B.RAMAN
Mr.S.M.Krishna, India's Minister For External Affairs, and his Pakistani counterpart Mr. Shah Mehmood Qureshi, had discussions lasting about six hours at Islamabad on July 15, 2010. In between, Mr.Krishna called on President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani. Those , who were hoping that the meeting between the Foreign Ministers would be as free of acrimony as the meeting (June 25 and 26) between Mr.P.Chidambaram, our Home Minister, and Mr.Rehman Malik, Pakistan's Interior Minister, and the one (June 24) between the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries would have reasons to be disappointed. The acrimony, hardly concealed, was there for all to see on their TV as they watched the joint press conference addressed by the two Foreign Ministers at the end of their discussions and their interactions with their respective media thereafter.
2. The objective of the meeting as agreed to by Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh and the Pakistani Prime Minister at their meeting at Thimpu in the margins of the SAARC summit ( April 28-29) was to create an atmosphere of trust between the two countries to facilitate the resumption of a formal dialogue on various pending issues. The proposed objective of the meeting as laid down by the two Prime Ministers was strategic, positive and forward-looking and not tactical and negative impeding a forward movement in bilateral relations.
3. One got the impression that instead the two Foreign Ministers had focussed totally on tactical issues without doing a brain-storming on various actions that could be taken to build trust. At the press conference, Mr.Krishna rightly emphasised that Pakistani action against the Pakistan-based conspirators of the 26/11 terrorist strike in Mumbai would be an important confidence-building measure. Mr.Qureshi, on his part, expressed the keenness of the Pakistani Government to implement the various confidence-building measures relating to Jammu & Kashmir, which had been agreed to by the previous Pakistani Governments in their interactions with the Govt. of India----such as promoting trade across the Line of Control.
4. He made a distinction between these confidence-building measures and measures of a political nature to settle the Kashmir dispute without disturbing the territorial status quo. Though he did not refer to Gen.Pervez Musharraf by name, it was evident he was referring to the measures of a political nature on which the two Governments had agreed through back-channel discussions when the General was in power. The present Pakistani Government had refused to honour agreements of a political nature agreed to by Gen.Musharraf during the back channel discussions. It was apparent from Mr.Qureshi's observations that his Government has remained firm on this refusal.
5. A forward-looking trust-building exercise should have focussed on many other issues of strategic interest such as the re-opening of the Indian Consulate in Karachi which was ordered to be closed down by Mrs.Benazir Bhutto when she was the Prime Minister in 1994, the opening of a Pakistani Consulate in Mumbai, which is a long-pending Pakistani request, increase in the number of journalists allowed to function from the two capitals, liaison arrangements between the intelligence and investigation agencies of the two countries, implementing measures for mutual legal assistance in the investigation and prosecution of crime, promotion of trade, removal of Pakistani restrictions on transit trade between India and Afghanistan, expansion of the contacts between the two Armies which are now restricted to the hot line between the Directors-General of Military Operations of the two countries and arrangements for a periodic dialogue between the Home/Interior Ministries of the two countries. If these measures are agreed to, this could have a cascading effect in building mutual trust.
6. From the press conference, one had an impression that none of these positive measures had been discussed in detail by the two Foreign Ministers. Instead the focus of the discussions seemed to have been largely on issues which have bedevilled the relations between the two countries. It was the realisation that the time is not yet ripe for tackling those issues that had made the two Prime Ministers agree upon an initial trust-building exercise as a starting block. Instead of initiating a process of trust-building, the meeting seems to have added to the existing wall of mistrust.
7. It was obvious that neither country had made proper preparations for the meeting. Since our Prime Minister reportedly attached considerable importance to this trust-building exercise,, one would have expected that before Mr.Krishna's visit to Islamabad he would have discussed a possible strategy for the meeting with the leaders of the opposition in order to evolve a political consensus and at a special meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) chaired by him to evolve an intere-departmental consensus on the strategy. It was evident that no such preparatory exercise for political and inter-departmental consensus-building in New Delhi before embarking on the trust-building exercise in Islamabad was undertaken.
8. Fortunately, there was no break-down at Islamabad. The Pakistani Foreign Minister is to visit to New Delhi next December to continue the discussions. In between, Dr.Manmohan Singh might meet Mr.Gilani again in New York in September if they decide to attend the inaugural session of the UN General Assembly. Before the September meeting, the Prime Minister should undertake a brain-storming with the opposition leaders and in the NSC on how to handle our relations with Pakistan----strategically as well as tactically. ( 16-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Thursday, July 15, 2010
Wednesday, July 14, 2010
“CHINESE SOVEREIGN WATERS”, “WATERS OF CHINA’S INTERESTS”, “PSYCHOLOGICAL TERRITORIAL SEAS”
B.RAMAN
Despite media reports originating from South Korea that the proposed US-South Korea joint naval exercise as a warning signal to North Korea may not be held as originally scheduled in the Yellow Sea and may instead be held in the middle of this month off South Korea’s southern or eastern coast, Chinese media and blogs have kept up their criticism of the move for holding the exercise in the Yellow Sea and the proposed participation of the nuclear-powered US aircraft carrier “USS George Washington” in it. They project it as a threat to China and as presaging a conflict between an emerging naval power seeking its due place and rights in the Western Pacific and a hegemonic naval power trying to counter it.
2.Some of the concepts/ideas figuring in the articles such as “China’s sovereign waters”, “waters of China’s interests” and “psychological territorial seas” need close study and analysis by our naval experts. They should also note that China has been increasingly assertive in support of its territorial and marine resources claims in the South China Sea and has expanded its definition of core interests to cover the South China Sea too, causing misgivings in the region. An article in the “China Daily” of July 13,2010, by an academic said: “Its (China’s) territorial sovereignty, strategic resources and trade routes comprise its core interests, and like any other country China will never compromise them. Rapid economic development and rising national strength have given China the chance to make it clear to the international community that it will never compromise its core interests. By adding the South China Sea to its core interests, China has shown its determination to secure its maritime resources and strategic waters. Its South China Sea strategy should thus be seen as a move to make up for its past ignorance about sea power and not as an aggressive expansionist measure.”
3.Extracts of interest from the articles are given below:
(1). From an article titled “US—South Korean Maritime War Games Needlessly Provocative” by Prof.Shen Dingli, Director of the Centre For American Studies at Fudan University, in the “Global Times” of July 13,2010: “The US and South Korea are implementing joint military exercises this month in the Yellow Sea, with the possibility of deploying the US aircraft carrier George Washington. The running of such exercises so close to China's waters has left China strongly, and rightfully, dissatisfied. The US and South Korea may argue that the exercise is not in China's territorial waters, so China has no right to comment. However, even if the joint exercises are not in Chinese sovereign waters, they may take place in the waters of China's interests as the international waters at Yellow Sea near China's exclusive economic zone are extremely important to China's interests. ….Military exercises aimed at provoking other countries in the waters of important Chinese interests can only be seen as a threat, and China should strongly oppose them….China's strong reaction is also part of its defensive diplomacy, which aims at dissolving the tension before it escalates into a serious crisis. China may not have the military strength to forcibly prevent such exercises now, but it may do so in response to such provocative actions in the future. “
(2). From an editorial of the “Global Times” titled “Watch out for China-US tension at sea” published on July 12,2010: “The eventuality that Beijing has to prepare for is close at hand. The delayed US-South Korean naval exercise in the Yellow Sea is now slated for mid-July. According to media reports, a nuclear-powered US aircraft carrier has left its Japanese base and is headed for the drill area. In their recent responses, several high-ranking Chinese navy officials have made it plain that China will not stay in "hands-off" mode as the drill gets underway. For, that will make the US believe that China's defense circle on the sea is small, and, therefore, US fleets will be able to freely cruise over the Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea in the future. Military experts have warned that if the joint drill really takes place off the western coast of South Korea, Chinese airplanes and warships will very likely go all the way out to closely watch the war game maneuvers. Within such proximity on not-so-clearly-marked international waters, any move that is considered hostile to the other side can willy-nilly trigger a rash reaction, which might escalate into the unexpected or the unforeseen. One false move, one wrong interpretation, is all it would take for the best-planned exercises to go awry. Wang Jisi, dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, says he is most worried about another collision crisis like the one over the South China Sea in 2001, when a Chinese fighter jet crashed into a US spy plane. The impact of a crisis on that scale would be tremendous, making any dispute over trade or the yuan's value between the two in recent years pale in comparison. Anti-US sentiment will be re-ignited among Chinese people despite the recent affirmations of warmth in the relationship, and a significant fan following in China for the charismatic US president Barack Obama. With the growth of China's economic power, the country will definitely extend its defense capability to the high seas. The US, far from trying to contain this assertiveness, should face up to the reality, and facilitate the Chinese navy to be peacefully integrated into the international system. This is China's legitimate due, which it cannot be denied for long. By the same token, China needs to be patient. The island chains in the western Pacific cannot block China from entering the open waters. But the country should move forward one step at a time, to show its confidence and to emphasize its goal of keeping peace. The US has long been a naval superpower, and will be understandably uneasy about accepting the fact that China is a growing power and can no longer keep silent when US warships enter China's sphere of influence. Since both sides lack experience of contact over the seas, the two countries should learn to get along with each other. First, the US must allow China space to explore. Second, the two navies need to increase exchanges to prevent further misunderstanding. Tension is mounting over the US-South Korean joint exercise. Beijing and Washington still have time, and leeway, to desist from moving toward a possible conflict on the Yellow Sea. “
(3).From a commentary titled “ Navies Play Crucial Role in Sino-US Ties” carried by the “People’s Daily” online on July 12: “ The navies of the United States and China will play a critical role in determining whether the two countries can avoid major conflict, said Wang Jisi, a Chinese expert in a report in the Global Times on Monday. This could be right. The two navies will not contribute to the increase of bilateral trade volume or the number of tourists, but it is easy for them to wreck bilateral ties. Many Chinese scholars hold the opinions that in the coming years, the western Pacific, a not too wide water area, will become a sensitive belt to test the relationships of China, world's largest rising country, and the United States, the world's largest hegemonic power. Major conflicts will most likely originate in this area. Over the past month or so, news that a U.S. aircraft carrier would enter the Yellow Sea to hold a military drill, which caused uproar in China, proved this. Bilateral trade vigor and the momentum of learning each other's languages make the two countries sometimes look like allies. And the wisdom of the two governments has downplayed the ideological and institutional differences between two countries, but there is still strong distrust in military matters, in particular with regard to the navies. Despite this, neither of the two navies is ready to retreat from their great strategies. The United States wants to maintain its hegemony in the western Pacific while China's navy extends eastward to "blue water." With the extension of psychological territorial seas, following the growth of national power, the two countries are gradually contiguous to each other in the western Pacific. In fact, China has no mind to meet the challenge although Chinese do not like U.S. maritime hegemony. But could the United States understand China? The United States had confrontations or conflicts at sea with several great rising powers in the history, so it is applying its experience to China. Some think- tank reports in the United States show the country's research and judgment on China, which over-exaggerates China's strategy against the United States. China and the United States must gradually increase strategic mutual trust, so China needs to make the steady progress in its strategy transparent, while the United States, with an absolute advantage in strategy, naturally assumes greater responsibility in enhancing mutual trust. The United States should have a greater breadth of mind to accept the Chinese navy's rights to widen its activity sphere, which is different from a challenge to the U.S. navy. While on China's side, it needs to actively understand the United States and reduce provocation, which is China's wisdom. Building strategic mutual trust is a slow process. China and the United States need to accelerate the establishment of a mechanism to avoid frictions. In a word, don't let the curse of a "conflict between a rising power and a hegemonic power," come true. “
(4).From an article titled “Exercise Restraint” carried by the “China Daily” on July 13: “The pending joint naval exercise by the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) on the Yellow Sea is gradually drawing widespread public ire in China. The drill is a threat to China's security and risks escalating tensions in the Korean Peninsula. The joint military exercise is reportedly intended to deter the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the wake of the Cheonan incident. The ROK's military made this point again July 6 when it announced that the drill, originally scheduled for June, would be postponed after likely UN action against the DPRK over its alleged sinking of the warship March 26. A presidential statement released by the UN Security Council on June 9 called for peaceful settlement of the dispute and the resumption of direct dialogue and negotiation between the DPRK and the ROK. Instead of resorting to any drastic moves, concerned parties must exercise restraint and calm in light of the UN statement. The public outcry in China will turn stronger if the US decides that its nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington is to participate in the exercise. The vessel's likely presence, whose combat radius can reach the nation's eastern coast, is nothing but a provocative action aimed at China's doorstep. Washington's persistent reconnaissance and surveillance on China's mainland have long brewed indignation among the Chinese. Its joint naval exercise with the ROK would only fan more antagonistic sentiment against Uncle Sam. Admittedly, even Washington would not like to see such an outcome. The US move will be a new roadblock to the resumption of normal military ties between Beijing and Washington.”
(5). From an article titled “Modernising Navy For Self-Defence” by Gong Jianhua, an Associate Professor at the School of Politics and Public Administration, Guangdong Ocean University, carried by the “China Daily” on July 13: “ Reports in some foreign media outlets that Beijing considers South China Sea a part of its "core interests" have caused concern among some countries. This has happened because they have grossly misunderstood China's actions. China is a large country with huge marine resources, but it does not have enough power to protect them. It is strengthening its marine strategy and its navy to protect its core national interests and not to pose a threat to any country. The People's Republic of China has never infringed upon any country's marine rights. On the contrary, other countries have violated its marine rights and interests repeatedly. History shows no country can be a great power without a strong naval force. And no country in modern times has faced greater threats from the sea as China. It is thus logical for it to develop and modernize its marine force. China's sea-related problems are three-fold. First, China has very complicated and intractable problems with its waters-sharing neighbors. Longstanding disputes over China's core interests in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea come to the fore from time to time. The subjects of these disputes range from sovereign control of islands to delimitation of exclusive economic zones. For example, the dispute over the South China Sea involves conflicting claims of several parties in the region and interference of outside powers. Second, China has some inherent internal weaknesses and faces outside threats to its marine interests. Internally, the country is yet to build a sound naval force, and its ocean strategy lags far behind its economic and political strategies. Externally, it has lost valuable resources when other powers have seized its islands and exploited its waters. It faces threats to its sea lanes, too. By misinterpreting the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and basing their actions on the so-called principles of "adjacency, prescription and security", some countries have violated its rights over islands, reefs and territorial waters. Third, these disputes are seriously depleting China's strategic resources. For example, it is impossible to resolve the disputes over the South China Sea to the mutual benefit of all because of the huge differences in the political stances, sincerity and tactics of the other parties. China has to use an enormous part of its economic and diplomatic resources in its efforts to settle such issues with every country that has a stake in the region. Seas have played a very important role in the development of a country. And their importance has multiplied manifold in the era of globalization. In order to secure its maritime resources, waterways and national security, a country has to defend its sea rights and interests. The disputes over rights and interests in the East China Sea, Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea are the remnants of the history of invasions of China from across the seas and colonial rule. But China's claims are based fully on historical facts. Its territorial sovereignty, strategic resources and trade routes comprise its core interests, and like any other country China will never compromise them. Rapid economic development and rising national strength have given China the chance to make it clear to the international community that it will never compromise its core interests. By adding the South China Sea to its core interests, China has shown its determination to secure its maritime resources and strategic waters. Its South China Sea strategy should thus be seen as a move to make up for its past ignorance about sea power and not as an aggressive expansionist measure. China's foreign policy has always depended on a "soft, gentle" approach, and it has practiced the doctrine of "setting aside disputes and working for joint development" of the seas with neighboring countries. Its new naval development strategy is a continuation of this approach and aimed exclusively at "offshore defense". While securing its core interests, China will continue to cultivate friendly ties with neighbors, increase regional cooperation and seek common development. It has no intention of posing a threat to other countries. But it has to change its backward marine strategy to suit the changing times. Its strategic initiatives should not be misunderstood by other countries - something that the West often does. The West, because of its tainted glasses, sees China's military modernization as military expansionism with potential strategic aggression. What Western politicians and media do not understand is China's need to safeguard its security to ensure sound economic and social development. It's a matter of perspective that the West considers a dragon as a symbol of "evil" when in China it signifies "luck". To safeguard its core interests, China should increase bilateral and multilateral exchanges with the countries that have a stake in the region, and actively publicize its commitment in building a "harmonious world". It should clarify its stance and eliminate fuzzy statements; hold all-round talks with other countries and strengthen political, economic and military mutual trust to help them understand that it is modernizing its navy for self-defense and is committed to traveling the road of peace to secure its core interests.”
