B.RAMAN
There was another debate on the issue of "Saffron Terror" organised by Ms.Barkha Dutt on NDTV under the "We The People" programme on the evening of September 5. I liked the format of the programme, which was different from the usual format of the "We the People" programmes on Sunday. The number of patrticipants was less and the debate was well-focussed. It was more like a brain-storming on the subject than a no-holds barred debating contest.
2. I wanted to record the following observations with reference to some of the points made during the discussions. I have made these observations many times before in my books and articles and during my participation in seminars. Despite that, I thought it was worth repeating them since there seems to be a lot of inadequate knowledge and appreciation of them:
* Firstly, During the 1980s, many Muslims from all over the world were motivated by the intelligence agencies of the US, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to go to Afghanistan and wage a jihad against the Soviet troops there. They could not succeed in motivating members of the Indian Muslim community outside Jammu & Kashmir to go to Afghanistan and join the anti-Soviet jihad.
* Secondly, a few Indian Muslims from outside J&K motivated by the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) of Pakistan did go to Pakistan for being trained in camps run by the JEI with funding by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The JEI and the ISI instructed them to wage a jihad against the Government of India and to operate jointly with the Khalistanis. On their return to India, they failed to motivate the members of the Indian Muslim community to start a jihad. Their appeals for action were spurned by the Indian Muslim community in hinterland India.
* Thirdly, according to the then President Najibullah of Afghanistan, many angry Kashmiris did go to Pakistan for training in the camps set up by the JEI. From there, they were taken to Afghanistan for gaining experience in waging a jihad. Some of these motivated Kashmiris became the initial hard core of the Hizbul Mujahideen and the J&K Liberation Front.
* Fourthly, while the phenomenon of the radicalisation of some sections of the Indian Muslims had started in J&K even before the demolition of the Babri Masjid, this phenomenon started in the Muslim community outside J&K in hinterland India only after the demolition. The demolition of the masjid was the initial trigger for acts of terrorism by some indigenous Muslims belonging to organisations such as the Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and Al Ummah of Tamil Nadu. Many young Indian Muslims were also driven into the arms of Dawood Ibrahim. Thus, anger among some sections of young Indian Muslims in hinterland India over the Babri Masjid demolition played an important role in the emergence of jihadi terrorism in hinterland India. This was the main motivating anger during the 1990s.Many of the major acts of terrorism during this period such as the Mumbai blasts of March 1993, the Coimbatore blasts of February 1998 and other incidents such as explosions in trains were attributable to the anger caused by the Babri Masjid demolition.
* Fifthly, after 9/11, not a single Indian Muslim living in India went to Afghanistan to join Al Qaeda's jihad against the Americans. However, some Indian Muslims based abroad did join Al Qaeda, but this was not due to their anger against the Government of India, but due to their anger against the US for its invasion and occupation of Iraq. The jihad in Iraq against the Americans waged by Al Qaeda attracted a large number of foreign Muslims, but Indian Muslims kept away from Iraq's Al Qaeda.
* Sixthly, post-2000, the anger among sections of Indian Muslim youth in hinterland India over the demolition of the Babri Masjid started subsiding, but a new cause of anger made its appearance. This was due to the perception that the Indian criminal justice system--- the police, the lawyer community and the judiciary--- was unfair to the Muslims. This new anger had two consequences. It led to some of these Muslims helping Pakistani/Bangladeshi organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM). At the same time it also led to the phenomenon of Indian Mujahideen.
* Seventhly, the phenomenon of some Hindus taking to anti-Muslim reprisal terrorism was the outcome of what is perceived by them as the soft policy of the Government of India towards Pakistan and towards those members of the Indian Muslim community who were indulging in terrorism. The anger over the allegedly soft policy made its appearance not only among some Hindu religious elements, but also among sections of the security bureaucracy belonging to the Hindu religion. The two felt attracted to each other and joned hands in starting reprisal terrorism against soft targets in the Muslim community.
* Eighthly, the emerging phenomenon of Hindu reprisal terrorism merits serious attention because of its negative implications for communal harmony and because of the emergence of a seeming alliance between some religious elements and some in the security bureaucracy. If we don't stop this, we may go the way of Pakistan.
* Ninthly,Counter-terrorism has two aspects----operational and psychological.The operational aspect relates to strengthening our preventive,investigative and intervention capabilities.The psychological aspect relates to prompt and effective action to identify and address causes for anger in any community. Equal attention should be paid to both these aspects. ( 6-9-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Sunday, September 5, 2010
Saturday, September 4, 2010
CHINA CORRECTS DIPLOMATIC FAUX PAS, BUT MAINTAINS PRESENCE IN GILGIT-BALTISTAN
B.RAMAN
On August 27,2010,the “New York Times” carried an article by Selig Harrison, former correspondent of the ”Washington Post” in New Delhi who now works in a Washington-based think tank, stating inter alia as follows: “While the world focuses on the flood-ravaged Indus River valley, a quiet geopolitical crisis is unfolding in the Himalayan borderlands of northern Pakistan, where Islamabad is handing over de facto control of the strategic Gilgit-Baltistan region in the northwest corner of disputed Kashmir to China. The entire Pakistan-occupied western portion of Kashmir stretching from Gilgit in the north to Azad (Free) Kashmir in the south is closed to the world, in contrast to the media access that India permits in the eastern part, where it is combating a Pakistan-backed insurgency. But reports from a variety of foreign intelligence sources, Pakistani journalists and Pakistani human rights workers reveal two important new developments in Gilgit-Baltistan: a simmering rebellion against Pakistani rule and the influx of an estimated 7,000 to 11,000 soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army.” ( http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/27/op...20china&st=cse)
2. The report caused considerable concern and sensation in India. The Government of India, while expressing its concern if the report is true, ordered a verification of it by its agencies. A strong denial of the report came from the Pakistani Embassy in Beijing. On September 1, the party-controlled “Global Times” reported as follows in an article written by one by Wang Zhaokun : “A senior Pakistani official Tuesday (August 31) denied recent reports that Chinese troops are stationed in the area of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir to build a high-speed rail and road there. "The story is not true," Masood Khan, ambassador of Pakistan to China, told the Global Times. "It is totally fabricated." Khan said there are no Chinese troops in the area, but a humanitarian team from China is currently there to help local Pakistanis who suffered during the ravage of the country's most devastating floods in history.”
3.In keeping with the practice followed by official and media sources in China, the article referred to the region mentioned by Selig Harrison in his article as “Pakistan-controlled Kashmir”. The practice followed till now by Chinese Government officials, journalists and columnists has been to describe Jammu and Kashmir as “Indian-controlled Kashmir”, the so-called Azad Kashmir as “Pakistan-controlled Kashmir” and Gilgit-Baltistan as the “ Gilgit-Baltistan region” of “Pakistan-controlled Kashmir”.
4.In what was feared by analysts in India as a major departure from this practice, on the night of September 1,2010, the Government-controlled Xinhua news agency disseminated the following report:
China refutes reports of sending troops to Pakistan
BEIJING, Sept. 1 (Xinhua) -- China on Wednesday rejected reports of the presence of over 11,000 Chinese troops in northern Pakistan, saying that such "groundless reports" were made with "ulterior motives."
"We believe the attempts of some people to fabricate stories to provoke China-Pakistan or China-India relations are doomed to fail," said Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu in a statement.
The comment came in response to recent reports of some American and Indian press that China had deployed more than 10,000 troops in the Gilgit-Baltistan region of Pakistan.
5. The next day, during the regular briefing of Bejing-based journalists, including some from India, Jiang Yu reportedly used the expression “northern Pakistan” while referring to Gilgit Baltistan in the context of the article of Selig Harrison. However, this did not find mention in a transcript of the media briefing carried by the web sites of many Chinese diplomatic missions abroad. The text of the relevant extracts from the media briefing transcript is given below:
Q: Can you brief us on the latest developments of China’s assistance to Pakistan’s flood-stricken areas?
A: As Pakistan's close neighbor and all-weather friend, China empathizes with Pakistan for its severe natural disaster. The Chinese Government has offered several installments of humanitarian relief supplies worth more than RMB 100 million. The Chinese People's Liberation Army, the Red Cross Society of China, local governments and Chinese enterprises provided different forms of assistance as well. An international relief team sent by the Chinese Government has arrived in the hardest-hit southern part of Pakistan and set up a mobile hospital which is in operation now.
China has provided sincere and timely assistance to Pakistan without any strings attached. We will continue to offer support as much as we can to Pakistan based on its needs, with a view to helping the Pakistani Government and people to overcome difficulties and rebuild homes.
Q: According to reports, China recently refused to grant a visa to Lieutenant General Jaswal, head of Indian Army’s Northern Command, and the Indian side said the refusal was about the Kashmir issue. Do you have any comment? What’s China’s position over the Kashmir issue? And what’s China’s visa policy towards residents of the Indian-held Kashmir region?
A: Relevant media reports are inconsistent with the facts, as is checked with relevant authorities.
The Kashmir issue is an issue left over by history between India and Pakistan. As a neighboring country and friend to both India and Pakistan, China always holds that the Kashmir issue should be properly handled through dialogue and consultation between India and Pakistan.
China’s visa policy towards the residents of Indian-held Kashmir is consistent and remains unchanged.
6. Under the heading “China Withdraws Reference to Gilgit-Baltistan as “northern Pakistan”, the correspondent of “The Hindu” of Chennai in Bejing reported as follows on September 5: “ A day after India voiced concerns to China over its reference to the disputed Gilgit-Baltistan region as a “ northern part of Pakistan”, the Chinese Government withdrew its statement from its official Xinhua agency as well as from the Foreign Ministry’s web site…..On Saturday ( September 4) the statement appeared to have been removed from the Xinhua’s web site. The link to the statement, headlined “China refutes reports of sending troops to Pakistan”, did not open. The Chinese Foreign Ministry, which in a regular briefing on Thursday (September 2) had repeated the reference to Gilgit-Baltistan as “ a northern part of Pakistan” in response to a question on the presence of Chinese troops, deleted records of both the question and its response from its official transcript, which was posted on its website on Friday (September 3) “
7. “The Hindu” correspondent further reported: “ On Friday (September 3) morning, Indian Ambassador to China, S.Jaishankar, had conveyed New Delhi’s concerns over China’s recent moves in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir in talks with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun. In the talks, Mr.Jaishankar raised questions over the presence of Chinese troops in POK and protested China’s reference to the disputed region as a part of northern Pakistan. Mr.Zhang assured Indian officials that the troops were stationed there only for flood relief work and to provide humanitarian assistance.”
