistic supplies for the NATO forces in Afghanistan.
5. The responsibility for the attack was claimed by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) as the Pakistani Taliban is known. It said that it carried out the attack to avenge the death of Osama bin Laden during a raid by US naval commandos at his hide-out at Abbottabad on May 2 ,2011.
6.The investigation into the attack by the local police has not yet made much progress. However, the arrests of some suspects in Karachi and Lahore, including an ex-naval commando of the Special Services Group (SSG), who was allegedly sacked 10 years ago on disciplinary grounds, have been reported.
7.Shahzad did not appear to have believed in the claim of the TTP. His enquiries indicated that the attack was carried out by the 313 Brigade of Ilyas Kashmiri, a former commando of the Special Services Group (SSG), which operates from North Waziristan as an affiliate of Al Qaeda.
8. Shahzad said in the first part of his investigative report: “Asia Times Online contacts confirm that the attackers were from Ilyas Kashmiri's 313 Brigade, the operational arm of al-Qaeda.” He alleged that “Al-Qaeda carried out the brazen attack on PNS Mehran naval air station in Karachi on May 22 after talks failed between the navy and al-Qaeda over the release of naval officials arrested on suspicion of al-Qaeda links.”
9. He had also indicated at the end of the first part of his despatch that the second part would cover “the recruitment and training of militants.”
10.He was the only Pakistani journalist to have visited the headquarters of the 313 Brigade in October 2009 at the invitation of Ilyas Kashmiri. One of the purposes of Ilyas’ invitation was to disprove rumours then circulating in Pakistan that Ilyas had been killed in an American Drone (pilotless plane) strike in South Waziristan in September,2009.
11. Subsequently, after the terrorist attack on the so-called German Bakery in Pune in February 2010, Shahzad was in receipt of a message purporting to be from Ilyas indirectly hinting that the 313 Brigade had a role in the Pune attack. Shahzad had written about it in Asia Times.
12. Shahzad was thus well-informed on the activities of the 313 Brigade and Ilyas Kashmiri. He was reportedly the only Pakistani journalist with good contacts in the 313 Brigade.
13. Who killed him--- the ISI as it is widely suspected in Pakistan or the 313 Brigade or the two acting in tandem? Next to the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the 313 Brigade has the closest contacts with the ISI. By virtue of his former association with the SSG, Ilyas is believed to have a network of contacts in the Army, the SSG and the ISI.
14. It is apparent that Shahzad was killed either because of what he reported in his despatch of May 27 regarding the penetration of the Navy by Al Qaeda or because of what he intended reporting about the training camps of the 303 Brigade.
15. Thus both the ISI and the 313 Brigade had a common motive for having him eliminated. Was their decision to eliminate him only related to his story on the Mehran attack or was there more to it? Whoever took the decision to eliminate him was in a desperate hurry. He was kidnapped within 48 hours of the first part being published. He would have most probably despatched the second part in the week beginning May 30. His captors wanted to do away with him before that.
16. Well-informed contacts in the Pakistani Police say that his kidnapping and murder were related not only to his investigation into the Mehran attack, but also his investigation into the local support base of OBL which facilitated his undetected stay for over five years at Abbottabad. His investigations post-May 2 were dangerously moving in that direction. His discovery of the penetration of the Navy by Al Qaeda was only the first step in his investigation. According to these police sources, he was digging deeper into OBL’s support base.
17. To have waited till he found out the details would have been suicidal for the ISI. The Police sources suspect that the ISI joined hands with the 313 Brigade to eliminate him before he made any progress in the matter.
18. The “real” truth will never be known just as the “real” truth behind the murder of Murtaza Bhutto in Karachi in 1996 and behind the murder of Benazir Bhutto at Rawalpindi in 2007 was never known.
19. People will be arrested and prosecuted, but they will not be the real perpetrators. The history of Pakistan is full of such instances of mysterious elimination of inconvenient people. Shahzad is the latest to join the ranks of such mysteriously eliminated people. He has paid with his life for daring to look into two incidents which the ISI wanted to be covered up---the Mehran attack and the stay of OBL at Abbottabad. (1-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The brutal murder of Syed Saleem Shahzad, the Pakistan Bureau Chief of Asia Times Online, is unlikely to be solved satisfactorily by the investigating agencies of Pakistan.
2. Shahzad went missing on the evening of May 29,2011, while going to the Islamabad studio of a private TV news channel and his car with his dead body was reportedly found at a place about 150 kms from Islamabad on May 31. His body reportedly had torture wounds, indicating he had been severely tortured in order to extract information from him.
3. What was that information? Who was interested in that? The widely believed suspicion in Pakistan is that the information sought to be extracted from him through torture must have had a bearing to the first part of a despatch which he had sent to Asia Times and was carried by it on May 27.
4. This related to the daring attack by some terrorists on PNS Mehran, the base of the Naval Air Arm of the Pakistan Navy, at Karachi on the night of May 22 during which the terrorists destroyed two US-supplied Orion maritime surveillance aircraft which were being used by the Navy to patrol the sea to prevent any Al Qaeda attack on ships bringing logistic supplies for the NATO forces in Afghanistan.
5. The responsibility for the attack was claimed by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) as the Pakistani Taliban is known. It said that it carried out the attack to avenge the death of Osama bin Laden during a raid by US naval commandos at his hide-out at Abbottabad on May 2 ,2011.
6.The investigation into the attack by the local police has not yet made much progress. However, the arrests of some suspects in Karachi and Lahore, including an ex-naval commando of the Special Services Group (SSG), who was allegedly sacked 10 years ago on disciplinary grounds, have been reported.
