B.RAMAN
The Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy of Singapore had organized on July 2 and 3,2010, an India-China Dialogue on “the Role of the Media in India-China Relations”.
2.An explanatory note of the School available on its web site says: “Despite the massive growth of bilateral trade between China and India, tensions over territorial and political issues have also grown, particularly in the last year. While some sources of stress are real, their effects are mediated and often inflamed by media depictions and perceptions of these tensions. Moreover, circumstances may also arise where the media tend to downplay more positive aspects of the relationship. In a situation where the Chinese and Indians have limited knowledge of each other and the interactions are dominated by strategic and business concerns, the media can play a constructive role in promoting mutual understanding among the general public. This first colloquium in the India-China Dialogue series seeks to answer some of these questions about the role of the media in India-China relations. It brings together representatives from the media and other areas to discuss pertinent issues and seeks alternatives to these path-dependent approaches. The speakers will discuss different aspects of image production and reception of these two large and varied nations, the different areas of competition and convergence as covered by the media, and the role of media in geo-politics, cultural relations, diplomacy, etc. Are the media in India and China really responsible for creating misperceptions and an adversarial image of each other? Are journalists in the two countries trained and qualified to cover the other country? What are the differences between the Indian media’s coverage of China and the Chinese media’s reporting on India? Are there alternative avenues for presenting information to the general public.”
3. This subject assumed importance last year following an escalation of mutual demonisation in the print, electronic and online media of the two countries. In the case of India, the escalation was more pronounced in the electronic and online media than in the print media. In China, the escalation was more marked in the print and online media than in the electronic media. China has not yet seen the kind of explosive growth in 24-hour private news channels that India has and it has no privately-run indigenous news channels. In India, the problem of uncontrolled demonisation of China was seen largely in the 24-hour news channels, which merrily lapped up anything critical of China said or written by anybody and organized discussions which tended to be over-dramatic and occasionally even hysterical..
4.In China, the demonisation of India was largely seen in the Chinese language print media and in the thousands of blogs which have come up in the country following the phenomenal growth of the Internet. Most of the blog contents was in the Chinese language. Since there are very few Chinese language experts in India, the majority of the negative articles and postings about India did not get translated and circulated. Only some were. If more of them had been translated and disseminated to Indian readers, the alarm caused in India would have been more.
5. In India, what appeared to be unbridled criticism of China was largely in the English media. The Indian language media, which has more readership and viewership than the English media, did not show the same interest in China and was not as negative about China as was the English media.
6. The analysis of these demonizing articles in the two countries tended to get distorted due to the following reasons:
* The lack of transparency about the Chinese media and the widespread perception in India that the Chinese media is still largely owned and/or controlled by the Chinese Government and the Communist Party of China. As a result, anything critical of India appearing in the Chinese media was viewed by large sections of the Indian public as representing the views of the Chinese Government and party.
* The lack of adequate knowledge in China about the free press that India has. Barring some radio stations and TV channels run by the Government, there is hardly any government owned or controlled media in India. Large sections of the Chinese public opinion tend to think that the entire Indian media is owned and/or controlled by the Government and the political party in power as is the case in China. These sections tended to assume that whatever was carried by the Indian media had the approval of the Government. Thus we had a situation in which large sections of the Chinese public assumed that the negative coverage of China in the Indian media was at the instance of the Government, which was not a fact. Large sections of the Indian public assumed that the negative coverage of India in the Chinese media was instigated by the Government and party, which may have been or may not have been a fact. Many claim that the media landscape in China has changed and that everything that appears in the media does not necessarily represent the views of the Government and party. The Indian public, except those belonging to the leftist parties, is not prepared to accept this.
* Many in India believe that the Internet in China is closely controlled by the Government and that the negative contents of the blogs have been allowed to appear by the Government. Otherwise, they would have been erased.
7. The consequent distortions in the analysis of the reports and writings in the media of the two countries almost led to a war of words between analysts, journalists and TV anchors of the two countries. Fortunately, the two Governments had a better understanding of the state of affairs and put a stop to this self-feeding rhetoric. The campaign of mutual demonisation has declined. But there is still a lot of criticism of each other, which is more due to the low level of trust between the civil societies of the two countries due to historical reasons than due to any malign reasons.
8. This may please be read in continuation of the following two articles written by Mr.D.S.Rajan, Director, Chennai Centre For China Studies:
(a). The Tricky Business of Watching Chinese Media, dated October 12,2009.
(b). China: Nationalistic Blogs Raise New Issues Concerning Sino-Indian Border, dated December 23,2009.
9. These articles, which are available at the web site of the Chennai Centre for China Studies, are annexed below for easy reference. (12-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
The Tricky Business of Watching Chinese Media
D.S.Rajan, C3S Paper No.385 dated October 12, 2009
For analysts of Chinese affairs abroad, the printed, online, radio and TV media in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), in Chinese, English and other languages, remain a major source of information. The conventional wisdom is that virtually the entire media are functioning under the guidance of either the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or the government led by it; the CCP Central Committee’s Publicity Department plays a pivotal role in this regard. As such, outside the PRC, the Chinese media are invariably being seen as reflecting the views of the CCP and the government.
It cannot be denied however that instances of very limited freedom, being enjoyed occasionally by the Chinese press are increasingly coming to notice. – Journals like ‘Cai Jing’, ‘Nanyang Zhoumo, Yan Huang Chun Qiu and scores of local newspapers, websites and blogs, are critical of the authorities sometimes on issues like corruption, nepotism, problems of peasants etc. Also, ideologically, Beijing is permitting neo-liberal, neo-left and even some ultra-Maoist scholars to express their views. In doing so, its motives seem to be using the available different viewpoints as possible inputs to ultimate policy making. As the party theoretical organ ‘Qiu Shi’ puts it, while ‘hundred flowers blossom’, the media must not cross the rubicon, by expressing any opinion challenging the rule of the communist party or affecting the unity and integrity of the country. A known example of ‘crossing the limit’ had been the journal ‘Strategy and Management’ which published (September 2004) an excessively independent article on North Korea. In response, the authorities closed down the journal (“Reporters without Borders”, 1 June 2005).
This writer started studying Chinese media more than four decades back and till today, have come across several reports, which are more concealing than revealing; I however do not mean that they reflect a general trend and feel that only on selected occasions such a phenomenon is being seen. Not surprisingly, China analysts world over per force are examining such dispatches by reading between the lines, examining the timing of publications, studying the significance of what has not been said and comparing the contents with earlier ones, all in an effort to draw certain meaningful conclusions, if possible. There is however a risk involved in following such techniques, as the likelihood of such analysts going wrong would always exist. On the other hand, Chinese experts at home, directly exposed to the system, are better equipped to understand the hidden meaning if any of Chinese media views. They may however prefer not to come out openly with their feelings out of fear of punishment by the authorities.
The following are case studies undertaken by me, aimed at examining the transparency or otherwise of Chinese media dispatches:
1) Shanghai Daily Wen Huibao (10 November 1965) carried an article entitled, “Criticism of Historical Drama- Hai Rui Dismissed from Office”, written by Yao Wenyuan, a member of the now disgraced ‘gang of four’. Not many were immediately aware of political implications of the article; the assessment that the drama was criticized as it made an allegorical attack on Chairman Mao for his dismissal of Defence Minister Peng Dehuai, and that the article gave a signal towards launch of cultural revolution, could come only subsequently. It is obvious that the article could not say certain things openly, as what was involved is a struggle for political power.
2) China Daily (1 November 2004) published an Op-Ed captioned, “US Strategy to be Blamed”, by Qian Qichen, considered Czar of Chinese foreign policy, right on the eve of US polling in which President Bush contested for second time. It was notable for its strident anti- US tone and expression of fears on a US encirclement of China. To the world’s dismay, the China Daily disowned the article next day and a PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson denied that Qian wrote any such article. It was natural that speculations then arose on leadership differences in Beijing on China’s US policy, but observers remain puzzled over the episode; the real reason still looks mysterious. How China finally played the issue diplomatically with the US is another matter.
3) A sharply worded comment in People’s Daily (1 September 2008), signaling China’s opposition to India’s getting waiver in the scheduled Vienna meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), said that the Indo-US nuclear deal is a major blow to India’s non-proliferation image. The article timed close to the voting at Vienna, coupled with China’s reported moves there to join the like minded countries that had reservations on India getting the waiver, gave an impression that Beijing will vote against India’s case at the NSG. What happened finally was China’s abstention from the voting; China’s foreign minister Yang Jiechi stated that his nation did not try to block anything in Vienna and played a constructive role (Reuters, 2 October 2008). In such circumstances, how to interpret the opinions of the People’s Daily, becomes a key question. A probable reason could be that they could be representative of Chinese thinking based on principles, whereas at diplomatic levels, China felt the necessity to select a practical and safe option; regardless of such explanation, for the public opinion outside China, the Chinese stand on the issue remains puzzling.
4) What was the meaning of the Chinese media outbursts against India’s dispatch of additional troops to Arunachal Pradesh, noticed in the run up to the 13th India-China round of Special Representatives talks on the border issue (7-8 August 2009)? The Global Times (11 June 2009) described the troops dispatch as India’s “unwise military moves” and asked whether India can afford the consequences of a ‘potential confrontation’ with China. The People’s Daily’s comment (19 June 2009) on the same subject captioned ‘ a veiled threat or a good neighbor’, alleged that India seemed to be conspiring to create a picture of an immediate war with China. These two items, kept for the comments of readers for a long time, received substantial number of responses, most of them critical of India. Questions arise – what was the purpose behind the talk of ‘confrontation or war’ with India in the two articles? Was it meant to apply pressure on India during the border talks? The Chinese official comments have on the other hand been positive. Zhang Yan, the Chinese Ambassador to India has described the visit of the PRC Special Representative to India as successful and that ‘in-depth’ talks on the border issue could be held between the two sides (The Hindu, 12 October 2009). The remarks earlier (4 August 2009) of the PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson were also positive, though he made a mention about the ‘illegal’ McMahon line. Coming out clear is the apparent dichotomy between the treatments of the media and the government establishments in China on the border issue. The question as to how to interpret the same, continues to be valid.
5) An article in a Chinese website (8 August 2009), published at the time of Sino-Indian border talks, suggested that China should break up the Indian Union. It was reproduced around the same time by more than 20 websites/blogs in China. After protests from India, the concerned Chinese website subsequently inserted the name of an individual who wrote the article, along with a disclaimer that the writer did not represent its views; the website also claimed it has no connections with the government. The same was published in the website of Chennai Centre for China Studies (CCCS), India, which originally reported the Chinese website article. Also, in response to an Op-Ed carried by the Hindu Newspaper, Chennai, alleging factual inaccuracies in the CCCS article, a letter to the Editor was sent to the Hindu pointing out that the CCCS report did not connect the Chinese website with the PRC government and that in particular, it did not make any reference to the China Institute of International and Strategic Studies, a military think tank. The Hindu did not publish the rejoinder.
This writer holds his view that nothing can be printed or published in China without the knowledge of the Party/Government there and that any failure on the part of the authorities in taking notice of media contents including in web posts, is unthinkable. Can any newspaper, website or blog in China get away from the clutches of the authorities if they challenge the authority of the CCP or question the unity and integrity of the country? The answer is a clear ‘No’. I have seen arguments coming from China that the article in question had been appearing in Chinese blogs since 2006. I ask following questions – what is the explanation for the article (only blog for the Chinese) continuing to appear, as late as August 2009, simultaneously in a number of web posts? How the government, which has introduced tough regulations stipulating registration of all websites/blogs with it, did not notice such posts, under circulation for about three years already, challenging the declared policy of China towards India? What action was taken by Beijing against the so-called bloggers (called Xinlang or Queen Park Cruiser)? Are the Chinese security agencies so inefficient that they could not identify and take action against these so-called ‘anonymous’ bloggers.
Interestingly, the Chinese web posts did not single out India only. Vietnam’s case is another example. Hanoi lodged a protest (August 2008) with Beijing at government levels against an article in Sina.Com and a few other Chinese websites, which disclosed a plan for China’s 31-day invasion of Vietnam involving 310,000 troops sweeping into the latter from Yunnan and Guangxi and by blocking of sea-lanes in South China Sea. Vietnamese foreign office reportedly summoned Chinese diplomats in Hanoi twice to protest against the reported plan. According to the Vietnamese Foreign Minister, Beijing was asked by Hanoi to prevent appearance of such articles.
