B.RAMAN
The Chinese authorities have told their people of the tsunami of documents of the US Government being flooded into the public domain by WikiLeaks. They are surprised that the US Government has not taken action to block its web site, which should be easy for it to do. The Chinese people are aware of WikiLeaks, but not of the contents. They have been denied access to the contents so far.
2. Their main concern is that WikiLeaks may not stop with leaking US Government documents. It may start acquiring and leaking the documents of other countries, including China. Political dissidents in China may be tempted to get hold of Government documents and pass them on to WikiLeaks. If this happens, the implications for China's political and social stability could be immense. How to prevent Chinese documents from reaching WikiLeaks? That is the question, that is urgently engaging the attention of the Chinese security agencies.
3. Some of the Chinese concerns are reflected in an editorial titled " Questions Linger Around WikiLeaks" carried by the party-controlled "Global Times" on December 2,2010. It says inter alia:" Once WikiLeaks sets its sights on other countries, the fallout could be drastic. Leaked information could severely damage the social stability of nations that are not able to handle the release of so much sensitive information. An information tsunami is flooding every country, but different countries have different abilities to control and absorb it.Developed countries, especially the US, dominate the global flow of information at the moment. Countries like China, despite their rising status in the information world, must have a line of defense against a hurtful information campaign. " ( 2-12-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail:seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, December 1, 2010
THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION IN CHINA
B.RAMAN
( Paper prepared for presentation at a seminar on China organized by the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) of New Delhi, on December 3 and 4,2010)
An editorial published on October 15,2010, by the Communist Party controlled “Global Times” said:“China has changed a lot. In the future it will continue to adopt gradualism to bring about changes. No force can compel the nation to change what cannot be changed at the moment….. The Chinese cherish stability. They don't want to let a radical revolution overwhelm current reforms. In respect to reforming the political system, China needs political wisdom and constant drive. It doesn't need to rush its fences.”
2. This editorial was published on the eve of the four-day fifth plenary session of the 17th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which was held at Beijing from October 15 to 18. Even though the main item on the agenda of the session was the approval of the next (12th) Fife-Year Plan, there was considerable speculation in China and abroad that the session might set in motion a programme of political reforms as a follow-up to the economic reforms launched by Deng Xiao-Ping in 1978 and the administrative reforms that followed in 1982.
3.The gradual introduction of a free market economy and the equally gradual integration of the Chinese economy with the global economy were the two pillars of the economic reforms. Deng believed that while a centrally controlled economy was necessary during a period of revolutionary war, the continuance of the planned economy after the revolutionary war was over would stand in the way of China’s rise as an economic power. His administrative reforms consisted of streamlining the structure of the Government by reducing the number of Ministries from about a 100 to 61 and providing a fixed tenure for all holders of political office.
4. Deng believed that the economic reforms, even if successful, would not be sustainable unless they were built on a carefully constructed foundation of political reforms. In a talk on “The Reform of the Chinese Political System” to the Europe-China Forum in Ireland on September 5, 2003, Professor Liu Ji,Executive President, China Europe International Business School, said as follows : “As China has now adopted a market-based economic system, great changes have to be made to its superstructure, including its political system. Mr. Deng once hit the nail on the head when he stated that without political reform, the economic reform would remain purely superficial, and might even turn out to be a failure.”
5. Has the time come for launching an ambitious programme of political reforms? If so, what should be the nature of the political reforms to be introduced? What should be the role of the Communist Party in future? These are some of the questions, which were engaging the attention of the political leadership since the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China held in October 2007. The debate in the party and in the intellectual circles outside the party focused on the following points:
• The time has come to undertake changes in the political structure, but such changes should not affect the continuity of the functioning of the State and the Party.
• The Party will be the innovator and the driving force of the political re-structuring as it was of the economic re-structuring after 1978.
• The individual freedom of speech will be freedom to criticize constructively and not freedom to promote destabilizing dissidence.
• The introduction of the political reforms will be gradual just as the introduction of the economic reforms were.
6.The report presented by President Hu Jintao, in his capacity as the Party Secretary, to the Congress contained 60 references to the expression "people's democracy". This expression also figured repeatedly in the subsequent discussion on the report. Both Deng and Jiang Zemin had spoken of socialist democracy as the basis of the proposed political reforms. To quote Prof. Liu Ji : “Mr. Deng pointed out that “socialism is not able to survive without democracy”, and it is our mission to “build a socialist democratic political system”. Mr. Jiang stated that “we are going to build up a nation based on a socialist democratic political system and the rule of law.” Unquote. Hu and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao spoke of people’s democracy as well as socialist democracy..
7. For China's progress and stability in the future, political development was as important as economic and social development. That was what Hu sought to underline in his report. What should be the political characteristics of the Chinese State would be decided by the Chinese people through their party in accordance with their genius and experience. It would not be imposed from outside. The Chinese media quoted Yang Guangbin, Professor of the Renmin University of China. as saying: "With more individual freedom, gradual shaping of unique concept of democracy and solid forming of institutional arrangements, China-style democracy is emerging."
8. Hu drew attention to the following aspects of democracy in Chinese colours: The supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of the law, avoidance of arbitrariness in decision-making and governance, collective leadership through the party tempered by a division of individual responsibilities, democratic centralism moderated by inner party democracy, decisions based on information and intellectual support to the decision-making process, self-management, self-service, self-education and self-oversight. He emphasised that "power must be exercised in the sunshine to ensure that it is exercised correctly".
9.During the Congress, the Chinese Party leaders sought to convey to their own people and to the rest of the world that what one saw in China was not the rule of the few over the many, but the rule of the many through the few. They projected China as a State where decisions were made and power was exercised not in darkness, but in full sunshine.
10.It was stated during the discussion on Hu's report that while China would continue to be a one-party State, the Party should avoid any pretension of a monopoly of wisdom. Non-party intellectuals and technocrats would have an increasing role in policy-formulation and governance. One need not have to be a party member in order to be associated with the Government, but those associated with the Government---whether they were party members or not--- must accept party supervision over their functioning.
11.Liberal democracy has two important features: The right of the people to elect their leaders and to question in open the wisdom of the decisions taken by the Government. The Chinese-style democracy would not have these features. The leaders would be elected by the party cadres in accordance with party procedures. While there would be a widest possible public contribution to decision-making by the leadership, once a decision was made, its wisdom cannot be challenged. The expression of any reservations or dissent should be in the darkness of party corridors and not in open sunshine. However, it was stated that the party had decided to experiment with direct elections of Party chiefs in more than 200 townships in Chongqing, Sichuan and Hubei.
12.Among those who expressed themselves in favour of political restructuring was Prime Minister Wen Jiabao himself who told the National People’s Congress (NPC) on March 5, 2010, while delivering the annual report on the work of his Government: “China's modernization drive and economic reforms could risk a failure without political restructuring. The Government would create conditions for the people to criticize and supervise the Government, and let news media fully play their oversight role so as to put the authorities under sunlight.”
13.This debate was further taken forward during functions held in Shenzhen in August-September, 2010, to mark the 30th anniversary of the setting up of the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) under the directive of Deng. In a speech delivered by him at Shenzhen on August 21, 2010, Wen, according to the Xinhua news agency, made the following points: China has to pursue political reform to safeguard its economic health. "Without the safeguarding of political restructuring, China may lose what it has already achieved through economic restructuring and the targets of its modernization drive might not be reached. People's democratic rights and legitimate rights must be guaranteed. People should be mobilized and organized to deal with, in accordance with the law, state, economic, social and cultural affairs." Wen also wanted to "create conditions" to allow the people to criticize and supervise the government as a way to address "the problem of over-concentration of power with ineffective supervision."
14.In an article published on August 23, the “Global Times” commented on Wen’s speech as follows: “Wen's remarks about political reform came 30 years after the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping first raised the issue during an important speech on August 18, 1980, which was regarded as "the programmatic document for China's political restructuring.". After three decades of reform and opening-up, China is expected to overtake Japan to become the world's second largest economy this year, but the country is facing mounting pressure during its social transition including frequent attacks on vulnerable groups, aggravating pollution, serious corruption, inequality of distribution and a widening income gap. Mounting social unrests in recent years have proved costly. In 2009, the government earmarked 514 billion yuan ($76 billion) to maintain stability, much more than the 480 billion yuan for national defense.”
15.The article added: ”Zhang Liangui, a professor at the Party School of the CPC Central Committee, noted that the root cause of growing social conflict is the slow pace of political reform that seriously lags behind unprecedented economic reform.” Mao Shoulong, a professor of administrative management at Renmin University, said that we will "cross the river by touching each stone" during political reform, just like economic reform in the past 30 years, and it should be carried out under the framework of the current political system, which is dominated by the CPC. Democracy would probably be promoted at the grassroots level, especially with the election of lower-ranking officials, Mao added.”
16.The message from the article was clear: Yes, China must embark on political reforms, but they should be carried out under the leadership of the Communist Party. The measures undertaken should reform the functioning of the Government and the Party without weakening them.
17. In his speech at Shenzhen on September 6, Hu Jintao avoided the use of expressions such as political re-structuring etc. Hu’s emphasis was on Shenzhen as a trigger for the Chinese economic miracle. . But Hu’s speech was not devoid of references to the political system as made out by some analysts. He said that the SEZs could experiment with reforms in economic, political, cultural and social systems.Hu called for "expanding socialist democracy" and speeding up the construction of "a socialist country under the rule of law." He said efforts should be made to carry out democratic elections, decision-making, management and supervision in order to safeguard the people's right to know, to participate, to express and to supervise.
18.In September, Wen was in New York to attend the UN General Assembly session.He was interviewed by Fareed Zakaria for CNN's Global Public Square programme. Zakaria asked him about freedom in China: "Can you be as strong and creative a nation with so many restrictions on freedom of expression, with the internet being censored?" Wen replied: "I believe freedom of speech is indispensable, for any country, a country in the course of development and a country that has become strong. Freedom of speech has been incorporated into the Chinese constitution. I often say that we should not only let people have the freedom of speech, we more importantly must create conditions to let them criticise the work of the government. It is only when there is the supervision and critical oversight from the people that the government will be in a position to do an even better job, and employees of government departments will be the true public servants of the people."
19.From Wen’s comments at Shenzhen and from his subsequent interview on the CNN, many analysts jumped to the conclusion that Hu and Wen were probably not on the same wavelength as regards the need for political restructuring in China and greater respect for the freedom of speech. But if one read and analysed carefully the statements and comments made by Hu and Wen since the 17th National Congress of the Party in October 2007, it was evident that both in their own respective style were reflecting the party line on the need for political restructuring and how to go about it.
20. However, expectations and speculation that the 5th plenum of the 17th Central Committee would come out with a slew of political reforms as forward-looking and as significant as the economic reforms of the post-1978 years were belied. The advocates of political gradualism and opponents of hasty actions seemed to have prevailed over those advocating a faster pace of political reforms. A communiqué issued at the end of the plenum said that the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) would be the "fundamental guarantee" for China to achieve the goals of the economic and social development plan for the next five years. It added that steps to improve the CPC’s ruling capacity and maintain the Party's advanced nature should be strengthened to promote the Party's competence in leading the country's economic and social development. A reformed, people-friendly Communist Party and not a reformed political structure emerged as the present objective.
21. Why this cautious line? Why, after the enthusiastic debate in the months after October 2007 on the need for political restructuring, the present emphasis on the need for a more gradual approach? Maintaining political stability, economic prosperity and social harmony is the driving force of Chinese policy-making. Three events since October 2007 have made the Chinese leadership feel that they cannot take the present stability, prosperity and harmony for granted. Potentially destabilizing factors continue to confront the leadership.
22. These events are: firstly, the economic melt-down; secondly, the uprising in Tibet in 2008 just before the Olympics; and thirdly, the violent incidents in the Xinjiang Province before the Olympics which were followed by a violent uprising by the Uighurs in the middle of 2009. The economic melt-down resulted in the retrenchment of about 30 million Chinese workers due to the closure of a number of manufacturing industries in the coastal areas due to a drop in orders from the West, particularly the US. These workers had migrated to the coastal areas from the rural areas to take up jobs. Their retrenchment and return to their villages created fears of possible widespread social unrest. However, these fears have been belied, but a new cause of unrest has arisen as a result of the economic re-restructuring undertaken by the Chinese leadership to reduce the dependence on exports and to increase the domestic demand for manufactured goods by increasing the minimum wages of workers in many towns. There have been many instances of workers unsatisfied with the increase in minimum wages resorting to strikes---particularly in foreign-owned enterprises---- in order to demand more. Fortunately, the labour unrest has not so far affected Government servants. There have been no reported instances of Government servants resorting to strikes in order to demand an increase in their salaries. If they do so, the political leadership could be faced with a tricky situation. The ambitious stimulus package to keep the economy doing well at a GDP growth rate of eight per cent plus and the increase in minimum wages have led to a spiraling inflationary situation with a potential for social unrest. While dealing with these problems through energetic economic management measures, the Government is at the same time avoiding hasty political actions which could cause instability due to a mix of political and economic factors.
23. The uprisings in Tibet and Xinjiang jolted the self-confidence of the political leadership which had convinced itself that through economic development it had won the loyalty of the Tibetan Buddhists and the Uighur Muslims. It realized that this is not so. Anti-Han feelings continue to be as high as ever in the Tibetan and Uighur-inhabited areas. More than the Uighur uprising of July 2009, what shocked the Government was the anger of the Hans who protested in the streets of Urumqi over the failure of the local Government to protect them from attacks by the Uighurs. The danger of the Hans taking the law into their own hands and indulging in a large-scale massacre of the Uighurs, thereby damaging China’s relations with the Islamic world, led to Hu Jintao, who had gone to Italy to participate in the G-20 summit, cancelling his participation and returning prematurely to Beijing to chair a meeting of the Central Military Commission to order the dispatch of army units to Xinjiang to help the local police in the restoration of law and order. In Tibet, the Army was not called in to help the civilian authorities in restoring law and order, but in Xinjiang the Army had to be called in.
24. Maintaining internal security against economic unrest in the Han-inhabited coastal areas and against ethnic unrest in the Tibetan and Uighur inhabited border areas has become a major concern. Chinese leaders have, of late, been speaking of their core interests and major concerns. When they talk of their core interests, they mean their disputes with other countries. In their perception, the threats to their core interests arise from abroad. When they talk of major concerns, they largely mean threats to their internal security.
25. The Chinese authorities have seen to it that the rest of the world does not know much of the internal security situation, but it is of major concern to the leadership. This would be obvious from their enormous budgetary allocation for their internal security apparatus, which, according to the “Global Times” of August 23, amounts to US $ 76 billion. If the “Global Times” is to be believed, China spends more money for maintaining political stability than for protecting the country from external threats. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the leadership is going slow on political reforms.
26.Can China disintegrate under the weight of its internal security problems? This is unlikely. The undoubted economic prosperity and the interest of the homogenous Hans as a whole in ensuring that this prosperity is maintained guarantees against any tendency towards disintegration in the Han core of the country. The Tibetan and Uighur uprisings have shown that economic prosperity has not diluted their yearnings for freedom. So long as this urge for freedom remains alive, the danger of instability in the border areas will remain.
27.The Chinese leadership has not learnt the right lessons from the Tibetan and Uighur uprisings. It continues to believe that by pumping more money into these areas for bringing their economic development on par with that in the coastal areas, it could dilute the tendency towards separation and reduce the feelings of alienation. It is confident that after the death of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, the situation in Tibet will become manageable after a short spell of controllable violence. It is counting on Pakistan and Turkey to help it maintain peace in Xinjiang. At the same time it has taken measures to dilute the ethnic identity of the Tibetans and the Uighurs by making Mandarin the medium of instruction in the Tibetan and Uighur schools. The importance of the Tibetan and Uighur languages has been reduced by making them only second languages. These actions have already evoked fresh protests among the youth and their teachers. However, the protests have remained peaceful. Some of the actions taken by it as mid-course corrections of its policies in the border areas might turn out to be new seeds of fresh unrest.
28. It is important for India to keep the hopes of the Tibetan youth alive. Total Indian silence on the developments in Tibet is already causing demoralization among the Tibetan youth. Our policy of silence and maintaining a distance from His Holiness the Dalai Lama is suiting the Chinese interests and not our future interests. We need to be a little more articulate on Tibet. ( 2-12-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies E-MAIL: seventyone2@gmail.com )
( Paper prepared for presentation at a seminar on China organized by the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) of New Delhi, on December 3 and 4,2010)
An editorial published on October 15,2010, by the Communist Party controlled “Global Times” said:“China has changed a lot. In the future it will continue to adopt gradualism to bring about changes. No force can compel the nation to change what cannot be changed at the moment….. The Chinese cherish stability. They don't want to let a radical revolution overwhelm current reforms. In respect to reforming the political system, China needs political wisdom and constant drive. It doesn't need to rush its fences.”