7.Shahzad did not appear to have believed in the claim of the TTP. His enquiries indicated that the attack was carried out by the 313 Brigade of Ilyas Kashmiri, a former commando of the Special Services Group (SSG), which operates from North Waziristan as an affiliate of Al Qaeda.
8. Shahzad said in the first part of his investigative report: “Asia Times Online contacts confirm that the attackers were from Ilyas Kashmiri's 313 Brigade, the operational arm of al-Qaeda.” He alleged that “Al-Qaeda carried out the brazen attack on PNS Mehran naval air station in Karachi on May 22 after talks failed between the navy and al-Qaeda over the release of naval officials arrested on suspicion of al-Qaeda links.”
9. He had also indicated at the end of the first part of his despatch that the second part would cover “the recruitment and training of militants.”
10.He was the only Pakistani journalist to have visited the headquarters of the 313 Brigade in October 2009 at the invitation of Ilyas Kashmiri. One of the purposes of Ilyas’ invitation was to disprove rumours then circulating in Pakistan that Ilyas had been killed in an American Drone (pilotless plane) strike in South Waziristan in September,2009.
11. Subsequently, after the terrorist attack on the so-called German Bakery in Pune in February 2010, Shahzad was in receipt of a message purporting to be from Ilyas indirectly hinting that the 313 Brigade had a role in the Pune attack. Shahzad had written about it in Asia Times.
12. Shahzad was thus well-informed on the activities of the 313 Brigade and Ilyas Kashmiri. He was reportedly the only Pakistani journalist with good contacts in the 313 Brigade.
13. Who killed him--- the ISI as it is widely suspected in Pakistan or the 313 Brigade or the two acting in tandem? Next to the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the 313 Brigade has the closest contacts with the ISI. By virtue of his former association with the SSG, Ilyas is believed to have a network of contacts in the Army, the SSG and the ISI.
14. It is apparent that Shahzad was killed either because of what he reported in his despatch of May 27 regarding the penetration of the Navy by Al Qaeda or because of what he intended reporting about the training camps of the 303 Brigade.
15. Thus both the ISI and the 313 Brigade had a common motive for having him eliminated. Was their decision to eliminate him only related to his story on the Mehran attack or was there more to it? Whoever took the decision to eliminate him was in a desperate hurry. He was kidnapped within 48 hours of the first part being published. He would have most probably despatched the second part in the week beginning May 30. His captors wanted to do away with him before that.
16. Well-informed contacts in the Pakistani Police say that his kidnapping and murder were related not only to his investigation into the Mehran attack, but also his investigation into the local support base of OBL which facilitated his undetected stay for over five years at Abbottabad. His investigations post-May 2 were dangerously moving in that direction. His discovery of the penetration of the Navy by Al Qaeda was only the first step in his investigation. According to these police sources, he was digging deeper into OBL’s support base.
17. To have waited till he found out the details would have been suicidal for the ISI. The Police sources suspect that the ISI joined hands with the 313 Brigade to eliminate him before he made any progress in the matter.
18. The “real” truth will never be known just as the “real” truth behind the murder of Murtaza Bhutto in Karachi in 1996 and behind the murder of Benazir Bhutto at Rawalpindi in 2007 was never known.
19. People will be arrested and prosecuted, but they will not be the real perpetrators. The history of Pakistan is full of such instances of mysterious elimination of inconvenient people. Shahzad is the latest to join the ranks of such mysteriously eliminated people. He has paid with his life for daring to look into two incidents which the ISI wanted to be covered up---the Mehran attack and the stay of OBL at Abbottabad. (1-6-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, May 30, 2011
LET BHULLAR DIE IN IGNOMINY, NOT IN GALLOWS
B.RAMAN
How many of you have heard of the so-called Khalistan terrorist movement, which spread death and destruction across Punjab and Delhi for 14 years between 1981 and 1995?
How many of you have heard of the repeated hijackings of Indian Airlines aircraft by the Khalistani terrorists in the 1980s?
How many of you remember the military operation in the Golden Temple, Amritsar, in June 1984, to flush out a group of Khalistani terrorists who had taken shelter there?
How many of you remember the desertions of some Sikh soldiers from the Army and the assassination of a Brigadier by some angry Sikh soldiers after the Golden Temple operation?
How many of you remember the assassination of Indira Gandhi by some of her till then highly trusted Sikh bodyguards, enraged by the Golden Temple operation, in October,1984?
How many of you remember the blowing-up of the Kanishka aircraft of Air India in 1985 and the 1986 assassination in retirement of Gen. A.S.Vaidya, who was the Chief of the Army Staff at the time of the Golden Temple operation?
How many of you remember the assassination of Beant Singh, the Chief Minister of Punjab, in 1995?
These are distant memories now. The Khalistan terrorist movement almost died in the months following the assassination of Beant Singh.
It is 95 per cent dead, but the embers are still there.
In Pakistan in the form of some remnants of the terrorist movement who have been given shelter by the Pakistan Government.
In the West, in the form of some recalcitrant individuals, who are not prepared to say die.
Even in our own country in the form of some individuals here and there in Punjab and Delhi.
They are without influence, without following, but not without lingering traces of the anger which initially gave rise to the movement.
The fact that for 16 years since 1995, the embers have remained embers and are slowly dying their natural death goes to the credit of the people of Punjab, who have ignored them with the contempt they merit.
Is it wise to give these discredited elements a source of new anger that they could exploit in an attempt to give themselves a new lease of life?