Another instance concerns South Korea. At the time of Olympics last year, a South Korea-China media row erupted after a Chinese website alleged that in the view of Koreans, Confucius was not Chinese, but a Korean. Also, the South Korean media are annoyed at the media campaign in China in progress since 2003, claiming that Koguryo, the 1300-year old Korean kingdom (existed in the present day North Korea- Manchuria region), was historically under China. For South Korean media, the campaign has hurt the Korean national pride .In particular, they have not taken kindly a ceremony organized by Chinese academics this year to mark the discovery of an unknown stretch of Great Wall in Dandong, close to the North Korean border; their criticism was that the discovery implied an extension of Chinese historical boundary to the ancient Koguryo.
The Chinese media have alleged that the media in India have over-reacted to an obscure web post in China. Any hyping is of course not correct, but the Chinese media should realize that the suggestion in the concerned web post for ‘splitting India’ has been unprecedented and atrocious enough to invite the Indian media’s wrath. They should also ponder over the Vietnamese reaction mentioned above. Is Hanoi’s response both at diplomatic and media levels to Chinese website articles also an over reaction? The basic question is that why the Chinese government is turning a blind eye to articles /blogs carried in the registered websites in the PRC, which the foreign governments and public find most objectionable. I feel puzzled when some Chinese media comments argue that such web posts reflect China’s ‘democracy’ – defending the indefensible indeed!
6) Another puzzling aspect relates to the non-publication so far of the full text of the CCP chief Hu Jintao’s Work Report submitted at the recently held party plenum; such practices had been followed in the past also. Why such secrecy? The plenum also kept everybody guessing on the expected reshuffle of personnel. Wang Changjiang, Director General, Central Party School, while answering a question as to why Xi Jinping, the politburo standing committee member, was not elected as Vice-Chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission, disclosed that personnel reshuffle was not in the agenda of the plenum. Though this somewhat put at rest speculations on the political future of Xi Jinping, widely expected to succeed Hu Jintao in 2012 as CCP General Secretary, a question still persists outside China on whether there was a lack of consensus among the leaders during the plenum on reshuffles in the run up to the next party congress in 2012.
The ‘Economist’ on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of founding the PRC, has said that the world accepts China as a great nation, but China is not behaving like one; that was in the context of human right and other issues, but there is no doubt that media openness is equally another condition for judging China’s greatness; if that condition is fulfilled, the outside world can interpret Chinese pronouncements correctly, leading to a better understanding of China abroad. But, will Beijing move quickly towards media openness? The answer is ‘No’. As long as the ruling party feels that press freedom could be detrimental to its hegemony over Chinese politics, no fundamental change in the PRC’s media policy can be expected. .
(The writer, D.S.Rajan, is Director, Chennai Centre for China Studies, Chennai, India.Email:dsrajan@gmail.com)
China: Nationalistic Blogs Raise New Issues Concerning Sino-Indian Border
D.S.Rajan, C3S Paper No.418 dated December 23, 2009
There is apparently a lull now in the propaganda drive of the Chinese state-controlled media on the Sino-Indian border issue. Epithets like ‘no compromise on territory’, ‘lessons of 1962’ and ‘dangerous consequences for India’, used by them earlier, are carefully being avoided. Adding to the atmosphere is the muted media reaction noticed so far to the Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh’s firm reference (Washington, 25 November 2009) to China’s ‘certain amount of assertiveness of late’ and implied disapproval of that country’s reform path ‘introduced by the writ of the ruling group in a non-democratic set up’. The only critical comment has been in a very brief manner- ‘Unfriendly remarks’, said People’s Daily of 9 December 2009. Similar has been the case with concerns expressed recently by the Indian Defence Minister, Mr. Antony, on China’s military help to Pakistan, with the Chinese media by and large not paying much attention to the same.
The fall in the level of the media rhetoric coincides with some significant military exchanges between the two sides. The Indian Air force Chief has taken part in the Zhuhai (China) air show in November 2009 and two top Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officials – Deputy Chief of Staff General Ge Zhenfeng and the Commander of the Tibet Military District Lt Gen Shu Yutai, have paid visits to India. The symbolic importance of the Tibet military commander’s sojourn in India, at the present juncture comes out clearly.
The Chinese language unofficial websites and blogs in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) however continue to take on India on the border issue, rather vehemently, which should be noted in India if not with alarm. Chinese scholars visiting India have argued in the past that the government is in no position to control bloggers in the country, said to be about 180 million; more over views expressed in the blogs have come from ‘Fen Qing’ or angry youth and do not represent official opinion. On the other hand, the contents of the blogs have always appeared important for analysts abroad as the concerned writers looked knowledgeable, enjoying more often access to the government data and information.
In the context mentioned, what the Chinese websites and blogs have said of late on contentious issues including that of Sino-Indian border deserve close scrutiny. Their views topic-wise are given below:
Sino-Indian war?
First, the blogs in the websites address the question whether there will be a second war with India and if so at what time. Revealing that China’s top central leadership has reached a consensus to teach India a lesson and recover ‘Southern Tibet’ (India’s Arunachal Pradesh), two blog assessments in Chinese language (www.warchina.com/n88582c21.aspx dated 1 December 2009 and www.warchina.com/n8183c21.aspx dated 9 December 2009) predict that Beijing may consider the 2010-2011 period as suitable for action against India; they argue that by that time conditions would have been established for next power transfer in China, economic crisis in China would have been over, the international role of the US would have become extremely weak, China would have become a powerful player in international politics, China would have been able to bring in regional military balance , the PRC’s comprehensive national strength would have developed further in comparison to that of India and lastly, China’s military preparedness would have been completed.
Chinese reinforcement in the border
The second theme in the blogs pertains to reinforcement of China’s troops in the border already carried out and the improvement of logistics on China’s side, in response to India’s recent dispatch of additional forces to Eastern sector. A Blog evaluation (in www.junshi315.cn, dated 11 December 2009) says that India’s sending more 60000 troops is a unilateral step and the same is also a part of Western strategies to contain China. Another Blog (in www.warchina.com/n8183c21.aspx dated 1 December 2009) highlights the holding of military exercises in the Chengdu Military Region recently, to counter the threat coming from India. Elaborating this point, a report (in www.ymglover.com/viewthread.php?action dated 6 December 2009) reveals that China’s border defence troops have now entered the strategically important plains in the southwest of Rikaze and East of Yadong covering the trijunction of China, Bhutan and Sikkim, adding that Bhutan, conscious of China’s influence, has been quiet to the presence of Chinese troops in its disputed area. Bhutan has also supported China’s position in the Sino-Indian border talks, it further claims. As per another Blog disclosure (www.junshi315.cn dated 11 December 2009), with additional troops in position, China’s border with India now stands sealed. The Chinese army is fully prepared as India, taking the reported military training to ULFA in China as a pretext, may plan to attack China, according to another blog (in huanqiu.com/? uid-158463-action-viewspace-itemid-390632)
On upgrading of logistics position, a blog (www.junshi315.cn dated 11 December 2009) quotes foreign reports to say that that the new airport at A Li with 4500-meter long runway is capable of lifting fighter aircraft and bombers. In the same connection a report (http://topics.huanqiu.com/thread-283700-1-1.html dated 19 October 2009) focuses on the proposed extension of Qinghai-Tibet railway to Nepal border and a railway project under planning to link China and Pakistan in parallel to the existing China-Pakistan Friendship Highway.
“ Ladakh- Another Southern Tibet”
As third theme of the websites, India’s Ladakh region is being described as part of China’s Tibet, along with the assertion that the Chinese government has never recognized New Delhi’s official position that Ladakh is part of India. Taking this stand, a blog under the title “Ladakh- another Southern Tibet”(bbs.huanqiu.com/thread-283700 dated 13 December 2009) says that the Volume 8 of the “Historical Atlas of China”, published in Beijing showing China’s territories as existed in 1820, included Ladakh as part of China’s Tibet. “Whether it is McMahon line in the East or Johnson line in the West, both have no legal basis and received no recognition from the Chinese government and people”, it asserts.
“Drive India out of Sikkim”
While one blog (bbs.huanqiu.com/thread-283700-1-1.html, 13 December 2009)
says that acceptance of Sikkim as part of India with Nathula as trading point, has been the greatest Chinese concession to India made during border talks, another comment (www.ymglover.com/viewthread.php?action dated 6 December 2009) under the caption “ China should drive India out of Sikkim”, finds motives behind India’s deployment of its 27th Mountain Division to Sikkim belt, after shifting it from its original base in Kashmir. It attributes the shift to the strategic pressure from China felt by India. It concludes by saying that a clash of Indian and Chinese strengths to capture Sikkim has already started.
India-Nepal Ties
India-Nepal relation is also a notable topic figuring in the Chinese language websites. Noting India’s high-level treatment to the visiting Nepalese Army Chief in December 2009 and its proposal to supply T-72 tanks to Nepal, a report in the authoritative website (mil.huanqiu.com/Observation/2009-12/664409.html) compares the military assistance to Nepal by China and India and finds China’s help to Nepal’s military training programme as superior. It quotes a Chinese military expert to say that the balanced position being maintained by Kathmandu at the current time of Sino-Indian tensions marks a victory for Beijing’s military strategy in the neighborhood. Also, according to an opinion (mil.huanqiu.com/Observation/2009-12/656241.html), the airport in Nepal’s Surketh, to be built by New Delhi under an agreement with Kathmandu, will be a ‘springboard’ to India for attacking China.
Conclusion
Despite tensions, both Beijing and New Delhi have managed to keep relations at government levels at an even keel and there is constant official exchange of views between the two sides. Even setting up of a hotline between the two prime ministers is under discussion. This being so, there may be some justification if a question is asked as to why pay attention to unofficial blogs now. The aim of this paper, which has done so, is not to create panic and cause misgivings in respect of Sino-Indian ties. But at the same time, it may not be wrong to say that analysts in India have a responsibility to take notice and analyze implications if any, of tall claims being made in the Chinese blogs like the ‘consensus’ at top leadership levels in the PRC to teach a lesson to India and recover Arunachal in the 2010-2011 period. Also, the assertion that Ladakh is part of ‘Southern Tibet’ and that the PRC has never recognized that territory as part of India, definitely raises more suspicions in India on China’s intentions.
(The writer, Mr. D.S.Rajan, is the Director, Chennai Centre for China Studies, Chennai`, India.Email:dsrajan@gmail.com)
Monday, July 12, 2010
Sunday, July 11, 2010
INDIA'S FS CALLS ON DALAI LAMA
B.RAMAN
Mrs.Nirupama Rao, India's Foreign Secretary, arrived in Dharamsala in Himachal Pradesh on July 10 and called on His Holiness the Dalai Lama. She was reportedly with him for about an hour. His Holiness lives in Dharamsala, where his Tibetan-Government-in-exile is located. Senior advisors of His Holiness, including his Prime Minister Samdhong Rinpoche, were reportedly present during the meeting. According to local sources, the welfare of the Tibetan exiles living in India and the adequacy of the physical security arrangements for His Holiness were among the subjects discussed.
2. A representative of the HP State Government had stated on July 9 that Mrs.Rao would be visiting Dharamsala on July 10 and 11, but he did not indicate whether she would be calling on His Holiness. Foreign Secretaries have usually been making a courtesy call on His Holiness during their tenure. She herself had planned to make a courtesy call on him on two or three occasions after taking over as the FS, but the visits were postponed due to her preoccupation with other work. In fact, it has been reported that she was to meet His Holiness on July 3 just before Mr.Shiv Shankar Menon, the National Security Adviser, left for China as a special envoy of Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh, but her meeting was postponed.
3. There was thus nothing unusual or secret about her visit and meeting with His Holiness, but there is likely to be speculation connecting her meeting with India's unhappiness over China's ignoring Indian concerns over the implications to India's national security of China's decisions to help Pakistan in improving its road infrastructure in the Gilgit-Baltistan area and in constructing a railway line to Xinjiang which will pass through Gilgit-Baltistan. These decisions were announced during the just-concluded visit of President Asif Ali Zardari to China.
4. Gilgit-Baltistan, which is de jure a part of India's Jammu & Kashmir, has been under Pakistan's illegal occupation since 1948. Pakistan had illegally ceded some of the Indian territory in the area occupied by it to China in the 1960s in return for Chinese assistance in the construction of the Karakoram Highway passing through the territory. This Highway is also being upgraded now with Chinese assistance.
