B.RAMAN
The volunteers of the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS), who protested outside the offices of the "Headlines Today" TV channel on July 16,2010, did not bring credit to the organisation. They were protesting against a programme telecast by the channel the previous day regarding the alleged role of some elements associated with the RSS in connection with acts of reprisal terrorism against Muslims and their places of worship. Individual members of the Hindu community have been arrested in connection with these attacks on some sections of the Muslim community and their places of worship.
2. The case is still under investigation. While the evidence available so far, as reported in the media, points towards the involvement of some members of the Hindu community suspected to be sympathetic to the RSS ideology and even some cadres of the RSS, it does not show the involvement of the RSS as an organisation in any of these incidents. Allegations of saffron terrorism or RSS-inspired terrorism are uncalled for.
3. At the same time, it is necessary for the RSS to take note of these allegations, do an in-house enquiry, weed out anyone suspected of complicity with the arrested elements and keep the public informed of the action taken by it. The RSS has thousands of dedicated cadres and sympathisers in India as well as abroad, who are doing very good work for the preservation of the Hindu religion in its homeland, where it is constantly under attack from different directions in the name of so-called secularism. The dedicated followers of the RSS in India and abroad have been in the forefront of those contributing to the welfare of the tribals in the Maoist-affected areas in Central India. When other Hindu organisations hesitate to go into the insecure tribal areas, the brave and dedicated cadres of the RSS have been going unmindful of threats to their security and helping the tribals.
4. They have also been in the forefront of those countering often foreign-funded attempts to convert large numbers of Hindus by taking advantage of feelings of anger in the deprived sections of the Hindu community in an attempt to reduce the number of Hindus in their homeland. They have also been highlighting the threatened changes in the demographic composition of sensitive areas of the country, particularly in the North-East, due to large-scale illegal immigration.
5. The Hindu religion needs a dedicated, articulate and boldly active organisation like the RSS to preserve its primacy in its homeland. It would be unfortunate if the continued capability of the RSS to serve the cause of the Hindu religion were to be affected by the alleged involvement of some persons associated with it in acts of anti-Muslim terrorism and in undemocratic and violent ways of protest as one saw outside the offices of Headlines Today.
6. Such instances will provide a handle to those in India and abroad, who are trying to project the RSS as a Hindu extremist organisation in order to weaken its service in the cause of the Hindus.
7. This may kindly be read in continuation of my article of June 18,2010, titled "Anti-Muslim Reprisal Terrorism----An Update" available at -http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers39%5Cpaper3866.html
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Saturday, July 17, 2010
Friday, July 16, 2010
PAKISTAN: INDIA'S OPTIONS
B.RAMAN
Remember Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, who was the Foreign Minister of Pakistan under Yahya Khan? Remember his antics, crude exhibitionism and unparliamentary remarks about Indira Gandhi in the months before the Indo-Pakistan war of December 1971? Remember the way he used to conduct himself in the UN Security Council when it debated the growing tension between India and Pakistan? Remember Benazir Bhutto, his daughter, who was the then Prime Minister,conducting herself hysterically in public in 1989? Remember her going to Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir, stand before a crowd near the Line of Control, face Indian territory and shout hysterically "azadi,azadi"? Remember the unparliamentary remarks which she used to make about Narasimha Rao, our then Prime Minister?
2. Indira Gandhi and Narasimha Rao ignored with contempt the behaviour of Z.A.Bhutto and Benazir and continued doing what they thought was necessary in India' national interest. We should similarly ignore with contempt the behaviour of Shah Mehmood Qureshi, the Pakistani Foreign Minister, and his unparliamentary remarks about Mr.S.M.Krishna, our Foreign Minister, while briefing Pakistani media personnel on July 16 about his talks with our Foreign Minister the previous day.
3. The Government of India, Mr.Krishna himself and Mrs.Nirupama Rao, our Foreign Secretary, need to be complimented for conducting themselves with great personal dignity befitting us as a responsible and mature nation with a mature political leadership in power and for refusing to let themselves be provoked and react in kind against Mr.Qureshi. One of the objectives of Mr.Qureshi was to create doubts in the minds of the Indian public about the credibility and professional competence of Mr.Krishna. Another was to create a crisis atmosphere in the hope of thereby making the West and the Islamic world exercise pressure on India. The Bharatiya Janata Party and some of its leaders and spokesmen are unwittingly walking into the Pakistani trap by their campaign against Mr.Krishna at a time when the political class should stand united behind him.
4. When Z.A.Bhutto and his daughter indulged in anti-India antics and exhibitionism there was no global TV. We had to read about them in the print media and wait for the visuals which arrived days later. There were no live transmissions, no live debates. Only we in India followed closely the antics and exhibitionism of Z.A.Bhutto and Benazir? Most of the rest of the world did not. The international community did not have an idea of the kind of Foreign Minister or Prime Minister Pakistan had.
5. Things are different today. Thanks to the global TV networks, the whole world had an opportunity of watching alive the antics and exhibitionism of Mr.Qureshi and the measured and cultured response of Mr.Krishna and Mrs.Nirupama Rao.It will redound to our credit and make the international community understand----if it has not already understood it--- the kind of Pakistani leadership and the kind of Pakistani Muslim mentality we have to contend with.
6. India's negotiating stance of "action against anti-India terrorism first, rest later" and the growing international understanding of India's stance after 26/11 have unsettled Pakistan. Mr.Qureshi's antics and exhibitionism did not reflect any embarrassment or nervousness over the reported admissions of David Coleman Headley, the head of the sleeper cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and the 313 Brigade of Ilyas Kashmiri in Chicago, to Indian interrogators about the role of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in the command and control of the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. Such embarrassments are flea-bites for Pakistan and its ISI.
7. Qureshi's antics and exhibitionism reflected his anger and petulance over his failure to bully Mr.Krishna and the Government of India into changing their negotiating stance and accepting the Pakistani position of "talk on all or talk on nothing" ---just as the antics and exhibitionism of Z.A.Bhutto and Benazir reflected their anger and petulance due to their failure to bully Indira Gandhi and Narasimha Rao into accepting the Pakistani viewpoint. We should ignore the antics and exhibitionism of Qureshi and look ahead.
8. What now are the options before India? The BJP has demanded that we call off the talks with Pakistan. This will be an unintelligent option. A time could come when have to act on our own against the anti-Indian terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory----either through direct military or through covert action. We have to convince the international community that we tried all other options to make Pakistan see reason and that only when those options failed, we were forced to resort to military or covert action. There are any number of Governmental statements and doctrines in various countries regarding the circumstances under which covert action would be justified. The most important of these are a speech given by George Shultz, the US Secretary of State under the then President Ronald Reagan, and an introduction to a report on terrorism written by Mr.George Bush, the Vice-President of Reagan and Chairman of the presidential Task Force Against Terrorism. They said that covert action against a State-sponsor of terrorism would be justified WHEN ALL OTHER OPTIONS FAIL.
9. Negotiation is one of the options that has to be tried. You cannot go straightaway into the covert action mode without trying out the negotiation mode. Negotiations could have one of two outcomes. Either Pakistan sees reason and acts against anti-India terrorism thereby obviating the need for covert action or continues to avoid action thereby justifying our resort to covert action. It is, therefore, important that we continue with our negotiations with Pakistan in the hope of establishing normal relations while at the same time reviving and strengthening our covert action capability for likely use if all other options fail.
10. Should we continue to negotiate with Qureshi as if nothing has happened after his insulting behaviour towards our Foreign Minister? Will it not be a poor reflection on us as a nation and as a people and further encourage such behaviour by Pakistan? We should not. At the same time, we cannot refuse to negotiate so long as he is the Pakistani Foreign Minister. Pakistani Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani has the right to have whomever he wants as his Foreign Minister, whether we like him or not.
11. So, the only option available to us to keep the negotiations going while at the same time protecting our national dignity is by confining our future negotiations to the interactions between our Home Ministry and the Pakistani Interior Ministry. We should withdraw the invitation to Mr.Qureshi to visit New Delhi which was issued before he indulged in his antics and exhibitionism and instead invite Mr.Rehman Malik, Pakistan's Interior Minister, for continuing his talks with our Home Minister. ( 17-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Remember Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, who was the Foreign Minister of Pakistan under Yahya Khan? Remember his antics, crude exhibitionism and unparliamentary remarks about Indira Gandhi in the months before the Indo-Pakistan war of December 1971? Remember the way he used to conduct himself in the UN Security Council when it debated the growing tension between India and Pakistan? Remember Benazir Bhutto, his daughter, who was the then Prime Minister,conducting herself hysterically in public in 1989? Remember her going to Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir, stand before a crowd near the Line of Control, face Indian territory and shout hysterically "azadi,azadi"? Remember the unparliamentary remarks which she used to make about Narasimha Rao, our then Prime Minister?
2. Indira Gandhi and Narasimha Rao ignored with contempt the behaviour of Z.A.Bhutto and Benazir and continued doing what they thought was necessary in India' national interest. We should similarly ignore with contempt the behaviour of Shah Mehmood Qureshi, the Pakistani Foreign Minister, and his unparliamentary remarks about Mr.S.M.Krishna, our Foreign Minister, while briefing Pakistani media personnel on July 16 about his talks with our Foreign Minister the previous day.
3. The Government of India, Mr.Krishna himself and Mrs.Nirupama Rao, our Foreign Secretary, need to be complimented for conducting themselves with great personal dignity befitting us as a responsible and mature nation with a mature political leadership in power and for refusing to let themselves be provoked and react in kind against Mr.Qureshi. One of the objectives of Mr.Qureshi was to create doubts in the minds of the Indian public about the credibility and professional competence of Mr.Krishna. Another was to create a crisis atmosphere in the hope of thereby making the West and the Islamic world exercise pressure on India. The Bharatiya Janata Party and some of its leaders and spokesmen are unwittingly walking into the Pakistani trap by their campaign against Mr.Krishna at a time when the political class should stand united behind him.
4. When Z.A.Bhutto and his daughter indulged in anti-India antics and exhibitionism there was no global TV. We had to read about them in the print media and wait for the visuals which arrived days later. There were no live transmissions, no live debates. Only we in India followed closely the antics and exhibitionism of Z.A.Bhutto and Benazir? Most of the rest of the world did not. The international community did not have an idea of the kind of Foreign Minister or Prime Minister Pakistan had.
5. Things are different today. Thanks to the global TV networks, the whole world had an opportunity of watching alive the antics and exhibitionism of Mr.Qureshi and the measured and cultured response of Mr.Krishna and Mrs.Nirupama Rao.It will redound to our credit and make the international community understand----if it has not already understood it--- the kind of Pakistani leadership and the kind of Pakistani Muslim mentality we have to contend with.
6. India's negotiating stance of "action against anti-India terrorism first, rest later" and the growing international understanding of India's stance after 26/11 have unsettled Pakistan. Mr.Qureshi's antics and exhibitionism did not reflect any embarrassment or nervousness over the reported admissions of David Coleman Headley, the head of the sleeper cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and the 313 Brigade of Ilyas Kashmiri in Chicago, to Indian interrogators about the role of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in the command and control of the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. Such embarrassments are flea-bites for Pakistan and its ISI.
7. Qureshi's antics and exhibitionism reflected his anger and petulance over his failure to bully Mr.Krishna and the Government of India into changing their negotiating stance and accepting the Pakistani position of "talk on all or talk on nothing" ---just as the antics and exhibitionism of Z.A.Bhutto and Benazir reflected their anger and petulance due to their failure to bully Indira Gandhi and Narasimha Rao into accepting the Pakistani viewpoint. We should ignore the antics and exhibitionism of Qureshi and look ahead.
8. What now are the options before India? The BJP has demanded that we call off the talks with Pakistan. This will be an unintelligent option. A time could come when have to act on our own against the anti-Indian terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory----either through direct military or through covert action. We have to convince the international community that we tried all other options to make Pakistan see reason and that only when those options failed, we were forced to resort to military or covert action. There are any number of Governmental statements and doctrines in various countries regarding the circumstances under which covert action would be justified. The most important of these are a speech given by George Shultz, the US Secretary of State under the then President Ronald Reagan, and an introduction to a report on terrorism written by Mr.George Bush, the Vice-President of Reagan and Chairman of the presidential Task Force Against Terrorism. They said that covert action against a State-sponsor of terrorism would be justified WHEN ALL OTHER OPTIONS FAIL.
9. Negotiation is one of the options that has to be tried. You cannot go straightaway into the covert action mode without trying out the negotiation mode. Negotiations could have one of two outcomes. Either Pakistan sees reason and acts against anti-India terrorism thereby obviating the need for covert action or continues to avoid action thereby justifying our resort to covert action. It is, therefore, important that we continue with our negotiations with Pakistan in the hope of establishing normal relations while at the same time reviving and strengthening our covert action capability for likely use if all other options fail.
10. Should we continue to negotiate with Qureshi as if nothing has happened after his insulting behaviour towards our Foreign Minister? Will it not be a poor reflection on us as a nation and as a people and further encourage such behaviour by Pakistan? We should not. At the same time, we cannot refuse to negotiate so long as he is the Pakistani Foreign Minister. Pakistani Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani has the right to have whomever he wants as his Foreign Minister, whether we like him or not.
11. So, the only option available to us to keep the negotiations going while at the same time protecting our national dignity is by confining our future negotiations to the interactions between our Home Ministry and the Pakistani Interior Ministry. We should withdraw the invitation to Mr.Qureshi to visit New Delhi which was issued before he indulged in his antics and exhibitionism and instead invite Mr.Rehman Malik, Pakistan's Interior Minister, for continuing his talks with our Home Minister. ( 17-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Thursday, July 15, 2010
ISLAMABAD: AN ILL-PREPARED MEETING
B.RAMAN
Mr.S.M.Krishna, India's Minister For External Affairs, and his Pakistani counterpart Mr. Shah Mehmood Qureshi, had discussions lasting about six hours at Islamabad on July 15, 2010. In between, Mr.Krishna called on President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani. Those , who were hoping that the meeting between the Foreign Ministers would be as free of acrimony as the meeting (June 25 and 26) between Mr.P.Chidambaram, our Home Minister, and Mr.Rehman Malik, Pakistan's Interior Minister, and the one (June 24) between the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries would have reasons to be disappointed. The acrimony, hardly concealed, was there for all to see on their TV as they watched the joint press conference addressed by the two Foreign Ministers at the end of their discussions and their interactions with their respective media thereafter.
2. The objective of the meeting as agreed to by Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh and the Pakistani Prime Minister at their meeting at Thimpu in the margins of the SAARC summit ( April 28-29) was to create an atmosphere of trust between the two countries to facilitate the resumption of a formal dialogue on various pending issues. The proposed objective of the meeting as laid down by the two Prime Ministers was strategic, positive and forward-looking and not tactical and negative impeding a forward movement in bilateral relations.
3. One got the impression that instead the two Foreign Ministers had focussed totally on tactical issues without doing a brain-storming on various actions that could be taken to build trust. At the press conference, Mr.Krishna rightly emphasised that Pakistani action against the Pakistan-based conspirators of the 26/11 terrorist strike in Mumbai would be an important confidence-building measure. Mr.Qureshi, on his part, expressed the keenness of the Pakistani Government to implement the various confidence-building measures relating to Jammu & Kashmir, which had been agreed to by the previous Pakistani Governments in their interactions with the Govt. of India----such as promoting trade across the Line of Control.
