B.RAMAN
This is the week of my quarterly cancer check-up. Due on the 18th when I will also be given my quarterly injection.
2. I had my tests on February 10. Everything seems normal. But one never knows with cancer. The doctor wanted me to have a scan too. That I will avoid. If the scan result is negative, that could affect my morale. I am living on my morale.
3. Learnt in October 2009 that I can hope to have a maximum of another three years of life. Sixteen months are already over. A maximum of 20 months more remains.
The woods are lovely, dark and deep,
But I have promises to keep,
And miles to go before I sleep,
And miles to go before I sleep.
---- Robert Frost
Sunday, February 13, 2011
EGYPT: AS SEEN FROM NERVOUS BEIJING
B.RAMAN
In its issue of February 14,2011, the "Global Times" of Beijing, which is controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, has come out with a commentary on the success of the Revolution in Egypt. It is worth reading in full and is hence reproduced below:
Egypt has won a battle, but not the war
* Source: Global Times
*February 14 2011
*
Street protest put the Mubarak's rule to an end. The regime change may bring progress for Egyptian society, though there is also worry over the prospects for the country and the entire Arab world.
The first test Egyptian society will face is whether Mubarak's domestic and foreign policies based on rationalism become national policies in a democratic way. Egypt's middle class is weak, bureaucracy and corruption are prevalent and the income gap between rich and poor is huge.
These problems cannot be solved by democracy itself. They require a hard process of economic and cultural development throughout Egyptian society. Egypt's real risk is that it has not formed a stable pillar to support democratic governance. Revolution broke out and changed the country, but there is no force to sustain that change. Therefore, the country is temporarily under the control of the military. However, in the months to come, the leader will still be elected from the old forces in the Middle East country, since there is still no new force to take over.
Egypt has a population of more than 78 million. With underdeveloped industry, it produces far less oil than Gulf countries. It is the US' largest aid recipient country in the Middle East and the US ensured that the Mubarak regime was pro-American.
If Egypt's future national path is chosen with the help of the United States, the significance of Mubarak's stepping down will be greatly reduced.
If the Egyptians carry out elections by themselves, and encourage the Middle East to make its own choices, nobody could foretell the lasting consequences of this revolution.
Various forces in the Middle East, including extremist forces, will engage in a brand-new competition to imprint upon Egypt's new social makeup. Egypt may well be the first chapter in a regional saga in this light.
As the Middle East is still an important balance point for major forces in the world, the region's governance, democratic or not, will have wide-reaching impacts.
The temporary takeover by the military can be seen as a response to global concerns. However, it is only a transitional military regime, lasting a few months,before the Egyptian society gets ready for democracy.
Therefore, when the military regime returns the regime to the people, it could really show the difficulty facing the Egyptian revolution.
In its issue of February 14,2011, the "Global Times" of Beijing, which is controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, has come out with a commentary on the success of the Revolution in Egypt. It is worth reading in full and is hence reproduced below:
Egypt has won a battle, but not the war
* Source: Global Times
*February 14 2011
*
Street protest put the Mubarak's rule to an end. The regime change may bring progress for Egyptian society, though there is also worry over the prospects for the country and the entire Arab world.
The first test Egyptian society will face is whether Mubarak's domestic and foreign policies based on rationalism become national policies in a democratic way. Egypt's middle class is weak, bureaucracy and corruption are prevalent and the income gap between rich and poor is huge.
These problems cannot be solved by democracy itself. They require a hard process of economic and cultural development throughout Egyptian society. Egypt's real risk is that it has not formed a stable pillar to support democratic governance. Revolution broke out and changed the country, but there is no force to sustain that change. Therefore, the country is temporarily under the control of the military. However, in the months to come, the leader will still be elected from the old forces in the Middle East country, since there is still no new force to take over.
Egypt has a population of more than 78 million. With underdeveloped industry, it produces far less oil than Gulf countries. It is the US' largest aid recipient country in the Middle East and the US ensured that the Mubarak regime was pro-American.
If Egypt's future national path is chosen with the help of the United States, the significance of Mubarak's stepping down will be greatly reduced.
If the Egyptians carry out elections by themselves, and encourage the Middle East to make its own choices, nobody could foretell the lasting consequences of this revolution.
Various forces in the Middle East, including extremist forces, will engage in a brand-new competition to imprint upon Egypt's new social makeup. Egypt may well be the first chapter in a regional saga in this light.
As the Middle East is still an important balance point for major forces in the world, the region's governance, democratic or not, will have wide-reaching impacts.
The temporary takeover by the military can be seen as a response to global concerns. However, it is only a transitional military regime, lasting a few months,before the Egyptian society gets ready for democracy.
Therefore, when the military regime returns the regime to the people, it could really show the difficulty facing the Egyptian revolution.
Saturday, February 12, 2011
NEED FOR INDO-PAK VISION STATEMENT
B.RAMAN
Political and non-governmental reactions to the agreement reached by India’s Foreign Secretary Mrs.Nirupama Rao with her Pakistani counterpart Mr.Salman Bashir during their meeting at Thimpu in Bhutan on February 6 have been mixed. The details of the agreement, which must have been finalized by the two Governments before the two Foreign Secretaries met at Thimpu in the margin of a SAARC Foreign Ministers’ meeting, were announced simultaneously in the two capitals on February 10. The text of an Indian news agency report on the subject is annexed.
2. The agreement provides for a series of meetings between the concerned officials of the two countries on various contentious issues, which formed part of the so-called composite dialogue, culminating in a visit by Pakistan’s Foreign Minister to New Delhi in July to review jointly with his Indian counterpart Shri S.M.Krishna the results of these meetings. These meetings, which were being held periodically with little forward movement, have been in a state of suspension since the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai by a group of terrorists of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET).
3.India had been insisting on effective action by Pakistan against the LET and the Pakistan-based conspirators of the 26/11 terrorist strikes before the dialogue process can be resumed. Pakistan had been insisting on a resumption of the dialogue process without linking the resumption to the progress of the trial against the LET conspirators. Last year, two meetings between the Foreign Secretaries in New Delhi and Islamabad, a bilateral meeting between Shri P.Chidambaram, our Home Minister, and Mr.Rehman Malik, the Pakistani Interior Minister, in the margins of a SAARC Interior Ministers’ meeting in Islamabad and a visit by Shi Krishna to Islamabad in July to meet Mr.Shah Mehmood Quereshi, the then Pakistani Foreign Minister, could not break the deadlock.
4. The efforts to find a way out of the deadlock were stymied by the intemperate language against Shri Krishna used by Mr.Quereshi at an Islamabad press conference after the visit of Shri Krishna and his insistence on a prior agreement for a resumption of the dialogue process in a time-bound manner before he could visit Delhi to reciprocate the visit of Shri Krishna. When everybody was expecting the deadlock to continue at Thimpu, there has been a surprising agreement to resume the talks without linking the resumption to the pre-26/11 composite dialogue. An attempt has been made to project the forthcoming resumption as a fresh start towards finding a solution to the various bilateral issues and not as a continuation of the old process.
5. In two interviews to Barkha Dutt of NDTV--- one before the announcement and the second after it--- Mrs.Nirupama Rao sought to project the agreement on the resumption as an indicator of the pragmatism characterizing the Indian policy towards Pakistan and as presaging a serious, sustained and comprehensive effort to move the process forward while continuing to stick to our strong stand on counter-terrorism.