2. This editorial was published on the eve of the four-day fifth plenary session of the 17th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which was held at Beijing from October 15 to 18. Even though the main item on the agenda of the session was the approval of the next (12th) Fife-Year Plan, there was considerable speculation in China and abroad that the session might set in motion a programme of political reforms as a follow-up to the economic reforms launched by Deng Xiao-Ping in 1978 and the administrative reforms that followed in 1982.
3.The gradual introduction of a free market economy and the equally gradual integration of the Chinese economy with the global economy were the two pillars of the economic reforms. Deng believed that while a centrally controlled economy was necessary during a period of revolutionary war, the continuance of the planned economy after the revolutionary war was over would stand in the way of China’s rise as an economic power. His administrative reforms consisted of streamlining the structure of the Government by reducing the number of Ministries from about a 100 to 61 and providing a fixed tenure for all holders of political office.
4. Deng believed that the economic reforms, even if successful, would not be sustainable unless they were built on a carefully constructed foundation of political reforms. In a talk on “The Reform of the Chinese Political System” to the Europe-China Forum in Ireland on September 5, 2003, Professor Liu Ji,Executive President, China Europe International Business School, said as follows : “As China has now adopted a market-based economic system, great changes have to be made to its superstructure, including its political system. Mr. Deng once hit the nail on the head when he stated that without political reform, the economic reform would remain purely superficial, and might even turn out to be a failure.”
5. Has the time come for launching an ambitious programme of political reforms? If so, what should be the nature of the political reforms to be introduced? What should be the role of the Communist Party in future? These are some of the questions, which were engaging the attention of the political leadership since the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China held in October 2007. The debate in the party and in the intellectual circles outside the party focused on the following points:
• The time has come to undertake changes in the political structure, but such changes should not affect the continuity of the functioning of the State and the Party.
• The Party will be the innovator and the driving force of the political re-structuring as it was of the economic re-structuring after 1978.
• The individual freedom of speech will be freedom to criticize constructively and not freedom to promote destabilizing dissidence.
• The introduction of the political reforms will be gradual just as the introduction of the economic reforms were.
6.The report presented by President Hu Jintao, in his capacity as the Party Secretary, to the Congress contained 60 references to the expression "people's democracy". This expression also figured repeatedly in the subsequent discussion on the report. Both Deng and Jiang Zemin had spoken of socialist democracy as the basis of the proposed political reforms. To quote Prof. Liu Ji : “Mr. Deng pointed out that “socialism is not able to survive without democracy”, and it is our mission to “build a socialist democratic political system”. Mr. Jiang stated that “we are going to build up a nation based on a socialist democratic political system and the rule of law.” Unquote. Hu and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao spoke of people’s democracy as well as socialist democracy..
7. For China's progress and stability in the future, political development was as important as economic and social development. That was what Hu sought to underline in his report. What should be the political characteristics of the Chinese State would be decided by the Chinese people through their party in accordance with their genius and experience. It would not be imposed from outside. The Chinese media quoted Yang Guangbin, Professor of the Renmin University of China. as saying: "With more individual freedom, gradual shaping of unique concept of democracy and solid forming of institutional arrangements, China-style democracy is emerging."
8. Hu drew attention to the following aspects of democracy in Chinese colours: The supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of the law, avoidance of arbitrariness in decision-making and governance, collective leadership through the party tempered by a division of individual responsibilities, democratic centralism moderated by inner party democracy, decisions based on information and intellectual support to the decision-making process, self-management, self-service, self-education and self-oversight. He emphasised that "power must be exercised in the sunshine to ensure that it is exercised correctly".
9.During the Congress, the Chinese Party leaders sought to convey to their own people and to the rest of the world that what one saw in China was not the rule of the few over the many, but the rule of the many through the few. They projected China as a State where decisions were made and power was exercised not in darkness, but in full sunshine.
10.It was stated during the discussion on Hu's report that while China would continue to be a one-party State, the Party should avoid any pretension of a monopoly of wisdom. Non-party intellectuals and technocrats would have an increasing role in policy-formulation and governance. One need not have to be a party member in order to be associated with the Government, but those associated with the Government---whether they were party members or not--- must accept party supervision over their functioning.
11.Liberal democracy has two important features: The right of the people to elect their leaders and to question in open the wisdom of the decisions taken by the Government. The Chinese-style democracy would not have these features. The leaders would be elected by the party cadres in accordance with party procedures. While there would be a widest possible public contribution to decision-making by the leadership, once a decision was made, its wisdom cannot be challenged. The expression of any reservations or dissent should be in the darkness of party corridors and not in open sunshine. However, it was stated that the party had decided to experiment with direct elections of Party chiefs in more than 200 townships in Chongqing, Sichuan and Hubei.
12.Among those who expressed themselves in favour of political restructuring was Prime Minister Wen Jiabao himself who told the National People’s Congress (NPC) on March 5, 2010, while delivering the annual report on the work of his Government: “China's modernization drive and economic reforms could risk a failure without political restructuring. The Government would create conditions for the people to criticize and supervise the Government, and let news media fully play their oversight role so as to put the authorities under sunlight.”
13.This debate was further taken forward during functions held in Shenzhen in August-September, 2010, to mark the 30th anniversary of the setting up of the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) under the directive of Deng. In a speech delivered by him at Shenzhen on August 21, 2010, Wen, according to the Xinhua news agency, made the following points: China has to pursue political reform to safeguard its economic health. "Without the safeguarding of political restructuring, China may lose what it has already achieved through economic restructuring and the targets of its modernization drive might not be reached. People's democratic rights and legitimate rights must be guaranteed. People should be mobilized and organized to deal with, in accordance with the law, state, economic, social and cultural affairs." Wen also wanted to "create conditions" to allow the people to criticize and supervise the government as a way to address "the problem of over-concentration of power with ineffective supervision."
14.In an article published on August 23, the “Global Times” commented on Wen’s speech as follows: “Wen's remarks about political reform came 30 years after the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping first raised the issue during an important speech on August 18, 1980, which was regarded as "the programmatic document for China's political restructuring.". After three decades of reform and opening-up, China is expected to overtake Japan to become the world's second largest economy this year, but the country is facing mounting pressure during its social transition including frequent attacks on vulnerable groups, aggravating pollution, serious corruption, inequality of distribution and a widening income gap. Mounting social unrests in recent years have proved costly. In 2009, the government earmarked 514 billion yuan ($76 billion) to maintain stability, much more than the 480 billion yuan for national defense.”
15.The article added: ”Zhang Liangui, a professor at the Party School of the CPC Central Committee, noted that the root cause of growing social conflict is the slow pace of political reform that seriously lags behind unprecedented economic reform.” Mao Shoulong, a professor of administrative management at Renmin University, said that we will "cross the river by touching each stone" during political reform, just like economic reform in the past 30 years, and it should be carried out under the framework of the current political system, which is dominated by the CPC. Democracy would probably be promoted at the grassroots level, especially with the election of lower-ranking officials, Mao added.”
16.The message from the article was clear: Yes, China must embark on political reforms, but they should be carried out under the leadership of the Communist Party. The measures undertaken should reform the functioning of the Government and the Party without weakening them.
17. In his speech at Shenzhen on September 6, Hu Jintao avoided the use of expressions such as political re-structuring etc. Hu’s emphasis was on Shenzhen as a trigger for the Chinese economic miracle. . But Hu’s speech was not devoid of references to the political system as made out by some analysts. He said that the SEZs could experiment with reforms in economic, political, cultural and social systems.Hu called for "expanding socialist democracy" and speeding up the construction of "a socialist country under the rule of law." He said efforts should be made to carry out democratic elections, decision-making, management and supervision in order to safeguard the people's right to know, to participate, to express and to supervise.
18.In September, Wen was in New York to attend the UN General Assembly session.He was interviewed by Fareed Zakaria for CNN's Global Public Square programme. Zakaria asked him about freedom in China: "Can you be as strong and creative a nation with so many restrictions on freedom of expression, with the internet being censored?" Wen replied: "I believe freedom of speech is indispensable, for any country, a country in the course of development and a country that has become strong. Freedom of speech has been incorporated into the Chinese constitution. I often say that we should not only let people have the freedom of speech, we more importantly must create conditions to let them criticise the work of the government. It is only when there is the supervision and critical oversight from the people that the government will be in a position to do an even better job, and employees of government departments will be the true public servants of the people."
19.From Wen’s comments at Shenzhen and from his subsequent interview on the CNN, many analysts jumped to the conclusion that Hu and Wen were probably not on the same wavelength as regards the need for political restructuring in China and greater respect for the freedom of speech. But if one read and analysed carefully the statements and comments made by Hu and Wen since the 17th National Congress of the Party in October 2007, it was evident that both in their own respective style were reflecting the party line on the need for political restructuring and how to go about it.
20. However, expectations and speculation that the 5th plenum of the 17th Central Committee would come out with a slew of political reforms as forward-looking and as significant as the economic reforms of the post-1978 years were belied. The advocates of political gradualism and opponents of hasty actions seemed to have prevailed over those advocating a faster pace of political reforms. A communiqué issued at the end of the plenum said that the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) would be the "fundamental guarantee" for China to achieve the goals of the economic and social development plan for the next five years. It added that steps to improve the CPC’s ruling capacity and maintain the Party's advanced nature should be strengthened to promote the Party's competence in leading the country's economic and social development. A reformed, people-friendly Communist Party and not a reformed political structure emerged as the present objective.
21. Why this cautious line? Why, after the enthusiastic debate in the months after October 2007 on the need for political restructuring, the present emphasis on the need for a more gradual approach? Maintaining political stability, economic prosperity and social harmony is the driving force of Chinese policy-making. Three events since October 2007 have made the Chinese leadership feel that they cannot take the present stability, prosperity and harmony for granted. Potentially destabilizing factors continue to confront the leadership.
22. These events are: firstly, the economic melt-down; secondly, the uprising in Tibet in 2008 just before the Olympics; and thirdly, the violent incidents in the Xinjiang Province before the Olympics which were followed by a violent uprising by the Uighurs in the middle of 2009. The economic melt-down resulted in the retrenchment of about 30 million Chinese workers due to the closure of a number of manufacturing industries in the coastal areas due to a drop in orders from the West, particularly the US. These workers had migrated to the coastal areas from the rural areas to take up jobs. Their retrenchment and return to their villages created fears of possible widespread social unrest. However, these fears have been belied, but a new cause of unrest has arisen as a result of the economic re-restructuring undertaken by the Chinese leadership to reduce the dependence on exports and to increase the domestic demand for manufactured goods by increasing the minimum wages of workers in many towns. There have been many instances of workers unsatisfied with the increase in minimum wages resorting to strikes---particularly in foreign-owned enterprises---- in order to demand more. Fortunately, the labour unrest has not so far affected Government servants. There have been no reported instances of Government servants resorting to strikes in order to demand an increase in their salaries. If they do so, the political leadership could be faced with a tricky situation. The ambitious stimulus package to keep the economy doing well at a GDP growth rate of eight per cent plus and the increase in minimum wages have led to a spiraling inflationary situation with a potential for social unrest. While dealing with these problems through energetic economic management measures, the Government is at the same time avoiding hasty political actions which could cause instability due to a mix of political and economic factors.
23. The uprisings in Tibet and Xinjiang jolted the self-confidence of the political leadership which had convinced itself that through economic development it had won the loyalty of the Tibetan Buddhists and the Uighur Muslims. It realized that this is not so. Anti-Han feelings continue to be as high as ever in the Tibetan and Uighur-inhabited areas. More than the Uighur uprising of July 2009, what shocked the Government was the anger of the Hans who protested in the streets of Urumqi over the failure of the local Government to protect them from attacks by the Uighurs. The danger of the Hans taking the law into their own hands and indulging in a large-scale massacre of the Uighurs, thereby damaging China’s relations with the Islamic world, led to Hu Jintao, who had gone to Italy to participate in the G-20 summit, cancelling his participation and returning prematurely to Beijing to chair a meeting of the Central Military Commission to order the dispatch of army units to Xinjiang to help the local police in the restoration of law and order. In Tibet, the Army was not called in to help the civilian authorities in restoring law and order, but in Xinjiang the Army had to be called in.
24. Maintaining internal security against economic unrest in the Han-inhabited coastal areas and against ethnic unrest in the Tibetan and Uighur inhabited border areas has become a major concern. Chinese leaders have, of late, been speaking of their core interests and major concerns. When they talk of their core interests, they mean their disputes with other countries. In their perception, the threats to their core interests arise from abroad. When they talk of major concerns, they largely mean threats to their internal security.
25. The Chinese authorities have seen to it that the rest of the world does not know much of the internal security situation, but it is of major concern to the leadership. This would be obvious from their enormous budgetary allocation for their internal security apparatus, which, according to the “Global Times” of August 23, amounts to US $ 76 billion. If the “Global Times” is to be believed, China spends more money for maintaining political stability than for protecting the country from external threats. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the leadership is going slow on political reforms.
26.Can China disintegrate under the weight of its internal security problems? This is unlikely. The undoubted economic prosperity and the interest of the homogenous Hans as a whole in ensuring that this prosperity is maintained guarantees against any tendency towards disintegration in the Han core of the country. The Tibetan and Uighur uprisings have shown that economic prosperity has not diluted their yearnings for freedom. So long as this urge for freedom remains alive, the danger of instability in the border areas will remain.
27.The Chinese leadership has not learnt the right lessons from the Tibetan and Uighur uprisings. It continues to believe that by pumping more money into these areas for bringing their economic development on par with that in the coastal areas, it could dilute the tendency towards separation and reduce the feelings of alienation. It is confident that after the death of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, the situation in Tibet will become manageable after a short spell of controllable violence. It is counting on Pakistan and Turkey to help it maintain peace in Xinjiang. At the same time it has taken measures to dilute the ethnic identity of the Tibetans and the Uighurs by making Mandarin the medium of instruction in the Tibetan and Uighur schools. The importance of the Tibetan and Uighur languages has been reduced by making them only second languages. These actions have already evoked fresh protests among the youth and their teachers. However, the protests have remained peaceful. Some of the actions taken by it as mid-course corrections of its policies in the border areas might turn out to be new seeds of fresh unrest.
28. It is important for India to keep the hopes of the Tibetan youth alive. Total Indian silence on the developments in Tibet is already causing demoralization among the Tibetan youth. Our policy of silence and maintaining a distance from His Holiness the Dalai Lama is suiting the Chinese interests and not our future interests. We need to be a little more articulate on Tibet. ( 2-12-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies E-MAIL: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, November 30, 2010
FIXING BARKHA DUTT
B.RAMAN
The programme on the recent allegations against Barkha Dutt, the well-known anchor of NDTV, aired by the NDTV on the night of November30,2010, was not satisfying.
2. Its failure to make an impact can be attributed to the format chosen by the NDTV. They should have chosen the BBC's "Hard Talk" format involving a one-to-one hard-hitting discussion between Barkha and a senior, eminent journalist. The objective should have been to throw light on the allegations levelled against Barkha in connection with her tapped (by the intelligence agencies) telephone conversations with Niira Radia, who runs a consultancy-cum-liaison agency euphemistically called a communications agency based in New Delhi. Two of India's leading corporate houses were among its clients. The conversations between Barkha and Radia related, inter alia, to attempts being made from behind the scenes by either the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), a regional political party of Tamila Nadu, or some corporate houses or both to influnce, through Radia, the Cabinet formation by Dr.Manmohan Singh, the Prime Minister, after the elections of 2009. They apparently wanted to ensure that the DMK got its share of portfolios in the coalition Ministry of Dr.Manmohan Singh, including the Telecommunications Ministry, which is the most lucrative Ministry of the Government of India, for A.Raja, who was holding that portfolio for some years before last year's elections.
3. During his first tenure as the Telecommunications Minister, there were serious allegations of improper procedures and favouritism against A.Raja in connection with the allotment of telecom spectrum to mobile operators. It was reported that the Prime Minister was reluctant to retain him in the Telecom Ministry because of the allegations against him. However, he had to give in to the pressure from the DMK and retain Raja. He has recently resigned following more allegations against him corroborated by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, who had gone into the manner in which the Telecom Ministry under A.Raja handled the spectrum allotment. As a result, the Government of India incurred losses amounting to billions of dollars.