This is a question that the Government should carefully consider before it goes ahead with its reported decision to send Devinder Pal Singh Bhullar, a notorious Khalistani terrorist, to the gallows in implementation of a long-pending death sentence awarded to him by a court.
Even if there is only a five per cent chance that his death could be exploited by the remnants of the Khalistan movement to re-kindle the embers, should we take the risk?
What do we hope to achieve by carrying out his death sentence?
We don’t need to teach any lesson to anybody 16 years after the movement went into a state of living death.
We don’t need to do any justice to the relatives of the victims of the Khalistan terrorist movement years after their painful memories have faded.
Executions have rarely ended any terrorist movement. Living ignominy has.
Like the ignominy of Carlos, the dreaded international terrorist of the 1970s and the 1980s. He was as dreaded in those years as Osama bin Laden was in the subsequent years.
Where is Carlos, the jackal, now?
Nobody knows. In some unheard of jail in France, spending a life sentence, almost forgotten by his old followers and the people. His movement is dead since 1994.
Nothing wipes out the persona of a terrorist more decisively than ignominy.
Let Bhullar die in ignominy and not in the gallows. ( 31-5-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India,New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com ),
How many of you have heard of the so-called Khalistan terrorist movement, which spread death and destruction across Punjab and Delhi for 14 years between 1981 and 1995?
How many of you have heard of the repeated hijackings of Indian Airlines aircraft by the Khalistani terrorists in the 1980s?
How many of you remember the military operation in the Golden Temple, Amritsar, in June 1984, to flush out a group of Khalistani terrorists who had taken shelter there?
How many of you remember the desertions of some Sikh soldiers from the Army and the assassination of a Brigadier by some angry Sikh soldiers after the Golden Temple operation?
How many of you remember the assassination of Indira Gandhi by some of her till then highly trusted Sikh bodyguards, enraged by the Golden Temple operation, in October,1984?
How many of you remember the blowing-up of the Kanishka aircraft of Air India in 1985 and the 1986 assassination in retirement of Gen. A.S.Vaidya, who was the Chief of the Army Staff at the time of the Golden Temple operation?
How many of you remember the assassination of Beant Singh, the Chief Minister of Punjab, in 1995?
These are distant memories now. The Khalistan terrorist movement almost died in the months following the assassination of Beant Singh.
It is 95 per cent dead, but the embers are still there.
In Pakistan in the form of some remnants of the terrorist movement who have been given shelter by the Pakistan Government.
In the West, in the form of some recalcitrant individuals, who are not prepared to say die.
Even in our own country in the form of some individuals here and there in Punjab and Delhi.
They are without influence, without following, but not without lingering traces of the anger which initially gave rise to the movement.
The fact that for 16 years since 1995, the embers have remained embers and are slowly dying their natural death goes to the credit of the people of Punjab, who have ignored them with the contempt they merit.
Is it wise to give these discredited elements a source of new anger that they could exploit in an attempt to give themselves a new lease of life?
This is a question that the Government should carefully consider before it goes ahead with its reported decision to send Devinder Pal Singh Bhullar, a notorious Khalistani terrorist, to the gallows in implementation of a long-pending death sentence awarded to him by a court.
Even if there is only a five per cent chance that his death could be exploited by the remnants of the Khalistan movement to re-kindle the embers, should we take the risk?
What do we hope to achieve by carrying out his death sentence?
We don’t need to teach any lesson to anybody 16 years after the movement went into a state of living death.
We don’t need to do any justice to the relatives of the victims of the Khalistan terrorist movement years after their painful memories have faded.
Executions have rarely ended any terrorist movement. Living ignominy has.
Like the ignominy of Carlos, the dreaded international terrorist of the 1970s and the 1980s. He was as dreaded in those years as Osama bin Laden was in the subsequent years.
Where is Carlos, the jackal, now?
Nobody knows. In some unheard of jail in France, spending a life sentence, almost forgotten by his old followers and the people. His movement is dead since 1994.
Nothing wipes out the persona of a terrorist more decisively than ignominy.
Let Bhullar die in ignominy and not in the gallows. ( 31-5-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India,New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com ),
Sunday, May 29, 2011
US-PAK COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION : THE RITUAL & THE REALITY
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR—PAPER NO.723
B.RAMAN
Secret commitments by both the political and military leaderships to co-operate with the US in counter-terrorism, ritual denial of such commitments in public statements, dragging the feet in the implementation of the commitments and fresh commitments. That has been the history of Pakistan's counter-terrorism co-operation with the US. That history continues after the death of Osama bin Laden.
2.The US-Pakistan counter-terrorism co-operation, which had stalled following the raid by US naval commandos into the residential hide-out of Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad in the Khyber Pakhtoonkwa province on May 2, has been re-started following a vigorous push given by Senator John Kerry, Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who visited Islamabad for talks on May 15 and 16 and by Mrs.Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, and Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, who followed up on Kerry’s talks during a short visit to Islamabad on May 27.
3. After Kerry’s visit, the two countries initiated measures to bring down the tensions, which had arisen after the Abbottabad raid. Pakistan handed over to the US the half-destroyed helicopter which the naval commandos had blown up ---- but not completely--- on May 2 when the pilot reportedly lost control and hit the compound wall of OBL’s residence while bringing it down. The US was worried that Pakistan might give the Chinese access to the half-destroyed chopper to enable them to study it. The handing-over of the chopper to the US authorities was one of the demands made by Kerry during his talks with the Pakistani authorities. Before Mrs. Clinton arrived, the Americans were allowed to take the half-destroyed chopper out of Pakistan.