4. He made a distinction between these confidence-building measures and measures of a political nature to settle the Kashmir dispute without disturbing the territorial status quo. Though he did not refer to Gen.Pervez Musharraf by name, it was evident he was referring to the measures of a political nature on which the two Governments had agreed through back-channel discussions when the General was in power. The present Pakistani Government had refused to honour agreements of a political nature agreed to by Gen.Musharraf during the back channel discussions. It was apparent from Mr.Qureshi's observations that his Government has remained firm on this refusal.
5. A forward-looking trust-building exercise should have focussed on many other issues of strategic interest such as the re-opening of the Indian Consulate in Karachi which was ordered to be closed down by Mrs.Benazir Bhutto when she was the Prime Minister in 1994, the opening of a Pakistani Consulate in Mumbai, which is a long-pending Pakistani request, increase in the number of journalists allowed to function from the two capitals, liaison arrangements between the intelligence and investigation agencies of the two countries, implementing measures for mutual legal assistance in the investigation and prosecution of crime, promotion of trade, removal of Pakistani restrictions on transit trade between India and Afghanistan, expansion of the contacts between the two Armies which are now restricted to the hot line between the Directors-General of Military Operations of the two countries and arrangements for a periodic dialogue between the Home/Interior Ministries of the two countries. If these measures are agreed to, this could have a cascading effect in building mutual trust.
6. From the press conference, one had an impression that none of these positive measures had been discussed in detail by the two Foreign Ministers. Instead the focus of the discussions seemed to have been largely on issues which have bedevilled the relations between the two countries. It was the realisation that the time is not yet ripe for tackling those issues that had made the two Prime Ministers agree upon an initial trust-building exercise as a starting block. Instead of initiating a process of trust-building, the meeting seems to have added to the existing wall of mistrust.
7. It was obvious that neither country had made proper preparations for the meeting. Since our Prime Minister reportedly attached considerable importance to this trust-building exercise,, one would have expected that before Mr.Krishna's visit to Islamabad he would have discussed a possible strategy for the meeting with the leaders of the opposition in order to evolve a political consensus and at a special meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) chaired by him to evolve an intere-departmental consensus on the strategy. It was evident that no such preparatory exercise for political and inter-departmental consensus-building in New Delhi before embarking on the trust-building exercise in Islamabad was undertaken.
8. Fortunately, there was no break-down at Islamabad. The Pakistani Foreign Minister is to visit to New Delhi next December to continue the discussions. In between, Dr.Manmohan Singh might meet Mr.Gilani again in New York in September if they decide to attend the inaugural session of the UN General Assembly. Before the September meeting, the Prime Minister should undertake a brain-storming with the opposition leaders and in the NSC on how to handle our relations with Pakistan----strategically as well as tactically. ( 16-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Mr.S.M.Krishna, India's Minister For External Affairs, and his Pakistani counterpart Mr. Shah Mehmood Qureshi, had discussions lasting about six hours at Islamabad on July 15, 2010. In between, Mr.Krishna called on President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani. Those , who were hoping that the meeting between the Foreign Ministers would be as free of acrimony as the meeting (June 25 and 26) between Mr.P.Chidambaram, our Home Minister, and Mr.Rehman Malik, Pakistan's Interior Minister, and the one (June 24) between the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries would have reasons to be disappointed. The acrimony, hardly concealed, was there for all to see on their TV as they watched the joint press conference addressed by the two Foreign Ministers at the end of their discussions and their interactions with their respective media thereafter.
2. The objective of the meeting as agreed to by Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh and the Pakistani Prime Minister at their meeting at Thimpu in the margins of the SAARC summit ( April 28-29) was to create an atmosphere of trust between the two countries to facilitate the resumption of a formal dialogue on various pending issues. The proposed objective of the meeting as laid down by the two Prime Ministers was strategic, positive and forward-looking and not tactical and negative impeding a forward movement in bilateral relations.
3. One got the impression that instead the two Foreign Ministers had focussed totally on tactical issues without doing a brain-storming on various actions that could be taken to build trust. At the press conference, Mr.Krishna rightly emphasised that Pakistani action against the Pakistan-based conspirators of the 26/11 terrorist strike in Mumbai would be an important confidence-building measure. Mr.Qureshi, on his part, expressed the keenness of the Pakistani Government to implement the various confidence-building measures relating to Jammu & Kashmir, which had been agreed to by the previous Pakistani Governments in their interactions with the Govt. of India----such as promoting trade across the Line of Control.
4. He made a distinction between these confidence-building measures and measures of a political nature to settle the Kashmir dispute without disturbing the territorial status quo. Though he did not refer to Gen.Pervez Musharraf by name, it was evident he was referring to the measures of a political nature on which the two Governments had agreed through back-channel discussions when the General was in power. The present Pakistani Government had refused to honour agreements of a political nature agreed to by Gen.Musharraf during the back channel discussions. It was apparent from Mr.Qureshi's observations that his Government has remained firm on this refusal.
5. A forward-looking trust-building exercise should have focussed on many other issues of strategic interest such as the re-opening of the Indian Consulate in Karachi which was ordered to be closed down by Mrs.Benazir Bhutto when she was the Prime Minister in 1994, the opening of a Pakistani Consulate in Mumbai, which is a long-pending Pakistani request, increase in the number of journalists allowed to function from the two capitals, liaison arrangements between the intelligence and investigation agencies of the two countries, implementing measures for mutual legal assistance in the investigation and prosecution of crime, promotion of trade, removal of Pakistani restrictions on transit trade between India and Afghanistan, expansion of the contacts between the two Armies which are now restricted to the hot line between the Directors-General of Military Operations of the two countries and arrangements for a periodic dialogue between the Home/Interior Ministries of the two countries. If these measures are agreed to, this could have a cascading effect in building mutual trust.
6. From the press conference, one had an impression that none of these positive measures had been discussed in detail by the two Foreign Ministers. Instead the focus of the discussions seemed to have been largely on issues which have bedevilled the relations between the two countries. It was the realisation that the time is not yet ripe for tackling those issues that had made the two Prime Ministers agree upon an initial trust-building exercise as a starting block. Instead of initiating a process of trust-building, the meeting seems to have added to the existing wall of mistrust.
7. It was obvious that neither country had made proper preparations for the meeting. Since our Prime Minister reportedly attached considerable importance to this trust-building exercise,, one would have expected that before Mr.Krishna's visit to Islamabad he would have discussed a possible strategy for the meeting with the leaders of the opposition in order to evolve a political consensus and at a special meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) chaired by him to evolve an intere-departmental consensus on the strategy. It was evident that no such preparatory exercise for political and inter-departmental consensus-building in New Delhi before embarking on the trust-building exercise in Islamabad was undertaken.
8. Fortunately, there was no break-down at Islamabad. The Pakistani Foreign Minister is to visit to New Delhi next December to continue the discussions. In between, Dr.Manmohan Singh might meet Mr.Gilani again in New York in September if they decide to attend the inaugural session of the UN General Assembly. Before the September meeting, the Prime Minister should undertake a brain-storming with the opposition leaders and in the NSC on how to handle our relations with Pakistan----strategically as well as tactically. ( 16-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, July 14, 2010
“CHINESE SOVEREIGN WATERS”, “WATERS OF CHINA’S INTERESTS”, “PSYCHOLOGICAL TERRITORIAL SEAS”
B.RAMAN
Despite media reports originating from South Korea that the proposed US-South Korea joint naval exercise as a warning signal to North Korea may not be held as originally scheduled in the Yellow Sea and may instead be held in the middle of this month off South Korea’s southern or eastern coast, Chinese media and blogs have kept up their criticism of the move for holding the exercise in the Yellow Sea and the proposed participation of the nuclear-powered US aircraft carrier “USS George Washington” in it. They project it as a threat to China and as presaging a conflict between an emerging naval power seeking its due place and rights in the Western Pacific and a hegemonic naval power trying to counter it.
2.Some of the concepts/ideas figuring in the articles such as “China’s sovereign waters”, “waters of China’s interests” and “psychological territorial seas” need close study and analysis by our naval experts. They should also note that China has been increasingly assertive in support of its territorial and marine resources claims in the South China Sea and has expanded its definition of core interests to cover the South China Sea too, causing misgivings in the region. An article in the “China Daily” of July 13,2010, by an academic said: “Its (China’s) territorial sovereignty, strategic resources and trade routes comprise its core interests, and like any other country China will never compromise them. Rapid economic development and rising national strength have given China the chance to make it clear to the international community that it will never compromise its core interests. By adding the South China Sea to its core interests, China has shown its determination to secure its maritime resources and strategic waters. Its South China Sea strategy should thus be seen as a move to make up for its past ignorance about sea power and not as an aggressive expansionist measure.”
3.Extracts of interest from the articles are given below:
(1). From an article titled “US—South Korean Maritime War Games Needlessly Provocative” by Prof.Shen Dingli, Director of the Centre For American Studies at Fudan University, in the “Global Times” of July 13,2010: “The US and South Korea are implementing joint military exercises this month in the Yellow Sea, with the possibility of deploying the US aircraft carrier George Washington. The running of such exercises so close to China's waters has left China strongly, and rightfully, dissatisfied. The US and South Korea may argue that the exercise is not in China's territorial waters, so China has no right to comment. However, even if the joint exercises are not in Chinese sovereign waters, they may take place in the waters of China's interests as the international waters at Yellow Sea near China's exclusive economic zone are extremely important to China's interests. ….Military exercises aimed at provoking other countries in the waters of important Chinese interests can only be seen as a threat, and China should strongly oppose them….China's strong reaction is also part of its defensive diplomacy, which aims at dissolving the tension before it escalates into a serious crisis. China may not have the military strength to forcibly prevent such exercises now, but it may do so in response to such provocative actions in the future. “
(2). From an editorial of the “Global Times” titled “Watch out for China-US tension at sea” published on July 12,2010: “The eventuality that Beijing has to prepare for is close at hand. The delayed US-South Korean naval exercise in the Yellow Sea is now slated for mid-July. According to media reports, a nuclear-powered US aircraft carrier has left its Japanese base and is headed for the drill area. In their recent responses, several high-ranking Chinese navy officials have made it plain that China will not stay in "hands-off" mode as the drill gets underway. For, that will make the US believe that China's defense circle on the sea is small, and, therefore, US fleets will be able to freely cruise over the Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea in the future. Military experts have warned that if the joint drill really takes place off the western coast of South Korea, Chinese airplanes and warships will very likely go all the way out to closely watch the war game maneuvers. Within such proximity on not-so-clearly-marked international waters, any move that is considered hostile to the other side can willy-nilly trigger a rash reaction, which might escalate into the unexpected or the unforeseen. One false move, one wrong interpretation, is all it would take for the best-planned exercises to go awry. Wang Jisi, dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, says he is most worried about another collision crisis like the one over the South China Sea in 2001, when a Chinese fighter jet crashed into a US spy plane. The impact of a crisis on that scale would be tremendous, making any dispute over trade or the yuan's value between the two in recent years pale in comparison. Anti-US sentiment will be re-ignited among Chinese people despite the recent affirmations of warmth in the relationship, and a significant fan following in China for the charismatic US president Barack Obama. With the growth of China's economic power, the country will definitely extend its defense capability to the high seas. The US, far from trying to contain this assertiveness, should face up to the reality, and facilitate the Chinese navy to be peacefully integrated into the international system. This is China's legitimate due, which it cannot be denied for long. By the same token, China needs to be patient. The island chains in the western Pacific cannot block China from entering the open waters. But the country should move forward one step at a time, to show its confidence and to emphasize its goal of keeping peace. The US has long been a naval superpower, and will be understandably uneasy about accepting the fact that China is a growing power and can no longer keep silent when US warships enter China's sphere of influence. Since both sides lack experience of contact over the seas, the two countries should learn to get along with each other. First, the US must allow China space to explore. Second, the two navies need to increase exchanges to prevent further misunderstanding. Tension is mounting over the US-South Korean joint exercise. Beijing and Washington still have time, and leeway, to desist from moving toward a possible conflict on the Yellow Sea. “
(3).From a commentary titled “ Navies Play Crucial Role in Sino-US Ties” carried by the “People’s Daily” online on July 12: “ The navies of the United States and China will play a critical role in determining whether the two countries can avoid major conflict, said Wang Jisi, a Chinese expert in a report in the Global Times on Monday. This could be right. The two navies will not contribute to the increase of bilateral trade volume or the number of tourists, but it is easy for them to wreck bilateral ties. Many Chinese scholars hold the opinions that in the coming years, the western Pacific, a not too wide water area, will become a sensitive belt to test the relationships of China, world's largest rising country, and the United States, the world's largest hegemonic power. Major conflicts will most likely originate in this area. Over the past month or so, news that a U.S. aircraft carrier would enter the Yellow Sea to hold a military drill, which caused uproar in China, proved this. Bilateral trade vigor and the momentum of learning each other's languages make the two countries sometimes look like allies. And the wisdom of the two governments has downplayed the ideological and institutional differences between two countries, but there is still strong distrust in military matters, in particular with regard to the navies. Despite this, neither of the two navies is ready to retreat from their great strategies. The United States wants to maintain its hegemony in the western Pacific while China's navy extends eastward to "blue water." With the extension of psychological territorial seas, following the growth of national power, the two countries are gradually contiguous to each other in the western Pacific. In fact, China has no mind to meet the challenge although Chinese do not like U.S. maritime hegemony. But could the United States understand China? The United States had confrontations or conflicts at sea with several great rising powers in the history, so it is applying its experience to China. Some think- tank reports in the United States show the country's research and judgment on China, which over-exaggerates China's strategy against the United States. China and the United States must gradually increase strategic mutual trust, so China needs to make the steady progress in its strategy transparent, while the United States, with an absolute advantage in strategy, naturally assumes greater responsibility in enhancing mutual trust. The United States should have a greater breadth of mind to accept the Chinese navy's rights to widen its activity sphere, which is different from a challenge to the U.S. navy. While on China's side, it needs to actively understand the United States and reduce provocation, which is China's wisdom. Building strategic mutual trust is a slow process. China and the United States need to accelerate the establishment of a mechanism to avoid frictions. In a word, don't let the curse of a "conflict between a rising power and a hegemonic power," come true. “
(4).From an article titled “Exercise Restraint” carried by the “China Daily” on July 13: “The pending joint naval exercise by the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) on the Yellow Sea is gradually drawing widespread public ire in China. The drill is a threat to China's security and risks escalating tensions in the Korean Peninsula. The joint military exercise is reportedly intended to deter the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the wake of the Cheonan incident. The ROK's military made this point again July 6 when it announced that the drill, originally scheduled for June, would be postponed after likely UN action against the DPRK over its alleged sinking of the warship March 26. A presidential statement released by the UN Security Council on June 9 called for peaceful settlement of the dispute and the resumption of direct dialogue and negotiation between the DPRK and the ROK. Instead of resorting to any drastic moves, concerned parties must exercise restraint and calm in light of the UN statement. The public outcry in China will turn stronger if the US decides that its nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington is to participate in the exercise. The vessel's likely presence, whose combat radius can reach the nation's eastern coast, is nothing but a provocative action aimed at China's doorstep. Washington's persistent reconnaissance and surveillance on China's mainland have long brewed indignation among the Chinese. Its joint naval exercise with the ROK would only fan more antagonistic sentiment against Uncle Sam. Admittedly, even Washington would not like to see such an outcome. The US move will be a new roadblock to the resumption of normal military ties between Beijing and Washington.”