4. Radia was apparently approached by elements in the DMK as well as the corporate world, independently of each other, to use her contacts in the decision-making circles of New Delhi to ensure that the DMK's demands were accepted. Radia seems to have had a wide circle of contacts in the world of journalism. She was in the habit of contacting them over phone to seek their help in various matters and allegedly to influence them to write in favour of her clients. There had been instances even in the past of intermediaries seeking to influence business-related decisions. The case of the late Win Chaddha, whose company played an important role in the 1980s in influencing the decision of the Ministry of Defence of the Government of India in favour of the Bofors gun, comes to mind.
5. There were no confirmed instances in the past of such intermediaries seeking to influence political decisions. They restricted themselves to influencing business-related decisions. Radia allegedly sought to influence not only business-related decisions, but also political decisions in matters such as appointment of Cabinet Ministers. Interested people approached her because they believed that she had the capability to influence such decisions. The fact that the DMK approached her shows that her reputation as someone who can influence political decisions was well known not only in the business world, but also in the world of politics.
6. Radia's attempts to influence the Cabinet formation would have remained unknown to the public but for the fact that the Income Tax Department allegedly suspected her company of tax evasion. They obtained the approval of the then Home Secretary of the Government of India to have her telephone tapped by the intelligence agencies in order to look for evidence regarding her alleged tax evasion. Apparently, they could not get any evidence on this score. Otherwise, they should have by now registered a case against her and formally initiated the investigation. However, the intelligence agencies recorded clandestinely near 5000 telephone conversations of Radia with her contacts on various matters.
7. These conversations revealed the extent of her role in seeking to influence political and business-related decisions. It was reported that there were about 15 journalists among those contacted by her. Copies of these recordings would have been available at three places--- the Income-Tax Department, the Intelligence Agency which carried out the tapping and the mobile telephone company or companies whose subscriber Radia was. From one of these sources, the recorded conversations leaked out to two journals, which published the transcripts of about a hundred of them. It needs to be underlined that these tapes were not discovered by the two journals as a result of their journalistic enterprise. These were apparently given to them by an unidentified source for giving publicity to the contents.
8. What could have been the motive of the source in leaking the tapes? Either to discredit Radia and her business clients or to discredit her journalist contacts or both. Of the 15-odd journalists figuring in the conversations, two have received the maximum adverse attention ---- Barkha Dutt and Vir Sanghvi. Barkha is a highly successful TV journalist with a large circle of admirers and critics. Her contribution to making Indian TV journalism reach great heights has been immense. Despite this, she is disliked by many, who accuse her of being pro-Muslim, pro-Pakistan, anti-national, anti-Hindutva, anti-RSS and anti-Narendra Modi, the Chief Minister of Gujarat. In recent months, her ctitics have become even more virulent against her after her active role to highlighting the alleged involvement of some Hindus in acts of terrorism against the Muslims. Her stories on the so-called Hindu terror have added to the enemity against her.
9. It is intriguing that the leakage of her tapped conversations with Radia and the controversay that followed came in the wake of her stories on the alleged Hindu terror. People, who know Barkha well, say that she has some negative traits in her personality too. They allege that she is intimidating and cannot take criticism in her stride. There was one alleged instance of her forcing a blogger, who made a critical posting on her, to apologice in public and remove his posting. Her success as a journalist has also brought in the professional jealousy of some of her colleagues in the profession.
10. Her critics and detractors jumped at the opportunity provided by the tapes in an attempt to put her on the defensive, destroy her credibility and damage her professional reputation. Nobody has accused her of being complicit in any crime by being in touch with Radia. Nobody has accused her of trying to play down or cover up the allegations against A.Raja in her journalist reporting. She has been accused only of letting herself be used by a lobbyist in a manner, which is contrary to the ethics of journalism. Barkha's reply is that she did not let herself be used by Radia, but she was using her contacts with Radia to collect information about the DMK. Barkha has been asked by her critics as to why in that case she did not write about the use of Radia by the DMK to influence the Cabinet formation. This is an unkind question---- as unkind as asking N.Ram, the Editor-in-Chief of "The Hindu", as to why he allegedly let himself be used by the Tamil elements from Sri Lanka as an intermediary with Rajiv Gandhi when he was the Prime Minister in the 1980s? As unkind as asking N.Ram as to why he played down the stories of the mass anti-Chinese uprising in Tibet in 2008? As unkind as asking N.Ram as to why for many years till recently he blacked out references to His Holiness the Dalai Lama in the columns of his paper. As unkind as asking him as to why he used to give publicity in his paper to the despatches of the Xinhua, the news agency owned by the Chinese Government. Ram should be the last person to throw stones at Barkha.
11.Many journalists, who are throwing stones today at Barkha, had themselces acted as intermediaries to some one or the other and allowed their coverage to be influenced by extraneous considerations.
12. A person should be judged not by what he or she says in private, but by what he or she says or writes in public and does.There is nothing inappropriate or unethical in Barkha's writings, reportage and actions. As regards her private conversations with Radia over phone she has explained the background and context and denied any malafide or unethical intention. Her explanation should be accepted instead of trying to fix her through an inquisition. ( 1-12-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and , presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The programme on the recent allegations against Barkha Dutt, the well-known anchor of NDTV, aired by the NDTV on the night of November30,2010, was not satisfying.
2. Its failure to make an impact can be attributed to the format chosen by the NDTV. They should have chosen the BBC's "Hard Talk" format involving a one-to-one hard-hitting discussion between Barkha and a senior, eminent journalist. The objective should have been to throw light on the allegations levelled against Barkha in connection with her tapped (by the intelligence agencies) telephone conversations with Niira Radia, who runs a consultancy-cum-liaison agency euphemistically called a communications agency based in New Delhi. Two of India's leading corporate houses were among its clients. The conversations between Barkha and Radia related, inter alia, to attempts being made from behind the scenes by either the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), a regional political party of Tamila Nadu, or some corporate houses or both to influnce, through Radia, the Cabinet formation by Dr.Manmohan Singh, the Prime Minister, after the elections of 2009. They apparently wanted to ensure that the DMK got its share of portfolios in the coalition Ministry of Dr.Manmohan Singh, including the Telecommunications Ministry, which is the most lucrative Ministry of the Government of India, for A.Raja, who was holding that portfolio for some years before last year's elections.
3. During his first tenure as the Telecommunications Minister, there were serious allegations of improper procedures and favouritism against A.Raja in connection with the allotment of telecom spectrum to mobile operators. It was reported that the Prime Minister was reluctant to retain him in the Telecom Ministry because of the allegations against him. However, he had to give in to the pressure from the DMK and retain Raja. He has recently resigned following more allegations against him corroborated by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, who had gone into the manner in which the Telecom Ministry under A.Raja handled the spectrum allotment. As a result, the Government of India incurred losses amounting to billions of dollars.
4. Radia was apparently approached by elements in the DMK as well as the corporate world, independently of each other, to use her contacts in the decision-making circles of New Delhi to ensure that the DMK's demands were accepted. Radia seems to have had a wide circle of contacts in the world of journalism. She was in the habit of contacting them over phone to seek their help in various matters and allegedly to influence them to write in favour of her clients. There had been instances even in the past of intermediaries seeking to influence business-related decisions. The case of the late Win Chaddha, whose company played an important role in the 1980s in influencing the decision of the Ministry of Defence of the Government of India in favour of the Bofors gun, comes to mind.
5. There were no confirmed instances in the past of such intermediaries seeking to influence political decisions. They restricted themselves to influencing business-related decisions. Radia allegedly sought to influence not only business-related decisions, but also political decisions in matters such as appointment of Cabinet Ministers. Interested people approached her because they believed that she had the capability to influence such decisions. The fact that the DMK approached her shows that her reputation as someone who can influence political decisions was well known not only in the business world, but also in the world of politics.
6. Radia's attempts to influence the Cabinet formation would have remained unknown to the public but for the fact that the Income Tax Department allegedly suspected her company of tax evasion. They obtained the approval of the then Home Secretary of the Government of India to have her telephone tapped by the intelligence agencies in order to look for evidence regarding her alleged tax evasion. Apparently, they could not get any evidence on this score. Otherwise, they should have by now registered a case against her and formally initiated the investigation. However, the intelligence agencies recorded clandestinely near 5000 telephone conversations of Radia with her contacts on various matters.
7. These conversations revealed the extent of her role in seeking to influence political and business-related decisions. It was reported that there were about 15 journalists among those contacted by her. Copies of these recordings would have been available at three places--- the Income-Tax Department, the Intelligence Agency which carried out the tapping and the mobile telephone company or companies whose subscriber Radia was. From one of these sources, the recorded conversations leaked out to two journals, which published the transcripts of about a hundred of them. It needs to be underlined that these tapes were not discovered by the two journals as a result of their journalistic enterprise. These were apparently given to them by an unidentified source for giving publicity to the contents.
8. What could have been the motive of the source in leaking the tapes? Either to discredit Radia and her business clients or to discredit her journalist contacts or both. Of the 15-odd journalists figuring in the conversations, two have received the maximum adverse attention ---- Barkha Dutt and Vir Sanghvi. Barkha is a highly successful TV journalist with a large circle of admirers and critics. Her contribution to making Indian TV journalism reach great heights has been immense. Despite this, she is disliked by many, who accuse her of being pro-Muslim, pro-Pakistan, anti-national, anti-Hindutva, anti-RSS and anti-Narendra Modi, the Chief Minister of Gujarat. In recent months, her ctitics have become even more virulent against her after her active role to highlighting the alleged involvement of some Hindus in acts of terrorism against the Muslims. Her stories on the so-called Hindu terror have added to the enemity against her.
9. It is intriguing that the leakage of her tapped conversations with Radia and the controversay that followed came in the wake of her stories on the alleged Hindu terror. People, who know Barkha well, say that she has some negative traits in her personality too. They allege that she is intimidating and cannot take criticism in her stride. There was one alleged instance of her forcing a blogger, who made a critical posting on her, to apologice in public and remove his posting. Her success as a journalist has also brought in the professional jealousy of some of her colleagues in the profession.
10. Her critics and detractors jumped at the opportunity provided by the tapes in an attempt to put her on the defensive, destroy her credibility and damage her professional reputation. Nobody has accused her of being complicit in any crime by being in touch with Radia. Nobody has accused her of trying to play down or cover up the allegations against A.Raja in her journalist reporting. She has been accused only of letting herself be used by a lobbyist in a manner, which is contrary to the ethics of journalism. Barkha's reply is that she did not let herself be used by Radia, but she was using her contacts with Radia to collect information about the DMK. Barkha has been asked by her critics as to why in that case she did not write about the use of Radia by the DMK to influence the Cabinet formation. This is an unkind question---- as unkind as asking N.Ram, the Editor-in-Chief of "The Hindu", as to why he allegedly let himself be used by the Tamil elements from Sri Lanka as an intermediary with Rajiv Gandhi when he was the Prime Minister in the 1980s? As unkind as asking N.Ram as to why he played down the stories of the mass anti-Chinese uprising in Tibet in 2008? As unkind as asking N.Ram as to why for many years till recently he blacked out references to His Holiness the Dalai Lama in the columns of his paper. As unkind as asking him as to why he used to give publicity in his paper to the despatches of the Xinhua, the news agency owned by the Chinese Government. Ram should be the last person to throw stones at Barkha.
11.Many journalists, who are throwing stones today at Barkha, had themselces acted as intermediaries to some one or the other and allowed their coverage to be influenced by extraneous considerations.
12. A person should be judged not by what he or she says in private, but by what he or she says or writes in public and does.There is nothing inappropriate or unethical in Barkha's writings, reportage and actions. As regards her private conversations with Radia over phone she has explained the background and context and denied any malafide or unethical intention. Her explanation should be accepted instead of trying to fix her through an inquisition. ( 1-12-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and , presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
WIKILEAKS: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE CABLES OF US EMBASSY IN NEW DELHI?
B.RAMAN
WikiLeaks claims to be having in its possession about 3000 diplomatic cables exchanged between the US State Department and the US Embassy in New Delhi. These have not so far been released by it. Nor does it appear to have given them to the "New York Times", the "Guardian", "Der Spiegel", "Le Monde" and "El Pais" to whom it had given the cables from the US Embassies in other countries, including China and Pakistan. Otherwise, they would have commented on their contents.
2. In the meanwhile, an editorial carried by "The Hindu" of Chennai on November 30,2010, on the WikiLeaks leakage of other cables ends with the following intriguing words:" When the 3000-odd despatches sent by the US Embassy in India are published over the next 48 hours, it is possible that some or many feathers will end up ruffled. Elements of the strategic partnership---especially those pertaining to defence and the wider set of American goals involved---- remain cloaked in secrecy. Stay tuned to this space."
3. What does this mean? Has WikiLeaks given the cables of the US Embassy in New Delhi to "The Hindu" for initial scrutiny and analysis---either directly or through " The Guardian" with which "The Hindu" has a collaboration agreement? The "New York Times" has stated that it received its share of the documents from "The Guardian" and not directly from WikiLeaks. Have the India-related cables been given to "The Hindu" through "The Guardian" for analysis and comments? (30-11-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
WikiLeaks claims to be having in its possession about 3000 diplomatic cables exchanged between the US State Department and the US Embassy in New Delhi. These have not so far been released by it. Nor does it appear to have given them to the "New York Times", the "Guardian", "Der Spiegel", "Le Monde" and "El Pais" to whom it had given the cables from the US Embassies in other countries, including China and Pakistan. Otherwise, they would have commented on their contents.
2. In the meanwhile, an editorial carried by "The Hindu" of Chennai on November 30,2010, on the WikiLeaks leakage of other cables ends with the following intriguing words:" When the 3000-odd despatches sent by the US Embassy in India are published over the next 48 hours, it is possible that some or many feathers will end up ruffled. Elements of the strategic partnership---especially those pertaining to defence and the wider set of American goals involved---- remain cloaked in secrecy. Stay tuned to this space."
3. What does this mean? Has WikiLeaks given the cables of the US Embassy in New Delhi to "The Hindu" for initial scrutiny and analysis---either directly or through " The Guardian" with which "The Hindu" has a collaboration agreement? The "New York Times" has stated that it received its share of the documents from "The Guardian" and not directly from WikiLeaks. Have the India-related cables been given to "The Hindu" through "The Guardian" for analysis and comments? (30-11-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, November 29, 2010
CHINA TELLS US: NOT IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST TO EXPAND UNSC PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP
B.RAMAN
Wikileaks has released 58 more diplomatic cables.None of them is between the US State Department and the US Embassy in New Delhi. There are some very interesting cables of 2009 relating to the visits of US officials to China and Singapore.
2.The cable from the US Embassy in Singapore on May 30,2009, gives the views of Lee Kuan Yew, former Prime Minister and Minister Mentor to the present Government, on the present situation in China and the Chinese leadership. He was reported to have expressed these views during a meeting with visiting US Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg.
3. Lee has been quoted as saying: " Xi Jinping ( My comment: Hu Jintao's expected successor) is a princeling who succeeded despite being rusticated. When the party needed his talents, Xi was brought in as Shanghai Party Secretary. Xi is seen as a Jiang Zemin protege, but in another three and a half years Jiang’s influence will be gone. The focus now is on maintaining the system. There are no more strongmen like Deng Xiaoping. Jiang did not like Hu, but could not stop him, because Hu had the backing of the system and he did not make mistakes. Vice Premier Wang Qishan, whom the MM (Minister Mentor) saw in connection with celebrations in May of the 15th anniversary of Singapore-China Suzhou Industrial Park, is an exceptional talent, very assured and efficient. Wang handled SARS (?) superbly when he was in Hainan. He excelled in coordinating the Beijing Olympics. Li Keqiang may not get the Premiership and the Party is looking for a way to keep Wang on past his 65th birthday until he is 70. MM Lee said he had met first Wang back in the 1990s but had forgotten their meeting. This time when they met, Wang told Lee he had reviewed the records of all Lee’s meetings with Chinese leaders going back to the days of Deng Xiaoping to see how Lee’s thinking had developed. Wang told Lee he respects him as a consistent man. China is following an approach consistent with ideas in the Chinese television series “The Rise of Great Powers.” The mistake of Germany and Japan had been their effort to challenge the existing order. The Chinese are not stupid; they have avoided this mistake. China’s economy has surpassed other countries, with the exceptions of Japan and the United States. Even with those two countries, the gap is closing, with China growing at seven-nine percent annually, versus two-three percent in the United States and Japan. Overall GDP, not GDP per capita, is what matters in terms of power. China has four times the population of the United States. China is active in Latin America, Africa, and in the Gulf. Within hours, everything that is discussed in ASEAN meetings is known in Beijing, given China’s close ties with Laos, Cambodia, and Burma. China will not reach the American level in terms of military capabilities any time soon, but is rapidly developing asymmetrical means to deter U.S. military power. China understands that its growth depends on imports, including energy, raw materials, and food. This is why China is working with South Africa on the China-Africa Development Fund. China also needs open sea lanes. Beijing is worried about its dependence on the Strait of Malacca and is moving to ease the dependence by means like a pipeline through Burma. The best course for the United States on China is to build ties with China’s young people. China’s best and brightest want to study in the United States."