6. The critics of the agreement have projected it as a climb-down by India in accepting the Pakistani insistence on a prior agreement on the resumption before the Pakistani Foreign Minister could visit New Delhi. Whether one calls it a climb-down or not, it is a major concession by India to the Pakistani point of view. Such concessions are part of pragmatic diplomacy and should not be seen in negative light provided they do not affect our basic national interests.
7. The major concession made by India has interestingly coincided with the removal of the Foreign Affairs portfolio from Mr. Quereshi in a Cabinet reshuffle, which followed the day after the Indo-Pak announcement. Mr.Quereshi has reportedly refused to join the new Cabinet if the Foreign Affairs portfolio is not restored to him. Hina Rabbani Khar, who was Minister of State for Finance in the outgoing Cabinet, has been asked to look after the Foreign Affairs portfolio for the present .Mr.Quereshi was reputed to be close to the Army leadership and his erratic handling of Indo-Pak relations and his intemperate language against our Foreign Minister were attributed to his anxiety to please the Army. Will the Army intervene to have the portfolio restored to Mr.Quereshi? Or will it insist on another hard-liner enjoying the Army’s confidence being made the new Foreign Minister? Who is appointed as the new Foreign Minister will indicate what we can expect in the months to come.
8. A new ambiance, a new lingo, a seeming bonhomie characterized the Thimpu talks between the Foreign Secretaries. Mr.Salman Bashir , who in the past never missed an opportunity to throw stones at India, was unusually and pleasantly restrained. He did not utter a single controversial remark in public. He declined to comment on the progress of the investigation in India into the explosion on board the Samjauta Express train in 2007 in which a large number of Pakistanis were killed. He resisted from linking the terrorist attack on the train to any religion. Mrs. Rao also tried to project an optimistic, forward-looking and not backward-bound posture.
9. All this showed that before the Foreign Secretaries met considerable spadework had been done through various channels to remove the poison that had been injected by the attitude of Mr.Quereshi towards India. One can keep on arguing whether the concession apparently made by India to Pakistan was wise. A more important question is whether the forthcoming talks will prove to be any different from those held before 26/11. A fresh start alone will not help unless there is a fresh mind-set. Mrs.Rao talked of a new pragmatism. Are there indicators of a similar pragmatism in Pakistan? One will know when a new Foreign Minister gets going in Islamabad. Indian pragmatism alone will not do unless reciprocated by an equal Pakistani pragmatism.
10. During her interaction with the media at Thimpu, Mrs. Rao referred to the difficulties faced by us in harmonising vision and the ground realities in Indo-Pakistan relations. The ground realities have not changed. Pakistan continues to sponsor terrorism against India. It has not expedited the trial against the 26/11 conspirators. It has refused to act against the anti-India terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory. It continues to create difficulties for India in Afghanistan. It continues to build up its military capability, including the nuclear capability, with Chinese assistance. It has granted the Chinese troops a growing presence in the Kashmiri territory under its occupation.
11. Is it realistic to talk of an Indo-Pakistani vision for their future relations in the face of the continuing ground realities such as these? Is it possible to have a shared vision for the future when the ground realities vitiate the atmosphere for such a vision? These are very valid questions. Equally valid is the fact that all Indo-Pakistan attempts for a forward movement in the bilateral relations have failed so far due to a lack of a shared vision for the future within the parameters of which the dialogue can be held.
12. Instead of re-starting the dialogue process under whatever name and reaching the same dead-end through a different route, should we not first reach a shared vision for the future and make the dialogue a natural flow from the vision? Such a shared vision cannot come from meetings at the level of officials and in political contacts in the margins of multilateral conferences. It can come only from direct, face-to-face meetings between the two Prime Ministers in each other’s capitals.
13. A bilateral visit by our Prime Minister to Islamabad is long overdue. The two bilateral visits of Gen.Pervez Musharraf, when he was the President, to India have remained unreciprocated. Of course, Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee, as Prime Minister, visited Islamabad in January 2004, but that was for a SAARC summit. It was reported in the past that the Prime Minister, Dr.Manmohan Singh, was of the view that a bilateral visit by him to Islamabad would be meaningless unless there was a prior agreement of a substantive nature at least on one of the issues affecting the bilateral relations.
14. The time has come for a re-look at this policy and to start thinking in terms of a bilateral visit by our Prime Minister to Pakistan for discussions with Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani and President Asif Ali Zardari on a single-point agenda of seeking a shared vision for the future. I know this idea will be criticized and ridiculed by the no-changers, but that is not a reason for not proposing it and for avoiding a debate on it. ( 13-1-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
TEXT OF A PRESS TRUST OF INDIA REPORT ON INDO-PAKISTAN TALKS
Unveiling the road-map for resumption of a comprehensive dialogue with Pakistan, India today announced that the Home Secretaries of the two countries will hold talks on counter-terrorism, including progress on 26/11 trial in Rawalpindi court, ahead of Foreign Minister S M Qureshi's visit here by July.
In a statement 'Agreed Outcome of India-Pakistan Foreign Secretary-level talks in Thimphu', Ministry of External Affairs said Secretary-level talks on the issues of counter-terrorism (including progress on Mumbai trial); humanitarian issues; peace and security, including CBMs; Jammu and Kashmir; promotion of friendly exchanges; Siachen and economic issues will be held in the next few months.
Discussions on issues such as Wullar barrage or Tulbul navigation project and Sir Creek will be at the level of Additional Secretaries or Surveyors General.
List of issues mentioned in the statement are same as in the Composite Dialogue, that was halted by India after the 2008 Mumbai attacks.
The ministry said, "the Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan met in Thimphu on February 6, 2011 to carry forward this process. They briefed their respective Governments."
The agreed statement was issued simultaneously both in New Delhi and Islamabad today.
About the schedule of the meetings, the ministry said dates will be fixed through diplomatic channels. But given the fact that the two sides have just few months left before Qureshi's visit here, the series of interactions are expected to start shortly.
In pursuance of the mandate given by the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, following their meeting in Thimphu in April 2010, the two Foreign Ministers had met in Islamabad in July 2010 to review the current state of the bilateral relationship and discuss steps to promote trust and confidence between the two countries, it said.
After the meeting of Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao and her counterpart Salman Bashir last Sunday, India and Pakistan have agreed to resume dialogue on all issues following the spirit of the Thimphu meeting between the two Prime Ministers.
"The Foreign Minister of Pakistan will visit India by July 2011 to review progress in the dialogue process with his counterpart. This will be preceded by a meeting of the two Foreign Secretaries," MEA said.
"They have agreed that prior to the visit of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, meetings at the level of respective Secretaries will be convened on counter-terrorism (including progress on Mumbai trial); humanitarian issues; peace and security, including CBMs; Jammu and Kashmir; promotion of friendly exchanges; Siachen; economic issues; Wullar Barrage/ Tulbul Navigation Project; and Sir Creek (at the level of Additional Secretaries/Surveyors General)," it said.