(6).From an article titled “Seoul says drill location undecided” by Li Jing in the “Global Times” of July 13: “South Korea is mulling moving the venue of a joint military drill with the US rather than in the Yellow Sea, local media reported Monday (July 12). Won Tae-jae, spokesman of the Ministry of Defense, said Monday in Seoul that South Korea and the US are "fine-tuning the timetable, scale and location" of the maneuvers, adding that both sides will soon announce the details. Arirang News cited a government source as saying Sunday that it is yet to be decided where the naval drill will take place, adding that it could be held off either coast, since the country is a peninsula. The drill, originally scheduled for June, was postponed until after the UN Security Council (US) issued a statement Friday on the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan, condemning the attack but not identifying who was to blame. Beijing has strongly opposed the drill in which US carriers may engage because the location of the maneuver is close to its territorial waters. "Wherever the drill takes place, Washington has once again tested its influence in the region and strengthened its alliance with Seoul," Yin Zhuo, a Chinese military strategist, told the Global Times. Jin Linbo, a deputy at the Asia-Pacific Research Center of the China Institute of International Studies, pointed out that after the US statement, almost all parties concerned have softened their tones. "Washington will decide the location of the drill after assessing its relations with Beijing, including those high-level military exchanges scheduled this year. If the US feels the need to pressure China, the drill may still take place in the Yellow Sea," Jin said. Lee Su-seok, a senior analyst at the Institute for National Security Strategy in Seoul, told the JoongAng Daily that South Korea needs to work harder to avoid political disputes with China. "You can give China some options, like inviting Chinese officials to view the drill or keeping them updated about the drill's progress and activities to some degree," he said. The Chosun Ilbo reported Monday that the White House, the Pentagon and the US State Department are weighing the pros and cons of allowing the aircraft carrier George Washington to engage in the drill. "The George Washington will not enter Korean waters for a few days," Chosun Ilbo quoted a military source as saying, implying that it could remain in the open sea. Meanwhile, North Korean and US military representatives will meet Tuesday to discuss the Cheonan incident, the US-led UN Command in South Korea said Monday. The colonel-level meeting will discuss arrangements for future talks at general-level on the incident. It will be the first such meeting since the warship sank in March.” (14-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Despite media reports originating from South Korea that the proposed US-South Korea joint naval exercise as a warning signal to North Korea may not be held as originally scheduled in the Yellow Sea and may instead be held in the middle of this month off South Korea’s southern or eastern coast, Chinese media and blogs have kept up their criticism of the move for holding the exercise in the Yellow Sea and the proposed participation of the nuclear-powered US aircraft carrier “USS George Washington” in it. They project it as a threat to China and as presaging a conflict between an emerging naval power seeking its due place and rights in the Western Pacific and a hegemonic naval power trying to counter it.
2.Some of the concepts/ideas figuring in the articles such as “China’s sovereign waters”, “waters of China’s interests” and “psychological territorial seas” need close study and analysis by our naval experts. They should also note that China has been increasingly assertive in support of its territorial and marine resources claims in the South China Sea and has expanded its definition of core interests to cover the South China Sea too, causing misgivings in the region. An article in the “China Daily” of July 13,2010, by an academic said: “Its (China’s) territorial sovereignty, strategic resources and trade routes comprise its core interests, and like any other country China will never compromise them. Rapid economic development and rising national strength have given China the chance to make it clear to the international community that it will never compromise its core interests. By adding the South China Sea to its core interests, China has shown its determination to secure its maritime resources and strategic waters. Its South China Sea strategy should thus be seen as a move to make up for its past ignorance about sea power and not as an aggressive expansionist measure.”
3.Extracts of interest from the articles are given below:
(1). From an article titled “US—South Korean Maritime War Games Needlessly Provocative” by Prof.Shen Dingli, Director of the Centre For American Studies at Fudan University, in the “Global Times” of July 13,2010: “The US and South Korea are implementing joint military exercises this month in the Yellow Sea, with the possibility of deploying the US aircraft carrier George Washington. The running of such exercises so close to China's waters has left China strongly, and rightfully, dissatisfied. The US and South Korea may argue that the exercise is not in China's territorial waters, so China has no right to comment. However, even if the joint exercises are not in Chinese sovereign waters, they may take place in the waters of China's interests as the international waters at Yellow Sea near China's exclusive economic zone are extremely important to China's interests. ….Military exercises aimed at provoking other countries in the waters of important Chinese interests can only be seen as a threat, and China should strongly oppose them….China's strong reaction is also part of its defensive diplomacy, which aims at dissolving the tension before it escalates into a serious crisis. China may not have the military strength to forcibly prevent such exercises now, but it may do so in response to such provocative actions in the future. “
(2). From an editorial of the “Global Times” titled “Watch out for China-US tension at sea” published on July 12,2010: “The eventuality that Beijing has to prepare for is close at hand. The delayed US-South Korean naval exercise in the Yellow Sea is now slated for mid-July. According to media reports, a nuclear-powered US aircraft carrier has left its Japanese base and is headed for the drill area. In their recent responses, several high-ranking Chinese navy officials have made it plain that China will not stay in "hands-off" mode as the drill gets underway. For, that will make the US believe that China's defense circle on the sea is small, and, therefore, US fleets will be able to freely cruise over the Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea in the future. Military experts have warned that if the joint drill really takes place off the western coast of South Korea, Chinese airplanes and warships will very likely go all the way out to closely watch the war game maneuvers. Within such proximity on not-so-clearly-marked international waters, any move that is considered hostile to the other side can willy-nilly trigger a rash reaction, which might escalate into the unexpected or the unforeseen. One false move, one wrong interpretation, is all it would take for the best-planned exercises to go awry. Wang Jisi, dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, says he is most worried about another collision crisis like the one over the South China Sea in 2001, when a Chinese fighter jet crashed into a US spy plane. The impact of a crisis on that scale would be tremendous, making any dispute over trade or the yuan's value between the two in recent years pale in comparison. Anti-US sentiment will be re-ignited among Chinese people despite the recent affirmations of warmth in the relationship, and a significant fan following in China for the charismatic US president Barack Obama. With the growth of China's economic power, the country will definitely extend its defense capability to the high seas. The US, far from trying to contain this assertiveness, should face up to the reality, and facilitate the Chinese navy to be peacefully integrated into the international system. This is China's legitimate due, which it cannot be denied for long. By the same token, China needs to be patient. The island chains in the western Pacific cannot block China from entering the open waters. But the country should move forward one step at a time, to show its confidence and to emphasize its goal of keeping peace. The US has long been a naval superpower, and will be understandably uneasy about accepting the fact that China is a growing power and can no longer keep silent when US warships enter China's sphere of influence. Since both sides lack experience of contact over the seas, the two countries should learn to get along with each other. First, the US must allow China space to explore. Second, the two navies need to increase exchanges to prevent further misunderstanding. Tension is mounting over the US-South Korean joint exercise. Beijing and Washington still have time, and leeway, to desist from moving toward a possible conflict on the Yellow Sea. “
(3).From a commentary titled “ Navies Play Crucial Role in Sino-US Ties” carried by the “People’s Daily” online on July 12: “ The navies of the United States and China will play a critical role in determining whether the two countries can avoid major conflict, said Wang Jisi, a Chinese expert in a report in the Global Times on Monday. This could be right. The two navies will not contribute to the increase of bilateral trade volume or the number of tourists, but it is easy for them to wreck bilateral ties. Many Chinese scholars hold the opinions that in the coming years, the western Pacific, a not too wide water area, will become a sensitive belt to test the relationships of China, world's largest rising country, and the United States, the world's largest hegemonic power. Major conflicts will most likely originate in this area. Over the past month or so, news that a U.S. aircraft carrier would enter the Yellow Sea to hold a military drill, which caused uproar in China, proved this. Bilateral trade vigor and the momentum of learning each other's languages make the two countries sometimes look like allies. And the wisdom of the two governments has downplayed the ideological and institutional differences between two countries, but there is still strong distrust in military matters, in particular with regard to the navies. Despite this, neither of the two navies is ready to retreat from their great strategies. The United States wants to maintain its hegemony in the western Pacific while China's navy extends eastward to "blue water." With the extension of psychological territorial seas, following the growth of national power, the two countries are gradually contiguous to each other in the western Pacific. In fact, China has no mind to meet the challenge although Chinese do not like U.S. maritime hegemony. But could the United States understand China? The United States had confrontations or conflicts at sea with several great rising powers in the history, so it is applying its experience to China. Some think- tank reports in the United States show the country's research and judgment on China, which over-exaggerates China's strategy against the United States. China and the United States must gradually increase strategic mutual trust, so China needs to make the steady progress in its strategy transparent, while the United States, with an absolute advantage in strategy, naturally assumes greater responsibility in enhancing mutual trust. The United States should have a greater breadth of mind to accept the Chinese navy's rights to widen its activity sphere, which is different from a challenge to the U.S. navy. While on China's side, it needs to actively understand the United States and reduce provocation, which is China's wisdom. Building strategic mutual trust is a slow process. China and the United States need to accelerate the establishment of a mechanism to avoid frictions. In a word, don't let the curse of a "conflict between a rising power and a hegemonic power," come true. “
(4).From an article titled “Exercise Restraint” carried by the “China Daily” on July 13: “The pending joint naval exercise by the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) on the Yellow Sea is gradually drawing widespread public ire in China. The drill is a threat to China's security and risks escalating tensions in the Korean Peninsula. The joint military exercise is reportedly intended to deter the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the wake of the Cheonan incident. The ROK's military made this point again July 6 when it announced that the drill, originally scheduled for June, would be postponed after likely UN action against the DPRK over its alleged sinking of the warship March 26. A presidential statement released by the UN Security Council on June 9 called for peaceful settlement of the dispute and the resumption of direct dialogue and negotiation between the DPRK and the ROK. Instead of resorting to any drastic moves, concerned parties must exercise restraint and calm in light of the UN statement. The public outcry in China will turn stronger if the US decides that its nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington is to participate in the exercise. The vessel's likely presence, whose combat radius can reach the nation's eastern coast, is nothing but a provocative action aimed at China's doorstep. Washington's persistent reconnaissance and surveillance on China's mainland have long brewed indignation among the Chinese. Its joint naval exercise with the ROK would only fan more antagonistic sentiment against Uncle Sam. Admittedly, even Washington would not like to see such an outcome. The US move will be a new roadblock to the resumption of normal military ties between Beijing and Washington.”
(5). From an article titled “Modernising Navy For Self-Defence” by Gong Jianhua, an Associate Professor at the School of Politics and Public Administration, Guangdong Ocean University, carried by the “China Daily” on July 13: “ Reports in some foreign media outlets that Beijing considers South China Sea a part of its "core interests" have caused concern among some countries. This has happened because they have grossly misunderstood China's actions. China is a large country with huge marine resources, but it does not have enough power to protect them. It is strengthening its marine strategy and its navy to protect its core national interests and not to pose a threat to any country. The People's Republic of China has never infringed upon any country's marine rights. On the contrary, other countries have violated its marine rights and interests repeatedly. History shows no country can be a great power without a strong naval force. And no country in modern times has faced greater threats from the sea as China. It is thus logical for it to develop and modernize its marine force. China's sea-related problems are three-fold. First, China has very complicated and intractable problems with its waters-sharing neighbors. Longstanding disputes over China's core interests in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea come to the fore from time to time. The subjects of these disputes range from sovereign control of islands to delimitation of exclusive economic zones. For example, the dispute over the South China Sea involves conflicting claims of several parties in the region and interference of outside powers. Second, China has some inherent internal weaknesses and faces outside threats to its marine interests. Internally, the country is yet to build a sound naval force, and its ocean strategy lags far behind its economic and political strategies. Externally, it has lost valuable resources when other powers have seized its islands and exploited its waters. It faces threats to its sea lanes, too. By misinterpreting the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and basing their actions on the so-called principles of "adjacency, prescription and security", some countries have violated its rights over islands, reefs and territorial waters. Third, these disputes are seriously depleting China's strategic resources. For example, it is impossible to resolve the disputes over the South China Sea to the mutual benefit of all because of the huge differences in the political stances, sincerity and tactics of the other parties. China has to use an enormous part of its economic and diplomatic resources in its efforts to settle such issues with every country that has a stake in the region. Seas have played a very important role in the development of a country. And their importance has multiplied manifold in the era of globalization. In order to secure its maritime resources, waterways and national security, a country has to defend its sea rights and interests. The disputes over rights and interests in the East China Sea, Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea are the remnants of the history of invasions of China from across the seas and colonial rule. But China's claims are based fully on historical facts. Its territorial sovereignty, strategic resources and trade routes comprise its core interests, and like any other country China will never compromise them. Rapid economic development and rising national strength have given China the chance to make it clear to the international community that it will never compromise its core interests. By adding the South China Sea to its core interests, China has shown its determination to secure its maritime resources and strategic waters. Its South China Sea strategy should thus be seen as a move to make up for its past ignorance about sea power and not as an aggressive expansionist measure. China's foreign policy has always depended on a "soft, gentle" approach, and it has practiced the doctrine of "setting aside disputes and working for joint development" of the seas with neighboring countries. Its new naval development strategy is a continuation of this approach and aimed exclusively at "offshore defense". While securing its core interests, China will continue to cultivate friendly ties with neighbors, increase regional cooperation and seek common development. It has no intention of posing a threat to other countries. But it has to change its backward marine strategy to suit the changing times. Its strategic initiatives should not be misunderstood by other countries - something that the West often does. The West, because of its tainted glasses, sees China's military modernization as military expansionism with potential strategic aggression. What Western politicians and media do not understand is China's need to safeguard its security to ensure sound economic and social development. It's a matter of perspective that the West considers a dragon as a symbol of "evil" when in China it signifies "luck". To safeguard its core interests, China should increase bilateral and multilateral exchanges with the countries that have a stake in the region, and actively publicize its commitment in building a "harmonious world". It should clarify its stance and eliminate fuzzy statements; hold all-round talks with other countries and strengthen political, economic and military mutual trust to help them understand that it is modernizing its navy for self-defense and is committed to traveling the road of peace to secure its core interests.”
(6).From an article titled “Seoul says drill location undecided” by Li Jing in the “Global Times” of July 13: “South Korea is mulling moving the venue of a joint military drill with the US rather than in the Yellow Sea, local media reported Monday (July 12). Won Tae-jae, spokesman of the Ministry of Defense, said Monday in Seoul that South Korea and the US are "fine-tuning the timetable, scale and location" of the maneuvers, adding that both sides will soon announce the details. Arirang News cited a government source as saying Sunday that it is yet to be decided where the naval drill will take place, adding that it could be held off either coast, since the country is a peninsula. The drill, originally scheduled for June, was postponed until after the UN Security Council (US) issued a statement Friday on the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan, condemning the attack but not identifying who was to blame. Beijing has strongly opposed the drill in which US carriers may engage because the location of the maneuver is close to its territorial waters. "Wherever the drill takes place, Washington has once again tested its influence in the region and strengthened its alliance with Seoul," Yin Zhuo, a Chinese military strategist, told the Global Times. Jin Linbo, a deputy at the Asia-Pacific Research Center of the China Institute of International Studies, pointed out that after the US statement, almost all parties concerned have softened their tones. "Washington will decide the location of the drill after assessing its relations with Beijing, including those high-level military exchanges scheduled this year. If the US feels the need to pressure China, the drill may still take place in the Yellow Sea," Jin said. Lee Su-seok, a senior analyst at the Institute for National Security Strategy in Seoul, told the JoongAng Daily that South Korea needs to work harder to avoid political disputes with China. "You can give China some options, like inviting Chinese officials to view the drill or keeping them updated about the drill's progress and activities to some degree," he said. The Chosun Ilbo reported Monday that the White House, the Pentagon and the US State Department are weighing the pros and cons of allowing the aircraft carrier George Washington to engage in the drill. "The George Washington will not enter Korean waters for a few days," Chosun Ilbo quoted a military source as saying, implying that it could remain in the open sea. Meanwhile, North Korean and US military representatives will meet Tuesday to discuss the Cheonan incident, the US-led UN Command in South Korea said Monday. The colonel-level meeting will discuss arrangements for future talks at general-level on the incident. It will be the first such meeting since the warship sank in March.” (14-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, July 13, 2010
INDIA-PAKISTAN: HOW TO CHANGE THE REFLEXES?
B.RAMAN
The three-day visit of Mr.S.M.Krishna, our Minister for External Affairs, to Pakistan from July 15,2010, has come in the wake of the visit of Mrs.Nirupama Rao, the Foreign Secretary( June 24), and Mr.P.Chidambaram, the Home Minister ( June 25 and 26). Mrs.Rao's visit was used to prepare the ground for the two ministerial visits to follow. Mr.Chidambaram's visit ---mainly to attend the SAARC Home Ministers' conference, but utilised for bilateral interactions too---- kept the focus on Pakistani action against anti-India terrorism in general and against the Pakistan-based conspirators of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) who were involved in the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai in particular.( http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers39%5Cpaper3891.html and http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers39%5Cpaper3893.html)
2. Mr.Chidambaram and his Pakistani counterpart Mr.Rehman Malik avoided acrimony and kept the accusatory reflexes, which usually distort Indo-Pakistan interactions, under control. The visit provided an opportunity for a courtesy meeting between the heads of the Intelligence Bureaus of the two countries, which had a common origin under the British rule and closely resemble each other in their structure and methods of functioning. The two are essentially organisations of police professionals who are experts in the collection and analysis of intelligence relating to internal security.
