B.RAMAN
Is the jihadi ideology spreading in the Muslim community of China ---- geographically as well as ethnically? Has it started infecting Muslims in provinces other than the Xinjiang Autonomous Region? Has it started affecting the Huis and other non-Uighur segements of the Chinese Muslim community? Is the Uighur separatist movement becoming part of the global jihadi movement? What has been the influence of Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban on the Chinese Muslims? What role has the Internet, which has spread spectacularly in China, been playing in facilitating the self-radicalisation of sections of the Chinese Muslim community?
2. These are questions which China analysts will be increasingly confronted with as they study the scanty information coming out of Xinjiang and other areas where there is a Muslim community. This is a sensitive subject for the Chinese. Their analysts rarely pose these questions and seek answers for them. The Chinese media merely repeats the Government propaganda---- the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is the source of all evil; it operates from the Af-Pak region; it is associated with Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban; it exploits the economic grievances of the UIghurs for achieving religious objectives; there is no religious anger in Xinjiang; people are happy as Muslims; the Government gives them all the facilities they need as Muslims; their grievances are mainly because they are economically not as advanced as the Chinese in the other provinces; the Government has decided to pour money into Xinjiang for its economic development; once that happens the Uighur splittist problem will be over. So the people in the rest of China and the international community are told. These are not lies, but these are not the whole truth either.
3. There has always been religious anger in Xinjiang over issues such as restrictions on people going on Haj pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. curbs on the observance of the holy fasting period, ban on private Koranic schools and classes, the requirement of Government's prior approval for religious sermons in mosques, the alleged imposition of Islam in Chinese colours etc.New religious issues have come up after the violent riots of July last year. One such issue is the alleged practice by the Chinese police of cremating the dead bodies of Muslims whose relatives cannot be traced. Another is the on-going replacement of exclusively Uighur quartiers in Urumqi by mixed quartiers where the Uighurs are forced to live side by side with Han Chinese in order to break their religious solidarity.
4. These grievances are keeping the anger against the Government alive. Is the anger also showing a tendency to spread---geographically and ethnically? It is difficult to answer this question definitively in the absence of data, But one occasionally finds tits-bits of information here and there as one monitors the Chinese media for information regarding the Chinese Muslim community. One such bit of information was found in an article published by the "China Daily" on July 3 on the joint Sino-Pakistani counter-terrorism exercise. It quoted Mr. Li Wei, a Beijing-based anti-terrorism researcher, as saying that besides the Xinjiang Region, the ETIM has also made its presence felt in central-eastern China, including in the Henan and Shanxi provinces. He said: "After the July 5 riot last year, China beefed up border security checks in Xinjiang, so instead of getting out of China through that region, more ETIM terrorists are now fleeing to the southwestern parts of China and getting out of the country there." He added that another new challenge for all countries is that terrorists have turned to the Internet where they recruit and brainwash new members. "This kind of prevention is even harder to do." He spoke generally about the problem faced by the rest of the world due to dangers of radicalisation through the Internet, but he did not say specifically whether there have been such instances in the Muslim community in China itself. (25-7-10)
ANNEXURE
THE MUSLIMS OF CHINA ( EXTRACTS TAKEN FROM WIKIPEDIA)
Muslims live in every region in China. The highest concentrations are found in the northwest provinces of Xinjiang, Gansu, and Ningxia, with significant populations also found throughout Yunnan province in southwest China and Henan province in central China. Of China’s 55 officially recognized minority peoples, ten groups are predominately Muslim. The largest groups in descending order are Hui (9.8 million in year 2000 census, or 48% of the officially tabulated number of Muslims), Uyghur (8.4 million, 41%), Kazakh (1.25 million , 6.1%), Dongxiang (514,000, 2.5%), Kyrgyz (161,000), Salar (105,000), Tajik (41,000), Uzbeks, Bonan (17,000), and Tatar (5,000). However, individual members of traditionally Muslim ethnic groups may profess other religions or none at all. Additionally, Tibetan Muslims are officially classified along with the Tibetan people, unlike the Hui who are classified as a separate people, even though they are indistinguishable from the Han. Muslims live predominantly in the areas that border Central Asia, Tibet and Mongolia, i.e. Xinjiang, Ningxia, Gansu and Qinghai, which is known as the "Quran Belt".
China is home to a large population of adherents of Islam. According to the CIA World Factbook, about 1%-2% of the total population in China are Muslims, while the US Department of State's International Religious Freedom Report shows that Muslims constitute about 1.5% of the Chinese population. Recent census counts imply that there may be up to 20 million Muslims in China. However, the last three national censuses (1982, 1990, and 2000) did not include questions about religion. The number of religious believers can be inferred indirectly from census counts of the number of people who identify themselves as belonging to particular ethnic groups, some of whom are known to be predominantly members of certain religious groups. A 2009 study done by the Pew Research Center, based on China's census, concluded there are 21,667,000 Muslims in China, accounting for 1.6% of the total population. According to data provided by the San Diego State University's International Population Center to U.S. News & World Report, China has 65.3 million Muslims. The BBC's "Religion and Ethics" website gave a range of 20 million to 100 million (1.5% to 7.5% of the total) Muslims in China.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Saturday, July 24, 2010
Friday, July 23, 2010
MONITORING CHINA'S NAVAL ASSERTIVENESS
B.RAMAN
Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff who visited Delhi this week for talks with Indian officials, is reported to have told Indian media persons on July 23,2010, that China's aggressive posturing over territorial claims in the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions was a matter of concern that the US shared with India.
2. He has been quoted by rediff.com as saying as follows: "China seems to be asserting itself more and more with respect to the kinds of territorial claims. They seem to be taking a much more aggressive approach to the near-sea areas recently....There is growing concern over it. In my perspective, we (the US) must work with India in this regard.In my recent interactions with its leadership, India too has expressed similar concerns." He gave the example of recent public statements by China about the US Navy operating in the Yellow Sea. Noting that the US navy was in the international waters, Mullen said despite such remarks by China, the US would continue to operate in the international waters there.
3.According to rediff.com, Admiral Mullen said further that the US believed China was shifting focus from land-centric to air and maritime capabilities. "Fairly recently I have gone from being curious about where China is headed to being concerned about it. One of the characteristics that does not exist as far as China appears militarily is transparency. In fact, there is opaqueness to it that we continue to really scratch our heads about from a military standpoint. We have virtually no relationship with the Chinese military. If we have such relationship, we can agree on and disagree on, and also we can learn from each other."
4. He pointed out that the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions were critical to economic and trade activities and that stability in these two regions was absolutely vital.
5. One was gratified by his observations because one was intrigued by the relative silence of the US media over the increasing naval assertiveness of China in the South and East China Seas and in the Yellow Sea and by its repeated demand since the beginning of this year for equality of status with the US Navy in the Western Pacific. In the past, the Chinese used to project themselves as a rising economic power, but were coy on their military power----particularly naval power. Now, for the last few months, they don't fight shy of projecting themselves as a rising naval power.
6. Since the crisis broke out in March following the North Korean sinking of a South Korean naval vessel and particularly since the US and South Korea announced a programme for a series of joint naval exercises to deter Norh Korea from any more such adventurist actions,Chinese media and strategic experts, including some from the Navy and the faculty of some Chinese training institutions, including their National Defence University, have been talking and writing increasingly of what they project as a looming naval conflict between a hegemonist naval power (US) and a rising naval power (China).
7. They strongly opposed the US-South Korea naval exercises covering the Yellow Sea and warned of the dangers of incidents if the US and South Korea went ahead with their exercises, which would involve the participation of a nuclear-powered aircraft-carrier of the US Navy. Even after the US and South Korea indicated that their naval exercise starting on July 25---- which would be the first in the series---- would not cover the Yellow Sea, the Chinese have kept up their campaign. Their Foreign Office claims to have issued five warnings to the US not to send its ships into the Yellow Sea.
8. The following points emerge clearly from the recent Chinese campaign:
* Firstly, the rise of the Chinese naval power is unstoppable.
* Secondly, instead of trying to counter it, the US should accommodate itself with it by accepting the new reality in the Western Pacific as a result of the rise of the Chinese Navy.
* Thirdly, China is keen to improve its military-military relations with the US, but this will be possible only if the US accepts this reality and pays attention to the Chinese sensitivities on maritime issues and Chinese interests in the Yellow Sea. Chinese expectations are no longer confined to US understanding Chinese sensitivities on arms sales to Taiwan. Beijing now has an expanded list of core sensitivities.
9. The Chinese are not yet talking---at least openly---- of their aspirations as an Indian Ocean power, but it is only a question of time before they start doing so and challenging any Indian primacy in the Indian Ocean Region. In their long-term plans to do so, they will first try to undermine the Indian naval influence in the island countries such as Sri Lanka, the Maldives. Seychelles and Mauritius and use repeated invitations from the Pakistani political leadership and Armed Forces to make greater use of the naval facilities in Pakistan for their ships in the Indian Ocean. Annexed is an article on co-operation between the Chinese and the Pakistani Navies carried by the "China Daily" on July 22,2010. There is a need for a joint monitoring of Chinese naval activities by India and the US.
10. This article may please be read in continuation of my following articles on the subject available at the web site of the Chennai Centre For China Studies at http://www.c3sindia.org/
(1).“Chinese Sovereign Waters”, “Waters of China’s Interests”,”Psychological Territorial Seas” of July 14,2010
(2). De-Escalation Moves in Yellow Sea of June 29,2010
(3). Hu Proposes, PLA Disposes of June 28,2010
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
Article carried by the "China Daily" on July 22,2010
Pakistan navy vows to expand co-op with China
By Sun Yuqing (chinadaily.com.cn)
Pakistan's navy is very satisfied with the performance of the F-22P frigate it bought from China and hopes to further the cooperation with the nation, said Admiral Noman Bashir, Pakistan's Chief of Naval Staff.
Two of the four F-22P frigates it ordered are already in service in Pakistan Navy, with the third one scheduled to be commissioned on September 15 this year. It's also expected that all four ships will be in service by 2013.
"We are very happy with the performance, and some technology is as good as in Western countries," said Noman Bashir, who visited China four times last year.
Pakistan also hopes to buy bigger ships with more firepower from China, such as 4,000 ton class frigates.
Pakistan has proposed to develop strategic maritime cooperation with China in both military and commercial sects, such as in fishery, economic development zones, and cargo, he said.
"The friendship between China and Pakistan is greater than the Himalayas and deeper than the Ocean. We already made progress in air force and other areas, now we should further and expand the cooperation in Navy, a broadly-based relation."
Pakistan's strategic geographical location in the Arabian Sea and its long coastline mean its possible contribution to the missions of China's navy, particular under the context of energy need from the Persian Gulf, said Pakistan officials.
Pakistan also has rich experiences in countering illegal activities at sea in order to maintain maritime security, four ships participated in anti-piracy operations, and there has been no act of maritime terrorism in its region in the recent past.
"We can provide facilities, ports, logistics, maintenance among other things (to Chinese navy)," said a Pakistan navy official.
Pakistan hopes to buy more ships from China, UK and France according to its development plan
Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff who visited Delhi this week for talks with Indian officials, is reported to have told Indian media persons on July 23,2010, that China's aggressive posturing over territorial claims in the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions was a matter of concern that the US shared with India.
