B.RAMAN
The facts of the tragedy in Manila on August 23,2010, which led to the death of eight tourists from Hong Kong due to the irrational behaviour of a dismissed Manila police officer as reported by the Agence France Presse (AFP) are as follows: Eight Hong Kong tourists were killed when police stormed a bus that had been commandeered 12 hours earlier by a disgraced ex-police officer demanding he get his job back. Seven other Hong Kong tourists were injured. One of them is still in a critical condition more than 12 hours after the bloody rescue attempt while the others sustained only slight injuries.The ordeal began when the suspect, armed with an M-16 assault rifle and dressed in combat pants, hijacked the bus with 25 people aboard in Manila's tourist district. He later freed seven Hong Kong tourists and two Filipinos. But negotiations broke down after nightfall when the gunman, former senior police inspector Rolando Mendoza, began shooting and commandos were forced to storm the bus, firing dozens of bullets of their own into the vehicle. The Filipino driver escaped just before the shooting.
2. The incident was telecast live by many TV channels of the world. We were thus able to see what was happening.Certain important points about the incident need to be underlined:
* First, it was not an act of terrorism. It was a criminal act committed by a recently dismissed police officer who had been rendered irrational by the dismissal. He was acting alone.
* Second, his grievances were purely personal. He just wanted his job back.
* Third, he took his victims hostage in a bus which was halted in the middle of the road.He was in a position to see all that was happening around the bus through the bus windows. As a result, the advantage of stealth in operational planning and execution was denied to the police. A similar thing happened during the Munich massacre of 1972 by some Palestinian terrorists and during the 26/11 terrorist strike in Mumbai. In Munich and Mumbai, the live telecasting of the security movements by TV channels enabled the hostage-takers to see what the police and other security agencies were doing. In Manila, his location inside a bus enabled the hostage-taker to see what was happening around him. The most important requisite in an operation against hostage-taking is operational stealth. This requirement was denied to the police and other security agencies in Munich, Mumbai and Manila by circumstances beyond their control.As a result, all these three incidents resulted in tragedies of various proportions.
* Four, the fact that the hostage-taker was writing out his demands on pieces of paper and pasting them on the windows for the police outside to read indicates that the communication set of the bus driver with his control station or the mobile hand-sets of the police and the hostage-taker were not being used throghout the incident. It is not known why. When the negotiators communicate with a hostage-taker orally it has a better impact than when they communicate with written notes. Persuasion is possible. It was reported that the brother of the hostage-taker and other relatives did try to persuade him----unsuccessfully--- to surrender. One does not know how they did so--- orally throgh mobile handsets or in writing,.
* Five, it has been reported that as a result of the negotiations, the hostage-taker did release nine passengers because of their age and health. This might have enabled the police to make a forcible entry into the bus by taking advantage of the opening of the door to allow these persons come out. Why they could not use this opportunity? It is not clear.
* Six, the bus was so air tight that the police had difficulty in making an opening through a sledge-hammer. After plane hijackings started, aircraft are so designed as to enable forcible and stealth entry by the special intervention forces. Buses are not so designed.The police have no way of making a forcible entry except by breaking the glasses in the full view of the hostage-taker.
* Seven, the police apparently prolonged the negotiations till nighfall hoping this would make some stealth movement possible. But, unforunately, the bus under the control of the hostage-taker was in a brightly-lit area of Manila and the police had not got the electricity to that area switched off before launching their attack on the bus.
* Eight, a basic principle in dealing with hostage-taking situations is, do not concede the demand of the hostage-taker. This could create more such incidents. In this case, some flexibility in the adherence to this principle was called for. The police could have tactically conceded the demand of the hostage-taker by agreeing to reinstate him and then sacked him again after he had released the passengers. A rigid adherence to the principle was unwise. Why the police did not consider this alternative?
3. The Filipino authorities would be making a detailed enquiry into the deficiencies, if any, in the handling of the situation and drawing lessons for the future. To prevent such incidents during the forthcoming Commonwealth Games in New Delhi, the Government of India should immediately send a joint team consisting of senior officers of the Intelligence Bureau, the Research & Analysis Wing, the National Security Guards and the Delhi Police to Manila for detailed discussions with their Filipino counterparts so that the lessons drawn by them could be incorporated into the security planning for the Delhi games. One can envisage two kinds of situations:
* Firstly, hijacking a normal bus or vehicle used by the public. It will be difficult to make anti-hijacking changes in them.
* Secondly, hijacking of buses used by the participants in the Games. Would it be possible at this late stage to provide them with remote control mrchanism for opening the doors from outside?
4. The Chinese authorities, who would be organising the Asian Games in November,2010, should also draw appropriate lessons and incorporate them in their security planning. We should also have an exchange of notes with the Chinese security agencies on how to prevent such incidents during the Commonwealth and Asian Games. (24-8-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, August 23, 2010
INDIAN MUSLIMS IN AL QAEDA'S SOMALI AFFILIATE?
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO.672
B.RAMAN
According to Garowe Online, a Somali news web site, some members of Al-Shabaab, the Somali associate of Al Qaeda, were killed during an accidental explosion on August 20,2010, in a house in the Hawl-Wadaag district of Mogadishu, where members of Al-Shabaab were preparing two explosive-laden vehicles for use as car bombs. The news web site claimed that the house belonged to Sheikh Mukhtar Robow Abu Mansoor, the deputy leader of Al-Shabaab.It was not clear whether he was present in the house at the time of the explosion and, if so, what happened to him. It did not give details of those killed except to say that there were both foreigners and Somalis.
2. Citing “security sources”, the local Ministry of Information and Radio Mogadishu reported on August 21 that at least 10 persons were killed in the accidental explosion-----three Pakistanis, two Indians, one Afghan, one Algerian, and two Somalis including a cleric who was in charge of praying for suicide bombers before they were dispatched. They did not indicate the nationality of the 10th person.Nor did they identify the Indians and Pakistanis killed or say as to how the security sources established that they were Indians and Pakistanis. Al- Shabaab has not so far admitted that the killed persons belonged to it. The local authorities claim to have established that the cleric killed in the explosion was Awais Abu Yusuf, a local Imam.
3.The Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) of Pakistan has been quite active in Somalia since the early 1990s. Despite a local ban on its activities, persons recruited by it in Pakistan have been visiting Somalia for religious preaching. The Somali authorities suspected that the TJ was in touch with local Wahabi/fundamentalist elements and that Pakistani jihadi organizations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Harkat-ul—Mujahideen (HUM) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) were active in the local Muslim community under the cover of TJ volunteers. Maulana Masood Azhar, the Amir of the JEM, had spent some months in Somalia in the 1990s when he was a member of the HUM. Al-Shabaab is believed to have a small component of Pakistani volunteers.