Political and non-governmental reactions to the agreement reached by India’s Foreign Secretary Mrs.Nirupama Rao with her Pakistani counterpart Mr.Salman Bashir during their meeting at Thimpu in Bhutan on February 6 have been mixed. The details of the agreement, which must have been finalized by the two Governments before the two Foreign Secretaries met at Thimpu in the margin of a SAARC Foreign Ministers’ meeting, were announced simultaneously in the two capitals on February 10. The text of an Indian news agency report on the subject is annexed.
2. The agreement provides for a series of meetings between the concerned officials of the two countries on various contentious issues, which formed part of the so-called composite dialogue, culminating in a visit by Pakistan’s Foreign Minister to New Delhi in July to review jointly with his Indian counterpart Shri S.M.Krishna the results of these meetings. These meetings, which were being held periodically with little forward movement, have been in a state of suspension since the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai by a group of terrorists of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET).
3.India had been insisting on effective action by Pakistan against the LET and the Pakistan-based conspirators of the 26/11 terrorist strikes before the dialogue process can be resumed. Pakistan had been insisting on a resumption of the dialogue process without linking the resumption to the progress of the trial against the LET conspirators. Last year, two meetings between the Foreign Secretaries in New Delhi and Islamabad, a bilateral meeting between Shri P.Chidambaram, our Home Minister, and Mr.Rehman Malik, the Pakistani Interior Minister, in the margins of a SAARC Interior Ministers’ meeting in Islamabad and a visit by Shi Krishna to Islamabad in July to meet Mr.Shah Mehmood Quereshi, the then Pakistani Foreign Minister, could not break the deadlock.
4. The efforts to find a way out of the deadlock were stymied by the intemperate language against Shri Krishna used by Mr.Quereshi at an Islamabad press conference after the visit of Shri Krishna and his insistence on a prior agreement for a resumption of the dialogue process in a time-bound manner before he could visit Delhi to reciprocate the visit of Shri Krishna. When everybody was expecting the deadlock to continue at Thimpu, there has been a surprising agreement to resume the talks without linking the resumption to the pre-26/11 composite dialogue. An attempt has been made to project the forthcoming resumption as a fresh start towards finding a solution to the various bilateral issues and not as a continuation of the old process.
5. In two interviews to Barkha Dutt of NDTV--- one before the announcement and the second after it--- Mrs.Nirupama Rao sought to project the agreement on the resumption as an indicator of the pragmatism characterizing the Indian policy towards Pakistan and as presaging a serious, sustained and comprehensive effort to move the process forward while continuing to stick to our strong stand on counter-terrorism.
6. The critics of the agreement have projected it as a climb-down by India in accepting the Pakistani insistence on a prior agreement on the resumption before the Pakistani Foreign Minister could visit New Delhi. Whether one calls it a climb-down or not, it is a major concession by India to the Pakistani point of view. Such concessions are part of pragmatic diplomacy and should not be seen in negative light provided they do not affect our basic national interests.
7. The major concession made by India has interestingly coincided with the removal of the Foreign Affairs portfolio from Mr. Quereshi in a Cabinet reshuffle, which followed the day after the Indo-Pak announcement. Mr.Quereshi has reportedly refused to join the new Cabinet if the Foreign Affairs portfolio is not restored to him. Hina Rabbani Khar, who was Minister of State for Finance in the outgoing Cabinet, has been asked to look after the Foreign Affairs portfolio for the present .Mr.Quereshi was reputed to be close to the Army leadership and his erratic handling of Indo-Pak relations and his intemperate language against our Foreign Minister were attributed to his anxiety to please the Army. Will the Army intervene to have the portfolio restored to Mr.Quereshi? Or will it insist on another hard-liner enjoying the Army’s confidence being made the new Foreign Minister? Who is appointed as the new Foreign Minister will indicate what we can expect in the months to come.
8. A new ambiance, a new lingo, a seeming bonhomie characterized the Thimpu talks between the Foreign Secretaries. Mr.Salman Bashir , who in the past never missed an opportunity to throw stones at India, was unusually and pleasantly restrained. He did not utter a single controversial remark in public. He declined to comment on the progress of the investigation in India into the explosion on board the Samjauta Express train in 2007 in which a large number of Pakistanis were killed. He resisted from linking the terrorist attack on the train to any religion. Mrs. Rao also tried to project an optimistic, forward-looking and not backward-bound posture.
9. All this showed that before the Foreign Secretaries met considerable spadework had been done through various channels to remove the poison that had been injected by the attitude of Mr.Quereshi towards India. One can keep on arguing whether the concession apparently made by India to Pakistan was wise. A more important question is whether the forthcoming talks will prove to be any different from those held before 26/11. A fresh start alone will not help unless there is a fresh mind-set. Mrs.Rao talked of a new pragmatism. Are there indicators of a similar pragmatism in Pakistan? One will know when a new Foreign Minister gets going in Islamabad. Indian pragmatism alone will not do unless reciprocated by an equal Pakistani pragmatism.
10. During her interaction with the media at Thimpu, Mrs. Rao referred to the difficulties faced by us in harmonising vision and the ground realities in Indo-Pakistan relations. The ground realities have not changed. Pakistan continues to sponsor terrorism against India. It has not expedited the trial against the 26/11 conspirators. It has refused to act against the anti-India terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory. It continues to create difficulties for India in Afghanistan. It continues to build up its military capability, including the nuclear capability, with Chinese assistance. It has granted the Chinese troops a growing presence in the Kashmiri territory under its occupation.
11. Is it realistic to talk of an Indo-Pakistani vision for their future relations in the face of the continuing ground realities such as these? Is it possible to have a shared vision for the future when the ground realities vitiate the atmosphere for such a vision? These are very valid questions. Equally valid is the fact that all Indo-Pakistan attempts for a forward movement in the bilateral relations have failed so far due to a lack of a shared vision for the future within the parameters of which the dialogue can be held.
12. Instead of re-starting the dialogue process under whatever name and reaching the same dead-end through a different route, should we not first reach a shared vision for the future and make the dialogue a natural flow from the vision? Such a shared vision cannot come from meetings at the level of officials and in political contacts in the margins of multilateral conferences. It can come only from direct, face-to-face meetings between the two Prime Ministers in each other’s capitals.
13. A bilateral visit by our Prime Minister to Islamabad is long overdue. The two bilateral visits of Gen.Pervez Musharraf, when he was the President, to India have remained unreciprocated. Of course, Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee, as Prime Minister, visited Islamabad in January 2004, but that was for a SAARC summit. It was reported in the past that the Prime Minister, Dr.Manmohan Singh, was of the view that a bilateral visit by him to Islamabad would be meaningless unless there was a prior agreement of a substantive nature at least on one of the issues affecting the bilateral relations.
14. The time has come for a re-look at this policy and to start thinking in terms of a bilateral visit by our Prime Minister to Pakistan for discussions with Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani and President Asif Ali Zardari on a single-point agenda of seeking a shared vision for the future. I know this idea will be criticized and ridiculed by the no-changers, but that is not a reason for not proposing it and for avoiding a debate on it. ( 13-1-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
TEXT OF A PRESS TRUST OF INDIA REPORT ON INDO-PAKISTAN TALKS
Unveiling the road-map for resumption of a comprehensive dialogue with Pakistan, India today announced that the Home Secretaries of the two countries will hold talks on counter-terrorism, including progress on 26/11 trial in Rawalpindi court, ahead of Foreign Minister S M Qureshi's visit here by July.