4. Before the arrival of Mrs.Clinton, the Pakistani authorities also allowed a team of the CIA to jointly interrogate the three wives of OBL who were taken into custody by the Pakistani authorities after the naval commandos had left Abbottabad. Originally, the US plan was to take the wives to Afghanistan for interrogation, but this was abandoned by the US after its commandos lost a chopper. Pakistan also accepted another request of the US to allow a team from the CIA to make a detailed inspection of OBL’s residence.While the naval commandos had removed from the residence all documents, computers and computer material which they had found there, they were not able to make a detailed inspection of the house because of the short time at their disposal. They will now be able to do so though belatedly.
5. There were two gestures from the US side. The first was the toning down of the suspicions of possible complicity with OBL at the higher levels of the Pakistani Government---particularly the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) --- which enabled him to live undetected for over five years at Abbottabad and direct the command and control of Al Qaeda from there. Mrs.Clinton has now ruled out the possibility of any complicity at the senior levels, but has continued to stress the need for a thorough enquiry regarding any possible complicity at the lower levels. The Pakistani Army and the ISI do not find any difficulty in accepting this demand.
6. The second US gesture was to agree to downsize the clandestine presence of US intelligence and special forces personnel in Pakistan to co-ordinate the counter-terrorism co-operation with their Pakistani counterparts. The US had agreed to make a small reduction in the number of US clandestine personnel posted in Pakistan even before the Abbottabad raid. This was in response to a Pakistani demand after the January incident involving Raymond Davis, a member of the administrative staff of the US Consulate at Lahore, who had allegedly killed two Pakistanis following his car. This has now been followed up by a reported US decision to cut down its clandestine personnel further. Apparently, after the death of OBL, the US does not feel the need for the persence of a large number of clandestine staff in Pakistani territory.Its decision to accommodate the Pakistani demand for a further reduction should not affect its capability on the ground in Pakistan significantly.
7. Both the Pakistani and the US authorities have been embarrassed by the disclosure by "Dawn" of Karachi of some diplomatic cables obtained from Wikileaks pertaining to the years 2008 and 2009. These cables, which had been sent by Anne Patterson, the then US Ambassador to Islamabad, to the US State Department clearly showed, firstly, that the Pakistani Army had allowed a much larger US clandestine presence than admitted so far not only in the Pashtun belt, but even in the GHQ in Rawalpindi, to enhance US-Pakistan counter-terrorism co-operation, and, secondly, that not only Pakistan's political leadership, but even its military leadership had tacitly allowed the US to operate its Drone ( pilotless aircraft) over the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) while openly criticising them as a violation of Pakistan's sovereignty. If the Army had tacitly agreed to instances of wanton US violation of Pakistani sovereignty in respect of the Drone strikes, is it not legitimate to suspect as many, including me, are doing, that there must have been some tacit understanding relating to the Abbottabad raid too? All this post-May 2 hysterics about the so-called violation of Pakistani sovereignty is a ritual meant to calm public opinion in Pakistan.
8.One of the Wikileaks cables from Anne Patterson in Islamabad to the US State Department in May 2009, as published by "Dawn", states as follows:“We have created Intelligence Fusion cells with embedded US Special Forces with both SSG ( Special Services Group) and Frontier Corps (Bala Hisar, Peshawar) with the Rover equipment ready to deploy.Through these embeds, we are assisting the Pakistanis collect and coordinate existing intelligence assets. We have not been given Pakistani military permission to accompany the Pakistani forces on deployments as yet.”
9.By September, 2009, plans for joint intelligence activities had been expanded to include army headquarters. “Pakistan has begun to accept intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support from the US military for COIN (counterr-insurgency) operations,” Ms Patterson wrote. “In addition … intelligence fusion centers” had been established “at the headquarters of Frontier Corps and the 11th Corps and we expect at additional sites, including GHQ and the 12th Corps in Balochistan.”
10.Even In April 2009, she had reported in a cable that the cell at Bala Hisar assisted in the Pakistan military operation then taking place in Lower Dir. “US Special Operations Command Force are assisting the FC at the Intelligence Fusion Cell at FC Headquarters with imagery, target packages, and operational planning.”
11. A US cable also said:“The 3rd Commando Group of the Pakistan Special Services Group (SSG) exploited the weakened state of the Taliban surrounding Daggar, the main city within Buner, to secure the city early on April 29.Although reported earlier that US officials would accompany the FC deployment to Daggar, a late-night decision on April 28 by the Pakistan Military General Headquarters (GHQ) denied the joint deployment, saying the FC had all the assets needed. Embassy will work with GHQ to determine the reason for the late change and to promote integrated operation support.”
12.In a cable of November 2009, Ms.Patterson said: “On a brighter note,there is the possibility that operations in the northern FATA may provide additional opportunities to embed US Special Operations Forces with FC units to provide ISR [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] support and general operational guidance. If we can expand on what we have recently been doing in Bajaur Agency … with our embeds, it would be a significant opportunity to contribute to the pursuit of the TTP (the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan).”
13. The cable added: “Previously, the Pakistani military leadership adamantly opposed letting us embed our special operations personnel with their military forces.The recent approval by GHQ … appears to represent a sea change in Pakistani thinking.These deployments are highly politically sensitive … Should [they] receive any coverage in the Pakistani or US media, the Pakistani military will likely stop making requests for such assistance.”