5. The Chinese have sought to play down Indian concerns over their assistance to Pakistan for improving the infrastructure in the Gilgit-Baltistan area by projecting it as meant to promote trade between Pakistan and Xinjiang, but it has serious military implications for India. It would enable Pakistan to move its troops and military equipment to these areas across the Line of Control in J&K more rapidly than in the past. It would also enable Chinese troops in Xinjiang to move to this area to assist Pakistan in the event of a military conflict. This would further increase the military threat to the Ladakh and Kargil areas where China claims a large area as Chinese territory. The military conflict between India and Pakistan in 1999 had broken out in this area after Gen.Pervez Musharraf, the then Chief of the Army Staff under the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, had secretly sent Pakistani troops to the area and occupied some Indian territory in the Kargil sector by taking advantage of the withdrawal of some Indian border posts during winter.
6. Even if Mrs.Rao's visit was not connected with the Chinese decisions announced during Mr.Zardari's visit, it is important for the Government of India to express openly and strongly its indignation over the Chinese actions in total disregard of India's legitimate concerns. Our policy-makers should also examine what options are available to India to counter the Chinese actions. Upgrading the interactions with His Holiness is one option. Establishing open contacts with the secular Uighur elements of the Munich-based World Uighur Congress (WUC) is another option. (11-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Mrs.Nirupama Rao, India's Foreign Secretary, arrived in Dharamsala in Himachal Pradesh on July 10 and called on His Holiness the Dalai Lama. She was reportedly with him for about an hour. His Holiness lives in Dharamsala, where his Tibetan-Government-in-exile is located. Senior advisors of His Holiness, including his Prime Minister Samdhong Rinpoche, were reportedly present during the meeting. According to local sources, the welfare of the Tibetan exiles living in India and the adequacy of the physical security arrangements for His Holiness were among the subjects discussed.
2. A representative of the HP State Government had stated on July 9 that Mrs.Rao would be visiting Dharamsala on July 10 and 11, but he did not indicate whether she would be calling on His Holiness. Foreign Secretaries have usually been making a courtesy call on His Holiness during their tenure. She herself had planned to make a courtesy call on him on two or three occasions after taking over as the FS, but the visits were postponed due to her preoccupation with other work. In fact, it has been reported that she was to meet His Holiness on July 3 just before Mr.Shiv Shankar Menon, the National Security Adviser, left for China as a special envoy of Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh, but her meeting was postponed.
3. There was thus nothing unusual or secret about her visit and meeting with His Holiness, but there is likely to be speculation connecting her meeting with India's unhappiness over China's ignoring Indian concerns over the implications to India's national security of China's decisions to help Pakistan in improving its road infrastructure in the Gilgit-Baltistan area and in constructing a railway line to Xinjiang which will pass through Gilgit-Baltistan. These decisions were announced during the just-concluded visit of President Asif Ali Zardari to China.
4. Gilgit-Baltistan, which is de jure a part of India's Jammu & Kashmir, has been under Pakistan's illegal occupation since 1948. Pakistan had illegally ceded some of the Indian territory in the area occupied by it to China in the 1960s in return for Chinese assistance in the construction of the Karakoram Highway passing through the territory. This Highway is also being upgraded now with Chinese assistance.
5. The Chinese have sought to play down Indian concerns over their assistance to Pakistan for improving the infrastructure in the Gilgit-Baltistan area by projecting it as meant to promote trade between Pakistan and Xinjiang, but it has serious military implications for India. It would enable Pakistan to move its troops and military equipment to these areas across the Line of Control in J&K more rapidly than in the past. It would also enable Chinese troops in Xinjiang to move to this area to assist Pakistan in the event of a military conflict. This would further increase the military threat to the Ladakh and Kargil areas where China claims a large area as Chinese territory. The military conflict between India and Pakistan in 1999 had broken out in this area after Gen.Pervez Musharraf, the then Chief of the Army Staff under the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, had secretly sent Pakistani troops to the area and occupied some Indian territory in the Kargil sector by taking advantage of the withdrawal of some Indian border posts during winter.
6. Even if Mrs.Rao's visit was not connected with the Chinese decisions announced during Mr.Zardari's visit, it is important for the Government of India to express openly and strongly its indignation over the Chinese actions in total disregard of India's legitimate concerns. Our policy-makers should also examine what options are available to India to counter the Chinese actions. Upgrading the interactions with His Holiness is one option. Establishing open contacts with the secular Uighur elements of the Munich-based World Uighur Congress (WUC) is another option. (11-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
PAKISTAN AS CHINA'S FORCE-MULTIPLIER AGAINST INDIA
B.RAMAN
Mr.Shiv Shankar Menon, India's National Security Adviser (NSA), visited China as the special envoy of Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh from July 3 to 6,2010, for talks with Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and other Chinese leaders. President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan visited Beijing for four days from July 6. Thereafter he proceeded to Shanghai to visit the International Expo. He was to return to Pakistan from Shanghai.
2.The two visits were scheduled independently of each other and were not inter-connected. Despite this, what stood out was the quiet Chinese determination not to allow India’s core concerns relating to Pakistan come in the way of China’s expanding presence in Pakistan and Chinese assistance to Pakistan in matters and areas which add to India’s concerns regarding the implications of the Sino-Pakistan relations to its internal and external security.
3. The discussions of Mr.Menon with his Chinese interlocutors including Prime Minister Wen Jiabao covered the broad parameters of the co-operation between India and China at the global level----sustaining the global economic recovery, climate protection, economic co-operation in third countries etc--- but not the nuts and bolts of it. Mr.Zardari's talks with the Chinese leaders covered the nuts and bolts of the co-operation at the bilateral and regional levels without any pretensions of the relationship having a global significance. The nuts and bolts touched upon related to keeping the Chinese interest in the Gwadar port sustained, infrastructural development and linkages between Pakistan and Western China in the fields of road, railways and fibre optics and Chinese assistance to meet Pakistan's nuclear and conventional energy needs. Other areas touched upon were bilateral co-operation against Pakistan-based terrorism affecting peace and stability in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, Chinese concerns over the security of the over 10,000 Chinese nationals living and working in about 120 projects in Pakistan and scope for bilateral co-operation and initiatives within the framework of the SAARC of which China is an observer and the Shanghai Co-Operation Organisation (SCO) of which Pakistan is an observer.
4. The repeated Chinese assurances to Mr.Zardari that China would maintain touch with Pakistan on the question of United Nationa reforms were meant to remove Pakistan’s fears that as a result of the seeming improvement in China’s relations with India, Beijing might support India becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Pakistan has been opposed to this. Instead of saying so directly, it has been saying since the days of Gen.Pervez Musharraf that it is time to make a Muslim country----Indonesia or Saudi Arabia--- a permanent member. China has not been unsympathetic to Pakistan’s view. The Associated Press of Pakistan (APP) reported that President Hu Jintao said that China would continue to maintain contact with Pakistan on issues such as the reform of the UN Security Council.
5. Mr.Zardari was reported to have assured Mr.Hu that Pakistan would continue to function as “China’s force-multiplier”. How is Pakistan playing this role of “China’s force-multiplier”? By keeping India faced with the threat of a two-front war against Pakistan and China. By continuing to supply nuclear and conventional military related and relevant equipment and technology to Pakistan China has been nursing this force-multiplier dimension of Pakistan. It became clear during Mr.Zardari’s talks with the Chinese leaders that there would be no change in this role of Pakistan as China’s force-multiplier against India, though India was not mentioned by name.
6.The APP reported as follows: “China is a friend and a strategic partner, committed to the promotion of stability and economic progress of Pakistan” is how (Hu) Jintao summed up the strategic relations. Zardari responded by saying, “It is our belief that Pakistan can act as a force multiplier for China and we will continue to work towards this end.”
7.Generally, in the past, China had not been using expressions such as "core interests", "major concerns" etc in characterisation of its relations with India and Pakistan. It uses such expressions with reference to its relations with the US and Japan and its interests in the South and East China Seas. Some of the subjects and issues which it seeks to cover under this characterisation are its insistence on the one China principle, supply of US arms to Taiwan, US naval movements in the East China Sea, its differences with Japan on the East China Sea islands and the US contacts with His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Beijing never hesitates to express its protests openly and loudly whenever it feels a threat to its core interests in these matters
8. During the recent visits of Mr.Menon and Mr.Zardari to China, one saw references to the concept of core interests and core concerns, which plays an important role in the formulation and assertion of Chinese foreign policy. The Chinese media reported Mr.Menon's discussions with Prime Minister Wen in the following words. "Premier Wen Jiabao said Monday (July 5,2010) that China regards India as an important strategic partner of cooperation. "We will work with India to maintain high level visits and take care of each other's core interests and major concerns," Wen said when meeting visiting Indian prime ministerial special envoy Shiv Shankar Menon.Wen also pledged to enhance dialogue and cooperation with India to benefit the two peoples, and make joint efforts to promote world peace and common prosperity. The two countries have also reached important agreements and made sound coordination in coping with the international financial crisis, climate change and other major issues, Wen noted. Wen said China and India, as neighbors and large developing nations with largest populations, enjoy not only profound historical and cultural origins but also broad common interests."A healthy, stable and dynamic China-India relationship is of far-reaching significance to the two nations, Asia and the whole world at large," he said. "
9.A reference to the core concept was not there in the Chinese media accounts of Mr.Zardar's meetings with President Hu and Prime Minister Wen. However, it was there in the media accounts of his meeting with Mr.Jia Qinglin, Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). According to the Chinese media, Mr.Jia told Mr. Zardari that China has always valued its relationship with Pakistan, and treats the bilateral ties from a strategic and long-term perspective. “Jia applauded the Pakistani government's firm support in issues concerning China's core interests, saying that China would work with Pakistan to cement traditional friendship and act on all consensuses reached by the two sides. Jia hoped the two nations would work together to push forward the bilateral strategic partnership of cooperation, in a bid to benefit the two peoples and promote regional peace and prosperity.”
10.China's perception of India's global importance as against Pakistan's purely regional importance came out clearly in the Chinese media accounts of the talks of Mr.Menon and Mr.Zardari with the Chinese leaders. In the case of India, the emphasis was on New Delhi and Beijing caring for each other's core interests and major concerns. In the case of Pakistan, the emphasis was on Pakistan's support to China "in issues concerning China's core interests." The Chinese have, however, not clarified what they saw as the core interests and major concerns in their relations with India.
11.However, there were references in the Chinese media to India's concerns relating to the Chinese move to supply two more civil nuclear reactors (Chashmas III and IV) to Pakistan without obtaining the clearance of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG). The Chinese media also referred strongly to China's unhappiness over Indian suspicions regarding Chinese telecommunication companies and imposing restrictions on Indian companies purchasing Chinese telecom equipment and technology. The reported assurance of Mr.Menon in his interaction with the media in Beijing that India was evolving a telecommunication import policy which will uniformly apply to all countries and will not be China-specific does not appear to have satisfied the Chinese critics of the Indian policy. Chinese media criticism of alleged Indian black-listing of a large number of Chinese telecom companies tended to become virulent despite the assurance reportedly conveyed by Mr.Menon.
12. Expectations that during Mr.Zardari’s visit the Governments of China and Pakistan might formally sign the agreement for the Chinese supply of Chashmas III and IV did not prove correct. However, both Chinese and Pakistani officials sought to remove any impression that China might be having second thoughts on the issue or might be going slow on it because of India’s concerns or the misgivings reportedly expressed by some members of the NSG, including the US.