In a statement 'Agreed Outcome of India-Pakistan Foreign Secretary-level talks in Thimphu', Ministry of External Affairs said Secretary-level talks on the issues of counter-terrorism (including progress on Mumbai trial); humanitarian issues; peace and security, including CBMs; Jammu and Kashmir; promotion of friendly exchanges; Siachen and economic issues will be held in the next few months.
Discussions on issues such as Wullar barrage or Tulbul navigation project and Sir Creek will be at the level of Additional Secretaries or Surveyors General.
List of issues mentioned in the statement are same as in the Composite Dialogue, that was halted by India after the 2008 Mumbai attacks.
The ministry said, "the Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan met in Thimphu on February 6, 2011 to carry forward this process. They briefed their respective Governments."
The agreed statement was issued simultaneously both in New Delhi and Islamabad today.
About the schedule of the meetings, the ministry said dates will be fixed through diplomatic channels. But given the fact that the two sides have just few months left before Qureshi's visit here, the series of interactions are expected to start shortly.
In pursuance of the mandate given by the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, following their meeting in Thimphu in April 2010, the two Foreign Ministers had met in Islamabad in July 2010 to review the current state of the bilateral relationship and discuss steps to promote trust and confidence between the two countries, it said.
After the meeting of Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao and her counterpart Salman Bashir last Sunday, India and Pakistan have agreed to resume dialogue on all issues following the spirit of the Thimphu meeting between the two Prime Ministers.
"The Foreign Minister of Pakistan will visit India by July 2011 to review progress in the dialogue process with his counterpart. This will be preceded by a meeting of the two Foreign Secretaries," MEA said.
"They have agreed that prior to the visit of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, meetings at the level of respective Secretaries will be convened on counter-terrorism (including progress on Mumbai trial); humanitarian issues; peace and security, including CBMs; Jammu and Kashmir; promotion of friendly exchanges; Siachen; economic issues; Wullar Barrage/ Tulbul Navigation Project; and Sir Creek (at the level of Additional Secretaries/Surveyors General)," it said.
Friday, February 11, 2011
EGYPT: AN UNCERTAIN TRANSITION
B.RAMAN
Some have termed the departure of President Hosni Mubarak from office on February 11,2011, as a resignation. Some others have called it waiving the office or powers of the President. The Egyptian Constitution provides for both contingencies. When a President resigns, the Constitution requires that he should address his letter of resignation to the President (Speaker) of the Parliament. When he stops exercising the powers of the President, he addresses his letter to the Vice-President. Article 82 provides for this interesting contingency of the President leaving office without formally resigning. It says: “If on account of any temporary obstacle the President of the Republic is unable to carry out his functions, he shall delegate his powers to a vice-president.”
2.Mubarak, while leaving office much to the jubilation of the protesters, did not inform the President of the Parliament and submit a formal letter of resignation as required under the Constitution. Nor did he ask the Vice-President Omar Suleiman to take over. Instead, he asked the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to take over. It is a coup without seeming to be a coup.
3. One can go on analyzing the circumstances of Mubarak’s departure. Whatever be the circumstances, Mubarak is gone from office for ever. It is time to discuss what next. Egypt is now in a state of transition under the leadership of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which consists of the following:
* Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, who has been the Minister of Defense and commander-in-chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces since 1991. He has been a Field Marshal since 1989. After the protests broke out on January 25, Mubarak promoted him as Deputy Prime Minister and asked him to continue to hold the defence portfolio. He visited the Tahrir Square on February 4 and met the troops deployed there as well as the protesters. He is the Chairman of the Supreme Council.
* Air Marshal Reda Mahmoud Hafez Mohamed, the chief of the Air Force since March 20,2008.
* Lieutenant General Sami Hafez Anan, Chief of Staff of the Army.
* Lt. Gen. Abd El Aziz Seif-Eldeen, Commander of Air Defense.
* Vice Admiral Mohab Mamish, chief of navy.
4. Is Lt.Gen. Omar Suleiman, the Vice-President, who made the televised announcement regarding Mubarak leaving office after handing over his powers, a member of the Supreme Council? The position is not clear. Al Jazeera says he is. Others do not say so. However, since he is only a Lt-Gen and since the Supreme Council is headed by a Field Marshal, it stands to reason that Suleiman may have to work under the orders of the Supreme Council and not vice versa.
5. What next? The present Constitution has become untenable since the post-Mubarak transitional arrangements are not in accordance with the Constitution. This gives rise to the possibility that the Supreme Council may suspend the Constitution and dissolve the Parliament. Mohamed El Baradei has said that Egypt will now have a provisional Constitution.
6. What will be the duration of the transitional arrangements? Till September when the election of a new President is due or for a longer period? The political elements, who participated in the protest movement, are already saying that it may not be possible for the Supreme Council to restore political and economic normalcy before September and, hence, according to them, it should be for a longer period. El Baradei has been quoted by the BBC as stating as follows: “ "What I have been proposing is a transitional period of one year. We will have a provisional constitution. We'll have a transitional government, hopefully a presidential council, including a person from the army and a couple of civilians. The main idea is that the army and the Egyptian people will work together in a systematic way for a year to reach the point where we can hold a genuine free and fair election, a parliamentary election and a presidential election. I think the people of Egypt, who have been suppressed for at least 30 years, are ready to wait for a year as they see things are going in the right direction."
7. The younger non-political elements, who played a leading role in the revolution, have not clearly indicated their view on this subject apart from expressing their trust in the Army. Wael Ghonim, the Egyptian Google executive, who is credited with rallying many young people behind El Baradei, has tweeted to his followers as follows: “The military statement is great. I trust our Egyptian Army”.
8. The Armed Forces’ statement to which he had referred said the Supreme Council would lift the country's emergency law but only "as soon as current circumstances end". It also said that the "Armed Forces make a commitment to caring for the people's legitimate demands, and to seeking to follow their implementation within the time frames with full precision and resolution, until the complete transfer of power, and the achievement of the democratic free society which the people aspire to". It pledged not to prosecute "the honest men who called for an end to corruption and for reform". While it spoke of time-frames for the transition, it refrained from specifying those time-frames. If Ghonim comes out ultimately in support of El Baradei’s call for a longer transition, will other youth leaders support him?
9. Who will be in any transitional Government or council that may be constituted? Everybody wants that it should be a civilian council possibly headed by El Baradei and including a representative of the Armed Forces. It is not yet clear whether the Supreme Council would accept a transitional council of which the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is a member. The MB has been supportive of El Baradei till now. He has been advocating a role for the MB in the transitional set-up, but the MB has said it does not want any role. The youth leaders are not opposed to it. The Supreme Council has not yet spelt out its views.
10. What now of Mubarak? Will he be allowed to lead a quiet life in Sharam-el- Sheikh, where he has reportedly taken up residence or will he face further humilitation. The youth elements want him to be held accountable for his alleged misdeeds and enquiries ordered against him. This is clear from the following Tweets of Ghonim to his followers: “Soon the ugly face of the regime will be supported by documents and evidence “ and “the money Mubarak and his family stole out of the Egyptian people should go to families of martyrs and to reconstruct Egypt.” The Supreme Council and El Baradei have kept quiet on any further action against Mubarak,but the youth leaders are now saying that now that Mubarak is gone, they should focus on action against his dictatorship. It is evident they want action against all those closely identified with Mubarak. Omar Suleiman was very close to Mubarak for 20 years. He was part of the Mubarak dictatorship. Will they demand action against him?