14.Another cable has described how, in a January 2009 meeting with Chief of Army Staff Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, then CENTCOM commander Gen David Petraeus explained he “had given instructions that Special Operations Forces would be deployed regularly and constantly, and the US needed to move their soldiers in here, so they could engage productively with the Frontier Corps." “Petraeus noted that the 11th Corps Chief of Staff Brigadier Amir was less cooperative with US forces, and Kayani took note of that.” That is, the US was complaining to Kayani about senior Pakistani officers who were not co-operative with the US and Kayani took note of such complaints.
15. In a post-Abbottabad assessment of the Wikileaks cables, "Dawn" has commented as follows: " Secret internal American government cables, accessed by Dawn through WikiLeaks, provide confirmation that the US military’s drone strikes programme within Pakistan had more than just tacit acceptance of the country’s top military brass, despite public posturing to the contrary. In fact, as long ago as January 2008, the country’s military was requesting the US for greater drone back-up for its own military operations. Previously exposed diplomatic cables have already shown that Pakistan’s civilian leaders are strongly supportive – in private – of the drone strikes on alleged militant targets in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), even as they condemn them for general consumption. But it is not just the civilian leadership that has been following a duplicitous policy on the robotic vehicles."
16. "Dawn" added: "In a meeting on January 22, 2008 with US CENTCOM Commander Admiral William J. Fallon, Army Chief General Ashfaq Kayani requested the Americans to provide “continuous Predator coverage of the conflict area” in South Waziristan where the army was conducting operations against militants. The request is detailed in a ‘Secret’ cable sent by then US Ambassador Anne Patterson on February 11, 2008. Pakistan’s military has consistently denied any involvement in the covert programme run mainly by the CIA. "
17. "Dawn" further said: "The American account of Gen Kayani’s request for “Predator coverage” does not make clear if mere air surveillance was being requested or missile-armed drones were being sought. Theoretically “Predator coverage” could simply mean air surveillance and not necessarily offensive support. However the reaction to the request suggests otherwise. According to the report of the meeting sent back to Washington by Patterson, Admiral Fallon “regretted that he did not have the assets to support this request” but offered trained US Marines (known as JTACs) to coordinate air strikes for Pakistani infantry forces on ground. General Kayani “demurred” on the offer, pointing out that having US soldiers on ground “would not be politically acceptable.”
18.In another meeting with US Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen over March 3-4, 2008, Kayani was asked for his help “in approving a third Restricted Operating Zone for US aircraft over the FATA.” The request – detailed in a cable sent from the US Embassy in Islamabad on March 24 – clearly indicated that two ‘corridors’ for US drones had already been approved earlier.
19. According to "Dawn", despite the occasional disastrously misdirected attacks which have fed into the public hue and cry over civilian casualties, there is, in private, " a seeming general acceptance by the military of the efficacy of drone strikes. In a cable dated February 19, 2009, Ambassador Patterson sent talking points to Washington ahead of a week-long visit to the US by COAS Kayani. Referring to drone strikes, she wrote: “Kayani knows full well that the strikes have been precise (creating few civilian casualties) and targeted primarily at foreign fighters in the Waziristans.”
20. In a cable of November 24,2008, Patterson cautioned the State Department as follows: “As the gap between private GOP acquiescence and public condemnation for US action grows,Pakistani leaders who feel they look increasingly weak to their constituents could begin considering stronger action against the US, even though the response to date has focused largely on ritual denunciation.”
21. Citing US media reports, the Pakistani media reported as follows before Mrs.Clinton's visit: Pakistan ordered the departure of up to 20 percent of the roughly 150 U.S. Special Operations forces trainers (SOFTs) in the wake of a series of differences between the two governments.Between 25 and 30 trainers were “told to leave” in the weeks before the U.S. commando raid that killed OBL, apparently in response to the Raymond Davis incident.
22. During Mrs.Clinton's talks in Islamabad, according to the Pakistani media,Islamabad agreed to intensify operations against Al Qaeda and affiliated groups in its territory, while Washington softened its stance on ‘unilateral action’ against high-profile terrorist targets inside Pakistan by underscoring the importance of acting together against terrorists. While there was no joint statement, Mrs.Clinton told the media at the US Embassy: “We both recognise that there is still much more work required to be done and it is urgent. Today we discussed in even greater detail cooperation to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda and to drive them from Pakistan and the region. We will do our part and we look to the government of Pakistan to take decisive steps in the days ahead. Joint action against Al Qaeda and its affiliates will make Pakistan, America and the world more safe and more secure.”
23. According to the Pakistani media, her media comments wavered between expression of acknowledgement of the sacrifices rendered by Pakistan in the fight against terrorism and frustration over the Taliban and other groups continuing to operate from Pakistani soil. Mrs Clinton reminded the Pakistanis that the only way forward in the relationship marred by deep mistrust over counter-terrorism efforts was to redouble efforts in the fight against terrorists. She spoke of “vicious terrorists” having found sanctuaries on Pakistani soil and Afghan militants operating from safe havens in tribal areas and said it was Islamabad’s responsibility to stop that from happening. She added: “There can be no peace, stability, no democracy, no future for Pakistan unless the violent extremists are removed.” Mrs Clinton said she had been assured of “some very specific actions” which Pakistanis would take in coming weeks. She did not give any detail.
24.According to ABC News of the US as quoted by the Pakistani media, the US side demanded immediate action and intelligence sharing on four leading terror names — Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Siraj Haqqani (operational commander of the Haqqani network), Ilyas Kashmiri and Atiya Abdel Rahman (Libyan operations chief of Al Qaeda, who was allegedly a key aide to bin Laden when he was hiding in Abbottabad). "Dawn" claimed that an American source confirmed the list and said that US softening on its position on unilateral action was conditional. “The message given to Pakistani leaders was loud and clear; you either cooperate with us on these four terrorists or we’ll take care of them by ourselves.”