13. While reiterating China's resolve to go ahead with the supply of Chashmas III and IV to Pakistan, Chinese analysts sought to reassure India that there is no need for it to be concerned over this transaction. An article under the title “India should not fidget at signs of intimacy” published by the “China Daily” on July 8,2010, said: “Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari's on-going visit to Beijing has aroused a lot of interest and concern from some Indian media. The much-anticipated deal on nuclear reactors between China and Pakistan was the centerpiece of the attention. Though, no further deal was reached when Zardari and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao held talks on Wednesday (July 7), the visit certainly firms up Beijing's commitment to continue its co-operation with Islamabad in the field of civil nuclear energy. On the surface, concern on possible nuclear proliferation in South Asia seems to have fueled the related media reports. However, delving deeper, lack of political trust is the crux of the matter. The proposed nuclear reactors constitute an expansion of the decades-old Chashma project in Pakistan's Punjab province. The Sino-Pakistani Chashma project has been under safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. As a signatory state to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, China always remains committed to safeguarding the international regime on nuclear non-proliferation. Therefore, any concerns over this nuclear energy project are unnecessary. They would only intensify suspicion and distrust between New Delhi and Beijing. Due to the enmity between New Delhi and Islamabad, Beijing often feels like walking a political tight rope when trying to balance its relations with the two. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao met Indian National Security Adviser Shiv Shankar Menon, the envoy of the Indian prime minister, in Beijing one day before Zardari's arrival. Beijing highly values its good neighborly ties with Islamabad and New Delhi, regarding both as a strategic partner. While cherishing the traditional bond with Islamabad, it is also eager to bring its relations with New Delhi to a higher level. Maintaining stable bilateral ties with the two major players in South Asia is in the national interests of China. As a close neighbor, China is willing to see and contribute to peace and security in the sub continent. In this regard, the interests of the three countries converge. Therefore, New Delhi does not need to fidget each time it sees signs of intimacy between Beijing and Islamabad. Instead, it should look to the larger picture of India-China relationship and deepen its political trust with Beijing. Sino-Pakistani friendship takes its root in a high degree of long-term mutual trust and support. That is why it has been widely acknowledged as "all-weather and time-tested." If Sino-Indian relations could sail along a smoother track, they will embrace an even brighter future too.”
14. Any Indian expectation that as part of the assurance of Prime Minister Wen of caring for India’s core interests and major concerns, China would reverse its policy of helping Pakistan in the development of its railway and road infrastructure in the Gilgit-Baltistan area bordering Xinjiang, which de jure is part of India’s Jammu and Kashmir, and developing the hydro-electric potential in the Gilgit-Baltistan area was belied when the two countries announced the formal signing of more agreements relating to Gilgit-Baltistan during Mr.Zardari’s stay in Beijing. Under Memoranda of Understanding signed by officials of the two Governments during the visit, China will build the 165-km long Jaglot-Skardu road and the 135-km long Thakot-Sazin road. The projects would cost Pakistani Rs 45 billion with 15 per cent financing by Pakistan and 85 per cent by China. Under another MoU to be jointly executed by Chinese company Datang and Norwegian company EBT, 500 MW electricity would be produced through wind power. It is not known whether this will also be in the Gilgit-Baltistan area.
15. Mr.Zardari and the officials accompanying him repeatedly indicated that the Chinese have agreed in principle to co-operate with Pakistan in the construction of a railway line connecting Pakistan with Xinjiang via Gilgit-Baltistan. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang told reporters in response to a question that cooperation for the construction of a railway link between the two countries was for mutual benefit and not directed against any third party. It would appear that details of the project such as arrangements for financing and the alignment of the railway line are yet to be worked out. Mr.Zardari proposed that the Pakistan and China Railways should form a joint consortium for the timely execution of this project.
16. Mr.Zardari once again took up with the Chinese the pending Pakistani proposals for the upgradation of the Gwadar port, the construction of an oil refinery and an airport in Gwadar and the construction of oil/gas pipelines from Gwadar to Xinjiang. While the Chinese have readily responded in a positive manner to various proposals for projects in the Gilgit-Baltistan area, they are still hesitant regarding new projects in the Balochistan area. While they do not anticipate any security problems in the Gilgit-Baltistan area, they are still worried about the security situation in Balochistan.
17. Mr.Zardari’s disappointment over the Chinese hesitation in the Balochistan area became evident in his reported remarks to Prime Minister Wen that Pakistan desired that “China should take maximum benefits from the Gwadar Port.” From this it is evident that while Pakistan is keen for the quick implementation of the Gwadar-related projects, security considerations still inhibit the Chinese response.
18. The agreement in principle for the upgradation of the Karakoram Highway was reportedly reached more than 10 years ago. The Chinese agreed to meet the cost of upgradation on their side and Pakistan on its side. While the Chinese carried out the upgradation on their side ahead of time, the Pakistanis could not find the money for the upgradation on their side. As a result, the execution of the project was delayed and the Chinese ultimately agreed to give a soft loan to Pakistan for this purpose.
19. Pakistan has reached a similar deal wit Iran in respect of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline. While Iran will finance and construct the pipeline on its side, Pakistan has agreed to do so on its side, but it does not have the money. Will the Chinese give the money and help in the pipeline construction in return for a supply of part of the gas from Iran? This is a question which Pakistan has repeatedly raised with Beijing. China has been reluctant so far. According to reliable sources, Mr. Zardari raised this issue once again in Beijing, but there was no positive response from the Chinese. (11-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
.
Mr.Shiv Shankar Menon, India's National Security Adviser (NSA), visited China as the special envoy of Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh from July 3 to 6,2010, for talks with Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and other Chinese leaders. President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan visited Beijing for four days from July 6. Thereafter he proceeded to Shanghai to visit the International Expo. He was to return to Pakistan from Shanghai.
2.The two visits were scheduled independently of each other and were not inter-connected. Despite this, what stood out was the quiet Chinese determination not to allow India’s core concerns relating to Pakistan come in the way of China’s expanding presence in Pakistan and Chinese assistance to Pakistan in matters and areas which add to India’s concerns regarding the implications of the Sino-Pakistan relations to its internal and external security.
3. The discussions of Mr.Menon with his Chinese interlocutors including Prime Minister Wen Jiabao covered the broad parameters of the co-operation between India and China at the global level----sustaining the global economic recovery, climate protection, economic co-operation in third countries etc--- but not the nuts and bolts of it. Mr.Zardari's talks with the Chinese leaders covered the nuts and bolts of the co-operation at the bilateral and regional levels without any pretensions of the relationship having a global significance. The nuts and bolts touched upon related to keeping the Chinese interest in the Gwadar port sustained, infrastructural development and linkages between Pakistan and Western China in the fields of road, railways and fibre optics and Chinese assistance to meet Pakistan's nuclear and conventional energy needs. Other areas touched upon were bilateral co-operation against Pakistan-based terrorism affecting peace and stability in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, Chinese concerns over the security of the over 10,000 Chinese nationals living and working in about 120 projects in Pakistan and scope for bilateral co-operation and initiatives within the framework of the SAARC of which China is an observer and the Shanghai Co-Operation Organisation (SCO) of which Pakistan is an observer.
4. The repeated Chinese assurances to Mr.Zardari that China would maintain touch with Pakistan on the question of United Nationa reforms were meant to remove Pakistan’s fears that as a result of the seeming improvement in China’s relations with India, Beijing might support India becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Pakistan has been opposed to this. Instead of saying so directly, it has been saying since the days of Gen.Pervez Musharraf that it is time to make a Muslim country----Indonesia or Saudi Arabia--- a permanent member. China has not been unsympathetic to Pakistan’s view. The Associated Press of Pakistan (APP) reported that President Hu Jintao said that China would continue to maintain contact with Pakistan on issues such as the reform of the UN Security Council.
5. Mr.Zardari was reported to have assured Mr.Hu that Pakistan would continue to function as “China’s force-multiplier”. How is Pakistan playing this role of “China’s force-multiplier”? By keeping India faced with the threat of a two-front war against Pakistan and China. By continuing to supply nuclear and conventional military related and relevant equipment and technology to Pakistan China has been nursing this force-multiplier dimension of Pakistan. It became clear during Mr.Zardari’s talks with the Chinese leaders that there would be no change in this role of Pakistan as China’s force-multiplier against India, though India was not mentioned by name.
6.The APP reported as follows: “China is a friend and a strategic partner, committed to the promotion of stability and economic progress of Pakistan” is how (Hu) Jintao summed up the strategic relations. Zardari responded by saying, “It is our belief that Pakistan can act as a force multiplier for China and we will continue to work towards this end.”
7.Generally, in the past, China had not been using expressions such as "core interests", "major concerns" etc in characterisation of its relations with India and Pakistan. It uses such expressions with reference to its relations with the US and Japan and its interests in the South and East China Seas. Some of the subjects and issues which it seeks to cover under this characterisation are its insistence on the one China principle, supply of US arms to Taiwan, US naval movements in the East China Sea, its differences with Japan on the East China Sea islands and the US contacts with His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Beijing never hesitates to express its protests openly and loudly whenever it feels a threat to its core interests in these matters
8. During the recent visits of Mr.Menon and Mr.Zardari to China, one saw references to the concept of core interests and core concerns, which plays an important role in the formulation and assertion of Chinese foreign policy. The Chinese media reported Mr.Menon's discussions with Prime Minister Wen in the following words. "Premier Wen Jiabao said Monday (July 5,2010) that China regards India as an important strategic partner of cooperation. "We will work with India to maintain high level visits and take care of each other's core interests and major concerns," Wen said when meeting visiting Indian prime ministerial special envoy Shiv Shankar Menon.Wen also pledged to enhance dialogue and cooperation with India to benefit the two peoples, and make joint efforts to promote world peace and common prosperity. The two countries have also reached important agreements and made sound coordination in coping with the international financial crisis, climate change and other major issues, Wen noted. Wen said China and India, as neighbors and large developing nations with largest populations, enjoy not only profound historical and cultural origins but also broad common interests."A healthy, stable and dynamic China-India relationship is of far-reaching significance to the two nations, Asia and the whole world at large," he said. "
9.A reference to the core concept was not there in the Chinese media accounts of Mr.Zardar's meetings with President Hu and Prime Minister Wen. However, it was there in the media accounts of his meeting with Mr.Jia Qinglin, Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). According to the Chinese media, Mr.Jia told Mr. Zardari that China has always valued its relationship with Pakistan, and treats the bilateral ties from a strategic and long-term perspective. “Jia applauded the Pakistani government's firm support in issues concerning China's core interests, saying that China would work with Pakistan to cement traditional friendship and act on all consensuses reached by the two sides. Jia hoped the two nations would work together to push forward the bilateral strategic partnership of cooperation, in a bid to benefit the two peoples and promote regional peace and prosperity.”
10.China's perception of India's global importance as against Pakistan's purely regional importance came out clearly in the Chinese media accounts of the talks of Mr.Menon and Mr.Zardari with the Chinese leaders. In the case of India, the emphasis was on New Delhi and Beijing caring for each other's core interests and major concerns. In the case of Pakistan, the emphasis was on Pakistan's support to China "in issues concerning China's core interests." The Chinese have, however, not clarified what they saw as the core interests and major concerns in their relations with India.
11.However, there were references in the Chinese media to India's concerns relating to the Chinese move to supply two more civil nuclear reactors (Chashmas III and IV) to Pakistan without obtaining the clearance of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG). The Chinese media also referred strongly to China's unhappiness over Indian suspicions regarding Chinese telecommunication companies and imposing restrictions on Indian companies purchasing Chinese telecom equipment and technology. The reported assurance of Mr.Menon in his interaction with the media in Beijing that India was evolving a telecommunication import policy which will uniformly apply to all countries and will not be China-specific does not appear to have satisfied the Chinese critics of the Indian policy. Chinese media criticism of alleged Indian black-listing of a large number of Chinese telecom companies tended to become virulent despite the assurance reportedly conveyed by Mr.Menon.
12. Expectations that during Mr.Zardari’s visit the Governments of China and Pakistan might formally sign the agreement for the Chinese supply of Chashmas III and IV did not prove correct. However, both Chinese and Pakistani officials sought to remove any impression that China might be having second thoughts on the issue or might be going slow on it because of India’s concerns or the misgivings reportedly expressed by some members of the NSG, including the US.