8. The Chinese reference to northern Pakistan could have been the result of the use of a similar expression by Selig Harrison, who had referred to Gilgit-Baltistan as “Himalayan borderlands of northern Pakistan.” It is likely that after the Indian Ambassador protested, the Chinese Foreign Office realized the diplomatic and legal implications of their referring to Gilgit-Baltistan as “ northern Pakistan” and deleted their statement from the web sites of Xinhua and the Foreign Office. But, they could have just deleted the reference to “northern Pakistan” and substituted in its place the name of the area as “Gilgit-Baltistan” and let the modified statement remain on the web sites. Why they deleted the entire statement? A satisfactory answer to this question is not available. However, it is evident that the Chinese, while sticking to the decisions to issue stapled visas to resident of J&K and to assist Pakistan in the development of its infrastructure in Gilgit-Baltistan, are at the same time keen that this issue should not seriously damage China’s relations with India. In this connection, reference is invited to my article dated August 30,2010, titled “Chinese Government, Media Play Down New Friction With India” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers41/paper4008.html
9. As regards Beijing’s contention that their troops were present in the Gilgit-Baltistan region only for humanitarian relief work, the Chinese have made two humanitarian interventions in the area this year. The first was in January last. On January 4, a landslide created a huge artificial lake in the Hunza area, which subsequently burst submerging a large number of villages in the Gojal Tehsil. About 22 KMs of the Karakoram Highway were submerged under water totally disrupting road communications with Xinjiang in China and with the rest of Gilgit-Baltistan. The Pakistan Army was able to go to the assistance of the affected villages only in the downstream area. It was not able to reach the affected villages in the upstream area for want of helicopters. The Pakistan Government appealed to the Chinese for assistance. Workers of the Chinese Red Cross and engineers of the People’s Liberation Army entered the Hunza area for relief. The Xinhua reported as follows: “On January 19, at the request of the Pakistani government, the Chinese side made special arrangements to open the Kunjirap border and facilitate the purchase of relief goods from China and its clearance. The China Road and Bridge Corporation, which is conducting the project of upgradation of the Karakoram Highway, has also provided engineering consultations and equipment to help the Pakistani side to deal with the problem.” The second humanitarian intervention at the request of Islamabad was made after the recent floods. In this connection, reference is invited to my article dated September 2 and titled “INDIA MISSES AN OPPORTUNITY FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN GILGIT-BALTISTAN” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers41/paper4016.html.
10. Reliable source reports say that the Chinese civilian and military personnel, who entered Gilgit-Baltistan for humanitarian relief work are still in the area, but no figures regarding their number are available. The sources say that their number will be in hundreds and not in thousands. Selig Harrison’s information about the presence of over 7,000 Chinese troops is not independently corroborated. There is also no information to indicate that the construction of the railway line from Xinjiang through Gilgit-Baltistan has started. A pre-feasibility study of the project has been done and a fesibility study is to be undertaken.
11. The “Gilgit-Baltistan Tribune” reported as follows on July 10,2010, on the eve of President Asif Ali Zardari’s visit to China: “The proposal for a rail link between landlocked Xinjiang in China’s far west and the Arabian Sea through Pakistan has been under discussion for some years. Chinese companies have apparently completed a pre-feasibility study on a rail project that must cross one of the most challenging terrains in the world. If the two sides take the political decision to go ahead with the project during Zardari’s visit, a consortium of Chinese companies is likely to be constituted to explore in detail the engineering and financial aspects of the project. While the technical aspects of the trans-Karakoram rail link are daunting, there is no denying the Chinese audacity in embracing projects that are grand in conception, challenging in their execution, and consequential in their impact. During the 1970s, long before China had become rich, the People’s Liberation Army had built at great cost the Karakoram highway between Xinjiang and northern Pakistan. The self-assurance of Chinese engineers and the geopolitical ambition of Beijing’s security establishment have grown manifold since. While India’s objections have not had much impact on either China or Pakistan, other developments have cast a shadow over some of the trans-Karakoram projects. The unstable terrain of the Karakorams demands costly upkeep of the highway, repeatedly damaged by landslides and formation of temporary lakes. At the political level, China has been concerned about growing links between Islamist and separatist movements in the Xinjiang province on the one hand and the terrorist safe havens in Pakistan and Afghanistan on the other. As a result, China had to often shut down the Karakoram highway. In recent months, Beijing has been pressing Islamabad to crack down hard on anti-Chinese extremist groups taking shelter on Pakistani soil.”
12. In this connection, please refer to my article on Zardari’s visit of July 11,2010, titled “PAKISTAN AS CHINA’S FORCE-MULTIPLIER AGAINST INDIA” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers40/paper3918.html . In that article, I had assessed the Chinese involvement in infrastructure development in Gilgit-Baltistan as follows:
“Any Indian expectation that as part of the assurance of Prime Minister Wen of caring for India’s core interests and major concerns, China would reverse its policy of helping Pakistan in the development of its railway and road infrastructure in the Gilgit-Baltistan area bordering Xinjiang, which de jure is part of India’s Jammu and Kashmir, and developing the hydro-electric potential in the Gilgit-Baltistan area was belied when the two countries announced the formal signing of more agreements relating to Gilgit-Baltistan during Mr.Zardari’s stay in Beijing. Under Memoranda of Understanding signed by officials of the two Governments during the visit, China will build the 165-km long Jaglot-Skardu road and the 135-km long Thakot-Sazin road. The projects would cost Pakistani Rs 45 billion with 15 per cent financing by Pakistan and 85 per cent by China. Under another MoU to be jointly executed by Chinese company Datang and Norwegian company EBT, 500 MW electricity would be produced through wind power. It is not known whether this will also be in the Gilgit-Baltistan area.
“ Mr.Zardari and the officials accompanying him repeatedly indicated that the Chinese have agreed in principle to co-operate with Pakistan in the construction of a railway line connecting Pakistan with Xinjiang via Gilgit-Baltistan. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang told reporters in response to a question that cooperation for the construction of a railway link between the two countries was for mutual benefit and not directed against any third party. It would appear that details of the project such as arrangements for financing and the alignment of the railway line are yet to be worked out. Mr.Zardari proposed that the Pakistan and China Railways should form a joint consortium for the timely execution of this project.
“ Mr.Zardari once again took up with the Chinese the pending Pakistani proposals for the upgradation of the Gwadar port, the construction of an oil refinery and an airport in Gwadar and the construction of oil/gas pipelines from Gwadar to Xinjiang. While the Chinese have readily responded in a positive manner to various proposals for projects in the Gilgit-Baltistan area, they are still hesitant regarding new projects in the Balochistan area. While they do not anticipate any security problems in the Gilgit-Baltistan area, they are still worried about the security situation in Balochistan.
“ Mr.Zardari’s disappointment over the Chinese hesitation in the Balochistan area became evident in his reported remarks to Prime Minister Wen that Pakistan desired that “China should take maximum benefits from the Gwadar Port.” From this it is evident that while Pakistan is keen for the quick implementation of the Gwadar-related projects, security considerations still inhibit the Chinese response.
“ The agreement in principle for the upgradation of the Karakoram Highway was reportedly reached more than 10 years ago. The Chinese agreed to meet the cost of upgradation on their side and Pakistan on its side. While the Chinese carried out the upgradation on their side ahead of time, the Pakistanis could not find the money for the upgradation on their side. As a result, the execution of the project was delayed and the Chinese ultimately agreed to give a soft loan to Pakistan for this purpose.
“. Pakistan has reached a similar deal wit Iran in respect of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline. While Iran will finance and construct the pipeline on its side, Pakistan has agreed to do so on its side, but it does not have the money. Will the Chinese give the money and help in the pipeline construction in return for a supply of part of the gas from Iran? This is a question which Pakistan has repeatedly raised with Beijing. China has been reluctant so far. According to reliable sources, Mr. Zardari raised this issue once again in Beijing, but there was no positive response from the Chinese.”
13.That position remains unchanged. ( 5-9-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director,Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
On August 27,2010,the “New York Times” carried an article by Selig Harrison, former correspondent of the ”Washington Post” in New Delhi who now works in a Washington-based think tank, stating inter alia as follows: “While the world focuses on the flood-ravaged Indus River valley, a quiet geopolitical crisis is unfolding in the Himalayan borderlands of northern Pakistan, where Islamabad is handing over de facto control of the strategic Gilgit-Baltistan region in the northwest corner of disputed Kashmir to China. The entire Pakistan-occupied western portion of Kashmir stretching from Gilgit in the north to Azad (Free) Kashmir in the south is closed to the world, in contrast to the media access that India permits in the eastern part, where it is combating a Pakistan-backed insurgency. But reports from a variety of foreign intelligence sources, Pakistani journalists and Pakistani human rights workers reveal two important new developments in Gilgit-Baltistan: a simmering rebellion against Pakistani rule and the influx of an estimated 7,000 to 11,000 soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army.” ( http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/27/op...20china&st=cse)
2. The report caused considerable concern and sensation in India. The Government of India, while expressing its concern if the report is true, ordered a verification of it by its agencies. A strong denial of the report came from the Pakistani Embassy in Beijing. On September 1, the party-controlled “Global Times” reported as follows in an article written by one by Wang Zhaokun : “A senior Pakistani official Tuesday (August 31) denied recent reports that Chinese troops are stationed in the area of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir to build a high-speed rail and road there. "The story is not true," Masood Khan, ambassador of Pakistan to China, told the Global Times. "It is totally fabricated." Khan said there are no Chinese troops in the area, but a humanitarian team from China is currently there to help local Pakistanis who suffered during the ravage of the country's most devastating floods in history.”
3.In keeping with the practice followed by official and media sources in China, the article referred to the region mentioned by Selig Harrison in his article as “Pakistan-controlled Kashmir”. The practice followed till now by Chinese Government officials, journalists and columnists has been to describe Jammu and Kashmir as “Indian-controlled Kashmir”, the so-called Azad Kashmir as “Pakistan-controlled Kashmir” and Gilgit-Baltistan as the “ Gilgit-Baltistan region” of “Pakistan-controlled Kashmir”.
4.In what was feared by analysts in India as a major departure from this practice, on the night of September 1,2010, the Government-controlled Xinhua news agency disseminated the following report:
China refutes reports of sending troops to Pakistan
BEIJING, Sept. 1 (Xinhua) -- China on Wednesday rejected reports of the presence of over 11,000 Chinese troops in northern Pakistan, saying that such "groundless reports" were made with "ulterior motives."
"We believe the attempts of some people to fabricate stories to provoke China-Pakistan or China-India relations are doomed to fail," said Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu in a statement.
The comment came in response to recent reports of some American and Indian press that China had deployed more than 10,000 troops in the Gilgit-Baltistan region of Pakistan.
5. The next day, during the regular briefing of Bejing-based journalists, including some from India, Jiang Yu reportedly used the expression “northern Pakistan” while referring to Gilgit Baltistan in the context of the article of Selig Harrison. However, this did not find mention in a transcript of the media briefing carried by the web sites of many Chinese diplomatic missions abroad. The text of the relevant extracts from the media briefing transcript is given below:
Q: Can you brief us on the latest developments of China’s assistance to Pakistan’s flood-stricken areas?
A: As Pakistan's close neighbor and all-weather friend, China empathizes with Pakistan for its severe natural disaster. The Chinese Government has offered several installments of humanitarian relief supplies worth more than RMB 100 million. The Chinese People's Liberation Army, the Red Cross Society of China, local governments and Chinese enterprises provided different forms of assistance as well. An international relief team sent by the Chinese Government has arrived in the hardest-hit southern part of Pakistan and set up a mobile hospital which is in operation now.
China has provided sincere and timely assistance to Pakistan without any strings attached. We will continue to offer support as much as we can to Pakistan based on its needs, with a view to helping the Pakistani Government and people to overcome difficulties and rebuild homes.
Q: According to reports, China recently refused to grant a visa to Lieutenant General Jaswal, head of Indian Army’s Northern Command, and the Indian side said the refusal was about the Kashmir issue. Do you have any comment? What’s China’s position over the Kashmir issue? And what’s China’s visa policy towards residents of the Indian-held Kashmir region?
A: Relevant media reports are inconsistent with the facts, as is checked with relevant authorities.
The Kashmir issue is an issue left over by history between India and Pakistan. As a neighboring country and friend to both India and Pakistan, China always holds that the Kashmir issue should be properly handled through dialogue and consultation between India and Pakistan.
China’s visa policy towards the residents of Indian-held Kashmir is consistent and remains unchanged.