25. "Dawn" further reported: "Something the sceptical Secretary found reassuring was a rare acknowledgement made by the Pakistani side at the talks that Osama bin Laden enjoyed a support network as he spent his years near the Army’s elite training centre. “Our counterparts in the (Pakistani) government were very forthcoming in saying that somebody, somewhere, was providing some kind of support, and they are carrying out an investigation and we have certainly offered to share whatever information we come across.”
26.In return for the promised counter-terrorism cooperation, Mrs Clinton offered “respect for and addressing” Pakistan’s concerns about the political settlement in Afghanistan. She did not elaborate, but said she was convinced that Pakistan had “legitimate” interests in the settlement of the Afghan conflict and its role was indispensable for the success of the reconciliation process. According to "Dawn",Mrs Clinton was particularly critical of the growing anti-Americanism in Pakistan. Although she didn’t explicitly say so, it was evident from her remarks that she thought a segment of the establishment was responsible for promoting it. She said: "In solving its problems Pakistan should understand that anti-Americanism and conspiracy theories will not make its problems disappear.” According to "Dawn", her Pakistani interlocutors complained to her that statements by US officials, leaks to media and unilateral actions were reducing the space for cooperation.
27. Coinciding with her visit, US media has reported that Pakistan has closed down the three joint intelligence fusion cells in Quetta and Peshawar to which there was a reference in the WikiLeaks cables. (30-5-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
Secret commitments by both the political and military leaderships to co-operate with the US in counter-terrorism, ritual denial of such commitments in public statements, dragging the feet in the implementation of the commitments and fresh commitments. That has been the history of Pakistan's counter-terrorism co-operation with the US. That history continues after the death of Osama bin Laden.
2.The US-Pakistan counter-terrorism co-operation, which had stalled following the raid by US naval commandos into the residential hide-out of Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad in the Khyber Pakhtoonkwa province on May 2, has been re-started following a vigorous push given by Senator John Kerry, Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who visited Islamabad for talks on May 15 and 16 and by Mrs.Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, and Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, who followed up on Kerry’s talks during a short visit to Islamabad on May 27.
3. After Kerry’s visit, the two countries initiated measures to bring down the tensions, which had arisen after the Abbottabad raid. Pakistan handed over to the US the half-destroyed helicopter which the naval commandos had blown up ---- but not completely--- on May 2 when the pilot reportedly lost control and hit the compound wall of OBL’s residence while bringing it down. The US was worried that Pakistan might give the Chinese access to the half-destroyed chopper to enable them to study it. The handing-over of the chopper to the US authorities was one of the demands made by Kerry during his talks with the Pakistani authorities. Before Mrs. Clinton arrived, the Americans were allowed to take the half-destroyed chopper out of Pakistan.
4. Before the arrival of Mrs.Clinton, the Pakistani authorities also allowed a team of the CIA to jointly interrogate the three wives of OBL who were taken into custody by the Pakistani authorities after the naval commandos had left Abbottabad. Originally, the US plan was to take the wives to Afghanistan for interrogation, but this was abandoned by the US after its commandos lost a chopper. Pakistan also accepted another request of the US to allow a team from the CIA to make a detailed inspection of OBL’s residence.While the naval commandos had removed from the residence all documents, computers and computer material which they had found there, they were not able to make a detailed inspection of the house because of the short time at their disposal. They will now be able to do so though belatedly.
5. There were two gestures from the US side. The first was the toning down of the suspicions of possible complicity with OBL at the higher levels of the Pakistani Government---particularly the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) --- which enabled him to live undetected for over five years at Abbottabad and direct the command and control of Al Qaeda from there. Mrs.Clinton has now ruled out the possibility of any complicity at the senior levels, but has continued to stress the need for a thorough enquiry regarding any possible complicity at the lower levels. The Pakistani Army and the ISI do not find any difficulty in accepting this demand.
6. The second US gesture was to agree to downsize the clandestine presence of US intelligence and special forces personnel in Pakistan to co-ordinate the counter-terrorism co-operation with their Pakistani counterparts. The US had agreed to make a small reduction in the number of US clandestine personnel posted in Pakistan even before the Abbottabad raid. This was in response to a Pakistani demand after the January incident involving Raymond Davis, a member of the administrative staff of the US Consulate at Lahore, who had allegedly killed two Pakistanis following his car. This has now been followed up by a reported US decision to cut down its clandestine personnel further. Apparently, after the death of OBL, the US does not feel the need for the persence of a large number of clandestine staff in Pakistani territory.Its decision to accommodate the Pakistani demand for a further reduction should not affect its capability on the ground in Pakistan significantly.
7. Both the Pakistani and the US authorities have been embarrassed by the disclosure by "Dawn" of Karachi of some diplomatic cables obtained from Wikileaks pertaining to the years 2008 and 2009. These cables, which had been sent by Anne Patterson, the then US Ambassador to Islamabad, to the US State Department clearly showed, firstly, that the Pakistani Army had allowed a much larger US clandestine presence than admitted so far not only in the Pashtun belt, but even in the GHQ in Rawalpindi, to enhance US-Pakistan counter-terrorism co-operation, and, secondly, that not only Pakistan's political leadership, but even its military leadership had tacitly allowed the US to operate its Drone ( pilotless aircraft) over the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) while openly criticising them as a violation of Pakistan's sovereignty. If the Army had tacitly agreed to instances of wanton US violation of Pakistani sovereignty in respect of the Drone strikes, is it not legitimate to suspect as many, including me, are doing, that there must have been some tacit understanding relating to the Abbottabad raid too? All this post-May 2 hysterics about the so-called violation of Pakistani sovereignty is a ritual meant to calm public opinion in Pakistan.