4. No Indian Muslim component of the organization had come to notice in the past. Till 2003, there were about 200 Bohra Muslims from India working in Somalia in the business of textiles dyeing. Many of them have since re-settled in Mombasa in Kenya. They had not come to notice for any association with extremist elements. If it is established that Al-Shabaab has a component of Indian origin, its members are likely to have been recruited either from the Indian Muslim diaspora in East Africa or the UK. In the past, there were instances of individual Indian Muslims from the diaspora in the UK either gravitating towards Al Qaeda or its associates or being influenced by its ideology. So far, there has been no confirmed instance of India-based Muslims joining Al Qaeda or pro-Al Qaeda organizations such as Al-Shabaab.
5. Indian intelligence and investigative agencies should seek more information from the local authorities in Mogadishu. This may please be read in continuation of my article dated July 13,2010, titled "KAMPALA BLASTS: Indian Casualties?" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers40%5Cpaper3922.html and article of December 4,2009, titled "The Somali Front of the Global Jihad" available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers36/paper3534.html. (23-8-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
According to Garowe Online, a Somali news web site, some members of Al-Shabaab, the Somali associate of Al Qaeda, were killed during an accidental explosion on August 20,2010, in a house in the Hawl-Wadaag district of Mogadishu, where members of Al-Shabaab were preparing two explosive-laden vehicles for use as car bombs. The news web site claimed that the house belonged to Sheikh Mukhtar Robow Abu Mansoor, the deputy leader of Al-Shabaab.It was not clear whether he was present in the house at the time of the explosion and, if so, what happened to him. It did not give details of those killed except to say that there were both foreigners and Somalis.
2. Citing “security sources”, the local Ministry of Information and Radio Mogadishu reported on August 21 that at least 10 persons were killed in the accidental explosion-----three Pakistanis, two Indians, one Afghan, one Algerian, and two Somalis including a cleric who was in charge of praying for suicide bombers before they were dispatched. They did not indicate the nationality of the 10th person.Nor did they identify the Indians and Pakistanis killed or say as to how the security sources established that they were Indians and Pakistanis. Al- Shabaab has not so far admitted that the killed persons belonged to it. The local authorities claim to have established that the cleric killed in the explosion was Awais Abu Yusuf, a local Imam.
3.The Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) of Pakistan has been quite active in Somalia since the early 1990s. Despite a local ban on its activities, persons recruited by it in Pakistan have been visiting Somalia for religious preaching. The Somali authorities suspected that the TJ was in touch with local Wahabi/fundamentalist elements and that Pakistani jihadi organizations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Harkat-ul—Mujahideen (HUM) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) were active in the local Muslim community under the cover of TJ volunteers. Maulana Masood Azhar, the Amir of the JEM, had spent some months in Somalia in the 1990s when he was a member of the HUM. Al-Shabaab is believed to have a small component of Pakistani volunteers.
4. No Indian Muslim component of the organization had come to notice in the past. Till 2003, there were about 200 Bohra Muslims from India working in Somalia in the business of textiles dyeing. Many of them have since re-settled in Mombasa in Kenya. They had not come to notice for any association with extremist elements. If it is established that Al-Shabaab has a component of Indian origin, its members are likely to have been recruited either from the Indian Muslim diaspora in East Africa or the UK. In the past, there were instances of individual Indian Muslims from the diaspora in the UK either gravitating towards Al Qaeda or its associates or being influenced by its ideology. So far, there has been no confirmed instance of India-based Muslims joining Al Qaeda or pro-Al Qaeda organizations such as Al-Shabaab.
5. Indian intelligence and investigative agencies should seek more information from the local authorities in Mogadishu. This may please be read in continuation of my article dated July 13,2010, titled "KAMPALA BLASTS: Indian Casualties?" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers40%5Cpaper3922.html and article of December 4,2009, titled "The Somali Front of the Global Jihad" available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers36/paper3534.html. (23-8-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Sunday, August 22, 2010
PAK FLOODS: DAMAGES EXAGGERATED BY ISLAMABAD TO GET MORE AID?
B.RAMAN
The Pakistani floods, which have reached Sindh, have inundated vast areas and caused considerable devastation. In the initial stages of the floods, its was the Khyber Pakhtunkwa, the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Balochistan which bore the brunt of the damages, but the latest figures after the floods reached Sindh show that materially Sindh has suffered more than the other provinces, but in terms of fatalities, Khyber Pakhtunkwa continues to have been the worst affected.
2. According to damage estimates dated August 19,2010, of the Federal Flood Commission, the fatalities were as follows: Khyber Pakhtunkwa --- 1067 (1068) ; Gilgit Baltistan -- 183, Punjab 103 ; FATA --64 ;Sindh -- 44 (50) and Balochistan -- 24. The figures within brackets are those given by the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA). While the Federal Flood Commission has not mentioned any fatalities in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), the NDMA has said there were 69 fatalities in the POK.
3.The Federal Flood Commission has estimated the material damages as follows:
• Out of the 6.378 million people affected in the country, 2.45 million belong to Sindh, 1.9 million to Punjab, 1.56 million to Khyber Pakhtunkwa, 476,845 to Balochistan and 87,000 to Gilgit-Baltistan. ( My comment: Originally, the Government of Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani had claimed that about 20 million people had been affected by the floods. It has now come down to 6.378 million people, one third of the initial estimates. The international aid pledges made so far were on the estimate that about 20 million people had been affected as claimed by the Pakistani Government. This has turned out to have been a highly exaggerated estimate )
• Of the 10,963 affected villages, 4,295 are located in Sindh, 3,132 in Punjab, 2,584 in Balochistan, 581 in Khyber Pakhtunkwa and 371 in Gilgit-Baltistan.
• The cropped area inundated in Sindh is 1.552 million acres, Punjab 1.471 million acres, Balochistan 630,705 acres, Khyber Pakhtunkwa 466,626 acres, FATA 6,500 acres and Gilgit-Baltistan 9,000 acres. The total cropped areas damaged countrywide is 4.135 million acres.
• At least 211,375 houses have been destroyed or damaged in Sindh, 178,493 in Khyber Pakhtunkwa, 91,210 in Punjab, 75,261 in Balochistan, 2,820 in Gilgit-Baltistan, 1,432 in FATA and 1,481 in POK. The total number of houses destroyed or damaged is 567,461.
• Of the 274,692 houses destroyed, 108,279 were in Khyber Pakhtunkwa, 75,261 in Balochistan, 44,752 in Punjab and 40,667 in Sindh.
• The livestock losses are also the highest in Sindh where over 126,200 cattle head have been killed. Balochistan has lost at least 17,926 cattle head, Khyber Pakhtunkwa 8,438, Gilgit-Baltistan 4,669, Punjab 748, AJK 400 and FATA 15.