3.The last meeting between senior officers of the two Intelligence Bureaus was when Rajiv Gandhi was the Prime Minister between 1984 and 1989. He and the late Zia-ul-Haq, the then ruler of Pakistan, had set up a mechanism for regular half-yearly meetings between the Home/Interior Secretaries of the two countries to discuss trans-border terrorism and security. Senior officers of the two IBs were among the officials in the two delegations. This mechanism fell into disuse after the outbreak of Pakistani-backed insurgency in Jammu & Kashmir in 1989.
4. Mr.Chidambaram's discussions with Mr.Malik, as reported in the media, focussed on tactical issues relating to co-operation in the investigation and prosecution of the LET conspirators. Matters of a strategic significance such as the utility of the revival of the pre-1989 mechanism for half-yearly meetings, structured interactions between the Home/Interior Ministries of the two countries and mutual legal assistance between the investigating agencies of the two countries did not appear to have been discussed. There was not even an invitation by Mr.Chidambaram to Mr.Malik and his intelligence chief to visit India. It was a one-shot visit with one-shot discussions, which did not try to create the traditions for such visits and discussions on a regular basis.
5. Unless we create such traditions, the political leaders and officials of the two countries will find it difficult to rid themselve of the constant air of suspicion which enveloppes the bilateral relations like a winter fog in New Delhi and to slowly rid themselves of the accusatory reflexes, which come in the way of a professional approach to security-related problems.
6. What stands in the way of normal relations between India and Pakistan as two neighbouring States with a common border is not just the Kashmir issue or Pakistan's use of terrorism against India. It is the negative reflexes created in our minds by the riots which accompanied the Partition in 1947, by the Indian anger against Pakistan for its repeated use of terrorist or insurgent surrogates against India in the North-East, Punjab and J&K and by the Pakistani anger against India for the Indian role in assisting the freedom struggle in Bangladesh. Unless the two countries rid themselves of these negative reflexes and develop a new mindset marked by at least partly positive rather than overwhelmingly negative perceptions of each other, nothing is going to help in bringing them together.
7. Back-channel discussions, academic interactions, be-good-to-each-other meetings will not help so long as the reflexes are overwhelmingly and compulsively negative. Turning the negative into the positive has to be a gradual process. The starting block of such a process has to be a realisation at the decision-making levels in the two countries that we have far too long been negative in our thinking and perceptions.
8. The realisation alone will not be sufficient. It has to be followed by painstaking efforts for setting up institutional networking at various levels---MEA-MEA, MHA-MHA,MOD-MOD,Army-Army, Intelligence-Intelligence, Police-Police--- so that the policy-makers of the two countries are able to pick each other's brains through personal interactions and are able to judge each other in flesh and blood instead of through source and media reports.
9. How to rid ourselves of these reflexes and how to make a beginning in setting up such networking? That should be the question to which Mr.Krishna and Mr.Shah Mehmood Qureshi, his Pakistani counterpart, should address themselves when they meet during the next three days. They could consider setting up a joint 3 plus 3 (Foreign Minister, Defence Minister, Home Minister) group or council to meet regularly to discuss the strategic aspects of the bilateral relations. This could be the substitute for the Composite Dialogue Process which has run out of steam.Instead, if they spend the time throwing the Indian dossiers on terrorism and Pakistani dossiers on Kashmir and river waters at each other they will be missing an opportunity for creating a possible and much-needed turning point in Indo-Pakistan relations.
10. To repeat one of my recent observations, Indo-Pakistan relations have become like an old gramaphone record of our grandparents' vintage in which the needle has got stuck. It is time to look for a new and better record. (14-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The three-day visit of Mr.S.M.Krishna, our Minister for External Affairs, to Pakistan from July 15,2010, has come in the wake of the visit of Mrs.Nirupama Rao, the Foreign Secretary( June 24), and Mr.P.Chidambaram, the Home Minister ( June 25 and 26). Mrs.Rao's visit was used to prepare the ground for the two ministerial visits to follow. Mr.Chidambaram's visit ---mainly to attend the SAARC Home Ministers' conference, but utilised for bilateral interactions too---- kept the focus on Pakistani action against anti-India terrorism in general and against the Pakistan-based conspirators of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) who were involved in the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai in particular.( http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers39%5Cpaper3891.html and http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers39%5Cpaper3893.html)
2. Mr.Chidambaram and his Pakistani counterpart Mr.Rehman Malik avoided acrimony and kept the accusatory reflexes, which usually distort Indo-Pakistan interactions, under control. The visit provided an opportunity for a courtesy meeting between the heads of the Intelligence Bureaus of the two countries, which had a common origin under the British rule and closely resemble each other in their structure and methods of functioning. The two are essentially organisations of police professionals who are experts in the collection and analysis of intelligence relating to internal security.
3.The last meeting between senior officers of the two Intelligence Bureaus was when Rajiv Gandhi was the Prime Minister between 1984 and 1989. He and the late Zia-ul-Haq, the then ruler of Pakistan, had set up a mechanism for regular half-yearly meetings between the Home/Interior Secretaries of the two countries to discuss trans-border terrorism and security. Senior officers of the two IBs were among the officials in the two delegations. This mechanism fell into disuse after the outbreak of Pakistani-backed insurgency in Jammu & Kashmir in 1989.
4. Mr.Chidambaram's discussions with Mr.Malik, as reported in the media, focussed on tactical issues relating to co-operation in the investigation and prosecution of the LET conspirators. Matters of a strategic significance such as the utility of the revival of the pre-1989 mechanism for half-yearly meetings, structured interactions between the Home/Interior Ministries of the two countries and mutual legal assistance between the investigating agencies of the two countries did not appear to have been discussed. There was not even an invitation by Mr.Chidambaram to Mr.Malik and his intelligence chief to visit India. It was a one-shot visit with one-shot discussions, which did not try to create the traditions for such visits and discussions on a regular basis.
5. Unless we create such traditions, the political leaders and officials of the two countries will find it difficult to rid themselve of the constant air of suspicion which enveloppes the bilateral relations like a winter fog in New Delhi and to slowly rid themselves of the accusatory reflexes, which come in the way of a professional approach to security-related problems.
6. What stands in the way of normal relations between India and Pakistan as two neighbouring States with a common border is not just the Kashmir issue or Pakistan's use of terrorism against India. It is the negative reflexes created in our minds by the riots which accompanied the Partition in 1947, by the Indian anger against Pakistan for its repeated use of terrorist or insurgent surrogates against India in the North-East, Punjab and J&K and by the Pakistani anger against India for the Indian role in assisting the freedom struggle in Bangladesh. Unless the two countries rid themselves of these negative reflexes and develop a new mindset marked by at least partly positive rather than overwhelmingly negative perceptions of each other, nothing is going to help in bringing them together.
7. Back-channel discussions, academic interactions, be-good-to-each-other meetings will not help so long as the reflexes are overwhelmingly and compulsively negative. Turning the negative into the positive has to be a gradual process. The starting block of such a process has to be a realisation at the decision-making levels in the two countries that we have far too long been negative in our thinking and perceptions.
8. The realisation alone will not be sufficient. It has to be followed by painstaking efforts for setting up institutional networking at various levels---MEA-MEA, MHA-MHA,MOD-MOD,Army-Army, Intelligence-Intelligence, Police-Police--- so that the policy-makers of the two countries are able to pick each other's brains through personal interactions and are able to judge each other in flesh and blood instead of through source and media reports.
9. How to rid ourselves of these reflexes and how to make a beginning in setting up such networking? That should be the question to which Mr.Krishna and Mr.Shah Mehmood Qureshi, his Pakistani counterpart, should address themselves when they meet during the next three days. They could consider setting up a joint 3 plus 3 (Foreign Minister, Defence Minister, Home Minister) group or council to meet regularly to discuss the strategic aspects of the bilateral relations. This could be the substitute for the Composite Dialogue Process which has run out of steam.Instead, if they spend the time throwing the Indian dossiers on terrorism and Pakistani dossiers on Kashmir and river waters at each other they will be missing an opportunity for creating a possible and much-needed turning point in Indo-Pakistan relations.
10. To repeat one of my recent observations, Indo-Pakistan relations have become like an old gramaphone record of our grandparents' vintage in which the needle has got stuck. It is time to look for a new and better record. (14-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
KAMPALA BLASTS: INDIAN CASUALTIES?
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO. 666
B.RAMAN
Seventy-four persons, 60 of them reportedly Ugandan nationals, were killed and 70 others injured on July 11,2010, in two explosions suspected to have been carried out by Al-Shabaab, the Somali wing of Al Qaeda, at a local rugby club and an Ethiopian restaurant at Kampala, the Ugandan capital. The explosions took place near large numbers of football enthusiasts watching on TV the final match of the World Cup football in South Africa between Spain and Holland.
2. Citing local officials, the British Broadcasting Corporation has stated that among the casualties were Ethiopian, Eritrean, Indian and Congolese nationals . It has not indicated how many Indian nationals were involved and whether there were fatalities among them.
3. In a statement issued from Mogadishu, the Somali capital, a spokesman of Al- Shabaab, who gave his name as Sheikh Ali Mohamud Rage claimed that his organisation had carried out the two explosions. There were some doubts whether these were timed or suicide explosions , but an Ugandan official said that the head of a person believed to be a Somali was found at the site of one of the blasts, thereby indicating that at least one, if not both the blasts, was carried out by a suicide bomber.
4. The Al-Shabaab spokesman has been quoted by news agencies as saying as follows:"Al-Shabaab was behind the two bomb blasts in Uganda.We thank the mujahideen that carried out the attack. We are sending a message to Uganda and Burundi, if they do not take out their Amisom [African Union Mission in Somalia] troops from Somalia, blasts will continue and it will happen in Bujumbura, the Burundi capital, too." These were thus reprisal attacks by Al-Shabaab against Uganda for participating in the African contingent helping the Somali authorities in their operations against Al-Shabaab and other jihadi elements in Somalia.
5. The Amir of Al-Shabaab, Mohamed Abdi Godane, had warned in an audio message earlier this month that Uganda and Burundi would be targeted. The main wing of Al Qaeda based in North Waziristan in Pakistan, the Yemen-based Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Al-Shabaab based in Somalia have continued to maintain a capability for planning and carrying out reprisal acts of terrorism in different parts of the world despite US claims of having eliminated many senior leaders of Al Qaeda through its Drone (pilotless plane) strikes in North and South Waziristan.
6.The deaths in the Drone strikes of many Al Qaeda leaders such as its No.3 Sai’d al-Masri (al-Masri means the Egyptian) also known as Mustafa Abu al-Yazid in May,2010 and Saleh-al-Somali from Somalia on December 8,2009, have not weakened the capability of Al Qaeda to plan and mount terrorist strikes---some successfuly, some unsuccessfully. The successful ones have been in the Af-Pak area, Somalia and Uganda and the unsuccessful ones in the UK, the US and Norway.
7.In supplementary indictments filed recently by federal prosecutors in Brooklyn, US, they have alleged that before his death Saleh al-Somali was involved along with Rashid Rauf, a Mirpuri from Birmingham, who was also killed in a Drone strike, and Adnan El-Shukrijumah, an absconding US national of Saudi origin,in organizing a conspiracy by Afghan immigrant Najibullah Zazi and others to bomb New York City subways last September.
8. Along with Saudis, Egyptians and Yemenis, the Somalis have been among the important components of Al Qaeda. Osama bin Laden had earlier used them for the terrorist strikes outside the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam in August 1998,and in Mombasa in October 2002. The Somalis of Al-Shabaab have now operated successfully in Kampala. The Yemeni and Somali wing of Al Qaeda have exhibited a certain operational autonomy which enables them to mount terrorist strikes on their own without having to depend on the main wing of Al Qaeda in Pakistan. While Al-Shabaab has extended its operations to Africa, the AQAP has been trying to extend its reach to South-East Asia as indicated by the recent detentions of two Singapore nationals with suspected contacts with the AQAP.
9.This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article of December 4,2009, titled "The Somali Front of the Global Jihad" available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers36/paper3534.html. It is annexed for easy reference. (13-7-10)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
THE SOMALI FRONT OF THE GLOBAL JIHAD
B.RAMAN
Al Qaeda looks upon its continuing jihad against the so-called Crusaders --- thereby meaning essentially the US, Israel and their supporters--- as a global intifada waged on many fronts and through many means. In this global jihad, Afghanistan, Somalia and Algeria are seen as battle fronts, which will determine the ultimate outcome. Afghanistan is seen as the core of the battle, Somalia as its southern front and Algeria as the Western front.
2. In a message disseminated on December 20, 2006, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the No.2 to Osama bin Laden in Al Qaeda, said: “Brothers in Islam and Jihad in Somalia: know that you are on the southern garrison of Islam, so don’t allow Islam to be attacked from your flank, and know that we are with you, and that the entire Muslim Ummah is with you. So don’t lose heart, or fall into despair, for you must dominate if you are true in faith. And know that you are fending off the same Crusade which is fighting your brothers in Islam in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon. So be resolute, be patient and be optimistic, for by Allah beside whom there is no other God, even if your enemies possess thousands of tons of iron and explosives, in their chests lie the hearts of mice. So be severe against them like Muhammad was. "
3. To keep the jihad going in Somalia is one of its important objectives. For this purpose, it uses not only recruits from the impoverished local population, but also from the Somali diaspora in the West----including the US--- as well as jihad-hardened cadres sent from the battle fronts in the Af-Pak region. The Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) of Pakistan has had a long history of contacts with the Muslim population in Somalia and East African countries just as it has with the Muslim population of Chechnya and Dagestan. Though the TJ itself does not indulge in acts of terrorism, it plays an important role in facilitating the ideological motivation of the population on behalf of Al Qaeda.
4. In September 2009, Al Shabaab, meaning “The Lads”, an organization of Somali youths, was reported to have disseminated through Islamic web sites usually identified with Al Qaeda a 48-minute video documentary in which it proclaimed its allegiance to Osama bin Laden. It derives its name “The Lads” from the fact that it used to be the youth wing of a fundamentalist organization called the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), which had established control over some parts of Somalia and was ultimately crushed by invading Ethiopian troops in 2006. While the elders of the UIC disappeared after being defeated by the better trained and better armed Ethiopian troops allegedly inspired and aided by the US, the Al Shabaab replaced the UIC as a born-again jihadi organization, which was determined to continue the jihad against the troops of the African Union, which had replaced the Ethiopian troops, and of the UN-backed local Government, which it viewed as apostate.
5. Though Somalis had participated in acts of suicide terrorism on behalf of Al Qaeda in other countries, suicide terrorism was unknown in Somalia itself till Al Shabaab made its appearance in 2006. Even though it proclaimed its loyalty to bin Laden only in September, 2009, it had carried out a number of acts of suicide terrorism against local Government targets as well as the peace-keeping troops of the African Union ever since the AU troops took over their peace-keeping responsibility in Somalia. Al Shabaab has been waging a two-front jihad---- against the AU troops and the local Government being protected by the AU troops. The first act of suicide terrorism took place on September 18, 2006. Since then, there have been 13 suicide attacks--- two in 2006, four in 2007, two in 2008 and five this year.
6. The Al Shabaab cadres, many of whom had allegedly served with the Afghan Mujahideen, the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the Af-Pak region, look upon their jihad as similar to the jihad waged by the Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviet troops and those of the Government of the then President Najibullah in the 1980s and the early 1990s.
7. In a serious attack of suicide terrorism, a male suicide bomber dressed as a woman managed to find his way into a graduation ceremony of medical students in a Mogadishu hotel on December 3, 2009, and blew himself up killing 19 persons, including three Ministers of the Cabinet of Prime Minister Omar Sharmarke of the UN-backed Government. Even though no organization has so far claimed responsibility for the attack, Al Shabaab is strongly suspected by the local authorities.
8. Though there is so far no evidence of any nexus between Al Shabaab and the Somali pirates, the dangers of money earned from piracy going to the coffers of Al Qaeda and the availability in Somalia of sea-faring people who could be used by Al Qaeda for future acts of maritime terrorism cannot be ignored.
9. A Reuters report carried on December 4, 2009, by the “Daily Times” of Lahore has quoted Bethuel Kiplagat, who used to be Kenya’s special envoy to the Somalia peace process from 2003 to 2005, as saying as follows: “Suicide bombings are a worrying trend not only for Somalia but also the region. There has been a rise in fundamentalism in Somalia coming from the Middle East and Pakistan. There’s a worry Al Qaeda may be looking at Somalia as a new sanctuary.”
10. On March 16, 2009, Mohamed Mohamed of the BBC’s Somali section, reported as follows: “As well as alleged links to al-Qaeda it is said to have Arabs, Asians, other Africans and - America's FBI believes - Westerners among its ranks. These foreigners are said to be involved in training Al Sabaab recruits in various aspects of guerrilla warfare, including suicide bombings and booby traps.”