13. While reiterating China's resolve to go ahead with the supply of Chashmas III and IV to Pakistan, Chinese analysts sought to reassure India that there is no need for it to be concerned over this transaction. An article under the title “India should not fidget at signs of intimacy” published by the “China Daily” on July 8,2010, said: “Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari's on-going visit to Beijing has aroused a lot of interest and concern from some Indian media. The much-anticipated deal on nuclear reactors between China and Pakistan was the centerpiece of the attention. Though, no further deal was reached when Zardari and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao held talks on Wednesday (July 7), the visit certainly firms up Beijing's commitment to continue its co-operation with Islamabad in the field of civil nuclear energy. On the surface, concern on possible nuclear proliferation in South Asia seems to have fueled the related media reports. However, delving deeper, lack of political trust is the crux of the matter. The proposed nuclear reactors constitute an expansion of the decades-old Chashma project in Pakistan's Punjab province. The Sino-Pakistani Chashma project has been under safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. As a signatory state to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, China always remains committed to safeguarding the international regime on nuclear non-proliferation. Therefore, any concerns over this nuclear energy project are unnecessary. They would only intensify suspicion and distrust between New Delhi and Beijing. Due to the enmity between New Delhi and Islamabad, Beijing often feels like walking a political tight rope when trying to balance its relations with the two. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao met Indian National Security Adviser Shiv Shankar Menon, the envoy of the Indian prime minister, in Beijing one day before Zardari's arrival. Beijing highly values its good neighborly ties with Islamabad and New Delhi, regarding both as a strategic partner. While cherishing the traditional bond with Islamabad, it is also eager to bring its relations with New Delhi to a higher level. Maintaining stable bilateral ties with the two major players in South Asia is in the national interests of China. As a close neighbor, China is willing to see and contribute to peace and security in the sub continent. In this regard, the interests of the three countries converge. Therefore, New Delhi does not need to fidget each time it sees signs of intimacy between Beijing and Islamabad. Instead, it should look to the larger picture of India-China relationship and deepen its political trust with Beijing. Sino-Pakistani friendship takes its root in a high degree of long-term mutual trust and support. That is why it has been widely acknowledged as "all-weather and time-tested." If Sino-Indian relations could sail along a smoother track, they will embrace an even brighter future too.”
14. Any Indian expectation that as part of the assurance of Prime Minister Wen of caring for India’s core interests and major concerns, China would reverse its policy of helping Pakistan in the development of its railway and road infrastructure in the Gilgit-Baltistan area bordering Xinjiang, which de jure is part of India’s Jammu and Kashmir, and developing the hydro-electric potential in the Gilgit-Baltistan area was belied when the two countries announced the formal signing of more agreements relating to Gilgit-Baltistan during Mr.Zardari’s stay in Beijing. Under Memoranda of Understanding signed by officials of the two Governments during the visit, China will build the 165-km long Jaglot-Skardu road and the 135-km long Thakot-Sazin road. The projects would cost Pakistani Rs 45 billion with 15 per cent financing by Pakistan and 85 per cent by China. Under another MoU to be jointly executed by Chinese company Datang and Norwegian company EBT, 500 MW electricity would be produced through wind power. It is not known whether this will also be in the Gilgit-Baltistan area.
15. Mr.Zardari and the officials accompanying him repeatedly indicated that the Chinese have agreed in principle to co-operate with Pakistan in the construction of a railway line connecting Pakistan with Xinjiang via Gilgit-Baltistan. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang told reporters in response to a question that cooperation for the construction of a railway link between the two countries was for mutual benefit and not directed against any third party. It would appear that details of the project such as arrangements for financing and the alignment of the railway line are yet to be worked out. Mr.Zardari proposed that the Pakistan and China Railways should form a joint consortium for the timely execution of this project.
16. Mr.Zardari once again took up with the Chinese the pending Pakistani proposals for the upgradation of the Gwadar port, the construction of an oil refinery and an airport in Gwadar and the construction of oil/gas pipelines from Gwadar to Xinjiang. While the Chinese have readily responded in a positive manner to various proposals for projects in the Gilgit-Baltistan area, they are still hesitant regarding new projects in the Balochistan area. While they do not anticipate any security problems in the Gilgit-Baltistan area, they are still worried about the security situation in Balochistan.
17. Mr.Zardari’s disappointment over the Chinese hesitation in the Balochistan area became evident in his reported remarks to Prime Minister Wen that Pakistan desired that “China should take maximum benefits from the Gwadar Port.” From this it is evident that while Pakistan is keen for the quick implementation of the Gwadar-related projects, security considerations still inhibit the Chinese response.
18. The agreement in principle for the upgradation of the Karakoram Highway was reportedly reached more than 10 years ago. The Chinese agreed to meet the cost of upgradation on their side and Pakistan on its side. While the Chinese carried out the upgradation on their side ahead of time, the Pakistanis could not find the money for the upgradation on their side. As a result, the execution of the project was delayed and the Chinese ultimately agreed to give a soft loan to Pakistan for this purpose.
19. Pakistan has reached a similar deal wit Iran in respect of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline. While Iran will finance and construct the pipeline on its side, Pakistan has agreed to do so on its side, but it does not have the money. Will the Chinese give the money and help in the pipeline construction in return for a supply of part of the gas from Iran? This is a question which Pakistan has repeatedly raised with Beijing. China has been reluctant so far. According to reliable sources, Mr. Zardari raised this issue once again in Beijing, but there was no positive response from the Chinese. (11-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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Friday, July 9, 2010
CHINESE ENGINEERS IN GWADAR ESCAPE ROCKET ATTACKS
B.RAMAN
Even as President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan was discussing with the Chinese leaders in Beijing his requests for the construction of an oil refinery in Gwadar and oil/gas pipelines from Gwadar to Xinjiang, a group of Chinese engineers deputed by Beijing to Gwadar to study the feasibility and utility of an oil refinery there has escaped two rocket attacks fired at the hotel in which it was staying.
2. According to the “Daily Times” of Lahore, unidentified persons fired rockets from the seaside on the Gwadar Port and the elitist hotel of the port city, the Gwadar Pearl Continental , on July 7,2010. The attack, which was launched by unknown persons from a boat, damaged the elevator inside the posh hotel, but did not cause any other serious damage to the hotel infrastructure. No casualties were reported in the attack. The paper reported that the Chinese engineers had arrived in Gwadar recently and were reportedly working on an oil refinery. Official sources believe that they were the targets of the attack. Security officials and paramilitary forces cordoned off the area after the attack and began investigations against unidentified assailants.
3. Subsequently, a spokesman of the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) claimed the responsiblity for the attack and warned foreign investors not to invest in Balochistan. He warned that the BLF would also attack the Pakistan navy and coast guards.
4. The Chinese have already constructed an international commercial port at Gwadar which is being upgraded to serve as a naval base. The commercial port, which was commissioned when Gen.Pervez Musharraf was in power, is not yet attracting foreign ocean-going ships due to the poor road and other infrastructure in the area and the deteriorating security situation caused by Baloch freedom fighters.
5. It has been reported from Beijing that the physical security of about 10,000 Chinese nationals employed in about 120 projects in Pakistan was one of the issues raised by President Hu Jintao during his meeting with Mr.Zardari.
6. According to Baloch sources, the Chinese have cut down their presence in Balochistan because of the local anti-Chinese feelings. They have not yet started work on the construction of an airport at Gwadar, which was awarded to them by Gen.Musharraf. They are going slow on the upgradation of the Gwadar port. According to these sources, the Chinese presence in Balochistan is presently confined to the development of the copper mines at Sandak and the construction of a road between Gwadar and Turbet. The Pakistan Government has reportedly asked one of its companies to start the construction of the airport.
7. There have been unconfirmed reports that the US has shown interest in the utilization of the Gwadar commercial port as a replacement for Karachi for the receipt of logistic supplies for the NATO forces in Afghanistan. ( 10-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Even as President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan was discussing with the Chinese leaders in Beijing his requests for the construction of an oil refinery in Gwadar and oil/gas pipelines from Gwadar to Xinjiang, a group of Chinese engineers deputed by Beijing to Gwadar to study the feasibility and utility of an oil refinery there has escaped two rocket attacks fired at the hotel in which it was staying.
2. According to the “Daily Times” of Lahore, unidentified persons fired rockets from the seaside on the Gwadar Port and the elitist hotel of the port city, the Gwadar Pearl Continental , on July 7,2010. The attack, which was launched by unknown persons from a boat, damaged the elevator inside the posh hotel, but did not cause any other serious damage to the hotel infrastructure. No casualties were reported in the attack. The paper reported that the Chinese engineers had arrived in Gwadar recently and were reportedly working on an oil refinery. Official sources believe that they were the targets of the attack. Security officials and paramilitary forces cordoned off the area after the attack and began investigations against unidentified assailants.
3. Subsequently, a spokesman of the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) claimed the responsiblity for the attack and warned foreign investors not to invest in Balochistan. He warned that the BLF would also attack the Pakistan navy and coast guards.
4. The Chinese have already constructed an international commercial port at Gwadar which is being upgraded to serve as a naval base. The commercial port, which was commissioned when Gen.Pervez Musharraf was in power, is not yet attracting foreign ocean-going ships due to the poor road and other infrastructure in the area and the deteriorating security situation caused by Baloch freedom fighters.
5. It has been reported from Beijing that the physical security of about 10,000 Chinese nationals employed in about 120 projects in Pakistan was one of the issues raised by President Hu Jintao during his meeting with Mr.Zardari.
6. According to Baloch sources, the Chinese have cut down their presence in Balochistan because of the local anti-Chinese feelings. They have not yet started work on the construction of an airport at Gwadar, which was awarded to them by Gen.Musharraf. They are going slow on the upgradation of the Gwadar port. According to these sources, the Chinese presence in Balochistan is presently confined to the development of the copper mines at Sandak and the construction of a road between Gwadar and Turbet. The Pakistan Government has reportedly asked one of its companies to start the construction of the airport.
7. There have been unconfirmed reports that the US has shown interest in the utilization of the Gwadar commercial port as a replacement for Karachi for the receipt of logistic supplies for the NATO forces in Afghanistan. ( 10-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Thursday, July 8, 2010
AL QAEDA IN NORWAY
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.665
B.RAMAN
A message of Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden's No. 2, broadcast by Al Jazeera on May 21, 2003, had called for reprisal attacks against the US and some of its allies for occupying Iraq.
2.The message, inter alia, said: "O Muslims, take matters firmly against the embassies of America, England, Australia, and Norway and their interests, companies, and employees. Burn the ground under their feet, as they should not enjoy your protection, safety, or security. Expel those criminals out of your countries. Do not allow the Americans, the British, the Australians, the Norwegians, and the other crusaders who killed your brothers in Iraq to live in your countries. Wreak havoc on them. "
3.While the calls for attacks on the US, the UK and Australia were not a surprise, the call for reprisals against Norway was, since Norway was not one of the allies of the US in Iraq. It was not clear why Zawahiri included Norway in the list. There was some speculation that he might have mistaken Norway for Denmark, which had a role in Iraq.
4. Islamic anger against Denmark for the publication of some cartoons of Prophet Mohammad in a Danish newspaper in 2005 extended to Norway too because some Norwegian newspapers had allegedly reproduced the cartoons. The protest demonstrations in West Asia against the cartoons were directed at some Norwegian diplomatic missions too, but there were no publicly aired threats of a terrorist attack against Norway in connection with the publication of the cartoons.
5. The terrorist threats uttered by Al Qaeda and other jihadi organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) of Pakistan were against Denmark and not Norway. Available details of the US investigation into the activities of LET operative David Coleman Headley, a US citizen of Pakistani origin living in Chicago, indicated preparations during 2009 for a terrorist strike against the Danish newspaper which had published the cartoons jointly by the LET and the so-called 313 Brigade of Ilyas Kashmiri of Pakistan based in North Waziristan. Norway did not figure in the details of the plot as indicated in the various court affidavits filed against Headley by the USA's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
6. The Islamic Jihad Union or Group (IJU), an Uzbek group based in North Waziristan and closely allied to Al Qaeda, has some followers in Germany among persons of Turkish origin as well as white German converts to Islam. Some arrests were made in Germany in August-September 2007 in connection with investigations into the activities of the IJU and its suspected plots for terrorist strikes in Germany against German as well as American targets. There were no reports of the arrest of any Uzbek in Germany in this connection. The IJU makes its recruitment from amongst Uzbeks, Uighurs and other Central Asians. In the past, most of its recruits came from the Af-Pak and the Central Asian regions. There were no reports of any recruitment by it from amongst the Uighurs and Uzbeks living in West Europe.
7. The Norwegian police announced on July 8,2010, the arrest of three men suspected of having ties to Al Qaeda on charges of preparing terrorist attacks. One of them is a Norwegian citizen of Uighur origin. The other two are permanent residents in Norway of Uzbek and Iraqi-Kurdish origin. Two of them (the Uzbek and the Uighur) are reported to have been arrested in Norway and the third (Iraqi-Kurd with a permanent residence permit of Norway) in Germany. The Norwegian police had been keeping them under surveillance for investigation for about a year. The arrests appear to have been made even though the investigation has not yet been completed because of the leakage of the news about the investigation against them to the media. They apparently decided to arrest them before the media came out with the news.