4.Based on the original figures of nearly 20 million people affected, the UN had estimated the immediate aid requirements of Pakistan for relief purposes as US $ 460 million. The dramatic projection of the damages suffered by Pakistan by the UN Secretary-General Mr.Ban Ki-moon, the US authorities and Mr.Shah Mehmood Quereshi, the Pakistani Foreign Minister, at the special session of the UN General Assembly on August 19 had resulted in pledges worth nearly US $ 800 million----the major pledges being US $ 150 million from the US and US $ 100 million each from the UK and Saudi Arabia. Only China, which apparently suspected that the Pakistani authorities were exaggerating the estimate of the damages suffered, refrained from increasing its pledge beyond the initial amount of US $ 10 million.
5. While many Governments and the UN Secretary-General let themselves be moved by the dramatic account of the damages painted by Pakistan, non-Governmental organisations and individual donors apparently suspected that there was an element of exaggeration in the accounts disseminated by Pakistan abroad. This was one of the factors responsible for their poor contributions.
6. The “Dawn” of Karachi wrote on August 22: “A mix of reasons were being given for the world’s sluggish response to the calamity. These ranged from a corrupt image of the government to being a supporter of Taliban. British Prime Minister Cameron’s terror export remarks reinforced this perception and made donation collection more difficult. …..Going through the hostile remarks posted on various websites seeking comments on assisting Pakistan floods reveals that there is hardly any friend of Pakistan in the outside world. “Governments are giving donations because of the geopolitical considerations, some multinationals are also donating after being encouraged by different capitals, but Pakistan clearly lacks public sympathy, which is crucial for generating funds,” a Western diplomat commented.
7. The Government of India has done well to make a contribution of US $ five million as a mark of solidarity with the victims of the floods, which the Pakistani authorities have accepted after some delay. Shri Salman Haider, former Foreign Secretary, has circulated an appeal on behalf of the so-called Balusa group with which the ill-tempered and ill-behaved Pakistani Foreign Minister used to be associated, asking the Indian public to donate generously for the flood relief in Pakistan. Well-wishers of the Pashtuns, Sindhis, Balochs and the Kashmiris of Gilgit Baltistan should appeal to the people to donate instead to India-friendly organizations in Khyber Pakhtunkwa,Sindh, Balochistan and Gilgit Baltistan for use in flood relief.(22-8-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The Pakistani floods, which have reached Sindh, have inundated vast areas and caused considerable devastation. In the initial stages of the floods, its was the Khyber Pakhtunkwa, the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Balochistan which bore the brunt of the damages, but the latest figures after the floods reached Sindh show that materially Sindh has suffered more than the other provinces, but in terms of fatalities, Khyber Pakhtunkwa continues to have been the worst affected.
2. According to damage estimates dated August 19,2010, of the Federal Flood Commission, the fatalities were as follows: Khyber Pakhtunkwa --- 1067 (1068) ; Gilgit Baltistan -- 183, Punjab 103 ; FATA --64 ;Sindh -- 44 (50) and Balochistan -- 24. The figures within brackets are those given by the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA). While the Federal Flood Commission has not mentioned any fatalities in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), the NDMA has said there were 69 fatalities in the POK.
3.The Federal Flood Commission has estimated the material damages as follows:
• Out of the 6.378 million people affected in the country, 2.45 million belong to Sindh, 1.9 million to Punjab, 1.56 million to Khyber Pakhtunkwa, 476,845 to Balochistan and 87,000 to Gilgit-Baltistan. ( My comment: Originally, the Government of Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani had claimed that about 20 million people had been affected by the floods. It has now come down to 6.378 million people, one third of the initial estimates. The international aid pledges made so far were on the estimate that about 20 million people had been affected as claimed by the Pakistani Government. This has turned out to have been a highly exaggerated estimate )
• Of the 10,963 affected villages, 4,295 are located in Sindh, 3,132 in Punjab, 2,584 in Balochistan, 581 in Khyber Pakhtunkwa and 371 in Gilgit-Baltistan.
• The cropped area inundated in Sindh is 1.552 million acres, Punjab 1.471 million acres, Balochistan 630,705 acres, Khyber Pakhtunkwa 466,626 acres, FATA 6,500 acres and Gilgit-Baltistan 9,000 acres. The total cropped areas damaged countrywide is 4.135 million acres.
• At least 211,375 houses have been destroyed or damaged in Sindh, 178,493 in Khyber Pakhtunkwa, 91,210 in Punjab, 75,261 in Balochistan, 2,820 in Gilgit-Baltistan, 1,432 in FATA and 1,481 in POK. The total number of houses destroyed or damaged is 567,461.
• Of the 274,692 houses destroyed, 108,279 were in Khyber Pakhtunkwa, 75,261 in Balochistan, 44,752 in Punjab and 40,667 in Sindh.
• The livestock losses are also the highest in Sindh where over 126,200 cattle head have been killed. Balochistan has lost at least 17,926 cattle head, Khyber Pakhtunkwa 8,438, Gilgit-Baltistan 4,669, Punjab 748, AJK 400 and FATA 15.
4.Based on the original figures of nearly 20 million people affected, the UN had estimated the immediate aid requirements of Pakistan for relief purposes as US $ 460 million. The dramatic projection of the damages suffered by Pakistan by the UN Secretary-General Mr.Ban Ki-moon, the US authorities and Mr.Shah Mehmood Quereshi, the Pakistani Foreign Minister, at the special session of the UN General Assembly on August 19 had resulted in pledges worth nearly US $ 800 million----the major pledges being US $ 150 million from the US and US $ 100 million each from the UK and Saudi Arabia. Only China, which apparently suspected that the Pakistani authorities were exaggerating the estimate of the damages suffered, refrained from increasing its pledge beyond the initial amount of US $ 10 million.
5. While many Governments and the UN Secretary-General let themselves be moved by the dramatic account of the damages painted by Pakistan, non-Governmental organisations and individual donors apparently suspected that there was an element of exaggeration in the accounts disseminated by Pakistan abroad. This was one of the factors responsible for their poor contributions.
6. The “Dawn” of Karachi wrote on August 22: “A mix of reasons were being given for the world’s sluggish response to the calamity. These ranged from a corrupt image of the government to being a supporter of Taliban. British Prime Minister Cameron’s terror export remarks reinforced this perception and made donation collection more difficult. …..Going through the hostile remarks posted on various websites seeking comments on assisting Pakistan floods reveals that there is hardly any friend of Pakistan in the outside world. “Governments are giving donations because of the geopolitical considerations, some multinationals are also donating after being encouraged by different capitals, but Pakistan clearly lacks public sympathy, which is crucial for generating funds,” a Western diplomat commented.