(5). From an article titled “Modernising Navy For Self-Defence” by Gong Jianhua, an Associate Professor at the School of Politics and Public Administration, Guangdong Ocean University, carried by the “China Daily” on July 13: “ Reports in some foreign media outlets that Beijing considers South China Sea a part of its "core interests" have caused concern among some countries. This has happened because they have grossly misunderstood China's actions. China is a large country with huge marine resources, but it does not have enough power to protect them. It is strengthening its marine strategy and its navy to protect its core national interests and not to pose a threat to any country. The People's Republic of China has never infringed upon any country's marine rights. On the contrary, other countries have violated its marine rights and interests repeatedly. History shows no country can be a great power without a strong naval force. And no country in modern times has faced greater threats from the sea as China. It is thus logical for it to develop and modernize its marine force. China's sea-related problems are three-fold. First, China has very complicated and intractable problems with its waters-sharing neighbors. Longstanding disputes over China's core interests in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea come to the fore from time to time. The subjects of these disputes range from sovereign control of islands to delimitation of exclusive economic zones. For example, the dispute over the South China Sea involves conflicting claims of several parties in the region and interference of outside powers. Second, China has some inherent internal weaknesses and faces outside threats to its marine interests. Internally, the country is yet to build a sound naval force, and its ocean strategy lags far behind its economic and political strategies. Externally, it has lost valuable resources when other powers have seized its islands and exploited its waters. It faces threats to its sea lanes, too. By misinterpreting the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and basing their actions on the so-called principles of "adjacency, prescription and security", some countries have violated its rights over islands, reefs and territorial waters. Third, these disputes are seriously depleting China's strategic resources. For example, it is impossible to resolve the disputes over the South China Sea to the mutual benefit of all because of the huge differences in the political stances, sincerity and tactics of the other parties. China has to use an enormous part of its economic and diplomatic resources in its efforts to settle such issues with every country that has a stake in the region. Seas have played a very important role in the development of a country. And their importance has multiplied manifold in the era of globalization. In order to secure its maritime resources, waterways and national security, a country has to defend its sea rights and interests. The disputes over rights and interests in the East China Sea, Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea are the remnants of the history of invasions of China from across the seas and colonial rule. But China's claims are based fully on historical facts. Its territorial sovereignty, strategic resources and trade routes comprise its core interests, and like any other country China will never compromise them. Rapid economic development and rising national strength have given China the chance to make it clear to the international community that it will never compromise its core interests. By adding the South China Sea to its core interests, China has shown its determination to secure its maritime resources and strategic waters. Its South China Sea strategy should thus be seen as a move to make up for its past ignorance about sea power and not as an aggressive expansionist measure. China's foreign policy has always depended on a "soft, gentle" approach, and it has practiced the doctrine of "setting aside disputes and working for joint development" of the seas with neighboring countries. Its new naval development strategy is a continuation of this approach and aimed exclusively at "offshore defense". While securing its core interests, China will continue to cultivate friendly ties with neighbors, increase regional cooperation and seek common development. It has no intention of posing a threat to other countries. But it has to change its backward marine strategy to suit the changing times. Its strategic initiatives should not be misunderstood by other countries - something that the West often does. The West, because of its tainted glasses, sees China's military modernization as military expansionism with potential strategic aggression. What Western politicians and media do not understand is China's need to safeguard its security to ensure sound economic and social development. It's a matter of perspective that the West considers a dragon as a symbol of "evil" when in China it signifies "luck". To safeguard its core interests, China should increase bilateral and multilateral exchanges with the countries that have a stake in the region, and actively publicize its commitment in building a "harmonious world". It should clarify its stance and eliminate fuzzy statements; hold all-round talks with other countries and strengthen political, economic and military mutual trust to help them understand that it is modernizing its navy for self-defense and is committed to traveling the road of peace to secure its core interests.”
(6).From an article titled “Seoul says drill location undecided” by Li Jing in the “Global Times” of July 13: “South Korea is mulling moving the venue of a joint military drill with the US rather than in the Yellow Sea, local media reported Monday (July 12). Won Tae-jae, spokesman of the Ministry of Defense, said Monday in Seoul that South Korea and the US are "fine-tuning the timetable, scale and location" of the maneuvers, adding that both sides will soon announce the details. Arirang News cited a government source as saying Sunday that it is yet to be decided where the naval drill will take place, adding that it could be held off either coast, since the country is a peninsula. The drill, originally scheduled for June, was postponed until after the UN Security Council (US) issued a statement Friday on the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan, condemning the attack but not identifying who was to blame. Beijing has strongly opposed the drill in which US carriers may engage because the location of the maneuver is close to its territorial waters. "Wherever the drill takes place, Washington has once again tested its influence in the region and strengthened its alliance with Seoul," Yin Zhuo, a Chinese military strategist, told the Global Times. Jin Linbo, a deputy at the Asia-Pacific Research Center of the China Institute of International Studies, pointed out that after the US statement, almost all parties concerned have softened their tones. "Washington will decide the location of the drill after assessing its relations with Beijing, including those high-level military exchanges scheduled this year. If the US feels the need to pressure China, the drill may still take place in the Yellow Sea," Jin said. Lee Su-seok, a senior analyst at the Institute for National Security Strategy in Seoul, told the JoongAng Daily that South Korea needs to work harder to avoid political disputes with China. "You can give China some options, like inviting Chinese officials to view the drill or keeping them updated about the drill's progress and activities to some degree," he said. The Chosun Ilbo reported Monday that the White House, the Pentagon and the US State Department are weighing the pros and cons of allowing the aircraft carrier George Washington to engage in the drill. "The George Washington will not enter Korean waters for a few days," Chosun Ilbo quoted a military source as saying, implying that it could remain in the open sea. Meanwhile, North Korean and US military representatives will meet Tuesday to discuss the Cheonan incident, the US-led UN Command in South Korea said Monday. The colonel-level meeting will discuss arrangements for future talks at general-level on the incident. It will be the first such meeting since the warship sank in March.” (14-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Despite media reports originating from South Korea that the proposed US-South Korea joint naval exercise as a warning signal to North Korea may not be held as originally scheduled in the Yellow Sea and may instead be held in the middle of this month off South Korea’s southern or eastern coast, Chinese media and blogs have kept up their criticism of the move for holding the exercise in the Yellow Sea and the proposed participation of the nuclear-powered US aircraft carrier “USS George Washington” in it. They project it as a threat to China and as presaging a conflict between an emerging naval power seeking its due place and rights in the Western Pacific and a hegemonic naval power trying to counter it.
2.Some of the concepts/ideas figuring in the articles such as “China’s sovereign waters”, “waters of China’s interests” and “psychological territorial seas” need close study and analysis by our naval experts. They should also note that China has been increasingly assertive in support of its territorial and marine resources claims in the South China Sea and has expanded its definition of core interests to cover the South China Sea too, causing misgivings in the region. An article in the “China Daily” of July 13,2010, by an academic said: “Its (China’s) territorial sovereignty, strategic resources and trade routes comprise its core interests, and like any other country China will never compromise them. Rapid economic development and rising national strength have given China the chance to make it clear to the international community that it will never compromise its core interests. By adding the South China Sea to its core interests, China has shown its determination to secure its maritime resources and strategic waters. Its South China Sea strategy should thus be seen as a move to make up for its past ignorance about sea power and not as an aggressive expansionist measure.”
3.Extracts of interest from the articles are given below:
(1). From an article titled “US—South Korean Maritime War Games Needlessly Provocative” by Prof.Shen Dingli, Director of the Centre For American Studies at Fudan University, in the “Global Times” of July 13,2010: “The US and South Korea are implementing joint military exercises this month in the Yellow Sea, with the possibility of deploying the US aircraft carrier George Washington. The running of such exercises so close to China's waters has left China strongly, and rightfully, dissatisfied. The US and South Korea may argue that the exercise is not in China's territorial waters, so China has no right to comment. However, even if the joint exercises are not in Chinese sovereign waters, they may take place in the waters of China's interests as the international waters at Yellow Sea near China's exclusive economic zone are extremely important to China's interests. ….Military exercises aimed at provoking other countries in the waters of important Chinese interests can only be seen as a threat, and China should strongly oppose them….China's strong reaction is also part of its defensive diplomacy, which aims at dissolving the tension before it escalates into a serious crisis. China may not have the military strength to forcibly prevent such exercises now, but it may do so in response to such provocative actions in the future. “
(2). From an editorial of the “Global Times” titled “Watch out for China-US tension at sea” published on July 12,2010: “The eventuality that Beijing has to prepare for is close at hand. The delayed US-South Korean naval exercise in the Yellow Sea is now slated for mid-July. According to media reports, a nuclear-powered US aircraft carrier has left its Japanese base and is headed for the drill area. In their recent responses, several high-ranking Chinese navy officials have made it plain that China will not stay in "hands-off" mode as the drill gets underway. For, that will make the US believe that China's defense circle on the sea is small, and, therefore, US fleets will be able to freely cruise over the Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea in the future. Military experts have warned that if the joint drill really takes place off the western coast of South Korea, Chinese airplanes and warships will very likely go all the way out to closely watch the war game maneuvers. Within such proximity on not-so-clearly-marked international waters, any move that is considered hostile to the other side can willy-nilly trigger a rash reaction, which might escalate into the unexpected or the unforeseen. One false move, one wrong interpretation, is all it would take for the best-planned exercises to go awry. Wang Jisi, dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, says he is most worried about another collision crisis like the one over the South China Sea in 2001, when a Chinese fighter jet crashed into a US spy plane. The impact of a crisis on that scale would be tremendous, making any dispute over trade or the yuan's value between the two in recent years pale in comparison. Anti-US sentiment will be re-ignited among Chinese people despite the recent affirmations of warmth in the relationship, and a significant fan following in China for the charismatic US president Barack Obama. With the growth of China's economic power, the country will definitely extend its defense capability to the high seas. The US, far from trying to contain this assertiveness, should face up to the reality, and facilitate the Chinese navy to be peacefully integrated into the international system. This is China's legitimate due, which it cannot be denied for long. By the same token, China needs to be patient. The island chains in the western Pacific cannot block China from entering the open waters. But the country should move forward one step at a time, to show its confidence and to emphasize its goal of keeping peace. The US has long been a naval superpower, and will be understandably uneasy about accepting the fact that China is a growing power and can no longer keep silent when US warships enter China's sphere of influence. Since both sides lack experience of contact over the seas, the two countries should learn to get along with each other. First, the US must allow China space to explore. Second, the two navies need to increase exchanges to prevent further misunderstanding. Tension is mounting over the US-South Korean joint exercise. Beijing and Washington still have time, and leeway, to desist from moving toward a possible conflict on the Yellow Sea. “
(3).From a commentary titled “ Navies Play Crucial Role in Sino-US Ties” carried by the “People’s Daily” online on July 12: “ The navies of the United States and China will play a critical role in determining whether the two countries can avoid major conflict, said Wang Jisi, a Chinese expert in a report in the Global Times on Monday. This could be right. The two navies will not contribute to the increase of bilateral trade volume or the number of tourists, but it is easy for them to wreck bilateral ties. Many Chinese scholars hold the opinions that in the coming years, the western Pacific, a not too wide water area, will become a sensitive belt to test the relationships of China, world's largest rising country, and the United States, the world's largest hegemonic power. Major conflicts will most likely originate in this area. Over the past month or so, news that a U.S. aircraft carrier would enter the Yellow Sea to hold a military drill, which caused uproar in China, proved this. Bilateral trade vigor and the momentum of learning each other's languages make the two countries sometimes look like allies. And the wisdom of the two governments has downplayed the ideological and institutional differences between two countries, but there is still strong distrust in military matters, in particular with regard to the navies. Despite this, neither of the two navies is ready to retreat from their great strategies. The United States wants to maintain its hegemony in the western Pacific while China's navy extends eastward to "blue water." With the extension of psychological territorial seas, following the growth of national power, the two countries are gradually contiguous to each other in the western Pacific. In fact, China has no mind to meet the challenge although Chinese do not like U.S. maritime hegemony. But could the United States understand China? The United States had confrontations or conflicts at sea with several great rising powers in the history, so it is applying its experience to China. Some think- tank reports in the United States show the country's research and judgment on China, which over-exaggerates China's strategy against the United States. China and the United States must gradually increase strategic mutual trust, so China needs to make the steady progress in its strategy transparent, while the United States, with an absolute advantage in strategy, naturally assumes greater responsibility in enhancing mutual trust. The United States should have a greater breadth of mind to accept the Chinese navy's rights to widen its activity sphere, which is different from a challenge to the U.S. navy. While on China's side, it needs to actively understand the United States and reduce provocation, which is China's wisdom. Building strategic mutual trust is a slow process. China and the United States need to accelerate the establishment of a mechanism to avoid frictions. In a word, don't let the curse of a "conflict between a rising power and a hegemonic power," come true. “
(4).From an article titled “Exercise Restraint” carried by the “China Daily” on July 13: “The pending joint naval exercise by the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) on the Yellow Sea is gradually drawing widespread public ire in China. The drill is a threat to China's security and risks escalating tensions in the Korean Peninsula. The joint military exercise is reportedly intended to deter the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the wake of the Cheonan incident. The ROK's military made this point again July 6 when it announced that the drill, originally scheduled for June, would be postponed after likely UN action against the DPRK over its alleged sinking of the warship March 26. A presidential statement released by the UN Security Council on June 9 called for peaceful settlement of the dispute and the resumption of direct dialogue and negotiation between the DPRK and the ROK. Instead of resorting to any drastic moves, concerned parties must exercise restraint and calm in light of the UN statement. The public outcry in China will turn stronger if the US decides that its nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington is to participate in the exercise. The vessel's likely presence, whose combat radius can reach the nation's eastern coast, is nothing but a provocative action aimed at China's doorstep. Washington's persistent reconnaissance and surveillance on China's mainland have long brewed indignation among the Chinese. Its joint naval exercise with the ROK would only fan more antagonistic sentiment against Uncle Sam. Admittedly, even Washington would not like to see such an outcome. The US move will be a new roadblock to the resumption of normal military ties between Beijing and Washington.”