2. He has been quoted by rediff.com as saying as follows: "China seems to be asserting itself more and more with respect to the kinds of territorial claims. They seem to be taking a much more aggressive approach to the near-sea areas recently....There is growing concern over it. In my perspective, we (the US) must work with India in this regard.In my recent interactions with its leadership, India too has expressed similar concerns." He gave the example of recent public statements by China about the US Navy operating in the Yellow Sea. Noting that the US navy was in the international waters, Mullen said despite such remarks by China, the US would continue to operate in the international waters there.
3.According to rediff.com, Admiral Mullen said further that the US believed China was shifting focus from land-centric to air and maritime capabilities. "Fairly recently I have gone from being curious about where China is headed to being concerned about it. One of the characteristics that does not exist as far as China appears militarily is transparency. In fact, there is opaqueness to it that we continue to really scratch our heads about from a military standpoint. We have virtually no relationship with the Chinese military. If we have such relationship, we can agree on and disagree on, and also we can learn from each other."
4. He pointed out that the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions were critical to economic and trade activities and that stability in these two regions was absolutely vital.
5. One was gratified by his observations because one was intrigued by the relative silence of the US media over the increasing naval assertiveness of China in the South and East China Seas and in the Yellow Sea and by its repeated demand since the beginning of this year for equality of status with the US Navy in the Western Pacific. In the past, the Chinese used to project themselves as a rising economic power, but were coy on their military power----particularly naval power. Now, for the last few months, they don't fight shy of projecting themselves as a rising naval power.
6. Since the crisis broke out in March following the North Korean sinking of a South Korean naval vessel and particularly since the US and South Korea announced a programme for a series of joint naval exercises to deter Norh Korea from any more such adventurist actions,Chinese media and strategic experts, including some from the Navy and the faculty of some Chinese training institutions, including their National Defence University, have been talking and writing increasingly of what they project as a looming naval conflict between a hegemonist naval power (US) and a rising naval power (China).
7. They strongly opposed the US-South Korea naval exercises covering the Yellow Sea and warned of the dangers of incidents if the US and South Korea went ahead with their exercises, which would involve the participation of a nuclear-powered aircraft-carrier of the US Navy. Even after the US and South Korea indicated that their naval exercise starting on July 25---- which would be the first in the series---- would not cover the Yellow Sea, the Chinese have kept up their campaign. Their Foreign Office claims to have issued five warnings to the US not to send its ships into the Yellow Sea.
8. The following points emerge clearly from the recent Chinese campaign:
* Firstly, the rise of the Chinese naval power is unstoppable.
* Secondly, instead of trying to counter it, the US should accommodate itself with it by accepting the new reality in the Western Pacific as a result of the rise of the Chinese Navy.
* Thirdly, China is keen to improve its military-military relations with the US, but this will be possible only if the US accepts this reality and pays attention to the Chinese sensitivities on maritime issues and Chinese interests in the Yellow Sea. Chinese expectations are no longer confined to US understanding Chinese sensitivities on arms sales to Taiwan. Beijing now has an expanded list of core sensitivities.
9. The Chinese are not yet talking---at least openly---- of their aspirations as an Indian Ocean power, but it is only a question of time before they start doing so and challenging any Indian primacy in the Indian Ocean Region. In their long-term plans to do so, they will first try to undermine the Indian naval influence in the island countries such as Sri Lanka, the Maldives. Seychelles and Mauritius and use repeated invitations from the Pakistani political leadership and Armed Forces to make greater use of the naval facilities in Pakistan for their ships in the Indian Ocean. Annexed is an article on co-operation between the Chinese and the Pakistani Navies carried by the "China Daily" on July 22,2010. There is a need for a joint monitoring of Chinese naval activities by India and the US.
10. This article may please be read in continuation of my following articles on the subject available at the web site of the Chennai Centre For China Studies at http://www.c3sindia.org/
(1).“Chinese Sovereign Waters”, “Waters of China’s Interests”,”Psychological Territorial Seas” of July 14,2010
(2). De-Escalation Moves in Yellow Sea of June 29,2010
(3). Hu Proposes, PLA Disposes of June 28,2010
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
Article carried by the "China Daily" on July 22,2010
Pakistan navy vows to expand co-op with China
By Sun Yuqing (chinadaily.com.cn)
Pakistan's navy is very satisfied with the performance of the F-22P frigate it bought from China and hopes to further the cooperation with the nation, said Admiral Noman Bashir, Pakistan's Chief of Naval Staff.
Two of the four F-22P frigates it ordered are already in service in Pakistan Navy, with the third one scheduled to be commissioned on September 15 this year. It's also expected that all four ships will be in service by 2013.
"We are very happy with the performance, and some technology is as good as in Western countries," said Noman Bashir, who visited China four times last year.
Pakistan also hopes to buy bigger ships with more firepower from China, such as 4,000 ton class frigates.
Pakistan has proposed to develop strategic maritime cooperation with China in both military and commercial sects, such as in fishery, economic development zones, and cargo, he said.
"The friendship between China and Pakistan is greater than the Himalayas and deeper than the Ocean. We already made progress in air force and other areas, now we should further and expand the cooperation in Navy, a broadly-based relation."
Pakistan's strategic geographical location in the Arabian Sea and its long coastline mean its possible contribution to the missions of China's navy, particular under the context of energy need from the Persian Gulf, said Pakistan officials.
Pakistan also has rich experiences in countering illegal activities at sea in order to maintain maritime security, four ships participated in anti-piracy operations, and there has been no act of maritime terrorism in its region in the recent past.
"We can provide facilities, ports, logistics, maintenance among other things (to Chinese navy)," said a Pakistan navy official.
Pakistan hopes to buy more ships from China, UK and France according to its development plan
GEN.ASHFAQ PARVEZ KAYANI
B.RAMAN
Gen.Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, who will be completing his three-year tenure as Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) on November 28,2010, has been given a three-year extension by the civilian Government of Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani. He will now continue as the COAS till November 28, 2013.
2. Mr.Gilani, who announced the decision to give him an extension in a brief telecast speech on the evening of July 22,2010, said the extension had been given in the interest of continuity at a time when the war on terror was successfully continuing against the elements who wanted to impose a system of their choice on the country ( an apparent reference to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan) . He said: “The success of military operations could only have been achieved under General Ashfaq Kayani’s leadership. He has been involved in planning and monitoring of operations in militancy-hit areas. These operations are at a critical stage and successful continuation of these operations required continuation in military high command. General Kayani is held in high esteem at the international level due to his excellent military leadership qualities and pro-democracy views. In the best interest of the nation, I, in my capacity as prime minister, have decided to give General Kayani a three-year extension in his service from November 29, 2010, relaxing the rules, and after consulting President Asif Ali Zardari.” Interestingly, he made no reference to the situation in Afghanistan and the tensions in Pakistan's relations with India while justifying the decision to extend his term. It was the General's role in countering the threats from terrorist elements in Pakistan which was underlined as the main reason for extending his term.
3. The decision to give him an extension, which was expected for some weeks, was announced shortly after the visits of Mr.S.M.Krishna, India's Minister For External Affairs, and Mrs.Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, to Islamabad. Mr.Krishna visited Islamabad for talks with his Pakistani counterpart, Mr.Shah Mehmood Qureshi, and Mrs.Clinton for the periodic strategic dialogue with Pakistani leaders and officials. Official sources took care to emphasise that there was no linkage between these visits and the timing of the announcement.
4.Ever since the elected civilian Government came to office in March 2008, there had been indications that while the General's relations with Prime Minister Gilani were correct and warm, his relations with Mr.Asif Ali Zardari, who took over as the President in September 2008, were correct, but lacking in warmth. The lack of warmth could be attributed to the general suspicion of the Army which Mr.Zardari had inherited from his wife Mrs.Benazir Bhutto and the General's feeling of discomfort with some of the persons in the entourage of Mr.Zardari, particularly Mr.Rehman Malik, an ex-police officer who is now the Interior Minister. Gen.Kayani, like some of his senior colleagues in the Army, also viewed with suspicion some of the initial statements of Mr.Zardari advocating close relations with India. The failed attempt of Mr.Zardari to have the control of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) transferred to the Interior Ministry also added to the misgivings nursed by Gen.Kayani and other Army officers about Mr.Zardari. These suspicions also played a role in Mr.Zardari having to give up his control of the nuclear national command authority which was transferred to the Prime Minister.
5. In view of these misgivings about each other nursed by Mr.Zardari and his entourage on the one side and Gen. Kayani and his Corps Commanders on the other, there was an element of doubt whether Mr.Zardari would agree to give his consent to the extension. Under the present dispensation after the passage of the 18th Amendment to the Constitution, the prerogative of selecting the COAS is that of the Prime Minister. But since Mr.Zardari controls the Pakistan People's Party, Mr. Gilani did not want to take the decision unilaterally without his consent . Ultimately, Mr.Gilani succeeded in convincing Mr.Zardari and his entourage that there would be no threat to the civilian Government from Gen.Kayani if he were given an extension.
6. Some retired Generals close to the PPP such as Gen.Abdul Wahid Kakkar, who was the COAS during the second tenure of Benazir as the Prime Minister, are also believed to have assured Mr.Zardari that there would be no threat to his position or to the civilian Government as a whole from Gen.Kayani and that at a time when the country was passing through a difficult internal security situation Kayani should be allowed to continue. The Americans too, who believe that a known General is better than an unknown General, were keen that Kayani should continue.
7. Once Mr.Zardari agreed to support the extension, things moved fast. On July 15, when the talks between the Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan were in progress, Mr.Gilani sent for the General and informed him of the decision to extend his term. Gen.Kayani reportedly wanted to seek the concurrence of his Corps Commanders before accepting the extension. The Corps Commanders, who were consulted by him the next day, approved of his accepting the extension. There was no voice of dissent. He informed Mr.Gilani immediately thereafter and the announcement was made.
8. It is learnt that Mr.Nawaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League, who had suffered at the hands of the Army when Pervez Musharraf was the COAS, had some misgivings too about the wisdom of giving an extension to Gen.Kayani since he feared that the extension could make Gen.Kayani powerful and could once again lead to military interference in politics. However, Mr.Nawaz was ultimately persuaded by his brother Mr.Shabaz Sharif, who is the Chief of Minister of Punjab, not to object to the extension. Gen.Kayani has warm relations with Mr.Shabaz. However, the PML (N) is yet to come out with a statement on the extension.
9. Since taking over as the COAS in November 2007, Gen.Kayani has been assertive in matters concerning the Armed Forces, including the ISI, but accommodating and non-interventionist in matters concerning the political governance and economic management of the country. His quietly assertive style in matters concerning the Armed Forces was seen in his strong opposition to the attempt to transfer the control of the ISI to the Ministry of the Interior under Mr.Rehman Malik, his opposition to some of the original conditionalities in the USA's Kerry-Lugar Bill regarding US assistance to Pakistan which, in the eyes of the senior army officers, tended to reflect negatively on the Army, his insistence that the Government should protest to the UN Secretary-General against the unflattering references to the intelligence agencies in the report of the UN Committee which had enquired into the assassination of Benazir and his reported remonstration with the Foreign Office for failing to counter effectively Indian allegations of the ISI's role in the Mumbai terrorist strikes of 26/11.