7. The Government of India has done well to make a contribution of US $ five million as a mark of solidarity with the victims of the floods, which the Pakistani authorities have accepted after some delay. Shri Salman Haider, former Foreign Secretary, has circulated an appeal on behalf of the so-called Balusa group with which the ill-tempered and ill-behaved Pakistani Foreign Minister used to be associated, asking the Indian public to donate generously for the flood relief in Pakistan. Well-wishers of the Pashtuns, Sindhis, Balochs and the Kashmiris of Gilgit Baltistan should appeal to the people to donate instead to India-friendly organizations in Khyber Pakhtunkwa,Sindh, Balochistan and Gilgit Baltistan for use in flood relief.(22-8-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Saturday, August 21, 2010
ASSOCIATE DALAI LAMA WITH REVIVED NALANDA UNIVERSITY
B.RAMAN
China is reported to have conveyed to the Government of India through diplomatic channels its unhappiness over a courtesy call made by His Holiness the Dalai Lama on Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at New Delhi on August 11,2010. It is not known how the Chinese came to know of this courtesy call since it was not publicised by the Government of India. The Government-controlled media in China has not yet reported about this.
2. After the publication by sections of the Indian media on August 19 about the meeting and the Chinese protest, Kalon Tenpa Tsering, the Tibetan leader’s representative in New Delhi, confirmed the meeting between the two leaders, in an interview to the Voice of Tibet Radio.
3. This is not the first time the Chinese had protested over a courtesy call by His Holiness on an Indian Prime Minister. Mr.Li Peng, the then Chinese Prime Minister, had protested to Mr.Narasimha Rao, the then Indian Prime Minister, in the early 1990s on the same subject. In that case, Mr.Rao himself had taken the initiative to inform Mr.Li Peng beforehand of the proposed courtesy call by His Holiness. Despite this, Mr.Li Peng objected to the meeting.
4. There is no need for us to be defensive or apologetic about meetings between HIs Holiness and senior Indian leaders and officials---- either for courtesy purposes or for discussing the problems of the Tibetans in India and elswhere. His Holiness has been an honoured guest of the Govt. of India and has the right to meet anybody he wants. There is no need to keep these meetings a secret. Similarly, the Prime Minister and other Indian personalities should not hesitate to return the courtesy calls of His Holiness.
5. Apart from being the leader of the Tibetan people all over the world, including those in China, His Holiness is also an important and highly respected leader of Buddhists all over the world. It is unfortunate that in misplaced deference to the sensitivities of China and Singapore, the Government of India has chosen not to associate His Holiness with the proposed joint project with Singapore for the revival of the fifth century Nalanda University. How can there be any project for the revival of the University without His Holiness being associated with it as a guide, adviser and well-wisher? The historic links between India and Tibet should be an important subject in its curriculum. If Singapore is not prepared to be associated with the project if His Holiness is to be associated with it, so be it. We should not allow China or Singapore to dictate to us in this matter .
6. China has ignored our sensitivities and core interests relating to Jammu & Kashmir, Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. Why should we pay attention to its sensitivities in matters relating to His Holiness and his Tibetan people? Our recognition of Tibet as a part of China should not mean our silence on all matters relating to His Holiness and the Tibetan people. This has to be made clear through appropriate actions and policies. ( 22-8-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
China is reported to have conveyed to the Government of India through diplomatic channels its unhappiness over a courtesy call made by His Holiness the Dalai Lama on Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at New Delhi on August 11,2010. It is not known how the Chinese came to know of this courtesy call since it was not publicised by the Government of India. The Government-controlled media in China has not yet reported about this.
2. After the publication by sections of the Indian media on August 19 about the meeting and the Chinese protest, Kalon Tenpa Tsering, the Tibetan leader’s representative in New Delhi, confirmed the meeting between the two leaders, in an interview to the Voice of Tibet Radio.
3. This is not the first time the Chinese had protested over a courtesy call by His Holiness on an Indian Prime Minister. Mr.Li Peng, the then Chinese Prime Minister, had protested to Mr.Narasimha Rao, the then Indian Prime Minister, in the early 1990s on the same subject. In that case, Mr.Rao himself had taken the initiative to inform Mr.Li Peng beforehand of the proposed courtesy call by His Holiness. Despite this, Mr.Li Peng objected to the meeting.
4. There is no need for us to be defensive or apologetic about meetings between HIs Holiness and senior Indian leaders and officials---- either for courtesy purposes or for discussing the problems of the Tibetans in India and elswhere. His Holiness has been an honoured guest of the Govt. of India and has the right to meet anybody he wants. There is no need to keep these meetings a secret. Similarly, the Prime Minister and other Indian personalities should not hesitate to return the courtesy calls of His Holiness.
5. Apart from being the leader of the Tibetan people all over the world, including those in China, His Holiness is also an important and highly respected leader of Buddhists all over the world. It is unfortunate that in misplaced deference to the sensitivities of China and Singapore, the Government of India has chosen not to associate His Holiness with the proposed joint project with Singapore for the revival of the fifth century Nalanda University. How can there be any project for the revival of the University without His Holiness being associated with it as a guide, adviser and well-wisher? The historic links between India and Tibet should be an important subject in its curriculum. If Singapore is not prepared to be associated with the project if His Holiness is to be associated with it, so be it. We should not allow China or Singapore to dictate to us in this matter .
6. China has ignored our sensitivities and core interests relating to Jammu & Kashmir, Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. Why should we pay attention to its sensitivities in matters relating to His Holiness and his Tibetan people? Our recognition of Tibet as a part of China should not mean our silence on all matters relating to His Holiness and the Tibetan people. This has to be made clear through appropriate actions and policies. ( 22-8-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, August 20, 2010
PAK FLOODS: IMPACT ON FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.671
B.RAMAN
It has been difficult to estimate the damage suffered by Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the various Punjabi terrorist organizations as a result of the floods in Pakistan. They must have suffered damages because many of their training camps were located in areas which are under water. North Waziristan, where the bases of Al Qaeda, the TTP, the Haqqani network, the 313 Brigade of Ilyas Kashmiri, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) are located is one of the affected areas in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
2.One could see that the Afghan Taliban, which operates from the Quetta area of Balochistan, has not been much affected. It has maintained its operations in Afghanistan even after the deluge. The operational difficulties of the NATO forces in Afghanistan could increase because the destruction of many roads and bridges could slow down the movement of logistic supplies to the NATO forces from the Karachi port.
3.The fact that even in the midst of the floods, the Pakistan Army has maintained a high level of air activity against the TTP in the Orakzai and Khurram Agencies of the FATA in retaliation for attacks by the TTP indicates that the terrorists continue to be active in these two agencies despite the floods. According to the Associated Press of Pakistan ( August 20 ), at least seven terrorists were killed and seven others injured when the security forces retaliated after an attack on a security checkpost in the Tapoo area of the Orakzai Agency in which one officer of the security forces was killed and another injured. The Army carried out an air strike on the hideouts of terrorists in the Wasti Kurram and Chinarak areas of the Kurram Agency. The floods have not affected the operations of the Drones (pilotless strike planes) of the USA’s Central Intelligence Agency. The success rate could, however, come down since the floods are likely to affect the movements of human agents and their ability to communicate with their handling officers.