(5). From an article titled “Modernising Navy For Self-Defence” by Gong Jianhua, an Associate Professor at the School of Politics and Public Administration, Guangdong Ocean University, carried by the “China Daily” on July 13: “ Reports in some foreign media outlets that Beijing considers South China Sea a part of its "core interests" have caused concern among some countries. This has happened because they have grossly misunderstood China's actions. China is a large country with huge marine resources, but it does not have enough power to protect them. It is strengthening its marine strategy and its navy to protect its core national interests and not to pose a threat to any country. The People's Republic of China has never infringed upon any country's marine rights. On the contrary, other countries have violated its marine rights and interests repeatedly. History shows no country can be a great power without a strong naval force. And no country in modern times has faced greater threats from the sea as China. It is thus logical for it to develop and modernize its marine force. China's sea-related problems are three-fold. First, China has very complicated and intractable problems with its waters-sharing neighbors. Longstanding disputes over China's core interests in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea come to the fore from time to time. The subjects of these disputes range from sovereign control of islands to delimitation of exclusive economic zones. For example, the dispute over the South China Sea involves conflicting claims of several parties in the region and interference of outside powers. Second, China has some inherent internal weaknesses and faces outside threats to its marine interests. Internally, the country is yet to build a sound naval force, and its ocean strategy lags far behind its economic and political strategies. Externally, it has lost valuable resources when other powers have seized its islands and exploited its waters. It faces threats to its sea lanes, too. By misinterpreting the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and basing their actions on the so-called principles of "adjacency, prescription and security", some countries have violated its rights over islands, reefs and territorial waters. Third, these disputes are seriously depleting China's strategic resources. For example, it is impossible to resolve the disputes over the South China Sea to the mutual benefit of all because of the huge differences in the political stances, sincerity and tactics of the other parties. China has to use an enormous part of its economic and diplomatic resources in its efforts to settle such issues with every country that has a stake in the region. Seas have played a very important role in the development of a country. And their importance has multiplied manifold in the era of globalization. In order to secure its maritime resources, waterways and national security, a country has to defend its sea rights and interests. The disputes over rights and interests in the East China Sea, Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea are the remnants of the history of invasions of China from across the seas and colonial rule. But China's claims are based fully on historical facts. Its territorial sovereignty, strategic resources and trade routes comprise its core interests, and like any other country China will never compromise them. Rapid economic development and rising national strength have given China the chance to make it clear to the international community that it will never compromise its core interests. By adding the South China Sea to its core interests, China has shown its determination to secure its maritime resources and strategic waters. Its South China Sea strategy should thus be seen as a move to make up for its past ignorance about sea power and not as an aggressive expansionist measure. China's foreign policy has always depended on a "soft, gentle" approach, and it has practiced the doctrine of "setting aside disputes and working for joint development" of the seas with neighboring countries. Its new naval development strategy is a continuation of this approach and aimed exclusively at "offshore defense". While securing its core interests, China will continue to cultivate friendly ties with neighbors, increase regional cooperation and seek common development. It has no intention of posing a threat to other countries. But it has to change its backward marine strategy to suit the changing times. Its strategic initiatives should not be misunderstood by other countries - something that the West often does. The West, because of its tainted glasses, sees China's military modernization as military expansionism with potential strategic aggression. What Western politicians and media do not understand is China's need to safeguard its security to ensure sound economic and social development. It's a matter of perspective that the West considers a dragon as a symbol of "evil" when in China it signifies "luck". To safeguard its core interests, China should increase bilateral and multilateral exchanges with the countries that have a stake in the region, and actively publicize its commitment in building a "harmonious world". It should clarify its stance and eliminate fuzzy statements; hold all-round talks with other countries and strengthen political, economic and military mutual trust to help them understand that it is modernizing its navy for self-defense and is committed to traveling the road of peace to secure its core interests.”
(6).From an article titled “Seoul says drill location undecided” by Li Jing in the “Global Times” of July 13: “South Korea is mulling moving the venue of a joint military drill with the US rather than in the Yellow Sea, local media reported Monday (July 12). Won Tae-jae, spokesman of the Ministry of Defense, said Monday in Seoul that South Korea and the US are "fine-tuning the timetable, scale and location" of the maneuvers, adding that both sides will soon announce the details. Arirang News cited a government source as saying Sunday that it is yet to be decided where the naval drill will take place, adding that it could be held off either coast, since the country is a peninsula. The drill, originally scheduled for June, was postponed until after the UN Security Council (US) issued a statement Friday on the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan, condemning the attack but not identifying who was to blame. Beijing has strongly opposed the drill in which US carriers may engage because the location of the maneuver is close to its territorial waters. "Wherever the drill takes place, Washington has once again tested its influence in the region and strengthened its alliance with Seoul," Yin Zhuo, a Chinese military strategist, told the Global Times. Jin Linbo, a deputy at the Asia-Pacific Research Center of the China Institute of International Studies, pointed out that after the US statement, almost all parties concerned have softened their tones. "Washington will decide the location of the drill after assessing its relations with Beijing, including those high-level military exchanges scheduled this year. If the US feels the need to pressure China, the drill may still take place in the Yellow Sea," Jin said. Lee Su-seok, a senior analyst at the Institute for National Security Strategy in Seoul, told the JoongAng Daily that South Korea needs to work harder to avoid political disputes with China. "You can give China some options, like inviting Chinese officials to view the drill or keeping them updated about the drill's progress and activities to some degree," he said. The Chosun Ilbo reported Monday that the White House, the Pentagon and the US State Department are weighing the pros and cons of allowing the aircraft carrier George Washington to engage in the drill. "The George Washington will not enter Korean waters for a few days," Chosun Ilbo quoted a military source as saying, implying that it could remain in the open sea. Meanwhile, North Korean and US military representatives will meet Tuesday to discuss the Cheonan incident, the US-led UN Command in South Korea said Monday. The colonel-level meeting will discuss arrangements for future talks at general-level on the incident. It will be the first such meeting since the warship sank in March.” (14-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, July 13, 2010
INDIA-PAKISTAN: HOW TO CHANGE THE REFLEXES?
B.RAMAN
The three-day visit of Mr.S.M.Krishna, our Minister for External Affairs, to Pakistan from July 15,2010, has come in the wake of the visit of Mrs.Nirupama Rao, the Foreign Secretary( June 24), and Mr.P.Chidambaram, the Home Minister ( June 25 and 26). Mrs.Rao's visit was used to prepare the ground for the two ministerial visits to follow. Mr.Chidambaram's visit ---mainly to attend the SAARC Home Ministers' conference, but utilised for bilateral interactions too---- kept the focus on Pakistani action against anti-India terrorism in general and against the Pakistan-based conspirators of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) who were involved in the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai in particular.( http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers39%5Cpaper3891.html and http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers39%5Cpaper3893.html)
2. Mr.Chidambaram and his Pakistani counterpart Mr.Rehman Malik avoided acrimony and kept the accusatory reflexes, which usually distort Indo-Pakistan interactions, under control. The visit provided an opportunity for a courtesy meeting between the heads of the Intelligence Bureaus of the two countries, which had a common origin under the British rule and closely resemble each other in their structure and methods of functioning. The two are essentially organisations of police professionals who are experts in the collection and analysis of intelligence relating to internal security.
3.The last meeting between senior officers of the two Intelligence Bureaus was when Rajiv Gandhi was the Prime Minister between 1984 and 1989. He and the late Zia-ul-Haq, the then ruler of Pakistan, had set up a mechanism for regular half-yearly meetings between the Home/Interior Secretaries of the two countries to discuss trans-border terrorism and security. Senior officers of the two IBs were among the officials in the two delegations. This mechanism fell into disuse after the outbreak of Pakistani-backed insurgency in Jammu & Kashmir in 1989.
4. Mr.Chidambaram's discussions with Mr.Malik, as reported in the media, focussed on tactical issues relating to co-operation in the investigation and prosecution of the LET conspirators. Matters of a strategic significance such as the utility of the revival of the pre-1989 mechanism for half-yearly meetings, structured interactions between the Home/Interior Ministries of the two countries and mutual legal assistance between the investigating agencies of the two countries did not appear to have been discussed. There was not even an invitation by Mr.Chidambaram to Mr.Malik and his intelligence chief to visit India. It was a one-shot visit with one-shot discussions, which did not try to create the traditions for such visits and discussions on a regular basis.
5. Unless we create such traditions, the political leaders and officials of the two countries will find it difficult to rid themselve of the constant air of suspicion which enveloppes the bilateral relations like a winter fog in New Delhi and to slowly rid themselves of the accusatory reflexes, which come in the way of a professional approach to security-related problems.
6. What stands in the way of normal relations between India and Pakistan as two neighbouring States with a common border is not just the Kashmir issue or Pakistan's use of terrorism against India. It is the negative reflexes created in our minds by the riots which accompanied the Partition in 1947, by the Indian anger against Pakistan for its repeated use of terrorist or insurgent surrogates against India in the North-East, Punjab and J&K and by the Pakistani anger against India for the Indian role in assisting the freedom struggle in Bangladesh. Unless the two countries rid themselves of these negative reflexes and develop a new mindset marked by at least partly positive rather than overwhelmingly negative perceptions of each other, nothing is going to help in bringing them together.
7. Back-channel discussions, academic interactions, be-good-to-each-other meetings will not help so long as the reflexes are overwhelmingly and compulsively negative. Turning the negative into the positive has to be a gradual process. The starting block of such a process has to be a realisation at the decision-making levels in the two countries that we have far too long been negative in our thinking and perceptions.
8. The realisation alone will not be sufficient. It has to be followed by painstaking efforts for setting up institutional networking at various levels---MEA-MEA, MHA-MHA,MOD-MOD,Army-Army, Intelligence-Intelligence, Police-Police--- so that the policy-makers of the two countries are able to pick each other's brains through personal interactions and are able to judge each other in flesh and blood instead of through source and media reports.
9. How to rid ourselves of these reflexes and how to make a beginning in setting up such networking? That should be the question to which Mr.Krishna and Mr.Shah Mehmood Qureshi, his Pakistani counterpart, should address themselves when they meet during the next three days. They could consider setting up a joint 3 plus 3 (Foreign Minister, Defence Minister, Home Minister) group or council to meet regularly to discuss the strategic aspects of the bilateral relations. This could be the substitute for the Composite Dialogue Process which has run out of steam.Instead, if they spend the time throwing the Indian dossiers on terrorism and Pakistani dossiers on Kashmir and river waters at each other they will be missing an opportunity for creating a possible and much-needed turning point in Indo-Pakistan relations.
10. To repeat one of my recent observations, Indo-Pakistan relations have become like an old gramaphone record of our grandparents' vintage in which the needle has got stuck. It is time to look for a new and better record. (14-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The three-day visit of Mr.S.M.Krishna, our Minister for External Affairs, to Pakistan from July 15,2010, has come in the wake of the visit of Mrs.Nirupama Rao, the Foreign Secretary( June 24), and Mr.P.Chidambaram, the Home Minister ( June 25 and 26). Mrs.Rao's visit was used to prepare the ground for the two ministerial visits to follow. Mr.Chidambaram's visit ---mainly to attend the SAARC Home Ministers' conference, but utilised for bilateral interactions too---- kept the focus on Pakistani action against anti-India terrorism in general and against the Pakistan-based conspirators of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) who were involved in the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai in particular.( http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers39%5Cpaper3891.html and http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers39%5Cpaper3893.html)
2. Mr.Chidambaram and his Pakistani counterpart Mr.Rehman Malik avoided acrimony and kept the accusatory reflexes, which usually distort Indo-Pakistan interactions, under control. The visit provided an opportunity for a courtesy meeting between the heads of the Intelligence Bureaus of the two countries, which had a common origin under the British rule and closely resemble each other in their structure and methods of functioning. The two are essentially organisations of police professionals who are experts in the collection and analysis of intelligence relating to internal security.
3.The last meeting between senior officers of the two Intelligence Bureaus was when Rajiv Gandhi was the Prime Minister between 1984 and 1989. He and the late Zia-ul-Haq, the then ruler of Pakistan, had set up a mechanism for regular half-yearly meetings between the Home/Interior Secretaries of the two countries to discuss trans-border terrorism and security. Senior officers of the two IBs were among the officials in the two delegations. This mechanism fell into disuse after the outbreak of Pakistani-backed insurgency in Jammu & Kashmir in 1989.
4. Mr.Chidambaram's discussions with Mr.Malik, as reported in the media, focussed on tactical issues relating to co-operation in the investigation and prosecution of the LET conspirators. Matters of a strategic significance such as the utility of the revival of the pre-1989 mechanism for half-yearly meetings, structured interactions between the Home/Interior Ministries of the two countries and mutual legal assistance between the investigating agencies of the two countries did not appear to have been discussed. There was not even an invitation by Mr.Chidambaram to Mr.Malik and his intelligence chief to visit India. It was a one-shot visit with one-shot discussions, which did not try to create the traditions for such visits and discussions on a regular basis.
5. Unless we create such traditions, the political leaders and officials of the two countries will find it difficult to rid themselve of the constant air of suspicion which enveloppes the bilateral relations like a winter fog in New Delhi and to slowly rid themselves of the accusatory reflexes, which come in the way of a professional approach to security-related problems.
6. What stands in the way of normal relations between India and Pakistan as two neighbouring States with a common border is not just the Kashmir issue or Pakistan's use of terrorism against India. It is the negative reflexes created in our minds by the riots which accompanied the Partition in 1947, by the Indian anger against Pakistan for its repeated use of terrorist or insurgent surrogates against India in the North-East, Punjab and J&K and by the Pakistani anger against India for the Indian role in assisting the freedom struggle in Bangladesh. Unless the two countries rid themselves of these negative reflexes and develop a new mindset marked by at least partly positive rather than overwhelmingly negative perceptions of each other, nothing is going to help in bringing them together.
7. Back-channel discussions, academic interactions, be-good-to-each-other meetings will not help so long as the reflexes are overwhelmingly and compulsively negative. Turning the negative into the positive has to be a gradual process. The starting block of such a process has to be a realisation at the decision-making levels in the two countries that we have far too long been negative in our thinking and perceptions.
8. The realisation alone will not be sufficient. It has to be followed by painstaking efforts for setting up institutional networking at various levels---MEA-MEA, MHA-MHA,MOD-MOD,Army-Army, Intelligence-Intelligence, Police-Police--- so that the policy-makers of the two countries are able to pick each other's brains through personal interactions and are able to judge each other in flesh and blood instead of through source and media reports.
9. How to rid ourselves of these reflexes and how to make a beginning in setting up such networking? That should be the question to which Mr.Krishna and Mr.Shah Mehmood Qureshi, his Pakistani counterpart, should address themselves when they meet during the next three days. They could consider setting up a joint 3 plus 3 (Foreign Minister, Defence Minister, Home Minister) group or council to meet regularly to discuss the strategic aspects of the bilateral relations. This could be the substitute for the Composite Dialogue Process which has run out of steam.Instead, if they spend the time throwing the Indian dossiers on terrorism and Pakistani dossiers on Kashmir and river waters at each other they will be missing an opportunity for creating a possible and much-needed turning point in Indo-Pakistan relations.
10. To repeat one of my recent observations, Indo-Pakistan relations have become like an old gramaphone record of our grandparents' vintage in which the needle has got stuck. It is time to look for a new and better record. (14-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
KAMPALA BLASTS: INDIAN CASUALTIES?
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO. 666
B.RAMAN
Seventy-four persons, 60 of them reportedly Ugandan nationals, were killed and 70 others injured on July 11,2010, in two explosions suspected to have been carried out by Al-Shabaab, the Somali wing of Al Qaeda, at a local rugby club and an Ethiopian restaurant at Kampala, the Ugandan capital. The explosions took place near large numbers of football enthusiasts watching on TV the final match of the World Cup football in South Africa between Spain and Holland.
2. Citing local officials, the British Broadcasting Corporation has stated that among the casualties were Ethiopian, Eritrean, Indian and Congolese nationals . It has not indicated how many Indian nationals were involved and whether there were fatalities among them.
3. In a statement issued from Mogadishu, the Somali capital, a spokesman of Al- Shabaab, who gave his name as Sheikh Ali Mohamud Rage claimed that his organisation had carried out the two explosions. There were some doubts whether these were timed or suicide explosions , but an Ugandan official said that the head of a person believed to be a Somali was found at the site of one of the blasts, thereby indicating that at least one, if not both the blasts, was carried out by a suicide bomber.