8.One of the Wikileaks cables from Anne Patterson in Islamabad to the US State Department in May 2009, as published by "Dawn", states as follows:“We have created Intelligence Fusion cells with embedded US Special Forces with both SSG ( Special Services Group) and Frontier Corps (Bala Hisar, Peshawar) with the Rover equipment ready to deploy.Through these embeds, we are assisting the Pakistanis collect and coordinate existing intelligence assets. We have not been given Pakistani military permission to accompany the Pakistani forces on deployments as yet.”
9.By September, 2009, plans for joint intelligence activities had been expanded to include army headquarters. “Pakistan has begun to accept intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support from the US military for COIN (counterr-insurgency) operations,” Ms Patterson wrote. “In addition … intelligence fusion centers” had been established “at the headquarters of Frontier Corps and the 11th Corps and we expect at additional sites, including GHQ and the 12th Corps in Balochistan.”
10.Even In April 2009, she had reported in a cable that the cell at Bala Hisar assisted in the Pakistan military operation then taking place in Lower Dir. “US Special Operations Command Force are assisting the FC at the Intelligence Fusion Cell at FC Headquarters with imagery, target packages, and operational planning.”
11. A US cable also said:“The 3rd Commando Group of the Pakistan Special Services Group (SSG) exploited the weakened state of the Taliban surrounding Daggar, the main city within Buner, to secure the city early on April 29.Although reported earlier that US officials would accompany the FC deployment to Daggar, a late-night decision on April 28 by the Pakistan Military General Headquarters (GHQ) denied the joint deployment, saying the FC had all the assets needed. Embassy will work with GHQ to determine the reason for the late change and to promote integrated operation support.”
12.In a cable of November 2009, Ms.Patterson said: “On a brighter note,there is the possibility that operations in the northern FATA may provide additional opportunities to embed US Special Operations Forces with FC units to provide ISR [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] support and general operational guidance. If we can expand on what we have recently been doing in Bajaur Agency … with our embeds, it would be a significant opportunity to contribute to the pursuit of the TTP (the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan).”
13. The cable added: “Previously, the Pakistani military leadership adamantly opposed letting us embed our special operations personnel with their military forces.The recent approval by GHQ … appears to represent a sea change in Pakistani thinking.These deployments are highly politically sensitive … Should [they] receive any coverage in the Pakistani or US media, the Pakistani military will likely stop making requests for such assistance.”
14.Another cable has described how, in a January 2009 meeting with Chief of Army Staff Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, then CENTCOM commander Gen David Petraeus explained he “had given instructions that Special Operations Forces would be deployed regularly and constantly, and the US needed to move their soldiers in here, so they could engage productively with the Frontier Corps." “Petraeus noted that the 11th Corps Chief of Staff Brigadier Amir was less cooperative with US forces, and Kayani took note of that.” That is, the US was complaining to Kayani about senior Pakistani officers who were not co-operative with the US and Kayani took note of such complaints.
15. In a post-Abbottabad assessment of the Wikileaks cables, "Dawn" has commented as follows: " Secret internal American government cables, accessed by Dawn through WikiLeaks, provide confirmation that the US military’s drone strikes programme within Pakistan had more than just tacit acceptance of the country’s top military brass, despite public posturing to the contrary. In fact, as long ago as January 2008, the country’s military was requesting the US for greater drone back-up for its own military operations. Previously exposed diplomatic cables have already shown that Pakistan’s civilian leaders are strongly supportive – in private – of the drone strikes on alleged militant targets in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), even as they condemn them for general consumption. But it is not just the civilian leadership that has been following a duplicitous policy on the robotic vehicles."
16. "Dawn" added: "In a meeting on January 22, 2008 with US CENTCOM Commander Admiral William J. Fallon, Army Chief General Ashfaq Kayani requested the Americans to provide “continuous Predator coverage of the conflict area” in South Waziristan where the army was conducting operations against militants. The request is detailed in a ‘Secret’ cable sent by then US Ambassador Anne Patterson on February 11, 2008. Pakistan’s military has consistently denied any involvement in the covert programme run mainly by the CIA. "
17. "Dawn" further said: "The American account of Gen Kayani’s request for “Predator coverage” does not make clear if mere air surveillance was being requested or missile-armed drones were being sought. Theoretically “Predator coverage” could simply mean air surveillance and not necessarily offensive support. However the reaction to the request suggests otherwise. According to the report of the meeting sent back to Washington by Patterson, Admiral Fallon “regretted that he did not have the assets to support this request” but offered trained US Marines (known as JTACs) to coordinate air strikes for Pakistani infantry forces on ground. General Kayani “demurred” on the offer, pointing out that having US soldiers on ground “would not be politically acceptable.”
18.In another meeting with US Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen over March 3-4, 2008, Kayani was asked for his help “in approving a third Restricted Operating Zone for US aircraft over the FATA.” The request – detailed in a cable sent from the US Embassy in Islamabad on March 24 – clearly indicated that two ‘corridors’ for US drones had already been approved earlier.