4.The Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) and the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) have also joined the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD), the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) in the collection of funds for flood relief and in organizing relief. They have extended their fund collection activities to all big cities, including Karachi. Taking note of international concerns over the activities of these organizations, which are all banned in the US and under decisions of the anti-terrorism monitoring committee of the UN Security Council, Mr.Rehman Malik, the Interior Minister, has ostensibly ordered the police and the security agencies to stop their activities, but his orders are not being complied with. Some of the large flow of funds for flood relief from Wahabi charity organisations in Saudi Arabia could go to these organisations and, ultimately, through them to Al Qaeda.
5.As a result of the surge in the popularity of the JUD and the LET because of their undoubtedly energetic work in the flood-affected areas, the outcome of the trial against the seven members of the LET for their participation in the conspiracy to carry out the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai has become uncertain. The sympathy of not only the public, but also sections of the judiciary will be with these organizations.
6.Will the preoccupation of these organizations with flood relief work come in the way of their operations in India? Unlikely. The similar preoccupation of these organizations with quake relief work in 2005 and the severe fatalities and damages suffered by the JUD and the LET as a result of the quake in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) and by the JEM in the Manshera area of Khyber Pakhtunkwa did not affect their ability to plan and carry out terrorist strikes in India as was seen by the suburban train explosions in Mumbai in July 2006.
7.The floods have not dampened the wave of inter-ethnic and Shia-Sunni sectarian violence that has been intermittently sweeping across Karachi since the beginning of this year. On August 19, an Awami National Party (ANP) office bearer, Ubaidullah Yousufzai, was gunned down along with a colleague near the Quaid-e-Azam International Airport. In the subsequent clashes between Mohajirs of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement and Pashtuns of the ANP, 11 people were shot dead and 16 others injured. Many trucks were set on fire, including some belonging to companies engaged by the NATO to move logistic supplies to the NATO forces in Afghanistan from the Karachi port.
8.Non-Governmental organizations have been active in flood relief --- even in Khyber Pakhtunkwa--- as they were in quake relief in 2005. These organizations come under two categories---- organizations with a religious background and those with a secular background. Some Christian organizations are already active such as the World Vision and the Church World Service. Many western Christian organizations, which participated in quake relief work in Haiti, had employed media managers to publicise their contribution. In Pakistan, attempts are being made to project their assistance to the flood victims as “Christian assistance”. This is unwise and could be suicidal. Their activities are likely to be misinterpreted as an attempt to exploit the human tragedy for their conversion work. Recently, there was a massacre of about 10 Western humanitarian workers in Afghanistan by the Afghan Taliban which falsely projected them as missionaries trying to convert Afghan Muslims to Christianity.
9..There is palpable concern among Western secular organizations engaged in flood relief regarding the security of their volunteers. This is reflected from the queries I have been getting for my assessment of the likely risks to their volunteers in Pakistan.
10.According to the Reuters news agency, the TTP has urged the Pakistan Government to reject Western aid for victims of the floods, saying it would only be siphoned off by corrupt officials. Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban have not yet reacted to the floods and to the flow of Western assistance. The concentration of the US aid efforts in the Swat Valley of Khyber Pakhtunkwa could cause concern to these organizations. (21-8-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
It has been difficult to estimate the damage suffered by Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the various Punjabi terrorist organizations as a result of the floods in Pakistan. They must have suffered damages because many of their training camps were located in areas which are under water. North Waziristan, where the bases of Al Qaeda, the TTP, the Haqqani network, the 313 Brigade of Ilyas Kashmiri, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) are located is one of the affected areas in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
2.One could see that the Afghan Taliban, which operates from the Quetta area of Balochistan, has not been much affected. It has maintained its operations in Afghanistan even after the deluge. The operational difficulties of the NATO forces in Afghanistan could increase because the destruction of many roads and bridges could slow down the movement of logistic supplies to the NATO forces from the Karachi port.
3.The fact that even in the midst of the floods, the Pakistan Army has maintained a high level of air activity against the TTP in the Orakzai and Khurram Agencies of the FATA in retaliation for attacks by the TTP indicates that the terrorists continue to be active in these two agencies despite the floods. According to the Associated Press of Pakistan ( August 20 ), at least seven terrorists were killed and seven others injured when the security forces retaliated after an attack on a security checkpost in the Tapoo area of the Orakzai Agency in which one officer of the security forces was killed and another injured. The Army carried out an air strike on the hideouts of terrorists in the Wasti Kurram and Chinarak areas of the Kurram Agency. The floods have not affected the operations of the Drones (pilotless strike planes) of the USA’s Central Intelligence Agency. The success rate could, however, come down since the floods are likely to affect the movements of human agents and their ability to communicate with their handling officers.
4.The Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) and the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) have also joined the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD), the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) in the collection of funds for flood relief and in organizing relief. They have extended their fund collection activities to all big cities, including Karachi. Taking note of international concerns over the activities of these organizations, which are all banned in the US and under decisions of the anti-terrorism monitoring committee of the UN Security Council, Mr.Rehman Malik, the Interior Minister, has ostensibly ordered the police and the security agencies to stop their activities, but his orders are not being complied with. Some of the large flow of funds for flood relief from Wahabi charity organisations in Saudi Arabia could go to these organisations and, ultimately, through them to Al Qaeda.
5.As a result of the surge in the popularity of the JUD and the LET because of their undoubtedly energetic work in the flood-affected areas, the outcome of the trial against the seven members of the LET for their participation in the conspiracy to carry out the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai has become uncertain. The sympathy of not only the public, but also sections of the judiciary will be with these organizations.
6.Will the preoccupation of these organizations with flood relief work come in the way of their operations in India? Unlikely. The similar preoccupation of these organizations with quake relief work in 2005 and the severe fatalities and damages suffered by the JUD and the LET as a result of the quake in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) and by the JEM in the Manshera area of Khyber Pakhtunkwa did not affect their ability to plan and carry out terrorist strikes in India as was seen by the suburban train explosions in Mumbai in July 2006.
7.The floods have not dampened the wave of inter-ethnic and Shia-Sunni sectarian violence that has been intermittently sweeping across Karachi since the beginning of this year. On August 19, an Awami National Party (ANP) office bearer, Ubaidullah Yousufzai, was gunned down along with a colleague near the Quaid-e-Azam International Airport. In the subsequent clashes between Mohajirs of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement and Pashtuns of the ANP, 11 people were shot dead and 16 others injured. Many trucks were set on fire, including some belonging to companies engaged by the NATO to move logistic supplies to the NATO forces in Afghanistan from the Karachi port.