4.A cable of April 30,2009. summarises the views of an unidentified Chinese official at a lunch hosted for him by the US Charge d-Affaires in Beijing.It says: "The Charge expressed concern with China’s defining Tibet as a “core issue” with the apparent expectation that others would “step back.” Instead, our two sides should agree to continue to discuss the issue in an attempt to resolve our differences. The United States recognized that Tibet is a part of China. Nevertheless, the Dalai Lama is a respected religious leader and Nobel Laureate, and U.S. officials meet with him in that capacity. Future meetings by U.S. officials with the Dalai Lama could not be ruled out. Moreover, there were serious concerns among the U.S. public, the Administration and Congress over the situation in Tibetan areas of China. China should take steps to address Tibetans’ legitimate grievances and engage the Dalai Lama’s representatives in productive dialogue. Denying a visa to the Dalai Lama was not being contemplated."
5.During this lunch, the unidentified Chinese official has been quoted as saying as follows: "China was concerned by “momentum” that was building on UN Security Council reform, which was “not good” for the P-5, XXXXXXXXXXXX said. China wanted the United States to maintain its position on UNSC reform and not be “proactive” on the matter, which the PRC feared could result in a UN General Assembly resolution on the subject. The P-5 “club” should not be “diluted,” XXXXXXXXXXXX said. If we end up with a “P-10,” both China and the United States would “be in trouble.” Moreover, it would be difficult for the Chinese public to accept Japan as a permanent member of the UNSC. The Charge replied that the Administration had not completed its policy review on UNSC expansion, so we do not yet have a position on specific proposals. Nonetheless, the United States believed that UN members should be allowed to state their positions freely and openly without undue P-5 influence. Regarding Japan, the Charge said that, while no decision had been made about which countries to support for permanent membership on the UNSC, it was hard to envision any expansion of the Council that did not include Japan, which was the second-largest contributor to the UN budget."
6. A cable of September 29,2009, quotes Chinese State Councillor Dai Bingguo as telling visiting US Deputy Secretary of State Steinberg as follows:"The U.S.-China relationship was of crucial importance, said Dai. China would do its best to cooperate with the United States wherever possible. “If we expand the pie for the common interest, the pie will be larger and more delicious.” Together, the two sides should work collaboratively for the good of the world, especially since the two countries were “passengers in the same boat.” Dai urged careful management of the relationship and respect for each other’s core interests and concerns."
7. These cables relate to the preparatory meetings held by US officials with their Chinese counterparts before the visit of President Barack Obama to China in November,2009. The atmosphere and cordiality were very good. The Chinese referred to only Tibet and Taiwan as their core interests. They did not refer to the South China Sea as their core interest. It was only subsequently this year that they started referring to the South China Sea also as their core interest. This was one of the factors that contributed to the cooling-off this year. ( 30-11-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wikileaks has released 58 more diplomatic cables.None of them is between the US State Department and the US Embassy in New Delhi. There are some very interesting cables of 2009 relating to the visits of US officials to China and Singapore.
2.The cable from the US Embassy in Singapore on May 30,2009, gives the views of Lee Kuan Yew, former Prime Minister and Minister Mentor to the present Government, on the present situation in China and the Chinese leadership. He was reported to have expressed these views during a meeting with visiting US Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg.
3. Lee has been quoted as saying: " Xi Jinping ( My comment: Hu Jintao's expected successor) is a princeling who succeeded despite being rusticated. When the party needed his talents, Xi was brought in as Shanghai Party Secretary. Xi is seen as a Jiang Zemin protege, but in another three and a half years Jiang’s influence will be gone. The focus now is on maintaining the system. There are no more strongmen like Deng Xiaoping. Jiang did not like Hu, but could not stop him, because Hu had the backing of the system and he did not make mistakes. Vice Premier Wang Qishan, whom the MM (Minister Mentor) saw in connection with celebrations in May of the 15th anniversary of Singapore-China Suzhou Industrial Park, is an exceptional talent, very assured and efficient. Wang handled SARS (?) superbly when he was in Hainan. He excelled in coordinating the Beijing Olympics. Li Keqiang may not get the Premiership and the Party is looking for a way to keep Wang on past his 65th birthday until he is 70. MM Lee said he had met first Wang back in the 1990s but had forgotten their meeting. This time when they met, Wang told Lee he had reviewed the records of all Lee’s meetings with Chinese leaders going back to the days of Deng Xiaoping to see how Lee’s thinking had developed. Wang told Lee he respects him as a consistent man. China is following an approach consistent with ideas in the Chinese television series “The Rise of Great Powers.” The mistake of Germany and Japan had been their effort to challenge the existing order. The Chinese are not stupid; they have avoided this mistake. China’s economy has surpassed other countries, with the exceptions of Japan and the United States. Even with those two countries, the gap is closing, with China growing at seven-nine percent annually, versus two-three percent in the United States and Japan. Overall GDP, not GDP per capita, is what matters in terms of power. China has four times the population of the United States. China is active in Latin America, Africa, and in the Gulf. Within hours, everything that is discussed in ASEAN meetings is known in Beijing, given China’s close ties with Laos, Cambodia, and Burma. China will not reach the American level in terms of military capabilities any time soon, but is rapidly developing asymmetrical means to deter U.S. military power. China understands that its growth depends on imports, including energy, raw materials, and food. This is why China is working with South Africa on the China-Africa Development Fund. China also needs open sea lanes. Beijing is worried about its dependence on the Strait of Malacca and is moving to ease the dependence by means like a pipeline through Burma. The best course for the United States on China is to build ties with China’s young people. China’s best and brightest want to study in the United States."
4.A cable of April 30,2009. summarises the views of an unidentified Chinese official at a lunch hosted for him by the US Charge d-Affaires in Beijing.It says: "The Charge expressed concern with China’s defining Tibet as a “core issue” with the apparent expectation that others would “step back.” Instead, our two sides should agree to continue to discuss the issue in an attempt to resolve our differences. The United States recognized that Tibet is a part of China. Nevertheless, the Dalai Lama is a respected religious leader and Nobel Laureate, and U.S. officials meet with him in that capacity. Future meetings by U.S. officials with the Dalai Lama could not be ruled out. Moreover, there were serious concerns among the U.S. public, the Administration and Congress over the situation in Tibetan areas of China. China should take steps to address Tibetans’ legitimate grievances and engage the Dalai Lama’s representatives in productive dialogue. Denying a visa to the Dalai Lama was not being contemplated."
5.During this lunch, the unidentified Chinese official has been quoted as saying as follows: "China was concerned by “momentum” that was building on UN Security Council reform, which was “not good” for the P-5, XXXXXXXXXXXX said. China wanted the United States to maintain its position on UNSC reform and not be “proactive” on the matter, which the PRC feared could result in a UN General Assembly resolution on the subject. The P-5 “club” should not be “diluted,” XXXXXXXXXXXX said. If we end up with a “P-10,” both China and the United States would “be in trouble.” Moreover, it would be difficult for the Chinese public to accept Japan as a permanent member of the UNSC. The Charge replied that the Administration had not completed its policy review on UNSC expansion, so we do not yet have a position on specific proposals. Nonetheless, the United States believed that UN members should be allowed to state their positions freely and openly without undue P-5 influence. Regarding Japan, the Charge said that, while no decision had been made about which countries to support for permanent membership on the UNSC, it was hard to envision any expansion of the Council that did not include Japan, which was the second-largest contributor to the UN budget."
6. A cable of September 29,2009, quotes Chinese State Councillor Dai Bingguo as telling visiting US Deputy Secretary of State Steinberg as follows:"The U.S.-China relationship was of crucial importance, said Dai. China would do its best to cooperate with the United States wherever possible. “If we expand the pie for the common interest, the pie will be larger and more delicious.” Together, the two sides should work collaboratively for the good of the world, especially since the two countries were “passengers in the same boat.” Dai urged careful management of the relationship and respect for each other’s core interests and concerns."
7. These cables relate to the preparatory meetings held by US officials with their Chinese counterparts before the visit of President Barack Obama to China in November,2009. The atmosphere and cordiality were very good. The Chinese referred to only Tibet and Taiwan as their core interests. They did not refer to the South China Sea as their core interest. It was only subsequently this year that they started referring to the South China Sea also as their core interest. This was one of the factors that contributed to the cooling-off this year. ( 30-11-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
WIKILEAKS: IMPLICATIONS OF LEAKAGE OF US DIPLOMATIC CABLES
B.RAMAN
The leakage by WikiLeaks of over 200,000 diplomatic cables exchanged between the US State Department and its diplomatic missions abroad could have serious implications for US diplomacy and for the US-led war on terror.
2. To be successful and effective, diplomacy has to be confidential. It cannot be conducted in the open. By breaching the confidentiality of diplomatic interactions and communications, WikiLeaks has made it difficult for US diplomats to function as they should. In future, their foreign interlocutors will hesitate to talk to them freely and frankly if they conclude that US diplomats cannot maintain the secrecy of the discussions on sensitive issues. This could also have an effect on the war on terror. The war is being fought not only through operational means, but also through diplomatic means. Diplomacy plays an important role in facilitating international co-operation against terrorism. This role could be made difficult in future.
3. One could note from the documents leaked that many of the important discussions on terrorism were between visiting US officials, including the US Co-ordinator of Counter-Terrorism, and rulers and officials of the countries visited. For example, the Co-ordinator had visited Saudi Arabia and discussed counter-terrorism with the rulers and officials of the Saudi Government. Similarly, he had visited Israel and held discussions with the chief of the Mossad, Israel's external intelligence agency.
4 Senior US officials had discussed counter-terrorism with leaders and officials of other Islamic countries too. The Muslim leaders and officials had discussed matters relating to terrorism freely and frankly with US officials. They had said many things in private about Al Qaeda which they would not have said in public. These cables would be read not only by analysts and media personnel, but also by the leaders of Al Qaeda and its affiliates. When they find that Muslim rulers and officials were very frank with US officials, their anger against them will increase. As it is, Islamic countries are hesitant to co-operate with the US in the war against Al Qaeda. They will be even more hesitant now.
5.WikiLeaks is reported to be having in its possession over 3000 cables exchanged between the US State Department and the US Embassy in New Delhi. It has not yet released them. As such, one does not know their contents. It is likely that some of those messages discuss sensitive matters having a bearing on India's relations with other countries and also touch upon the internal political situation in India. It is the job of diplomats to keep their Foreign Office informed of internal political developments and give their frank assessment of the leadership of the country to which they are accredited. If such frank and sensitice cables leak out, it could damage the mutual trust between the officials and leadership of the two countries.
6. The same applies to any leakage of the diplomatic cables with the US Embassy in Islamabad. In the case of Pakistan, the implications could be more serious because of the US dependence on Pakistan for the war against Al Qaeda and for the operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan.
7. The cables do not give details of individual intelligence operations except a US exercise to build a data-base of senior officials of the UN Secretariat, presumably to facilitate the operations of the US intelligence in the UN headquarters. The cables do give details of discussions of US diplomats and visiting US officials with senior intelligence officers of some countries. These offiicers and their organisations could withdraw into their shell and may not in future be as forthcoming as they were till now in their interactions with US diplomats and officials.
8. It will be difficult to quantify the damage caused to US diplomacy, but it will be immense. (29-11-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The leakage by WikiLeaks of over 200,000 diplomatic cables exchanged between the US State Department and its diplomatic missions abroad could have serious implications for US diplomacy and for the US-led war on terror.
2. To be successful and effective, diplomacy has to be confidential. It cannot be conducted in the open. By breaching the confidentiality of diplomatic interactions and communications, WikiLeaks has made it difficult for US diplomats to function as they should. In future, their foreign interlocutors will hesitate to talk to them freely and frankly if they conclude that US diplomats cannot maintain the secrecy of the discussions on sensitive issues. This could also have an effect on the war on terror. The war is being fought not only through operational means, but also through diplomatic means. Diplomacy plays an important role in facilitating international co-operation against terrorism. This role could be made difficult in future.
3. One could note from the documents leaked that many of the important discussions on terrorism were between visiting US officials, including the US Co-ordinator of Counter-Terrorism, and rulers and officials of the countries visited. For example, the Co-ordinator had visited Saudi Arabia and discussed counter-terrorism with the rulers and officials of the Saudi Government. Similarly, he had visited Israel and held discussions with the chief of the Mossad, Israel's external intelligence agency.
4 Senior US officials had discussed counter-terrorism with leaders and officials of other Islamic countries too. The Muslim leaders and officials had discussed matters relating to terrorism freely and frankly with US officials. They had said many things in private about Al Qaeda which they would not have said in public. These cables would be read not only by analysts and media personnel, but also by the leaders of Al Qaeda and its affiliates. When they find that Muslim rulers and officials were very frank with US officials, their anger against them will increase. As it is, Islamic countries are hesitant to co-operate with the US in the war against Al Qaeda. They will be even more hesitant now.
5.WikiLeaks is reported to be having in its possession over 3000 cables exchanged between the US State Department and the US Embassy in New Delhi. It has not yet released them. As such, one does not know their contents. It is likely that some of those messages discuss sensitive matters having a bearing on India's relations with other countries and also touch upon the internal political situation in India. It is the job of diplomats to keep their Foreign Office informed of internal political developments and give their frank assessment of the leadership of the country to which they are accredited. If such frank and sensitice cables leak out, it could damage the mutual trust between the officials and leadership of the two countries.
6. The same applies to any leakage of the diplomatic cables with the US Embassy in Islamabad. In the case of Pakistan, the implications could be more serious because of the US dependence on Pakistan for the war against Al Qaeda and for the operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan.
7. The cables do not give details of individual intelligence operations except a US exercise to build a data-base of senior officials of the UN Secretariat, presumably to facilitate the operations of the US intelligence in the UN headquarters. The cables do give details of discussions of US diplomats and visiting US officials with senior intelligence officers of some countries. These offiicers and their organisations could withdraw into their shell and may not in future be as forthcoming as they were till now in their interactions with US diplomats and officials.
8. It will be difficult to quantify the damage caused to US diplomacy, but it will be immense. (29-11-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Sunday, November 28, 2010
WIKILEAKS: INFORMATION OF INTEREST TO INDIA---PRE-2010 DOCUMENTS
B.RAMAN
Wikileaks has claimed to have received from its source 251,287 documents, which are mainly diplomatic cables of a classification lower than “Top Secret” exchanged between the US State Department and its diplomatic missions abroad. It has given advance access to these documents to “The New York Times”, the “Guardian” of the UK, “Der Spiegel” of Germany, “Le Monde” of France and “El Pais” of Spain. They have already come out on November 28 with a summary of the significant points in the documents given to them. The summaries published by “The New York Times” and “the Guardian” have been reproduced by “The Hindu” of Chennai on November 29. These summaries do not contain any information or comments, which could embarrass India. According to the media, 3038 of the cables in the possession of Wikileaks were exchanged between the US State Department and the US Embassy in New Delhi. These cables have not been uploaded by Wikileaks . In fact, it has uploaded only 220 of the 251,287cables so far. None of them was from the US Embassy in New Delhi. I had earlier extracted information of interest to India contained in the cables of January and February,2010. Wikileaks does not appear to have received from its source or sources any cables from March, 2010 onwards. Information of interest to India extracted from the cables uploaded by the Wikileaks, which relate to the period between 1966 and December,2009, is extracted below.
2009
At the regular meeting of G-5 Ambassadors in Beijing
May 8, French DCM Nicholas Chapuis reported that State
Councilor Dai Bingguo told visiting former French President
Chirac that the West would not gain from more sanctions on
North Korea. Dai reportedly said that "the lever of economic
development" had not been used effectively in Six-Party Talks
and that a U.S.-DPRK dialogue was "the only way to make
progress." German Ambassador Michael Schaefer reported that
Germany had informed China of the U.S. request to accept some
Uighur detainees held at Guantanamo and had been subsequently
warned by China of "a heavy burden on bilateral relations" if
Germany were to accept any detainees. Japanese DCM Kunio
Umeda reported that Premier Wen Jiabao was "tired and seemed
under a lot of pressure" during his meeting with visiting
Prime Minister Taro Aso, while President Hu Jintao was
"relaxed and confident." According to UK DCM Chris Wood,
China had requested the UK not allow the Dalai Lama to
transit London or meet with any government officials. Wood
reported that local authorities in Gansu Province had
detained a British Consul, reflecting the authorities' angst
over foreigners traveling to the Tibetan regions of the
province. End Summary.