6. Under the heading “China Withdraws Reference to Gilgit-Baltistan as “northern Pakistan”, the correspondent of “The Hindu” of Chennai in Bejing reported as follows on September 5: “ A day after India voiced concerns to China over its reference to the disputed Gilgit-Baltistan region as a “ northern part of Pakistan”, the Chinese Government withdrew its statement from its official Xinhua agency as well as from the Foreign Ministry’s web site…..On Saturday ( September 4) the statement appeared to have been removed from the Xinhua’s web site. The link to the statement, headlined “China refutes reports of sending troops to Pakistan”, did not open. The Chinese Foreign Ministry, which in a regular briefing on Thursday (September 2) had repeated the reference to Gilgit-Baltistan as “ a northern part of Pakistan” in response to a question on the presence of Chinese troops, deleted records of both the question and its response from its official transcript, which was posted on its website on Friday (September 3) “
7. “The Hindu” correspondent further reported: “ On Friday (September 3) morning, Indian Ambassador to China, S.Jaishankar, had conveyed New Delhi’s concerns over China’s recent moves in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir in talks with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun. In the talks, Mr.Jaishankar raised questions over the presence of Chinese troops in POK and protested China’s reference to the disputed region as a part of northern Pakistan. Mr.Zhang assured Indian officials that the troops were stationed there only for flood relief work and to provide humanitarian assistance.”
8. The Chinese reference to northern Pakistan could have been the result of the use of a similar expression by Selig Harrison, who had referred to Gilgit-Baltistan as “Himalayan borderlands of northern Pakistan.” It is likely that after the Indian Ambassador protested, the Chinese Foreign Office realized the diplomatic and legal implications of their referring to Gilgit-Baltistan as “ northern Pakistan” and deleted their statement from the web sites of Xinhua and the Foreign Office. But, they could have just deleted the reference to “northern Pakistan” and substituted in its place the name of the area as “Gilgit-Baltistan” and let the modified statement remain on the web sites. Why they deleted the entire statement? A satisfactory answer to this question is not available. However, it is evident that the Chinese, while sticking to the decisions to issue stapled visas to resident of J&K and to assist Pakistan in the development of its infrastructure in Gilgit-Baltistan, are at the same time keen that this issue should not seriously damage China’s relations with India. In this connection, reference is invited to my article dated August 30,2010, titled “Chinese Government, Media Play Down New Friction With India” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers41/paper4008.html
9. As regards Beijing’s contention that their troops were present in the Gilgit-Baltistan region only for humanitarian relief work, the Chinese have made two humanitarian interventions in the area this year. The first was in January last. On January 4, a landslide created a huge artificial lake in the Hunza area, which subsequently burst submerging a large number of villages in the Gojal Tehsil. About 22 KMs of the Karakoram Highway were submerged under water totally disrupting road communications with Xinjiang in China and with the rest of Gilgit-Baltistan. The Pakistan Army was able to go to the assistance of the affected villages only in the downstream area. It was not able to reach the affected villages in the upstream area for want of helicopters. The Pakistan Government appealed to the Chinese for assistance. Workers of the Chinese Red Cross and engineers of the People’s Liberation Army entered the Hunza area for relief. The Xinhua reported as follows: “On January 19, at the request of the Pakistani government, the Chinese side made special arrangements to open the Kunjirap border and facilitate the purchase of relief goods from China and its clearance. The China Road and Bridge Corporation, which is conducting the project of upgradation of the Karakoram Highway, has also provided engineering consultations and equipment to help the Pakistani side to deal with the problem.” The second humanitarian intervention at the request of Islamabad was made after the recent floods. In this connection, reference is invited to my article dated September 2 and titled “INDIA MISSES AN OPPORTUNITY FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN GILGIT-BALTISTAN” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers41/paper4016.html.
10. Reliable source reports say that the Chinese civilian and military personnel, who entered Gilgit-Baltistan for humanitarian relief work are still in the area, but no figures regarding their number are available. The sources say that their number will be in hundreds and not in thousands. Selig Harrison’s information about the presence of over 7,000 Chinese troops is not independently corroborated. There is also no information to indicate that the construction of the railway line from Xinjiang through Gilgit-Baltistan has started. A pre-feasibility study of the project has been done and a fesibility study is to be undertaken.
11. The “Gilgit-Baltistan Tribune” reported as follows on July 10,2010, on the eve of President Asif Ali Zardari’s visit to China: “The proposal for a rail link between landlocked Xinjiang in China’s far west and the Arabian Sea through Pakistan has been under discussion for some years. Chinese companies have apparently completed a pre-feasibility study on a rail project that must cross one of the most challenging terrains in the world. If the two sides take the political decision to go ahead with the project during Zardari’s visit, a consortium of Chinese companies is likely to be constituted to explore in detail the engineering and financial aspects of the project. While the technical aspects of the trans-Karakoram rail link are daunting, there is no denying the Chinese audacity in embracing projects that are grand in conception, challenging in their execution, and consequential in their impact. During the 1970s, long before China had become rich, the People’s Liberation Army had built at great cost the Karakoram highway between Xinjiang and northern Pakistan. The self-assurance of Chinese engineers and the geopolitical ambition of Beijing’s security establishment have grown manifold since. While India’s objections have not had much impact on either China or Pakistan, other developments have cast a shadow over some of the trans-Karakoram projects. The unstable terrain of the Karakorams demands costly upkeep of the highway, repeatedly damaged by landslides and formation of temporary lakes. At the political level, China has been concerned about growing links between Islamist and separatist movements in the Xinjiang province on the one hand and the terrorist safe havens in Pakistan and Afghanistan on the other. As a result, China had to often shut down the Karakoram highway. In recent months, Beijing has been pressing Islamabad to crack down hard on anti-Chinese extremist groups taking shelter on Pakistani soil.”
12. In this connection, please refer to my article on Zardari’s visit of July 11,2010, titled “PAKISTAN AS CHINA’S FORCE-MULTIPLIER AGAINST INDIA” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers40/paper3918.html . In that article, I had assessed the Chinese involvement in infrastructure development in Gilgit-Baltistan as follows:
“Any Indian expectation that as part of the assurance of Prime Minister Wen of caring for India’s core interests and major concerns, China would reverse its policy of helping Pakistan in the development of its railway and road infrastructure in the Gilgit-Baltistan area bordering Xinjiang, which de jure is part of India’s Jammu and Kashmir, and developing the hydro-electric potential in the Gilgit-Baltistan area was belied when the two countries announced the formal signing of more agreements relating to Gilgit-Baltistan during Mr.Zardari’s stay in Beijing. Under Memoranda of Understanding signed by officials of the two Governments during the visit, China will build the 165-km long Jaglot-Skardu road and the 135-km long Thakot-Sazin road. The projects would cost Pakistani Rs 45 billion with 15 per cent financing by Pakistan and 85 per cent by China. Under another MoU to be jointly executed by Chinese company Datang and Norwegian company EBT, 500 MW electricity would be produced through wind power. It is not known whether this will also be in the Gilgit-Baltistan area.
“ Mr.Zardari and the officials accompanying him repeatedly indicated that the Chinese have agreed in principle to co-operate with Pakistan in the construction of a railway line connecting Pakistan with Xinjiang via Gilgit-Baltistan. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang told reporters in response to a question that cooperation for the construction of a railway link between the two countries was for mutual benefit and not directed against any third party. It would appear that details of the project such as arrangements for financing and the alignment of the railway line are yet to be worked out. Mr.Zardari proposed that the Pakistan and China Railways should form a joint consortium for the timely execution of this project.
“ Mr.Zardari once again took up with the Chinese the pending Pakistani proposals for the upgradation of the Gwadar port, the construction of an oil refinery and an airport in Gwadar and the construction of oil/gas pipelines from Gwadar to Xinjiang. While the Chinese have readily responded in a positive manner to various proposals for projects in the Gilgit-Baltistan area, they are still hesitant regarding new projects in the Balochistan area. While they do not anticipate any security problems in the Gilgit-Baltistan area, they are still worried about the security situation in Balochistan.
“ Mr.Zardari’s disappointment over the Chinese hesitation in the Balochistan area became evident in his reported remarks to Prime Minister Wen that Pakistan desired that “China should take maximum benefits from the Gwadar Port.” From this it is evident that while Pakistan is keen for the quick implementation of the Gwadar-related projects, security considerations still inhibit the Chinese response.
“ The agreement in principle for the upgradation of the Karakoram Highway was reportedly reached more than 10 years ago. The Chinese agreed to meet the cost of upgradation on their side and Pakistan on its side. While the Chinese carried out the upgradation on their side ahead of time, the Pakistanis could not find the money for the upgradation on their side. As a result, the execution of the project was delayed and the Chinese ultimately agreed to give a soft loan to Pakistan for this purpose.
“. Pakistan has reached a similar deal wit Iran in respect of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline. While Iran will finance and construct the pipeline on its side, Pakistan has agreed to do so on its side, but it does not have the money. Will the Chinese give the money and help in the pipeline construction in return for a supply of part of the gas from Iran? This is a question which Pakistan has repeatedly raised with Beijing. China has been reluctant so far. According to reliable sources, Mr. Zardari raised this issue once again in Beijing, but there was no positive response from the Chinese.”
13.That position remains unchanged. ( 5-9-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director,Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, September 3, 2010
ATTACKS ON SHIAS IN PAKISTAN, A MESSAGE TO IRAN TOO
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO.674
B.RAMAN
The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ), which is an affiliate of Al Qaeda, have both claimed responsibility for the murderous attacks through suicide bombers on Shia processions during the holy fasting period at Lahore on September 1, 2010, and Quetta on September 3,2010. The Shia procession in Lahore was a normal one with no political significance. The procession in Quetta was in observance of Al Quds Day on the last Friday of the fasting period. Al Quds is the name of the historic mosque in East Jerusalem, which is under Israeli control since 1967. Ever since Israel occupied East Jerusalem in 1967, Muslims all over the world observe the last Friday of the fasting period as Al Quds Day to remind each other that Al Quds is still under the control of Israel.
2. The call for the observance of the last Friday of the fasting period as Al Quds Day was given by Ayatollah Khomeini in a message issued by him to all the Muslims of the world----Shias as well as Sunnis---in August 1979. He said in his message: " I invite Muslims all over the globe to consecrate the last Friday of the holy month of Ramadan as Al-Quds Day and to proclaim the international solidarity of Muslims in support of the legitimate rights of the Muslim people of Palestine. For many years, I have been notifying the Muslims of the danger posed by the usurper Israel which today has intensified its savage attacks against the Palestinian brothers and sisters, and which, in the south of Lebanon in particular, is continually bombing Palestinian homes in the hope of crushing the Palestinian struggle. I ask all the Muslims of the world and the Muslim governments to join together to sever the hand of this usurper and its supporters. I call on all the Muslims of the world to select as Al-Quds Day the last Friday in the holy month of Ramadan - which is itself a determining period and can also be the determiner of the Palestinian people’s fate - and through a ceremony demonstrating the solidarity of Muslims world-wide, announce their support for the legitimate rights of the Muslim people. I ask God Almighty for the victory of the Muslims over the infidels."
3. Thirty-three people, mostly Shias, died in the explosions in Lahore and 55 in Quetta. Attacks on Shias are not unusual in Pakistan, but the attacks this year have been very virulent. In the past the Sunni extremists used to attack the Shias when they were highlighting their sectarian identity. On September 3, they attacked them even when they were highlighting their solidarity with all Muslims---Sunnis and Shias--- in renewing the pledge of the Islamic world not to rest till Al Quds was liberated from Israeli control.