10. Gen.Kayani strongly shares the traditional suspicions of India nursed by the Punjabi officers in the Pakistan Army, who look upon India as an ill-wisher of Pakistan. He shares the determination of the Punjabi officers to counter India in every way possible and necessary , whether in Jammu & Kashmir or in Afghanistan or elsewhere. He has a good equation with the leadership of the People’s Liberation Army of China and has further strengthened the military-military relationship with the PLA. The past relations which were focused on the two armies and air forces, have now been expanded to focus more on the two Navies. The joint counter-terrorism exercises between the two armies have practically become joint counter-Uighur exercises, with China increasingly relying on the Pakistani security forces for putting down the revolt of the Uighurs in the Xinjiang province. While he has been reluctant to act against Al Qaeda and its associates in North Waziristan, he has not hesitated to act against the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which poses a threat to China.
11. In the counter-insurgency operations against the TTP he has had partial successes in the Swat Valley, South Waziristan, Bajaur and Orakzai agencies. Under his leadership, the Army has been able to deny the TTP territorial control in these areas, but has not been able to destroy their capability for terrorist strikes and commando-style raids in tribal as well as non-tribal areas. While arresting some leaders of the Afghan Taliban, who were living in Karachi and other non-tribal areas, he has avoided action against the Afghan Taliban leadership operating from the tribal areas.
12. He has avoided any action against Al Qaeda elements which have taken sanctuary in the non-tribal areas. Under Musharraf, the Army and the ISI were much more active against Al Qaeda in the non-tribal areas than they have been under Kayani. The anger of Al Qaeda and its associates against Musharraf because of the action taken by the Army and the ISI was responsible for the virulent campaign of Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri against Musharraf and the Army. They abused Musharraf as apostate, collaborator of the Hindus etc and thrice tried to kill him---once in Karachi and twice in Rawalpindi. Compared to that, there is hardly any Al Qaeda campaign against Kayani. There is a greater threat to Mr.Zardari from Al Qaeda than to Kayani. The Army and the ISI have managed to create an impression in the tribal areas that Mr.Zardari and not Gen.Kayani is responsible for the facilities extended to the US for its Drone (pilotless plane) strikes in the tribal areas. Since Gen.Kayani took over, while many Al Qaeda leaders have been killed in the tribal areas by the Drone strikes, there have been very few arrests of Al Qaeda elements in the non-tribal areas. Al Qaeda feels more secure in the non-tribal areas of Pakistan today than it was under Musharraf.
13. India has reasons to be concerned over the continuance of Gen.Kayani as the COAS. There is unlikely to be any change in Pakistan’s use of terrorism against India. Kayani is thought of well both by the Pentagon and the PLA leadership. The resumed flow of sophisticated US military equipment to Pakistan and the enhanced strategic assistance from China would add to the threats already faced by India. Musharraf started as a fierce adversary of India, but mellowed down over the years. Kayani shows no signs of mellowing down. So long as there is no change in the attitude of Kayani and his Army, including the ISI, even if the elected political leadership sincerely wants better relations with India, it may face difficulties.
14. The continuing paranoia of the Pakistani Army is due to its lingering memories of its humiliation in the 1971 war and its fears that India is determined to break up Pakistan. Any reduction of this paranoia would depend on our success in building up military-military relationships at various levels. The quest for better relations with the Pakistan Army should go hand-in-hand with the quest for better relations with the political leadership and the people. ( 23-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Gen.Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, who will be completing his three-year tenure as Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) on November 28,2010, has been given a three-year extension by the civilian Government of Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani. He will now continue as the COAS till November 28, 2013.
2. Mr.Gilani, who announced the decision to give him an extension in a brief telecast speech on the evening of July 22,2010, said the extension had been given in the interest of continuity at a time when the war on terror was successfully continuing against the elements who wanted to impose a system of their choice on the country ( an apparent reference to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan) . He said: “The success of military operations could only have been achieved under General Ashfaq Kayani’s leadership. He has been involved in planning and monitoring of operations in militancy-hit areas. These operations are at a critical stage and successful continuation of these operations required continuation in military high command. General Kayani is held in high esteem at the international level due to his excellent military leadership qualities and pro-democracy views. In the best interest of the nation, I, in my capacity as prime minister, have decided to give General Kayani a three-year extension in his service from November 29, 2010, relaxing the rules, and after consulting President Asif Ali Zardari.” Interestingly, he made no reference to the situation in Afghanistan and the tensions in Pakistan's relations with India while justifying the decision to extend his term. It was the General's role in countering the threats from terrorist elements in Pakistan which was underlined as the main reason for extending his term.
3. The decision to give him an extension, which was expected for some weeks, was announced shortly after the visits of Mr.S.M.Krishna, India's Minister For External Affairs, and Mrs.Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, to Islamabad. Mr.Krishna visited Islamabad for talks with his Pakistani counterpart, Mr.Shah Mehmood Qureshi, and Mrs.Clinton for the periodic strategic dialogue with Pakistani leaders and officials. Official sources took care to emphasise that there was no linkage between these visits and the timing of the announcement.
4.Ever since the elected civilian Government came to office in March 2008, there had been indications that while the General's relations with Prime Minister Gilani were correct and warm, his relations with Mr.Asif Ali Zardari, who took over as the President in September 2008, were correct, but lacking in warmth. The lack of warmth could be attributed to the general suspicion of the Army which Mr.Zardari had inherited from his wife Mrs.Benazir Bhutto and the General's feeling of discomfort with some of the persons in the entourage of Mr.Zardari, particularly Mr.Rehman Malik, an ex-police officer who is now the Interior Minister. Gen.Kayani, like some of his senior colleagues in the Army, also viewed with suspicion some of the initial statements of Mr.Zardari advocating close relations with India. The failed attempt of Mr.Zardari to have the control of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) transferred to the Interior Ministry also added to the misgivings nursed by Gen.Kayani and other Army officers about Mr.Zardari. These suspicions also played a role in Mr.Zardari having to give up his control of the nuclear national command authority which was transferred to the Prime Minister.
5. In view of these misgivings about each other nursed by Mr.Zardari and his entourage on the one side and Gen. Kayani and his Corps Commanders on the other, there was an element of doubt whether Mr.Zardari would agree to give his consent to the extension. Under the present dispensation after the passage of the 18th Amendment to the Constitution, the prerogative of selecting the COAS is that of the Prime Minister. But since Mr.Zardari controls the Pakistan People's Party, Mr. Gilani did not want to take the decision unilaterally without his consent . Ultimately, Mr.Gilani succeeded in convincing Mr.Zardari and his entourage that there would be no threat to the civilian Government from Gen.Kayani if he were given an extension.
6. Some retired Generals close to the PPP such as Gen.Abdul Wahid Kakkar, who was the COAS during the second tenure of Benazir as the Prime Minister, are also believed to have assured Mr.Zardari that there would be no threat to his position or to the civilian Government as a whole from Gen.Kayani and that at a time when the country was passing through a difficult internal security situation Kayani should be allowed to continue. The Americans too, who believe that a known General is better than an unknown General, were keen that Kayani should continue.
7. Once Mr.Zardari agreed to support the extension, things moved fast. On July 15, when the talks between the Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan were in progress, Mr.Gilani sent for the General and informed him of the decision to extend his term. Gen.Kayani reportedly wanted to seek the concurrence of his Corps Commanders before accepting the extension. The Corps Commanders, who were consulted by him the next day, approved of his accepting the extension. There was no voice of dissent. He informed Mr.Gilani immediately thereafter and the announcement was made.
8. It is learnt that Mr.Nawaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League, who had suffered at the hands of the Army when Pervez Musharraf was the COAS, had some misgivings too about the wisdom of giving an extension to Gen.Kayani since he feared that the extension could make Gen.Kayani powerful and could once again lead to military interference in politics. However, Mr.Nawaz was ultimately persuaded by his brother Mr.Shabaz Sharif, who is the Chief of Minister of Punjab, not to object to the extension. Gen.Kayani has warm relations with Mr.Shabaz. However, the PML (N) is yet to come out with a statement on the extension.
9. Since taking over as the COAS in November 2007, Gen.Kayani has been assertive in matters concerning the Armed Forces, including the ISI, but accommodating and non-interventionist in matters concerning the political governance and economic management of the country. His quietly assertive style in matters concerning the Armed Forces was seen in his strong opposition to the attempt to transfer the control of the ISI to the Ministry of the Interior under Mr.Rehman Malik, his opposition to some of the original conditionalities in the USA's Kerry-Lugar Bill regarding US assistance to Pakistan which, in the eyes of the senior army officers, tended to reflect negatively on the Army, his insistence that the Government should protest to the UN Secretary-General against the unflattering references to the intelligence agencies in the report of the UN Committee which had enquired into the assassination of Benazir and his reported remonstration with the Foreign Office for failing to counter effectively Indian allegations of the ISI's role in the Mumbai terrorist strikes of 26/11.
10. Gen.Kayani strongly shares the traditional suspicions of India nursed by the Punjabi officers in the Pakistan Army, who look upon India as an ill-wisher of Pakistan. He shares the determination of the Punjabi officers to counter India in every way possible and necessary , whether in Jammu & Kashmir or in Afghanistan or elsewhere. He has a good equation with the leadership of the People’s Liberation Army of China and has further strengthened the military-military relationship with the PLA. The past relations which were focused on the two armies and air forces, have now been expanded to focus more on the two Navies. The joint counter-terrorism exercises between the two armies have practically become joint counter-Uighur exercises, with China increasingly relying on the Pakistani security forces for putting down the revolt of the Uighurs in the Xinjiang province. While he has been reluctant to act against Al Qaeda and its associates in North Waziristan, he has not hesitated to act against the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which poses a threat to China.
11. In the counter-insurgency operations against the TTP he has had partial successes in the Swat Valley, South Waziristan, Bajaur and Orakzai agencies. Under his leadership, the Army has been able to deny the TTP territorial control in these areas, but has not been able to destroy their capability for terrorist strikes and commando-style raids in tribal as well as non-tribal areas. While arresting some leaders of the Afghan Taliban, who were living in Karachi and other non-tribal areas, he has avoided action against the Afghan Taliban leadership operating from the tribal areas.
12. He has avoided any action against Al Qaeda elements which have taken sanctuary in the non-tribal areas. Under Musharraf, the Army and the ISI were much more active against Al Qaeda in the non-tribal areas than they have been under Kayani. The anger of Al Qaeda and its associates against Musharraf because of the action taken by the Army and the ISI was responsible for the virulent campaign of Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri against Musharraf and the Army. They abused Musharraf as apostate, collaborator of the Hindus etc and thrice tried to kill him---once in Karachi and twice in Rawalpindi. Compared to that, there is hardly any Al Qaeda campaign against Kayani. There is a greater threat to Mr.Zardari from Al Qaeda than to Kayani. The Army and the ISI have managed to create an impression in the tribal areas that Mr.Zardari and not Gen.Kayani is responsible for the facilities extended to the US for its Drone (pilotless plane) strikes in the tribal areas. Since Gen.Kayani took over, while many Al Qaeda leaders have been killed in the tribal areas by the Drone strikes, there have been very few arrests of Al Qaeda elements in the non-tribal areas. Al Qaeda feels more secure in the non-tribal areas of Pakistan today than it was under Musharraf.