11. Ghonim emerged as a legendary leader of the youth component of the revolution. But he was also a senior executive of a US multinational (Google). Some of his statements could now be interpreted as business and corporate houses friendly. One of his Tweets says: “ Lets work on raising 100 Billion EGP from Egyptians to rebuild Egypt. Talked to one business man and he is ready to put the first 1 B”. Will other young leaders, who come from middle and lower middle class families, feel comfortable with his policies towards the business world? All the business families, which minted billions, were with Mubarak.
12. What are the chances of the prairie fire of revolution spreading to other Arab countries? The immediate danger is to Yemen, Algeria and Libya. Ghonim has already tweeted as follows to anti-Govt protesters in Algeria: “My heart and prayers to the Algerian brothers and sisters. “ Yemen has been in turmoil for nearly three weeks now. There have been sporadic protests in Algeria and Libya. Developments in these countries can move fast now. ( 12-2-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Some have termed the departure of President Hosni Mubarak from office on February 11,2011, as a resignation. Some others have called it waiving the office or powers of the President. The Egyptian Constitution provides for both contingencies. When a President resigns, the Constitution requires that he should address his letter of resignation to the President (Speaker) of the Parliament. When he stops exercising the powers of the President, he addresses his letter to the Vice-President. Article 82 provides for this interesting contingency of the President leaving office without formally resigning. It says: “If on account of any temporary obstacle the President of the Republic is unable to carry out his functions, he shall delegate his powers to a vice-president.”
2.Mubarak, while leaving office much to the jubilation of the protesters, did not inform the President of the Parliament and submit a formal letter of resignation as required under the Constitution. Nor did he ask the Vice-President Omar Suleiman to take over. Instead, he asked the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to take over. It is a coup without seeming to be a coup.
3. One can go on analyzing the circumstances of Mubarak’s departure. Whatever be the circumstances, Mubarak is gone from office for ever. It is time to discuss what next. Egypt is now in a state of transition under the leadership of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which consists of the following:
* Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, who has been the Minister of Defense and commander-in-chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces since 1991. He has been a Field Marshal since 1989. After the protests broke out on January 25, Mubarak promoted him as Deputy Prime Minister and asked him to continue to hold the defence portfolio. He visited the Tahrir Square on February 4 and met the troops deployed there as well as the protesters. He is the Chairman of the Supreme Council.
* Air Marshal Reda Mahmoud Hafez Mohamed, the chief of the Air Force since March 20,2008.
* Lieutenant General Sami Hafez Anan, Chief of Staff of the Army.
* Lt. Gen. Abd El Aziz Seif-Eldeen, Commander of Air Defense.
* Vice Admiral Mohab Mamish, chief of navy.
4. Is Lt.Gen. Omar Suleiman, the Vice-President, who made the televised announcement regarding Mubarak leaving office after handing over his powers, a member of the Supreme Council? The position is not clear. Al Jazeera says he is. Others do not say so. However, since he is only a Lt-Gen and since the Supreme Council is headed by a Field Marshal, it stands to reason that Suleiman may have to work under the orders of the Supreme Council and not vice versa.
5. What next? The present Constitution has become untenable since the post-Mubarak transitional arrangements are not in accordance with the Constitution. This gives rise to the possibility that the Supreme Council may suspend the Constitution and dissolve the Parliament. Mohamed El Baradei has said that Egypt will now have a provisional Constitution.
6. What will be the duration of the transitional arrangements? Till September when the election of a new President is due or for a longer period? The political elements, who participated in the protest movement, are already saying that it may not be possible for the Supreme Council to restore political and economic normalcy before September and, hence, according to them, it should be for a longer period. El Baradei has been quoted by the BBC as stating as follows: “ "What I have been proposing is a transitional period of one year. We will have a provisional constitution. We'll have a transitional government, hopefully a presidential council, including a person from the army and a couple of civilians. The main idea is that the army and the Egyptian people will work together in a systematic way for a year to reach the point where we can hold a genuine free and fair election, a parliamentary election and a presidential election. I think the people of Egypt, who have been suppressed for at least 30 years, are ready to wait for a year as they see things are going in the right direction."
7. The younger non-political elements, who played a leading role in the revolution, have not clearly indicated their view on this subject apart from expressing their trust in the Army. Wael Ghonim, the Egyptian Google executive, who is credited with rallying many young people behind El Baradei, has tweeted to his followers as follows: “The military statement is great. I trust our Egyptian Army”.
8. The Armed Forces’ statement to which he had referred said the Supreme Council would lift the country's emergency law but only "as soon as current circumstances end". It also said that the "Armed Forces make a commitment to caring for the people's legitimate demands, and to seeking to follow their implementation within the time frames with full precision and resolution, until the complete transfer of power, and the achievement of the democratic free society which the people aspire to". It pledged not to prosecute "the honest men who called for an end to corruption and for reform". While it spoke of time-frames for the transition, it refrained from specifying those time-frames. If Ghonim comes out ultimately in support of El Baradei’s call for a longer transition, will other youth leaders support him?
9. Who will be in any transitional Government or council that may be constituted? Everybody wants that it should be a civilian council possibly headed by El Baradei and including a representative of the Armed Forces. It is not yet clear whether the Supreme Council would accept a transitional council of which the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is a member. The MB has been supportive of El Baradei till now. He has been advocating a role for the MB in the transitional set-up, but the MB has said it does not want any role. The youth leaders are not opposed to it. The Supreme Council has not yet spelt out its views.
10. What now of Mubarak? Will he be allowed to lead a quiet life in Sharam-el- Sheikh, where he has reportedly taken up residence or will he face further humilitation. The youth elements want him to be held accountable for his alleged misdeeds and enquiries ordered against him. This is clear from the following Tweets of Ghonim to his followers: “Soon the ugly face of the regime will be supported by documents and evidence “ and “the money Mubarak and his family stole out of the Egyptian people should go to families of martyrs and to reconstruct Egypt.” The Supreme Council and El Baradei have kept quiet on any further action against Mubarak,but the youth leaders are now saying that now that Mubarak is gone, they should focus on action against his dictatorship. It is evident they want action against all those closely identified with Mubarak. Omar Suleiman was very close to Mubarak for 20 years. He was part of the Mubarak dictatorship. Will they demand action against him?
11. Ghonim emerged as a legendary leader of the youth component of the revolution. But he was also a senior executive of a US multinational (Google). Some of his statements could now be interpreted as business and corporate houses friendly. One of his Tweets says: “ Lets work on raising 100 Billion EGP from Egyptians to rebuild Egypt. Talked to one business man and he is ready to put the first 1 B”. Will other young leaders, who come from middle and lower middle class families, feel comfortable with his policies towards the business world? All the business families, which minted billions, were with Mubarak.