8.Non-Governmental organizations have been active in flood relief --- even in Khyber Pakhtunkwa--- as they were in quake relief in 2005. These organizations come under two categories---- organizations with a religious background and those with a secular background. Some Christian organizations are already active such as the World Vision and the Church World Service. Many western Christian organizations, which participated in quake relief work in Haiti, had employed media managers to publicise their contribution. In Pakistan, attempts are being made to project their assistance to the flood victims as “Christian assistance”. This is unwise and could be suicidal. Their activities are likely to be misinterpreted as an attempt to exploit the human tragedy for their conversion work. Recently, there was a massacre of about 10 Western humanitarian workers in Afghanistan by the Afghan Taliban which falsely projected them as missionaries trying to convert Afghan Muslims to Christianity.
9..There is palpable concern among Western secular organizations engaged in flood relief regarding the security of their volunteers. This is reflected from the queries I have been getting for my assessment of the likely risks to their volunteers in Pakistan.
10.According to the Reuters news agency, the TTP has urged the Pakistan Government to reject Western aid for victims of the floods, saying it would only be siphoned off by corrupt officials. Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban have not yet reacted to the floods and to the flow of Western assistance. The concentration of the US aid efforts in the Swat Valley of Khyber Pakhtunkwa could cause concern to these organizations. (21-8-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
EXPLOSION KILLS 4 UIGHUR POLICEMEN
B.RAMAN
Seven persons, four of them uniformed Uighur policemen working for the Ministry of Public Security at Aksu in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, were killed on August 19,2010, when an Uigur man and a woman approached a group of 15 Uighur policemen returning to a police station after performing their night beat duty and threw an explosive device at them. The two assailants were in a motorised three-wheeled vehicle generally used for carrying merchandise. The woman also died, but it is not known what caused her death. The man was reportedly caught by the police.
2. The local correspondent of the Xinhua news agency immediately flashed the news of the incident to his headquarters in Beijing, which disseminated it . According to Uighur sources, the local authorities denied for some time that any such incident had taken place. When they were confronted with the news of the incident disseminated by Xinhua, they reluctantly admitted it. They held a press conference subsequently to give some details. They described the incident as an intentional act of crime, but refrained from calling it an act of terrorism. It is not yet known whether the two Uighurs attacked the policemen, who belonged to their community, due to any personal grievance or whether it was a reprisal attack by Uighur freedom-fighters to punish the Uighur policemen for collaborating with the Chinese Government. The Uighur policemen used to go on beat duty in the Uighur areas every night to check the identities of Uighurs moving around in the town.
3. An unidentified individual has recorded the following post in a blog: "Of the many news stories about the Aksu (Aqsu) explosion yesterday, this one from the Hong Kong-based Ming Pao Daily News I find most entertaining. Since this is probably going to slip past the attention of most readers, I’ll try to roughly translate and summarize it here. Let me know if you catch any inconsistencies:
"Immediately after the news of explosion had been released by the state-run Xinhua news agency and injuries confirmed by a local hospital in Aksu, journalists from Hong Kong called the Aksu Police Office (gong’an ju) for further details. The spokeswoman denied any explosion had taken place: “Stop! I know what you’re trying to ask! This is a total fabrication! No such thing happened!” Then the journalist called again and mentioned the Xinhua report. The spokeswoman replied impatiently: “Even what Xinhua said is not necessarily true. All should be accorded with the Police Office. And what you said (about the explosion) is liable to legal obligations!” A few hours later, after Xinhua’s news conference, the journalist called again, and the spokeswoman continued: “You media like to create troubles and make irresponsible remarks without knowing what actually happened. Nothing! Nothing! Nothing!”
"Wow! “Even what Xinhua said is not necessarily true!” Now I’m very interested to know the ethnicity of this little daring Aksu police! Was it a grumble from someone reluctantly dispatched to safeguard the remote frontier of her motherland? Or was it an undue faithfulness barked out—carelessly, perhaps— from the steadfastly loyal? "
4.Radio Free Asia run by the US State Department has quoted Zubeira Shemshidin, a staff member of the Washington-based Uighur Democracy and Human Rights Foundation, as saying that while the slain policemen were themselves ethnic Uighurs, the bomb attack had appeared to target “people wearing the uniforms of Chinese law enforcement officers who were carrying out a political mission. “So this was an attack on the Chinese Government,” she said. She called on the Chinese authorities not to use Thursday’s attack as an excuse to persecute Uighurs, but instead to respect the Uighurs’ right to religious freedom and beliefs."
5.Aksu is about 650 km (400 miles) west of Urumqi, and 60 km (37 miles) from the border with Kyrgyzstan. ( 20-8-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Seven persons, four of them uniformed Uighur policemen working for the Ministry of Public Security at Aksu in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, were killed on August 19,2010, when an Uigur man and a woman approached a group of 15 Uighur policemen returning to a police station after performing their night beat duty and threw an explosive device at them. The two assailants were in a motorised three-wheeled vehicle generally used for carrying merchandise. The woman also died, but it is not known what caused her death. The man was reportedly caught by the police.
2. The local correspondent of the Xinhua news agency immediately flashed the news of the incident to his headquarters in Beijing, which disseminated it . According to Uighur sources, the local authorities denied for some time that any such incident had taken place. When they were confronted with the news of the incident disseminated by Xinhua, they reluctantly admitted it. They held a press conference subsequently to give some details. They described the incident as an intentional act of crime, but refrained from calling it an act of terrorism. It is not yet known whether the two Uighurs attacked the policemen, who belonged to their community, due to any personal grievance or whether it was a reprisal attack by Uighur freedom-fighters to punish the Uighur policemen for collaborating with the Chinese Government. The Uighur policemen used to go on beat duty in the Uighur areas every night to check the identities of Uighurs moving around in the town.
3. An unidentified individual has recorded the following post in a blog: "Of the many news stories about the Aksu (Aqsu) explosion yesterday, this one from the Hong Kong-based Ming Pao Daily News I find most entertaining. Since this is probably going to slip past the attention of most readers, I’ll try to roughly translate and summarize it here. Let me know if you catch any inconsistencies:
"Immediately after the news of explosion had been released by the state-run Xinhua news agency and injuries confirmed by a local hospital in Aksu, journalists from Hong Kong called the Aksu Police Office (gong’an ju) for further details. The spokeswoman denied any explosion had taken place: “Stop! I know what you’re trying to ask! This is a total fabrication! No such thing happened!” Then the journalist called again and mentioned the Xinhua report. The spokeswoman replied impatiently: “Even what Xinhua said is not necessarily true. All should be accorded with the Police Office. And what you said (about the explosion) is liable to legal obligations!” A few hours later, after Xinhua’s news conference, the journalist called again, and the spokeswoman continued: “You media like to create troubles and make irresponsible remarks without knowing what actually happened. Nothing! Nothing! Nothing!”