8.Media reports indicate that the arrested persons were suspected of involvement in plots for terrorist strikes in Norway and of having links with some terrorist suspects under investigation in the US and the UK. The involvement of an Uzbek and an Uighur in this plot could indicate a possible Chinese target too. There is a small, but active Uighur community in Norway, with links to the anti-Chinese World Uighur Congress (WUC) based in Munich. The Uighurs had held a demonstration against the Chinese in Oslo last year to protest against anti-Uighur violence by the Hans in Urumqi in July last .
9.Members of the Uighur and Uzbek communities in West Europe may not normally get involved in attacking Western targets. The kind of anti-Western anger one finds in the Arabs and the Pakistanis one does not find in the Uzbeks and the Uighurs living in the West, but the Uzbeks of the IJU do nurse a strong anger against the West. It is not clear whether the reported plots in Norway were the work of Al Qaeda or its associates such as the IJU, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan or the Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan. It is also not clear whether the targeting of Norway had anything to do with its role in Afghanistan as a member of the NATO forces fighting against the Taliban. Were the three arrested persons already members of any of these organisations or were they merely self-radicalised Muslims looking for sponsors?(8-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
A message of Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden's No. 2, broadcast by Al Jazeera on May 21, 2003, had called for reprisal attacks against the US and some of its allies for occupying Iraq.
2.The message, inter alia, said: "O Muslims, take matters firmly against the embassies of America, England, Australia, and Norway and their interests, companies, and employees. Burn the ground under their feet, as they should not enjoy your protection, safety, or security. Expel those criminals out of your countries. Do not allow the Americans, the British, the Australians, the Norwegians, and the other crusaders who killed your brothers in Iraq to live in your countries. Wreak havoc on them. "
3.While the calls for attacks on the US, the UK and Australia were not a surprise, the call for reprisals against Norway was, since Norway was not one of the allies of the US in Iraq. It was not clear why Zawahiri included Norway in the list. There was some speculation that he might have mistaken Norway for Denmark, which had a role in Iraq.
4. Islamic anger against Denmark for the publication of some cartoons of Prophet Mohammad in a Danish newspaper in 2005 extended to Norway too because some Norwegian newspapers had allegedly reproduced the cartoons. The protest demonstrations in West Asia against the cartoons were directed at some Norwegian diplomatic missions too, but there were no publicly aired threats of a terrorist attack against Norway in connection with the publication of the cartoons.
5. The terrorist threats uttered by Al Qaeda and other jihadi organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) of Pakistan were against Denmark and not Norway. Available details of the US investigation into the activities of LET operative David Coleman Headley, a US citizen of Pakistani origin living in Chicago, indicated preparations during 2009 for a terrorist strike against the Danish newspaper which had published the cartoons jointly by the LET and the so-called 313 Brigade of Ilyas Kashmiri of Pakistan based in North Waziristan. Norway did not figure in the details of the plot as indicated in the various court affidavits filed against Headley by the USA's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
6. The Islamic Jihad Union or Group (IJU), an Uzbek group based in North Waziristan and closely allied to Al Qaeda, has some followers in Germany among persons of Turkish origin as well as white German converts to Islam. Some arrests were made in Germany in August-September 2007 in connection with investigations into the activities of the IJU and its suspected plots for terrorist strikes in Germany against German as well as American targets. There were no reports of the arrest of any Uzbek in Germany in this connection. The IJU makes its recruitment from amongst Uzbeks, Uighurs and other Central Asians. In the past, most of its recruits came from the Af-Pak and the Central Asian regions. There were no reports of any recruitment by it from amongst the Uighurs and Uzbeks living in West Europe.
7. The Norwegian police announced on July 8,2010, the arrest of three men suspected of having ties to Al Qaeda on charges of preparing terrorist attacks. One of them is a Norwegian citizen of Uighur origin. The other two are permanent residents in Norway of Uzbek and Iraqi-Kurdish origin. Two of them (the Uzbek and the Uighur) are reported to have been arrested in Norway and the third (Iraqi-Kurd with a permanent residence permit of Norway) in Germany. The Norwegian police had been keeping them under surveillance for investigation for about a year. The arrests appear to have been made even though the investigation has not yet been completed because of the leakage of the news about the investigation against them to the media. They apparently decided to arrest them before the media came out with the news.
8.Media reports indicate that the arrested persons were suspected of involvement in plots for terrorist strikes in Norway and of having links with some terrorist suspects under investigation in the US and the UK. The involvement of an Uzbek and an Uighur in this plot could indicate a possible Chinese target too. There is a small, but active Uighur community in Norway, with links to the anti-Chinese World Uighur Congress (WUC) based in Munich. The Uighurs had held a demonstration against the Chinese in Oslo last year to protest against anti-Uighur violence by the Hans in Urumqi in July last .
9.Members of the Uighur and Uzbek communities in West Europe may not normally get involved in attacking Western targets. The kind of anti-Western anger one finds in the Arabs and the Pakistanis one does not find in the Uzbeks and the Uighurs living in the West, but the Uzbeks of the IJU do nurse a strong anger against the West. It is not clear whether the reported plots in Norway were the work of Al Qaeda or its associates such as the IJU, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan or the Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan. It is also not clear whether the targeting of Norway had anything to do with its role in Afghanistan as a member of the NATO forces fighting against the Taliban. Were the three arrested persons already members of any of these organisations or were they merely self-radicalised Muslims looking for sponsors?(8-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, July 7, 2010
THE SHADOWS IN J & K
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO.664
B.RAMAN
In his message of February 12, 2007, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the No.2 to Osama bin Laden, has spoken of a global Jihadi Intifada. Has he spoken of any special areas of focus for this Intifada?
Whenever he talks of a global jihad or now of a global Jihadi Intifada, Zawahiri makes it clear that this has to cover all lands in the world, which rightfully belong to Islam. After saying so, he specifies certain areas, which he thinks should receive special attention first. Of these, he gives the topmost priority to Afghanistan and Iraq. He says the future of Islam and of the global Intifada itself will be decided in those countries. If they can defeat the Americans there, the jihadis' victory in the rest of the lands will be assured. After mentioning these two countries, he mentions certain other areas specifically. He believes that the victory of the jihadis in these areas would also be crucial for the ultimate victory of Islam. These areas are Palestine, including Gaza, the Lebanon, Somalia, Algeria and Chechnya in Russia. He describes Somalia as the Southern garrison of Islam and Algeria as its Western garrison.
What does he mean by Jihadi Intifada?
A kind of struggle in which the role of motivated individual Muslims will become more important than that of organisations so that the weakening or collapse of an organisation does not result in a collapse of the Intifada. He wants the Intifada to acquire a momentum of its own as a result of the sacrifices of individual Muslims...... The importance of a central command and control in keeping the Intifada going is down-played. The motivation of individual Muslims is more important than any centralised command and control. He also projects the Intifada as a mix of military and non-military struggles. He says in his message of December 20, 2006: "We must bear arms. And if we are unable to bear them, then we must support those who carry them. This support comes in many forms and guises, so we must exploit all Dawah, student and union activities to back the Jihadi resistance....... The Muslim Ummah must exploit all methods of popular protest, like demonstrations, sit-ins, strikes, refusing to pay taxes, preventing cooperation with the security forces, refusing to provide the Crusaders with fuel, hitting traders who supply the Crusader forces, boycotting Crusader and Jewish products, and other ways of popular protest."
----- From my article of February 14,2007, titled JIHADI INTIFADA: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/common/uploaded_files/paper2135.html
--------------------------------------------------
What we are witnessing in certain areas of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) is the beginning of an intifada of Zawahiri's conception as propounded by him in his messages of February 12,2007,and earlier addressed to the Muslims of the world. One does not know whether Al Qaeda has had any role in the current violence in J&K, but its idea that the time had come to transform the jihad characterised by acts of terrorism into an intifada on a global scale characterised by leaderless street violence and the technique of a mix of military and non-military struggles has had some impact on the thinking and behaviour of some sections of the Kashmiri youth.
2. We are confronted with a situation marked by leaders without followers and followers without leaders. The traditional political leaders of J&K have no influence over the agitating youth. The agitating youth have no identifiable leaders to whom an approach can be made by the Government for bringing down the violence. Whatever be the extent of the Pakistani role in instigating the violence, it has acquired a momentum of its own unrelated to Pakistan. Islamabad has been exploiting the violence, but does not seem to be the originator of it.
3. The root cause is the growing perception among some sections of the youth that the security forces have been insensitive in performing their counter-insurgency duties and have been adopting objectionable methods ( e.g alleged false encounters) and using disproportionate force against the people. The current street violence has had no strategic political objective relating to the future political status of J&K. It is the result of an outburst of anger against the security forces. It does not have a strategic direction as yet, but may acquire one if it continues without the anger of the participating youth being pacified by the Government.
4. The anger of the youth might have been pacified initially if the Governments at Srinagar and New Delhi had shown some understanding of the anger and initiated measures to pacify it such as enquiries into allegations of excesses by the security forces, paying greater attention to complaints of violations of the human rights of the people and better ways of dealing with street protestors without using firearms. The succes of the last general elections in which nearly two-thirds of the voters participated and the perception that the ground situation was coming under control created a feeling of over-confidence in the Government at the centre, which slowed down the efforts to find a political soplution to the demands of the people and showed an increased insensitivity towards the anger of sections of the youth against the security forces.
5. The current movement started due to some anger against the security forces. Perceptions of political indifference to that anger has led to the anger turning against the political leadership. We find ourselves caught in a vicious circle. The more the publicly expressed anger against the security forces, the more the force used against the agitators and the more the force used against the agitators, the more the anger against the security forces.
6. When there was a decline in violence and we should have been taking advantage of it to deal with strategic issues relating to the future political set-up, we did not do so. Now, when the immediate objectiove should be to reduce the anger of the moment due to the grievances against the security forces, we are talking of long-term political issues. Better methods of street control to avoid the use of firearms, prompt and satisfactory attention to the complaints of the people regarding excessive use of force and violations of human rights, greater interactions between the Government and the agitating youth, greater control over our rhetoric to avoid demonisation of the agitators and attempts to remove the impression that the Government tends to bat for the errant elements in the security forces and not for the people are some of the immediate steps required. The use of the Army against the street agitators would be unwise unless the situation turms desperate leaving no other option. ( 8-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
In his message of February 12, 2007, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the No.2 to Osama bin Laden, has spoken of a global Jihadi Intifada. Has he spoken of any special areas of focus for this Intifada?
Whenever he talks of a global jihad or now of a global Jihadi Intifada, Zawahiri makes it clear that this has to cover all lands in the world, which rightfully belong to Islam. After saying so, he specifies certain areas, which he thinks should receive special attention first. Of these, he gives the topmost priority to Afghanistan and Iraq. He says the future of Islam and of the global Intifada itself will be decided in those countries. If they can defeat the Americans there, the jihadis' victory in the rest of the lands will be assured. After mentioning these two countries, he mentions certain other areas specifically. He believes that the victory of the jihadis in these areas would also be crucial for the ultimate victory of Islam. These areas are Palestine, including Gaza, the Lebanon, Somalia, Algeria and Chechnya in Russia. He describes Somalia as the Southern garrison of Islam and Algeria as its Western garrison.
What does he mean by Jihadi Intifada?
A kind of struggle in which the role of motivated individual Muslims will become more important than that of organisations so that the weakening or collapse of an organisation does not result in a collapse of the Intifada. He wants the Intifada to acquire a momentum of its own as a result of the sacrifices of individual Muslims...... The importance of a central command and control in keeping the Intifada going is down-played. The motivation of individual Muslims is more important than any centralised command and control. He also projects the Intifada as a mix of military and non-military struggles. He says in his message of December 20, 2006: "We must bear arms. And if we are unable to bear them, then we must support those who carry them. This support comes in many forms and guises, so we must exploit all Dawah, student and union activities to back the Jihadi resistance....... The Muslim Ummah must exploit all methods of popular protest, like demonstrations, sit-ins, strikes, refusing to pay taxes, preventing cooperation with the security forces, refusing to provide the Crusaders with fuel, hitting traders who supply the Crusader forces, boycotting Crusader and Jewish products, and other ways of popular protest."
----- From my article of February 14,2007, titled JIHADI INTIFADA: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/common/uploaded_files/paper2135.html
--------------------------------------------------
What we are witnessing in certain areas of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) is the beginning of an intifada of Zawahiri's conception as propounded by him in his messages of February 12,2007,and earlier addressed to the Muslims of the world. One does not know whether Al Qaeda has had any role in the current violence in J&K, but its idea that the time had come to transform the jihad characterised by acts of terrorism into an intifada on a global scale characterised by leaderless street violence and the technique of a mix of military and non-military struggles has had some impact on the thinking and behaviour of some sections of the Kashmiri youth.