11. On February 29, 2008, the then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice designated Al Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
B.RAMAN
Seventy-four persons, 60 of them reportedly Ugandan nationals, were killed and 70 others injured on July 11,2010, in two explosions suspected to have been carried out by Al-Shabaab, the Somali wing of Al Qaeda, at a local rugby club and an Ethiopian restaurant at Kampala, the Ugandan capital. The explosions took place near large numbers of football enthusiasts watching on TV the final match of the World Cup football in South Africa between Spain and Holland.
2. Citing local officials, the British Broadcasting Corporation has stated that among the casualties were Ethiopian, Eritrean, Indian and Congolese nationals . It has not indicated how many Indian nationals were involved and whether there were fatalities among them.
3. In a statement issued from Mogadishu, the Somali capital, a spokesman of Al- Shabaab, who gave his name as Sheikh Ali Mohamud Rage claimed that his organisation had carried out the two explosions. There were some doubts whether these were timed or suicide explosions , but an Ugandan official said that the head of a person believed to be a Somali was found at the site of one of the blasts, thereby indicating that at least one, if not both the blasts, was carried out by a suicide bomber.
4. The Al-Shabaab spokesman has been quoted by news agencies as saying as follows:"Al-Shabaab was behind the two bomb blasts in Uganda.We thank the mujahideen that carried out the attack. We are sending a message to Uganda and Burundi, if they do not take out their Amisom [African Union Mission in Somalia] troops from Somalia, blasts will continue and it will happen in Bujumbura, the Burundi capital, too." These were thus reprisal attacks by Al-Shabaab against Uganda for participating in the African contingent helping the Somali authorities in their operations against Al-Shabaab and other jihadi elements in Somalia.
5. The Amir of Al-Shabaab, Mohamed Abdi Godane, had warned in an audio message earlier this month that Uganda and Burundi would be targeted. The main wing of Al Qaeda based in North Waziristan in Pakistan, the Yemen-based Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Al-Shabaab based in Somalia have continued to maintain a capability for planning and carrying out reprisal acts of terrorism in different parts of the world despite US claims of having eliminated many senior leaders of Al Qaeda through its Drone (pilotless plane) strikes in North and South Waziristan.
6.The deaths in the Drone strikes of many Al Qaeda leaders such as its No.3 Sai’d al-Masri (al-Masri means the Egyptian) also known as Mustafa Abu al-Yazid in May,2010 and Saleh-al-Somali from Somalia on December 8,2009, have not weakened the capability of Al Qaeda to plan and mount terrorist strikes---some successfuly, some unsuccessfully. The successful ones have been in the Af-Pak area, Somalia and Uganda and the unsuccessful ones in the UK, the US and Norway.
7.In supplementary indictments filed recently by federal prosecutors in Brooklyn, US, they have alleged that before his death Saleh al-Somali was involved along with Rashid Rauf, a Mirpuri from Birmingham, who was also killed in a Drone strike, and Adnan El-Shukrijumah, an absconding US national of Saudi origin,in organizing a conspiracy by Afghan immigrant Najibullah Zazi and others to bomb New York City subways last September.
8. Along with Saudis, Egyptians and Yemenis, the Somalis have been among the important components of Al Qaeda. Osama bin Laden had earlier used them for the terrorist strikes outside the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam in August 1998,and in Mombasa in October 2002. The Somalis of Al-Shabaab have now operated successfully in Kampala. The Yemeni and Somali wing of Al Qaeda have exhibited a certain operational autonomy which enables them to mount terrorist strikes on their own without having to depend on the main wing of Al Qaeda in Pakistan. While Al-Shabaab has extended its operations to Africa, the AQAP has been trying to extend its reach to South-East Asia as indicated by the recent detentions of two Singapore nationals with suspected contacts with the AQAP.
9.This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article of December 4,2009, titled "The Somali Front of the Global Jihad" available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers36/paper3534.html. It is annexed for easy reference. (13-7-10)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
THE SOMALI FRONT OF THE GLOBAL JIHAD
B.RAMAN
Al Qaeda looks upon its continuing jihad against the so-called Crusaders --- thereby meaning essentially the US, Israel and their supporters--- as a global intifada waged on many fronts and through many means. In this global jihad, Afghanistan, Somalia and Algeria are seen as battle fronts, which will determine the ultimate outcome. Afghanistan is seen as the core of the battle, Somalia as its southern front and Algeria as the Western front.
2. In a message disseminated on December 20, 2006, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the No.2 to Osama bin Laden in Al Qaeda, said: “Brothers in Islam and Jihad in Somalia: know that you are on the southern garrison of Islam, so don’t allow Islam to be attacked from your flank, and know that we are with you, and that the entire Muslim Ummah is with you. So don’t lose heart, or fall into despair, for you must dominate if you are true in faith. And know that you are fending off the same Crusade which is fighting your brothers in Islam in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon. So be resolute, be patient and be optimistic, for by Allah beside whom there is no other God, even if your enemies possess thousands of tons of iron and explosives, in their chests lie the hearts of mice. So be severe against them like Muhammad was. "
3. To keep the jihad going in Somalia is one of its important objectives. For this purpose, it uses not only recruits from the impoverished local population, but also from the Somali diaspora in the West----including the US--- as well as jihad-hardened cadres sent from the battle fronts in the Af-Pak region. The Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) of Pakistan has had a long history of contacts with the Muslim population in Somalia and East African countries just as it has with the Muslim population of Chechnya and Dagestan. Though the TJ itself does not indulge in acts of terrorism, it plays an important role in facilitating the ideological motivation of the population on behalf of Al Qaeda.
4. In September 2009, Al Shabaab, meaning “The Lads”, an organization of Somali youths, was reported to have disseminated through Islamic web sites usually identified with Al Qaeda a 48-minute video documentary in which it proclaimed its allegiance to Osama bin Laden. It derives its name “The Lads” from the fact that it used to be the youth wing of a fundamentalist organization called the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), which had established control over some parts of Somalia and was ultimately crushed by invading Ethiopian troops in 2006. While the elders of the UIC disappeared after being defeated by the better trained and better armed Ethiopian troops allegedly inspired and aided by the US, the Al Shabaab replaced the UIC as a born-again jihadi organization, which was determined to continue the jihad against the troops of the African Union, which had replaced the Ethiopian troops, and of the UN-backed local Government, which it viewed as apostate.
5. Though Somalis had participated in acts of suicide terrorism on behalf of Al Qaeda in other countries, suicide terrorism was unknown in Somalia itself till Al Shabaab made its appearance in 2006. Even though it proclaimed its loyalty to bin Laden only in September, 2009, it had carried out a number of acts of suicide terrorism against local Government targets as well as the peace-keeping troops of the African Union ever since the AU troops took over their peace-keeping responsibility in Somalia. Al Shabaab has been waging a two-front jihad---- against the AU troops and the local Government being protected by the AU troops. The first act of suicide terrorism took place on September 18, 2006. Since then, there have been 13 suicide attacks--- two in 2006, four in 2007, two in 2008 and five this year.
6. The Al Shabaab cadres, many of whom had allegedly served with the Afghan Mujahideen, the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the Af-Pak region, look upon their jihad as similar to the jihad waged by the Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviet troops and those of the Government of the then President Najibullah in the 1980s and the early 1990s.
7. In a serious attack of suicide terrorism, a male suicide bomber dressed as a woman managed to find his way into a graduation ceremony of medical students in a Mogadishu hotel on December 3, 2009, and blew himself up killing 19 persons, including three Ministers of the Cabinet of Prime Minister Omar Sharmarke of the UN-backed Government. Even though no organization has so far claimed responsibility for the attack, Al Shabaab is strongly suspected by the local authorities.
8. Though there is so far no evidence of any nexus between Al Shabaab and the Somali pirates, the dangers of money earned from piracy going to the coffers of Al Qaeda and the availability in Somalia of sea-faring people who could be used by Al Qaeda for future acts of maritime terrorism cannot be ignored.
9. A Reuters report carried on December 4, 2009, by the “Daily Times” of Lahore has quoted Bethuel Kiplagat, who used to be Kenya’s special envoy to the Somalia peace process from 2003 to 2005, as saying as follows: “Suicide bombings are a worrying trend not only for Somalia but also the region. There has been a rise in fundamentalism in Somalia coming from the Middle East and Pakistan. There’s a worry Al Qaeda may be looking at Somalia as a new sanctuary.”
10. On March 16, 2009, Mohamed Mohamed of the BBC’s Somali section, reported as follows: “As well as alleged links to al-Qaeda it is said to have Arabs, Asians, other Africans and - America's FBI believes - Westerners among its ranks. These foreigners are said to be involved in training Al Sabaab recruits in various aspects of guerrilla warfare, including suicide bombings and booby traps.”
11. On February 29, 2008, the then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice designated Al Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
Monday, July 12, 2010
THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS
B.RAMAN
The Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy of Singapore had organized on July 2 and 3,2010, an India-China Dialogue on “the Role of the Media in India-China Relations”.
2.An explanatory note of the School available on its web site says: “Despite the massive growth of bilateral trade between China and India, tensions over territorial and political issues have also grown, particularly in the last year. While some sources of stress are real, their effects are mediated and often inflamed by media depictions and perceptions of these tensions. Moreover, circumstances may also arise where the media tend to downplay more positive aspects of the relationship. In a situation where the Chinese and Indians have limited knowledge of each other and the interactions are dominated by strategic and business concerns, the media can play a constructive role in promoting mutual understanding among the general public. This first colloquium in the India-China Dialogue series seeks to answer some of these questions about the role of the media in India-China relations. It brings together representatives from the media and other areas to discuss pertinent issues and seeks alternatives to these path-dependent approaches. The speakers will discuss different aspects of image production and reception of these two large and varied nations, the different areas of competition and convergence as covered by the media, and the role of media in geo-politics, cultural relations, diplomacy, etc. Are the media in India and China really responsible for creating misperceptions and an adversarial image of each other? Are journalists in the two countries trained and qualified to cover the other country? What are the differences between the Indian media’s coverage of China and the Chinese media’s reporting on India? Are there alternative avenues for presenting information to the general public.”
3. This subject assumed importance last year following an escalation of mutual demonisation in the print, electronic and online media of the two countries. In the case of India, the escalation was more pronounced in the electronic and online media than in the print media. In China, the escalation was more marked in the print and online media than in the electronic media. China has not yet seen the kind of explosive growth in 24-hour private news channels that India has and it has no privately-run indigenous news channels. In India, the problem of uncontrolled demonisation of China was seen largely in the 24-hour news channels, which merrily lapped up anything critical of China said or written by anybody and organized discussions which tended to be over-dramatic and occasionally even hysterical..
4.In China, the demonisation of India was largely seen in the Chinese language print media and in the thousands of blogs which have come up in the country following the phenomenal growth of the Internet. Most of the blog contents was in the Chinese language. Since there are very few Chinese language experts in India, the majority of the negative articles and postings about India did not get translated and circulated. Only some were. If more of them had been translated and disseminated to Indian readers, the alarm caused in India would have been more.
5. In India, what appeared to be unbridled criticism of China was largely in the English media. The Indian language media, which has more readership and viewership than the English media, did not show the same interest in China and was not as negative about China as was the English media.
6. The analysis of these demonizing articles in the two countries tended to get distorted due to the following reasons:
* The lack of transparency about the Chinese media and the widespread perception in India that the Chinese media is still largely owned and/or controlled by the Chinese Government and the Communist Party of China. As a result, anything critical of India appearing in the Chinese media was viewed by large sections of the Indian public as representing the views of the Chinese Government and party.
* The lack of adequate knowledge in China about the free press that India has. Barring some radio stations and TV channels run by the Government, there is hardly any government owned or controlled media in India. Large sections of the Chinese public opinion tend to think that the entire Indian media is owned and/or controlled by the Government and the political party in power as is the case in China. These sections tended to assume that whatever was carried by the Indian media had the approval of the Government. Thus we had a situation in which large sections of the Chinese public assumed that the negative coverage of China in the Indian media was at the instance of the Government, which was not a fact. Large sections of the Indian public assumed that the negative coverage of India in the Chinese media was instigated by the Government and party, which may have been or may not have been a fact. Many claim that the media landscape in China has changed and that everything that appears in the media does not necessarily represent the views of the Government and party. The Indian public, except those belonging to the leftist parties, is not prepared to accept this.
* Many in India believe that the Internet in China is closely controlled by the Government and that the negative contents of the blogs have been allowed to appear by the Government. Otherwise, they would have been erased.
7. The consequent distortions in the analysis of the reports and writings in the media of the two countries almost led to a war of words between analysts, journalists and TV anchors of the two countries. Fortunately, the two Governments had a better understanding of the state of affairs and put a stop to this self-feeding rhetoric. The campaign of mutual demonisation has declined. But there is still a lot of criticism of each other, which is more due to the low level of trust between the civil societies of the two countries due to historical reasons than due to any malign reasons.
8. This may please be read in continuation of the following two articles written by Mr.D.S.Rajan, Director, Chennai Centre For China Studies:
(a). The Tricky Business of Watching Chinese Media, dated October 12,2009.
(b). China: Nationalistic Blogs Raise New Issues Concerning Sino-Indian Border, dated December 23,2009.
9. These articles, which are available at the web site of the Chennai Centre for China Studies, are annexed below for easy reference. (12-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
The Tricky Business of Watching Chinese Media
D.S.Rajan, C3S Paper No.385 dated October 12, 2009
For analysts of Chinese affairs abroad, the printed, online, radio and TV media in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), in Chinese, English and other languages, remain a major source of information. The conventional wisdom is that virtually the entire media are functioning under the guidance of either the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or the government led by it; the CCP Central Committee’s Publicity Department plays a pivotal role in this regard. As such, outside the PRC, the Chinese media are invariably being seen as reflecting the views of the CCP and the government.
It cannot be denied however that instances of very limited freedom, being enjoyed occasionally by the Chinese press are increasingly coming to notice. – Journals like ‘Cai Jing’, ‘Nanyang Zhoumo, Yan Huang Chun Qiu and scores of local newspapers, websites and blogs, are critical of the authorities sometimes on issues like corruption, nepotism, problems of peasants etc. Also, ideologically, Beijing is permitting neo-liberal, neo-left and even some ultra-Maoist scholars to express their views. In doing so, its motives seem to be using the available different viewpoints as possible inputs to ultimate policy making. As the party theoretical organ ‘Qiu Shi’ puts it, while ‘hundred flowers blossom’, the media must not cross the rubicon, by expressing any opinion challenging the rule of the communist party or affecting the unity and integrity of the country. A known example of ‘crossing the limit’ had been the journal ‘Strategy and Management’ which published (September 2004) an excessively independent article on North Korea. In response, the authorities closed down the journal (“Reporters without Borders”, 1 June 2005).
This writer started studying Chinese media more than four decades back and till today, have come across several reports, which are more concealing than revealing; I however do not mean that they reflect a general trend and feel that only on selected occasions such a phenomenon is being seen. Not surprisingly, China analysts world over per force are examining such dispatches by reading between the lines, examining the timing of publications, studying the significance of what has not been said and comparing the contents with earlier ones, all in an effort to draw certain meaningful conclusions, if possible. There is however a risk involved in following such techniques, as the likelihood of such analysts going wrong would always exist. On the other hand, Chinese experts at home, directly exposed to the system, are better equipped to understand the hidden meaning if any of Chinese media views. They may however prefer not to come out openly with their feelings out of fear of punishment by the authorities.
The following are case studies undertaken by me, aimed at examining the transparency or otherwise of Chinese media dispatches:
1) Shanghai Daily Wen Huibao (10 November 1965) carried an article entitled, “Criticism of Historical Drama- Hai Rui Dismissed from Office”, written by Yao Wenyuan, a member of the now disgraced ‘gang of four’. Not many were immediately aware of political implications of the article; the assessment that the drama was criticized as it made an allegorical attack on Chairman Mao for his dismissal of Defence Minister Peng Dehuai, and that the article gave a signal towards launch of cultural revolution, could come only subsequently. It is obvious that the article could not say certain things openly, as what was involved is a struggle for political power.
2) China Daily (1 November 2004) published an Op-Ed captioned, “US Strategy to be Blamed”, by Qian Qichen, considered Czar of Chinese foreign policy, right on the eve of US polling in which President Bush contested for second time. It was notable for its strident anti- US tone and expression of fears on a US encirclement of China. To the world’s dismay, the China Daily disowned the article next day and a PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson denied that Qian wrote any such article. It was natural that speculations then arose on leadership differences in Beijing on China’s US policy, but observers remain puzzled over the episode; the real reason still looks mysterious. How China finally played the issue diplomatically with the US is another matter.