4. The Al-Shabaab spokesman has been quoted by news agencies as saying as follows:"Al-Shabaab was behind the two bomb blasts in Uganda.We thank the mujahideen that carried out the attack. We are sending a message to Uganda and Burundi, if they do not take out their Amisom [African Union Mission in Somalia] troops from Somalia, blasts will continue and it will happen in Bujumbura, the Burundi capital, too." These were thus reprisal attacks by Al-Shabaab against Uganda for participating in the African contingent helping the Somali authorities in their operations against Al-Shabaab and other jihadi elements in Somalia.
5. The Amir of Al-Shabaab, Mohamed Abdi Godane, had warned in an audio message earlier this month that Uganda and Burundi would be targeted. The main wing of Al Qaeda based in North Waziristan in Pakistan, the Yemen-based Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Al-Shabaab based in Somalia have continued to maintain a capability for planning and carrying out reprisal acts of terrorism in different parts of the world despite US claims of having eliminated many senior leaders of Al Qaeda through its Drone (pilotless plane) strikes in North and South Waziristan.
6.The deaths in the Drone strikes of many Al Qaeda leaders such as its No.3 Sai’d al-Masri (al-Masri means the Egyptian) also known as Mustafa Abu al-Yazid in May,2010 and Saleh-al-Somali from Somalia on December 8,2009, have not weakened the capability of Al Qaeda to plan and mount terrorist strikes---some successfuly, some unsuccessfully. The successful ones have been in the Af-Pak area, Somalia and Uganda and the unsuccessful ones in the UK, the US and Norway.
7.In supplementary indictments filed recently by federal prosecutors in Brooklyn, US, they have alleged that before his death Saleh al-Somali was involved along with Rashid Rauf, a Mirpuri from Birmingham, who was also killed in a Drone strike, and Adnan El-Shukrijumah, an absconding US national of Saudi origin,in organizing a conspiracy by Afghan immigrant Najibullah Zazi and others to bomb New York City subways last September.
8. Along with Saudis, Egyptians and Yemenis, the Somalis have been among the important components of Al Qaeda. Osama bin Laden had earlier used them for the terrorist strikes outside the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam in August 1998,and in Mombasa in October 2002. The Somalis of Al-Shabaab have now operated successfully in Kampala. The Yemeni and Somali wing of Al Qaeda have exhibited a certain operational autonomy which enables them to mount terrorist strikes on their own without having to depend on the main wing of Al Qaeda in Pakistan. While Al-Shabaab has extended its operations to Africa, the AQAP has been trying to extend its reach to South-East Asia as indicated by the recent detentions of two Singapore nationals with suspected contacts with the AQAP.
9.This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article of December 4,2009, titled "The Somali Front of the Global Jihad" available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers36/paper3534.html. It is annexed for easy reference. (13-7-10)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
THE SOMALI FRONT OF THE GLOBAL JIHAD
B.RAMAN
Al Qaeda looks upon its continuing jihad against the so-called Crusaders --- thereby meaning essentially the US, Israel and their supporters--- as a global intifada waged on many fronts and through many means. In this global jihad, Afghanistan, Somalia and Algeria are seen as battle fronts, which will determine the ultimate outcome. Afghanistan is seen as the core of the battle, Somalia as its southern front and Algeria as the Western front.
2. In a message disseminated on December 20, 2006, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the No.2 to Osama bin Laden in Al Qaeda, said: “Brothers in Islam and Jihad in Somalia: know that you are on the southern garrison of Islam, so don’t allow Islam to be attacked from your flank, and know that we are with you, and that the entire Muslim Ummah is with you. So don’t lose heart, or fall into despair, for you must dominate if you are true in faith. And know that you are fending off the same Crusade which is fighting your brothers in Islam in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon. So be resolute, be patient and be optimistic, for by Allah beside whom there is no other God, even if your enemies possess thousands of tons of iron and explosives, in their chests lie the hearts of mice. So be severe against them like Muhammad was. "
3. To keep the jihad going in Somalia is one of its important objectives. For this purpose, it uses not only recruits from the impoverished local population, but also from the Somali diaspora in the West----including the US--- as well as jihad-hardened cadres sent from the battle fronts in the Af-Pak region. The Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) of Pakistan has had a long history of contacts with the Muslim population in Somalia and East African countries just as it has with the Muslim population of Chechnya and Dagestan. Though the TJ itself does not indulge in acts of terrorism, it plays an important role in facilitating the ideological motivation of the population on behalf of Al Qaeda.
4. In September 2009, Al Shabaab, meaning “The Lads”, an organization of Somali youths, was reported to have disseminated through Islamic web sites usually identified with Al Qaeda a 48-minute video documentary in which it proclaimed its allegiance to Osama bin Laden. It derives its name “The Lads” from the fact that it used to be the youth wing of a fundamentalist organization called the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), which had established control over some parts of Somalia and was ultimately crushed by invading Ethiopian troops in 2006. While the elders of the UIC disappeared after being defeated by the better trained and better armed Ethiopian troops allegedly inspired and aided by the US, the Al Shabaab replaced the UIC as a born-again jihadi organization, which was determined to continue the jihad against the troops of the African Union, which had replaced the Ethiopian troops, and of the UN-backed local Government, which it viewed as apostate.
5. Though Somalis had participated in acts of suicide terrorism on behalf of Al Qaeda in other countries, suicide terrorism was unknown in Somalia itself till Al Shabaab made its appearance in 2006. Even though it proclaimed its loyalty to bin Laden only in September, 2009, it had carried out a number of acts of suicide terrorism against local Government targets as well as the peace-keeping troops of the African Union ever since the AU troops took over their peace-keeping responsibility in Somalia. Al Shabaab has been waging a two-front jihad---- against the AU troops and the local Government being protected by the AU troops. The first act of suicide terrorism took place on September 18, 2006. Since then, there have been 13 suicide attacks--- two in 2006, four in 2007, two in 2008 and five this year.
6. The Al Shabaab cadres, many of whom had allegedly served with the Afghan Mujahideen, the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the Af-Pak region, look upon their jihad as similar to the jihad waged by the Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviet troops and those of the Government of the then President Najibullah in the 1980s and the early 1990s.
7. In a serious attack of suicide terrorism, a male suicide bomber dressed as a woman managed to find his way into a graduation ceremony of medical students in a Mogadishu hotel on December 3, 2009, and blew himself up killing 19 persons, including three Ministers of the Cabinet of Prime Minister Omar Sharmarke of the UN-backed Government. Even though no organization has so far claimed responsibility for the attack, Al Shabaab is strongly suspected by the local authorities.
8. Though there is so far no evidence of any nexus between Al Shabaab and the Somali pirates, the dangers of money earned from piracy going to the coffers of Al Qaeda and the availability in Somalia of sea-faring people who could be used by Al Qaeda for future acts of maritime terrorism cannot be ignored.
9. A Reuters report carried on December 4, 2009, by the “Daily Times” of Lahore has quoted Bethuel Kiplagat, who used to be Kenya’s special envoy to the Somalia peace process from 2003 to 2005, as saying as follows: “Suicide bombings are a worrying trend not only for Somalia but also the region. There has been a rise in fundamentalism in Somalia coming from the Middle East and Pakistan. There’s a worry Al Qaeda may be looking at Somalia as a new sanctuary.”
10. On March 16, 2009, Mohamed Mohamed of the BBC’s Somali section, reported as follows: “As well as alleged links to al-Qaeda it is said to have Arabs, Asians, other Africans and - America's FBI believes - Westerners among its ranks. These foreigners are said to be involved in training Al Sabaab recruits in various aspects of guerrilla warfare, including suicide bombings and booby traps.”
11. On February 29, 2008, the then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice designated Al Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
B.RAMAN
Seventy-four persons, 60 of them reportedly Ugandan nationals, were killed and 70 others injured on July 11,2010, in two explosions suspected to have been carried out by Al-Shabaab, the Somali wing of Al Qaeda, at a local rugby club and an Ethiopian restaurant at Kampala, the Ugandan capital. The explosions took place near large numbers of football enthusiasts watching on TV the final match of the World Cup football in South Africa between Spain and Holland.
2. Citing local officials, the British Broadcasting Corporation has stated that among the casualties were Ethiopian, Eritrean, Indian and Congolese nationals . It has not indicated how many Indian nationals were involved and whether there were fatalities among them.
3. In a statement issued from Mogadishu, the Somali capital, a spokesman of Al- Shabaab, who gave his name as Sheikh Ali Mohamud Rage claimed that his organisation had carried out the two explosions. There were some doubts whether these were timed or suicide explosions , but an Ugandan official said that the head of a person believed to be a Somali was found at the site of one of the blasts, thereby indicating that at least one, if not both the blasts, was carried out by a suicide bomber.
4. The Al-Shabaab spokesman has been quoted by news agencies as saying as follows:"Al-Shabaab was behind the two bomb blasts in Uganda.We thank the mujahideen that carried out the attack. We are sending a message to Uganda and Burundi, if they do not take out their Amisom [African Union Mission in Somalia] troops from Somalia, blasts will continue and it will happen in Bujumbura, the Burundi capital, too." These were thus reprisal attacks by Al-Shabaab against Uganda for participating in the African contingent helping the Somali authorities in their operations against Al-Shabaab and other jihadi elements in Somalia.
5. The Amir of Al-Shabaab, Mohamed Abdi Godane, had warned in an audio message earlier this month that Uganda and Burundi would be targeted. The main wing of Al Qaeda based in North Waziristan in Pakistan, the Yemen-based Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Al-Shabaab based in Somalia have continued to maintain a capability for planning and carrying out reprisal acts of terrorism in different parts of the world despite US claims of having eliminated many senior leaders of Al Qaeda through its Drone (pilotless plane) strikes in North and South Waziristan.
6.The deaths in the Drone strikes of many Al Qaeda leaders such as its No.3 Sai’d al-Masri (al-Masri means the Egyptian) also known as Mustafa Abu al-Yazid in May,2010 and Saleh-al-Somali from Somalia on December 8,2009, have not weakened the capability of Al Qaeda to plan and mount terrorist strikes---some successfuly, some unsuccessfully. The successful ones have been in the Af-Pak area, Somalia and Uganda and the unsuccessful ones in the UK, the US and Norway.
7.In supplementary indictments filed recently by federal prosecutors in Brooklyn, US, they have alleged that before his death Saleh al-Somali was involved along with Rashid Rauf, a Mirpuri from Birmingham, who was also killed in a Drone strike, and Adnan El-Shukrijumah, an absconding US national of Saudi origin,in organizing a conspiracy by Afghan immigrant Najibullah Zazi and others to bomb New York City subways last September.
8. Along with Saudis, Egyptians and Yemenis, the Somalis have been among the important components of Al Qaeda. Osama bin Laden had earlier used them for the terrorist strikes outside the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam in August 1998,and in Mombasa in October 2002. The Somalis of Al-Shabaab have now operated successfully in Kampala. The Yemeni and Somali wing of Al Qaeda have exhibited a certain operational autonomy which enables them to mount terrorist strikes on their own without having to depend on the main wing of Al Qaeda in Pakistan. While Al-Shabaab has extended its operations to Africa, the AQAP has been trying to extend its reach to South-East Asia as indicated by the recent detentions of two Singapore nationals with suspected contacts with the AQAP.
9.This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article of December 4,2009, titled "The Somali Front of the Global Jihad" available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers36/paper3534.html. It is annexed for easy reference. (13-7-10)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
THE SOMALI FRONT OF THE GLOBAL JIHAD
B.RAMAN
Al Qaeda looks upon its continuing jihad against the so-called Crusaders --- thereby meaning essentially the US, Israel and their supporters--- as a global intifada waged on many fronts and through many means. In this global jihad, Afghanistan, Somalia and Algeria are seen as battle fronts, which will determine the ultimate outcome. Afghanistan is seen as the core of the battle, Somalia as its southern front and Algeria as the Western front.
2. In a message disseminated on December 20, 2006, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the No.2 to Osama bin Laden in Al Qaeda, said: “Brothers in Islam and Jihad in Somalia: know that you are on the southern garrison of Islam, so don’t allow Islam to be attacked from your flank, and know that we are with you, and that the entire Muslim Ummah is with you. So don’t lose heart, or fall into despair, for you must dominate if you are true in faith. And know that you are fending off the same Crusade which is fighting your brothers in Islam in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon. So be resolute, be patient and be optimistic, for by Allah beside whom there is no other God, even if your enemies possess thousands of tons of iron and explosives, in their chests lie the hearts of mice. So be severe against them like Muhammad was. "
3. To keep the jihad going in Somalia is one of its important objectives. For this purpose, it uses not only recruits from the impoverished local population, but also from the Somali diaspora in the West----including the US--- as well as jihad-hardened cadres sent from the battle fronts in the Af-Pak region. The Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) of Pakistan has had a long history of contacts with the Muslim population in Somalia and East African countries just as it has with the Muslim population of Chechnya and Dagestan. Though the TJ itself does not indulge in acts of terrorism, it plays an important role in facilitating the ideological motivation of the population on behalf of Al Qaeda.
4. In September 2009, Al Shabaab, meaning “The Lads”, an organization of Somali youths, was reported to have disseminated through Islamic web sites usually identified with Al Qaeda a 48-minute video documentary in which it proclaimed its allegiance to Osama bin Laden. It derives its name “The Lads” from the fact that it used to be the youth wing of a fundamentalist organization called the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), which had established control over some parts of Somalia and was ultimately crushed by invading Ethiopian troops in 2006. While the elders of the UIC disappeared after being defeated by the better trained and better armed Ethiopian troops allegedly inspired and aided by the US, the Al Shabaab replaced the UIC as a born-again jihadi organization, which was determined to continue the jihad against the troops of the African Union, which had replaced the Ethiopian troops, and of the UN-backed local Government, which it viewed as apostate.
5. Though Somalis had participated in acts of suicide terrorism on behalf of Al Qaeda in other countries, suicide terrorism was unknown in Somalia itself till Al Shabaab made its appearance in 2006. Even though it proclaimed its loyalty to bin Laden only in September, 2009, it had carried out a number of acts of suicide terrorism against local Government targets as well as the peace-keeping troops of the African Union ever since the AU troops took over their peace-keeping responsibility in Somalia. Al Shabaab has been waging a two-front jihad---- against the AU troops and the local Government being protected by the AU troops. The first act of suicide terrorism took place on September 18, 2006. Since then, there have been 13 suicide attacks--- two in 2006, four in 2007, two in 2008 and five this year.
6. The Al Shabaab cadres, many of whom had allegedly served with the Afghan Mujahideen, the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the Af-Pak region, look upon their jihad as similar to the jihad waged by the Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviet troops and those of the Government of the then President Najibullah in the 1980s and the early 1990s.
7. In a serious attack of suicide terrorism, a male suicide bomber dressed as a woman managed to find his way into a graduation ceremony of medical students in a Mogadishu hotel on December 3, 2009, and blew himself up killing 19 persons, including three Ministers of the Cabinet of Prime Minister Omar Sharmarke of the UN-backed Government. Even though no organization has so far claimed responsibility for the attack, Al Shabaab is strongly suspected by the local authorities.
8. Though there is so far no evidence of any nexus between Al Shabaab and the Somali pirates, the dangers of money earned from piracy going to the coffers of Al Qaeda and the availability in Somalia of sea-faring people who could be used by Al Qaeda for future acts of maritime terrorism cannot be ignored.