Participants
------------
¶2. (C) French DCM Nicholas Chapuis hosted German Ambassador
Dr. Michael Schaefer, Japanese DCM Kunio Umeda, UK DCM Chris
Wood and Acting DCM May 8 for the regular gathering of
Beijing-based G-5 Chiefs of Mission.
Chirac's Visit to China, DPRK, Africa
-------------------------------------
¶3. (C) French DCM Nicholas Chapuis reported that President Hu
had not mentioned Tibet in his meeting with visiting former
French President Jacques Chirac. State Councilor Dai Bingguo
had told Chirac that the West would not gain from more
sanctions on North Korea and that a U.S.-DPRK dialogue was
"the only way to make progress" in Six-Party Talks. Dai
reportedly said that North Korea wanted to open up
economically and that the "lever of economic development" had
not been used effectively in Six-Party Talks. Dai suggested
to Chirac that, given China and France's "conflict of
interests" in Africa, the two countries should have a
dialogue on Africa.
Germany and Guantanamo Uighurs
------------------------------
¶4. (C) German Ambassador Schaefer said the German State
Secretary had informed China of the U.S. request to accept
some Uighur detainees held at Guantanamo, noting that Germany
had not made a decision regarding the Uighurs. He noted that
no German state had yet agreed to accept the detainees.
Ambassador Schaefer said China had not officially demarched
Germany but had warned Germany that accepting any Uighur
detainees would "put enormous pressure on Beijing and a heavy
burden on bilateral relations."
Sino-Japanese Relations
-----------------------
¶5. (C) Japanese DCM Kunio Umeda reported that PM Taro Aso,
who had visited Beijing April 29-30, had said Premier Wen
Jiabao was "very tired and seemed under a lot of pressure"
from dealing with the economic crisis, while President Hu
Jintao had seemed "confident and relaxed." PM Aso had
requested China not implement its planned compulsory
certification of IT products in China, while Premier Wen had
insisted the law was consistent with China's WTO commitments.
Dalai Lama
----------
¶6. (C) UK DCM Chris Wood reported that China had requested
the UK not allow the Dalai Lama to transit London but
softened the demarche by requesting that government officials
not meet the Dalai Lama if he were to transit the country.
French DCM Nicholas Chapuis said China's demarche was part of a campaign to limit the Dalai Lama's travel and noted that
the Beijing city government had threatened to break its
sister-city relationship with Paris if the Dalai Lama were to
receive an honorary citizen award from the French capital.
Ambassador Schaefer said Germany had not received such
demands from the Chinese, in spite of the Dalai Lama's
frequent trips to Germany.
Harassment of UK Embassy Staff in Gansu
---------------------------------------
¶7. (C) UK DCM Wood said UK Energy and Climate Change
Secretary Ed Miliband had recently visited Gansu Province and
had been accompanied by a British journalist from "The
Guardian." According to Woodward, local Chinese authorities
had briefly detained a British Consul to express displeasure
with the accompanying journalist, who had stayed in Gansu
without the authorities' permission after Secretary Miliband
had departed. "Local goons" had come to the traveling
delegation's hotel and threatened to follow a UK Embassy
female staffer (but did not). In addition, a British
"Financial Times" reporter in Sichuan had been harassed by
local authorities who were apparently upset by the
journalist's interest in reporting on schools destroyed
during the Sichuan earthquake.
Climate Change
--------------
¶8. (C) UK DCM Wood said the UK Environment and Science
Minister had recently had talks with Chinese officials on
climate change. In the llead up to Copenhagen, China would
not agree to targets on emissions but was willing to be
constructive and would come to Copenhagen with a package of
action items related to nuclear power, renewable energy and
reforestation. Wood said his impression was that China could
be induced to do more on climate change.
Rule of Law
-----------
¶9. (C) Ambassador Schaefer reported that German Minister of
Justice Brigitte Zypries recently had visited China to attend
a three-day rule of law dialogue on social security and
pensions that was attended by 45 Chinese lawyers and judges.
Schaefer said Germany and China would have another dialogue
on a proposed law on regulating lawyers, noting that the
Chinese Government was looking to give lawyers "more space"
without giving up control.
IRANIAN BALOCHISTAN
“Iran view from Baku” is the first in an occasional series from Embassy Baku Iran Watcher that will report on short and/or partially documented items of interest to Iran information consumers, but not necessarily warranting separate cables. This cable includes information on reported increasing security problems in Iranian Baluchistan, including alleged disruption of Iran-Pakistan railroad links; a message from a senior GOAJ military offical about the dangers of stirring up Iranian minorities; the apparent quadrupling in first quarter 2009 (compared to first quarter 2008) seizures in Azerbaijan of Iranian- transited heroin; and skepticism about Iranian gas export contracts, related by industry participants at the recently-completed Baku Oil and Gas show. End Summary.
Baluchi Violence Obstructing Iran-Pakistan Rail Link?
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶2. (C) Several Iranian contacts, including apolitical businessmen, have told Baku Iran watcher that the recent suicide bombing of a Sh’ia mosque, and subsequent attack on a campaign center in Zahedan, reflect a surge in Baluchi violence in the border area and inside Pakistan that has been building steadily over several years. According to one source, the Iranian security forces may be losing effective control over growing areas in the countryside. All noted that the rising violence in Iranian Baluchistan is mirrored and influenced by similar events on the Pakistani side of the border (recently described in ref(a)).
¶3. (C) One alleged result is the apparent postponement of completion of the long-planned improved rail link between Pakistan and Iran, designed to run through or near Baluchi territory on both sides of the border. The current rail connection, running between Quetta, Pakistan and Zahedan, Iran is in poor condition and has low freight-carrying capacity. Moreover, according to reports it has recently been repeatedly subject to rocket attacks and other disruption by Baluchi tribes. An improved link also traversing Iranian and Pakistani Baluchi areas was originally supposed to have been inaugurated in March, 2009, with container train service beginning in August. According to Iranian sources in Baku, this deadline is unlikely to be achieved, and regular use of the Iran-Pakistan railway for significant cargo shipment is unlikely in the foreseeable future.
¶4. (S)[Source removed] quoted the Ministry source as saying that in 2008 Iran asked Pakistan to establish a new, “more secure and modern” route, but that Pakistan has so far refused. The source added that Tehran is rife with rumors about the increasing lack of safety in Baluchi areas, and claimed that many guard and police posts in Sistan-Baluchistan areas are no longer occupied at night due to the increased danger of attack.
¶5. (C) Another source, [Source removed] blamed the Ahmadinejad administration for pursuing provocative anti-Sunni practices (including harassment of Sunni clergy and congregations and raids on Sunni mosques) and other “arrogant” crackdowns over the last few years. He claimed that these practices, combined with high unemployment, perceived discrimination,
and few government services, has increased anger among Baluchis, and identification of the central government as an “enemy.” He cited the appointment of Ahmadinejad ally Habibullah Dehmordah as a Governor of Sistan-Baluchistan as a typical insensitive blunder, calling him a “stupid, brutal, Sunni-hater.” (Note: Dehmordah was replaced as Governor in 2008 by Ali-Mohammed Azad. End Note).
GOAJ Military Figure Opposes Promoting Unrest in Iran
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶6. (S) At a 12 May meeting with a visiting group of 16 U.S. military general officers, the GOAJ’s Special Assistant to the President for Defense, General Vahid Aliyev, related that he had recently met in Iranian Azerbaijan with (unnamed) high-ranking &Iranian General.8 Although he did not provide details, Aliyev strongly implied that the Iranian General raised alleged “foreign-sponsored” efforts to foment unrest among Iranian ethnic groups, including Iranian Azerbaijanis (who make up nearly thirty percent of the Iranian population). Commenting on this issue, Aliyev asserted that “there have been four attempts by Iranian Azerbaijanis to assert autonomy in the last hundred years all of which were crushed” by the Iranian state. As an example, Aliyev cited the Soviet effort during World War II to establish a breakaway “Republic of South Azerbaijan.” The Soviets forces pulled back in 1946, after a “Truman-Stalin Agreement,” which Aliyev depicted as a cynical “betrayal” of collaborating Iranian Azerbaijanis. He recounted that the resulting repression by Tehran resulted in the deaths of 60,000 Azeris, and the flight of many more into Soviet Azerbaijan.
¶7. (S) U.S. military participants agreed that Aliyev appeared to be implicitly signaling that outside fomenting of unrest in Iranian Azerbaijan is opposed by the GOAJ. Aliyev similarly told the U.S. officers that any foreign war with Iran will be bad for Azerbaijan, and result in a flood of refugees entering the country. (Note: The three other “failed Azerbaijani autonomy struggles” cited by Aliyev presumably refer to the early 20th century Constitutional Revolution, Azerbaijani resistance to Reza Shah’s centralization policies in the 1920’s, and efforts by senior Azerbaijani clerics and activists to obtain local autonomy in the wake of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. End note).
GOAJ Iran-Origin Heroin Seizures Continue Rise
--------------------------------------------- -
¶8. (C) According to [Source removed], export of narcotics from Iran into Azerbaijan continue to skyrocket (see ref b). According to statistics provided to Baku Iran watcher on June 3, 2009 by the UNODC-sponsored counter-narcotics “Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Center” (CARICC) headquarters in Tashkent, Iran-origin heroin seizures (i.e., heroin derived from Afghani and Pakistani opium that entered Azerbaijan from Iran) in Azerbaijan nearly quadrupled during the first quarter of 2009, as compared to the first quarter of 2008. According to the GOAJ, virtually all of this heroin had been fully processed in labs and was “ready for market.” Total heroin seizures in Azerbaijan during the first quarter of 2008 reflected a sharp increase over the first quarter of 2007; while in 2006 only twenty kilograms of such heroin was officially reported seized in Azerbaijan during the entire year. In contrast, reported GOAJ seizures of Iran-origin heroin during the first quarter of 2009 amounted to nearly 59,000 kilos, as compared to approximately 15,000 kilos of heroin seized in the first quarter of 2008.
CHINA-IRAN
China is biding its time until the political
crisis in Iran reaches a clearer resolution and the
Ahmadinejad government consolidates power, and will signal
its renewed engagement by sending a high-level delegation to
Tehran once the political situation has been resolved,
according to an MFA official. Our contact reaffirmed China's
commitment to the P5-plus-1 process and assessed that Iran is
attempting to keep the door to negotiation with the United
States open despite the turmoil surrounding the June
election, but cautioned that a complete halt to uranium
enrichment is an unattainable goal. China continues to urge
Iran to respond positively to the P5-plus-1 offer for talks,
and these entreaties have been passed directly to Supreme
Leader Khamenei. Iran reportedly requested to upgrade its
relationship with Beijing to a "strategic partnership," but
China refused. A Communist Party official told us that the
CCP is seeking to increase its relations with six major
political parties and factions in Iran and deepen its
understanding of U.S. policy in the Middle East. He repeated
China's standard position on the Iran nuclear issue and
suggested that the U.S. offer economic incentives to persuade
the Iranians to enter into talks on the nuclear issue. He
dismissed concerns that negative perceptions in the Middle
East of China after the July violence in Xinjiang province
would affect China's diplomacy with Iran. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) PolOff discussed Iran-China relations with MFA West
Asian Affairs Department Iran Division Deputy Director Ni
Ruchi August 31. In a separate meeting the same day, Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee International Liaison
Department (CCID) Third Bureau (West Asia and North Africa)
Director Wu Baocai gave PolOff the Party's perspective on
Iran and the nuclear issue.
Holding Back Bilaterally until Political Dust Settles
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶3. (C) MFA Iran Division Deputy Director Ni said that the
political turmoil in Iran had yet to settle and that China
was still waiting for the situation to calm further before
re-engaging fully in bilateral relations. He argued that the
internal divisions that had played out in the June
presidential elections had existed well before the violent
aftermath of the June election. China had been aware of the
potential for conflict among those divisions to spill into
the street and had taken a cautious approach before the
election. He said that the Chinese government understood
that the election was a strong indication of deep-seated
divisions within the Iranian government, but stressed that
the contested election had not fundamentally undermined the
current government and that China would continue with its
normal engagement with Tehran.
¶4. (C) China would signal its re-engagement, Ni reported,
with a high-level delegation to Tehran, but there was no
timetable for such a visit yet because the leadership in
Tehran was still fully focused on consolidating power. He
noted that during his mid-August visit to Iran, protestors
had continued to take to the selection. Ni reaffirmed China's
commitment to the P5-plus-1 process, stressing that the U.S.
and China not only had common interests in Iran, but the
scope of this common interest was increasing.
Iran Keeping the Door Open?
---------------------------
¶5. (C) Ni said that China had taken note of efforts by the
Iranian government to keep a path open to direct negotiations
despite the ongoing political turmoil. He claimed that
Tehran had refrained from overplaying its accusations of the
U.S. role in the election turmoil, preferring to point the
finger at European countries, indicating that the Iranian
leadership was interested in maintaining the possibility of
direct talks. Ni said that the election had caused the
Iranian leadership to reexamine seriously its foreign policy,
particularly on the nuclear issue, adding that Iran's nuclear
development had suffered technical setbacks recently, which
had also forced the leadership to consider how to move
forward.
China Lobbying but Total Halt to Enrichment Unattainable
--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶6. (C) Ni reported that China continued to urge Iran at every
level of their engagement to respond positively to the
P53-plus-1 offer of direct talks and cease uranium enrichment
activities. He said that Chinese leaders had pointed out to
their Iranian counterparts on many occasions that the United
States had shown "restraint" in its public comments during
the June election aftermath, and that Iran was missing an
important opportunity by refusing to respond to the P5-plus-1
offer. Ni said that China's message encouraging greater
engagement had been passed directly to Supreme Leader
Khamenei. He cautioned that Tehran would not be able to
respond positively to P5-plus-1 overtures until it had
reinforced its position at home, and that a "100-percent"
halt to uranium enrichment had become an unattainable goal.
Ni said that China continued to believe that fresh sanctions
would be ineffective in persuading Iran to cease enrichment
activities and would be counter-productive by increasing the
unity of the various factions in Iran behind the nuclear
program and the current government. Ni argued that the
regime in Iran would emerge from the crisis in a weakened
position and thus more likely to negotiate with the P5-plus-1
on the nuclear issue.
Iran Seeks "Strategic Partnership" with an Unwilling PRC
--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶7. (C) Ni said that Iran had requested that Beijing upgrade
its relationship with Tehran, presumably to counter Western
pressure, by lobbying Beijing to label its relationship with
Iran a "strategic partnership" as it does for Russia and
other countries. Ni said that China had so far refused to do
so and Iran was frustrated with China's continuing insistence
that the two countries shared merely "normal" relations.
Party Seeks to Increase its Interaction with Iran
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶8. (C) CCP Central Committee International Liaison Department
(CCID) Third Bureau (West Asia and North Africa) Director Wu
Baocai told PolOff August 31 that the CCP was seeking to
increase its relations with six major political parties and
factions in Iran. He noted that links between the CCP and
Iranian political parties had lagged behind the growth in
relations between executive branches and far behind the
increase in economic links. He said that deepening
understanding among the CCP leadership of the U.S.
position
on Iran was another emerging priority for his office and that
he was open to continued exchanges with the U.S. on the
nuclear issue.
CCP Perspective on Iran Nuclear Program
---------------------------------------
¶9. (C) Wu said that CCP officials were increasingly concerned
through 2008 at the possibility of the United States taking
military action against Iran's nuclear program but assessed
that such a possibility was much lower in 2009. He noted
that sanctions had not only failed to change Iranian behavior
and create meaningful effects in Iran but were negatively
affecting the countries joining in the international effort
to persuade Iran to stop its nuclear activities, citing as an
example constraints placed on Chinese banks from doing
business with Iran. He said that he believed the
international community was unlikely to be able to persuade
Iran to fully abandon its enrichment activities and suggested
the U.S. offer modest economic benefits as an incentive to
persuade Iran to enter into dialogue. Wu reiterated China's
strong opposition to Iran using its nuclear technology to
develop nuclear weapons but stressed the right of all
countries to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
FRENCH LEAKS TO CHINA
In the interest of transparency and enhanced cooperation
on nonproliferation matters, we would like to share the
following information:
-- We have information that the French firm Sofradir and its
subsidiary Ulis continue to sell both cooled and uncooled
infrared detectors to China's Zhejiang Dali Technology
Company Ltd for incorporation into thermal imaging systems.
-- Our information indicates the Chinese firm is actively
selling its thermal imaging systems to Iranian defense
entities.