13. India has reasons to be concerned over the continuance of Gen.Kayani as the COAS. There is unlikely to be any change in Pakistan’s use of terrorism against India. Kayani is thought of well both by the Pentagon and the PLA leadership. The resumed flow of sophisticated US military equipment to Pakistan and the enhanced strategic assistance from China would add to the threats already faced by India. Musharraf started as a fierce adversary of India, but mellowed down over the years. Kayani shows no signs of mellowing down. So long as there is no change in the attitude of Kayani and his Army, including the ISI, even if the elected political leadership sincerely wants better relations with India, it may face difficulties.
14. The continuing paranoia of the Pakistani Army is due to its lingering memories of its humiliation in the 1971 war and its fears that India is determined to break up Pakistan. Any reduction of this paranoia would depend on our success in building up military-military relationships at various levels. The quest for better relations with the Pakistan Army should go hand-in-hand with the quest for better relations with the political leadership and the people. ( 23-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, July 21, 2010
G.K.PILLAI & S.M.KRISHNA
B.RAMAN
A team of investigators from the National Investigation Agency (NIA) of the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Govt. of India had been to the US in the beginning of June to question David Coleman Headley, an American citizen of Pakistani origin, who is presently awaiting sentence by a US federal court in Chicago on charges of conspiracy to blow up the office of a Danish newspaper in Copenhagen, which had published cartoons of Prophet Mohammad, and helping the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in carrying out its terrorist strikes in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008. According to the USA's Federal Bureau of Investigation, he had visited India a number of times to collect operational data such as details of the targets, possible landing points for the LET boat etc for use in the planning of the strikes. Headley had pleaded guilty to these charges and made a plea bargain with the FBI under which he admitted the charges against him in return for an assurance that he would not be sentenced to death. The court is still to pronounce its judgement on his plea bargain.
2. The NIA reportedly interrogated Headley in the presence of his lawyer and the case officer of the FBI. During his interrogation by the NIA team, he reportedly stated that Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) and Navy had assisted the LET in the planning and execution of its sea-borne raid on Mumbai. He also mentioned the names of some ISI officers who were involved.
3. Headley's admission to the NIA team called for three follow-up actions by the Govt. of India:
* Request the US to exercise pressure on Pakistan to act against the officers named by Headley and co-operate with India in the further investigation. One does not know whether this was done.
* Share the information with the Ministry of Interior of the Government of Pakistan and request for investigation and prosecution of the officers involved. It has been reported that this request was made by Mr.P.Chidambaram, our Home Minister, to Mr.Rehman Malik, the Pakistani Interior Minister, whom he met at Islamabad on June 25 and 26 during a conference of SAARC Home/Interior Ministers. The media was not told about it at that time.
* Share the information with the Governments of countries other than the US whose nationals were killed by the LET and request them to exercise pressure on Pakistan to act against the officers named by Headley. One understands that this action has not so far been taken by the Govt. of India at any level.
4. A few days before the departure of Mr.S.M.Krishna, our Minister For External Affairs, to Islamabad for his July 15 meeting with his Pakistani counterpart Mr.Shah Mehmood Qureshi, Mr.G.K.Pillai, our Home Secretary, is alleged to have told a correspondent of the "Indian Express", New Delhi, about the admission made by Headley regarding the involvement of the ISI "from the beginning till the end." His disclosure to the media reportedly vitiated the atmosphere during and after the meeting of the two Foreign Ministers and created avoidable embarrassment for Mr.Krishna, who has expressed his disapproval of the action of Mr.Pillai in two interviews to Indian media on July 21. His objection seems to be to Mr.Pillai's prematurely disclosing it to the media before the Foreign Ministers' meeting, instead of waiting till the meeting was over.
5. Mr.Pillai's action raises two issues. Firstly, the professional wisdom of his action in disclosing to the media sensitive details of the interrogation of a conspirator when the facts relating to the ISI involvement are still under investigation. Secondly, the procedural appropriateness of his action in disclosing Headley's admission to the media without examining the diplomatic implications of his action in consultation with the Foreign Secretary and the Cabinet Secretary.
6. Interrogations of sensitive suspects give rise to the question whether what they have stated should be disclosed to the media before follow-up enquiries into their disclosure have been completed. In August 1994, the MHA told the media details of the ISI involvement in the Mumbai blasts of March 1993 as disclosed to Indian interrogators by some members of the Memon family of Mumbai, who had allegedly played an active role in helping Dawood Ibrahim in carrying out the blasts. When Narasimha Rao, the then Prime Minister, read about it in the media, he was very unhappy. At an inter-departmental meeting at which I was present, Rao told S.B.Chavan, the then Home Minister: "Dawood Ibrahim and the ISI must be frantically trying to find out what the Memon family members are telling their interrogators. We have made their job easy and helped them by disclosing these details of the interrogation to the media."
7. By disclosing details of Headley's interrogation by the NIA, have we similarly unwittingly helped the ISI and the LET to cover up their tracks? This is a very important question, which does not appear to have been addressed.
8. The Home Secretary's disclosure also has diplomatic implications. Firstly, the US would be unhappy that the details have been disclosed to the media at a time when their court is still to pronounce judgement on the plea bargain. Secondly, since there was a danger of its vitiating the atmosphere during the Foreign Ministers' meeting, if the Home Secretary strongly felt that the media should be informed even before the meeting, he should have referred the matter to the collective wisdom of the Secretaries' Committee instead of acting on his own. If the Secretaries' Committee agreed that the media sould be informed, the follow-up action should have been taken by the Foreign Secretary.
9.Previously, national security problems used to arise due to lack of coordination at the level of intelligence and physical security agencies. In the Government of Dr.Manmohan Singh, such problems are arising due to lack of co-ordination at much higher levels such as those of the Home Secretary, the Foreign Secretary, the Defence Secretary and the Cabinet Secretary. This dos not bode well for our national security management.
10. This episode does not speak well of the sense of propriety and professional leadership of Mr.Krishna. At the joint press conference at Islamabad, Mr.Krishna failed to rebuke the Pakistani Foreign Minister when he compared the Home Secretary's disclosure to the media to the instigatory statements of the Amir of the LET. Mr.Krishna is now trying to cover up his confused and over-awed silence on grounds of good manners. This is ridiculous.
11. His publicly blaming the Home Secretary in two media interviews is totally in violation of the rules of ministerial etiquette under which a Minister should not pull up his senior officers in public.Any rebuke must be administered in private and not in public. Mr.Krishna's unwise action mightl affect the stature of the Home Secretary in the eyes of his own staff. The correct thing for Mr.Krishna would have been to convey his unhappiness to Mr.Chidambaram and let him decide how to deal with the matter. Moreover, by publicly expressing his disapproval of the action of the Home Secretary, Mr.Krishna has enabled his Pakistani counterpart to justify his raising the issue of the Home Secretary's disclosure to the media in the obnoxious manner he did. (22-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyoine2@gmail.com )
A team of investigators from the National Investigation Agency (NIA) of the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Govt. of India had been to the US in the beginning of June to question David Coleman Headley, an American citizen of Pakistani origin, who is presently awaiting sentence by a US federal court in Chicago on charges of conspiracy to blow up the office of a Danish newspaper in Copenhagen, which had published cartoons of Prophet Mohammad, and helping the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in carrying out its terrorist strikes in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008. According to the USA's Federal Bureau of Investigation, he had visited India a number of times to collect operational data such as details of the targets, possible landing points for the LET boat etc for use in the planning of the strikes. Headley had pleaded guilty to these charges and made a plea bargain with the FBI under which he admitted the charges against him in return for an assurance that he would not be sentenced to death. The court is still to pronounce its judgement on his plea bargain.
2. The NIA reportedly interrogated Headley in the presence of his lawyer and the case officer of the FBI. During his interrogation by the NIA team, he reportedly stated that Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) and Navy had assisted the LET in the planning and execution of its sea-borne raid on Mumbai. He also mentioned the names of some ISI officers who were involved.
3. Headley's admission to the NIA team called for three follow-up actions by the Govt. of India:
* Request the US to exercise pressure on Pakistan to act against the officers named by Headley and co-operate with India in the further investigation. One does not know whether this was done.
* Share the information with the Ministry of Interior of the Government of Pakistan and request for investigation and prosecution of the officers involved. It has been reported that this request was made by Mr.P.Chidambaram, our Home Minister, to Mr.Rehman Malik, the Pakistani Interior Minister, whom he met at Islamabad on June 25 and 26 during a conference of SAARC Home/Interior Ministers. The media was not told about it at that time.
* Share the information with the Governments of countries other than the US whose nationals were killed by the LET and request them to exercise pressure on Pakistan to act against the officers named by Headley. One understands that this action has not so far been taken by the Govt. of India at any level.
4. A few days before the departure of Mr.S.M.Krishna, our Minister For External Affairs, to Islamabad for his July 15 meeting with his Pakistani counterpart Mr.Shah Mehmood Qureshi, Mr.G.K.Pillai, our Home Secretary, is alleged to have told a correspondent of the "Indian Express", New Delhi, about the admission made by Headley regarding the involvement of the ISI "from the beginning till the end." His disclosure to the media reportedly vitiated the atmosphere during and after the meeting of the two Foreign Ministers and created avoidable embarrassment for Mr.Krishna, who has expressed his disapproval of the action of Mr.Pillai in two interviews to Indian media on July 21. His objection seems to be to Mr.Pillai's prematurely disclosing it to the media before the Foreign Ministers' meeting, instead of waiting till the meeting was over.
5. Mr.Pillai's action raises two issues. Firstly, the professional wisdom of his action in disclosing to the media sensitive details of the interrogation of a conspirator when the facts relating to the ISI involvement are still under investigation. Secondly, the procedural appropriateness of his action in disclosing Headley's admission to the media without examining the diplomatic implications of his action in consultation with the Foreign Secretary and the Cabinet Secretary.
6. Interrogations of sensitive suspects give rise to the question whether what they have stated should be disclosed to the media before follow-up enquiries into their disclosure have been completed. In August 1994, the MHA told the media details of the ISI involvement in the Mumbai blasts of March 1993 as disclosed to Indian interrogators by some members of the Memon family of Mumbai, who had allegedly played an active role in helping Dawood Ibrahim in carrying out the blasts. When Narasimha Rao, the then Prime Minister, read about it in the media, he was very unhappy. At an inter-departmental meeting at which I was present, Rao told S.B.Chavan, the then Home Minister: "Dawood Ibrahim and the ISI must be frantically trying to find out what the Memon family members are telling their interrogators. We have made their job easy and helped them by disclosing these details of the interrogation to the media."
7. By disclosing details of Headley's interrogation by the NIA, have we similarly unwittingly helped the ISI and the LET to cover up their tracks? This is a very important question, which does not appear to have been addressed.
8. The Home Secretary's disclosure also has diplomatic implications. Firstly, the US would be unhappy that the details have been disclosed to the media at a time when their court is still to pronounce judgement on the plea bargain. Secondly, since there was a danger of its vitiating the atmosphere during the Foreign Ministers' meeting, if the Home Secretary strongly felt that the media should be informed even before the meeting, he should have referred the matter to the collective wisdom of the Secretaries' Committee instead of acting on his own. If the Secretaries' Committee agreed that the media sould be informed, the follow-up action should have been taken by the Foreign Secretary.