12. What are the chances of the prairie fire of revolution spreading to other Arab countries? The immediate danger is to Yemen, Algeria and Libya. Ghonim has already tweeted as follows to anti-Govt protesters in Algeria: “My heart and prayers to the Algerian brothers and sisters. “ Yemen has been in turmoil for nearly three weeks now. There have been sporadic protests in Algeria and Libya. Developments in these countries can move fast now. ( 12-2-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Thursday, February 10, 2011
WRITING A NEW PAGE IN EGYPT'S HISTORY
B.RAMAN
My heart bled last night as I watched with millions of Indians the disappointment and anger on the face of the Egyptian people, particularly the youth, as they heard with disbelief the defiant broadcast of discredited President Hosni Mubarak in which he dashed their expectation that he was about to quit in the face of the revolution inspired and led by young people, which has gathered momentum beyond expectation.
2. All sorts of speculative stories were flying across the electronic world. "Mubarak has resigned", "Mubarak has fled the country with US $ 2 billion", "he had pre-recorded his speech before he fled the country"etc. I was reminded of what Indian Air Force (IAF) officers of my vintage, who had served in Egypt and had known Mubarak as an instructor in the Egyptian Air Force Academy, had told me: "Mubarak is a man of great pride. He will die in the country and never flee from it."
3.Mubarak is not the discredited Tunisian President Ben Ali who fled to Saudi Arabia at the height of the recent protest movement against him. He sincerely believes that he played a role in giving pride back to the country after its humiliating defeat by Israel in 1967 and that the Egyptian nation owes him a debt of gratitude for that. Mubarak is a hated despot. He is alleged to be corrupt. He suppressed the will of the people without remorse. But he is not a coward. He will not flee the country and die in foreign soil. That is the impression I had of him.
4. This impression was strengthened by the following Tweet from an unknown Egyptian disseminated by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in the moments before Mubarak's televised speech: "Mubarak is too proud to step down.. to say it himself.. NO WAY.. honestly I would be surprised if…"
5. As I was awaiting his telecast, I was frequently visiting the Twitter site of Wael Ghonim, the young Egyptian Google executive, who has become a hero of the Egyptian people for leading the uprising with other young Egyptians, to see what were his feelings in those electrifying moments when the Egyptian people and the world with them had convinced themselves that Mubarak is gone or about to go. The following Tweets from Ghonim to his followers caught my attention:
* "Failure is not an option."
* "Guys, don't do much speculation for now, just wait and see. Long live Egypt!"
* "We are hoping that the "Friday of Martyrs" will be the world's largest funeral to bid farewell to 300 Egyptians"
* "Friday of martyrs is still on whatever happens today."
* "Started to rain in Cairo, and I am optimistic. Hoping that sky is crying from happiness"
6. Somehow, I had a gnawing feeling that he was not yet convinced that the exit of Mubarak was in sight. As I kept awake watching the glorious moments in Egypt on the TV and exchanging Tweets with my friends on the evolving situation in Egypt, I sent the following Tweet to my friends in my Twitter group (Ramanthink) : "Under Constitution, if Mub quits Speaker takes over. If he reports sick, Suleiman takes over.If he runs away, it is constitutional crisis."
7. I spent hours last week studying the Egyptian Constitution to see whether there is a constitutional way of bringing about the end of the Mubarak regime. I wrote as follows in my article of February 6 titled "The Egyptian Stand-off" available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers44%5Cpaper4318.html : "The problem is while the status quo can be easily changed in the ruling party and the unpopular leaders removed from positions of influence, it is difficult to change it in the Governmental set-up under the present Constitution, which clearly provides that if the President quits, the Speaker of the Parliament would be sworn in as the officiating President till fresh elections are held. Neither Lt.Gen.Omar Suleiman, the former intelligence chief who was recently nominated as the Vice-President by Mubarak, nor El Baradei, former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, whom the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and the secular opposition parties are prepared to support as the interim head till the elections are held, can officiate as the President because neither of them is an elected member of the Parliament and because of the specific provision in the Constitution that the Speaker would officiate. However, there is a provision in the Constitution under which Mubarak, while continuing to be the de jure President, can delegate the powers of the President to his Vice-President who will thus become the de facto President and could co-ordinate the arrangements for the elections without Mubarak playing any role in it. It is doubtful whether the protesters would agree to such an arrangement because of the close association of Suleiman with Mubarak for nearly two decades and his equally close association with the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).....Thus, the position is: Suleiman is acceptable to Mubarak and his followers and the US as interim head of a transitional Government, but he may not be acceptable to the protesters. El Baradei may be acceptable to the protesters, but he cannot head the tranitional set-up under the present Constitution."
8. In his televised speech, Mubarak has chosen the constitutional way of easing himself out of the controversy, which has pitted him against his people. While expressing his determination to continue as the President till his term ends in September, he has said that he is transfering some of his powers as the President to the Vice-President without specifying which powers. He said: "I saw fit to delegate presidential jurisdictions to the Vice-President as defined by the constitution. I am certain that Egypt will overcome its crisis." The Egyptian Ambassador to the US, Sameh Shoukry, has been quoted by the BBC as saying Vice President Suleiman is now the "de facto head of state" following Mubarak's speech, but this has not been confirmed.
9. It is doubtful whether there can be a constitutional end to the present crisis. The only way of ending the crisis is for the Army to take over power, suspend the constitution and appoint a transitional Government headed by someone enjoying the confidence of the protesters to pave the way for the election of a new President. From the comments of the protesters and their leaders, it appears they may not be averse to the Army playing a role to bring about the end of Mubarak's regime here and now. But will the Army play the game fairly after the protesters go back to their studies or work and return to the barracks and co-operate with the transitional Govt? That is a question to which it will be difficult to give an answer.
10. Today, there are going to be millions and millions of angry and disappointed Egyptians out in the streets to observe the "Martyrs Day". Will they try to force the exit of Mubarak by marching to his palace? If they try to do so, can there be bloodshed?
11. Egyptians are living through glorious moments. They are living through ennobling moments. They are also living through unchartered moments----moments the like of which their country had not seen before. As Ghonim remarked in one of his Tweets : "I feel that their last line is being written, and soon we're taking the pen to start drawing our own future"
12. Let us wish the Egyptian people all the luck in the world as they try to write a new page in their history. They deserve to prevail. (11-2-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
My heart bled last night as I watched with millions of Indians the disappointment and anger on the face of the Egyptian people, particularly the youth, as they heard with disbelief the defiant broadcast of discredited President Hosni Mubarak in which he dashed their expectation that he was about to quit in the face of the revolution inspired and led by young people, which has gathered momentum beyond expectation.
2. All sorts of speculative stories were flying across the electronic world. "Mubarak has resigned", "Mubarak has fled the country with US $ 2 billion", "he had pre-recorded his speech before he fled the country"etc. I was reminded of what Indian Air Force (IAF) officers of my vintage, who had served in Egypt and had known Mubarak as an instructor in the Egyptian Air Force Academy, had told me: "Mubarak is a man of great pride. He will die in the country and never flee from it."
3.Mubarak is not the discredited Tunisian President Ben Ali who fled to Saudi Arabia at the height of the recent protest movement against him. He sincerely believes that he played a role in giving pride back to the country after its humiliating defeat by Israel in 1967 and that the Egyptian nation owes him a debt of gratitude for that. Mubarak is a hated despot. He is alleged to be corrupt. He suppressed the will of the people without remorse. But he is not a coward. He will not flee the country and die in foreign soil. That is the impression I had of him.