4. Even though the TTP and the LEJ have projected the attacks on the processions as in reprisal for the murder of a Sunni cleric last year allegedly by the Shias, there is another angle to the anti-Shia attacks this year. The fasting period this year has coincided with the proclaimed end of the US military mission in Iraq. Sunni extremists have always held Iran and the Shias responsible for facilitating the US invasion and occupation of Iraq and accused them of collaborating with the US against Saddam Hussein.Ayman al-Zawahiri, the No 2 of Al Qaeda, had in the past accused Iran of stabbing the Ummah in the back by facilitating the US occupation of Iraq.
5. Al Qaeda, the TTP and the LEJ have a common objective in making Iran pay a price for its collaboration with the US in Iraq. In the Islamic world, anti-Shia feelings are the strongest in Pakistan. The loyalty of the Shias of Pakistan to Iran remains strong. In the past, the LEJ had attacked not only Shia targets, but also Iranian targets. It had killed Iranian diplomats and has allegedly been assisting the Jundullah, the Sunni organisation of Iranian Balochistan, which has been fighting against the Iranian regime.
6. The attacks on Shias observing Al Quds Day in Quetta were meant to punish not only the Shias of Pakistan, but also Iran. Generally, Iranian diplomats join Al Quds Day processions in different cities of Pakistan. One should not be surprised if there were some Iranian diplomats in the Quetta procession.
7. The international community has not taken note of the continuing siege of the Shias of the Kurram Agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) by the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. The Shias call Kurram the Pakistani Gaza and have been repeatedly appealing to the international community to end the siege by the Taliban. They accuse the Pakistan Army and its Chief of the Army Staff, Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani of inaction while pretending to act against the two Talibans.
8. The mutual hostility of the Shias and Sunnis of Pakistan towards each other shows no signs of abating. On the contrary, it has been increasing as seen by recent anti-Shia attacks in Karachi, Lahore and Quetta. ( 4-9-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ), which is an affiliate of Al Qaeda, have both claimed responsibility for the murderous attacks through suicide bombers on Shia processions during the holy fasting period at Lahore on September 1, 2010, and Quetta on September 3,2010. The Shia procession in Lahore was a normal one with no political significance. The procession in Quetta was in observance of Al Quds Day on the last Friday of the fasting period. Al Quds is the name of the historic mosque in East Jerusalem, which is under Israeli control since 1967. Ever since Israel occupied East Jerusalem in 1967, Muslims all over the world observe the last Friday of the fasting period as Al Quds Day to remind each other that Al Quds is still under the control of Israel.
2. The call for the observance of the last Friday of the fasting period as Al Quds Day was given by Ayatollah Khomeini in a message issued by him to all the Muslims of the world----Shias as well as Sunnis---in August 1979. He said in his message: " I invite Muslims all over the globe to consecrate the last Friday of the holy month of Ramadan as Al-Quds Day and to proclaim the international solidarity of Muslims in support of the legitimate rights of the Muslim people of Palestine. For many years, I have been notifying the Muslims of the danger posed by the usurper Israel which today has intensified its savage attacks against the Palestinian brothers and sisters, and which, in the south of Lebanon in particular, is continually bombing Palestinian homes in the hope of crushing the Palestinian struggle. I ask all the Muslims of the world and the Muslim governments to join together to sever the hand of this usurper and its supporters. I call on all the Muslims of the world to select as Al-Quds Day the last Friday in the holy month of Ramadan - which is itself a determining period and can also be the determiner of the Palestinian people’s fate - and through a ceremony demonstrating the solidarity of Muslims world-wide, announce their support for the legitimate rights of the Muslim people. I ask God Almighty for the victory of the Muslims over the infidels."
3. Thirty-three people, mostly Shias, died in the explosions in Lahore and 55 in Quetta. Attacks on Shias are not unusual in Pakistan, but the attacks this year have been very virulent. In the past the Sunni extremists used to attack the Shias when they were highlighting their sectarian identity. On September 3, they attacked them even when they were highlighting their solidarity with all Muslims---Sunnis and Shias--- in renewing the pledge of the Islamic world not to rest till Al Quds was liberated from Israeli control.
4. Even though the TTP and the LEJ have projected the attacks on the processions as in reprisal for the murder of a Sunni cleric last year allegedly by the Shias, there is another angle to the anti-Shia attacks this year. The fasting period this year has coincided with the proclaimed end of the US military mission in Iraq. Sunni extremists have always held Iran and the Shias responsible for facilitating the US invasion and occupation of Iraq and accused them of collaborating with the US against Saddam Hussein.Ayman al-Zawahiri, the No 2 of Al Qaeda, had in the past accused Iran of stabbing the Ummah in the back by facilitating the US occupation of Iraq.
5. Al Qaeda, the TTP and the LEJ have a common objective in making Iran pay a price for its collaboration with the US in Iraq. In the Islamic world, anti-Shia feelings are the strongest in Pakistan. The loyalty of the Shias of Pakistan to Iran remains strong. In the past, the LEJ had attacked not only Shia targets, but also Iranian targets. It had killed Iranian diplomats and has allegedly been assisting the Jundullah, the Sunni organisation of Iranian Balochistan, which has been fighting against the Iranian regime.
6. The attacks on Shias observing Al Quds Day in Quetta were meant to punish not only the Shias of Pakistan, but also Iran. Generally, Iranian diplomats join Al Quds Day processions in different cities of Pakistan. One should not be surprised if there were some Iranian diplomats in the Quetta procession.
7. The international community has not taken note of the continuing siege of the Shias of the Kurram Agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) by the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. The Shias call Kurram the Pakistani Gaza and have been repeatedly appealing to the international community to end the siege by the Taliban. They accuse the Pakistan Army and its Chief of the Army Staff, Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani of inaction while pretending to act against the two Talibans.
8. The mutual hostility of the Shias and Sunnis of Pakistan towards each other shows no signs of abating. On the contrary, it has been increasing as seen by recent anti-Shia attacks in Karachi, Lahore and Quetta. ( 4-9-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Thursday, September 2, 2010
MY THOUGHTS ON THE MAOIST HOSTAGE-TAKING IN BIHAR
B.RAMAN
The Maoists of Bihar kidnapped on August 29,2010, Sub-Inspectors Rupesh Kumar and Abhay Prasad Yadav, Bihar Military Police havildar Ehtesham Khan and BMP ASI Lucas Tete after an encounter in the Kajra police station area the same day, which left eight policemen dead. They reportedly demanded the release of eight Maoists who are in the custody of the local authorities for allegedly having been involved in Maoist acts of violence.
2.Following the alleged absence of any move by the Bihar Government to establish contact with them before the deadline indicated by them for talks on their demand expired, they claim to have killed Sub-Inspector Abhay Prasad Yadav. They have not yet provided proof of their claim, but have promised to return Yadav's dead body to the police. They have further extended the deadline till 10 AM on September 3 and threatened to kill the other hostages if their demand is not met,
3.There is considerable indignation and shock over the claimed execution of S.I. Yadav.All TV news channels are devoting considerable attention to a discussion of the development with the participation of representatives of political parties and some retired bureaucrats.Participating in a debate on CNN-IBN anchored by Shri Rajdeep Sardesai, a leading TV anchor, at 9 PM on September 2, I pointed out that the hostage-takers will be watching the debates on different TV channels and any impression of differences as to how to deal with the situation could make a difficult situation even more difficult. I stressed the importance of everyone talking in a single voice in condemning the hostage-takers. I also stressed the importance of the State Government remaining in touch with the families of the hostages in order to keep them in the picture on the evolving situation and reassure them that everything possible was being done to rescue the hostages.
4.We should not forget that the failure of the Government of the then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in December 1999 to remain in touch with the families of the passengers in an Indian Airlines plane hijacked to Kandahar by some terrorists of the Pakistan-backed and Pakistan-based Harkat-ul-Mujahideen led to a surge in protests from the relatives and their public and media supporters. This was one of the factors which forced the Government of Shri Vajpayee to concede the demand of the hijackers for the release of some Pakistani terrorists in the custody of the Government of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K).
5. The Indian TV coverage of the Kandahar hijacking and the Manila TV coverage of a recent hostage-taking incident involving a sacked Filipino police officer on August 23 showed how ill-advised coverage and comments by the participants in the TV discussions could prove counter -productive and lead to a tragedy. There has been considerable criticism in Manila of the TV coverage, with some experts holding it partly responsible for the tragic death of eight of the hostages, who were allegedly killed by the hostage-taker who was losing patience.
6. One has to emphasise the importance of balance in the TV discussions while the hostage-taking situation continues. It would be a good idea for the TV anchors to caution the participants in the beginning of the discussions that the situation is continuing and that they should keep in mind the strong possibility that the hostage-takers will be watching the TV discussions. Leaders of political parties too should caution their media persons deputed to participate in the debates. Retired bureaucrats participating in the debates should also remember that their comments will be closely watched and noted by the hostage-takers.
7. At this stage, when the hostage-taking continues, only some general observations would be in order:
* Firstly, it would be unwise to treat the present incident as an act of desperation of the Maoists. It is more an indicator of their ruthless determination to continue their fight against the Government with no holds barred.
* Secondly, the Maoists' calculation in exploiting the police officers captured during an encounter with the police as hostages has two objectives---to discredit the Government of Bihar in the eyes of the public and to try to drive a wedge between junior and senior police officers and between the police and the political leadership by projecting the senior officers and the political leaders as insensitive to the agony of the relatives.
8. It is important for the crisis managers of the Governments of Bihar and India to keep these factors constantly in view while planning and carrying out their strategy to deal with the situation. Any other comments of a specific nature relating to the handling of the situation would be unwise at this stage.The entire nation should make it clear that it is behind the brave attempts of the security agencies, including the Bihar Police, to rescue the hostages and that it shares the agony of the relatives of the hostages. ( 3-9-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The Maoists of Bihar kidnapped on August 29,2010, Sub-Inspectors Rupesh Kumar and Abhay Prasad Yadav, Bihar Military Police havildar Ehtesham Khan and BMP ASI Lucas Tete after an encounter in the Kajra police station area the same day, which left eight policemen dead. They reportedly demanded the release of eight Maoists who are in the custody of the local authorities for allegedly having been involved in Maoist acts of violence.
2.Following the alleged absence of any move by the Bihar Government to establish contact with them before the deadline indicated by them for talks on their demand expired, they claim to have killed Sub-Inspector Abhay Prasad Yadav. They have not yet provided proof of their claim, but have promised to return Yadav's dead body to the police. They have further extended the deadline till 10 AM on September 3 and threatened to kill the other hostages if their demand is not met,
3.There is considerable indignation and shock over the claimed execution of S.I. Yadav.All TV news channels are devoting considerable attention to a discussion of the development with the participation of representatives of political parties and some retired bureaucrats.Participating in a debate on CNN-IBN anchored by Shri Rajdeep Sardesai, a leading TV anchor, at 9 PM on September 2, I pointed out that the hostage-takers will be watching the debates on different TV channels and any impression of differences as to how to deal with the situation could make a difficult situation even more difficult. I stressed the importance of everyone talking in a single voice in condemning the hostage-takers. I also stressed the importance of the State Government remaining in touch with the families of the hostages in order to keep them in the picture on the evolving situation and reassure them that everything possible was being done to rescue the hostages.