19. According to "Dawn", despite the occasional disastrously misdirected attacks which have fed into the public hue and cry over civilian casualties, there is, in private, " a seeming general acceptance by the military of the efficacy of drone strikes. In a cable dated February 19, 2009, Ambassador Patterson sent talking points to Washington ahead of a week-long visit to the US by COAS Kayani. Referring to drone strikes, she wrote: “Kayani knows full well that the strikes have been precise (creating few civilian casualties) and targeted primarily at foreign fighters in the Waziristans.”
20. In a cable of November 24,2008, Patterson cautioned the State Department as follows: “As the gap between private GOP acquiescence and public condemnation for US action grows,Pakistani leaders who feel they look increasingly weak to their constituents could begin considering stronger action against the US, even though the response to date has focused largely on ritual denunciation.”
21. Citing US media reports, the Pakistani media reported as follows before Mrs.Clinton's visit: Pakistan ordered the departure of up to 20 percent of the roughly 150 U.S. Special Operations forces trainers (SOFTs) in the wake of a series of differences between the two governments.Between 25 and 30 trainers were “told to leave” in the weeks before the U.S. commando raid that killed OBL, apparently in response to the Raymond Davis incident.
22. During Mrs.Clinton's talks in Islamabad, according to the Pakistani media,Islamabad agreed to intensify operations against Al Qaeda and affiliated groups in its territory, while Washington softened its stance on ‘unilateral action’ against high-profile terrorist targets inside Pakistan by underscoring the importance of acting together against terrorists. While there was no joint statement, Mrs.Clinton told the media at the US Embassy: “We both recognise that there is still much more work required to be done and it is urgent. Today we discussed in even greater detail cooperation to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda and to drive them from Pakistan and the region. We will do our part and we look to the government of Pakistan to take decisive steps in the days ahead. Joint action against Al Qaeda and its affiliates will make Pakistan, America and the world more safe and more secure.”
23. According to the Pakistani media, her media comments wavered between expression of acknowledgement of the sacrifices rendered by Pakistan in the fight against terrorism and frustration over the Taliban and other groups continuing to operate from Pakistani soil. Mrs Clinton reminded the Pakistanis that the only way forward in the relationship marred by deep mistrust over counter-terrorism efforts was to redouble efforts in the fight against terrorists. She spoke of “vicious terrorists” having found sanctuaries on Pakistani soil and Afghan militants operating from safe havens in tribal areas and said it was Islamabad’s responsibility to stop that from happening. She added: “There can be no peace, stability, no democracy, no future for Pakistan unless the violent extremists are removed.” Mrs Clinton said she had been assured of “some very specific actions” which Pakistanis would take in coming weeks. She did not give any detail.
24.According to ABC News of the US as quoted by the Pakistani media, the US side demanded immediate action and intelligence sharing on four leading terror names — Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Siraj Haqqani (operational commander of the Haqqani network), Ilyas Kashmiri and Atiya Abdel Rahman (Libyan operations chief of Al Qaeda, who was allegedly a key aide to bin Laden when he was hiding in Abbottabad). "Dawn" claimed that an American source confirmed the list and said that US softening on its position on unilateral action was conditional. “The message given to Pakistani leaders was loud and clear; you either cooperate with us on these four terrorists or we’ll take care of them by ourselves.”
25. "Dawn" further reported: "Something the sceptical Secretary found reassuring was a rare acknowledgement made by the Pakistani side at the talks that Osama bin Laden enjoyed a support network as he spent his years near the Army’s elite training centre. “Our counterparts in the (Pakistani) government were very forthcoming in saying that somebody, somewhere, was providing some kind of support, and they are carrying out an investigation and we have certainly offered to share whatever information we come across.”
26.In return for the promised counter-terrorism cooperation, Mrs Clinton offered “respect for and addressing” Pakistan’s concerns about the political settlement in Afghanistan. She did not elaborate, but said she was convinced that Pakistan had “legitimate” interests in the settlement of the Afghan conflict and its role was indispensable for the success of the reconciliation process. According to "Dawn",Mrs Clinton was particularly critical of the growing anti-Americanism in Pakistan. Although she didn’t explicitly say so, it was evident from her remarks that she thought a segment of the establishment was responsible for promoting it. She said: "In solving its problems Pakistan should understand that anti-Americanism and conspiracy theories will not make its problems disappear.” According to "Dawn", her Pakistani interlocutors complained to her that statements by US officials, leaks to media and unilateral actions were reducing the space for cooperation.
27. Coinciding with her visit, US media has reported that Pakistan has closed down the three joint intelligence fusion cells in Quetta and Peshawar to which there was a reference in the WikiLeaks cables. (30-5-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Thursday, May 26, 2011
THIS MELODY IS FOR YOU
My own adaptation of the words of Julien Clerc's "This Melody" . He was
and is one of my favourite French singers---B.Raman
This melody
Is a melody for you
This melody
Is the ocean between us
This melody
Is the silence between us
This melody
Is a melody for you
This melody
Is the chasm between us
This melody
Is the anguish between us
This melody
Is a melody for you
I am not the greatest
I am not proud or handsome
But I am here
Like this melody
Like this song
Like this sadness
This melody
Is a melody for you
and is one of my favourite French singers---B.Raman
This melody
Is a melody for you
This melody
Is the ocean between us
This melody
Is the silence between us
This melody
Is a melody for you
This melody
Is the chasm between us
This melody
Is the anguish between us
This melody
Is a melody for you
I am not the greatest
I am not proud or handsome
But I am here
Like this melody
Like this song
Like this sadness
This melody
Is a melody for you
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