4. This impression was strengthened by the following Tweet from an unknown Egyptian disseminated by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in the moments before Mubarak's televised speech: "Mubarak is too proud to step down.. to say it himself.. NO WAY.. honestly I would be surprised if…"
5. As I was awaiting his telecast, I was frequently visiting the Twitter site of Wael Ghonim, the young Egyptian Google executive, who has become a hero of the Egyptian people for leading the uprising with other young Egyptians, to see what were his feelings in those electrifying moments when the Egyptian people and the world with them had convinced themselves that Mubarak is gone or about to go. The following Tweets from Ghonim to his followers caught my attention:
* "Failure is not an option."
* "Guys, don't do much speculation for now, just wait and see. Long live Egypt!"
* "We are hoping that the "Friday of Martyrs" will be the world's largest funeral to bid farewell to 300 Egyptians"
* "Friday of martyrs is still on whatever happens today."
* "Started to rain in Cairo, and I am optimistic. Hoping that sky is crying from happiness"
6. Somehow, I had a gnawing feeling that he was not yet convinced that the exit of Mubarak was in sight. As I kept awake watching the glorious moments in Egypt on the TV and exchanging Tweets with my friends on the evolving situation in Egypt, I sent the following Tweet to my friends in my Twitter group (Ramanthink) : "Under Constitution, if Mub quits Speaker takes over. If he reports sick, Suleiman takes over.If he runs away, it is constitutional crisis."
7. I spent hours last week studying the Egyptian Constitution to see whether there is a constitutional way of bringing about the end of the Mubarak regime. I wrote as follows in my article of February 6 titled "The Egyptian Stand-off" available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers44%5Cpaper4318.html : "The problem is while the status quo can be easily changed in the ruling party and the unpopular leaders removed from positions of influence, it is difficult to change it in the Governmental set-up under the present Constitution, which clearly provides that if the President quits, the Speaker of the Parliament would be sworn in as the officiating President till fresh elections are held. Neither Lt.Gen.Omar Suleiman, the former intelligence chief who was recently nominated as the Vice-President by Mubarak, nor El Baradei, former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, whom the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and the secular opposition parties are prepared to support as the interim head till the elections are held, can officiate as the President because neither of them is an elected member of the Parliament and because of the specific provision in the Constitution that the Speaker would officiate. However, there is a provision in the Constitution under which Mubarak, while continuing to be the de jure President, can delegate the powers of the President to his Vice-President who will thus become the de facto President and could co-ordinate the arrangements for the elections without Mubarak playing any role in it. It is doubtful whether the protesters would agree to such an arrangement because of the close association of Suleiman with Mubarak for nearly two decades and his equally close association with the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).....Thus, the position is: Suleiman is acceptable to Mubarak and his followers and the US as interim head of a transitional Government, but he may not be acceptable to the protesters. El Baradei may be acceptable to the protesters, but he cannot head the tranitional set-up under the present Constitution."
8. In his televised speech, Mubarak has chosen the constitutional way of easing himself out of the controversy, which has pitted him against his people. While expressing his determination to continue as the President till his term ends in September, he has said that he is transfering some of his powers as the President to the Vice-President without specifying which powers. He said: "I saw fit to delegate presidential jurisdictions to the Vice-President as defined by the constitution. I am certain that Egypt will overcome its crisis." The Egyptian Ambassador to the US, Sameh Shoukry, has been quoted by the BBC as saying Vice President Suleiman is now the "de facto head of state" following Mubarak's speech, but this has not been confirmed.
9. It is doubtful whether there can be a constitutional end to the present crisis. The only way of ending the crisis is for the Army to take over power, suspend the constitution and appoint a transitional Government headed by someone enjoying the confidence of the protesters to pave the way for the election of a new President. From the comments of the protesters and their leaders, it appears they may not be averse to the Army playing a role to bring about the end of Mubarak's regime here and now. But will the Army play the game fairly after the protesters go back to their studies or work and return to the barracks and co-operate with the transitional Govt? That is a question to which it will be difficult to give an answer.
10. Today, there are going to be millions and millions of angry and disappointed Egyptians out in the streets to observe the "Martyrs Day". Will they try to force the exit of Mubarak by marching to his palace? If they try to do so, can there be bloodshed?
11. Egyptians are living through glorious moments. They are living through ennobling moments. They are also living through unchartered moments----moments the like of which their country had not seen before. As Ghonim remarked in one of his Tweets : "I feel that their last line is being written, and soon we're taking the pen to start drawing our own future"
12. Let us wish the Egyptian people all the luck in the world as they try to write a new page in their history. They deserve to prevail. (11-2-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
EGYPT: A PRAYER
Mind Without Fear
Where the mind is without fear and the head is held high;
Where knowledge is free;
Where the world has not been broken up
into fragments by narrow domestic walls;
Where words come out from the depth of truth;
Where tireless striving stretches its arms towards perfection;
Where the clear stream of reason
has not lost its way into the dreary desert sand of dead habit;
Where the mind is led forward by thee into ever-widening thought and action---
Into that heaven of freedom, my Father, let Egypt awake.
( Adapted From Rabindranath Tagore's poem )
Where the mind is without fear and the head is held high;
Where knowledge is free;
Where the world has not been broken up
into fragments by narrow domestic walls;
Where words come out from the depth of truth;
Where tireless striving stretches its arms towards perfection;
Where the clear stream of reason
has not lost its way into the dreary desert sand of dead habit;
Where the mind is led forward by thee into ever-widening thought and action---
Into that heaven of freedom, my Father, let Egypt awake.
( Adapted From Rabindranath Tagore's poem )
US NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY--2011 :CONTINUED FOCUS ON TERRORISM & ENHANCED FOCUS ON CHINA
B.RAMAN
Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, released on February 8,2011, the USA's new National Military Strategy in replacement of the earlier strategy released in 2004 when Mr.George Bush was the President. The text of the new strategy is available at
http://www.jcs.mil//content/files/2011-02/020811084800_2011_NMS_-_08_FEB_2011.pdf
2. The fight against terrorism and extremism emanating from the Af-Pak and other regions contInues to receive priority in the new strategy too, but the new strategy envisages an enhanced focus on China. It says "The Nation’s strategic priorities and interests will increasingly emanate from the Asia-Pacific region. The region's share of global wealth is growing, enabling increased military capabilities. This is causing the region’s security architecture to change rapidly, creating new challenges and opportunities for our national security and leadership. Though still underpinned by the U.S. bilateral alliance system, Asia's security architecture is becoming a more complex mix of formal and informal multilateral relationships and expanded bilateral security ties among states."