4.We should not forget that the failure of the Government of the then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in December 1999 to remain in touch with the families of the passengers in an Indian Airlines plane hijacked to Kandahar by some terrorists of the Pakistan-backed and Pakistan-based Harkat-ul-Mujahideen led to a surge in protests from the relatives and their public and media supporters. This was one of the factors which forced the Government of Shri Vajpayee to concede the demand of the hijackers for the release of some Pakistani terrorists in the custody of the Government of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K).
5. The Indian TV coverage of the Kandahar hijacking and the Manila TV coverage of a recent hostage-taking incident involving a sacked Filipino police officer on August 23 showed how ill-advised coverage and comments by the participants in the TV discussions could prove counter -productive and lead to a tragedy. There has been considerable criticism in Manila of the TV coverage, with some experts holding it partly responsible for the tragic death of eight of the hostages, who were allegedly killed by the hostage-taker who was losing patience.
6. One has to emphasise the importance of balance in the TV discussions while the hostage-taking situation continues. It would be a good idea for the TV anchors to caution the participants in the beginning of the discussions that the situation is continuing and that they should keep in mind the strong possibility that the hostage-takers will be watching the TV discussions. Leaders of political parties too should caution their media persons deputed to participate in the debates. Retired bureaucrats participating in the debates should also remember that their comments will be closely watched and noted by the hostage-takers.
7. At this stage, when the hostage-taking continues, only some general observations would be in order:
* Firstly, it would be unwise to treat the present incident as an act of desperation of the Maoists. It is more an indicator of their ruthless determination to continue their fight against the Government with no holds barred.
* Secondly, the Maoists' calculation in exploiting the police officers captured during an encounter with the police as hostages has two objectives---to discredit the Government of Bihar in the eyes of the public and to try to drive a wedge between junior and senior police officers and between the police and the political leadership by projecting the senior officers and the political leaders as insensitive to the agony of the relatives.
8. It is important for the crisis managers of the Governments of Bihar and India to keep these factors constantly in view while planning and carrying out their strategy to deal with the situation. Any other comments of a specific nature relating to the handling of the situation would be unwise at this stage.The entire nation should make it clear that it is behind the brave attempts of the security agencies, including the Bihar Police, to rescue the hostages and that it shares the agony of the relatives of the hostages. ( 3-9-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, September 1, 2010
INDIA MISSES AN OPPORTUNITY FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN GILGIT-BALTISTAN
B.RAMAN
The Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) area of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) was one of the first and worst to be affected by the floods caused by the recent monsoon and breaches of dams and water reservoirs in Pakistan. The damages spread from there to other parts of Pakistan. The devastation caused by flash floods in GB preceded that in Ladakh and was even worse. Finding that the Pakistan Government was unable and unwilling ----because of the floods in other areas--- to come to the help of the people of GB, local nationalist organizations sent out SOS messages to India and the other members of the international community to help them. These messages started coming in from the second week of August.
2. In a direct appeal to the international community, Mr. Abdul Hamid Khan of the Balawaristan National Front of GB stated as follows: “52 people have died and 160 rendered homeless in the village Qamrah of occupied Gilgit Baltistan region, and 22 have died, 40 rendered homeless in village Talas, 45 died and 70 injured in Giyes of Diamar. Similarly, in Talas 22 people were killed and 40 houses destroyed while in Hotoo, Rondu, Darel, Tangir, Botogah, Khinar, Thor, Hoodoor,Babusar, Gini, Hunza Nagir, Chhamoogardh Colony of Konodas and Skarkooi, Gilgit, Ghowadi Baltistan, Yasen, Gulaper, Isshqaman, Damas, Ginday, Sandhi, Hondoor, Dahrkoot, Mastuj, Booni, Garam Chashma, Yarkhoon in Chitral, and Koli and Pattan in Kohistan over 500 people have lost their lives whereas, more than half a million have become homeless and nearly 50,000 families have completely lost everything, including land, shelter, livestock and all means of living". I had referred to this message in my article dated August 26,2010, titled “SOS from Khyber Pakhtunkwa, Balochistan & Gilgit-Baltistan” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers40/paper4000.html
3. In a statement disseminated from Skardu, Mr.Manzoor Hussain Parwana, the Chairman of the Gilgit-Baltistan United Movement (GBUM) demanded that the Indian aid coming for relief victims should also be shared with the people of Gilgit Baltistan. He also demanded that the Kargil-Skardu and the Astore-Srinagar roads should be opened immediately to provide relief to the local people. He requested the international community to play a greater role in providing relief to the flood victims of GB. He said: “The region is cut off from the rest of the world for the last 20 days due to flashfloods and landslides. Commodity and food prices have skyrocketed and causing famine like situation. Many villages have been flattened. Lack of medicines has caused endemic diseases in the region. GB is a disputed territory under Pakistani administration. The people of GB have no hope from the Pakistani Government since the country itself is in crisis and the regime lacks the capacity and the will to provide for the millions of flood victims in the rest of the country. While the rulers look towards the international community for help, the relief is coming at much slower pace due to lack of credibility of the Pakistani authorities, who embezzled billions of rupees of relief funds during the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir. Given the circumstances, the international community and especially neighbouring countries have to enhance their direct influence in the relief work."
4. He further said that the current puppet government of GB had failed to repair the road network. “Every village is cut off from the rest and no relief has reached the affectees. Government has resorted to releasing statements in the newspapers and made false claims of improvement in the conditions of the natives. With the closure of the Karakoram Highway (KKH), the Gilgit-Skardu Road, the Ghizer-Chitral road, and the Hunza-China section of the KKH, the prices of food items have increased. Food items, kerosene and gasoline are not available in the markets. The problems will continue to increase as the situation worsens. Pakistani helicopters are only working to evacuate the foreigners and military officials and related loved ones, and have failed to service the poor natives. This is sheer discrimination towards the people of GB. Pakistan has conspired to disrupt traffic on the Kargil-Skardu road and the Astore-Gurez road for all these years. Further, the creation of the Ataabad Lake has obstructed traffic to China for the coming months. Under these circumstances, the Government must make immediate effort to open the Kargil-Skardu road to provide relief to the affected people of Skardu district, Shigar district, Gangche district, Kharmang district, Astore district and Deosai-Gultari district. In the same manner, the Ishkoman road to Tajikistan and Wakhan should be opened to benefit the people of Ghizer district. The road from Astore to Srinagar must be used immediately to supply food and ration to the poor two million people of the region. In this great time of need, the people of GB expect neighbors to play a greater role in rehabilitation."
5. In a statement to the media on August 16, Chief Minister Mehdi Shah of GB said that the situation in GB was worsening due to a breakdown of road network and civic facilities in the region. "It is beyond the capacity of the Gilgit-Baltistan government to cope with the situation." He said that he had requested the Federal Government to provide Rs10 billion for the rehabilitation and compensation of the affected people. According to him, the area had been cut off from the rest of the country for the last one month as the Karakoram Highway, which was the lifeline for the region, was totally damaged. Work for its restoration has been started but it will take a considerable time to restore traffic. Fuel and essential commodities had been running out of stock in the region and the Government was supplying it through the Kaghan-Naran road.
6.The desperate SOS messages from the people and nationalist elements in GB were not noticed in New Delhi. The Government of India did not refer to the plight of the people of GB while announcing its offer of the first instalment of assistance amounting to US $ five million for flood relief in Pakistan. Nor has it made a reference to the plight of the people of GB, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkwa while making its offer of the second instalment of US $ 20 million on August 31. It did not even issue a statement expressing its sympathy and solidarity with the people of GB. During his visit to the flood-affected areas in Ladakh, Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh could have made a statement saying that his heart went out to the people of GB, many of whom are related to people in our Kargil area. Such thoughts never occur to him.
7. We were lethargic, negligent and insensitive in our response. Look at what the Chinese did. They mobilized their disaster relief machinery in Xinjiang and Sichuan. They set up a special facility in the Kashgar area of Xinjiang to rush to the aid of the affected people in Baltistan. They brought in the Chinese Red Cross to oversee the flow of assistance. Relief material in the form of food articles, water purification plants, mineral water bottles and medicines were rushed across to Baltistan. The engineers of the PLA were mobilized and sent into GB to repair the damages caused to the KKH and other roads and to restore electricity which totally failed in the entire GB region.
8 Admitted that we could not have done all this even if we had wanted to. Pakistan permitted the Chinese to do this and was happy to hand over the responsibility for disaster relief in GB to the Chinese. There was panic in Islamabad that taking advantage of the collapse of the administration in GB, India might make a humanitarian intervention of its own on the ground that GB is Indian territory. It urged the Chinese to do a humanitarian intervention in GB. They were happy to do it. We missed an opportunity to make a humanitarian intervention of our own. We did not even open our mouth on the plight of the people of GB.Can we blame Beijing if the people of the area start looking up to China?
9. This may also be read as my comments on the recent article in the “New York Times” by Selig Harrison on Pakistan handing over de facto control of parts of GB to the Chinese. ( 2-9-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) area of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) was one of the first and worst to be affected by the floods caused by the recent monsoon and breaches of dams and water reservoirs in Pakistan. The damages spread from there to other parts of Pakistan. The devastation caused by flash floods in GB preceded that in Ladakh and was even worse. Finding that the Pakistan Government was unable and unwilling ----because of the floods in other areas--- to come to the help of the people of GB, local nationalist organizations sent out SOS messages to India and the other members of the international community to help them. These messages started coming in from the second week of August.
2. In a direct appeal to the international community, Mr. Abdul Hamid Khan of the Balawaristan National Front of GB stated as follows: “52 people have died and 160 rendered homeless in the village Qamrah of occupied Gilgit Baltistan region, and 22 have died, 40 rendered homeless in village Talas, 45 died and 70 injured in Giyes of Diamar. Similarly, in Talas 22 people were killed and 40 houses destroyed while in Hotoo, Rondu, Darel, Tangir, Botogah, Khinar, Thor, Hoodoor,Babusar, Gini, Hunza Nagir, Chhamoogardh Colony of Konodas and Skarkooi, Gilgit, Ghowadi Baltistan, Yasen, Gulaper, Isshqaman, Damas, Ginday, Sandhi, Hondoor, Dahrkoot, Mastuj, Booni, Garam Chashma, Yarkhoon in Chitral, and Koli and Pattan in Kohistan over 500 people have lost their lives whereas, more than half a million have become homeless and nearly 50,000 families have completely lost everything, including land, shelter, livestock and all means of living". I had referred to this message in my article dated August 26,2010, titled “SOS from Khyber Pakhtunkwa, Balochistan & Gilgit-Baltistan” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers40/paper4000.html
3. In a statement disseminated from Skardu, Mr.Manzoor Hussain Parwana, the Chairman of the Gilgit-Baltistan United Movement (GBUM) demanded that the Indian aid coming for relief victims should also be shared with the people of Gilgit Baltistan. He also demanded that the Kargil-Skardu and the Astore-Srinagar roads should be opened immediately to provide relief to the local people. He requested the international community to play a greater role in providing relief to the flood victims of GB. He said: “The region is cut off from the rest of the world for the last 20 days due to flashfloods and landslides. Commodity and food prices have skyrocketed and causing famine like situation. Many villages have been flattened. Lack of medicines has caused endemic diseases in the region. GB is a disputed territory under Pakistani administration. The people of GB have no hope from the Pakistani Government since the country itself is in crisis and the regime lacks the capacity and the will to provide for the millions of flood victims in the rest of the country. While the rulers look towards the international community for help, the relief is coming at much slower pace due to lack of credibility of the Pakistani authorities, who embezzled billions of rupees of relief funds during the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir. Given the circumstances, the international community and especially neighbouring countries have to enhance their direct influence in the relief work."