9. A Reuters report carried on December 4, 2009, by the “Daily Times” of Lahore has quoted Bethuel Kiplagat, who used to be Kenya’s special envoy to the Somalia peace process from 2003 to 2005, as saying as follows: “Suicide bombings are a worrying trend not only for Somalia but also the region. There has been a rise in fundamentalism in Somalia coming from the Middle East and Pakistan. There’s a worry Al Qaeda may be looking at Somalia as a new sanctuary.”
10. On March 16, 2009, Mohamed Mohamed of the BBC’s Somali section, reported as follows: “As well as alleged links to al-Qaeda it is said to have Arabs, Asians, other Africans and - America's FBI believes - Westerners among its ranks. These foreigners are said to be involved in training Al Sabaab recruits in various aspects of guerrilla warfare, including suicide bombings and booby traps.”
11. On February 29, 2008, the then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice designated Al Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
Monday, July 12, 2010
THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS
B.RAMAN
The Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy of Singapore had organized on July 2 and 3,2010, an India-China Dialogue on “the Role of the Media in India-China Relations”.
2.An explanatory note of the School available on its web site says: “Despite the massive growth of bilateral trade between China and India, tensions over territorial and political issues have also grown, particularly in the last year. While some sources of stress are real, their effects are mediated and often inflamed by media depictions and perceptions of these tensions. Moreover, circumstances may also arise where the media tend to downplay more positive aspects of the relationship. In a situation where the Chinese and Indians have limited knowledge of each other and the interactions are dominated by strategic and business concerns, the media can play a constructive role in promoting mutual understanding among the general public. This first colloquium in the India-China Dialogue series seeks to answer some of these questions about the role of the media in India-China relations. It brings together representatives from the media and other areas to discuss pertinent issues and seeks alternatives to these path-dependent approaches. The speakers will discuss different aspects of image production and reception of these two large and varied nations, the different areas of competition and convergence as covered by the media, and the role of media in geo-politics, cultural relations, diplomacy, etc. Are the media in India and China really responsible for creating misperceptions and an adversarial image of each other? Are journalists in the two countries trained and qualified to cover the other country? What are the differences between the Indian media’s coverage of China and the Chinese media’s reporting on India? Are there alternative avenues for presenting information to the general public.”
3. This subject assumed importance last year following an escalation of mutual demonisation in the print, electronic and online media of the two countries. In the case of India, the escalation was more pronounced in the electronic and online media than in the print media. In China, the escalation was more marked in the print and online media than in the electronic media. China has not yet seen the kind of explosive growth in 24-hour private news channels that India has and it has no privately-run indigenous news channels. In India, the problem of uncontrolled demonisation of China was seen largely in the 24-hour news channels, which merrily lapped up anything critical of China said or written by anybody and organized discussions which tended to be over-dramatic and occasionally even hysterical..
4.In China, the demonisation of India was largely seen in the Chinese language print media and in the thousands of blogs which have come up in the country following the phenomenal growth of the Internet. Most of the blog contents was in the Chinese language. Since there are very few Chinese language experts in India, the majority of the negative articles and postings about India did not get translated and circulated. Only some were. If more of them had been translated and disseminated to Indian readers, the alarm caused in India would have been more.
5. In India, what appeared to be unbridled criticism of China was largely in the English media. The Indian language media, which has more readership and viewership than the English media, did not show the same interest in China and was not as negative about China as was the English media.
6. The analysis of these demonizing articles in the two countries tended to get distorted due to the following reasons:
* The lack of transparency about the Chinese media and the widespread perception in India that the Chinese media is still largely owned and/or controlled by the Chinese Government and the Communist Party of China. As a result, anything critical of India appearing in the Chinese media was viewed by large sections of the Indian public as representing the views of the Chinese Government and party.
* The lack of adequate knowledge in China about the free press that India has. Barring some radio stations and TV channels run by the Government, there is hardly any government owned or controlled media in India. Large sections of the Chinese public opinion tend to think that the entire Indian media is owned and/or controlled by the Government and the political party in power as is the case in China. These sections tended to assume that whatever was carried by the Indian media had the approval of the Government. Thus we had a situation in which large sections of the Chinese public assumed that the negative coverage of China in the Indian media was at the instance of the Government, which was not a fact. Large sections of the Indian public assumed that the negative coverage of India in the Chinese media was instigated by the Government and party, which may have been or may not have been a fact. Many claim that the media landscape in China has changed and that everything that appears in the media does not necessarily represent the views of the Government and party. The Indian public, except those belonging to the leftist parties, is not prepared to accept this.
* Many in India believe that the Internet in China is closely controlled by the Government and that the negative contents of the blogs have been allowed to appear by the Government. Otherwise, they would have been erased.
7. The consequent distortions in the analysis of the reports and writings in the media of the two countries almost led to a war of words between analysts, journalists and TV anchors of the two countries. Fortunately, the two Governments had a better understanding of the state of affairs and put a stop to this self-feeding rhetoric. The campaign of mutual demonisation has declined. But there is still a lot of criticism of each other, which is more due to the low level of trust between the civil societies of the two countries due to historical reasons than due to any malign reasons.
8. This may please be read in continuation of the following two articles written by Mr.D.S.Rajan, Director, Chennai Centre For China Studies:
(a). The Tricky Business of Watching Chinese Media, dated October 12,2009.
(b). China: Nationalistic Blogs Raise New Issues Concerning Sino-Indian Border, dated December 23,2009.
9. These articles, which are available at the web site of the Chennai Centre for China Studies, are annexed below for easy reference. (12-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
The Tricky Business of Watching Chinese Media
D.S.Rajan, C3S Paper No.385 dated October 12, 2009
For analysts of Chinese affairs abroad, the printed, online, radio and TV media in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), in Chinese, English and other languages, remain a major source of information. The conventional wisdom is that virtually the entire media are functioning under the guidance of either the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or the government led by it; the CCP Central Committee’s Publicity Department plays a pivotal role in this regard. As such, outside the PRC, the Chinese media are invariably being seen as reflecting the views of the CCP and the government.
It cannot be denied however that instances of very limited freedom, being enjoyed occasionally by the Chinese press are increasingly coming to notice. – Journals like ‘Cai Jing’, ‘Nanyang Zhoumo, Yan Huang Chun Qiu and scores of local newspapers, websites and blogs, are critical of the authorities sometimes on issues like corruption, nepotism, problems of peasants etc. Also, ideologically, Beijing is permitting neo-liberal, neo-left and even some ultra-Maoist scholars to express their views. In doing so, its motives seem to be using the available different viewpoints as possible inputs to ultimate policy making. As the party theoretical organ ‘Qiu Shi’ puts it, while ‘hundred flowers blossom’, the media must not cross the rubicon, by expressing any opinion challenging the rule of the communist party or affecting the unity and integrity of the country. A known example of ‘crossing the limit’ had been the journal ‘Strategy and Management’ which published (September 2004) an excessively independent article on North Korea. In response, the authorities closed down the journal (“Reporters without Borders”, 1 June 2005).
This writer started studying Chinese media more than four decades back and till today, have come across several reports, which are more concealing than revealing; I however do not mean that they reflect a general trend and feel that only on selected occasions such a phenomenon is being seen. Not surprisingly, China analysts world over per force are examining such dispatches by reading between the lines, examining the timing of publications, studying the significance of what has not been said and comparing the contents with earlier ones, all in an effort to draw certain meaningful conclusions, if possible. There is however a risk involved in following such techniques, as the likelihood of such analysts going wrong would always exist. On the other hand, Chinese experts at home, directly exposed to the system, are better equipped to understand the hidden meaning if any of Chinese media views. They may however prefer not to come out openly with their feelings out of fear of punishment by the authorities.
The following are case studies undertaken by me, aimed at examining the transparency or otherwise of Chinese media dispatches:
1) Shanghai Daily Wen Huibao (10 November 1965) carried an article entitled, “Criticism of Historical Drama- Hai Rui Dismissed from Office”, written by Yao Wenyuan, a member of the now disgraced ‘gang of four’. Not many were immediately aware of political implications of the article; the assessment that the drama was criticized as it made an allegorical attack on Chairman Mao for his dismissal of Defence Minister Peng Dehuai, and that the article gave a signal towards launch of cultural revolution, could come only subsequently. It is obvious that the article could not say certain things openly, as what was involved is a struggle for political power.
2) China Daily (1 November 2004) published an Op-Ed captioned, “US Strategy to be Blamed”, by Qian Qichen, considered Czar of Chinese foreign policy, right on the eve of US polling in which President Bush contested for second time. It was notable for its strident anti- US tone and expression of fears on a US encirclement of China. To the world’s dismay, the China Daily disowned the article next day and a PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson denied that Qian wrote any such article. It was natural that speculations then arose on leadership differences in Beijing on China’s US policy, but observers remain puzzled over the episode; the real reason still looks mysterious. How China finally played the issue diplomatically with the US is another matter.
3) A sharply worded comment in People’s Daily (1 September 2008), signaling China’s opposition to India’s getting waiver in the scheduled Vienna meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), said that the Indo-US nuclear deal is a major blow to India’s non-proliferation image. The article timed close to the voting at Vienna, coupled with China’s reported moves there to join the like minded countries that had reservations on India getting the waiver, gave an impression that Beijing will vote against India’s case at the NSG. What happened finally was China’s abstention from the voting; China’s foreign minister Yang Jiechi stated that his nation did not try to block anything in Vienna and played a constructive role (Reuters, 2 October 2008). In such circumstances, how to interpret the opinions of the People’s Daily, becomes a key question. A probable reason could be that they could be representative of Chinese thinking based on principles, whereas at diplomatic levels, China felt the necessity to select a practical and safe option; regardless of such explanation, for the public opinion outside China, the Chinese stand on the issue remains puzzling.
4) What was the meaning of the Chinese media outbursts against India’s dispatch of additional troops to Arunachal Pradesh, noticed in the run up to the 13th India-China round of Special Representatives talks on the border issue (7-8 August 2009)? The Global Times (11 June 2009) described the troops dispatch as India’s “unwise military moves” and asked whether India can afford the consequences of a ‘potential confrontation’ with China. The People’s Daily’s comment (19 June 2009) on the same subject captioned ‘ a veiled threat or a good neighbor’, alleged that India seemed to be conspiring to create a picture of an immediate war with China. These two items, kept for the comments of readers for a long time, received substantial number of responses, most of them critical of India. Questions arise – what was the purpose behind the talk of ‘confrontation or war’ with India in the two articles? Was it meant to apply pressure on India during the border talks? The Chinese official comments have on the other hand been positive. Zhang Yan, the Chinese Ambassador to India has described the visit of the PRC Special Representative to India as successful and that ‘in-depth’ talks on the border issue could be held between the two sides (The Hindu, 12 October 2009). The remarks earlier (4 August 2009) of the PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson were also positive, though he made a mention about the ‘illegal’ McMahon line. Coming out clear is the apparent dichotomy between the treatments of the media and the government establishments in China on the border issue. The question as to how to interpret the same, continues to be valid.
5) An article in a Chinese website (8 August 2009), published at the time of Sino-Indian border talks, suggested that China should break up the Indian Union. It was reproduced around the same time by more than 20 websites/blogs in China. After protests from India, the concerned Chinese website subsequently inserted the name of an individual who wrote the article, along with a disclaimer that the writer did not represent its views; the website also claimed it has no connections with the government. The same was published in the website of Chennai Centre for China Studies (CCCS), India, which originally reported the Chinese website article. Also, in response to an Op-Ed carried by the Hindu Newspaper, Chennai, alleging factual inaccuracies in the CCCS article, a letter to the Editor was sent to the Hindu pointing out that the CCCS report did not connect the Chinese website with the PRC government and that in particular, it did not make any reference to the China Institute of International and Strategic Studies, a military think tank. The Hindu did not publish the rejoinder.
This writer holds his view that nothing can be printed or published in China without the knowledge of the Party/Government there and that any failure on the part of the authorities in taking notice of media contents including in web posts, is unthinkable. Can any newspaper, website or blog in China get away from the clutches of the authorities if they challenge the authority of the CCP or question the unity and integrity of the country? The answer is a clear ‘No’. I have seen arguments coming from China that the article in question had been appearing in Chinese blogs since 2006. I ask following questions – what is the explanation for the article (only blog for the Chinese) continuing to appear, as late as August 2009, simultaneously in a number of web posts? How the government, which has introduced tough regulations stipulating registration of all websites/blogs with it, did not notice such posts, under circulation for about three years already, challenging the declared policy of China towards India? What action was taken by Beijing against the so-called bloggers (called Xinlang or Queen Park Cruiser)? Are the Chinese security agencies so inefficient that they could not identify and take action against these so-called ‘anonymous’ bloggers.
Interestingly, the Chinese web posts did not single out India only. Vietnam’s case is another example. Hanoi lodged a protest (August 2008) with Beijing at government levels against an article in Sina.Com and a few other Chinese websites, which disclosed a plan for China’s 31-day invasion of Vietnam involving 310,000 troops sweeping into the latter from Yunnan and Guangxi and by blocking of sea-lanes in South China Sea. Vietnamese foreign office reportedly summoned Chinese diplomats in Hanoi twice to protest against the reported plan. According to the Vietnamese Foreign Minister, Beijing was asked by Hanoi to prevent appearance of such articles.
Another instance concerns South Korea. At the time of Olympics last year, a South Korea-China media row erupted after a Chinese website alleged that in the view of Koreans, Confucius was not Chinese, but a Korean. Also, the South Korean media are annoyed at the media campaign in China in progress since 2003, claiming that Koguryo, the 1300-year old Korean kingdom (existed in the present day North Korea- Manchuria region), was historically under China. For South Korean media, the campaign has hurt the Korean national pride .In particular, they have not taken kindly a ceremony organized by Chinese academics this year to mark the discovery of an unknown stretch of Great Wall in Dandong, close to the North Korean border; their criticism was that the discovery implied an extension of Chinese historical boundary to the ancient Koguryo.
The Chinese media have alleged that the media in India have over-reacted to an obscure web post in China. Any hyping is of course not correct, but the Chinese media should realize that the suggestion in the concerned web post for ‘splitting India’ has been unprecedented and atrocious enough to invite the Indian media’s wrath. They should also ponder over the Vietnamese reaction mentioned above. Is Hanoi’s response both at diplomatic and media levels to Chinese website articles also an over reaction? The basic question is that why the Chinese government is turning a blind eye to articles /blogs carried in the registered websites in the PRC, which the foreign governments and public find most objectionable. I feel puzzled when some Chinese media comments argue that such web posts reflect China’s ‘democracy’ – defending the indefensible indeed!
6) Another puzzling aspect relates to the non-publication so far of the full text of the CCP chief Hu Jintao’s Work Report submitted at the recently held party plenum; such practices had been followed in the past also. Why such secrecy? The plenum also kept everybody guessing on the expected reshuffle of personnel. Wang Changjiang, Director General, Central Party School, while answering a question as to why Xi Jinping, the politburo standing committee member, was not elected as Vice-Chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission, disclosed that personnel reshuffle was not in the agenda of the plenum. Though this somewhat put at rest speculations on the political future of Xi Jinping, widely expected to succeed Hu Jintao in 2012 as CCP General Secretary, a question still persists outside China on whether there was a lack of consensus among the leaders during the plenum on reshuffles in the run up to the next party congress in 2012.