2. We are confronted with a situation marked by leaders without followers and followers without leaders. The traditional political leaders of J&K have no influence over the agitating youth. The agitating youth have no identifiable leaders to whom an approach can be made by the Government for bringing down the violence. Whatever be the extent of the Pakistani role in instigating the violence, it has acquired a momentum of its own unrelated to Pakistan. Islamabad has been exploiting the violence, but does not seem to be the originator of it.
3. The root cause is the growing perception among some sections of the youth that the security forces have been insensitive in performing their counter-insurgency duties and have been adopting objectionable methods ( e.g alleged false encounters) and using disproportionate force against the people. The current street violence has had no strategic political objective relating to the future political status of J&K. It is the result of an outburst of anger against the security forces. It does not have a strategic direction as yet, but may acquire one if it continues without the anger of the participating youth being pacified by the Government.
4. The anger of the youth might have been pacified initially if the Governments at Srinagar and New Delhi had shown some understanding of the anger and initiated measures to pacify it such as enquiries into allegations of excesses by the security forces, paying greater attention to complaints of violations of the human rights of the people and better ways of dealing with street protestors without using firearms. The succes of the last general elections in which nearly two-thirds of the voters participated and the perception that the ground situation was coming under control created a feeling of over-confidence in the Government at the centre, which slowed down the efforts to find a political soplution to the demands of the people and showed an increased insensitivity towards the anger of sections of the youth against the security forces.
5. The current movement started due to some anger against the security forces. Perceptions of political indifference to that anger has led to the anger turning against the political leadership. We find ourselves caught in a vicious circle. The more the publicly expressed anger against the security forces, the more the force used against the agitators and the more the force used against the agitators, the more the anger against the security forces.
6. When there was a decline in violence and we should have been taking advantage of it to deal with strategic issues relating to the future political set-up, we did not do so. Now, when the immediate objectiove should be to reduce the anger of the moment due to the grievances against the security forces, we are talking of long-term political issues. Better methods of street control to avoid the use of firearms, prompt and satisfactory attention to the complaints of the people regarding excessive use of force and violations of human rights, greater interactions between the Government and the agitating youth, greater control over our rhetoric to avoid demonisation of the agitators and attempts to remove the impression that the Government tends to bat for the errant elements in the security forces and not for the people are some of the immediate steps required. The use of the Army against the street agitators would be unwise unless the situation turms desperate leaving no other option. ( 8-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
AL QAEDA & TERRORIST STRIKES IN INDIA
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.663
B.RAMAN
“The Hindu” of July 7,2010, has carried an article by its terrorism analyst Praveen Swami titled “Pakistan’s Competing Jihadists.” The article refers to a message purported to have been issued before his death (confirmed by Al Qaeda) in a US Drone strike in May last by Sai’d al-Masri (al-Masri means the Egyptian) also known as Mustafa Abu al-Yazid. He was reputedly the No.3 in Al Qaeda and was in charge of operations in Afghanistan.
2.According to Shri Swami, an English translation of this message was made available to him “by the Washington DC based Middle East Media Research Institute”. This Institute is popularly known as MEMRI. It is alleged to have close links with the Israeli Military Intelligence and the Likud Party.
3. Wikipedia comments as follows on MEMRI: “The Middle East Media Research Institute, or MEMRI for short, is a Middle Eastern press monitoring organization. Its headquarters is located in Washington, DC, with branch offices in Jerusalem, Berlin, London, Rome, Shanghai, Baghdad, and Tokyo. MEMRI was co-founded in 1998 by Yigal Carmon, a former colonel in Israeli military intelligence, and another Israeli Meyrav Wurmser. It provides a free source of English language translations of material published in Arabic and Persian script, and publishes its analyses and in-depth reports on its website - although it also offers specialized content for a fee. The organization's translations are regularly quoted by major international newspapers, and its work has generated strong criticism and praise. Some critics have accused MEMRI of selectively choosing for translation and dissemination the most extreme views from Arabic and Persian media, which portray the Arab and Muslim world in a negative light, while ignoring moderate views that are often found in the same media outlets. Other critics charge that while MEMRI does sometimes translate pro-US or pro-democracy voices in the regional media, it systematically leaves out intelligent criticism of Western-style democracy, US and Israeli policy and secularism. MEMRI's current mission statement states the organization "explores the Middle East through the region's media. MEMRI bridges the language gap which exists between the West and the Middle East, providing timely translations of Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and Urdu-Pashtun media, as well as original analysis of political, ideological, intellectual, social, cultural, and religious trends in the Middle East." Until 2001, its Mission Statement stated that the institute also emphasizes "the continuing relevance of Zionism to the Jewish people and to the state of Israel." MEMRI's goals and emphasis have evolved over the years; it originally translated articles in both Arabic and Hebrew. Concerning this change in their ‘mission statement,’ Political Research Associates (PRA), which studies the US political right, notes that it occurred three weeks after the September 11 attacks, and considers MEMRI "was previously more forthcoming about its political orientation in its self-description and in staff profiles on its website." PRA considers that “MEMRI's slogan, ‘Bridging the Language Gap Between the Middle East and the West,’ does not convey the institute's stridently pro-Israel and anti-Arab political bias.” It further notes, that MEMRI's founders, Wurmser and Carmon, “are both hardline pro-Israel ideologues aligned with Israel's Likud party.”
4. So far as one knows, the message of al-Masri disseminated by MEMRI has not yet been authenticated by any official Western agency or non-governmental organization studying messages purported to have been disseminated by Al Qaeda, its leaders and as-Sahab, the propaganda wing of Al Qaeda, but one is subject to correction.
5. In its intro to Shri Swami’s article, “The Hindu” says: “ For the first time, the al-Qaeda has claimed responsibility for an attack in India.” “The Hindu’s” reference is to the explosion in the German bakery in Pune on February 13 last. Mr.Swami himself writes in his article as follows: “ For the first time, though, al-Masri referred to the Pakistan-based jihadist Muhammad Ilyas Kashmiri as an official part of the Al Qaeda--- and made public his role in an attack on India.”
6.According to Mr.Swami, the message as supplied by MEMRI says as follows: “ I bring you the good tidings that last February’s India operation was against a Jewish locale in the West of the Indian capital in the area of the German bakeries--- a fact that the enemy tried to hide---- and close to 20 Jews were killed in the operation, a majority of them from the so-called statelet, Israel. The person who carried out this operation was a heroic soldier from the “Soldiers of the Sacrifice Brigade”, which is one of the brigades of Qaedat al-Jihad ( the al-Qaeda’s formal name) in Kashmir under the command of commander Ilyas Kashmiri, may Allah preserve him.”
7. Commenting on the claim made in the message. Mr.Swami says: “ From the text, it is clear that al-Masri had little knowledge of the bombing of the German Bakery in Pune. Pune is not to the west of New Delhi; it is not Jewish-owned; and no Israelis were killed there. There would thus be no reason to take al-Masri’s claims seriously--- if it weren’t for the testimony of Pakistani-American jihadist David Headley.”
8. al-Masri was born in Egypt on December 17, 1955. Along with Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s No.2,he was a founding member of the Islamic Jihad of Egypt, which was alleged to have been involved in the assassination of then Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981. He was arrested by the Egyptian authorities along with Zawahiri. They managed to escape and reach Afghanistan in 1988 and join Osama bin Laden. When bin Laden went to the Sudan in 1991 after his passport was reportedly cancelled by the Saudi authorities, al-Masri joined him there and was appointed by bin Laden as an accountant of a business company started by him in the Sudan. In 1996, under US pressure, the Sudanese authorities asked bin Laden to leave the Sudan. He went to Afghanistan accompanied by al-Masri. Zawahiri joined them there. The US National Commission, which enquired into the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US homeland, described him as the Chief Financial Manager of Al Qaeda. In May 2007, bin Laden was reported to have designated him as in charge of Al Qaeda’s operations in Afghanistan. In that capacity, he was responsible for co-ordination of operations with the Afghan Taliban.
9. In February 2009, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) had received a message purported to be from Mustafa Abu-al Yazid, warning of more Mumbai-style attacks. The message, whose authenticity could not be established, sought to create an impression as if the 28/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai were carried out by Al Qaeda.
10.I had commented as follows on that mesaage : “ His warnings of more Mumbai-style attacks should be factored into our security arrangements and that means, strengthening physical security not only for possible Indian targets, but also for possible foreign targets such as those of Israel and the US. A rule of prudence is don’t ignore a threat unless and until it is proved to be false. The message needs careful analysis in co-operation with Al Qaeda experts in the US. The message suspiciously serves the Pakistani agenda of projecting the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai as executed by an international jihadi group based in Europe and inspired by Al Qaeda. There are suspicious elements in the message. Why was it disseminated through the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and not initially through Al Jazeera? Why has it not yet appeared in the web sites associated with Al Qaeda? Why there was no reference to the Mumbai attack in the one message of Osama bin Laden and two of his No.2 Ayman al-Zawahiri disseminated by Al Qaeda since the beginning of this year? Why the message has not been disseminated through As Sahab, the official propaganda organ of Al Qaeda.”
11. Subsequently, in April,2009, another message purporting to be from al-Masri circulated through the Internet. It read as follows: “. “We send a short and succinct message to the Indian Government. The Mujahideen will never allow you to invade the Muslims and their lands in Pakistan. If you beguile yourselves into doing this, know well that you will pay a very heavy price, which you will regret much. We will call upon our whole Muslim nation, its Mujahideen and its martyrdom squads against you. We will strike your interests and your economic lifelines wherever they may be until you are demolished and bankrupt as America is being demolished and going bankrupt today. The Islamic nation which produced the audacious and heroic martyrs of Bombay, who struck you in the midst of your homes and humiliated you, is able to produce thousands more like them. You cannot be more powerful or have more ability than the Soviet Union which was destroyed on the rocks of the Afghanistan mountains nor Americans whose nose we rubbed in the dirt of Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia.”
12. This message added to the suspicion that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence might be behind the dissemination of these messages in order to draw suspicion away from the LET for the terrorist strikes of 26/11 in Mumbai. After the Pune Bakery attack, Syed Saleem Shahzad , the Karachi correspondent of “Asia Times Online”, received an E-mail message purporting to be from Ilyas Kashmiri threatening terrorist strikes in India during the World Cup Hockey League and IPL cricket matches as well as during the forthcoming Commonwealth Games. In his dispatch to the Asia Times on this, Mr.Shahzad reported as follows: “ Asia Times Online has received a message from top guerrilla commander Ilyas Kashmiri, whose 313 Brigade is an operational arm of al-Qaeda. The message arrived on Monday morning (Feb.15), shortly after the deadly weekend bombing of the German Bakery in the western Indian city of Pune. The message does not specifically claim responsibility for the bombing, but implies the Brigade's involvement.”
13. Even after the July,2006, explosions in the Mumbai suburban trains, a person, who gave his name as Abu al Hadeed, had rung up the office of the Current News Service (CNS) in Srinagar claiming responsibility in the name of what he described as Al Qaeda of J&K. However, indigenous Kashmiri organisations ridiculed the claim and said that there was no such organisation in the State.
14.On June 8, 2007, the same news agency is reported to have received a statement in Urdu recorded in a CD in the name of one Abu Abdal Rehman al-Ansari, described as the Amir of Al Qaeda fil Hind (Al Qaeda in India). The statement was read out by a masked gunman, who gave his name as Abu Ibrahim al-Asim before a camera. Whereas the 2006 statement was in the name of Al Qaeda of J&K, the statement of June 8, 2007, was in the name of Al Qaeda of India. Both the statements had referred to al-Ansari as the Amir of Al Qaeda. The June 8 statement pledged to wage jihad not only on India, but also against all infidels, apostates and hypocrites and against "enemies masqueradng as friends" . It criticised both the factions of the Hurriyat Conference and the Pakistan-based United Jihad Council headed by Syed Salahuddin of the Hizbul Mujahideen.
15. There are two types of messages purporting to be from Al Qaeda relating to India. The first are video or audio messages of Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri relating to the global jihad and the global intifada in which there are references to India, including Kashmir. These have been authenticated by Western intelligence agencies on the basis of voice recognition. They are in the form of general criticism of India or general threats and not specific.