9.Previously, national security problems used to arise due to lack of coordination at the level of intelligence and physical security agencies. In the Government of Dr.Manmohan Singh, such problems are arising due to lack of co-ordination at much higher levels such as those of the Home Secretary, the Foreign Secretary, the Defence Secretary and the Cabinet Secretary. This dos not bode well for our national security management.
10. This episode does not speak well of the sense of propriety and professional leadership of Mr.Krishna. At the joint press conference at Islamabad, Mr.Krishna failed to rebuke the Pakistani Foreign Minister when he compared the Home Secretary's disclosure to the media to the instigatory statements of the Amir of the LET. Mr.Krishna is now trying to cover up his confused and over-awed silence on grounds of good manners. This is ridiculous.
11. His publicly blaming the Home Secretary in two media interviews is totally in violation of the rules of ministerial etiquette under which a Minister should not pull up his senior officers in public.Any rebuke must be administered in private and not in public. Mr.Krishna's unwise action mightl affect the stature of the Home Secretary in the eyes of his own staff. The correct thing for Mr.Krishna would have been to convey his unhappiness to Mr.Chidambaram and let him decide how to deal with the matter. Moreover, by publicly expressing his disapproval of the action of the Home Secretary, Mr.Krishna has enabled his Pakistani counterpart to justify his raising the issue of the Home Secretary's disclosure to the media in the obnoxious manner he did. (22-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyoine2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, July 20, 2010
LOCKERBIE & MUMBAI 26/11
B.RAMAN
On December 21,1988,Pan Am Flight 103 flying from London to New York was destroyed by a bomb, killing all 243 passengers and 16 crew members. Eleven residents of Lockerbie in southern Scotland were also killed as large sections of the plane fell in and around the town.
2.Joint investigation by the Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary of Scotland and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation( FBI) established after three years that the bombing was carried out by two officers of the Libyan Intelligence, who were identified as Abdelbaset Ali al-Megrahi, who was the security chief of the Libyan Arab Airlines (LAA), and Lamin Khalifah Fhimah, a Libyan intelligence officer working under cover as the station manager of LAA in the Malta airport. The US demanded in the UN Security Council that the two Libyan intelligence officers should be handed over to the Scottish authorities for trial in a neutral venue. On Libya's refusal, the UN Security Council, at the instance of the US, imposed sanctions against Libya. Under sustained international pressure, the Libyan Government handed over the two Libyan intelligence officers to the Scottish Police on April 5,1999. They were tried by a neutral court in Netherlands.
3.On January 31, 2001, Megrahi was convicted of murder by a panel of three Scottish judges and sentenced to 27 years in prison, but Fhimah was acquitted. Megrahi's appeal against his conviction was rejected on March 14, 2002, and his application to the European Court of Human Rights was declared inadmissible in July 2003. On September 23, 2003, he petitioned to the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC) for his conviction to be reviewed. On June 28, 2007 the SCCRC referred the case to the Court of Criminal Appeal in Edinburgh after it found he "may have suffered a miscarriage of justice". He was released from prison on compassionate grounds on August 20, 2009 . It was stated that he was suffering from an incurable ailment He was allowed to return to Libya.
4.On August 15, 2003, Libya's UN Ambassador, Mr. Ahmed Own, informed the UN Security Council that Libya formally accepted "responsibility for the actions of its officials" in relation to the Lockerbie bombing. The Libyan Government paid a compensation of US$8 million to each family which had suffered because of the death of its member or members in the bombing. A sum of US$2.5 million per family was deducted from the compensation payment to reimburse to the Governments concerned the expenditure incurred by them on the investigation and prosecution of the case. The UN and US sanctions against Libya were removed.
5. This is the first instance in the history of counter-terrorism of a State-sponsor of terrorism being held legally accountable for the involvement of its intelligence officers in an act of terrorism abroad targeting innocent civilians. The successful prosecution and the payment of compensation had a salutary effect on the Libyan Government and it stopped sponsoring acts of terrorism through its intelligence agencies to achieve its strategic objectives.
6. The successful and exemplary denouement of the case was made possible by the sustained pressure by the US bilaterally as well as through the UN Security Council, public support for the families of the victims, vigorous activism by the families which did not allow Libya to get away with its criminal act, international support for the US and thorough investigation by the Scottish Police and the FBI.
7.Between November 26 and 29,2008, ten terrorists of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), a Pakistani terrorist organisation, organised a sea-borne raid on two five-star hotels, a restaurant, a Jewish cultural centre, a railway station and a hospital, among other places, in Mumbai. They brutally mowed down many passengers in the railway station, held the inmates of the hotel hostages for three days, killed innocent customers in the restaurant and brutally tortured and killed the inmates of the Jewish centre, including a pregnant Jewish woman.
8. By the time they were neutralised by the Indian security forces after three days, they had killed 166 persons--- 123 Indian civilians, 25 foreign civilians and 18 membvers of the security forces. Of the 25 foreign civilians, six were Israelis, three each were Americans and Germans, two each were Canadians and Australians, and one each were British, Belgian, Italian, French, Mauritian, Malaysian, Singaporean, Thai and Japanese.
9. The investigation by the Indian investigators revealed the involvement of officers of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence and Army in helping the LET in mounting the terrorist attacks in Mumbai. Independently,the FBI had arrested in the first week of October, 2009, David Coleman Headley, a US citizen of Pakistani origin, because intercepts of his telephone conversations and E-mails with persons in Pakistan showed that he was in touch with the LET and Ilyas Kashmiri of the 313 Brigade, both associates of Al Qaeda, and was trying to help them in planning and executing a terrorist strike on a Danish newspaper, which had in 2005 published some cartoons of Prophet Mohammad.
10. His interrogation after his arrest by FBI officers for eight months also revealed that he had helped the LET in mounting the sea-borne terrorist raid on Mumbai. For this purpose, he had visited India a number of times for taking video photography of suitable targets, for studying those targets, for selecting suitable landing points for the LET boat and for storing data on the glibal positioning system subsequently used by the LET. It also came out that in addition to Ilyas Kashmiri, who is a retired officer of the US-trained Special Services Group (SSG) of the Pakistan Army, which is a special force unit, Headley was in touch with other serving and retired officers of the Pakistan Army.
11. In June,2010, the FBI allowed a team of investigators of India's National Investigation Agency (NIA) to interrogate Headley in US custody in the presence of his lawyer and FBI officers. According to the NIA investigators, Headley confessed during his interrogation that the ISI and the Pakistan Navy had played an active role in helping the LET in getting its terrorists trained and in mounting the attack.
12. Thus, the Indian investigators have two types of evidence of the involvement of the ISI and the Pakistani Army----
* Evidence collected by Indian investigators in India on their own. Pakistan and the US can dismiss this evidence as not credible and as probably obtained through questionable methods such as torture of the witnesses and suspects.
* Evidence collected by the NIA team during their interrogation of Headley in the US. It has a very high value and cannot be dismissed as not credible. He was questioned in US and not Indian custody. Hence, the question of using improper methods does not arise. He was questioned in the presence of his lawyer and FBI officers. Hence, any question of the NIA team fabricating the confession does not arise.
13. If US claims of co-operating with India in counter-terrorism are correct and if its protestations of its determination to fight against terrorism wherever it takes place and whoever is involved are to be believed, one would have expected the US to initiate against the Pakistani officers involved and the Pakisani State the same action as it initiated against the Libyan intelligence officers and the State of Libya. It fought against Libya legally and in the UN Security Council for 13 years in order to have the Libyan intelligence officers convicted and to force Libya to pay compensation to the families of the victims. It imposed its own sanctions against Libya and had other sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council.
14. In a typical example of US double standards in counter-terrorism, the US, which was in the forefront of the international campaign to hold Libya accountable for the actions of its intelligence officers, has pushed the evidence against the ISI and its officers under the carpet as it had repeatedly done in the past and has been trying to see that no harm comes to Pakistan.Libya was punished----politically and economically--- for sponsoring terrorism against the US. Pakistan has been repeatedly rewarded---politically and economically despite evidence of the role of its ISI and Army in the sponsorship of terrorism against India.
15. Pakistan is able to get away with its criminal acts and the US is able to get away with its double standards, because we have a Government, which hesitates to raise vigorously such issues to protect our nationals and to maintain our national honour. Inactions by the US are shocking. Inactions by our own Government are equally shocking:
* Did we take up the case before the UN Security Council? No.
* Did we bring the evidence collected by us to the notice of the anti-terrorism committee of the UN Security Council and demand a debate and follow-up action? No.
* Did we bring the confession of Headley to the notice of the UN Security Council? No.
* Did we register an offence against the ISI and other Pakistani Army officers named by Headley and take up our own investigation? No.
* Did we convene a conference of the officials of the countries whose nationals were killed by the LET, share the evidence against the ISI with them and request them that they too should raise this matter in appropriate fora? No.
* Did we help the familes of the victims in mounting a campaign for the payment of compensation by Pakistan? No.
16. I have been saying and writing for many years that we should follow a two-pronged policy towards Pakistan---"Talk, talk, hit, hit" . Talk, if useful. Hit, if necessary. We have a Government which only wants to talk and does not want to hit.
17. The role of our opposition parties has been equally dismal. They were only interested in exploiting the terrorist strikes during the election campaign last year and for embarrassing the Congress party now. Beyond that, they have hardly done anything to see that justice was done. (21-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
On December 21,1988,Pan Am Flight 103 flying from London to New York was destroyed by a bomb, killing all 243 passengers and 16 crew members. Eleven residents of Lockerbie in southern Scotland were also killed as large sections of the plane fell in and around the town.
2.Joint investigation by the Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary of Scotland and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation( FBI) established after three years that the bombing was carried out by two officers of the Libyan Intelligence, who were identified as Abdelbaset Ali al-Megrahi, who was the security chief of the Libyan Arab Airlines (LAA), and Lamin Khalifah Fhimah, a Libyan intelligence officer working under cover as the station manager of LAA in the Malta airport. The US demanded in the UN Security Council that the two Libyan intelligence officers should be handed over to the Scottish authorities for trial in a neutral venue. On Libya's refusal, the UN Security Council, at the instance of the US, imposed sanctions against Libya. Under sustained international pressure, the Libyan Government handed over the two Libyan intelligence officers to the Scottish Police on April 5,1999. They were tried by a neutral court in Netherlands.
3.On January 31, 2001, Megrahi was convicted of murder by a panel of three Scottish judges and sentenced to 27 years in prison, but Fhimah was acquitted. Megrahi's appeal against his conviction was rejected on March 14, 2002, and his application to the European Court of Human Rights was declared inadmissible in July 2003. On September 23, 2003, he petitioned to the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC) for his conviction to be reviewed. On June 28, 2007 the SCCRC referred the case to the Court of Criminal Appeal in Edinburgh after it found he "may have suffered a miscarriage of justice". He was released from prison on compassionate grounds on August 20, 2009 . It was stated that he was suffering from an incurable ailment He was allowed to return to Libya.