"Wow! “Even what Xinhua said is not necessarily true!” Now I’m very interested to know the ethnicity of this little daring Aksu police! Was it a grumble from someone reluctantly dispatched to safeguard the remote frontier of her motherland? Or was it an undue faithfulness barked out—carelessly, perhaps— from the steadfastly loyal? "
4.Radio Free Asia run by the US State Department has quoted Zubeira Shemshidin, a staff member of the Washington-based Uighur Democracy and Human Rights Foundation, as saying that while the slain policemen were themselves ethnic Uighurs, the bomb attack had appeared to target “people wearing the uniforms of Chinese law enforcement officers who were carrying out a political mission. “So this was an attack on the Chinese Government,” she said. She called on the Chinese authorities not to use Thursday’s attack as an excuse to persecute Uighurs, but instead to respect the Uighurs’ right to religious freedom and beliefs."
5.Aksu is about 650 km (400 miles) west of Urumqi, and 60 km (37 miles) from the border with Kyrgyzstan. ( 20-8-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, August 18, 2010
THREAT TO PAKISTAN'S EXTERNAL SECURITY: NO CHANGE IN ISI'S ASSESSMENT
B.RAMAN
The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan is a joint agency of the armed forces, normally headed by an officer of the Army, which is responsible for the collection, analysis and assessment of tactical and strategic intelligence having a bearing on Pakistan's internal and external security.
2. Pakistan does not have separate set-ups for the analysis and assessment of tactical and strategic intelligence similar to India's Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS). India follows the British principle that the same agency should not handle collection as well as analysis and assessment. Pakistan did have an NSC under Gen.Pervez Musharraf, but it has been dispensed with by the present Government.As a result, the Armed Forces, particularly the Army, dominate the process of assessment of likely threats to national security----internal and external.
3. The ISI is also an action agency which undertakes covert actions in Pakistan as well as abroad.As examples of its covert actions, one can mention its operations in Pakistan against the Bengali nationalists before Bangladesh was born in 1971 and its subsequent operations against Sindhi, Baloch and Pashtun nationalists and its role in the clandestine acquisition of nuclear and missile capabilities. Its use of terrorism against India and its operations in Afghanistan to protect Pakistan's interests would also come under this category.
4.The ISI views its use of terrorism against India as meant to dilute the asymmetric advantage enjoyed by the Indian armed forces over their Pakistani counterparts.Lt.Gen.Hamid Gul, who was the Director-General of the ISI during Benazir Bhutto's first term as the Prime Minister (1988-90), used to argue that keeping India preoccupied with internal security problems was equivalent to the Pakistan Army having two extra Divisions at no cost.
5. It has been the assessment of the ISI that India is the principal threat to Pakistan's external and internal security. The threat to its external security arises from India's military and nuclear capabilities. In the ISI's perception, India is also a major threat to Pakistan's internal security because of its alleged links with the Sindhi and Pashtun nationalists when Gen.Zia-ul Haq was in power and with the Baloch nationalists when Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto was in power before 1977 and even presently.
6. Influenced by the ISI's assessment, Pakistan's national security management is focussed on five pre-requisites to protect the integrity of Pakistan:
* Firstly, maintaining a high level of preparedness and capability on the Indian border to deter a military conflict initiated by India.
* Secondly, constantly improving its nuclear and missile capabilities to deter India from using its capabilities against Pakistan.
* Thirdly, keeping the Indian security forces preoccupied with internal security problems.
* Fourthly, preventing the Indian security agencies from exploiting the feelings of alienation of the non-Punjabi segments of the Pakistani population.
* Fifthly, preventing India from acquiring a second front capability in Afghanistan.
7. Since the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1988-89, Pakistan's internal security problems have been aggravated by developments and elements, that have had nothing to do with India. As examples one could mention the following:
* The return to Pakistan of its Wahabis who had fought in Afghanistan. They assumed control of the madrasas and started using them for spreading the cult of jihad in Pakistan and abroad.
* The return to Pakistan of the Arab mercenaries of the Afghan Mujahideen groups. They became the forerunners of Al Qaeda.
* The return to Pakistan from Afghanistan of anti-Shia sectarian organisations which stepped up anti-Shia violence.
8. The ISI tried to deal with the resulting situation in the following manner:
* By diverting the Pakistani returness from Afghanistan to Indian territory to wage a jihad against the Indian security forces.
* By persuading or pressuring the Arabs to return to their country. Many did, but some who had married local women stayed behind and became the initial recruits of Al Qaeda.
* By using the madrasas to raise a new crop of volunteers to found the Taliban in 1994 and helping it to capture power in Afghanistan from the Afghan Mujahideen of the 1980s vintage.
* By creating splits in the anti-Shia sectarian movement in the hope of weakening it.
9. As a result of these developments, the post-9/11 internal security situation in Pakistan has been aggravated by the presence and activities of a hotch-potch of ethnic nationalist, indigenous jihadi and global jihadi groups. These groups could be divided into the following categories:
* (a).Nationalist groups which the ISI suspects to be having links with India.
* (b).Jihadi groups originally supported by the ISI for use against India which have now gone out of the control of the ISI and have been operating in Indian as well as Pakistani territory against the security forces of these two countries.Under this category would come the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM).These are essentially Punjabi groups.
* (c). Jihadi groups sponsored and supported by the ISI for use in India and Afghanistan, which have retained their loyalty to the ISI and the Pakistani security forces, but have at the same time been helping Al Qaeda in its global jihad. Examples: The Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Hizbe-Islami of Gulbuddin Heckmatyar, the Afghan Taliban headed by Mulla Mohammad Omar and the Haqqani network.
* (d).New organisations that have come up on their own after the raid of the Pakistani Army into the Lal Masjid of Islamabad in July 2007. They are concentrating their attacks on the ISI, the Pakistani security forces and sections of the mainstream politicians.They have formed the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), known as the Pakistani Taliban. They are essentially Pashtuns and joined hands with the anti-Army Punjabi groups known as the Punjabi Taliban.
* (e). The anti-Shia Sunni organisations which have been helping Al Qaeda in its operations in Pakistani territory.The most active of them are the Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.
10. A consequence of these developments is that the principal threat to Pakistan's internal security now arises not from nationalist organisations, which are accused by the ISI of having links with India, but from jihadi Frankenstein's monsters.It is concern over the activities of these monsters which is reflected in the ISI's assessment as reported by the Wall Street Journal of August 16. According to the WSJ:
"A recent internal assessment of security by the Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan's powerful military spy agency, determined that for the first time in 63 years it expects a majority of threats to come from Islamist militants, according to a senior ISI officer.The assessment, a regular review of national security, allocates a two-thirds likelihood of a major threat to the state coming from militants rather than from India or elsewhere. It is the first time since the two countries gained independence from Britain in 1947 that India hasn't been viewed as the top threat. Decades into one of the most bitter neighborly rivalries in modern history, both countries maintain huge troop deployments along their Himalayan border".