16. The second are messages claiming responsibility on behalf of Al Qaeda for specific acts of terrorism in India such as the Mumbai suburban train explosions of July 2006, the Mumbai terrorist strikes of 26/11 and the Pune German bakery explosion and warning of future acts of terrorism against global sports events in India. These are messages circulated through the Internet or through phone calls by persons whose voices could not be identified. There is no way of establishing the authenticity of these messages. We must take them seriously for further investigation and strengthening physical security. At the same time, we should take care not to walk into any trap of the ISI to divert suspicion away from the LET and other Pakistani jihadi organizations and from the ISI for serious acts of terrorism in Indian territory by creating an impression that those were carried out by Al Qaeda.
17. It is quite possible that there was an active role of Al Qaeda in acts of terrorism in Indian territory, including Jammu & Kashmir. It has been particularly keen to attack Jewish targets in India, including the Israeli Embassy in New Delhi. Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, who had orchestrated the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US, had admitted to have once visited India and had told US interrogators of Al Qaeda’s intention for an attack on the Israeli Embassy in New Delhi. But it is doubtful whether Al Qaeda is as yet in a position to organize a major strike in Indian territory on its own without the collaboration of the LET and other Pakistani organizations. We should not walk into any ISI trap for creating an impression that Al Qaeda has supplanted the ISI’s surrogates such as the LET. ( 7-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
“The Hindu” of July 7,2010, has carried an article by its terrorism analyst Praveen Swami titled “Pakistan’s Competing Jihadists.” The article refers to a message purported to have been issued before his death (confirmed by Al Qaeda) in a US Drone strike in May last by Sai’d al-Masri (al-Masri means the Egyptian) also known as Mustafa Abu al-Yazid. He was reputedly the No.3 in Al Qaeda and was in charge of operations in Afghanistan.
2.According to Shri Swami, an English translation of this message was made available to him “by the Washington DC based Middle East Media Research Institute”. This Institute is popularly known as MEMRI. It is alleged to have close links with the Israeli Military Intelligence and the Likud Party.
3. Wikipedia comments as follows on MEMRI: “The Middle East Media Research Institute, or MEMRI for short, is a Middle Eastern press monitoring organization. Its headquarters is located in Washington, DC, with branch offices in Jerusalem, Berlin, London, Rome, Shanghai, Baghdad, and Tokyo. MEMRI was co-founded in 1998 by Yigal Carmon, a former colonel in Israeli military intelligence, and another Israeli Meyrav Wurmser. It provides a free source of English language translations of material published in Arabic and Persian script, and publishes its analyses and in-depth reports on its website - although it also offers specialized content for a fee. The organization's translations are regularly quoted by major international newspapers, and its work has generated strong criticism and praise. Some critics have accused MEMRI of selectively choosing for translation and dissemination the most extreme views from Arabic and Persian media, which portray the Arab and Muslim world in a negative light, while ignoring moderate views that are often found in the same media outlets. Other critics charge that while MEMRI does sometimes translate pro-US or pro-democracy voices in the regional media, it systematically leaves out intelligent criticism of Western-style democracy, US and Israeli policy and secularism. MEMRI's current mission statement states the organization "explores the Middle East through the region's media. MEMRI bridges the language gap which exists between the West and the Middle East, providing timely translations of Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and Urdu-Pashtun media, as well as original analysis of political, ideological, intellectual, social, cultural, and religious trends in the Middle East." Until 2001, its Mission Statement stated that the institute also emphasizes "the continuing relevance of Zionism to the Jewish people and to the state of Israel." MEMRI's goals and emphasis have evolved over the years; it originally translated articles in both Arabic and Hebrew. Concerning this change in their ‘mission statement,’ Political Research Associates (PRA), which studies the US political right, notes that it occurred three weeks after the September 11 attacks, and considers MEMRI "was previously more forthcoming about its political orientation in its self-description and in staff profiles on its website." PRA considers that “MEMRI's slogan, ‘Bridging the Language Gap Between the Middle East and the West,’ does not convey the institute's stridently pro-Israel and anti-Arab political bias.” It further notes, that MEMRI's founders, Wurmser and Carmon, “are both hardline pro-Israel ideologues aligned with Israel's Likud party.”
4. So far as one knows, the message of al-Masri disseminated by MEMRI has not yet been authenticated by any official Western agency or non-governmental organization studying messages purported to have been disseminated by Al Qaeda, its leaders and as-Sahab, the propaganda wing of Al Qaeda, but one is subject to correction.
5. In its intro to Shri Swami’s article, “The Hindu” says: “ For the first time, the al-Qaeda has claimed responsibility for an attack in India.” “The Hindu’s” reference is to the explosion in the German bakery in Pune on February 13 last. Mr.Swami himself writes in his article as follows: “ For the first time, though, al-Masri referred to the Pakistan-based jihadist Muhammad Ilyas Kashmiri as an official part of the Al Qaeda--- and made public his role in an attack on India.”
6.According to Mr.Swami, the message as supplied by MEMRI says as follows: “ I bring you the good tidings that last February’s India operation was against a Jewish locale in the West of the Indian capital in the area of the German bakeries--- a fact that the enemy tried to hide---- and close to 20 Jews were killed in the operation, a majority of them from the so-called statelet, Israel. The person who carried out this operation was a heroic soldier from the “Soldiers of the Sacrifice Brigade”, which is one of the brigades of Qaedat al-Jihad ( the al-Qaeda’s formal name) in Kashmir under the command of commander Ilyas Kashmiri, may Allah preserve him.”
7. Commenting on the claim made in the message. Mr.Swami says: “ From the text, it is clear that al-Masri had little knowledge of the bombing of the German Bakery in Pune. Pune is not to the west of New Delhi; it is not Jewish-owned; and no Israelis were killed there. There would thus be no reason to take al-Masri’s claims seriously--- if it weren’t for the testimony of Pakistani-American jihadist David Headley.”
8. al-Masri was born in Egypt on December 17, 1955. Along with Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s No.2,he was a founding member of the Islamic Jihad of Egypt, which was alleged to have been involved in the assassination of then Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981. He was arrested by the Egyptian authorities along with Zawahiri. They managed to escape and reach Afghanistan in 1988 and join Osama bin Laden. When bin Laden went to the Sudan in 1991 after his passport was reportedly cancelled by the Saudi authorities, al-Masri joined him there and was appointed by bin Laden as an accountant of a business company started by him in the Sudan. In 1996, under US pressure, the Sudanese authorities asked bin Laden to leave the Sudan. He went to Afghanistan accompanied by al-Masri. Zawahiri joined them there. The US National Commission, which enquired into the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US homeland, described him as the Chief Financial Manager of Al Qaeda. In May 2007, bin Laden was reported to have designated him as in charge of Al Qaeda’s operations in Afghanistan. In that capacity, he was responsible for co-ordination of operations with the Afghan Taliban.
9. In February 2009, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) had received a message purported to be from Mustafa Abu-al Yazid, warning of more Mumbai-style attacks. The message, whose authenticity could not be established, sought to create an impression as if the 28/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai were carried out by Al Qaeda.
10.I had commented as follows on that mesaage : “ His warnings of more Mumbai-style attacks should be factored into our security arrangements and that means, strengthening physical security not only for possible Indian targets, but also for possible foreign targets such as those of Israel and the US. A rule of prudence is don’t ignore a threat unless and until it is proved to be false. The message needs careful analysis in co-operation with Al Qaeda experts in the US. The message suspiciously serves the Pakistani agenda of projecting the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai as executed by an international jihadi group based in Europe and inspired by Al Qaeda. There are suspicious elements in the message. Why was it disseminated through the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and not initially through Al Jazeera? Why has it not yet appeared in the web sites associated with Al Qaeda? Why there was no reference to the Mumbai attack in the one message of Osama bin Laden and two of his No.2 Ayman al-Zawahiri disseminated by Al Qaeda since the beginning of this year? Why the message has not been disseminated through As Sahab, the official propaganda organ of Al Qaeda.”
11. Subsequently, in April,2009, another message purporting to be from al-Masri circulated through the Internet. It read as follows: “. “We send a short and succinct message to the Indian Government. The Mujahideen will never allow you to invade the Muslims and their lands in Pakistan. If you beguile yourselves into doing this, know well that you will pay a very heavy price, which you will regret much. We will call upon our whole Muslim nation, its Mujahideen and its martyrdom squads against you. We will strike your interests and your economic lifelines wherever they may be until you are demolished and bankrupt as America is being demolished and going bankrupt today. The Islamic nation which produced the audacious and heroic martyrs of Bombay, who struck you in the midst of your homes and humiliated you, is able to produce thousands more like them. You cannot be more powerful or have more ability than the Soviet Union which was destroyed on the rocks of the Afghanistan mountains nor Americans whose nose we rubbed in the dirt of Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia.”
12. This message added to the suspicion that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence might be behind the dissemination of these messages in order to draw suspicion away from the LET for the terrorist strikes of 26/11 in Mumbai. After the Pune Bakery attack, Syed Saleem Shahzad , the Karachi correspondent of “Asia Times Online”, received an E-mail message purporting to be from Ilyas Kashmiri threatening terrorist strikes in India during the World Cup Hockey League and IPL cricket matches as well as during the forthcoming Commonwealth Games. In his dispatch to the Asia Times on this, Mr.Shahzad reported as follows: “ Asia Times Online has received a message from top guerrilla commander Ilyas Kashmiri, whose 313 Brigade is an operational arm of al-Qaeda. The message arrived on Monday morning (Feb.15), shortly after the deadly weekend bombing of the German Bakery in the western Indian city of Pune. The message does not specifically claim responsibility for the bombing, but implies the Brigade's involvement.”
13. Even after the July,2006, explosions in the Mumbai suburban trains, a person, who gave his name as Abu al Hadeed, had rung up the office of the Current News Service (CNS) in Srinagar claiming responsibility in the name of what he described as Al Qaeda of J&K. However, indigenous Kashmiri organisations ridiculed the claim and said that there was no such organisation in the State.
14.On June 8, 2007, the same news agency is reported to have received a statement in Urdu recorded in a CD in the name of one Abu Abdal Rehman al-Ansari, described as the Amir of Al Qaeda fil Hind (Al Qaeda in India). The statement was read out by a masked gunman, who gave his name as Abu Ibrahim al-Asim before a camera. Whereas the 2006 statement was in the name of Al Qaeda of J&K, the statement of June 8, 2007, was in the name of Al Qaeda of India. Both the statements had referred to al-Ansari as the Amir of Al Qaeda. The June 8 statement pledged to wage jihad not only on India, but also against all infidels, apostates and hypocrites and against "enemies masqueradng as friends" . It criticised both the factions of the Hurriyat Conference and the Pakistan-based United Jihad Council headed by Syed Salahuddin of the Hizbul Mujahideen.
15. There are two types of messages purporting to be from Al Qaeda relating to India. The first are video or audio messages of Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri relating to the global jihad and the global intifada in which there are references to India, including Kashmir. These have been authenticated by Western intelligence agencies on the basis of voice recognition. They are in the form of general criticism of India or general threats and not specific.
16. The second are messages claiming responsibility on behalf of Al Qaeda for specific acts of terrorism in India such as the Mumbai suburban train explosions of July 2006, the Mumbai terrorist strikes of 26/11 and the Pune German bakery explosion and warning of future acts of terrorism against global sports events in India. These are messages circulated through the Internet or through phone calls by persons whose voices could not be identified. There is no way of establishing the authenticity of these messages. We must take them seriously for further investigation and strengthening physical security. At the same time, we should take care not to walk into any trap of the ISI to divert suspicion away from the LET and other Pakistani jihadi organizations and from the ISI for serious acts of terrorism in Indian territory by creating an impression that those were carried out by Al Qaeda.
17. It is quite possible that there was an active role of Al Qaeda in acts of terrorism in Indian territory, including Jammu & Kashmir. It has been particularly keen to attack Jewish targets in India, including the Israeli Embassy in New Delhi. Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, who had orchestrated the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US, had admitted to have once visited India and had told US interrogators of Al Qaeda’s intention for an attack on the Israeli Embassy in New Delhi. But it is doubtful whether Al Qaeda is as yet in a position to organize a major strike in Indian territory on its own without the collaboration of the LET and other Pakistani organizations. We should not walk into any ISI trap for creating an impression that Al Qaeda has supplanted the ISI’s surrogates such as the LET. ( 7-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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