4.On August 15, 2003, Libya's UN Ambassador, Mr. Ahmed Own, informed the UN Security Council that Libya formally accepted "responsibility for the actions of its officials" in relation to the Lockerbie bombing. The Libyan Government paid a compensation of US$8 million to each family which had suffered because of the death of its member or members in the bombing. A sum of US$2.5 million per family was deducted from the compensation payment to reimburse to the Governments concerned the expenditure incurred by them on the investigation and prosecution of the case. The UN and US sanctions against Libya were removed.
5. This is the first instance in the history of counter-terrorism of a State-sponsor of terrorism being held legally accountable for the involvement of its intelligence officers in an act of terrorism abroad targeting innocent civilians. The successful prosecution and the payment of compensation had a salutary effect on the Libyan Government and it stopped sponsoring acts of terrorism through its intelligence agencies to achieve its strategic objectives.
6. The successful and exemplary denouement of the case was made possible by the sustained pressure by the US bilaterally as well as through the UN Security Council, public support for the families of the victims, vigorous activism by the families which did not allow Libya to get away with its criminal act, international support for the US and thorough investigation by the Scottish Police and the FBI.
7.Between November 26 and 29,2008, ten terrorists of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), a Pakistani terrorist organisation, organised a sea-borne raid on two five-star hotels, a restaurant, a Jewish cultural centre, a railway station and a hospital, among other places, in Mumbai. They brutally mowed down many passengers in the railway station, held the inmates of the hotel hostages for three days, killed innocent customers in the restaurant and brutally tortured and killed the inmates of the Jewish centre, including a pregnant Jewish woman.
8. By the time they were neutralised by the Indian security forces after three days, they had killed 166 persons--- 123 Indian civilians, 25 foreign civilians and 18 membvers of the security forces. Of the 25 foreign civilians, six were Israelis, three each were Americans and Germans, two each were Canadians and Australians, and one each were British, Belgian, Italian, French, Mauritian, Malaysian, Singaporean, Thai and Japanese.
9. The investigation by the Indian investigators revealed the involvement of officers of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence and Army in helping the LET in mounting the terrorist attacks in Mumbai. Independently,the FBI had arrested in the first week of October, 2009, David Coleman Headley, a US citizen of Pakistani origin, because intercepts of his telephone conversations and E-mails with persons in Pakistan showed that he was in touch with the LET and Ilyas Kashmiri of the 313 Brigade, both associates of Al Qaeda, and was trying to help them in planning and executing a terrorist strike on a Danish newspaper, which had in 2005 published some cartoons of Prophet Mohammad.
10. His interrogation after his arrest by FBI officers for eight months also revealed that he had helped the LET in mounting the sea-borne terrorist raid on Mumbai. For this purpose, he had visited India a number of times for taking video photography of suitable targets, for studying those targets, for selecting suitable landing points for the LET boat and for storing data on the glibal positioning system subsequently used by the LET. It also came out that in addition to Ilyas Kashmiri, who is a retired officer of the US-trained Special Services Group (SSG) of the Pakistan Army, which is a special force unit, Headley was in touch with other serving and retired officers of the Pakistan Army.
11. In June,2010, the FBI allowed a team of investigators of India's National Investigation Agency (NIA) to interrogate Headley in US custody in the presence of his lawyer and FBI officers. According to the NIA investigators, Headley confessed during his interrogation that the ISI and the Pakistan Navy had played an active role in helping the LET in getting its terrorists trained and in mounting the attack.
12. Thus, the Indian investigators have two types of evidence of the involvement of the ISI and the Pakistani Army----
* Evidence collected by Indian investigators in India on their own. Pakistan and the US can dismiss this evidence as not credible and as probably obtained through questionable methods such as torture of the witnesses and suspects.
* Evidence collected by the NIA team during their interrogation of Headley in the US. It has a very high value and cannot be dismissed as not credible. He was questioned in US and not Indian custody. Hence, the question of using improper methods does not arise. He was questioned in the presence of his lawyer and FBI officers. Hence, any question of the NIA team fabricating the confession does not arise.
13. If US claims of co-operating with India in counter-terrorism are correct and if its protestations of its determination to fight against terrorism wherever it takes place and whoever is involved are to be believed, one would have expected the US to initiate against the Pakistani officers involved and the Pakisani State the same action as it initiated against the Libyan intelligence officers and the State of Libya. It fought against Libya legally and in the UN Security Council for 13 years in order to have the Libyan intelligence officers convicted and to force Libya to pay compensation to the families of the victims. It imposed its own sanctions against Libya and had other sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council.
14. In a typical example of US double standards in counter-terrorism, the US, which was in the forefront of the international campaign to hold Libya accountable for the actions of its intelligence officers, has pushed the evidence against the ISI and its officers under the carpet as it had repeatedly done in the past and has been trying to see that no harm comes to Pakistan.Libya was punished----politically and economically--- for sponsoring terrorism against the US. Pakistan has been repeatedly rewarded---politically and economically despite evidence of the role of its ISI and Army in the sponsorship of terrorism against India.
15. Pakistan is able to get away with its criminal acts and the US is able to get away with its double standards, because we have a Government, which hesitates to raise vigorously such issues to protect our nationals and to maintain our national honour. Inactions by the US are shocking. Inactions by our own Government are equally shocking:
* Did we take up the case before the UN Security Council? No.
* Did we bring the evidence collected by us to the notice of the anti-terrorism committee of the UN Security Council and demand a debate and follow-up action? No.
* Did we bring the confession of Headley to the notice of the UN Security Council? No.
* Did we register an offence against the ISI and other Pakistani Army officers named by Headley and take up our own investigation? No.
* Did we convene a conference of the officials of the countries whose nationals were killed by the LET, share the evidence against the ISI with them and request them that they too should raise this matter in appropriate fora? No.
* Did we help the familes of the victims in mounting a campaign for the payment of compensation by Pakistan? No.
16. I have been saying and writing for many years that we should follow a two-pronged policy towards Pakistan---"Talk, talk, hit, hit" . Talk, if useful. Hit, if necessary. We have a Government which only wants to talk and does not want to hit.
17. The role of our opposition parties has been equally dismal. They were only interested in exploiting the terrorist strikes during the election campaign last year and for embarrassing the Congress party now. Beyond that, they have hardly done anything to see that justice was done. (21-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, July 19, 2010
SITUATION IN IRANIAN BALOCHISTAN: AN UPDATE
B.RAMAN
"The Iranian authorities have been projecting the Jundallah as a surrogate of the US intelligence operating from sanctuaries in Pakistani territory. They have been alleging that the periodic terrorist strikes in Iranian Balochistan are being mounted from Pakistani territory. While they accuse the Pakistani authorities of inaction against the anti-Iranian Sunni elements operating from Pakistani territory, they have never accused the Baloch nationalist organisations of Pakistani Balochistan of backing the Jundallah. They have been suspecting the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ), the anti-Shia organisation of Pakistan which is allied with Al Qaeda, to be training the suicide bombers of the Jundallah. Some of the statements attributed to the Jundallah are disseminated from London. This has created some suspicion in the minds of the Iranian authorities that the UK is also probably backing the Jundallah in its anti-Teheran activities. The capture of the Amir of the Jundallah is a major blow to this organisation. With the two brothers who were the moving spirit of this organisation now in the custody of the Iranian authorities, the organisation has definitely suffered a set-back at least temporarily. But the anti-Shia and anti-Teheran anger in Sunni Sistan-Balochistan is so intense and so widespread that it is only a question of time before a new leadership emerges. Ant-Shia organisations of Pakistan such as the LEJ would also see that the anti-Shia movement in the Sunni majority frontier areas of Iran is kept alive."
------- Extract from my article of February 24,2010, titled " Iranian Intelligence Captures Anti-Tehran Baloch Sunni Leader"available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers37/paper3690.html
---------------------------------
Iranian satisfaction over the arrest and execution of Abdolmalek Rigi, the Amir of the Iranian Jundallah, and his brother, Abdolhamid Rigi,who were in the forefront of the resistance movement in Iranian Balochistan known as Sistan Balochistan, has proved short-lived. The resistance movement was partly Sunni extremist directed against the Shias in Iranian Balochistan and partly Baloch nationalist directed against the members of the Iranian security forces deployed in the province.
2. Abdolhamid Rigi was reportedly arrested by the Pakistani authorities in 2008 and handed over to the Iranian authorities. Abdolmalek Rigi was captured by the Iranian intelligence towards the end of February last as he was travelling by air from Dubai to Kyrgyzstan. The plane was forced to land in an Iranian airport and he was taken into custody. It was reported that information about his plan to travel by this flight was passed on to the Iranian authorities by the Pakistani Government. After the capture of its Amir by the Iranian intelligence, the Jundallah announced that Muhammad Dhahir Baluch would act as the Amir in his place.
3.The Iranian authorities executed Abdolhamid Rigi in May last and Abdolmalek Rigi in June last. The two brothers were accused, inter alia, of being mercenaries of the US and Israeli intelligence. The Jundallah warned of retaliation against the Iranian and the Pakistani authorities. The retaliation came promptly---- first from the Lashksar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) in Pakistan. On the night of July 1,2010, over 40 worshippers were killed in twin suicide blasts in a highly venerated sufi shrine of Lahore popularly known as Data Darbar. While there has been no authentic claim of responsibility for these blasts, the needle of suspicion pointed to its probably being an act of reprisal against the Pakistan Government by the Jundallah of Iranian Balochistan and the anti-Shia and anti-Iran Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) of Pakistan in retaliation for the suspected collaboration of Pakistan with Iran in the arrest of Abdolmalek Rigi.
4. The retaliation against the Iranian authorities came on July 15, the birth anniversary of Imam Hussein, the grandson of Prophet Mohammad, when two suicide bombers blew themselves up at the time of the prayers in the Grand Mosque of Zahedan, the capital of the Sistan Balochistan province. Twenty-seven Shia worshippers, many of them officers of the Revolutionary Guards, were killed. A suspect dressed as a woman was stopped by the security authorities at the entrance for personal search. The person blew himself up. As people rushed to the area to help those injured, a second bomber blew himself up.
5.The Jundallah has claimed responsibility for the suicide explosions and has named the suicide bombers as Abdolbaset Rigi and Mohammad Rigi, both reportedly related to Abdolmalek Rigi. In a message sent to al-Arabiyya TV, Jundallah said it carried out the attacks to avenge the hanging of Abdolmalek Rigi. The Governor of the province, Mr. Ali Mohammad Azad, has blamed foreign intelligence services for the terrorist attack. He said in a statement: “It is obvious that the intelligence services of certain states and arrogant powers are behind the twin blasts outside the Zahedan Grand Mosque…. Enemies outside Iranian borders are making every effort to undermine Iran's security.”
6.President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was reported to have alleged at a Cabinet meeting on July 18 that US forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan were backing bombings such as the two suicide attacks and that the Pakistani Government was also accountable. ISNA, the State-owned news agency, quoted him as having told the Cabinet as follows: “If (US President Barack) Obama is unaware of actions of American forces, then we tell him that American forces based in Afghanistan and Pakistan back such actions. NATO and US forces back terrorists with equipment and funds to launch such attacks in Iran.Despite this support, the US President sends a message of sympathy.Islamabad must also be held accountable for such actions. We are friends of Pakistan and we are by its side, but at any rate the Government of that country should be accountable.” Iranian Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani told the Parliament the same day that the Pakistan Government must be answerable for the presence of evil people in its territory. The Chairman of Iran's Parliament National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, Mr. Alaeddin Boroujerdi, said on July 17 that Pakistan must be answerable for sheltering terrorists.