4. He further said that the current puppet government of GB had failed to repair the road network. “Every village is cut off from the rest and no relief has reached the affectees. Government has resorted to releasing statements in the newspapers and made false claims of improvement in the conditions of the natives. With the closure of the Karakoram Highway (KKH), the Gilgit-Skardu Road, the Ghizer-Chitral road, and the Hunza-China section of the KKH, the prices of food items have increased. Food items, kerosene and gasoline are not available in the markets. The problems will continue to increase as the situation worsens. Pakistani helicopters are only working to evacuate the foreigners and military officials and related loved ones, and have failed to service the poor natives. This is sheer discrimination towards the people of GB. Pakistan has conspired to disrupt traffic on the Kargil-Skardu road and the Astore-Gurez road for all these years. Further, the creation of the Ataabad Lake has obstructed traffic to China for the coming months. Under these circumstances, the Government must make immediate effort to open the Kargil-Skardu road to provide relief to the affected people of Skardu district, Shigar district, Gangche district, Kharmang district, Astore district and Deosai-Gultari district. In the same manner, the Ishkoman road to Tajikistan and Wakhan should be opened to benefit the people of Ghizer district. The road from Astore to Srinagar must be used immediately to supply food and ration to the poor two million people of the region. In this great time of need, the people of GB expect neighbors to play a greater role in rehabilitation."
5. In a statement to the media on August 16, Chief Minister Mehdi Shah of GB said that the situation in GB was worsening due to a breakdown of road network and civic facilities in the region. "It is beyond the capacity of the Gilgit-Baltistan government to cope with the situation." He said that he had requested the Federal Government to provide Rs10 billion for the rehabilitation and compensation of the affected people. According to him, the area had been cut off from the rest of the country for the last one month as the Karakoram Highway, which was the lifeline for the region, was totally damaged. Work for its restoration has been started but it will take a considerable time to restore traffic. Fuel and essential commodities had been running out of stock in the region and the Government was supplying it through the Kaghan-Naran road.
6.The desperate SOS messages from the people and nationalist elements in GB were not noticed in New Delhi. The Government of India did not refer to the plight of the people of GB while announcing its offer of the first instalment of assistance amounting to US $ five million for flood relief in Pakistan. Nor has it made a reference to the plight of the people of GB, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkwa while making its offer of the second instalment of US $ 20 million on August 31. It did not even issue a statement expressing its sympathy and solidarity with the people of GB. During his visit to the flood-affected areas in Ladakh, Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh could have made a statement saying that his heart went out to the people of GB, many of whom are related to people in our Kargil area. Such thoughts never occur to him.
7. We were lethargic, negligent and insensitive in our response. Look at what the Chinese did. They mobilized their disaster relief machinery in Xinjiang and Sichuan. They set up a special facility in the Kashgar area of Xinjiang to rush to the aid of the affected people in Baltistan. They brought in the Chinese Red Cross to oversee the flow of assistance. Relief material in the form of food articles, water purification plants, mineral water bottles and medicines were rushed across to Baltistan. The engineers of the PLA were mobilized and sent into GB to repair the damages caused to the KKH and other roads and to restore electricity which totally failed in the entire GB region.
8 Admitted that we could not have done all this even if we had wanted to. Pakistan permitted the Chinese to do this and was happy to hand over the responsibility for disaster relief in GB to the Chinese. There was panic in Islamabad that taking advantage of the collapse of the administration in GB, India might make a humanitarian intervention of its own on the ground that GB is Indian territory. It urged the Chinese to do a humanitarian intervention in GB. They were happy to do it. We missed an opportunity to make a humanitarian intervention of our own. We did not even open our mouth on the plight of the people of GB.Can we blame Beijing if the people of the area start looking up to China?
9. This may also be read as my comments on the recent article in the “New York Times” by Selig Harrison on Pakistan handing over de facto control of parts of GB to the Chinese. ( 2-9-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, August 31, 2010
A CHINESE CALL FOR NAVAL TRUST-BUILDING IN ASIA
B.RAMAN
At a time when there is already concern over the increasing assertiveness of the Chinese Navy in the South and East China Seas, the first port call by two ships of the Chinese Navy in Myanmar while on their way back from anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf has aroused considerable interest and some concern in the neighbouring countries.
2.China has a long history of army-army cooperation with Myanmar, including a militaery supply relationship. It has also been helping Myanmar in building an oil/gas terminal at Kyaukpu off the Arakan coast. The new port, when completed, will place three modern ports at the disposal of China----the other two being Gwadar on the Mekran coast of Pakistan and Hambantota in Sri Lanka. The Bangladesh Government is interested in securing Chinese assistance for the modernisation of the Chittagong port.
3.Till now, the Chinese authorities and the Governments of Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Bangladesh have projected these ports as purely commercial ventures with no naval significance. Only Pakistan makes no secret of the significance of Gwadar for the navies of Pakistan and China. It hopes that a modern naval base at Gwadar will give the Pakistan Navy a strategic depth by reducing its dependence on the Karachi port, which is vulnerable to attacks by the Indian Navy. It is prepared to offer the proposed naval base at Gwadar to the Chinese Navy for use by its naval ships visiting the Indian Ocean and the Gulf.
4.Some retired Chinese naval officers are of the view that a viable Indian Ocean fleet for their navy would require forward bases in this area. How to acquire such bases without adding to the alarm of the US, which is already talking of the Chinese assertiveness in the Indian Ocean area as Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, did during his recent visit to New Delhi? The Chinese have not yet openly reacted to his comments though they reacted quickly and vehemently to the comments of Mrs.Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, on the Chinese naval assertiveness in the South China Sea at the recent Asean Regional Forum meeting at Hanoi.
5.The US view of the Chinese intentions in the Indian Ocean are still confused despite the lucid remarks of Admiral Mullen. While he was clear and forthcoming, Ms.Michele Flournoy, the US Under-Secretary of Defence, was not that forthcoming during her visit to Delhi in the third week of August to prepare for the forthcoming visit of Shri A.K.Antony, our Defence Minister, to the US. She avoided any reference to the Chinese activities in the Indian Ocean area.
6.Her remarks could be interpreted as discouraging any Indian expectation of major Indo-US naval co-operation against Chinese forays into the Indian Ocean as one of the possible results of the forthcoming visit of President Barack Obama to New Delhi coming November. She reportedly told the Indian media on August 10: " There has been tremendous progress in the number of joint exercises, but the need is to make them meaningful so that they are reflective of the real world situation....The exercises must prepare both sides to jointly undertake counter-piracy operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. We also have to respond to maritime security and freedom of navigation against those contesting the accepted rules of the world. We will have to work to prevent that. We have to be prepared in terms of capability."
7.The visit of the two Chinese naval ships to the Yangon port in Myanmar must have been under preparation for some time and could not have been the Chinese way of reacting to the pronouncements of US officials while visiting New Delhi. At the same time, the port call in Myanmar proclaims openly the beginning of Chinese activism, if not assertiveness, in the Indian Ocean region.
8.The Chinese have taken note of the speculation in India and elsewhere as to what the port visit portends. Is it an innocent halt while returning home from the Gulf or does it have a strategic significance? Is it meant to convey a message to the US and the Indian Navies that China has core interests in the Indian Ocean too as it has in the South and East China Seas? This subject should figure in the agenda of the forthcoming talks with Mr.Obama when he visits New Delhi.
9.To calm any frenzied speculation over the Chinese intention, the Party-owned "Global Times", in an editoriial on September 1, has proposed a naval trust-building exercise among the Asian navies. The text of the editorial is annexed.
10.This may pleae be read in continuation of my article dated July 24,2010, titled MONITORING CHINA'S NAVAL ASSERTIVENESS at
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers40%5Cpaper3944.html and article dated August 10,2010, titled "CHINA: A Wake-Up Call for Vietnam & India" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers40%5Cpaper3974.html (1-9-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE ( Editorial carried by the "Global Times" on September 1,2010)
Asian navies should trust each other
The Chinese navy's first-ever port call to Myanmar on Sunday (August 29) has triggered plenty of noise and speculation in India.
The Indian press aligns Myanmar with Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, where they believe China has helped build port facilities, and conclude that the neighboring giant is aimed at building a "string of pearls" for greater space on the Indian Ocean - long considered India's backyard.
Just like the strong reactions from Japan when China's warships made their way through the first island chain into the Pacific Ocean, every step the fledgling power makes to test its wings has been met with suspicion.
The biggest fear, as some foreign strategists asserted, is that China may flex its muscles from one ocean to another, and eventually become a frightening superpower cruising around the world's blue waters.
What a grand picture these strategists are drawing. Some amateur military "experts" will jump into the air over the slightest mention of such an ambitious plan.
The reality of the situation is much less exciting than their fantasies.
Only two escort ships back from their missions to protect Chinese trade fleets from piracy in waters off the Somali coast visited Myanmar. On the way home, the escort group made port calls to Egypt, Italy and Greece.
Conspiracy theories aside, China's navy has been growing stronger over the past few years, and has been reaching places it has never reached before.
Not surprisingly, Japan, South Korea, India and some Southeast Asian countries are concerned.
These countries should be more concerned about the US, the only real super power, which could cause trouble by stoking feelings of discontent.
China has to pay attention to the concerns arising naturally from its neighbors in Asia.
A stronger Chinese navy does not necessarily mean a threat, but an additional peace-keeping force, as is shown in the gulf of Aden.
The fear aimed at the Chinese navy is a dangerous result of neighboring countries' suspicion and mistrust over China's rise.
The process to resolve this mistrust is the same process to resolve the "China threat" theory.
A lack of communications has built up this mistrust and misjudgment.
The Chinese government may try to establish a communication mechanism between navies in Asia.
Only through the better exchange of ideas and explanations can the other countries fully understand the Chinese navy's willingness to cooperate instead of compete.
Asia's navies should not repeat history in the Atlantic Ocean where world powers tried to use their naval powers to conquer each other.
At a time when there is already concern over the increasing assertiveness of the Chinese Navy in the South and East China Seas, the first port call by two ships of the Chinese Navy in Myanmar while on their way back from anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf has aroused considerable interest and some concern in the neighbouring countries.
2.China has a long history of army-army cooperation with Myanmar, including a militaery supply relationship. It has also been helping Myanmar in building an oil/gas terminal at Kyaukpu off the Arakan coast. The new port, when completed, will place three modern ports at the disposal of China----the other two being Gwadar on the Mekran coast of Pakistan and Hambantota in Sri Lanka. The Bangladesh Government is interested in securing Chinese assistance for the modernisation of the Chittagong port.
3.Till now, the Chinese authorities and the Governments of Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Bangladesh have projected these ports as purely commercial ventures with no naval significance. Only Pakistan makes no secret of the significance of Gwadar for the navies of Pakistan and China. It hopes that a modern naval base at Gwadar will give the Pakistan Navy a strategic depth by reducing its dependence on the Karachi port, which is vulnerable to attacks by the Indian Navy. It is prepared to offer the proposed naval base at Gwadar to the Chinese Navy for use by its naval ships visiting the Indian Ocean and the Gulf.
4.Some retired Chinese naval officers are of the view that a viable Indian Ocean fleet for their navy would require forward bases in this area. How to acquire such bases without adding to the alarm of the US, which is already talking of the Chinese assertiveness in the Indian Ocean area as Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, did during his recent visit to New Delhi? The Chinese have not yet openly reacted to his comments though they reacted quickly and vehemently to the comments of Mrs.Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, on the Chinese naval assertiveness in the South China Sea at the recent Asean Regional Forum meeting at Hanoi.