3) A sharply worded comment in People’s Daily (1 September 2008), signaling China’s opposition to India’s getting waiver in the scheduled Vienna meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), said that the Indo-US nuclear deal is a major blow to India’s non-proliferation image. The article timed close to the voting at Vienna, coupled with China’s reported moves there to join the like minded countries that had reservations on India getting the waiver, gave an impression that Beijing will vote against India’s case at the NSG. What happened finally was China’s abstention from the voting; China’s foreign minister Yang Jiechi stated that his nation did not try to block anything in Vienna and played a constructive role (Reuters, 2 October 2008). In such circumstances, how to interpret the opinions of the People’s Daily, becomes a key question. A probable reason could be that they could be representative of Chinese thinking based on principles, whereas at diplomatic levels, China felt the necessity to select a practical and safe option; regardless of such explanation, for the public opinion outside China, the Chinese stand on the issue remains puzzling.
4) What was the meaning of the Chinese media outbursts against India’s dispatch of additional troops to Arunachal Pradesh, noticed in the run up to the 13th India-China round of Special Representatives talks on the border issue (7-8 August 2009)? The Global Times (11 June 2009) described the troops dispatch as India’s “unwise military moves” and asked whether India can afford the consequences of a ‘potential confrontation’ with China. The People’s Daily’s comment (19 June 2009) on the same subject captioned ‘ a veiled threat or a good neighbor’, alleged that India seemed to be conspiring to create a picture of an immediate war with China. These two items, kept for the comments of readers for a long time, received substantial number of responses, most of them critical of India. Questions arise – what was the purpose behind the talk of ‘confrontation or war’ with India in the two articles? Was it meant to apply pressure on India during the border talks? The Chinese official comments have on the other hand been positive. Zhang Yan, the Chinese Ambassador to India has described the visit of the PRC Special Representative to India as successful and that ‘in-depth’ talks on the border issue could be held between the two sides (The Hindu, 12 October 2009). The remarks earlier (4 August 2009) of the PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson were also positive, though he made a mention about the ‘illegal’ McMahon line. Coming out clear is the apparent dichotomy between the treatments of the media and the government establishments in China on the border issue. The question as to how to interpret the same, continues to be valid.
5) An article in a Chinese website (8 August 2009), published at the time of Sino-Indian border talks, suggested that China should break up the Indian Union. It was reproduced around the same time by more than 20 websites/blogs in China. After protests from India, the concerned Chinese website subsequently inserted the name of an individual who wrote the article, along with a disclaimer that the writer did not represent its views; the website also claimed it has no connections with the government. The same was published in the website of Chennai Centre for China Studies (CCCS), India, which originally reported the Chinese website article. Also, in response to an Op-Ed carried by the Hindu Newspaper, Chennai, alleging factual inaccuracies in the CCCS article, a letter to the Editor was sent to the Hindu pointing out that the CCCS report did not connect the Chinese website with the PRC government and that in particular, it did not make any reference to the China Institute of International and Strategic Studies, a military think tank. The Hindu did not publish the rejoinder.
This writer holds his view that nothing can be printed or published in China without the knowledge of the Party/Government there and that any failure on the part of the authorities in taking notice of media contents including in web posts, is unthinkable. Can any newspaper, website or blog in China get away from the clutches of the authorities if they challenge the authority of the CCP or question the unity and integrity of the country? The answer is a clear ‘No’. I have seen arguments coming from China that the article in question had been appearing in Chinese blogs since 2006. I ask following questions – what is the explanation for the article (only blog for the Chinese) continuing to appear, as late as August 2009, simultaneously in a number of web posts? How the government, which has introduced tough regulations stipulating registration of all websites/blogs with it, did not notice such posts, under circulation for about three years already, challenging the declared policy of China towards India? What action was taken by Beijing against the so-called bloggers (called Xinlang or Queen Park Cruiser)? Are the Chinese security agencies so inefficient that they could not identify and take action against these so-called ‘anonymous’ bloggers.
Interestingly, the Chinese web posts did not single out India only. Vietnam’s case is another example. Hanoi lodged a protest (August 2008) with Beijing at government levels against an article in Sina.Com and a few other Chinese websites, which disclosed a plan for China’s 31-day invasion of Vietnam involving 310,000 troops sweeping into the latter from Yunnan and Guangxi and by blocking of sea-lanes in South China Sea. Vietnamese foreign office reportedly summoned Chinese diplomats in Hanoi twice to protest against the reported plan. According to the Vietnamese Foreign Minister, Beijing was asked by Hanoi to prevent appearance of such articles.
Another instance concerns South Korea. At the time of Olympics last year, a South Korea-China media row erupted after a Chinese website alleged that in the view of Koreans, Confucius was not Chinese, but a Korean. Also, the South Korean media are annoyed at the media campaign in China in progress since 2003, claiming that Koguryo, the 1300-year old Korean kingdom (existed in the present day North Korea- Manchuria region), was historically under China. For South Korean media, the campaign has hurt the Korean national pride .In particular, they have not taken kindly a ceremony organized by Chinese academics this year to mark the discovery of an unknown stretch of Great Wall in Dandong, close to the North Korean border; their criticism was that the discovery implied an extension of Chinese historical boundary to the ancient Koguryo.
The Chinese media have alleged that the media in India have over-reacted to an obscure web post in China. Any hyping is of course not correct, but the Chinese media should realize that the suggestion in the concerned web post for ‘splitting India’ has been unprecedented and atrocious enough to invite the Indian media’s wrath. They should also ponder over the Vietnamese reaction mentioned above. Is Hanoi’s response both at diplomatic and media levels to Chinese website articles also an over reaction? The basic question is that why the Chinese government is turning a blind eye to articles /blogs carried in the registered websites in the PRC, which the foreign governments and public find most objectionable. I feel puzzled when some Chinese media comments argue that such web posts reflect China’s ‘democracy’ – defending the indefensible indeed!
6) Another puzzling aspect relates to the non-publication so far of the full text of the CCP chief Hu Jintao’s Work Report submitted at the recently held party plenum; such practices had been followed in the past also. Why such secrecy? The plenum also kept everybody guessing on the expected reshuffle of personnel. Wang Changjiang, Director General, Central Party School, while answering a question as to why Xi Jinping, the politburo standing committee member, was not elected as Vice-Chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission, disclosed that personnel reshuffle was not in the agenda of the plenum. Though this somewhat put at rest speculations on the political future of Xi Jinping, widely expected to succeed Hu Jintao in 2012 as CCP General Secretary, a question still persists outside China on whether there was a lack of consensus among the leaders during the plenum on reshuffles in the run up to the next party congress in 2012.
The ‘Economist’ on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of founding the PRC, has said that the world accepts China as a great nation, but China is not behaving like one; that was in the context of human right and other issues, but there is no doubt that media openness is equally another condition for judging China’s greatness; if that condition is fulfilled, the outside world can interpret Chinese pronouncements correctly, leading to a better understanding of China abroad. But, will Beijing move quickly towards media openness? The answer is ‘No’. As long as the ruling party feels that press freedom could be detrimental to its hegemony over Chinese politics, no fundamental change in the PRC’s media policy can be expected. .
(The writer, D.S.Rajan, is Director, Chennai Centre for China Studies, Chennai, India.Email:dsrajan@gmail.com)
China: Nationalistic Blogs Raise New Issues Concerning Sino-Indian Border
D.S.Rajan, C3S Paper No.418 dated December 23, 2009
There is apparently a lull now in the propaganda drive of the Chinese state-controlled media on the Sino-Indian border issue. Epithets like ‘no compromise on territory’, ‘lessons of 1962’ and ‘dangerous consequences for India’, used by them earlier, are carefully being avoided. Adding to the atmosphere is the muted media reaction noticed so far to the Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh’s firm reference (Washington, 25 November 2009) to China’s ‘certain amount of assertiveness of late’ and implied disapproval of that country’s reform path ‘introduced by the writ of the ruling group in a non-democratic set up’. The only critical comment has been in a very brief manner- ‘Unfriendly remarks’, said People’s Daily of 9 December 2009. Similar has been the case with concerns expressed recently by the Indian Defence Minister, Mr. Antony, on China’s military help to Pakistan, with the Chinese media by and large not paying much attention to the same.
The fall in the level of the media rhetoric coincides with some significant military exchanges between the two sides. The Indian Air force Chief has taken part in the Zhuhai (China) air show in November 2009 and two top Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officials – Deputy Chief of Staff General Ge Zhenfeng and the Commander of the Tibet Military District Lt Gen Shu Yutai, have paid visits to India. The symbolic importance of the Tibet military commander’s sojourn in India, at the present juncture comes out clearly.
The Chinese language unofficial websites and blogs in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) however continue to take on India on the border issue, rather vehemently, which should be noted in India if not with alarm. Chinese scholars visiting India have argued in the past that the government is in no position to control bloggers in the country, said to be about 180 million; more over views expressed in the blogs have come from ‘Fen Qing’ or angry youth and do not represent official opinion. On the other hand, the contents of the blogs have always appeared important for analysts abroad as the concerned writers looked knowledgeable, enjoying more often access to the government data and information.
In the context mentioned, what the Chinese websites and blogs have said of late on contentious issues including that of Sino-Indian border deserve close scrutiny. Their views topic-wise are given below:
Sino-Indian war?
First, the blogs in the websites address the question whether there will be a second war with India and if so at what time. Revealing that China’s top central leadership has reached a consensus to teach India a lesson and recover ‘Southern Tibet’ (India’s Arunachal Pradesh), two blog assessments in Chinese language (www.warchina.com/n88582c21.aspx dated 1 December 2009 and www.warchina.com/n8183c21.aspx dated 9 December 2009) predict that Beijing may consider the 2010-2011 period as suitable for action against India; they argue that by that time conditions would have been established for next power transfer in China, economic crisis in China would have been over, the international role of the US would have become extremely weak, China would have become a powerful player in international politics, China would have been able to bring in regional military balance , the PRC’s comprehensive national strength would have developed further in comparison to that of India and lastly, China’s military preparedness would have been completed.
Chinese reinforcement in the border
The second theme in the blogs pertains to reinforcement of China’s troops in the border already carried out and the improvement of logistics on China’s side, in response to India’s recent dispatch of additional forces to Eastern sector. A Blog evaluation (in www.junshi315.cn, dated 11 December 2009) says that India’s sending more 60000 troops is a unilateral step and the same is also a part of Western strategies to contain China. Another Blog (in www.warchina.com/n8183c21.aspx dated 1 December 2009) highlights the holding of military exercises in the Chengdu Military Region recently, to counter the threat coming from India. Elaborating this point, a report (in www.ymglover.com/viewthread.php?action dated 6 December 2009) reveals that China’s border defence troops have now entered the strategically important plains in the southwest of Rikaze and East of Yadong covering the trijunction of China, Bhutan and Sikkim, adding that Bhutan, conscious of China’s influence, has been quiet to the presence of Chinese troops in its disputed area. Bhutan has also supported China’s position in the Sino-Indian border talks, it further claims. As per another Blog disclosure (www.junshi315.cn dated 11 December 2009), with additional troops in position, China’s border with India now stands sealed. The Chinese army is fully prepared as India, taking the reported military training to ULFA in China as a pretext, may plan to attack China, according to another blog (in huanqiu.com/? uid-158463-action-viewspace-itemid-390632)
On upgrading of logistics position, a blog (www.junshi315.cn dated 11 December 2009) quotes foreign reports to say that that the new airport at A Li with 4500-meter long runway is capable of lifting fighter aircraft and bombers. In the same connection a report (http://topics.huanqiu.com/thread-283700-1-1.html dated 19 October 2009) focuses on the proposed extension of Qinghai-Tibet railway to Nepal border and a railway project under planning to link China and Pakistan in parallel to the existing China-Pakistan Friendship Highway.
“ Ladakh- Another Southern Tibet”
As third theme of the websites, India’s Ladakh region is being described as part of China’s Tibet, along with the assertion that the Chinese government has never recognized New Delhi’s official position that Ladakh is part of India. Taking this stand, a blog under the title “Ladakh- another Southern Tibet”(bbs.huanqiu.com/thread-283700 dated 13 December 2009) says that the Volume 8 of the “Historical Atlas of China”, published in Beijing showing China’s territories as existed in 1820, included Ladakh as part of China’s Tibet. “Whether it is McMahon line in the East or Johnson line in the West, both have no legal basis and received no recognition from the Chinese government and people”, it asserts.
“Drive India out of Sikkim”
While one blog (bbs.huanqiu.com/thread-283700-1-1.html, 13 December 2009)
says that acceptance of Sikkim as part of India with Nathula as trading point, has been the greatest Chinese concession to India made during border talks, another comment (www.ymglover.com/viewthread.php?action dated 6 December 2009) under the caption “ China should drive India out of Sikkim”, finds motives behind India’s deployment of its 27th Mountain Division to Sikkim belt, after shifting it from its original base in Kashmir. It attributes the shift to the strategic pressure from China felt by India. It concludes by saying that a clash of Indian and Chinese strengths to capture Sikkim has already started.
India-Nepal Ties
India-Nepal relation is also a notable topic figuring in the Chinese language websites. Noting India’s high-level treatment to the visiting Nepalese Army Chief in December 2009 and its proposal to supply T-72 tanks to Nepal, a report in the authoritative website (mil.huanqiu.com/Observation/2009-12/664409.html) compares the military assistance to Nepal by China and India and finds China’s help to Nepal’s military training programme as superior. It quotes a Chinese military expert to say that the balanced position being maintained by Kathmandu at the current time of Sino-Indian tensions marks a victory for Beijing’s military strategy in the neighborhood. Also, according to an opinion (mil.huanqiu.com/Observation/2009-12/656241.html), the airport in Nepal’s Surketh, to be built by New Delhi under an agreement with Kathmandu, will be a ‘springboard’ to India for attacking China.
Conclusion
Despite tensions, both Beijing and New Delhi have managed to keep relations at government levels at an even keel and there is constant official exchange of views between the two sides. Even setting up of a hotline between the two prime ministers is under discussion. This being so, there may be some justification if a question is asked as to why pay attention to unofficial blogs now. The aim of this paper, which has done so, is not to create panic and cause misgivings in respect of Sino-Indian ties. But at the same time, it may not be wrong to say that analysts in India have a responsibility to take notice and analyze implications if any, of tall claims being made in the Chinese blogs like the ‘consensus’ at top leadership levels in the PRC to teach a lesson to India and recover Arunachal in the 2010-2011 period. Also, the assertion that Ladakh is part of ‘Southern Tibet’ and that the PRC has never recognized that territory as part of India, definitely raises more suspicions in India on China’s intentions.
(The writer, Mr. D.S.Rajan, is the Director, Chennai Centre for China Studies, Chennai`, India.Email:dsrajan@gmail.com)
The Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy of Singapore had organized on July 2 and 3,2010, an India-China Dialogue on “the Role of the Media in India-China Relations”.
2.An explanatory note of the School available on its web site says: “Despite the massive growth of bilateral trade between China and India, tensions over territorial and political issues have also grown, particularly in the last year. While some sources of stress are real, their effects are mediated and often inflamed by media depictions and perceptions of these tensions. Moreover, circumstances may also arise where the media tend to downplay more positive aspects of the relationship. In a situation where the Chinese and Indians have limited knowledge of each other and the interactions are dominated by strategic and business concerns, the media can play a constructive role in promoting mutual understanding among the general public. This first colloquium in the India-China Dialogue series seeks to answer some of these questions about the role of the media in India-China relations. It brings together representatives from the media and other areas to discuss pertinent issues and seeks alternatives to these path-dependent approaches. The speakers will discuss different aspects of image production and reception of these two large and varied nations, the different areas of competition and convergence as covered by the media, and the role of media in geo-politics, cultural relations, diplomacy, etc. Are the media in India and China really responsible for creating misperceptions and an adversarial image of each other? Are journalists in the two countries trained and qualified to cover the other country? What are the differences between the Indian media’s coverage of China and the Chinese media’s reporting on India? Are there alternative avenues for presenting information to the general public.”
3. This subject assumed importance last year following an escalation of mutual demonisation in the print, electronic and online media of the two countries. In the case of India, the escalation was more pronounced in the electronic and online media than in the print media. In China, the escalation was more marked in the print and online media than in the electronic media. China has not yet seen the kind of explosive growth in 24-hour private news channels that India has and it has no privately-run indigenous news channels. In India, the problem of uncontrolled demonisation of China was seen largely in the 24-hour news channels, which merrily lapped up anything critical of China said or written by anybody and organized discussions which tended to be over-dramatic and occasionally even hysterical..
4.In China, the demonisation of India was largely seen in the Chinese language print media and in the thousands of blogs which have come up in the country following the phenomenal growth of the Internet. Most of the blog contents was in the Chinese language. Since there are very few Chinese language experts in India, the majority of the negative articles and postings about India did not get translated and circulated. Only some were. If more of them had been translated and disseminated to Indian readers, the alarm caused in India would have been more.
5. In India, what appeared to be unbridled criticism of China was largely in the English media. The Indian language media, which has more readership and viewership than the English media, did not show the same interest in China and was not as negative about China as was the English media.
6. The analysis of these demonizing articles in the two countries tended to get distorted due to the following reasons:
* The lack of transparency about the Chinese media and the widespread perception in India that the Chinese media is still largely owned and/or controlled by the Chinese Government and the Communist Party of China. As a result, anything critical of India appearing in the Chinese media was viewed by large sections of the Indian public as representing the views of the Chinese Government and party.