11. Indications from reliable sources in Pakistan are that the ISI still views India as posing the principal threat to Pakistan's external security and has advised against any major changes in Pakistani capabilities and deployments on the Indian border. This assessment, which was prepared before the recent visit of Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff, to China, is understood to have stressed the importance of continued nuclear and missile supply relationship with China and seeking additional Chinese help for strengthening the Pakistani Navy. ( 19-8-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan is a joint agency of the armed forces, normally headed by an officer of the Army, which is responsible for the collection, analysis and assessment of tactical and strategic intelligence having a bearing on Pakistan's internal and external security.
2. Pakistan does not have separate set-ups for the analysis and assessment of tactical and strategic intelligence similar to India's Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS). India follows the British principle that the same agency should not handle collection as well as analysis and assessment. Pakistan did have an NSC under Gen.Pervez Musharraf, but it has been dispensed with by the present Government.As a result, the Armed Forces, particularly the Army, dominate the process of assessment of likely threats to national security----internal and external.
3. The ISI is also an action agency which undertakes covert actions in Pakistan as well as abroad.As examples of its covert actions, one can mention its operations in Pakistan against the Bengali nationalists before Bangladesh was born in 1971 and its subsequent operations against Sindhi, Baloch and Pashtun nationalists and its role in the clandestine acquisition of nuclear and missile capabilities. Its use of terrorism against India and its operations in Afghanistan to protect Pakistan's interests would also come under this category.
4.The ISI views its use of terrorism against India as meant to dilute the asymmetric advantage enjoyed by the Indian armed forces over their Pakistani counterparts.Lt.Gen.Hamid Gul, who was the Director-General of the ISI during Benazir Bhutto's first term as the Prime Minister (1988-90), used to argue that keeping India preoccupied with internal security problems was equivalent to the Pakistan Army having two extra Divisions at no cost.
5. It has been the assessment of the ISI that India is the principal threat to Pakistan's external and internal security. The threat to its external security arises from India's military and nuclear capabilities. In the ISI's perception, India is also a major threat to Pakistan's internal security because of its alleged links with the Sindhi and Pashtun nationalists when Gen.Zia-ul Haq was in power and with the Baloch nationalists when Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto was in power before 1977 and even presently.
6. Influenced by the ISI's assessment, Pakistan's national security management is focussed on five pre-requisites to protect the integrity of Pakistan:
* Firstly, maintaining a high level of preparedness and capability on the Indian border to deter a military conflict initiated by India.
* Secondly, constantly improving its nuclear and missile capabilities to deter India from using its capabilities against Pakistan.
* Thirdly, keeping the Indian security forces preoccupied with internal security problems.
* Fourthly, preventing the Indian security agencies from exploiting the feelings of alienation of the non-Punjabi segments of the Pakistani population.
* Fifthly, preventing India from acquiring a second front capability in Afghanistan.
7. Since the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1988-89, Pakistan's internal security problems have been aggravated by developments and elements, that have had nothing to do with India. As examples one could mention the following:
* The return to Pakistan of its Wahabis who had fought in Afghanistan. They assumed control of the madrasas and started using them for spreading the cult of jihad in Pakistan and abroad.
* The return to Pakistan of the Arab mercenaries of the Afghan Mujahideen groups. They became the forerunners of Al Qaeda.
* The return to Pakistan from Afghanistan of anti-Shia sectarian organisations which stepped up anti-Shia violence.
8. The ISI tried to deal with the resulting situation in the following manner:
* By diverting the Pakistani returness from Afghanistan to Indian territory to wage a jihad against the Indian security forces.
* By persuading or pressuring the Arabs to return to their country. Many did, but some who had married local women stayed behind and became the initial recruits of Al Qaeda.
* By using the madrasas to raise a new crop of volunteers to found the Taliban in 1994 and helping it to capture power in Afghanistan from the Afghan Mujahideen of the 1980s vintage.
* By creating splits in the anti-Shia sectarian movement in the hope of weakening it.
9. As a result of these developments, the post-9/11 internal security situation in Pakistan has been aggravated by the presence and activities of a hotch-potch of ethnic nationalist, indigenous jihadi and global jihadi groups. These groups could be divided into the following categories:
* (a).Nationalist groups which the ISI suspects to be having links with India.
* (b).Jihadi groups originally supported by the ISI for use against India which have now gone out of the control of the ISI and have been operating in Indian as well as Pakistani territory against the security forces of these two countries.Under this category would come the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM).These are essentially Punjabi groups.
* (c). Jihadi groups sponsored and supported by the ISI for use in India and Afghanistan, which have retained their loyalty to the ISI and the Pakistani security forces, but have at the same time been helping Al Qaeda in its global jihad. Examples: The Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Hizbe-Islami of Gulbuddin Heckmatyar, the Afghan Taliban headed by Mulla Mohammad Omar and the Haqqani network.
* (d).New organisations that have come up on their own after the raid of the Pakistani Army into the Lal Masjid of Islamabad in July 2007. They are concentrating their attacks on the ISI, the Pakistani security forces and sections of the mainstream politicians.They have formed the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), known as the Pakistani Taliban. They are essentially Pashtuns and joined hands with the anti-Army Punjabi groups known as the Punjabi Taliban.
* (e). The anti-Shia Sunni organisations which have been helping Al Qaeda in its operations in Pakistani territory.The most active of them are the Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.
10. A consequence of these developments is that the principal threat to Pakistan's internal security now arises not from nationalist organisations, which are accused by the ISI of having links with India, but from jihadi Frankenstein's monsters.It is concern over the activities of these monsters which is reflected in the ISI's assessment as reported by the Wall Street Journal of August 16. According to the WSJ:
"A recent internal assessment of security by the Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan's powerful military spy agency, determined that for the first time in 63 years it expects a majority of threats to come from Islamist militants, according to a senior ISI officer.The assessment, a regular review of national security, allocates a two-thirds likelihood of a major threat to the state coming from militants rather than from India or elsewhere. It is the first time since the two countries gained independence from Britain in 1947 that India hasn't been viewed as the top threat. Decades into one of the most bitter neighborly rivalries in modern history, both countries maintain huge troop deployments along their Himalayan border".
11. Indications from reliable sources in Pakistan are that the ISI still views India as posing the principal threat to Pakistan's external security and has advised against any major changes in Pakistani capabilities and deployments on the Indian border. This assessment, which was prepared before the recent visit of Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff, to China, is understood to have stressed the importance of continued nuclear and missile supply relationship with China and seeking additional Chinese help for strengthening the Pakistani Navy. ( 19-8-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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