5.The US view of the Chinese intentions in the Indian Ocean are still confused despite the lucid remarks of Admiral Mullen. While he was clear and forthcoming, Ms.Michele Flournoy, the US Under-Secretary of Defence, was not that forthcoming during her visit to Delhi in the third week of August to prepare for the forthcoming visit of Shri A.K.Antony, our Defence Minister, to the US. She avoided any reference to the Chinese activities in the Indian Ocean area.
6.Her remarks could be interpreted as discouraging any Indian expectation of major Indo-US naval co-operation against Chinese forays into the Indian Ocean as one of the possible results of the forthcoming visit of President Barack Obama to New Delhi coming November. She reportedly told the Indian media on August 10: " There has been tremendous progress in the number of joint exercises, but the need is to make them meaningful so that they are reflective of the real world situation....The exercises must prepare both sides to jointly undertake counter-piracy operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. We also have to respond to maritime security and freedom of navigation against those contesting the accepted rules of the world. We will have to work to prevent that. We have to be prepared in terms of capability."
7.The visit of the two Chinese naval ships to the Yangon port in Myanmar must have been under preparation for some time and could not have been the Chinese way of reacting to the pronouncements of US officials while visiting New Delhi. At the same time, the port call in Myanmar proclaims openly the beginning of Chinese activism, if not assertiveness, in the Indian Ocean region.
8.The Chinese have taken note of the speculation in India and elsewhere as to what the port visit portends. Is it an innocent halt while returning home from the Gulf or does it have a strategic significance? Is it meant to convey a message to the US and the Indian Navies that China has core interests in the Indian Ocean too as it has in the South and East China Seas? This subject should figure in the agenda of the forthcoming talks with Mr.Obama when he visits New Delhi.
9.To calm any frenzied speculation over the Chinese intention, the Party-owned "Global Times", in an editoriial on September 1, has proposed a naval trust-building exercise among the Asian navies. The text of the editorial is annexed.
10.This may pleae be read in continuation of my article dated July 24,2010, titled MONITORING CHINA'S NAVAL ASSERTIVENESS at
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers40%5Cpaper3944.html and article dated August 10,2010, titled "CHINA: A Wake-Up Call for Vietnam & India" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers40%5Cpaper3974.html (1-9-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE ( Editorial carried by the "Global Times" on September 1,2010)
Asian navies should trust each other
The Chinese navy's first-ever port call to Myanmar on Sunday (August 29) has triggered plenty of noise and speculation in India.
The Indian press aligns Myanmar with Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, where they believe China has helped build port facilities, and conclude that the neighboring giant is aimed at building a "string of pearls" for greater space on the Indian Ocean - long considered India's backyard.
Just like the strong reactions from Japan when China's warships made their way through the first island chain into the Pacific Ocean, every step the fledgling power makes to test its wings has been met with suspicion.
The biggest fear, as some foreign strategists asserted, is that China may flex its muscles from one ocean to another, and eventually become a frightening superpower cruising around the world's blue waters.
What a grand picture these strategists are drawing. Some amateur military "experts" will jump into the air over the slightest mention of such an ambitious plan.
The reality of the situation is much less exciting than their fantasies.
Only two escort ships back from their missions to protect Chinese trade fleets from piracy in waters off the Somali coast visited Myanmar. On the way home, the escort group made port calls to Egypt, Italy and Greece.
Conspiracy theories aside, China's navy has been growing stronger over the past few years, and has been reaching places it has never reached before.
Not surprisingly, Japan, South Korea, India and some Southeast Asian countries are concerned.
These countries should be more concerned about the US, the only real super power, which could cause trouble by stoking feelings of discontent.
China has to pay attention to the concerns arising naturally from its neighbors in Asia.
A stronger Chinese navy does not necessarily mean a threat, but an additional peace-keeping force, as is shown in the gulf of Aden.
The fear aimed at the Chinese navy is a dangerous result of neighboring countries' suspicion and mistrust over China's rise.
The process to resolve this mistrust is the same process to resolve the "China threat" theory.
A lack of communications has built up this mistrust and misjudgment.
The Chinese government may try to establish a communication mechanism between navies in Asia.
Only through the better exchange of ideas and explanations can the other countries fully understand the Chinese navy's willingness to cooperate instead of compete.
Asia's navies should not repeat history in the Atlantic Ocean where world powers tried to use their naval powers to conquer each other.
VISIT OF KIM JONG-IL TO CHINA---AN ASSESSMENT
B.RAMAN
Kim Jong-il, General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and Chairman of North Korea’s National Defense Commission, visited China from August 26 to 30,2010. This is his second visit to China this year. He had earlier visited China in May last. Underlining the significance of the visit, the "China Daily" said in an article: "Never before has Kim paid two visits abroad within a year."
2. The visit by train was first detected by the South Korean intelligence and reported by the South Korean media. Western news agencies picked up news of the visit from the South Korean media. The Chinese and North Korean authorities and the Government/party controlled media of the two countries maintained silence on the visit till the morning of August 30. On the morning of August 30, the Chinese media for the first time commented on the reports carried by the South Korean and Western media on the visit without confirming that he was in China. The confirmation came later that day on the Chinese Central TV after he had returned to North Korea. The TV reported that President Hu Jintao had met Kim Jong-il in Changchun, the capital of the Jilin province, on August 27. It carried visuals of the meeting between the two leaders and a report on a banquet hosted by Mr.Hu in honour of the North Korean leader.
3. Kim's visit was confined to Jilin and Heilongjiang, where he visited several agricultural and industrial establishments---- reportedly in order to learn from the Chinese experience in the modernisation of its economy. In this connection, the Chinese media referred to a visit earlier made by him ----without saying when--- to Vietnam to learn from its experience in modernisation. Kim visited a food processing factory, a high-speed train factory and an elementary school in Jilin where his father, the late Kim Sung-Il, had studied in the 1920s.
4. The "China Daily" reported on August 31 that during the talks with Kim President Hu emphasized that it was a basic experience of China's reform over the past three decades that economic development called for self-dependence but cannot be achieved without cooperating with the outside world. Hu reportedly said:”This is the inevitable path of the times that accelerates the development of a country.” According to Piao Jianyi, chief of the Center of Korean Peninsula Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Kim indicated that North Korea's development will be closely connected with cooperation with China. Piao was of the view that a major party meeting next month in Pyongyang might take important decisions concerning development, probably by drawing inspiration from China's experience.
5. Chinese analysts feel that an important objective of the visit was probably to brief the Chinese leadership on North Korean plans for launching a drive for the modernisation of the North Korean economy. Would that drive be as ambitious as that of China? Would North Korea open up to the outside world---particularly to the West--- as significantly as China had done post-1978? Or would the expected North Korean modernisation and opening-up be in North Korean colours----more gradual with continuing suspicion of the outside world? The answers to these questions are not yet available. They are unlikely to be available in adequate measure even after the coming party meeting next month. North Korea's evolution into a modern economy would most probably come about slowly and almost imperceptibly. There are no indications as yet that its leadership has overcome its paranoia of the West----particularly the US.
6. The second objective was to brief the Chinese leaders about what Kim called "the rising generation" and to reassure Beijing that the expected generational changes would not affect North Korean bonds with China. Kim was quoted as having stated as follows at the banquet hosted by President Hu: "With the international situation remaining complicated, it is our important historical mission to hand over to the rising generation the baton of the traditional friendship passed over by the revolutionary forerunners of the two countries as a precious asset so as to carry it forward through generations."
7. This strengthened speculation that at the party meeting next month Kim might officially indicate his plans for his succession which might involve the elevation of his youngest Swiss-educated son (27 years old) Kim Jong-Un. Why did Kim feel the need to reassure the Chinese that the "rising generation" will be as close to China as the present generation and the preceding one of his father? Was his visit to the Chinese school which his father had attended meant to emphasise the close links of his family with China and calm possible Chinese misgivings about the impact of the Swiss upbringing of Kim Jong-Un on future North Korean policies?
8. The third objective was to discuss with the Chinese leadership a possible return of North Korea to the six-party talks on its nuclear programme and the sequel to the sinking of a South Korean naval ship allegedly by North Korea in March last. The Xinhua news agency reported that Kim told Hu that North Korea remained committed to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and that it "is not willing to see tensions on the peninsula." According to Xinhua, Kim said he wished to maintain close communication and coordination with China in pushing for an early resumption of the Six-Party Talks to ease the tension on the Korean Peninsula, and to maintain peace and stability there. It quoted Hu as telling Kim that maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula accorded with the common aspiration of the people, and China respected and supported positive efforts made by North Korea to ease the situation. The North Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), however, made no mention of the remarks attributed to Kim by Xinhua.
9. Despite these remarks, Chinese analysts are not optimistic about the chances of an early resumption of the Six-Party talks. The “China Daily” has quoted Zhang Liangui, Professor of international strategic research at the Central Party School, as saying as follows: "The US and the DRPK have different expectations on the talks. While the US seeks denuclearization of the peninsula, the DPRK wants to get the UN sanctions on it lifted.”
10. Chinese analysts described as a surprise Kim’s leaving Pyongyang for China when former US President Jimmy Carter was visiting the North Korean capital to secure the release of an American, Aijalon Mahli Gomes, who was sentenced in April to eight years in jail for entering the country illegally. Lü Chao, Director of the North and South Korea Research Center at the Liaoning Academy of Social Sciences, said in an interview: "Carter has a good reputation in North Korea. Kim has met him before. But perhaps Kim missed this meeting on purpose to show his toughness and send a message that it will not bow to US pressure after a series of military drills between the US and South Korea."
11. Two interesting editorials carried by the Party-owned “Global Times” on the visit on August 30 and 31 are annexed. ( 31-8-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE (“ Global Times” editorials)
North Korea's reform and opening-up ( published on August 31,2010)
The fact that North Korean leader Kim Jong-il visited China last week was finally confirmed by the two governments Monday.
Although foreign media continues to speculate about Kim's "succession plan" and whether he brought his son along, there are signs that the North Korean leader is showing an increasing interest in the economy.
In his two visits within about a three-month span, Kim visited a number of cities that are on the frontier of China's booming market economy.
Earlier, he also visited Vietnam, and inspected Russian cities that were undergoing social transformations.
This points to North Korea having a strong interest in opening up and developing its economy. In fact, the country has made several experimental attempts in the past decade or two, including setting up a special economic zone and conducting currency reform.
It is hard to imagine that any country wants to stay poor and isolated. The international community should not marginalize North Korea out of prejudice.
China's rising economy is taking place just across a river from North Korea. There is no reason the North Korean leadership is not willing to learn from China.
Kim Jong-il's latest visit shows his attention to the economy has been growing.
The outside world complains that North Korea has shut itself in. But, they may think otherwise when they consider the existence of a South Korea-US alliance, and the fact that the media in South Korea, the US and Japan have been openly discussing how to overthrow the North's rule.
The West always sees North Korea as one of the world's major threats. But how could a country like North Korea be strong enough to launch a "suicide attack" against them?
Living in the shadows of South Korea, Japan and the US, North Korea has to wrap itself up tighter in order to fend off military threats, and threats of political and cultural infiltration.
North Korea's opening-up will help relieve tensions in Northeast Asia. But, the knot does not only lie on the North's side. Other countries in this region must redouble their efforts to untangle the knot.
These three nations should not bully North Korea any more. China should also try hard to pull North Korea out of its international turmoil.