-- Iranian military access to Chinese thermal imaging systems
that rely on high-grade French infrared detectors could
increase the threat to US and allied forces operating in the
Gulf region.
-- Infrared detectors (IRD) are sensors and critical
components of high performance thermal imaging systems. IRDs
are controlled under Wassenaar Arrangement, Section 6.A.2.a.3.
-- IRDs are used in the core assemblies for advanced
targeting pods, long-range reconnaissance systems, gimbaled
imaging systems in manned and unmanned airborne
reconnaissance and combat aircraft, Forward Looking Infrared
(FLIR) sensors, tank targeting systems, submarine periscopes,
and missile seekers.
-- Diversion of the subject components could be harmful to
our shared national security interests. If these IRDs were
included in the optical targeting mechanism for tanks and air
defense systems, they could potentially be used to degrade US
superiority in night combat operations.
-- We ask that you carefully consider the consequences of
such sales.
-- We also welcome any further information about this case
that may come to light in the course of any French
investigation into the matter.
2007
In an August 17 meeting, Israeli Mossad Chief Meir
Dagan thanked Under Secretary Burns for America's support of
Israel as evidenced by the previous day's signing of an MOU
that provides Israel with USD 30 billion in security
assistance from 2008-2018. Dagan provided his assessment of
the Middle East region, Pakistan and Turkey,
PAKISTAN: ISRAEL WORRIED ABOUT MUSHARRAF
-----------------------------------------
¶16. (S) On Pakistan, Dagan said that President Musharraf is
losing control, and that some of his coalition partners could
threaten him in the future. The key question, Dagan said, is
whether Musharraf retains his commander-in-chief role in
addition to his role as president. If not, he will have
problems. Dagan observed that there has been an increase in
the number of attempts on Musharraf's life, and wondered
whether he will survive the next few years. Under Secretary
Burns replied that South Asia has assumed vital importance in
American foreign policy since September 11. The U.S. is
committed to denying Afghanistan as a safe-haven for Taliban
and Al-Qaeda activity. The USG will continue to support
Pakistani President Musharraf, and is seeking to boost his
military defensive capabilities. At the same time, the U.S.
is encouraging Pakistan and Afghanistan to work with each
other militarily. Turning to India, Under Secretary Burns
noted that U.S.-Indian economic cooperation is growing, and
that the USG is working effectively to reduce tensions
between India and Pakistan.
CHINA-IRAN
IN SEPTEMBER DURING THEIR
MEETING AT THE APEC SUMMIT IN SYDNEY AUSTRALIA, PRESIDENT
BUSH DISCUSSED WITH CHINESE PRESIDENT HU STRONG CONCERNS
RELATING TO THE ONGOING TRANSSHIPMENT VIA BEIJING OF KEY
BALLISTIC MISSILE PARTS FROM NORTH KOREA TO IRAN'S MISSILE
PROGRAM. PRESIDENT BUSH PLEDGED TO RESPOND TO PRESIDENT
HU'S REQUESTS FOR FURTHER INFORMATION. EMBASSY SHOULD ON
NOVEMBER 3 AT THE MOST EFFECTIVE LEVEL POSSIBLE, DELIVER
THE NON-PAPER IN PARA 8 WHICH RELATES TO SPECIFIC, TIME-
SENSITIVE INFORMATION ABOUT AN IMMINENT TRANSSHIPMENT. IN
ADDITION, AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY POST SHOULD DELIVER
THE NON-PAPER IN PARA 9 TO MFA AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL
POSSIBLE, PREFERABLY BY THE AMBASSADOR SINCE THIS IS IN
RESPONSE TO PRESIDENTIAL-LEVEL DISCUSSIONS.
----------
OBJECTIVES
----------
¶2. (S/REL CHINA) Post should:
--(This point for November 3 Delivery) Request China to stop an
imminent shipment to Iran's ballistic missile program. This is the
same cargo that the Ambassador shared about on October 25 (ref E). It
is now scheduled to leave Beijing airport on November 4.
--(This point for November 3 Delivery) Note the importance of this
demarche since it relates to a topic discussed by Presidents Bush and
Hu in Sydney. Embassy should further note that the Embassy will be
seeking an appointment at the highest level possible to convey a more
extensive presentation on this topic of ballistic missile parts from
North Korea to Iran.
--Remind Chinese officials that President Bush has been personally
engaged on the issue of the transshipment of ballistic missile parts
between North Korea and Iran via Beijing and that he raised this issue
with President Hu at the APEC Summit.
-- Seek information on the steps China has taken since the APEC
discussion to address this issue and impress on them the necessity for
China to take immediate strong action.
-- Stress that the credibility of UN Security Council actions must be
maintained by vigorous implementation by UN Member States of UNSC
resolutions calling for Chapter VII sanctions, particularly 1718,
1737, and 1747.
--Indicate that the U.S. believes that the proliferation of missile
technology between North Korea and Iran will increase and that these
two countries will attempt to conduct these trantransfers through Chinese
territory.
--Emphasize the need to inspect cargo and personal goods on regularly
scheduled flights transiting Beijing from North Korea to Iran in order
to detect and deter these shipments.
--Explain to Chinese officials that the U.S. carefully reviews the
intelligence material that we have on shipments before we share it,
and we ask that Chinese authorities respect this and act on our
information accordingly and appropriately.
--Indicate that the United States believes that we can work together
cooperatively and effectively on these issues.
--Express our willingness to continue to share as much information as
possible to assist China's efforts to uphold these UN Security Council
resolutions.
--------------------------------------------- -------------
Background: Ballistic Missile Parts Shipped via Beijing Between North
Korea and Iran.
--------------------------------------------- -------------
¶3. (S/Rel China) Iran and North Korea have continued their
longstanding cooperation on ballistic missile technology, via air-
shipments of ballistic-missile related items. We assess that some of
these shipments consist of ballistic missile jet vanes that frequently
transit Beijing on regularly scheduled flights on Air Koryo and Iran
Air. We believe that the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG) is
the probable end user for these parts. SBIG is listed in the annex to
UNSCR 1737 and these jet vanes are controlled under Item 10.A.2 of the
Missile Technology Control Regime and Item 6 of China's missile-
related export control regulations. Moreover, UNSCRs 1718 and 1737
prohibit the transfer to or from North Korea or Iran, respectively, of
jet vanes and any other item listed in UNSC document S/2006/815.
These shipments therefore represent violations of UNSCRs 1718 and
¶1737.
¶4. (S/Rel China) The U.S. has raised this issue with China at the
highest levels several times in the last few months. In May 2007, the
United States informed China of imminent shipments on three separate
occasions (Refs A,B and C). Though Chinese officials informed Embassy
Beijing that China's investigations have found no evidence of these
transfers, it appears that these shipments did occur and are
continuing to transit via Beijing. In addition this issue was raised
by ISN PDAS Patricia McNerney during bilateral nonproliferation talks
in August 2007 (Ref D). The Deputy Secretary also raised this issue
with Executive Vice Foreign Minister (EVFM) Dai Bingguo via during a
telephone conversation in August. Finally, in September 2007,
President Bush discussed this issue with Chinese President Hu at the
APEC summit in Sydney. The two leaders agreed that the USG would
provide the PRC with further information on these transfers.
¶5. (S/Rel China) On October 25 the U.S. provided PRC officials with
detailed information, including the airway bill and flight number, of
another imminent shipment of military related goods from North Korea
to Iran via Beijing. This shipment was also assessed as destined for
Iran's solid propellant missile development organization, the Shahid
Bagheri Industries Group (SBIG). We now have information that the
goods will be shipped on November 4 and insist on a substantive
response from China to this information.
¶6. (S/Rel China) Our information indicates that at least 10 air
shipments of jet vanes have transited Beijing thus far and that these
shipments will not only continue but will also grow in volume. We
have encouraged the Chinese to undertake frequent inspections of cargo
on Air Koryo or Iran Air flights transiting Beijing from North Korea
to both deter and detect these shipments.
¶7. (S/Rel China) The Department is seeking both immediate action on
this new information and a strategic approach with regards to this
critical issue. We assess that the best way to prevent these
shipments in the future is for Chinese authorities to take action,
such as those identified in para 9, that will make the Beijing airport
a less hospitable transfer point.
--------------------------------------------- --------
NON-PAPER ON URGENT MATTER TO BE DELIVERED NOVEMBER 3
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶8. (S/Rel China) Begin points:
-- Last week we raised with you information regarding North Korean
plans to send a shipment, probably for Iran's ballistic missile
program, to Iran. We believe the cargo is intended for Iran's Shahid
Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG), which is responsible for Iran's
solid-propellant ballistic missile program. You had requested
additional information.
-- We now have reason to believe that the items above will be shipped
to Iran via scheduled Iran Air flight on November 4.
--If these goods are missile-related, North Korea is prohibited under
UNSCR 1718 from exporting missile-related items and UN Member States
are prohibited from importing those items. In addition, North Korea
would potentially be precluded under UNSCR 1737 from transferring
these items to Iran if they are among the missile-related components
included in S/2006/815 or if North Korea or China determines that they
would contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery
systems. Moreover, SBIG is designated in United Nations Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737 and, as such, is subject to the
mandatory asset freeze called for in the resolution. With these
concerns in mind we are asking that Chinese authorities investigate
this shipment and prohibit it from proceeding to Iran.
------------------------------------------
BEGIN NON-PAPER FOR DELIVERY BY AMBASSADOR
------------------------------------------
¶9. (S/REL CHINA) Begin Points:
--Over the past several months we have raised with Chinese officials
the problem of ballistic missile-related transfers between Iran and
North Korea being transshipped through China. President Bush raised
U.S. concerns on this matter with President Hu during the APEC summit
in Sydney, demonstrating the importance of the issue to the United
States. In response to President Hu's request for additional details,
we are providing you further information regarding these activities.
Specifically, we are urgently providing information regarding an
imminent shipment of serious concern.
-- North Korea is prohibited under UNSCR 1718 from exporting missile-
related items and UN Member States are prohibited from importing those
items. In addition, North Korea would potentially be precluded under
UNSCR 1737 from transferring these items to Iran if they are among the
missile-related components included in S/2006/815 or if North Korea or
China determines that they would contribute to the development of
nuclear weapon delivery systems. Moreover, SBIG is designated in
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737 and, as such,
is subject to the mandatory asset freeze called for in the resolution.
With these concerns in mind we are insisting that Chinese authorities
urgently investigate this shipment and prohibit it from proceeding to
Iran.
--We are very concerned that North Korean shipments of jet vanes occur
on regularly scheduled commercial air flights transiting through
Beijing. We believe this has been the case on about 10 flights.
--These items are likely intended for Iran's solid propellant missile
development organization, the Shahid Bagheri Industries Group (SBIG).
--These cargo shipments probably include front companies.
--We have identified a large number of shipments beginning late last
year of what are probably ballistic missile-related items that have
transited Beijing, and we would like to share further information on
these shipments.
--14 December 2006: A delegation from SBIG returned from Pyongyang
probably via Beijing and transported what we assess to be jet vanes
for a solid propellant medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) under
development in Iran.
--On or about 15 January 2007: North Korea delivered what were
probably jet vanes for Iran's developmental solid propellant MRBM to
SBIG via Beijing on board regularly-scheduled commercial passenger
flights.
--On or around 23 January 2007: North Korea delivered what were
probably jet vanes for Iran's developmental solid propellant MRBM to
SBIG via Beijing on board regularly-scheduled commercial passenger
flights.
--On or about 16 May 2007: An air shipment composed of four what were
probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to
depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled
commercial passenger flights.
--On or about 24 May 2007: An air shipment composed of five what were
probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to
depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled
commercial passenger flights.
--On or about 6 June 2007: An air shipment composed of four what were
probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to
depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled
commercial passenger flights.
-- On or about 12 June 2007: An air shipment composed of five what
were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was
scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-
scheduled commercial passenger flights.
--On or about 14 June 2007: An air shipment composed of three what
were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was
scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-
scheduled commercial passenger flights.
--On or about 14 July 2007: An air shipment composed of ten what were
probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to
depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled
commercial passenger flights.
--On or about 26 July 2007: An air shipment possibly composed of an
unknown number of jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was
scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-
scheduled commercial passenger flights.
--On or about 22 August: An air shipment possibly composed of one jet
vane from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North
Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger
flights.
--We believe that the number of jet vanes sent to Iran will increase
dramatically in the future.
--To date we believe that about 40 probable jet vanes have been sent
from North Korea to Iran.
--The contract for these components called for a total number of 500
and we assess that shipments of these may increase to a rate of 100-
160 per month.
--In addition, our information indicates that a second order of 1,500
components - possibly additional jet vanes - was agreed to in December
of last year.
-- We believe that this trade will continue to utilize regularly-
scheduled commercial passenger flights.
--As we have discussed on several occasions, Iran also has been
seeking probable tungsten-copper alloy plates from China's Dalian
Sunny Industries, also known as LIMMT. Dalian Sunny Industries
shipped part of an order for this material in September. These plates
are suitable for Iranian domestic production of jet vanes or as an
insulator for ballistic missile components. Iran could be seeking
these plates in case North Korea is unable to provide the quantity or
quality of jet vanes required.
--We urge you to prevent such shipments via whatever action you deem
appropriate, including frequent inspection of Iran Air and Air Koryo
flights. The use of regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights
indicates that frequent regular inspections of Iran Air flights and
Air Koryo flights are in order and would help deter these shipments in
the future.
--We will continue to provide you with relevant information to help
end this proliferation.
2006
UAE--PAKISTAN
Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed,s weekly
Sunday "VIP Majlis" provided an excellent opportunity for a
visiting National Defense University delegation to observe
first-hand the UAEG,s informal consultative process. MbZ,
brothers MinState Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan and Interior
Minister Sheikh Saif, and Labor Minister al Ka'abi were
joined by several dozen prominent Abu Dhabi officials and
businessmen for the weekly gathering at Bateen Palace.
Pakistan
--------
¶5. (C) Ambassador asked about MbZ's visit the week before to
Lahore to meet with Pakistani President Musharraf. MbZ
chuckled and asked why the USG "always" convinced the
Pakistanis to delay news of the capture of senior Al Qaeda
operatives such as Abu Faraj al Libbi. MbZ went on to
congratulate Washington for its decision to allow U.S. firms
to bid for contracts to provide F-16s and other defense
technology to Pakistan. It was important to support
Musharraf as he battled the terrorists, he emphasized. While
the Indians had and would continue to balk at the decision,
the region needed Musharraf to stay strong. There was no
alternative leader in sight, MbZ opined. Besides, he
continued, the F-16 decision would not tip the military
balance between India and Pakistan. Even if it had, India's
strength as a stable democracy would ensure that it would not
ever be in as "risky" a situation as its neighbor. MbZ then
slapped his knee and said "you,ll never guess what Musharraf
asked me...he asked me whether the UAE had received approval
for the Predator!" (Note: the USG's inability to meet the
UAE's request for an armed Predator remains a sore point for
MbZ, although he has not directly raised the issue with us
for some time.)
Iran Relations Unaffected by Xinjiang Violence
--------------------------------------------- -
¶10. (C) Wu dismissed concerns that dismay in Iran and other
parts of the Middle East over China's treatment of ethnic
Uighurs in Xinjiang province would complicate China's
diplomacy with Iran. While acknowledging that some
high-level religious leaders in Iran had been highly critical
of China in the wake of the July violence in Xinjiang, he
said that Beijing was seeking to counter the danger of China
becoming a target for anger in the Muslim world by
significantly increasing its media outreach in the Middle
East, citing the recent establishment of an Arabic-language
version of government-run CCTV.
Wikileaks has claimed to have received from its source 251,287 documents, which are mainly diplomatic cables of a classification lower than “Top Secret” exchanged between the US State Department and its diplomatic missions abroad. It has given advance access to these documents to “The New York Times”, the “Guardian” of the UK, “Der Spiegel” of Germany, “Le Monde” of France and “El Pais” of Spain. They have already come out on November 28 with a summary of the significant points in the documents given to them. The summaries published by “The New York Times” and “the Guardian” have been reproduced by “The Hindu” of Chennai on November 29. These summaries do not contain any information or comments, which could embarrass India. According to the media, 3038 of the cables in the possession of Wikileaks were exchanged between the US State Department and the US Embassy in New Delhi. These cables have not been uploaded by Wikileaks . In fact, it has uploaded only 220 of the 251,287cables so far. None of them was from the US Embassy in New Delhi. I had earlier extracted information of interest to India contained in the cables of January and February,2010. Wikileaks does not appear to have received from its source or sources any cables from March, 2010 onwards. Information of interest to India extracted from the cables uploaded by the Wikileaks, which relate to the period between 1966 and December,2009, is extracted below.