"Terrorism needs to be confronted more seriously.Given the fact that Pakistan is terrorists' shelter, Pakistani officials must be held accountable for the issue." Without naming Pakistan specifically, Mr.Ahmadreza Radan, Iran's deputy police chief, has issued a tough warning to “neighbors on the eastern borders” of Iran. He said: “The Islamic Republic considers it its right to deal with insurgents who disappear into the other side of the border.,”
7. From these statements and warnings, it is evident that the Iranian authorities suspect that the new leadership of the Jundallah was also operating from the Pakistani territory and that the two suicide bombers had come from Pakistani territory. They seem to suspect that the Jundallah continues to have its volunteers trained for suicide terrorism in Pakistani territory. In the past, they had accused the Jundallah of having links with Al Qaeda, without mentioning specifically the LEJ, which is an associate of Al Qaeda. It is likely that the LEJ continues to train the Jundallah in its camps in North Waziristan. The fact that the Jundallah suicide bombers, after training, are able to cross into Sistan Balochistan without being detected by the Iranian border guards speaks of some local support on both sides of the Pakistan-Iran border.Zahedan, with an estimated population of 5,80,000, is located near the border and is easily susceptible to suicide attacks and hit and run raids across the border from Pakistani territory. Iranian authorities periodically warn Islamabad they would undertake hot pursuit and cross-border raids, but avoid carrying out the threats lest it spoil their state-to-state relations with Pakistan and lead to more anti-Shia incidents in Pakistan. Sunni extremist organisations of Pakistan such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba and the LEJ tend to attack the Shias of Pakistan to express their anger against Iran. They look upon the Shias of Pakistan as the fifth columnists of Iran.
8. It is difficult to assess what support the Jundallah has inside Sistan Balochistan. However, it is evident from a study of its strikes so far that while it is in a position to indulge in sporadic acts of terrorism, it is not in a position to organise a sustained insurgency which could endanger the Iranian position in the province. ( 20-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
"The Iranian authorities have been projecting the Jundallah as a surrogate of the US intelligence operating from sanctuaries in Pakistani territory. They have been alleging that the periodic terrorist strikes in Iranian Balochistan are being mounted from Pakistani territory. While they accuse the Pakistani authorities of inaction against the anti-Iranian Sunni elements operating from Pakistani territory, they have never accused the Baloch nationalist organisations of Pakistani Balochistan of backing the Jundallah. They have been suspecting the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ), the anti-Shia organisation of Pakistan which is allied with Al Qaeda, to be training the suicide bombers of the Jundallah. Some of the statements attributed to the Jundallah are disseminated from London. This has created some suspicion in the minds of the Iranian authorities that the UK is also probably backing the Jundallah in its anti-Teheran activities. The capture of the Amir of the Jundallah is a major blow to this organisation. With the two brothers who were the moving spirit of this organisation now in the custody of the Iranian authorities, the organisation has definitely suffered a set-back at least temporarily. But the anti-Shia and anti-Teheran anger in Sunni Sistan-Balochistan is so intense and so widespread that it is only a question of time before a new leadership emerges. Ant-Shia organisations of Pakistan such as the LEJ would also see that the anti-Shia movement in the Sunni majority frontier areas of Iran is kept alive."
------- Extract from my article of February 24,2010, titled " Iranian Intelligence Captures Anti-Tehran Baloch Sunni Leader"available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers37/paper3690.html
---------------------------------
Iranian satisfaction over the arrest and execution of Abdolmalek Rigi, the Amir of the Iranian Jundallah, and his brother, Abdolhamid Rigi,who were in the forefront of the resistance movement in Iranian Balochistan known as Sistan Balochistan, has proved short-lived. The resistance movement was partly Sunni extremist directed against the Shias in Iranian Balochistan and partly Baloch nationalist directed against the members of the Iranian security forces deployed in the province.
2. Abdolhamid Rigi was reportedly arrested by the Pakistani authorities in 2008 and handed over to the Iranian authorities. Abdolmalek Rigi was captured by the Iranian intelligence towards the end of February last as he was travelling by air from Dubai to Kyrgyzstan. The plane was forced to land in an Iranian airport and he was taken into custody. It was reported that information about his plan to travel by this flight was passed on to the Iranian authorities by the Pakistani Government. After the capture of its Amir by the Iranian intelligence, the Jundallah announced that Muhammad Dhahir Baluch would act as the Amir in his place.
3.The Iranian authorities executed Abdolhamid Rigi in May last and Abdolmalek Rigi in June last. The two brothers were accused, inter alia, of being mercenaries of the US and Israeli intelligence. The Jundallah warned of retaliation against the Iranian and the Pakistani authorities. The retaliation came promptly---- first from the Lashksar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) in Pakistan. On the night of July 1,2010, over 40 worshippers were killed in twin suicide blasts in a highly venerated sufi shrine of Lahore popularly known as Data Darbar. While there has been no authentic claim of responsibility for these blasts, the needle of suspicion pointed to its probably being an act of reprisal against the Pakistan Government by the Jundallah of Iranian Balochistan and the anti-Shia and anti-Iran Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) of Pakistan in retaliation for the suspected collaboration of Pakistan with Iran in the arrest of Abdolmalek Rigi.
4. The retaliation against the Iranian authorities came on July 15, the birth anniversary of Imam Hussein, the grandson of Prophet Mohammad, when two suicide bombers blew themselves up at the time of the prayers in the Grand Mosque of Zahedan, the capital of the Sistan Balochistan province. Twenty-seven Shia worshippers, many of them officers of the Revolutionary Guards, were killed. A suspect dressed as a woman was stopped by the security authorities at the entrance for personal search. The person blew himself up. As people rushed to the area to help those injured, a second bomber blew himself up.
5.The Jundallah has claimed responsibility for the suicide explosions and has named the suicide bombers as Abdolbaset Rigi and Mohammad Rigi, both reportedly related to Abdolmalek Rigi. In a message sent to al-Arabiyya TV, Jundallah said it carried out the attacks to avenge the hanging of Abdolmalek Rigi. The Governor of the province, Mr. Ali Mohammad Azad, has blamed foreign intelligence services for the terrorist attack. He said in a statement: “It is obvious that the intelligence services of certain states and arrogant powers are behind the twin blasts outside the Zahedan Grand Mosque…. Enemies outside Iranian borders are making every effort to undermine Iran's security.”
6.President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was reported to have alleged at a Cabinet meeting on July 18 that US forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan were backing bombings such as the two suicide attacks and that the Pakistani Government was also accountable. ISNA, the State-owned news agency, quoted him as having told the Cabinet as follows: “If (US President Barack) Obama is unaware of actions of American forces, then we tell him that American forces based in Afghanistan and Pakistan back such actions. NATO and US forces back terrorists with equipment and funds to launch such attacks in Iran.Despite this support, the US President sends a message of sympathy.Islamabad must also be held accountable for such actions. We are friends of Pakistan and we are by its side, but at any rate the Government of that country should be accountable.” Iranian Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani told the Parliament the same day that the Pakistan Government must be answerable for the presence of evil people in its territory. The Chairman of Iran's Parliament National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, Mr. Alaeddin Boroujerdi, said on July 17 that Pakistan must be answerable for sheltering terrorists.
"Terrorism needs to be confronted more seriously.Given the fact that Pakistan is terrorists' shelter, Pakistani officials must be held accountable for the issue." Without naming Pakistan specifically, Mr.Ahmadreza Radan, Iran's deputy police chief, has issued a tough warning to “neighbors on the eastern borders” of Iran. He said: “The Islamic Republic considers it its right to deal with insurgents who disappear into the other side of the border.,”
7. From these statements and warnings, it is evident that the Iranian authorities suspect that the new leadership of the Jundallah was also operating from the Pakistani territory and that the two suicide bombers had come from Pakistani territory. They seem to suspect that the Jundallah continues to have its volunteers trained for suicide terrorism in Pakistani territory. In the past, they had accused the Jundallah of having links with Al Qaeda, without mentioning specifically the LEJ, which is an associate of Al Qaeda. It is likely that the LEJ continues to train the Jundallah in its camps in North Waziristan. The fact that the Jundallah suicide bombers, after training, are able to cross into Sistan Balochistan without being detected by the Iranian border guards speaks of some local support on both sides of the Pakistan-Iran border.Zahedan, with an estimated population of 5,80,000, is located near the border and is easily susceptible to suicide attacks and hit and run raids across the border from Pakistani territory. Iranian authorities periodically warn Islamabad they would undertake hot pursuit and cross-border raids, but avoid carrying out the threats lest it spoil their state-to-state relations with Pakistan and lead to more anti-Shia incidents in Pakistan. Sunni extremist organisations of Pakistan such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba and the LEJ tend to attack the Shias of Pakistan to express their anger against Iran. They look upon the Shias of Pakistan as the fifth columnists of Iran.
8. It is difficult to assess what support the Jundallah has inside Sistan Balochistan. However, it is evident from a study of its strikes so far that while it is in a position to indulge in sporadic acts of terrorism, it is not in a position to organise a sustained insurgency which could endanger the Iranian position in the province. ( 20-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
MY THOUGHTS ON AFGHANISTAN
B.RAMAN
The situation in Afghanistan differs in some significant aspects from the situation that had prevailed when the Soviet troops withdrew in 1988-89.
2.The Soviets had left in Najibullah a capable Pashtun leader who was a three-in-one---- a leader with good political instincts, a good military commander and a good intelligence professional who had headed the Khad, the then Afghan intelligence agency. He had the support of the Uzbeks headed by Rashid Dostum, but the Tajiks headed by the late Ahmed Shah Masood were against him and supporting the anti-Najib Pashtun Mujahideen groups.
3.In the months before the Soviet withdrawal, Moscow had transferred considerable responsibilities to Najib, who was handling the ground situation competently. He belied the expectations of the US that his Government and Army would collapse once the Soviets left. They didn't. On the contrary, he managed to consolidate his position on the ground and strengthened his links with the Awami National Party in the NWFP (now called Khyber-Pakhtoonkwa) and the Balochs under Khair Bux Marri. The ANP and the cadres of Marri became excellent providers of HUMINT for him. He not only survived, but beat back an ISI-instigated and led attempt by the Afghan Mujahideen to capture Jalalabad. The rout of the Mujahideen at Jalalabad led to the exit of Lt.Gen.Hamid Gul from the post of Director-General of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence ( ISI).
4.Najib survived for nearly four years. What ultimately led to his defeat and fall in April 1992 was his split with Dostum and the desertion of the Uzbek troops from the Afghan Army.
5.As contrasted with Najib, President Hamid Karzai has neither good political instincts nor military capability nor an aptitude for intelligence.The kind of operational responsibilities which the Soviets had entrusted to Najib, the Americans have not given to Karzai, who hardly plays any role in the command and control of the ground operations.The Soviets encouraged and trained local leadership.The US control over Afghanistan has not given scope for local leadership to assume effective command and control.