If the US does not cooperate, South Korea and Japan will have to reconsider their roles. Do they really want to be trapped in a knot made tighter by the US?
China-North Korea's stable relationship ( published on August 30,2010)
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il has become a hot topic in international news media over the past few days, as they speculate about Kim's "secret" trip to northeastern China, and his political mission.
With anonymous sources saying that Kim met with Chinese President Hu Jintao, and Kim likely asked Beijing to concur with North Korea's long-anticipated leadership change, Western media has also been trying to illustrate a "special" relationship between the two countries.
Actually, in today's China, the media seldom uses the word "special" to describe the two countries' relations. It does not necessarily mean China is deliberately shunning the long historical ties the two countries share.
Beijing has long made it clear that it aims to keep the peace on the Korean Peninsula via a normal China-North Korea relationship.
North Korea has become a marginalized member of Northeast Asia. When China, South Korea and Japan compete with each other and become further involved with each other's economies, the North is like a forgotten island.
Many in China have begun to complain that the isolated North Korea brings too much trouble for China in international relations, and the two countries' relationship should not go back to a "special" status.
However, as a result of historical and geopolitical reasons, the current China-North Korea relationship is not a simple one. This also explains why Kim Jong-il visits China frequently.
Every coin has two sides. The China-North Korea relationship gives other interested countries too much hope of bringing North Korea back to the negotiation table over the North's nuclear weapons program.
The other countries unrealistically expect China has a strong hand to teach its little brother a lesson when it gets naughty.
Perhaps they do not know that North Korea has a strong mind to make its own decisions. Also, China's diplomatic principle is to not interfere with another country's internal affairs.
However, North Korea is an active variable in Northeast Asia, and keeping a stable relationship with it will give China an edge in taking the initiative in international affairs in this region.
The seeming trouble made by North Korea is actually a reflection of Cold War mentalities that separate the Korean Peninsula into the North and the South, and the US has a big part in the region's confusion.
China is not a passive player in Northeast Asia. A stable relationship with North Korea does not mean China has to be an enemy of Japan, South Korea or the US.
As long as China carefully balances international relations in this region, the China-North Korea relationship will not become a negative factor, but a positive boost toward Northeast Asia's peace and prosperity.
China will continue to encourage and help North Korea open up to the world, which will be conducive to the peace in Northeast Asia.
Kim Jong-il, General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and Chairman of North Korea’s National Defense Commission, visited China from August 26 to 30,2010. This is his second visit to China this year. He had earlier visited China in May last. Underlining the significance of the visit, the "China Daily" said in an article: "Never before has Kim paid two visits abroad within a year."
2. The visit by train was first detected by the South Korean intelligence and reported by the South Korean media. Western news agencies picked up news of the visit from the South Korean media. The Chinese and North Korean authorities and the Government/party controlled media of the two countries maintained silence on the visit till the morning of August 30. On the morning of August 30, the Chinese media for the first time commented on the reports carried by the South Korean and Western media on the visit without confirming that he was in China. The confirmation came later that day on the Chinese Central TV after he had returned to North Korea. The TV reported that President Hu Jintao had met Kim Jong-il in Changchun, the capital of the Jilin province, on August 27. It carried visuals of the meeting between the two leaders and a report on a banquet hosted by Mr.Hu in honour of the North Korean leader.
3. Kim's visit was confined to Jilin and Heilongjiang, where he visited several agricultural and industrial establishments---- reportedly in order to learn from the Chinese experience in the modernisation of its economy. In this connection, the Chinese media referred to a visit earlier made by him ----without saying when--- to Vietnam to learn from its experience in modernisation. Kim visited a food processing factory, a high-speed train factory and an elementary school in Jilin where his father, the late Kim Sung-Il, had studied in the 1920s.
4. The "China Daily" reported on August 31 that during the talks with Kim President Hu emphasized that it was a basic experience of China's reform over the past three decades that economic development called for self-dependence but cannot be achieved without cooperating with the outside world. Hu reportedly said:”This is the inevitable path of the times that accelerates the development of a country.” According to Piao Jianyi, chief of the Center of Korean Peninsula Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Kim indicated that North Korea's development will be closely connected with cooperation with China. Piao was of the view that a major party meeting next month in Pyongyang might take important decisions concerning development, probably by drawing inspiration from China's experience.
5. Chinese analysts feel that an important objective of the visit was probably to brief the Chinese leadership on North Korean plans for launching a drive for the modernisation of the North Korean economy. Would that drive be as ambitious as that of China? Would North Korea open up to the outside world---particularly to the West--- as significantly as China had done post-1978? Or would the expected North Korean modernisation and opening-up be in North Korean colours----more gradual with continuing suspicion of the outside world? The answers to these questions are not yet available. They are unlikely to be available in adequate measure even after the coming party meeting next month. North Korea's evolution into a modern economy would most probably come about slowly and almost imperceptibly. There are no indications as yet that its leadership has overcome its paranoia of the West----particularly the US.
6. The second objective was to brief the Chinese leaders about what Kim called "the rising generation" and to reassure Beijing that the expected generational changes would not affect North Korean bonds with China. Kim was quoted as having stated as follows at the banquet hosted by President Hu: "With the international situation remaining complicated, it is our important historical mission to hand over to the rising generation the baton of the traditional friendship passed over by the revolutionary forerunners of the two countries as a precious asset so as to carry it forward through generations."
7. This strengthened speculation that at the party meeting next month Kim might officially indicate his plans for his succession which might involve the elevation of his youngest Swiss-educated son (27 years old) Kim Jong-Un. Why did Kim feel the need to reassure the Chinese that the "rising generation" will be as close to China as the present generation and the preceding one of his father? Was his visit to the Chinese school which his father had attended meant to emphasise the close links of his family with China and calm possible Chinese misgivings about the impact of the Swiss upbringing of Kim Jong-Un on future North Korean policies?
8. The third objective was to discuss with the Chinese leadership a possible return of North Korea to the six-party talks on its nuclear programme and the sequel to the sinking of a South Korean naval ship allegedly by North Korea in March last. The Xinhua news agency reported that Kim told Hu that North Korea remained committed to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and that it "is not willing to see tensions on the peninsula." According to Xinhua, Kim said he wished to maintain close communication and coordination with China in pushing for an early resumption of the Six-Party Talks to ease the tension on the Korean Peninsula, and to maintain peace and stability there. It quoted Hu as telling Kim that maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula accorded with the common aspiration of the people, and China respected and supported positive efforts made by North Korea to ease the situation. The North Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), however, made no mention of the remarks attributed to Kim by Xinhua.
9. Despite these remarks, Chinese analysts are not optimistic about the chances of an early resumption of the Six-Party talks. The “China Daily” has quoted Zhang Liangui, Professor of international strategic research at the Central Party School, as saying as follows: "The US and the DRPK have different expectations on the talks. While the US seeks denuclearization of the peninsula, the DPRK wants to get the UN sanctions on it lifted.”
10. Chinese analysts described as a surprise Kim’s leaving Pyongyang for China when former US President Jimmy Carter was visiting the North Korean capital to secure the release of an American, Aijalon Mahli Gomes, who was sentenced in April to eight years in jail for entering the country illegally. Lü Chao, Director of the North and South Korea Research Center at the Liaoning Academy of Social Sciences, said in an interview: "Carter has a good reputation in North Korea. Kim has met him before. But perhaps Kim missed this meeting on purpose to show his toughness and send a message that it will not bow to US pressure after a series of military drills between the US and South Korea."
11. Two interesting editorials carried by the Party-owned “Global Times” on the visit on August 30 and 31 are annexed. ( 31-8-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE (“ Global Times” editorials)
North Korea's reform and opening-up ( published on August 31,2010)
The fact that North Korean leader Kim Jong-il visited China last week was finally confirmed by the two governments Monday.
Although foreign media continues to speculate about Kim's "succession plan" and whether he brought his son along, there are signs that the North Korean leader is showing an increasing interest in the economy.
In his two visits within about a three-month span, Kim visited a number of cities that are on the frontier of China's booming market economy.
Earlier, he also visited Vietnam, and inspected Russian cities that were undergoing social transformations.
This points to North Korea having a strong interest in opening up and developing its economy. In fact, the country has made several experimental attempts in the past decade or two, including setting up a special economic zone and conducting currency reform.
It is hard to imagine that any country wants to stay poor and isolated. The international community should not marginalize North Korea out of prejudice.
China's rising economy is taking place just across a river from North Korea. There is no reason the North Korean leadership is not willing to learn from China.
Kim Jong-il's latest visit shows his attention to the economy has been growing.
The outside world complains that North Korea has shut itself in. But, they may think otherwise when they consider the existence of a South Korea-US alliance, and the fact that the media in South Korea, the US and Japan have been openly discussing how to overthrow the North's rule.
The West always sees North Korea as one of the world's major threats. But how could a country like North Korea be strong enough to launch a "suicide attack" against them?
Living in the shadows of South Korea, Japan and the US, North Korea has to wrap itself up tighter in order to fend off military threats, and threats of political and cultural infiltration.
North Korea's opening-up will help relieve tensions in Northeast Asia. But, the knot does not only lie on the North's side. Other countries in this region must redouble their efforts to untangle the knot.
These three nations should not bully North Korea any more. China should also try hard to pull North Korea out of its international turmoil.
If the US does not cooperate, South Korea and Japan will have to reconsider their roles. Do they really want to be trapped in a knot made tighter by the US?
China-North Korea's stable relationship ( published on August 30,2010)
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il has become a hot topic in international news media over the past few days, as they speculate about Kim's "secret" trip to northeastern China, and his political mission.
With anonymous sources saying that Kim met with Chinese President Hu Jintao, and Kim likely asked Beijing to concur with North Korea's long-anticipated leadership change, Western media has also been trying to illustrate a "special" relationship between the two countries.
Actually, in today's China, the media seldom uses the word "special" to describe the two countries' relations. It does not necessarily mean China is deliberately shunning the long historical ties the two countries share.
Beijing has long made it clear that it aims to keep the peace on the Korean Peninsula via a normal China-North Korea relationship.
North Korea has become a marginalized member of Northeast Asia. When China, South Korea and Japan compete with each other and become further involved with each other's economies, the North is like a forgotten island.
Many in China have begun to complain that the isolated North Korea brings too much trouble for China in international relations, and the two countries' relationship should not go back to a "special" status.
However, as a result of historical and geopolitical reasons, the current China-North Korea relationship is not a simple one. This also explains why Kim Jong-il visits China frequently.
Every coin has two sides. The China-North Korea relationship gives other interested countries too much hope of bringing North Korea back to the negotiation table over the North's nuclear weapons program.
The other countries unrealistically expect China has a strong hand to teach its little brother a lesson when it gets naughty.
Perhaps they do not know that North Korea has a strong mind to make its own decisions. Also, China's diplomatic principle is to not interfere with another country's internal affairs.
However, North Korea is an active variable in Northeast Asia, and keeping a stable relationship with it will give China an edge in taking the initiative in international affairs in this region.
The seeming trouble made by North Korea is actually a reflection of Cold War mentalities that separate the Korean Peninsula into the North and the South, and the US has a big part in the region's confusion.
China is not a passive player in Northeast Asia. A stable relationship with North Korea does not mean China has to be an enemy of Japan, South Korea or the US.
As long as China carefully balances international relations in this region, the China-North Korea relationship will not become a negative factor, but a positive boost toward Northeast Asia's peace and prosperity.
China will continue to encourage and help North Korea open up to the world, which will be conducive to the peace in Northeast Asia.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)