2009
At the regular meeting of G-5 Ambassadors in Beijing
May 8, French DCM Nicholas Chapuis reported that State
Councilor Dai Bingguo told visiting former French President
Chirac that the West would not gain from more sanctions on
North Korea. Dai reportedly said that "the lever of economic
development" had not been used effectively in Six-Party Talks
and that a U.S.-DPRK dialogue was "the only way to make
progress." German Ambassador Michael Schaefer reported that
Germany had informed China of the U.S. request to accept some
Uighur detainees held at Guantanamo and had been subsequently
warned by China of "a heavy burden on bilateral relations" if
Germany were to accept any detainees. Japanese DCM Kunio
Umeda reported that Premier Wen Jiabao was "tired and seemed
under a lot of pressure" during his meeting with visiting
Prime Minister Taro Aso, while President Hu Jintao was
"relaxed and confident." According to UK DCM Chris Wood,
China had requested the UK not allow the Dalai Lama to
transit London or meet with any government officials. Wood
reported that local authorities in Gansu Province had
detained a British Consul, reflecting the authorities' angst
over foreigners traveling to the Tibetan regions of the
province. End Summary.
Participants
------------
¶2. (C) French DCM Nicholas Chapuis hosted German Ambassador
Dr. Michael Schaefer, Japanese DCM Kunio Umeda, UK DCM Chris
Wood and Acting DCM May 8 for the regular gathering of
Beijing-based G-5 Chiefs of Mission.
Chirac's Visit to China, DPRK, Africa
-------------------------------------
¶3. (C) French DCM Nicholas Chapuis reported that President Hu
had not mentioned Tibet in his meeting with visiting former
French President Jacques Chirac. State Councilor Dai Bingguo
had told Chirac that the West would not gain from more
sanctions on North Korea and that a U.S.-DPRK dialogue was
"the only way to make progress" in Six-Party Talks. Dai
reportedly said that North Korea wanted to open up
economically and that the "lever of economic development" had
not been used effectively in Six-Party Talks. Dai suggested
to Chirac that, given China and France's "conflict of
interests" in Africa, the two countries should have a
dialogue on Africa.
Germany and Guantanamo Uighurs
------------------------------
¶4. (C) German Ambassador Schaefer said the German State
Secretary had informed China of the U.S. request to accept
some Uighur detainees held at Guantanamo, noting that Germany
had not made a decision regarding the Uighurs. He noted that
no German state had yet agreed to accept the detainees.
Ambassador Schaefer said China had not officially demarched
Germany but had warned Germany that accepting any Uighur
detainees would "put enormous pressure on Beijing and a heavy
burden on bilateral relations."
Sino-Japanese Relations
-----------------------
¶5. (C) Japanese DCM Kunio Umeda reported that PM Taro Aso,
who had visited Beijing April 29-30, had said Premier Wen
Jiabao was "very tired and seemed under a lot of pressure"
from dealing with the economic crisis, while President Hu
Jintao had seemed "confident and relaxed." PM Aso had
requested China not implement its planned compulsory
certification of IT products in China, while Premier Wen had
insisted the law was consistent with China's WTO commitments.
Dalai Lama
----------
¶6. (C) UK DCM Chris Wood reported that China had requested
the UK not allow the Dalai Lama to transit London but
softened the demarche by requesting that government officials
not meet the Dalai Lama if he were to transit the country.
French DCM Nicholas Chapuis said China's demarche was part of a campaign to limit the Dalai Lama's travel and noted that
the Beijing city government had threatened to break its
sister-city relationship with Paris if the Dalai Lama were to
receive an honorary citizen award from the French capital.
Ambassador Schaefer said Germany had not received such
demands from the Chinese, in spite of the Dalai Lama's
frequent trips to Germany.
Harassment of UK Embassy Staff in Gansu
---------------------------------------
¶7. (C) UK DCM Wood said UK Energy and Climate Change
Secretary Ed Miliband had recently visited Gansu Province and
had been accompanied by a British journalist from "The
Guardian." According to Woodward, local Chinese authorities
had briefly detained a British Consul to express displeasure
with the accompanying journalist, who had stayed in Gansu
without the authorities' permission after Secretary Miliband
had departed. "Local goons" had come to the traveling
delegation's hotel and threatened to follow a UK Embassy
female staffer (but did not). In addition, a British
"Financial Times" reporter in Sichuan had been harassed by
local authorities who were apparently upset by the
journalist's interest in reporting on schools destroyed
during the Sichuan earthquake.
Climate Change
--------------
¶8. (C) UK DCM Wood said the UK Environment and Science
Minister had recently had talks with Chinese officials on
climate change. In the llead up to Copenhagen, China would
not agree to targets on emissions but was willing to be
constructive and would come to Copenhagen with a package of
action items related to nuclear power, renewable energy and
reforestation. Wood said his impression was that China could
be induced to do more on climate change.
Rule of Law
-----------
¶9. (C) Ambassador Schaefer reported that German Minister of
Justice Brigitte Zypries recently had visited China to attend
a three-day rule of law dialogue on social security and
pensions that was attended by 45 Chinese lawyers and judges.
Schaefer said Germany and China would have another dialogue
on a proposed law on regulating lawyers, noting that the
Chinese Government was looking to give lawyers "more space"
without giving up control.
IRANIAN BALOCHISTAN
“Iran view from Baku” is the first in an occasional series from Embassy Baku Iran Watcher that will report on short and/or partially documented items of interest to Iran information consumers, but not necessarily warranting separate cables. This cable includes information on reported increasing security problems in Iranian Baluchistan, including alleged disruption of Iran-Pakistan railroad links; a message from a senior GOAJ military offical about the dangers of stirring up Iranian minorities; the apparent quadrupling in first quarter 2009 (compared to first quarter 2008) seizures in Azerbaijan of Iranian- transited heroin; and skepticism about Iranian gas export contracts, related by industry participants at the recently-completed Baku Oil and Gas show. End Summary.
Baluchi Violence Obstructing Iran-Pakistan Rail Link?
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶2. (C) Several Iranian contacts, including apolitical businessmen, have told Baku Iran watcher that the recent suicide bombing of a Sh’ia mosque, and subsequent attack on a campaign center in Zahedan, reflect a surge in Baluchi violence in the border area and inside Pakistan that has been building steadily over several years. According to one source, the Iranian security forces may be losing effective control over growing areas in the countryside. All noted that the rising violence in Iranian Baluchistan is mirrored and influenced by similar events on the Pakistani side of the border (recently described in ref(a)).
¶3. (C) One alleged result is the apparent postponement of completion of the long-planned improved rail link between Pakistan and Iran, designed to run through or near Baluchi territory on both sides of the border. The current rail connection, running between Quetta, Pakistan and Zahedan, Iran is in poor condition and has low freight-carrying capacity. Moreover, according to reports it has recently been repeatedly subject to rocket attacks and other disruption by Baluchi tribes. An improved link also traversing Iranian and Pakistani Baluchi areas was originally supposed to have been inaugurated in March, 2009, with container train service beginning in August. According to Iranian sources in Baku, this deadline is unlikely to be achieved, and regular use of the Iran-Pakistan railway for significant cargo shipment is unlikely in the foreseeable future.
¶4. (S)[Source removed] quoted the Ministry source as saying that in 2008 Iran asked Pakistan to establish a new, “more secure and modern” route, but that Pakistan has so far refused. The source added that Tehran is rife with rumors about the increasing lack of safety in Baluchi areas, and claimed that many guard and police posts in Sistan-Baluchistan areas are no longer occupied at night due to the increased danger of attack.
¶5. (C) Another source, [Source removed] blamed the Ahmadinejad administration for pursuing provocative anti-Sunni practices (including harassment of Sunni clergy and congregations and raids on Sunni mosques) and other “arrogant” crackdowns over the last few years. He claimed that these practices, combined with high unemployment, perceived discrimination,
and few government services, has increased anger among Baluchis, and identification of the central government as an “enemy.” He cited the appointment of Ahmadinejad ally Habibullah Dehmordah as a Governor of Sistan-Baluchistan as a typical insensitive blunder, calling him a “stupid, brutal, Sunni-hater.” (Note: Dehmordah was replaced as Governor in 2008 by Ali-Mohammed Azad. End Note).
GOAJ Military Figure Opposes Promoting Unrest in Iran
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶6. (S) At a 12 May meeting with a visiting group of 16 U.S. military general officers, the GOAJ’s Special Assistant to the President for Defense, General Vahid Aliyev, related that he had recently met in Iranian Azerbaijan with (unnamed) high-ranking &Iranian General.8 Although he did not provide details, Aliyev strongly implied that the Iranian General raised alleged “foreign-sponsored” efforts to foment unrest among Iranian ethnic groups, including Iranian Azerbaijanis (who make up nearly thirty percent of the Iranian population). Commenting on this issue, Aliyev asserted that “there have been four attempts by Iranian Azerbaijanis to assert autonomy in the last hundred years all of which were crushed” by the Iranian state. As an example, Aliyev cited the Soviet effort during World War II to establish a breakaway “Republic of South Azerbaijan.” The Soviets forces pulled back in 1946, after a “Truman-Stalin Agreement,” which Aliyev depicted as a cynical “betrayal” of collaborating Iranian Azerbaijanis. He recounted that the resulting repression by Tehran resulted in the deaths of 60,000 Azeris, and the flight of many more into Soviet Azerbaijan.
¶7. (S) U.S. military participants agreed that Aliyev appeared to be implicitly signaling that outside fomenting of unrest in Iranian Azerbaijan is opposed by the GOAJ. Aliyev similarly told the U.S. officers that any foreign war with Iran will be bad for Azerbaijan, and result in a flood of refugees entering the country. (Note: The three other “failed Azerbaijani autonomy struggles” cited by Aliyev presumably refer to the early 20th century Constitutional Revolution, Azerbaijani resistance to Reza Shah’s centralization policies in the 1920’s, and efforts by senior Azerbaijani clerics and activists to obtain local autonomy in the wake of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. End note).
GOAJ Iran-Origin Heroin Seizures Continue Rise
--------------------------------------------- -
¶8. (C) According to [Source removed], export of narcotics from Iran into Azerbaijan continue to skyrocket (see ref b). According to statistics provided to Baku Iran watcher on June 3, 2009 by the UNODC-sponsored counter-narcotics “Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Center” (CARICC) headquarters in Tashkent, Iran-origin heroin seizures (i.e., heroin derived from Afghani and Pakistani opium that entered Azerbaijan from Iran) in Azerbaijan nearly quadrupled during the first quarter of 2009, as compared to the first quarter of 2008. According to the GOAJ, virtually all of this heroin had been fully processed in labs and was “ready for market.” Total heroin seizures in Azerbaijan during the first quarter of 2008 reflected a sharp increase over the first quarter of 2007; while in 2006 only twenty kilograms of such heroin was officially reported seized in Azerbaijan during the entire year. In contrast, reported GOAJ seizures of Iran-origin heroin during the first quarter of 2009 amounted to nearly 59,000 kilos, as compared to approximately 15,000 kilos of heroin seized in the first quarter of 2008.
CHINA-IRAN
China is biding its time until the political
crisis in Iran reaches a clearer resolution and the
Ahmadinejad government consolidates power, and will signal
its renewed engagement by sending a high-level delegation to
Tehran once the political situation has been resolved,
according to an MFA official. Our contact reaffirmed China's
commitment to the P5-plus-1 process and assessed that Iran is
attempting to keep the door to negotiation with the United
States open despite the turmoil surrounding the June
election, but cautioned that a complete halt to uranium
enrichment is an unattainable goal. China continues to urge
Iran to respond positively to the P5-plus-1 offer for talks,
and these entreaties have been passed directly to Supreme
Leader Khamenei. Iran reportedly requested to upgrade its
relationship with Beijing to a "strategic partnership," but
China refused. A Communist Party official told us that the
CCP is seeking to increase its relations with six major
political parties and factions in Iran and deepen its
understanding of U.S. policy in the Middle East. He repeated
China's standard position on the Iran nuclear issue and
suggested that the U.S. offer economic incentives to persuade
the Iranians to enter into talks on the nuclear issue. He
dismissed concerns that negative perceptions in the Middle
East of China after the July violence in Xinjiang province
would affect China's diplomacy with Iran. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) PolOff discussed Iran-China relations with MFA West
Asian Affairs Department Iran Division Deputy Director Ni
Ruchi August 31. In a separate meeting the same day, Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee International Liaison
Department (CCID) Third Bureau (West Asia and North Africa)
Director Wu Baocai gave PolOff the Party's perspective on
Iran and the nuclear issue.
Holding Back Bilaterally until Political Dust Settles
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶3. (C) MFA Iran Division Deputy Director Ni said that the
political turmoil in Iran had yet to settle and that China
was still waiting for the situation to calm further before
re-engaging fully in bilateral relations. He argued that the
internal divisions that had played out in the June
presidential elections had existed well before the violent
aftermath of the June election. China had been aware of the
potential for conflict among those divisions to spill into
the street and had taken a cautious approach before the
election. He said that the Chinese government understood
that the election was a strong indication of deep-seated
divisions within the Iranian government, but stressed that
the contested election had not fundamentally undermined the
current government and that China would continue with its
normal engagement with Tehran.
¶4. (C) China would signal its re-engagement, Ni reported,
with a high-level delegation to Tehran, but there was no
timetable for such a visit yet because the leadership in
Tehran was still fully focused on consolidating power. He
noted that during his mid-August visit to Iran, protestors
had continued to take to the selection. Ni reaffirmed China's
commitment to the P5-plus-1 process, stressing that the U.S.
and China not only had common interests in Iran, but the
scope of this common interest was increasing.
Iran Keeping the Door Open?
---------------------------
¶5. (C) Ni said that China had taken note of efforts by the
Iranian government to keep a path open to direct negotiations
despite the ongoing political turmoil. He claimed that
Tehran had refrained from overplaying its accusations of the
U.S. role in the election turmoil, preferring to point the
finger at European countries, indicating that the Iranian
leadership was interested in maintaining the possibility of
direct talks. Ni said that the election had caused the
Iranian leadership to reexamine seriously its foreign policy,
particularly on the nuclear issue, adding that Iran's nuclear
development had suffered technical setbacks recently, which
had also forced the leadership to consider how to move
forward.
China Lobbying but Total Halt to Enrichment Unattainable
--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶6. (C) Ni reported that China continued to urge Iran at every
level of their engagement to respond positively to the
P53-plus-1 offer of direct talks and cease uranium enrichment
activities. He said that Chinese leaders had pointed out to
their Iranian counterparts on many occasions that the United
States had shown "restraint" in its public comments during
the June election aftermath, and that Iran was missing an
important opportunity by refusing to respond to the P5-plus-1
offer. Ni said that China's message encouraging greater
engagement had been passed directly to Supreme Leader
Khamenei. He cautioned that Tehran would not be able to
respond positively to P5-plus-1 overtures until it had
reinforced its position at home, and that a "100-percent"
halt to uranium enrichment had become an unattainable goal.
Ni said that China continued to believe that fresh sanctions
would be ineffective in persuading Iran to cease enrichment
activities and would be counter-productive by increasing the
unity of the various factions in Iran behind the nuclear
program and the current government. Ni argued that the
regime in Iran would emerge from the crisis in a weakened
position and thus more likely to negotiate with the P5-plus-1
on the nuclear issue.
Iran Seeks "Strategic Partnership" with an Unwilling PRC
--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶7. (C) Ni said that Iran had requested that Beijing upgrade
its relationship with Tehran, presumably to counter Western
pressure, by lobbying Beijing to label its relationship with
Iran a "strategic partnership" as it does for Russia and
other countries. Ni said that China had so far refused to do
so and Iran was frustrated with China's continuing insistence
that the two countries shared merely "normal" relations.
Party Seeks to Increase its Interaction with Iran
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶8. (C) CCP Central Committee International Liaison Department
(CCID) Third Bureau (West Asia and North Africa) Director Wu
Baocai told PolOff August 31 that the CCP was seeking to
increase its relations with six major political parties and
factions in Iran. He noted that links between the CCP and
Iranian political parties had lagged behind the growth in
relations between executive branches and far behind the
increase in economic links. He said that deepening
understanding among the CCP leadership of the U.S.
position
on Iran was another emerging priority for his office and that
he was open to continued exchanges with the U.S. on the
nuclear issue.