The ‘Economist’ on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of founding the PRC, has said that the world accepts China as a great nation, but China is not behaving like one; that was in the context of human right and other issues, but there is no doubt that media openness is equally another condition for judging China’s greatness; if that condition is fulfilled, the outside world can interpret Chinese pronouncements correctly, leading to a better understanding of China abroad. But, will Beijing move quickly towards media openness? The answer is ‘No’. As long as the ruling party feels that press freedom could be detrimental to its hegemony over Chinese politics, no fundamental change in the PRC’s media policy can be expected. .
(The writer, D.S.Rajan, is Director, Chennai Centre for China Studies, Chennai, India.Email:dsrajan@gmail.com)
China: Nationalistic Blogs Raise New Issues Concerning Sino-Indian Border
D.S.Rajan, C3S Paper No.418 dated December 23, 2009
There is apparently a lull now in the propaganda drive of the Chinese state-controlled media on the Sino-Indian border issue. Epithets like ‘no compromise on territory’, ‘lessons of 1962’ and ‘dangerous consequences for India’, used by them earlier, are carefully being avoided. Adding to the atmosphere is the muted media reaction noticed so far to the Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh’s firm reference (Washington, 25 November 2009) to China’s ‘certain amount of assertiveness of late’ and implied disapproval of that country’s reform path ‘introduced by the writ of the ruling group in a non-democratic set up’. The only critical comment has been in a very brief manner- ‘Unfriendly remarks’, said People’s Daily of 9 December 2009. Similar has been the case with concerns expressed recently by the Indian Defence Minister, Mr. Antony, on China’s military help to Pakistan, with the Chinese media by and large not paying much attention to the same.
The fall in the level of the media rhetoric coincides with some significant military exchanges between the two sides. The Indian Air force Chief has taken part in the Zhuhai (China) air show in November 2009 and two top Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officials – Deputy Chief of Staff General Ge Zhenfeng and the Commander of the Tibet Military District Lt Gen Shu Yutai, have paid visits to India. The symbolic importance of the Tibet military commander’s sojourn in India, at the present juncture comes out clearly.
The Chinese language unofficial websites and blogs in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) however continue to take on India on the border issue, rather vehemently, which should be noted in India if not with alarm. Chinese scholars visiting India have argued in the past that the government is in no position to control bloggers in the country, said to be about 180 million; more over views expressed in the blogs have come from ‘Fen Qing’ or angry youth and do not represent official opinion. On the other hand, the contents of the blogs have always appeared important for analysts abroad as the concerned writers looked knowledgeable, enjoying more often access to the government data and information.
In the context mentioned, what the Chinese websites and blogs have said of late on contentious issues including that of Sino-Indian border deserve close scrutiny. Their views topic-wise are given below:
Sino-Indian war?
First, the blogs in the websites address the question whether there will be a second war with India and if so at what time. Revealing that China’s top central leadership has reached a consensus to teach India a lesson and recover ‘Southern Tibet’ (India’s Arunachal Pradesh), two blog assessments in Chinese language (www.warchina.com/n88582c21.aspx dated 1 December 2009 and www.warchina.com/n8183c21.aspx dated 9 December 2009) predict that Beijing may consider the 2010-2011 period as suitable for action against India; they argue that by that time conditions would have been established for next power transfer in China, economic crisis in China would have been over, the international role of the US would have become extremely weak, China would have become a powerful player in international politics, China would have been able to bring in regional military balance , the PRC’s comprehensive national strength would have developed further in comparison to that of India and lastly, China’s military preparedness would have been completed.
Chinese reinforcement in the border
The second theme in the blogs pertains to reinforcement of China’s troops in the border already carried out and the improvement of logistics on China’s side, in response to India’s recent dispatch of additional forces to Eastern sector. A Blog evaluation (in www.junshi315.cn, dated 11 December 2009) says that India’s sending more 60000 troops is a unilateral step and the same is also a part of Western strategies to contain China. Another Blog (in www.warchina.com/n8183c21.aspx dated 1 December 2009) highlights the holding of military exercises in the Chengdu Military Region recently, to counter the threat coming from India. Elaborating this point, a report (in www.ymglover.com/viewthread.php?action dated 6 December 2009) reveals that China’s border defence troops have now entered the strategically important plains in the southwest of Rikaze and East of Yadong covering the trijunction of China, Bhutan and Sikkim, adding that Bhutan, conscious of China’s influence, has been quiet to the presence of Chinese troops in its disputed area. Bhutan has also supported China’s position in the Sino-Indian border talks, it further claims. As per another Blog disclosure (www.junshi315.cn dated 11 December 2009), with additional troops in position, China’s border with India now stands sealed. The Chinese army is fully prepared as India, taking the reported military training to ULFA in China as a pretext, may plan to attack China, according to another blog (in huanqiu.com/? uid-158463-action-viewspace-itemid-390632)
On upgrading of logistics position, a blog (www.junshi315.cn dated 11 December 2009) quotes foreign reports to say that that the new airport at A Li with 4500-meter long runway is capable of lifting fighter aircraft and bombers. In the same connection a report (http://topics.huanqiu.com/thread-283700-1-1.html dated 19 October 2009) focuses on the proposed extension of Qinghai-Tibet railway to Nepal border and a railway project under planning to link China and Pakistan in parallel to the existing China-Pakistan Friendship Highway.
“ Ladakh- Another Southern Tibet”
As third theme of the websites, India’s Ladakh region is being described as part of China’s Tibet, along with the assertion that the Chinese government has never recognized New Delhi’s official position that Ladakh is part of India. Taking this stand, a blog under the title “Ladakh- another Southern Tibet”(bbs.huanqiu.com/thread-283700 dated 13 December 2009) says that the Volume 8 of the “Historical Atlas of China”, published in Beijing showing China’s territories as existed in 1820, included Ladakh as part of China’s Tibet. “Whether it is McMahon line in the East or Johnson line in the West, both have no legal basis and received no recognition from the Chinese government and people”, it asserts.
“Drive India out of Sikkim”
While one blog (bbs.huanqiu.com/thread-283700-1-1.html, 13 December 2009)
says that acceptance of Sikkim as part of India with Nathula as trading point, has been the greatest Chinese concession to India made during border talks, another comment (www.ymglover.com/viewthread.php?action dated 6 December 2009) under the caption “ China should drive India out of Sikkim”, finds motives behind India’s deployment of its 27th Mountain Division to Sikkim belt, after shifting it from its original base in Kashmir. It attributes the shift to the strategic pressure from China felt by India. It concludes by saying that a clash of Indian and Chinese strengths to capture Sikkim has already started.
India-Nepal Ties
India-Nepal relation is also a notable topic figuring in the Chinese language websites. Noting India’s high-level treatment to the visiting Nepalese Army Chief in December 2009 and its proposal to supply T-72 tanks to Nepal, a report in the authoritative website (mil.huanqiu.com/Observation/2009-12/664409.html) compares the military assistance to Nepal by China and India and finds China’s help to Nepal’s military training programme as superior. It quotes a Chinese military expert to say that the balanced position being maintained by Kathmandu at the current time of Sino-Indian tensions marks a victory for Beijing’s military strategy in the neighborhood. Also, according to an opinion (mil.huanqiu.com/Observation/2009-12/656241.html), the airport in Nepal’s Surketh, to be built by New Delhi under an agreement with Kathmandu, will be a ‘springboard’ to India for attacking China.
Conclusion
Despite tensions, both Beijing and New Delhi have managed to keep relations at government levels at an even keel and there is constant official exchange of views between the two sides. Even setting up of a hotline between the two prime ministers is under discussion. This being so, there may be some justification if a question is asked as to why pay attention to unofficial blogs now. The aim of this paper, which has done so, is not to create panic and cause misgivings in respect of Sino-Indian ties. But at the same time, it may not be wrong to say that analysts in India have a responsibility to take notice and analyze implications if any, of tall claims being made in the Chinese blogs like the ‘consensus’ at top leadership levels in the PRC to teach a lesson to India and recover Arunachal in the 2010-2011 period. Also, the assertion that Ladakh is part of ‘Southern Tibet’ and that the PRC has never recognized that territory as part of India, definitely raises more suspicions in India on China’s intentions.
(The writer, Mr. D.S.Rajan, is the Director, Chennai Centre for China Studies, Chennai`, India.Email:dsrajan@gmail.com)
The Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy of Singapore had organized on July 2 and 3,2010, an India-China Dialogue on “the Role of the Media in India-China Relations”.
2.An explanatory note of the School available on its web site says: “Despite the massive growth of bilateral trade between China and India, tensions over territorial and political issues have also grown, particularly in the last year. While some sources of stress are real, their effects are mediated and often inflamed by media depictions and perceptions of these tensions. Moreover, circumstances may also arise where the media tend to downplay more positive aspects of the relationship. In a situation where the Chinese and Indians have limited knowledge of each other and the interactions are dominated by strategic and business concerns, the media can play a constructive role in promoting mutual understanding among the general public. This first colloquium in the India-China Dialogue series seeks to answer some of these questions about the role of the media in India-China relations. It brings together representatives from the media and other areas to discuss pertinent issues and seeks alternatives to these path-dependent approaches. The speakers will discuss different aspects of image production and reception of these two large and varied nations, the different areas of competition and convergence as covered by the media, and the role of media in geo-politics, cultural relations, diplomacy, etc. Are the media in India and China really responsible for creating misperceptions and an adversarial image of each other? Are journalists in the two countries trained and qualified to cover the other country? What are the differences between the Indian media’s coverage of China and the Chinese media’s reporting on India? Are there alternative avenues for presenting information to the general public.”
3. This subject assumed importance last year following an escalation of mutual demonisation in the print, electronic and online media of the two countries. In the case of India, the escalation was more pronounced in the electronic and online media than in the print media. In China, the escalation was more marked in the print and online media than in the electronic media. China has not yet seen the kind of explosive growth in 24-hour private news channels that India has and it has no privately-run indigenous news channels. In India, the problem of uncontrolled demonisation of China was seen largely in the 24-hour news channels, which merrily lapped up anything critical of China said or written by anybody and organized discussions which tended to be over-dramatic and occasionally even hysterical..
4.In China, the demonisation of India was largely seen in the Chinese language print media and in the thousands of blogs which have come up in the country following the phenomenal growth of the Internet. Most of the blog contents was in the Chinese language. Since there are very few Chinese language experts in India, the majority of the negative articles and postings about India did not get translated and circulated. Only some were. If more of them had been translated and disseminated to Indian readers, the alarm caused in India would have been more.
5. In India, what appeared to be unbridled criticism of China was largely in the English media. The Indian language media, which has more readership and viewership than the English media, did not show the same interest in China and was not as negative about China as was the English media.
6. The analysis of these demonizing articles in the two countries tended to get distorted due to the following reasons:
* The lack of transparency about the Chinese media and the widespread perception in India that the Chinese media is still largely owned and/or controlled by the Chinese Government and the Communist Party of China. As a result, anything critical of India appearing in the Chinese media was viewed by large sections of the Indian public as representing the views of the Chinese Government and party.
* The lack of adequate knowledge in China about the free press that India has. Barring some radio stations and TV channels run by the Government, there is hardly any government owned or controlled media in India. Large sections of the Chinese public opinion tend to think that the entire Indian media is owned and/or controlled by the Government and the political party in power as is the case in China. These sections tended to assume that whatever was carried by the Indian media had the approval of the Government. Thus we had a situation in which large sections of the Chinese public assumed that the negative coverage of China in the Indian media was at the instance of the Government, which was not a fact. Large sections of the Indian public assumed that the negative coverage of India in the Chinese media was instigated by the Government and party, which may have been or may not have been a fact. Many claim that the media landscape in China has changed and that everything that appears in the media does not necessarily represent the views of the Government and party. The Indian public, except those belonging to the leftist parties, is not prepared to accept this.
* Many in India believe that the Internet in China is closely controlled by the Government and that the negative contents of the blogs have been allowed to appear by the Government. Otherwise, they would have been erased.
7. The consequent distortions in the analysis of the reports and writings in the media of the two countries almost led to a war of words between analysts, journalists and TV anchors of the two countries. Fortunately, the two Governments had a better understanding of the state of affairs and put a stop to this self-feeding rhetoric. The campaign of mutual demonisation has declined. But there is still a lot of criticism of each other, which is more due to the low level of trust between the civil societies of the two countries due to historical reasons than due to any malign reasons.
8. This may please be read in continuation of the following two articles written by Mr.D.S.Rajan, Director, Chennai Centre For China Studies:
(a). The Tricky Business of Watching Chinese Media, dated October 12,2009.
(b). China: Nationalistic Blogs Raise New Issues Concerning Sino-Indian Border, dated December 23,2009.
9. These articles, which are available at the web site of the Chennai Centre for China Studies, are annexed below for easy reference. (12-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
The Tricky Business of Watching Chinese Media
D.S.Rajan, C3S Paper No.385 dated October 12, 2009
For analysts of Chinese affairs abroad, the printed, online, radio and TV media in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), in Chinese, English and other languages, remain a major source of information. The conventional wisdom is that virtually the entire media are functioning under the guidance of either the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or the government led by it; the CCP Central Committee’s Publicity Department plays a pivotal role in this regard. As such, outside the PRC, the Chinese media are invariably being seen as reflecting the views of the CCP and the government.
It cannot be denied however that instances of very limited freedom, being enjoyed occasionally by the Chinese press are increasingly coming to notice. – Journals like ‘Cai Jing’, ‘Nanyang Zhoumo, Yan Huang Chun Qiu and scores of local newspapers, websites and blogs, are critical of the authorities sometimes on issues like corruption, nepotism, problems of peasants etc. Also, ideologically, Beijing is permitting neo-liberal, neo-left and even some ultra-Maoist scholars to express their views. In doing so, its motives seem to be using the available different viewpoints as possible inputs to ultimate policy making. As the party theoretical organ ‘Qiu Shi’ puts it, while ‘hundred flowers blossom’, the media must not cross the rubicon, by expressing any opinion challenging the rule of the communist party or affecting the unity and integrity of the country. A known example of ‘crossing the limit’ had been the journal ‘Strategy and Management’ which published (September 2004) an excessively independent article on North Korea. In response, the authorities closed down the journal (“Reporters without Borders”, 1 June 2005).
This writer started studying Chinese media more than four decades back and till today, have come across several reports, which are more concealing than revealing; I however do not mean that they reflect a general trend and feel that only on selected occasions such a phenomenon is being seen. Not surprisingly, China analysts world over per force are examining such dispatches by reading between the lines, examining the timing of publications, studying the significance of what has not been said and comparing the contents with earlier ones, all in an effort to draw certain meaningful conclusions, if possible. There is however a risk involved in following such techniques, as the likelihood of such analysts going wrong would always exist. On the other hand, Chinese experts at home, directly exposed to the system, are better equipped to understand the hidden meaning if any of Chinese media views. They may however prefer not to come out openly with their feelings out of fear of punishment by the authorities.
The following are case studies undertaken by me, aimed at examining the transparency or otherwise of Chinese media dispatches:
1) Shanghai Daily Wen Huibao (10 November 1965) carried an article entitled, “Criticism of Historical Drama- Hai Rui Dismissed from Office”, written by Yao Wenyuan, a member of the now disgraced ‘gang of four’. Not many were immediately aware of political implications of the article; the assessment that the drama was criticized as it made an allegorical attack on Chairman Mao for his dismissal of Defence Minister Peng Dehuai, and that the article gave a signal towards launch of cultural revolution, could come only subsequently. It is obvious that the article could not say certain things openly, as what was involved is a struggle for political power.