3. It also says: "The United States will remain the foremost economic and military power for the foreseeable future, though national debt poses a significant national security risk. Asia will increase its regional share of global wealth. Though it faces a number of domestic challenges, continuation of China’s decades-long economic growth is expected to facilitate its continued military modernization and expansion of its interests within and beyond the region. Other states in Asia, too, are becoming more militarily capable as they grow more prosperous. "
4. It further says of China as follows: "Our Nation seeks a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship with China that welcomes it to take on a responsible leadership role. To support this, the Joint Force seeks a deeper military-to-military relationship with China to expand areas of mutual interest and benefit, improve understanding, reduce misperception, and prevent miscalculation. We will promote common interests through China’s cooperation in countering piracy and proliferation of WMD, and using its influence with North Korea to preserve stability on the Korean peninsula. We will continue to monitor carefully China’s military developments and the implications those developments have on the military balance in the Taiwan Strait. "
5. In a veiled caution to China, the 2011 Strategy says: "We remain concerned about the extent and strategic intent of China’s military modernization, and its assertiveness in space, cyberspace, in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea. To safeguard U.S. and
partner nation interests, we will be prepared to demonstrate the will and commit the resources needed to oppose any nation’s actions that jeopardize access to and use of the global commons and cyberspace, or that threaten the security of our allies. "
6. The Strategy has a single sentence reference to India. It says: " We seek expanded military cooperation with India on nonproliferation, safeguarding the global commons, countering terrorism, and elsewhere."
7. It stresses the continued importance of the USA's relations with Japan and South Korea for its Asia-Pacific strategy. It says: "We expect to maintain a strong military presence in Northeast Asia for decades. We will work with the Japan Self-Defense Forces to improve their out-of-area operational capabilities as the nation adjusts its defense posture. The Republic of Korea has proven a steadfast ally supporting U.S. security efforts around the world; our commitment to the Republic of Korea is unwavering as North Korea remains a provocative threat to regional stability. We will retain operational control over combined forces on the Korean peninsula through 2015 and provide assistance to South Korea as it expands its security responsibilities. We will continue to work with Japan and South Korea to help improve security
ties between them, enhance military cooperation, and preserve regional stability. "
8.It explains the continued importance of the fight against terrorism as follows: "There are no more vital interests than the security of the American people, our territory, and our way of life. This is why we are at war in South Central Asia, the epicenter of violent extremism. Afghanistan is where al Qaida, given sanctuary by the Taliban, planned the attacks that murdered more than 3,000 innocent people on 11 September 2001. Al Qaida senior leadership remains in Pakistan and intends to continue to attack the United States, allies, and our
partners. The Nation’s strategic objective in this campaign is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaida and its affiliates in Afghanistan and Pakistan and prevent their return to either country. Success requires the Joint Force to closely work with NATO, our coalition partners, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. We will continue to erode Taliban influence, work with the Afghan government to facilitate reintegration and reconciliation of former insurgents, continue to strengthen the capacity of Afghan security forces, and enable Pakistan to ultimately defeat al Qaida and its extremist allies. "
9. It says further: "The threat of violent extremism is not limited to South Central Asia. Groups such as Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Shabaab, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, and others emanate from Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere around the globe. Terrorists’ abilities to remotely plan and coordinate attacks is growing, sometimes facilitated by global illicit trafficking routes, extending their operational reach while rendering targeting of their sanctuaries more difficult. Undeterred by the complexity of terrorist networks
and in concert with our Allies and partners, we will be prepared to find, capture, or kill violent extremists wherever they reside when they threaten interests and citizens of America and our allies. " (10-2-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, released on February 8,2011, the USA's new National Military Strategy in replacement of the earlier strategy released in 2004 when Mr.George Bush was the President. The text of the new strategy is available at
http://www.jcs.mil//content/files/2011-02/020811084800_2011_NMS_-_08_FEB_2011.pdf
2. The fight against terrorism and extremism emanating from the Af-Pak and other regions contInues to receive priority in the new strategy too, but the new strategy envisages an enhanced focus on China. It says "The Nation’s strategic priorities and interests will increasingly emanate from the Asia-Pacific region. The region's share of global wealth is growing, enabling increased military capabilities. This is causing the region’s security architecture to change rapidly, creating new challenges and opportunities for our national security and leadership. Though still underpinned by the U.S. bilateral alliance system, Asia's security architecture is becoming a more complex mix of formal and informal multilateral relationships and expanded bilateral security ties among states."
3. It also says: "The United States will remain the foremost economic and military power for the foreseeable future, though national debt poses a significant national security risk. Asia will increase its regional share of global wealth. Though it faces a number of domestic challenges, continuation of China’s decades-long economic growth is expected to facilitate its continued military modernization and expansion of its interests within and beyond the region. Other states in Asia, too, are becoming more militarily capable as they grow more prosperous. "
4. It further says of China as follows: "Our Nation seeks a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship with China that welcomes it to take on a responsible leadership role. To support this, the Joint Force seeks a deeper military-to-military relationship with China to expand areas of mutual interest and benefit, improve understanding, reduce misperception, and prevent miscalculation. We will promote common interests through China’s cooperation in countering piracy and proliferation of WMD, and using its influence with North Korea to preserve stability on the Korean peninsula. We will continue to monitor carefully China’s military developments and the implications those developments have on the military balance in the Taiwan Strait. "
5. In a veiled caution to China, the 2011 Strategy says: "We remain concerned about the extent and strategic intent of China’s military modernization, and its assertiveness in space, cyberspace, in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea. To safeguard U.S. and
partner nation interests, we will be prepared to demonstrate the will and commit the resources needed to oppose any nation’s actions that jeopardize access to and use of the global commons and cyberspace, or that threaten the security of our allies. "
6. The Strategy has a single sentence reference to India. It says: " We seek expanded military cooperation with India on nonproliferation, safeguarding the global commons, countering terrorism, and elsewhere."
7. It stresses the continued importance of the USA's relations with Japan and South Korea for its Asia-Pacific strategy. It says: "We expect to maintain a strong military presence in Northeast Asia for decades. We will work with the Japan Self-Defense Forces to improve their out-of-area operational capabilities as the nation adjusts its defense posture. The Republic of Korea has proven a steadfast ally supporting U.S. security efforts around the world; our commitment to the Republic of Korea is unwavering as North Korea remains a provocative threat to regional stability. We will retain operational control over combined forces on the Korean peninsula through 2015 and provide assistance to South Korea as it expands its security responsibilities. We will continue to work with Japan and South Korea to help improve security
ties between them, enhance military cooperation, and preserve regional stability. "
8.It explains the continued importance of the fight against terrorism as follows: "There are no more vital interests than the security of the American people, our territory, and our way of life. This is why we are at war in South Central Asia, the epicenter of violent extremism. Afghanistan is where al Qaida, given sanctuary by the Taliban, planned the attacks that murdered more than 3,000 innocent people on 11 September 2001. Al Qaida senior leadership remains in Pakistan and intends to continue to attack the United States, allies, and our
partners. The Nation’s strategic objective in this campaign is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaida and its affiliates in Afghanistan and Pakistan and prevent their return to either country. Success requires the Joint Force to closely work with NATO, our coalition partners, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. We will continue to erode Taliban influence, work with the Afghan government to facilitate reintegration and reconciliation of former insurgents, continue to strengthen the capacity of Afghan security forces, and enable Pakistan to ultimately defeat al Qaida and its extremist allies. "
9. It says further: "The threat of violent extremism is not limited to South Central Asia. Groups such as Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Shabaab, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, and others emanate from Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere around the globe. Terrorists’ abilities to remotely plan and coordinate attacks is growing, sometimes facilitated by global illicit trafficking routes, extending their operational reach while rendering targeting of their sanctuaries more difficult. Undeterred by the complexity of terrorist networks
and in concert with our Allies and partners, we will be prepared to find, capture, or kill violent extremists wherever they reside when they threaten interests and citizens of America and our allies. " (10-2-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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