CCP Perspective on Iran Nuclear Program
---------------------------------------
¶9. (C) Wu said that CCP officials were increasingly concerned
through 2008 at the possibility of the United States taking
military action against Iran's nuclear program but assessed
that such a possibility was much lower in 2009. He noted
that sanctions had not only failed to change Iranian behavior
and create meaningful effects in Iran but were negatively
affecting the countries joining in the international effort
to persuade Iran to stop its nuclear activities, citing as an
example constraints placed on Chinese banks from doing
business with Iran. He said that he believed the
international community was unlikely to be able to persuade
Iran to fully abandon its enrichment activities and suggested
the U.S. offer modest economic benefits as an incentive to
persuade Iran to enter into dialogue. Wu reiterated China's
strong opposition to Iran using its nuclear technology to
develop nuclear weapons but stressed the right of all
countries to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
FRENCH LEAKS TO CHINA
In the interest of transparency and enhanced cooperation
on nonproliferation matters, we would like to share the
following information:
-- We have information that the French firm Sofradir and its
subsidiary Ulis continue to sell both cooled and uncooled
infrared detectors to China's Zhejiang Dali Technology
Company Ltd for incorporation into thermal imaging systems.
-- Our information indicates the Chinese firm is actively
selling its thermal imaging systems to Iranian defense
entities.
-- Iranian military access to Chinese thermal imaging systems
that rely on high-grade French infrared detectors could
increase the threat to US and allied forces operating in the
Gulf region.
-- Infrared detectors (IRD) are sensors and critical
components of high performance thermal imaging systems. IRDs
are controlled under Wassenaar Arrangement, Section 6.A.2.a.3.
-- IRDs are used in the core assemblies for advanced
targeting pods, long-range reconnaissance systems, gimbaled
imaging systems in manned and unmanned airborne
reconnaissance and combat aircraft, Forward Looking Infrared
(FLIR) sensors, tank targeting systems, submarine periscopes,
and missile seekers.
-- Diversion of the subject components could be harmful to
our shared national security interests. If these IRDs were
included in the optical targeting mechanism for tanks and air
defense systems, they could potentially be used to degrade US
superiority in night combat operations.
-- We ask that you carefully consider the consequences of
such sales.
-- We also welcome any further information about this case
that may come to light in the course of any French
investigation into the matter.
2007
In an August 17 meeting, Israeli Mossad Chief Meir
Dagan thanked Under Secretary Burns for America's support of
Israel as evidenced by the previous day's signing of an MOU
that provides Israel with USD 30 billion in security
assistance from 2008-2018. Dagan provided his assessment of
the Middle East region, Pakistan and Turkey,
PAKISTAN: ISRAEL WORRIED ABOUT MUSHARRAF
-----------------------------------------
¶16. (S) On Pakistan, Dagan said that President Musharraf is
losing control, and that some of his coalition partners could
threaten him in the future. The key question, Dagan said, is
whether Musharraf retains his commander-in-chief role in
addition to his role as president. If not, he will have
problems. Dagan observed that there has been an increase in
the number of attempts on Musharraf's life, and wondered
whether he will survive the next few years. Under Secretary
Burns replied that South Asia has assumed vital importance in
American foreign policy since September 11. The U.S. is
committed to denying Afghanistan as a safe-haven for Taliban
and Al-Qaeda activity. The USG will continue to support
Pakistani President Musharraf, and is seeking to boost his
military defensive capabilities. At the same time, the U.S.
is encouraging Pakistan and Afghanistan to work with each
other militarily. Turning to India, Under Secretary Burns
noted that U.S.-Indian economic cooperation is growing, and
that the USG is working effectively to reduce tensions
between India and Pakistan.
CHINA-IRAN
IN SEPTEMBER DURING THEIR
MEETING AT THE APEC SUMMIT IN SYDNEY AUSTRALIA, PRESIDENT
BUSH DISCUSSED WITH CHINESE PRESIDENT HU STRONG CONCERNS
RELATING TO THE ONGOING TRANSSHIPMENT VIA BEIJING OF KEY
BALLISTIC MISSILE PARTS FROM NORTH KOREA TO IRAN'S MISSILE
PROGRAM. PRESIDENT BUSH PLEDGED TO RESPOND TO PRESIDENT
HU'S REQUESTS FOR FURTHER INFORMATION. EMBASSY SHOULD ON
NOVEMBER 3 AT THE MOST EFFECTIVE LEVEL POSSIBLE, DELIVER
THE NON-PAPER IN PARA 8 WHICH RELATES TO SPECIFIC, TIME-
SENSITIVE INFORMATION ABOUT AN IMMINENT TRANSSHIPMENT. IN
ADDITION, AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY POST SHOULD DELIVER
THE NON-PAPER IN PARA 9 TO MFA AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL
POSSIBLE, PREFERABLY BY THE AMBASSADOR SINCE THIS IS IN
RESPONSE TO PRESIDENTIAL-LEVEL DISCUSSIONS.
----------
OBJECTIVES
----------
¶2. (S/REL CHINA) Post should:
--(This point for November 3 Delivery) Request China to stop an
imminent shipment to Iran's ballistic missile program. This is the
same cargo that the Ambassador shared about on October 25 (ref E). It
is now scheduled to leave Beijing airport on November 4.
--(This point for November 3 Delivery) Note the importance of this
demarche since it relates to a topic discussed by Presidents Bush and
Hu in Sydney. Embassy should further note that the Embassy will be
seeking an appointment at the highest level possible to convey a more
extensive presentation on this topic of ballistic missile parts from
North Korea to Iran.
--Remind Chinese officials that President Bush has been personally
engaged on the issue of the transshipment of ballistic missile parts
between North Korea and Iran via Beijing and that he raised this issue
with President Hu at the APEC Summit.
-- Seek information on the steps China has taken since the APEC
discussion to address this issue and impress on them the necessity for
China to take immediate strong action.
-- Stress that the credibility of UN Security Council actions must be
maintained by vigorous implementation by UN Member States of UNSC
resolutions calling for Chapter VII sanctions, particularly 1718,
1737, and 1747.
--Indicate that the U.S. believes that the proliferation of missile
technology between North Korea and Iran will increase and that these
two countries will attempt to conduct these trantransfers through Chinese
territory.
--Emphasize the need to inspect cargo and personal goods on regularly
scheduled flights transiting Beijing from North Korea to Iran in order
to detect and deter these shipments.
--Explain to Chinese officials that the U.S. carefully reviews the
intelligence material that we have on shipments before we share it,
and we ask that Chinese authorities respect this and act on our
information accordingly and appropriately.
--Indicate that the United States believes that we can work together
cooperatively and effectively on these issues.
--Express our willingness to continue to share as much information as
possible to assist China's efforts to uphold these UN Security Council
resolutions.
--------------------------------------------- -------------
Background: Ballistic Missile Parts Shipped via Beijing Between North
Korea and Iran.
--------------------------------------------- -------------
¶3. (S/Rel China) Iran and North Korea have continued their
longstanding cooperation on ballistic missile technology, via air-
shipments of ballistic-missile related items. We assess that some of
these shipments consist of ballistic missile jet vanes that frequently
transit Beijing on regularly scheduled flights on Air Koryo and Iran
Air. We believe that the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG) is
the probable end user for these parts. SBIG is listed in the annex to
UNSCR 1737 and these jet vanes are controlled under Item 10.A.2 of the
Missile Technology Control Regime and Item 6 of China's missile-
related export control regulations. Moreover, UNSCRs 1718 and 1737
prohibit the transfer to or from North Korea or Iran, respectively, of
jet vanes and any other item listed in UNSC document S/2006/815.
These shipments therefore represent violations of UNSCRs 1718 and
¶1737.
¶4. (S/Rel China) The U.S. has raised this issue with China at the
highest levels several times in the last few months. In May 2007, the
United States informed China of imminent shipments on three separate
occasions (Refs A,B and C). Though Chinese officials informed Embassy
Beijing that China's investigations have found no evidence of these
transfers, it appears that these shipments did occur and are
continuing to transit via Beijing. In addition this issue was raised
by ISN PDAS Patricia McNerney during bilateral nonproliferation talks
in August 2007 (Ref D). The Deputy Secretary also raised this issue
with Executive Vice Foreign Minister (EVFM) Dai Bingguo via during a
telephone conversation in August. Finally, in September 2007,
President Bush discussed this issue with Chinese President Hu at the
APEC summit in Sydney. The two leaders agreed that the USG would
provide the PRC with further information on these transfers.
¶5. (S/Rel China) On October 25 the U.S. provided PRC officials with
detailed information, including the airway bill and flight number, of
another imminent shipment of military related goods from North Korea
to Iran via Beijing. This shipment was also assessed as destined for
Iran's solid propellant missile development organization, the Shahid
Bagheri Industries Group (SBIG). We now have information that the
goods will be shipped on November 4 and insist on a substantive
response from China to this information.
¶6. (S/Rel China) Our information indicates that at least 10 air
shipments of jet vanes have transited Beijing thus far and that these
shipments will not only continue but will also grow in volume. We
have encouraged the Chinese to undertake frequent inspections of cargo
on Air Koryo or Iran Air flights transiting Beijing from North Korea
to both deter and detect these shipments.
¶7. (S/Rel China) The Department is seeking both immediate action on
this new information and a strategic approach with regards to this
critical issue. We assess that the best way to prevent these
shipments in the future is for Chinese authorities to take action,
such as those identified in para 9, that will make the Beijing airport
a less hospitable transfer point.
--------------------------------------------- --------
NON-PAPER ON URGENT MATTER TO BE DELIVERED NOVEMBER 3
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶8. (S/Rel China) Begin points:
-- Last week we raised with you information regarding North Korean
plans to send a shipment, probably for Iran's ballistic missile
program, to Iran. We believe the cargo is intended for Iran's Shahid
Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG), which is responsible for Iran's
solid-propellant ballistic missile program. You had requested
additional information.
-- We now have reason to believe that the items above will be shipped
to Iran via scheduled Iran Air flight on November 4.
--If these goods are missile-related, North Korea is prohibited under
UNSCR 1718 from exporting missile-related items and UN Member States
are prohibited from importing those items. In addition, North Korea
would potentially be precluded under UNSCR 1737 from transferring
these items to Iran if they are among the missile-related components
included in S/2006/815 or if North Korea or China determines that they
would contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery
systems. Moreover, SBIG is designated in United Nations Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737 and, as such, is subject to the
mandatory asset freeze called for in the resolution. With these
concerns in mind we are asking that Chinese authorities investigate
this shipment and prohibit it from proceeding to Iran.
------------------------------------------
BEGIN NON-PAPER FOR DELIVERY BY AMBASSADOR
------------------------------------------
¶9. (S/REL CHINA) Begin Points:
--Over the past several months we have raised with Chinese officials
the problem of ballistic missile-related transfers between Iran and
North Korea being transshipped through China. President Bush raised
U.S. concerns on this matter with President Hu during the APEC summit
in Sydney, demonstrating the importance of the issue to the United
States. In response to President Hu's request for additional details,
we are providing you further information regarding these activities.
Specifically, we are urgently providing information regarding an
imminent shipment of serious concern.
-- North Korea is prohibited under UNSCR 1718 from exporting missile-
related items and UN Member States are prohibited from importing those
items. In addition, North Korea would potentially be precluded under
UNSCR 1737 from transferring these items to Iran if they are among the
missile-related components included in S/2006/815 or if North Korea or
China determines that they would contribute to the development of
nuclear weapon delivery systems. Moreover, SBIG is designated in
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737 and, as such,
is subject to the mandatory asset freeze called for in the resolution.
With these concerns in mind we are insisting that Chinese authorities
urgently investigate this shipment and prohibit it from proceeding to
Iran.
--We are very concerned that North Korean shipments of jet vanes occur
on regularly scheduled commercial air flights transiting through
Beijing. We believe this has been the case on about 10 flights.
--These items are likely intended for Iran's solid propellant missile
development organization, the Shahid Bagheri Industries Group (SBIG).
--These cargo shipments probably include front companies.
--We have identified a large number of shipments beginning late last
year of what are probably ballistic missile-related items that have
transited Beijing, and we would like to share further information on
these shipments.
--14 December 2006: A delegation from SBIG returned from Pyongyang
probably via Beijing and transported what we assess to be jet vanes
for a solid propellant medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) under
development in Iran.
--On or about 15 January 2007: North Korea delivered what were
probably jet vanes for Iran's developmental solid propellant MRBM to
SBIG via Beijing on board regularly-scheduled commercial passenger
flights.
--On or around 23 January 2007: North Korea delivered what were
probably jet vanes for Iran's developmental solid propellant MRBM to
SBIG via Beijing on board regularly-scheduled commercial passenger
flights.
--On or about 16 May 2007: An air shipment composed of four what were
probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to
depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled
commercial passenger flights.
--On or about 24 May 2007: An air shipment composed of five what were
probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to
depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled
commercial passenger flights.
--On or about 6 June 2007: An air shipment composed of four what were
probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to
depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled
commercial passenger flights.
-- On or about 12 June 2007: An air shipment composed of five what
were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was
scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-
scheduled commercial passenger flights.
--On or about 14 June 2007: An air shipment composed of three what
were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was
scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-
scheduled commercial passenger flights.
--On or about 14 July 2007: An air shipment composed of ten what were
probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to
depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled
commercial passenger flights.
--On or about 26 July 2007: An air shipment possibly composed of an
unknown number of jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was
scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-
scheduled commercial passenger flights.
--On or about 22 August: An air shipment possibly composed of one jet
vane from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North
Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger
flights.
--We believe that the number of jet vanes sent to Iran will increase
dramatically in the future.
--To date we believe that about 40 probable jet vanes have been sent
from North Korea to Iran.
--The contract for these components called for a total number of 500
and we assess that shipments of these may increase to a rate of 100-
160 per month.
--In addition, our information indicates that a second order of 1,500
components - possibly additional jet vanes - was agreed to in December
of last year.
-- We believe that this trade will continue to utilize regularly-
scheduled commercial passenger flights.
--As we have discussed on several occasions, Iran also has been
seeking probable tungsten-copper alloy plates from China's Dalian
Sunny Industries, also known as LIMMT. Dalian Sunny Industries
shipped part of an order for this material in September. These plates
are suitable for Iranian domestic production of jet vanes or as an
insulator for ballistic missile components. Iran could be seeking
these plates in case North Korea is unable to provide the quantity or
quality of jet vanes required.
--We urge you to prevent such shipments via whatever action you deem
appropriate, including frequent inspection of Iran Air and Air Koryo
flights. The use of regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights
indicates that frequent regular inspections of Iran Air flights and
Air Koryo flights are in order and would help deter these shipments in
the future.
--We will continue to provide you with relevant information to help
end this proliferation.
2006
UAE--PAKISTAN
Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed,s weekly
Sunday "VIP Majlis" provided an excellent opportunity for a
visiting National Defense University delegation to observe
first-hand the UAEG,s informal consultative process. MbZ,
brothers MinState Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan and Interior
Minister Sheikh Saif, and Labor Minister al Ka'abi were
joined by several dozen prominent Abu Dhabi officials and
businessmen for the weekly gathering at Bateen Palace.
Pakistan
--------
¶5. (C) Ambassador asked about MbZ's visit the week before to
Lahore to meet with Pakistani President Musharraf. MbZ
chuckled and asked why the USG "always" convinced the
Pakistanis to delay news of the capture of senior Al Qaeda
operatives such as Abu Faraj al Libbi. MbZ went on to
congratulate Washington for its decision to allow U.S. firms
to bid for contracts to provide F-16s and other defense
technology to Pakistan. It was important to support
Musharraf as he battled the terrorists, he emphasized. While
the Indians had and would continue to balk at the decision,
the region needed Musharraf to stay strong. There was no
alternative leader in sight, MbZ opined. Besides, he
continued, the F-16 decision would not tip the military
balance between India and Pakistan. Even if it had, India's
strength as a stable democracy would ensure that it would not
ever be in as "risky" a situation as its neighbor. MbZ then
slapped his knee and said "you,ll never guess what Musharraf
asked me...he asked me whether the UAE had received approval
for the Predator!" (Note: the USG's inability to meet the
UAE's request for an armed Predator remains a sore point for
MbZ, although he has not directly raised the issue with us
for some time.)
Iran Relations Unaffected by Xinjiang Violence
--------------------------------------------- -
¶10. (C) Wu dismissed concerns that dismay in Iran and other
parts of the Middle East over China's treatment of ethnic
Uighurs in Xinjiang province would complicate China's
diplomacy with Iran. While acknowledging that some
high-level religious leaders in Iran had been highly critical
of China in the wake of the July violence in Xinjiang, he
said that Beijing was seeking to counter the danger of China
becoming a target for anger in the Muslim world by
significantly increasing its media outreach in the Middle
East, citing the recent establishment of an Arabic-language
version of government-run CCTV.
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