* The lack of adequate knowledge in China about the free press that India has. Barring some radio stations and TV channels run by the Government, there is hardly any government owned or controlled media in India. Large sections of the Chinese public opinion tend to think that the entire Indian media is owned and/or controlled by the Government and the political party in power as is the case in China. These sections tended to assume that whatever was carried by the Indian media had the approval of the Government. Thus we had a situation in which large sections of the Chinese public assumed that the negative coverage of China in the Indian media was at the instance of the Government, which was not a fact. Large sections of the Indian public assumed that the negative coverage of India in the Chinese media was instigated by the Government and party, which may have been or may not have been a fact. Many claim that the media landscape in China has changed and that everything that appears in the media does not necessarily represent the views of the Government and party. The Indian public, except those belonging to the leftist parties, is not prepared to accept this.
* Many in India believe that the Internet in China is closely controlled by the Government and that the negative contents of the blogs have been allowed to appear by the Government. Otherwise, they would have been erased.
7. The consequent distortions in the analysis of the reports and writings in the media of the two countries almost led to a war of words between analysts, journalists and TV anchors of the two countries. Fortunately, the two Governments had a better understanding of the state of affairs and put a stop to this self-feeding rhetoric. The campaign of mutual demonisation has declined. But there is still a lot of criticism of each other, which is more due to the low level of trust between the civil societies of the two countries due to historical reasons than due to any malign reasons.
8. This may please be read in continuation of the following two articles written by Mr.D.S.Rajan, Director, Chennai Centre For China Studies:
(a). The Tricky Business of Watching Chinese Media, dated October 12,2009.
(b). China: Nationalistic Blogs Raise New Issues Concerning Sino-Indian Border, dated December 23,2009.
9. These articles, which are available at the web site of the Chennai Centre for China Studies, are annexed below for easy reference. (12-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
The Tricky Business of Watching Chinese Media
D.S.Rajan, C3S Paper No.385 dated October 12, 2009
For analysts of Chinese affairs abroad, the printed, online, radio and TV media in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), in Chinese, English and other languages, remain a major source of information. The conventional wisdom is that virtually the entire media are functioning under the guidance of either the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or the government led by it; the CCP Central Committee’s Publicity Department plays a pivotal role in this regard. As such, outside the PRC, the Chinese media are invariably being seen as reflecting the views of the CCP and the government.
It cannot be denied however that instances of very limited freedom, being enjoyed occasionally by the Chinese press are increasingly coming to notice. – Journals like ‘Cai Jing’, ‘Nanyang Zhoumo, Yan Huang Chun Qiu and scores of local newspapers, websites and blogs, are critical of the authorities sometimes on issues like corruption, nepotism, problems of peasants etc. Also, ideologically, Beijing is permitting neo-liberal, neo-left and even some ultra-Maoist scholars to express their views. In doing so, its motives seem to be using the available different viewpoints as possible inputs to ultimate policy making. As the party theoretical organ ‘Qiu Shi’ puts it, while ‘hundred flowers blossom’, the media must not cross the rubicon, by expressing any opinion challenging the rule of the communist party or affecting the unity and integrity of the country. A known example of ‘crossing the limit’ had been the journal ‘Strategy and Management’ which published (September 2004) an excessively independent article on North Korea. In response, the authorities closed down the journal (“Reporters without Borders”, 1 June 2005).
This writer started studying Chinese media more than four decades back and till today, have come across several reports, which are more concealing than revealing; I however do not mean that they reflect a general trend and feel that only on selected occasions such a phenomenon is being seen. Not surprisingly, China analysts world over per force are examining such dispatches by reading between the lines, examining the timing of publications, studying the significance of what has not been said and comparing the contents with earlier ones, all in an effort to draw certain meaningful conclusions, if possible. There is however a risk involved in following such techniques, as the likelihood of such analysts going wrong would always exist. On the other hand, Chinese experts at home, directly exposed to the system, are better equipped to understand the hidden meaning if any of Chinese media views. They may however prefer not to come out openly with their feelings out of fear of punishment by the authorities.
The following are case studies undertaken by me, aimed at examining the transparency or otherwise of Chinese media dispatches:
1) Shanghai Daily Wen Huibao (10 November 1965) carried an article entitled, “Criticism of Historical Drama- Hai Rui Dismissed from Office”, written by Yao Wenyuan, a member of the now disgraced ‘gang of four’. Not many were immediately aware of political implications of the article; the assessment that the drama was criticized as it made an allegorical attack on Chairman Mao for his dismissal of Defence Minister Peng Dehuai, and that the article gave a signal towards launch of cultural revolution, could come only subsequently. It is obvious that the article could not say certain things openly, as what was involved is a struggle for political power.
2) China Daily (1 November 2004) published an Op-Ed captioned, “US Strategy to be Blamed”, by Qian Qichen, considered Czar of Chinese foreign policy, right on the eve of US polling in which President Bush contested for second time. It was notable for its strident anti- US tone and expression of fears on a US encirclement of China. To the world’s dismay, the China Daily disowned the article next day and a PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson denied that Qian wrote any such article. It was natural that speculations then arose on leadership differences in Beijing on China’s US policy, but observers remain puzzled over the episode; the real reason still looks mysterious. How China finally played the issue diplomatically with the US is another matter.
3) A sharply worded comment in People’s Daily (1 September 2008), signaling China’s opposition to India’s getting waiver in the scheduled Vienna meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), said that the Indo-US nuclear deal is a major blow to India’s non-proliferation image. The article timed close to the voting at Vienna, coupled with China’s reported moves there to join the like minded countries that had reservations on India getting the waiver, gave an impression that Beijing will vote against India’s case at the NSG. What happened finally was China’s abstention from the voting; China’s foreign minister Yang Jiechi stated that his nation did not try to block anything in Vienna and played a constructive role (Reuters, 2 October 2008). In such circumstances, how to interpret the opinions of the People’s Daily, becomes a key question. A probable reason could be that they could be representative of Chinese thinking based on principles, whereas at diplomatic levels, China felt the necessity to select a practical and safe option; regardless of such explanation, for the public opinion outside China, the Chinese stand on the issue remains puzzling.
4) What was the meaning of the Chinese media outbursts against India’s dispatch of additional troops to Arunachal Pradesh, noticed in the run up to the 13th India-China round of Special Representatives talks on the border issue (7-8 August 2009)? The Global Times (11 June 2009) described the troops dispatch as India’s “unwise military moves” and asked whether India can afford the consequences of a ‘potential confrontation’ with China. The People’s Daily’s comment (19 June 2009) on the same subject captioned ‘ a veiled threat or a good neighbor’, alleged that India seemed to be conspiring to create a picture of an immediate war with China. These two items, kept for the comments of readers for a long time, received substantial number of responses, most of them critical of India. Questions arise – what was the purpose behind the talk of ‘confrontation or war’ with India in the two articles? Was it meant to apply pressure on India during the border talks? The Chinese official comments have on the other hand been positive. Zhang Yan, the Chinese Ambassador to India has described the visit of the PRC Special Representative to India as successful and that ‘in-depth’ talks on the border issue could be held between the two sides (The Hindu, 12 October 2009). The remarks earlier (4 August 2009) of the PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson were also positive, though he made a mention about the ‘illegal’ McMahon line. Coming out clear is the apparent dichotomy between the treatments of the media and the government establishments in China on the border issue. The question as to how to interpret the same, continues to be valid.
5) An article in a Chinese website (8 August 2009), published at the time of Sino-Indian border talks, suggested that China should break up the Indian Union. It was reproduced around the same time by more than 20 websites/blogs in China. After protests from India, the concerned Chinese website subsequently inserted the name of an individual who wrote the article, along with a disclaimer that the writer did not represent its views; the website also claimed it has no connections with the government. The same was published in the website of Chennai Centre for China Studies (CCCS), India, which originally reported the Chinese website article. Also, in response to an Op-Ed carried by the Hindu Newspaper, Chennai, alleging factual inaccuracies in the CCCS article, a letter to the Editor was sent to the Hindu pointing out that the CCCS report did not connect the Chinese website with the PRC government and that in particular, it did not make any reference to the China Institute of International and Strategic Studies, a military think tank. The Hindu did not publish the rejoinder.
This writer holds his view that nothing can be printed or published in China without the knowledge of the Party/Government there and that any failure on the part of the authorities in taking notice of media contents including in web posts, is unthinkable. Can any newspaper, website or blog in China get away from the clutches of the authorities if they challenge the authority of the CCP or question the unity and integrity of the country? The answer is a clear ‘No’. I have seen arguments coming from China that the article in question had been appearing in Chinese blogs since 2006. I ask following questions – what is the explanation for the article (only blog for the Chinese) continuing to appear, as late as August 2009, simultaneously in a number of web posts? How the government, which has introduced tough regulations stipulating registration of all websites/blogs with it, did not notice such posts, under circulation for about three years already, challenging the declared policy of China towards India? What action was taken by Beijing against the so-called bloggers (called Xinlang or Queen Park Cruiser)? Are the Chinese security agencies so inefficient that they could not identify and take action against these so-called ‘anonymous’ bloggers.
Interestingly, the Chinese web posts did not single out India only. Vietnam’s case is another example. Hanoi lodged a protest (August 2008) with Beijing at government levels against an article in Sina.Com and a few other Chinese websites, which disclosed a plan for China’s 31-day invasion of Vietnam involving 310,000 troops sweeping into the latter from Yunnan and Guangxi and by blocking of sea-lanes in South China Sea. Vietnamese foreign office reportedly summoned Chinese diplomats in Hanoi twice to protest against the reported plan. According to the Vietnamese Foreign Minister, Beijing was asked by Hanoi to prevent appearance of such articles.
Another instance concerns South Korea. At the time of Olympics last year, a South Korea-China media row erupted after a Chinese website alleged that in the view of Koreans, Confucius was not Chinese, but a Korean. Also, the South Korean media are annoyed at the media campaign in China in progress since 2003, claiming that Koguryo, the 1300-year old Korean kingdom (existed in the present day North Korea- Manchuria region), was historically under China. For South Korean media, the campaign has hurt the Korean national pride .In particular, they have not taken kindly a ceremony organized by Chinese academics this year to mark the discovery of an unknown stretch of Great Wall in Dandong, close to the North Korean border; their criticism was that the discovery implied an extension of Chinese historical boundary to the ancient Koguryo.
The Chinese media have alleged that the media in India have over-reacted to an obscure web post in China. Any hyping is of course not correct, but the Chinese media should realize that the suggestion in the concerned web post for ‘splitting India’ has been unprecedented and atrocious enough to invite the Indian media’s wrath. They should also ponder over the Vietnamese reaction mentioned above. Is Hanoi’s response both at diplomatic and media levels to Chinese website articles also an over reaction? The basic question is that why the Chinese government is turning a blind eye to articles /blogs carried in the registered websites in the PRC, which the foreign governments and public find most objectionable. I feel puzzled when some Chinese media comments argue that such web posts reflect China’s ‘democracy’ – defending the indefensible indeed!
6) Another puzzling aspect relates to the non-publication so far of the full text of the CCP chief Hu Jintao’s Work Report submitted at the recently held party plenum; such practices had been followed in the past also. Why such secrecy? The plenum also kept everybody guessing on the expected reshuffle of personnel. Wang Changjiang, Director General, Central Party School, while answering a question as to why Xi Jinping, the politburo standing committee member, was not elected as Vice-Chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission, disclosed that personnel reshuffle was not in the agenda of the plenum. Though this somewhat put at rest speculations on the political future of Xi Jinping, widely expected to succeed Hu Jintao in 2012 as CCP General Secretary, a question still persists outside China on whether there was a lack of consensus among the leaders during the plenum on reshuffles in the run up to the next party congress in 2012.
The ‘Economist’ on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of founding the PRC, has said that the world accepts China as a great nation, but China is not behaving like one; that was in the context of human right and other issues, but there is no doubt that media openness is equally another condition for judging China’s greatness; if that condition is fulfilled, the outside world can interpret Chinese pronouncements correctly, leading to a better understanding of China abroad. But, will Beijing move quickly towards media openness? The answer is ‘No’. As long as the ruling party feels that press freedom could be detrimental to its hegemony over Chinese politics, no fundamental change in the PRC’s media policy can be expected. .
(The writer, D.S.Rajan, is Director, Chennai Centre for China Studies, Chennai, India.Email:dsrajan@gmail.com)
China: Nationalistic Blogs Raise New Issues Concerning Sino-Indian Border
D.S.Rajan, C3S Paper No.418 dated December 23, 2009
There is apparently a lull now in the propaganda drive of the Chinese state-controlled media on the Sino-Indian border issue. Epithets like ‘no compromise on territory’, ‘lessons of 1962’ and ‘dangerous consequences for India’, used by them earlier, are carefully being avoided. Adding to the atmosphere is the muted media reaction noticed so far to the Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh’s firm reference (Washington, 25 November 2009) to China’s ‘certain amount of assertiveness of late’ and implied disapproval of that country’s reform path ‘introduced by the writ of the ruling group in a non-democratic set up’. The only critical comment has been in a very brief manner- ‘Unfriendly remarks’, said People’s Daily of 9 December 2009. Similar has been the case with concerns expressed recently by the Indian Defence Minister, Mr. Antony, on China’s military help to Pakistan, with the Chinese media by and large not paying much attention to the same.
The fall in the level of the media rhetoric coincides with some significant military exchanges between the two sides. The Indian Air force Chief has taken part in the Zhuhai (China) air show in November 2009 and two top Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officials – Deputy Chief of Staff General Ge Zhenfeng and the Commander of the Tibet Military District Lt Gen Shu Yutai, have paid visits to India. The symbolic importance of the Tibet military commander’s sojourn in India, at the present juncture comes out clearly.
The Chinese language unofficial websites and blogs in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) however continue to take on India on the border issue, rather vehemently, which should be noted in India if not with alarm. Chinese scholars visiting India have argued in the past that the government is in no position to control bloggers in the country, said to be about 180 million; more over views expressed in the blogs have come from ‘Fen Qing’ or angry youth and do not represent official opinion. On the other hand, the contents of the blogs have always appeared important for analysts abroad as the concerned writers looked knowledgeable, enjoying more often access to the government data and information.
In the context mentioned, what the Chinese websites and blogs have said of late on contentious issues including that of Sino-Indian border deserve close scrutiny. Their views topic-wise are given below:
Sino-Indian war?
First, the blogs in the websites address the question whether there will be a second war with India and if so at what time. Revealing that China’s top central leadership has reached a consensus to teach India a lesson and recover ‘Southern Tibet’ (India’s Arunachal Pradesh), two blog assessments in Chinese language (www.warchina.com/n88582c21.aspx dated 1 December 2009 and www.warchina.com/n8183c21.aspx dated 9 December 2009) predict that Beijing may consider the 2010-2011 period as suitable for action against India; they argue that by that time conditions would have been established for next power transfer in China, economic crisis in China would have been over, the international role of the US would have become extremely weak, China would have become a powerful player in international politics, China would have been able to bring in regional military balance , the PRC’s comprehensive national strength would have developed further in comparison to that of India and lastly, China’s military preparedness would have been completed.
Chinese reinforcement in the border
The second theme in the blogs pertains to reinforcement of China’s troops in the border already carried out and the improvement of logistics on China’s side, in response to India’s recent dispatch of additional forces to Eastern sector. A Blog evaluation (in www.junshi315.cn, dated 11 December 2009) says that India’s sending more 60000 troops is a unilateral step and the same is also a part of Western strategies to contain China. Another Blog (in www.warchina.com/n8183c21.aspx dated 1 December 2009) highlights the holding of military exercises in the Chengdu Military Region recently, to counter the threat coming from India. Elaborating this point, a report (in www.ymglover.com/viewthread.php?action dated 6 December 2009) reveals that China’s border defence troops have now entered the strategically important plains in the southwest of Rikaze and East of Yadong covering the trijunction of China, Bhutan and Sikkim, adding that Bhutan, conscious of China’s influence, has been quiet to the presence of Chinese troops in its disputed area. Bhutan has also supported China’s position in the Sino-Indian border talks, it further claims. As per another Blog disclosure (www.junshi315.cn dated 11 December 2009), with additional troops in position, China’s border with India now stands sealed. The Chinese army is fully prepared as India, taking the reported military training to ULFA in China as a pretext, may plan to attack China, according to another blog (in huanqiu.com/? uid-158463-action-viewspace-itemid-390632)
On upgrading of logistics position, a blog (www.junshi315.cn dated 11 December 2009) quotes foreign reports to say that that the new airport at A Li with 4500-meter long runway is capable of lifting fighter aircraft and bombers. In the same connection a report (http://topics.huanqiu.com/thread-283700-1-1.html dated 19 October 2009) focuses on the proposed extension of Qinghai-Tibet railway to Nepal border and a railway project under planning to link China and Pakistan in parallel to the existing China-Pakistan Friendship Highway.