2) China Daily (1 November 2004) published an Op-Ed captioned, “US Strategy to be Blamed”, by Qian Qichen, considered Czar of Chinese foreign policy, right on the eve of US polling in which President Bush contested for second time. It was notable for its strident anti- US tone and expression of fears on a US encirclement of China. To the world’s dismay, the China Daily disowned the article next day and a PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson denied that Qian wrote any such article. It was natural that speculations then arose on leadership differences in Beijing on China’s US policy, but observers remain puzzled over the episode; the real reason still looks mysterious. How China finally played the issue diplomatically with the US is another matter.
3) A sharply worded comment in People’s Daily (1 September 2008), signaling China’s opposition to India’s getting waiver in the scheduled Vienna meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), said that the Indo-US nuclear deal is a major blow to India’s non-proliferation image. The article timed close to the voting at Vienna, coupled with China’s reported moves there to join the like minded countries that had reservations on India getting the waiver, gave an impression that Beijing will vote against India’s case at the NSG. What happened finally was China’s abstention from the voting; China’s foreign minister Yang Jiechi stated that his nation did not try to block anything in Vienna and played a constructive role (Reuters, 2 October 2008). In such circumstances, how to interpret the opinions of the People’s Daily, becomes a key question. A probable reason could be that they could be representative of Chinese thinking based on principles, whereas at diplomatic levels, China felt the necessity to select a practical and safe option; regardless of such explanation, for the public opinion outside China, the Chinese stand on the issue remains puzzling.
4) What was the meaning of the Chinese media outbursts against India’s dispatch of additional troops to Arunachal Pradesh, noticed in the run up to the 13th India-China round of Special Representatives talks on the border issue (7-8 August 2009)? The Global Times (11 June 2009) described the troops dispatch as India’s “unwise military moves” and asked whether India can afford the consequences of a ‘potential confrontation’ with China. The People’s Daily’s comment (19 June 2009) on the same subject captioned ‘ a veiled threat or a good neighbor’, alleged that India seemed to be conspiring to create a picture of an immediate war with China. These two items, kept for the comments of readers for a long time, received substantial number of responses, most of them critical of India. Questions arise – what was the purpose behind the talk of ‘confrontation or war’ with India in the two articles? Was it meant to apply pressure on India during the border talks? The Chinese official comments have on the other hand been positive. Zhang Yan, the Chinese Ambassador to India has described the visit of the PRC Special Representative to India as successful and that ‘in-depth’ talks on the border issue could be held between the two sides (The Hindu, 12 October 2009). The remarks earlier (4 August 2009) of the PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson were also positive, though he made a mention about the ‘illegal’ McMahon line. Coming out clear is the apparent dichotomy between the treatments of the media and the government establishments in China on the border issue. The question as to how to interpret the same, continues to be valid.
5) An article in a Chinese website (8 August 2009), published at the time of Sino-Indian border talks, suggested that China should break up the Indian Union. It was reproduced around the same time by more than 20 websites/blogs in China. After protests from India, the concerned Chinese website subsequently inserted the name of an individual who wrote the article, along with a disclaimer that the writer did not represent its views; the website also claimed it has no connections with the government. The same was published in the website of Chennai Centre for China Studies (CCCS), India, which originally reported the Chinese website article. Also, in response to an Op-Ed carried by the Hindu Newspaper, Chennai, alleging factual inaccuracies in the CCCS article, a letter to the Editor was sent to the Hindu pointing out that the CCCS report did not connect the Chinese website with the PRC government and that in particular, it did not make any reference to the China Institute of International and Strategic Studies, a military think tank. The Hindu did not publish the rejoinder.
This writer holds his view that nothing can be printed or published in China without the knowledge of the Party/Government there and that any failure on the part of the authorities in taking notice of media contents including in web posts, is unthinkable. Can any newspaper, website or blog in China get away from the clutches of the authorities if they challenge the authority of the CCP or question the unity and integrity of the country? The answer is a clear ‘No’. I have seen arguments coming from China that the article in question had been appearing in Chinese blogs since 2006. I ask following questions – what is the explanation for the article (only blog for the Chinese) continuing to appear, as late as August 2009, simultaneously in a number of web posts? How the government, which has introduced tough regulations stipulating registration of all websites/blogs with it, did not notice such posts, under circulation for about three years already, challenging the declared policy of China towards India? What action was taken by Beijing against the so-called bloggers (called Xinlang or Queen Park Cruiser)? Are the Chinese security agencies so inefficient that they could not identify and take action against these so-called ‘anonymous’ bloggers.
Interestingly, the Chinese web posts did not single out India only. Vietnam’s case is another example. Hanoi lodged a protest (August 2008) with Beijing at government levels against an article in Sina.Com and a few other Chinese websites, which disclosed a plan for China’s 31-day invasion of Vietnam involving 310,000 troops sweeping into the latter from Yunnan and Guangxi and by blocking of sea-lanes in South China Sea. Vietnamese foreign office reportedly summoned Chinese diplomats in Hanoi twice to protest against the reported plan. According to the Vietnamese Foreign Minister, Beijing was asked by Hanoi to prevent appearance of such articles.
Another instance concerns South Korea. At the time of Olympics last year, a South Korea-China media row erupted after a Chinese website alleged that in the view of Koreans, Confucius was not Chinese, but a Korean. Also, the South Korean media are annoyed at the media campaign in China in progress since 2003, claiming that Koguryo, the 1300-year old Korean kingdom (existed in the present day North Korea- Manchuria region), was historically under China. For South Korean media, the campaign has hurt the Korean national pride .In particular, they have not taken kindly a ceremony organized by Chinese academics this year to mark the discovery of an unknown stretch of Great Wall in Dandong, close to the North Korean border; their criticism was that the discovery implied an extension of Chinese historical boundary to the ancient Koguryo.
The Chinese media have alleged that the media in India have over-reacted to an obscure web post in China. Any hyping is of course not correct, but the Chinese media should realize that the suggestion in the concerned web post for ‘splitting India’ has been unprecedented and atrocious enough to invite the Indian media’s wrath. They should also ponder over the Vietnamese reaction mentioned above. Is Hanoi’s response both at diplomatic and media levels to Chinese website articles also an over reaction? The basic question is that why the Chinese government is turning a blind eye to articles /blogs carried in the registered websites in the PRC, which the foreign governments and public find most objectionable. I feel puzzled when some Chinese media comments argue that such web posts reflect China’s ‘democracy’ – defending the indefensible indeed!
6) Another puzzling aspect relates to the non-publication so far of the full text of the CCP chief Hu Jintao’s Work Report submitted at the recently held party plenum; such practices had been followed in the past also. Why such secrecy? The plenum also kept everybody guessing on the expected reshuffle of personnel. Wang Changjiang, Director General, Central Party School, while answering a question as to why Xi Jinping, the politburo standing committee member, was not elected as Vice-Chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission, disclosed that personnel reshuffle was not in the agenda of the plenum. Though this somewhat put at rest speculations on the political future of Xi Jinping, widely expected to succeed Hu Jintao in 2012 as CCP General Secretary, a question still persists outside China on whether there was a lack of consensus among the leaders during the plenum on reshuffles in the run up to the next party congress in 2012.
The ‘Economist’ on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of founding the PRC, has said that the world accepts China as a great nation, but China is not behaving like one; that was in the context of human right and other issues, but there is no doubt that media openness is equally another condition for judging China’s greatness; if that condition is fulfilled, the outside world can interpret Chinese pronouncements correctly, leading to a better understanding of China abroad. But, will Beijing move quickly towards media openness? The answer is ‘No’. As long as the ruling party feels that press freedom could be detrimental to its hegemony over Chinese politics, no fundamental change in the PRC’s media policy can be expected. .
(The writer, D.S.Rajan, is Director, Chennai Centre for China Studies, Chennai, India.Email:dsrajan@gmail.com)
China: Nationalistic Blogs Raise New Issues Concerning Sino-Indian Border
D.S.Rajan, C3S Paper No.418 dated December 23, 2009
There is apparently a lull now in the propaganda drive of the Chinese state-controlled media on the Sino-Indian border issue. Epithets like ‘no compromise on territory’, ‘lessons of 1962’ and ‘dangerous consequences for India’, used by them earlier, are carefully being avoided. Adding to the atmosphere is the muted media reaction noticed so far to the Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh’s firm reference (Washington, 25 November 2009) to China’s ‘certain amount of assertiveness of late’ and implied disapproval of that country’s reform path ‘introduced by the writ of the ruling group in a non-democratic set up’. The only critical comment has been in a very brief manner- ‘Unfriendly remarks’, said People’s Daily of 9 December 2009. Similar has been the case with concerns expressed recently by the Indian Defence Minister, Mr. Antony, on China’s military help to Pakistan, with the Chinese media by and large not paying much attention to the same.
The fall in the level of the media rhetoric coincides with some significant military exchanges between the two sides. The Indian Air force Chief has taken part in the Zhuhai (China) air show in November 2009 and two top Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officials – Deputy Chief of Staff General Ge Zhenfeng and the Commander of the Tibet Military District Lt Gen Shu Yutai, have paid visits to India. The symbolic importance of the Tibet military commander’s sojourn in India, at the present juncture comes out clearly.
The Chinese language unofficial websites and blogs in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) however continue to take on India on the border issue, rather vehemently, which should be noted in India if not with alarm. Chinese scholars visiting India have argued in the past that the government is in no position to control bloggers in the country, said to be about 180 million; more over views expressed in the blogs have come from ‘Fen Qing’ or angry youth and do not represent official opinion. On the other hand, the contents of the blogs have always appeared important for analysts abroad as the concerned writers looked knowledgeable, enjoying more often access to the government data and information.
In the context mentioned, what the Chinese websites and blogs have said of late on contentious issues including that of Sino-Indian border deserve close scrutiny. Their views topic-wise are given below:
Sino-Indian war?
First, the blogs in the websites address the question whether there will be a second war with India and if so at what time. Revealing that China’s top central leadership has reached a consensus to teach India a lesson and recover ‘Southern Tibet’ (India’s Arunachal Pradesh), two blog assessments in Chinese language (www.warchina.com/n88582c21.aspx dated 1 December 2009 and www.warchina.com/n8183c21.aspx dated 9 December 2009) predict that Beijing may consider the 2010-2011 period as suitable for action against India; they argue that by that time conditions would have been established for next power transfer in China, economic crisis in China would have been over, the international role of the US would have become extremely weak, China would have become a powerful player in international politics, China would have been able to bring in regional military balance , the PRC’s comprehensive national strength would have developed further in comparison to that of India and lastly, China’s military preparedness would have been completed.
Chinese reinforcement in the border
The second theme in the blogs pertains to reinforcement of China’s troops in the border already carried out and the improvement of logistics on China’s side, in response to India’s recent dispatch of additional forces to Eastern sector. A Blog evaluation (in www.junshi315.cn, dated 11 December 2009) says that India’s sending more 60000 troops is a unilateral step and the same is also a part of Western strategies to contain China. Another Blog (in www.warchina.com/n8183c21.aspx dated 1 December 2009) highlights the holding of military exercises in the Chengdu Military Region recently, to counter the threat coming from India. Elaborating this point, a report (in www.ymglover.com/viewthread.php?action dated 6 December 2009) reveals that China’s border defence troops have now entered the strategically important plains in the southwest of Rikaze and East of Yadong covering the trijunction of China, Bhutan and Sikkim, adding that Bhutan, conscious of China’s influence, has been quiet to the presence of Chinese troops in its disputed area. Bhutan has also supported China’s position in the Sino-Indian border talks, it further claims. As per another Blog disclosure (www.junshi315.cn dated 11 December 2009), with additional troops in position, China’s border with India now stands sealed. The Chinese army is fully prepared as India, taking the reported military training to ULFA in China as a pretext, may plan to attack China, according to another blog (in huanqiu.com/? uid-158463-action-viewspace-itemid-390632)
On upgrading of logistics position, a blog (www.junshi315.cn dated 11 December 2009) quotes foreign reports to say that that the new airport at A Li with 4500-meter long runway is capable of lifting fighter aircraft and bombers. In the same connection a report (http://topics.huanqiu.com/thread-283700-1-1.html dated 19 October 2009) focuses on the proposed extension of Qinghai-Tibet railway to Nepal border and a railway project under planning to link China and Pakistan in parallel to the existing China-Pakistan Friendship Highway.
“ Ladakh- Another Southern Tibet”
As third theme of the websites, India’s Ladakh region is being described as part of China’s Tibet, along with the assertion that the Chinese government has never recognized New Delhi’s official position that Ladakh is part of India. Taking this stand, a blog under the title “Ladakh- another Southern Tibet”(bbs.huanqiu.com/thread-283700 dated 13 December 2009) says that the Volume 8 of the “Historical Atlas of China”, published in Beijing showing China’s territories as existed in 1820, included Ladakh as part of China’s Tibet. “Whether it is McMahon line in the East or Johnson line in the West, both have no legal basis and received no recognition from the Chinese government and people”, it asserts.
“Drive India out of Sikkim”
While one blog (bbs.huanqiu.com/thread-283700-1-1.html, 13 December 2009)
says that acceptance of Sikkim as part of India with Nathula as trading point, has been the greatest Chinese concession to India made during border talks, another comment (www.ymglover.com/viewthread.php?action dated 6 December 2009) under the caption “ China should drive India out of Sikkim”, finds motives behind India’s deployment of its 27th Mountain Division to Sikkim belt, after shifting it from its original base in Kashmir. It attributes the shift to the strategic pressure from China felt by India. It concludes by saying that a clash of Indian and Chinese strengths to capture Sikkim has already started.
India-Nepal Ties
India-Nepal relation is also a notable topic figuring in the Chinese language websites. Noting India’s high-level treatment to the visiting Nepalese Army Chief in December 2009 and its proposal to supply T-72 tanks to Nepal, a report in the authoritative website (mil.huanqiu.com/Observation/2009-12/664409.html) compares the military assistance to Nepal by China and India and finds China’s help to Nepal’s military training programme as superior. It quotes a Chinese military expert to say that the balanced position being maintained by Kathmandu at the current time of Sino-Indian tensions marks a victory for Beijing’s military strategy in the neighborhood. Also, according to an opinion (mil.huanqiu.com/Observation/2009-12/656241.html), the airport in Nepal’s Surketh, to be built by New Delhi under an agreement with Kathmandu, will be a ‘springboard’ to India for attacking China.
Conclusion
Despite tensions, both Beijing and New Delhi have managed to keep relations at government levels at an even keel and there is constant official exchange of views between the two sides. Even setting up of a hotline between the two prime ministers is under discussion. This being so, there may be some justification if a question is asked as to why pay attention to unofficial blogs now. The aim of this paper, which has done so, is not to create panic and cause misgivings in respect of Sino-Indian ties. But at the same time, it may not be wrong to say that analysts in India have a responsibility to take notice and analyze implications if any, of tall claims being made in the Chinese blogs like the ‘consensus’ at top leadership levels in the PRC to teach a lesson to India and recover Arunachal in the 2010-2011 period. Also, the assertion that Ladakh is part of ‘Southern Tibet’ and that the PRC has never recognized that territory as part of India, definitely raises more suspicions in India on China’s intentions.
(The writer, Mr. D.S.Rajan, is the Director, Chennai Centre for China Studies, Chennai`, India.Email:dsrajan@gmail.com)
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