6. Mr.Karzai is inexperienced despite being in power for nearly eight years and may not be able to last long if he falls out with the Northern Alliance elements with whom his relations are even now hardly cordial.Once the Americans withdraw or considerably reduce their presence in Afghanistan, the chances of Mr. Karzai continuing to remain in power would depend upon the unity between him and the elements of the Northern Alliance. If the unity fails, the Tajiks and the Uzbeks will take over control of their respective ethnic areas as they did when the ISI-created Taliban captured Kabul in September 1996.
7. If this happens, we will revert to the de facto partition of Afghanistan that had prevailed between September 1996 and October 2001---- with the Pashtuns under the Taliban in control of the Pashtun areas and the Tajiks and Uzbeks in control of their areas. If the Tajiks and Uzbeks can retain control of Kabul this time, they will be in a slightly better position than they were between 1996 and 2001.We will face another bleeding stalemate with the Tajik-Uzbek combine and the Pashtuns having sufficient capability to make each other bleed, but not being able to prevail---one over the other.
8. The ability of one to prevail over the other would depend upon whether it is able to get air support. The Northern Alliance, which was not able to prevail over the Taliban till 9/11, managed to after 9/11 because of the US air support. The Taliban, which resisted the Northern Alliance till 9/11, collapsed thereafter because it did not have any air support. In the eventuality of another conflict between the Taliban on the one side and the Tajiks-Uzbeks on the other, the US would not give air support to the Tajiks-Uzbek combine. The Pashtuns are better fighters than the Tajiks and Uzbeks. They constitute about 20 per cent of the Pakistan Army. They can help the US in its war against Al Qaeda if they want to. The US would not like to antagonise them further than it has already done. The US would, therefore, remain neutral, making sure that no other external air power intervenes. History will repeat itself. The Tajiks and Uzbeks will look up to India, Iran and Russia for help. Iran would most probably respond positively. Russia too would, probably. India, unlike in 1997, may not be able to even if it wants because of its growing strategic dependence on the US. The scope for any role for external powers would thus be limited.
9. How the situation turns on the ground would depend on Al Qaeda now based in North Waziristan and its allies and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Neither was a player in the Af-Pak scenario before 1996. Al Qaeda has emerged as an important player after Osama bin Laden shifted to Afghanistan from the Sudan in 1996. The TTP has emerged as an important player after the Pakistani Army's commando action in the Lal Masjid of Islamabad in July 2007 during which a large number of Pashtun children were killed.Neither Al Qaeda nor the TTP is playing an important role in the ground situation in Afghanistan today. Al Qaeda has left command and control completely in the hands of the Afghan Taliban. The relationship between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP is strained. The Afghan Taliban looks upon the Pakistan Army as an ally. The TTP looks upon it as an adversary. Al Qaeda looks upon the Pakistan Army as apostate because of its co-operation with the US . As a result of these factors, the support of Al Qaeda and the TTP to the Afghan Taliban may not be whole-hearted.
10. As a result, we might find a triangular confrontation on the ground if and when the US-led NATO troops leave or thin themselves down. This confrontation would involve the Afghan Taliban supported by Pakistan, the Northern Alliance remnants supported by Iran and Russia probably and by India too possibly and the Al Qaeda-TTP combine without any external support. The Pashtun support will be divided. The Afghan Pashtuns will support the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistan Army. The Pakistani Pashtuns of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) will support Al Qaeda and its allies and the TTP.
11. The expectations that there will be a resurgence of the independent Pashtunistan movement as a result of the developments is a pipedream. The independent Pashtunistan movement has enjoyed support only among the Pashtuns of Khyber-Paktoonkwa and not among the Pashtuns of the FATA, who do not support it even today. The Pashtun community has prospered considerably in Pakistan. There are more Pashtuns in Karachi today than in Peshawar. The Pashtuns have emerged as a dominant community in certain parts of Balochistan, including Quetta. The Pashtuns and the Punjabis are the major beneficiaries of the development of the Gwadar area. The Pashtuns of Pakistan are beneficiaries of the NATO's involvement in Afghanistan. They control the truck business and are minting millions from the Americans by monopolising the movement of logistic supplies for the NATO troops from Karachi. The Pashtuns know they might lose all these benefits if they separate from Pakistan. They will keep shouting slogans for an independent Pashtunistan from time to time to scare the Pakistanis and to add to our pipedreams, but they don't want it.
12. How then will the triangular confrontation end? The Pakistan Army will ultimately succeed in making all the Pashtuns unite in support of its agenda. If and when that happens, the Tajiks and Uzbeks will make peace with them. India's options will be very limited. All we can do is clearly identify our objective allies and stick to them as long as possible in the hope that they would emerge as important players if not the dominant player, and support our interests. Our objective allies would be the Tajiks and the Pashtun supporters of the ANP and Mr.Karzai. The Uzbeks will be unpredictable. ( 19-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyobe2@gmail.com )
The situation in Afghanistan differs in some significant aspects from the situation that had prevailed when the Soviet troops withdrew in 1988-89.
2.The Soviets had left in Najibullah a capable Pashtun leader who was a three-in-one---- a leader with good political instincts, a good military commander and a good intelligence professional who had headed the Khad, the then Afghan intelligence agency. He had the support of the Uzbeks headed by Rashid Dostum, but the Tajiks headed by the late Ahmed Shah Masood were against him and supporting the anti-Najib Pashtun Mujahideen groups.
3.In the months before the Soviet withdrawal, Moscow had transferred considerable responsibilities to Najib, who was handling the ground situation competently. He belied the expectations of the US that his Government and Army would collapse once the Soviets left. They didn't. On the contrary, he managed to consolidate his position on the ground and strengthened his links with the Awami National Party in the NWFP (now called Khyber-Pakhtoonkwa) and the Balochs under Khair Bux Marri. The ANP and the cadres of Marri became excellent providers of HUMINT for him. He not only survived, but beat back an ISI-instigated and led attempt by the Afghan Mujahideen to capture Jalalabad. The rout of the Mujahideen at Jalalabad led to the exit of Lt.Gen.Hamid Gul from the post of Director-General of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence ( ISI).
4.Najib survived for nearly four years. What ultimately led to his defeat and fall in April 1992 was his split with Dostum and the desertion of the Uzbek troops from the Afghan Army.
5.As contrasted with Najib, President Hamid Karzai has neither good political instincts nor military capability nor an aptitude for intelligence.The kind of operational responsibilities which the Soviets had entrusted to Najib, the Americans have not given to Karzai, who hardly plays any role in the command and control of the ground operations.The Soviets encouraged and trained local leadership.The US control over Afghanistan has not given scope for local leadership to assume effective command and control.
6. Mr.Karzai is inexperienced despite being in power for nearly eight years and may not be able to last long if he falls out with the Northern Alliance elements with whom his relations are even now hardly cordial.Once the Americans withdraw or considerably reduce their presence in Afghanistan, the chances of Mr. Karzai continuing to remain in power would depend upon the unity between him and the elements of the Northern Alliance. If the unity fails, the Tajiks and the Uzbeks will take over control of their respective ethnic areas as they did when the ISI-created Taliban captured Kabul in September 1996.
7. If this happens, we will revert to the de facto partition of Afghanistan that had prevailed between September 1996 and October 2001---- with the Pashtuns under the Taliban in control of the Pashtun areas and the Tajiks and Uzbeks in control of their areas. If the Tajiks and Uzbeks can retain control of Kabul this time, they will be in a slightly better position than they were between 1996 and 2001.We will face another bleeding stalemate with the Tajik-Uzbek combine and the Pashtuns having sufficient capability to make each other bleed, but not being able to prevail---one over the other.
8. The ability of one to prevail over the other would depend upon whether it is able to get air support. The Northern Alliance, which was not able to prevail over the Taliban till 9/11, managed to after 9/11 because of the US air support. The Taliban, which resisted the Northern Alliance till 9/11, collapsed thereafter because it did not have any air support. In the eventuality of another conflict between the Taliban on the one side and the Tajiks-Uzbeks on the other, the US would not give air support to the Tajiks-Uzbek combine. The Pashtuns are better fighters than the Tajiks and Uzbeks. They constitute about 20 per cent of the Pakistan Army. They can help the US in its war against Al Qaeda if they want to. The US would not like to antagonise them further than it has already done. The US would, therefore, remain neutral, making sure that no other external air power intervenes. History will repeat itself. The Tajiks and Uzbeks will look up to India, Iran and Russia for help. Iran would most probably respond positively. Russia too would, probably. India, unlike in 1997, may not be able to even if it wants because of its growing strategic dependence on the US. The scope for any role for external powers would thus be limited.
9. How the situation turns on the ground would depend on Al Qaeda now based in North Waziristan and its allies and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Neither was a player in the Af-Pak scenario before 1996. Al Qaeda has emerged as an important player after Osama bin Laden shifted to Afghanistan from the Sudan in 1996. The TTP has emerged as an important player after the Pakistani Army's commando action in the Lal Masjid of Islamabad in July 2007 during which a large number of Pashtun children were killed.Neither Al Qaeda nor the TTP is playing an important role in the ground situation in Afghanistan today. Al Qaeda has left command and control completely in the hands of the Afghan Taliban. The relationship between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP is strained. The Afghan Taliban looks upon the Pakistan Army as an ally. The TTP looks upon it as an adversary. Al Qaeda looks upon the Pakistan Army as apostate because of its co-operation with the US . As a result of these factors, the support of Al Qaeda and the TTP to the Afghan Taliban may not be whole-hearted.
10. As a result, we might find a triangular confrontation on the ground if and when the US-led NATO troops leave or thin themselves down. This confrontation would involve the Afghan Taliban supported by Pakistan, the Northern Alliance remnants supported by Iran and Russia probably and by India too possibly and the Al Qaeda-TTP combine without any external support. The Pashtun support will be divided. The Afghan Pashtuns will support the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistan Army. The Pakistani Pashtuns of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) will support Al Qaeda and its allies and the TTP.
11. The expectations that there will be a resurgence of the independent Pashtunistan movement as a result of the developments is a pipedream. The independent Pashtunistan movement has enjoyed support only among the Pashtuns of Khyber-Paktoonkwa and not among the Pashtuns of the FATA, who do not support it even today. The Pashtun community has prospered considerably in Pakistan. There are more Pashtuns in Karachi today than in Peshawar. The Pashtuns have emerged as a dominant community in certain parts of Balochistan, including Quetta. The Pashtuns and the Punjabis are the major beneficiaries of the development of the Gwadar area. The Pashtuns of Pakistan are beneficiaries of the NATO's involvement in Afghanistan. They control the truck business and are minting millions from the Americans by monopolising the movement of logistic supplies for the NATO troops from Karachi. The Pashtuns know they might lose all these benefits if they separate from Pakistan. They will keep shouting slogans for an independent Pashtunistan from time to time to scare the Pakistanis and to add to our pipedreams, but they don't want it.
12. How then will the triangular confrontation end? The Pakistan Army will ultimately succeed in making all the Pashtuns unite in support of its agenda. If and when that happens, the Tajiks and Uzbeks will make peace with them. India's options will be very limited. All we can do is clearly identify our objective allies and stick to them as long as possible in the hope that they would emerge as important players if not the dominant player, and support our interests. Our objective allies would be the Tajiks and the Pashtun supporters of the ANP and Mr.Karzai. The Uzbeks will be unpredictable. ( 19-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyobe2@gmail.com )
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