“ Ladakh- Another Southern Tibet”
As third theme of the websites, India’s Ladakh region is being described as part of China’s Tibet, along with the assertion that the Chinese government has never recognized New Delhi’s official position that Ladakh is part of India. Taking this stand, a blog under the title “Ladakh- another Southern Tibet”(bbs.huanqiu.com/thread-283700 dated 13 December 2009) says that the Volume 8 of the “Historical Atlas of China”, published in Beijing showing China’s territories as existed in 1820, included Ladakh as part of China’s Tibet. “Whether it is McMahon line in the East or Johnson line in the West, both have no legal basis and received no recognition from the Chinese government and people”, it asserts.
“Drive India out of Sikkim”
While one blog (bbs.huanqiu.com/thread-283700-1-1.html, 13 December 2009)
says that acceptance of Sikkim as part of India with Nathula as trading point, has been the greatest Chinese concession to India made during border talks, another comment (www.ymglover.com/viewthread.php?action dated 6 December 2009) under the caption “ China should drive India out of Sikkim”, finds motives behind India’s deployment of its 27th Mountain Division to Sikkim belt, after shifting it from its original base in Kashmir. It attributes the shift to the strategic pressure from China felt by India. It concludes by saying that a clash of Indian and Chinese strengths to capture Sikkim has already started.
India-Nepal Ties
India-Nepal relation is also a notable topic figuring in the Chinese language websites. Noting India’s high-level treatment to the visiting Nepalese Army Chief in December 2009 and its proposal to supply T-72 tanks to Nepal, a report in the authoritative website (mil.huanqiu.com/Observation/2009-12/664409.html) compares the military assistance to Nepal by China and India and finds China’s help to Nepal’s military training programme as superior. It quotes a Chinese military expert to say that the balanced position being maintained by Kathmandu at the current time of Sino-Indian tensions marks a victory for Beijing’s military strategy in the neighborhood. Also, according to an opinion (mil.huanqiu.com/Observation/2009-12/656241.html), the airport in Nepal’s Surketh, to be built by New Delhi under an agreement with Kathmandu, will be a ‘springboard’ to India for attacking China.
Conclusion
Despite tensions, both Beijing and New Delhi have managed to keep relations at government levels at an even keel and there is constant official exchange of views between the two sides. Even setting up of a hotline between the two prime ministers is under discussion. This being so, there may be some justification if a question is asked as to why pay attention to unofficial blogs now. The aim of this paper, which has done so, is not to create panic and cause misgivings in respect of Sino-Indian ties. But at the same time, it may not be wrong to say that analysts in India have a responsibility to take notice and analyze implications if any, of tall claims being made in the Chinese blogs like the ‘consensus’ at top leadership levels in the PRC to teach a lesson to India and recover Arunachal in the 2010-2011 period. Also, the assertion that Ladakh is part of ‘Southern Tibet’ and that the PRC has never recognized that territory as part of India, definitely raises more suspicions in India on China’s intentions.
(The writer, Mr. D.S.Rajan, is the Director, Chennai Centre for China Studies, Chennai`, India.Email:dsrajan@gmail.com)
Sunday, July 11, 2010
INDIA'S FS CALLS ON DALAI LAMA
B.RAMAN
Mrs.Nirupama Rao, India's Foreign Secretary, arrived in Dharamsala in Himachal Pradesh on July 10 and called on His Holiness the Dalai Lama. She was reportedly with him for about an hour. His Holiness lives in Dharamsala, where his Tibetan-Government-in-exile is located. Senior advisors of His Holiness, including his Prime Minister Samdhong Rinpoche, were reportedly present during the meeting. According to local sources, the welfare of the Tibetan exiles living in India and the adequacy of the physical security arrangements for His Holiness were among the subjects discussed.
2. A representative of the HP State Government had stated on July 9 that Mrs.Rao would be visiting Dharamsala on July 10 and 11, but he did not indicate whether she would be calling on His Holiness. Foreign Secretaries have usually been making a courtesy call on His Holiness during their tenure. She herself had planned to make a courtesy call on him on two or three occasions after taking over as the FS, but the visits were postponed due to her preoccupation with other work. In fact, it has been reported that she was to meet His Holiness on July 3 just before Mr.Shiv Shankar Menon, the National Security Adviser, left for China as a special envoy of Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh, but her meeting was postponed.
3. There was thus nothing unusual or secret about her visit and meeting with His Holiness, but there is likely to be speculation connecting her meeting with India's unhappiness over China's ignoring Indian concerns over the implications to India's national security of China's decisions to help Pakistan in improving its road infrastructure in the Gilgit-Baltistan area and in constructing a railway line to Xinjiang which will pass through Gilgit-Baltistan. These decisions were announced during the just-concluded visit of President Asif Ali Zardari to China.
4. Gilgit-Baltistan, which is de jure a part of India's Jammu & Kashmir, has been under Pakistan's illegal occupation since 1948. Pakistan had illegally ceded some of the Indian territory in the area occupied by it to China in the 1960s in return for Chinese assistance in the construction of the Karakoram Highway passing through the territory. This Highway is also being upgraded now with Chinese assistance.
5. The Chinese have sought to play down Indian concerns over their assistance to Pakistan for improving the infrastructure in the Gilgit-Baltistan area by projecting it as meant to promote trade between Pakistan and Xinjiang, but it has serious military implications for India. It would enable Pakistan to move its troops and military equipment to these areas across the Line of Control in J&K more rapidly than in the past. It would also enable Chinese troops in Xinjiang to move to this area to assist Pakistan in the event of a military conflict. This would further increase the military threat to the Ladakh and Kargil areas where China claims a large area as Chinese territory. The military conflict between India and Pakistan in 1999 had broken out in this area after Gen.Pervez Musharraf, the then Chief of the Army Staff under the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, had secretly sent Pakistani troops to the area and occupied some Indian territory in the Kargil sector by taking advantage of the withdrawal of some Indian border posts during winter.
6. Even if Mrs.Rao's visit was not connected with the Chinese decisions announced during Mr.Zardari's visit, it is important for the Government of India to express openly and strongly its indignation over the Chinese actions in total disregard of India's legitimate concerns. Our policy-makers should also examine what options are available to India to counter the Chinese actions. Upgrading the interactions with His Holiness is one option. Establishing open contacts with the secular Uighur elements of the Munich-based World Uighur Congress (WUC) is another option. (11-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Mrs.Nirupama Rao, India's Foreign Secretary, arrived in Dharamsala in Himachal Pradesh on July 10 and called on His Holiness the Dalai Lama. She was reportedly with him for about an hour. His Holiness lives in Dharamsala, where his Tibetan-Government-in-exile is located. Senior advisors of His Holiness, including his Prime Minister Samdhong Rinpoche, were reportedly present during the meeting. According to local sources, the welfare of the Tibetan exiles living in India and the adequacy of the physical security arrangements for His Holiness were among the subjects discussed.
2. A representative of the HP State Government had stated on July 9 that Mrs.Rao would be visiting Dharamsala on July 10 and 11, but he did not indicate whether she would be calling on His Holiness. Foreign Secretaries have usually been making a courtesy call on His Holiness during their tenure. She herself had planned to make a courtesy call on him on two or three occasions after taking over as the FS, but the visits were postponed due to her preoccupation with other work. In fact, it has been reported that she was to meet His Holiness on July 3 just before Mr.Shiv Shankar Menon, the National Security Adviser, left for China as a special envoy of Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh, but her meeting was postponed.
3. There was thus nothing unusual or secret about her visit and meeting with His Holiness, but there is likely to be speculation connecting her meeting with India's unhappiness over China's ignoring Indian concerns over the implications to India's national security of China's decisions to help Pakistan in improving its road infrastructure in the Gilgit-Baltistan area and in constructing a railway line to Xinjiang which will pass through Gilgit-Baltistan. These decisions were announced during the just-concluded visit of President Asif Ali Zardari to China.
4. Gilgit-Baltistan, which is de jure a part of India's Jammu & Kashmir, has been under Pakistan's illegal occupation since 1948. Pakistan had illegally ceded some of the Indian territory in the area occupied by it to China in the 1960s in return for Chinese assistance in the construction of the Karakoram Highway passing through the territory. This Highway is also being upgraded now with Chinese assistance.
5. The Chinese have sought to play down Indian concerns over their assistance to Pakistan for improving the infrastructure in the Gilgit-Baltistan area by projecting it as meant to promote trade between Pakistan and Xinjiang, but it has serious military implications for India. It would enable Pakistan to move its troops and military equipment to these areas across the Line of Control in J&K more rapidly than in the past. It would also enable Chinese troops in Xinjiang to move to this area to assist Pakistan in the event of a military conflict. This would further increase the military threat to the Ladakh and Kargil areas where China claims a large area as Chinese territory. The military conflict between India and Pakistan in 1999 had broken out in this area after Gen.Pervez Musharraf, the then Chief of the Army Staff under the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, had secretly sent Pakistani troops to the area and occupied some Indian territory in the Kargil sector by taking advantage of the withdrawal of some Indian border posts during winter.
6. Even if Mrs.Rao's visit was not connected with the Chinese decisions announced during Mr.Zardari's visit, it is important for the Government of India to express openly and strongly its indignation over the Chinese actions in total disregard of India's legitimate concerns. Our policy-makers should also examine what options are available to India to counter the Chinese actions. Upgrading the interactions with His Holiness is one option. Establishing open contacts with the secular Uighur elements of the Munich-based World Uighur Congress (WUC) is another option. (11-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
PAKISTAN AS CHINA'S FORCE-MULTIPLIER AGAINST INDIA
B.RAMAN
Mr.Shiv Shankar Menon, India's National Security Adviser (NSA), visited China as the special envoy of Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh from July 3 to 6,2010, for talks with Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and other Chinese leaders. President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan visited Beijing for four days from July 6. Thereafter he proceeded to Shanghai to visit the International Expo. He was to return to Pakistan from Shanghai.
2.The two visits were scheduled independently of each other and were not inter-connected. Despite this, what stood out was the quiet Chinese determination not to allow India’s core concerns relating to Pakistan come in the way of China’s expanding presence in Pakistan and Chinese assistance to Pakistan in matters and areas which add to India’s concerns regarding the implications of the Sino-Pakistan relations to its internal and external security.
3. The discussions of Mr.Menon with his Chinese interlocutors including Prime Minister Wen Jiabao covered the broad parameters of the co-operation between India and China at the global level----sustaining the global economic recovery, climate protection, economic co-operation in third countries etc--- but not the nuts and bolts of it. Mr.Zardari's talks with the Chinese leaders covered the nuts and bolts of the co-operation at the bilateral and regional levels without any pretensions of the relationship having a global significance. The nuts and bolts touched upon related to keeping the Chinese interest in the Gwadar port sustained, infrastructural development and linkages between Pakistan and Western China in the fields of road, railways and fibre optics and Chinese assistance to meet Pakistan's nuclear and conventional energy needs. Other areas touched upon were bilateral co-operation against Pakistan-based terrorism affecting peace and stability in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, Chinese concerns over the security of the over 10,000 Chinese nationals living and working in about 120 projects in Pakistan and scope for bilateral co-operation and initiatives within the framework of the SAARC of which China is an observer and the Shanghai Co-Operation Organisation (SCO) of which Pakistan is an observer.
4. The repeated Chinese assurances to Mr.Zardari that China would maintain touch with Pakistan on the question of United Nationa reforms were meant to remove Pakistan’s fears that as a result of the seeming improvement in China’s relations with India, Beijing might support India becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Pakistan has been opposed to this. Instead of saying so directly, it has been saying since the days of Gen.Pervez Musharraf that it is time to make a Muslim country----Indonesia or Saudi Arabia--- a permanent member. China has not been unsympathetic to Pakistan’s view. The Associated Press of Pakistan (APP) reported that President Hu Jintao said that China would continue to maintain contact with Pakistan on issues such as the reform of the UN Security Council.
5. Mr.Zardari was reported to have assured Mr.Hu that Pakistan would continue to function as “China’s force-multiplier”. How is Pakistan playing this role of “China’s force-multiplier”? By keeping India faced with the threat of a two-front war against Pakistan and China. By continuing to supply nuclear and conventional military related and relevant equipment and technology to Pakistan China has been nursing this force-multiplier dimension of Pakistan. It became clear during Mr.Zardari’s talks with the Chinese leaders that there would be no change in this role of Pakistan as China’s force-multiplier against India, though India was not mentioned by name.
6.The APP reported as follows: “China is a friend and a strategic partner, committed to the promotion of stability and economic progress of Pakistan” is how (Hu) Jintao summed up the strategic relations. Zardari responded by saying, “It is our belief that Pakistan can act as a force multiplier for China and we will continue to work towards this end.”
7.Generally, in the past, China had not been using expressions such as "core interests", "major concerns" etc in characterisation of its relations with India and Pakistan. It uses such expressions with reference to its relations with the US and Japan and its interests in the South and East China Seas. Some of the subjects and issues which it seeks to cover under this characterisation are its insistence on the one China principle, supply of US arms to Taiwan, US naval movements in the East China Sea, its differences with Japan on the East China Sea islands and the US contacts with His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Beijing never hesitates to express its protests openly and loudly whenever it feels a threat to its core interests in these matters
8. During the recent visits of Mr.Menon and Mr.Zardari to China, one saw references to the concept of core interests and core concerns, which plays an important role in the formulation and assertion of Chinese foreign policy. The Chinese media reported Mr.Menon's discussions with Prime Minister Wen in the following words. "Premier Wen Jiabao said Monday (July 5,2010) that China regards India as an important strategic partner of cooperation. "We will work with India to maintain high level visits and take care of each other's core interests and major concerns," Wen said when meeting visiting Indian prime ministerial special envoy Shiv Shankar Menon.Wen also pledged to enhance dialogue and cooperation with India to benefit the two peoples, and make joint efforts to promote world peace and common prosperity. The two countries have also reached important agreements and made sound coordination in coping with the international financial crisis, climate change and other major issues, Wen noted. Wen said China and India, as neighbors and large developing nations with largest populations, enjoy not only profound historical and cultural origins but also broad common interests."A healthy, stable and dynamic China-India relationship is of far-reaching significance to the two nations, Asia and the whole world at large," he said. "
9.A reference to the core concept was not there in the Chinese media accounts of Mr.Zardar's meetings with President Hu and Prime Minister Wen. However, it was there in the media accounts of his meeting with Mr.Jia Qinglin, Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). According to the Chinese media, Mr.Jia told Mr. Zardari that China has always valued its relationship with Pakistan, and treats the bilateral ties from a strategic and long-term perspective. “Jia applauded the Pakistani government's firm support in issues concerning China's core interests, saying that China would work with Pakistan to cement traditional friendship and act on all consensuses reached by the two sides. Jia hoped the two nations would work together to push forward the bilateral strategic partnership of cooperation, in a bid to benefit the two peoples and promote regional peace and prosperity.”
10.China's perception of India's global importance as against Pakistan's purely regional importance came out clearly in the Chinese media accounts of the talks of Mr.Menon and Mr.Zardari with the Chinese leaders. In the case of India, the emphasis was on New Delhi and Beijing caring for each other's core interests and major concerns. In the case of Pakistan, the emphasis was on Pakistan's support to China "in issues concerning China's core interests." The Chinese have, however, not clarified what they saw as the core interests and major concerns in their relations with India.
11.However, there were references in the Chinese media to India's concerns relating to the Chinese move to supply two more civil nuclear reactors (Chashmas III and IV) to Pakistan without obtaining the clearance of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG). The Chinese media also referred strongly to China's unhappiness over Indian suspicions regarding Chinese telecommunication companies and imposing restrictions on Indian companies purchasing Chinese telecom equipment and technology. The reported assurance of Mr.Menon in his interaction with the media in Beijing that India was evolving a telecommunication import policy which will uniformly apply to all countries and will not be China-specific does not appear to have satisfied the Chinese critics of the Indian policy. Chinese media criticism of alleged Indian black-listing of a large number of Chinese telecom companies tended to become virulent despite the assurance reportedly conveyed by Mr.Menon.
12. Expectations that during Mr.Zardari’s visit the Governments of China and Pakistan might formally sign the agreement for the Chinese supply of Chashmas III and IV did not prove correct. However, both Chinese and Pakistani officials sought to remove any impression that China might be having second thoughts on the issue or might be going slow on it because of India’s concerns or the misgivings reportedly expressed by some members of the NSG, including the US.
13. While reiterating China's resolve to go ahead with the supply of Chashmas III and IV to Pakistan, Chinese analysts sought to reassure India that there is no need for it to be concerned over this transaction. An article under the title “India should not fidget at signs of intimacy” published by the “China Daily” on July 8,2010, said: “Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari's on-going visit to Beijing has aroused a lot of interest and concern from some Indian media. The much-anticipated deal on nuclear reactors between China and Pakistan was the centerpiece of the attention. Though, no further deal was reached when Zardari and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao held talks on Wednesday (July 7), the visit certainly firms up Beijing's commitment to continue its co-operation with Islamabad in the field of civil nuclear energy. On the surface, concern on possible nuclear proliferation in South Asia seems to have fueled the related media reports. However, delving deeper, lack of political trust is the crux of the matter. The proposed nuclear reactors constitute an expansion of the decades-old Chashma project in Pakistan's Punjab province. The Sino-Pakistani Chashma project has been under safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. As a signatory state to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, China always remains committed to safeguarding the international regime on nuclear non-proliferation. Therefore, any concerns over this nuclear energy project are unnecessary. They would only intensify suspicion and distrust between New Delhi and Beijing. Due to the enmity between New Delhi and Islamabad, Beijing often feels like walking a political tight rope when trying to balance its relations with the two. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao met Indian National Security Adviser Shiv Shankar Menon, the envoy of the Indian prime minister, in Beijing one day before Zardari's arrival. Beijing highly values its good neighborly ties with Islamabad and New Delhi, regarding both as a strategic partner. While cherishing the traditional bond with Islamabad, it is also eager to bring its relations with New Delhi to a higher level. Maintaining stable bilateral ties with the two major players in South Asia is in the national interests of China. As a close neighbor, China is willing to see and contribute to peace and security in the sub continent. In this regard, the interests of the three countries converge. Therefore, New Delhi does not need to fidget each time it sees signs of intimacy between Beijing and Islamabad. Instead, it should look to the larger picture of India-China relationship and deepen its political trust with Beijing. Sino-Pakistani friendship takes its root in a high degree of long-term mutual trust and support. That is why it has been widely acknowledged as "all-weather and time-tested." If Sino-Indian relations could sail along a smoother track, they will embrace an even brighter future too.”
14. Any Indian expectation that as part of the assurance of Prime Minister Wen of caring for India’s core interests and major concerns, China would reverse its policy of helping Pakistan in the development of its railway and road infrastructure in the Gilgit-Baltistan area bordering Xinjiang, which de jure is part of India’s Jammu and Kashmir, and developing the hydro-electric potential in the Gilgit-Baltistan area was belied when the two countries announced the formal signing of more agreements relating to Gilgit-Baltistan during Mr.Zardari’s stay in Beijing. Under Memoranda of Understanding signed by officials of the two Governments during the visit, China will build the 165-km long Jaglot-Skardu road and the 135-km long Thakot-Sazin road. The projects would cost Pakistani Rs 45 billion with 15 per cent financing by Pakistan and 85 per cent by China. Under another MoU to be jointly executed by Chinese company Datang and Norwegian company EBT, 500 MW electricity would be produced through wind power. It is not known whether this will also be in the Gilgit-Baltistan area.
15. Mr.Zardari and the officials accompanying him repeatedly indicated that the Chinese have agreed in principle to co-operate with Pakistan in the construction of a railway line connecting Pakistan with Xinjiang via Gilgit-Baltistan. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang told reporters in response to a question that cooperation for the construction of a railway link between the two countries was for mutual benefit and not directed against any third party. It would appear that details of the project such as arrangements for financing and the alignment of the railway line are yet to be worked out. Mr.Zardari proposed that the Pakistan and China Railways should form a joint consortium for the timely execution of this project.
16. Mr.Zardari once again took up with the Chinese the pending Pakistani proposals for the upgradation of the Gwadar port, the construction of an oil refinery and an airport in Gwadar and the construction of oil/gas pipelines from Gwadar to Xinjiang. While the Chinese have readily responded in a positive manner to various proposals for projects in the Gilgit-Baltistan area, they are still hesitant regarding new projects in the Balochistan area. While they do not anticipate any security problems in the Gilgit-Baltistan area, they are still worried about the security situation in Balochistan.
17. Mr.Zardari’s disappointment over the Chinese hesitation in the Balochistan area became evident in his reported remarks to Prime Minister Wen that Pakistan desired that “China should take maximum benefits from the Gwadar Port.” From this it is evident that while Pakistan is keen for the quick implementation of the Gwadar-related projects, security considerations still inhibit the Chinese response.
18. The agreement in principle for the upgradation of the Karakoram Highway was reportedly reached more than 10 years ago. The Chinese agreed to meet the cost of upgradation on their side and Pakistan on its side. While the Chinese carried out the upgradation on their side ahead of time, the Pakistanis could not find the money for the upgradation on their side. As a result, the execution of the project was delayed and the Chinese ultimately agreed to give a soft loan to Pakistan for this purpose.
19. Pakistan has reached a similar deal wit Iran in respect of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline. While Iran will finance and construct the pipeline on its side, Pakistan has agreed to do so on its side, but it does not have the money. Will the Chinese give the money and help in the pipeline construction in return for a supply of part of the gas from Iran? This is a question which Pakistan has repeatedly raised with Beijing. China has been reluctant so far. According to reliable sources, Mr. Zardari raised this issue once again in Beijing, but there was no positive response from the Chinese. (11-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
.
Mr.Shiv Shankar Menon, India's National Security Adviser (NSA), visited China as the special envoy of Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh from July 3 to 6,2010, for talks with Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and other Chinese leaders. President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan visited Beijing for four days from July 6. Thereafter he proceeded to Shanghai to visit the International Expo. He was to return to Pakistan from Shanghai.
2.The two visits were scheduled independently of each other and were not inter-connected. Despite this, what stood out was the quiet Chinese determination not to allow India’s core concerns relating to Pakistan come in the way of China’s expanding presence in Pakistan and Chinese assistance to Pakistan in matters and areas which add to India’s concerns regarding the implications of the Sino-Pakistan relations to its internal and external security.
3. The discussions of Mr.Menon with his Chinese interlocutors including Prime Minister Wen Jiabao covered the broad parameters of the co-operation between India and China at the global level----sustaining the global economic recovery, climate protection, economic co-operation in third countries etc--- but not the nuts and bolts of it. Mr.Zardari's talks with the Chinese leaders covered the nuts and bolts of the co-operation at the bilateral and regional levels without any pretensions of the relationship having a global significance. The nuts and bolts touched upon related to keeping the Chinese interest in the Gwadar port sustained, infrastructural development and linkages between Pakistan and Western China in the fields of road, railways and fibre optics and Chinese assistance to meet Pakistan's nuclear and conventional energy needs. Other areas touched upon were bilateral co-operation against Pakistan-based terrorism affecting peace and stability in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, Chinese concerns over the security of the over 10,000 Chinese nationals living and working in about 120 projects in Pakistan and scope for bilateral co-operation and initiatives within the framework of the SAARC of which China is an observer and the Shanghai Co-Operation Organisation (SCO) of which Pakistan is an observer.
4. The repeated Chinese assurances to Mr.Zardari that China would maintain touch with Pakistan on the question of United Nationa reforms were meant to remove Pakistan’s fears that as a result of the seeming improvement in China’s relations with India, Beijing might support India becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Pakistan has been opposed to this. Instead of saying so directly, it has been saying since the days of Gen.Pervez Musharraf that it is time to make a Muslim country----Indonesia or Saudi Arabia--- a permanent member. China has not been unsympathetic to Pakistan’s view. The Associated Press of Pakistan (APP) reported that President Hu Jintao said that China would continue to maintain contact with Pakistan on issues such as the reform of the UN Security Council.
5. Mr.Zardari was reported to have assured Mr.Hu that Pakistan would continue to function as “China’s force-multiplier”. How is Pakistan playing this role of “China’s force-multiplier”? By keeping India faced with the threat of a two-front war against Pakistan and China. By continuing to supply nuclear and conventional military related and relevant equipment and technology to Pakistan China has been nursing this force-multiplier dimension of Pakistan. It became clear during Mr.Zardari’s talks with the Chinese leaders that there would be no change in this role of Pakistan as China’s force-multiplier against India, though India was not mentioned by name.
6.The APP reported as follows: “China is a friend and a strategic partner, committed to the promotion of stability and economic progress of Pakistan” is how (Hu) Jintao summed up the strategic relations. Zardari responded by saying, “It is our belief that Pakistan can act as a force multiplier for China and we will continue to work towards this end.”
7.Generally, in the past, China had not been using expressions such as "core interests", "major concerns" etc in characterisation of its relations with India and Pakistan. It uses such expressions with reference to its relations with the US and Japan and its interests in the South and East China Seas. Some of the subjects and issues which it seeks to cover under this characterisation are its insistence on the one China principle, supply of US arms to Taiwan, US naval movements in the East China Sea, its differences with Japan on the East China Sea islands and the US contacts with His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Beijing never hesitates to express its protests openly and loudly whenever it feels a threat to its core interests in these matters
8. During the recent visits of Mr.Menon and Mr.Zardari to China, one saw references to the concept of core interests and core concerns, which plays an important role in the formulation and assertion of Chinese foreign policy. The Chinese media reported Mr.Menon's discussions with Prime Minister Wen in the following words. "Premier Wen Jiabao said Monday (July 5,2010) that China regards India as an important strategic partner of cooperation. "We will work with India to maintain high level visits and take care of each other's core interests and major concerns," Wen said when meeting visiting Indian prime ministerial special envoy Shiv Shankar Menon.Wen also pledged to enhance dialogue and cooperation with India to benefit the two peoples, and make joint efforts to promote world peace and common prosperity. The two countries have also reached important agreements and made sound coordination in coping with the international financial crisis, climate change and other major issues, Wen noted. Wen said China and India, as neighbors and large developing nations with largest populations, enjoy not only profound historical and cultural origins but also broad common interests."A healthy, stable and dynamic China-India relationship is of far-reaching significance to the two nations, Asia and the whole world at large," he said. "
9.A reference to the core concept was not there in the Chinese media accounts of Mr.Zardar's meetings with President Hu and Prime Minister Wen. However, it was there in the media accounts of his meeting with Mr.Jia Qinglin, Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). According to the Chinese media, Mr.Jia told Mr. Zardari that China has always valued its relationship with Pakistan, and treats the bilateral ties from a strategic and long-term perspective. “Jia applauded the Pakistani government's firm support in issues concerning China's core interests, saying that China would work with Pakistan to cement traditional friendship and act on all consensuses reached by the two sides. Jia hoped the two nations would work together to push forward the bilateral strategic partnership of cooperation, in a bid to benefit the two peoples and promote regional peace and prosperity.”
10.China's perception of India's global importance as against Pakistan's purely regional importance came out clearly in the Chinese media accounts of the talks of Mr.Menon and Mr.Zardari with the Chinese leaders. In the case of India, the emphasis was on New Delhi and Beijing caring for each other's core interests and major concerns. In the case of Pakistan, the emphasis was on Pakistan's support to China "in issues concerning China's core interests." The Chinese have, however, not clarified what they saw as the core interests and major concerns in their relations with India.
11.However, there were references in the Chinese media to India's concerns relating to the Chinese move to supply two more civil nuclear reactors (Chashmas III and IV) to Pakistan without obtaining the clearance of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG). The Chinese media also referred strongly to China's unhappiness over Indian suspicions regarding Chinese telecommunication companies and imposing restrictions on Indian companies purchasing Chinese telecom equipment and technology. The reported assurance of Mr.Menon in his interaction with the media in Beijing that India was evolving a telecommunication import policy which will uniformly apply to all countries and will not be China-specific does not appear to have satisfied the Chinese critics of the Indian policy. Chinese media criticism of alleged Indian black-listing of a large number of Chinese telecom companies tended to become virulent despite the assurance reportedly conveyed by Mr.Menon.
12. Expectations that during Mr.Zardari’s visit the Governments of China and Pakistan might formally sign the agreement for the Chinese supply of Chashmas III and IV did not prove correct. However, both Chinese and Pakistani officials sought to remove any impression that China might be having second thoughts on the issue or might be going slow on it because of India’s concerns or the misgivings reportedly expressed by some members of the NSG, including the US.
13. While reiterating China's resolve to go ahead with the supply of Chashmas III and IV to Pakistan, Chinese analysts sought to reassure India that there is no need for it to be concerned over this transaction. An article under the title “India should not fidget at signs of intimacy” published by the “China Daily” on July 8,2010, said: “Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari's on-going visit to Beijing has aroused a lot of interest and concern from some Indian media. The much-anticipated deal on nuclear reactors between China and Pakistan was the centerpiece of the attention. Though, no further deal was reached when Zardari and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao held talks on Wednesday (July 7), the visit certainly firms up Beijing's commitment to continue its co-operation with Islamabad in the field of civil nuclear energy. On the surface, concern on possible nuclear proliferation in South Asia seems to have fueled the related media reports. However, delving deeper, lack of political trust is the crux of the matter. The proposed nuclear reactors constitute an expansion of the decades-old Chashma project in Pakistan's Punjab province. The Sino-Pakistani Chashma project has been under safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. As a signatory state to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, China always remains committed to safeguarding the international regime on nuclear non-proliferation. Therefore, any concerns over this nuclear energy project are unnecessary. They would only intensify suspicion and distrust between New Delhi and Beijing. Due to the enmity between New Delhi and Islamabad, Beijing often feels like walking a political tight rope when trying to balance its relations with the two. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao met Indian National Security Adviser Shiv Shankar Menon, the envoy of the Indian prime minister, in Beijing one day before Zardari's arrival. Beijing highly values its good neighborly ties with Islamabad and New Delhi, regarding both as a strategic partner. While cherishing the traditional bond with Islamabad, it is also eager to bring its relations with New Delhi to a higher level. Maintaining stable bilateral ties with the two major players in South Asia is in the national interests of China. As a close neighbor, China is willing to see and contribute to peace and security in the sub continent. In this regard, the interests of the three countries converge. Therefore, New Delhi does not need to fidget each time it sees signs of intimacy between Beijing and Islamabad. Instead, it should look to the larger picture of India-China relationship and deepen its political trust with Beijing. Sino-Pakistani friendship takes its root in a high degree of long-term mutual trust and support. That is why it has been widely acknowledged as "all-weather and time-tested." If Sino-Indian relations could sail along a smoother track, they will embrace an even brighter future too.”
14. Any Indian expectation that as part of the assurance of Prime Minister Wen of caring for India’s core interests and major concerns, China would reverse its policy of helping Pakistan in the development of its railway and road infrastructure in the Gilgit-Baltistan area bordering Xinjiang, which de jure is part of India’s Jammu and Kashmir, and developing the hydro-electric potential in the Gilgit-Baltistan area was belied when the two countries announced the formal signing of more agreements relating to Gilgit-Baltistan during Mr.Zardari’s stay in Beijing. Under Memoranda of Understanding signed by officials of the two Governments during the visit, China will build the 165-km long Jaglot-Skardu road and the 135-km long Thakot-Sazin road. The projects would cost Pakistani Rs 45 billion with 15 per cent financing by Pakistan and 85 per cent by China. Under another MoU to be jointly executed by Chinese company Datang and Norwegian company EBT, 500 MW electricity would be produced through wind power. It is not known whether this will also be in the Gilgit-Baltistan area.
15. Mr.Zardari and the officials accompanying him repeatedly indicated that the Chinese have agreed in principle to co-operate with Pakistan in the construction of a railway line connecting Pakistan with Xinjiang via Gilgit-Baltistan. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang told reporters in response to a question that cooperation for the construction of a railway link between the two countries was for mutual benefit and not directed against any third party. It would appear that details of the project such as arrangements for financing and the alignment of the railway line are yet to be worked out. Mr.Zardari proposed that the Pakistan and China Railways should form a joint consortium for the timely execution of this project.
16. Mr.Zardari once again took up with the Chinese the pending Pakistani proposals for the upgradation of the Gwadar port, the construction of an oil refinery and an airport in Gwadar and the construction of oil/gas pipelines from Gwadar to Xinjiang. While the Chinese have readily responded in a positive manner to various proposals for projects in the Gilgit-Baltistan area, they are still hesitant regarding new projects in the Balochistan area. While they do not anticipate any security problems in the Gilgit-Baltistan area, they are still worried about the security situation in Balochistan.
17. Mr.Zardari’s disappointment over the Chinese hesitation in the Balochistan area became evident in his reported remarks to Prime Minister Wen that Pakistan desired that “China should take maximum benefits from the Gwadar Port.” From this it is evident that while Pakistan is keen for the quick implementation of the Gwadar-related projects, security considerations still inhibit the Chinese response.
18. The agreement in principle for the upgradation of the Karakoram Highway was reportedly reached more than 10 years ago. The Chinese agreed to meet the cost of upgradation on their side and Pakistan on its side. While the Chinese carried out the upgradation on their side ahead of time, the Pakistanis could not find the money for the upgradation on their side. As a result, the execution of the project was delayed and the Chinese ultimately agreed to give a soft loan to Pakistan for this purpose.
19. Pakistan has reached a similar deal wit Iran in respect of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline. While Iran will finance and construct the pipeline on its side, Pakistan has agreed to do so on its side, but it does not have the money. Will the Chinese give the money and help in the pipeline construction in return for a supply of part of the gas from Iran? This is a question which Pakistan has repeatedly raised with Beijing. China has been reluctant so far. According to reliable sources, Mr. Zardari raised this issue once again in Beijing, but there was no positive response from the Chinese. (11-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)