B.RAMAN
"It should be a matter of concern---but not yet of alarm---- that the fedayeen attack by a group of two terrorists---- apparently from Pakistan --- in the Lal Chowk of Srinagar on January 6, 2010, has come at a time when emotions are once again being whipped up in Pakistan over the Kashmir issue. The fedayeen attack resulted in a 22-hour confrontation between the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the terrorists, who managed to entrench themselves in a local hotel before they were killed.
"The whipping-up of emotions has the following objectives:
* To divert attention away from the domestic challenges faced by Zardari and the PPP-led Government.
* To placate the Army due to fears that the Army might get involved in any conspiracy to force the exit of Zardari.
* To placate the Punjabi jihadi organisations, which have been itching for renewed action in J&K, in order to bring about a divide between them and the anti-Army Pakistani Taliban.
"As a result of an improvement in the ground situation during the last two years, the Government of India, with the co-operation of the Government in Srinagar, had embarked on a policy with the following components:
* A calibrated withdrawal and/or re-deployment of the Army troops in order to give the J&K Police and the CRPF a greater responsibility for maintaining peace and law and order in the State.
* Maintaining on the ground the confidence-building measures already agreed upon with Pakistan before the bilateral dialogue came to be suspended following the 26/11 terrorist strikes by the Lashkar-e-Toiba in Mumbai.
* Maintaining the momentum of the dialogue between the Government and representatives of different political formations in the State in order to work out a political solution to their demands which are considered legitimate.
"The first fedayeen attack since 2007 need not call into question the wisdom of continuing this strategy. At the same time, the danger that a besieged Zardari-led Government might try to undermine this strategy by stepping up jihadi terrorism in the State has to be constantly studied, analysed and assessed by our intelligence agencies, the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). "
--------- From my note of January 8,2010, titled " Terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers36%5Cpaper3595.html
---------------------------------------------
The latest spell of unrest in Jammu & Kashmir ( J&K) involving clashes between stone-throwing and curfew-breaking mobs and the security forces has resulted in some fatalities----many of them allegedly young people. According to available accounts, the unrest has been partly spontaneous and partly orchestrated by elements suspected to be associated with the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in the Sopore area. The exploitation of the unrest by the LET and its subsequent aggravation should not be a matter of surprise. The unrest, if it can be kept sustained, gives the LET and other Pakistan-based jihadi organizations an opportunity to turn the international focus back to J&K without incurring any international criticism. While the West has come out against jihadi terrorism of Pakistani origin in hinterland India outside J&K, it will be inclined to close its eyes to the role of the Pakistani jihadi organisations in the latest spell of unrest in J&K and focus only on the manner in which the Indian security forces have been dealing with the unrest.
2. In Mumbai and the rest of hinterland India, the focus was and continues to be largely on Pakistan, but in J&K it will be considerably on India. This makes it important for us to adopt a mix of firmness in discouraging violence and avoiding over-reaction in responding to acts of violence----particularly by young people. There is a need for a verbal restraint from all sides. Lionisation of the security forces by some political parties and praising their valour in facing the violent mobs would be as inadvisable as their demonisation by others. Similarly any attempt by the Governments in the State and at the Centre to demonise the Kashmiri youth participating in the demonstrations against the security forces would be unwise. Even if the Government has concrete evidence of the involvement of the LET in provoking and stoking the unrest, it should avoid for the time being any over-projection of the external involvement since this could further provoke the younger elements.
3. The immediate objective should be enforcement of law and order without letting ourselves be provoked into using more force than necessary and at the same time diluting the anger through interactions with the civil society and seeking its co-operation in discouraging violations of curfew and mob violence directed against the security forces. The Government has done well to advise the security forces to use restraint in dealing with stone-pelting mobs. It is an advice easily given, but difficult to carry out, but one has to find ways of doing so if there are a large number of children in the mob.
4. Remarks by political leaders on both sides of the political spectrum which lend themselves to misinterpretation by sections of the people that the political class and the security personnel are insensitive to the deaths of young people allegedly at the hands of the security forces add to the anger and tend to make the situation even more uncontrollable than it has been.
5. We cannot treat our Kashmiris as no different from the Pakistanis of the LET and other Pakistan-based organizations even if they let themselves be used by the Pakistani organizations. The Government has an obligation to ascertain their grievances and address those which seem to be legitimate. Perceptions of Government’s indifference to dialogue unless it is forced to talk through mob violence add to the violence and create fresh spells of unrest.
6. The Government of Pakistan, its Army and Inter-Services Intelligence cannot ask for anything better than a confrontational situation between the security forces and sections of the people of Kashmir. Confrontational situations play into the hands of Pakistan-sponsored terrorists and would enable them to keep J&K boiling again.
7. In the training of our security forces in mob control, we have to stress the importance of a balanced response and not getting easily provoked by a mob.
8. The coverage of the unrest in J&K by some of our TV channels has been unfortunate. This has been particularly so in the case of Shri Arnab Goswami, the Editor and Anchor of the Times Now Channel, who has converted his channel into an electronic Hyde Park. In a programme on the evening of June 30, he had invited a representative each of the Congress (I) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a former Director of the Intelligence Bureau, and two Kashmiri leaders who are not on the same wavelength as the Governments in Srinagar and New Delhi. Since the Kashmiris are the aggrieved people, one would have expected him to give adequate opportunity to the two Kashmiri leaders. Unfortunately, he allowed most of the discussion to be monopolized by the Congress (I) and BJP leaders, who fought in an unbecoming manner. The two Kashmiri leaders were hardly able to give vent to their feelings. The fact that Mr.Goswami is a man of many prejudices came out clearly. (1-7-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, June 30, 2010
ENHANCED CHINESE INTEREST IN PAKISTAN
B.RAMAN
The Chinese Foreign Ministry has announced that at the invitation of the Chinese Government President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan will be visiting China from July 6 to 11,2010, for talks with President Hu Jintao, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and other Chinese leaders.This will be his second official visit to China at the invitation of the Chinese Government. His first visit was in October,2008, shortly after he took over as the President. In fact, after assuming office as the President, he chose China for his first official bilateral visit to emphasise the importance attached by him to his country's relations with China.
2. He had announced during his first visit that he would be visiting various Chinese provinces once a quarter to learn from the Chinese experience in economic development. In pursuance of this, he had visited China thrice last year. These visits were not undertaken at the invitation of the Chinese Government. He visited a number of Chinese provinces and discussed with the local officials and businessmen about their experience in developing their provinces. He also discussed with them prospects for co-operation between their provinces and Pakistan. During these visits, he did not go to Beijing. The Chinese Foreign Minister flew to one of the provinces being visited by Mr.Zardari and called on him. Before leaving for Pakistan, he spoke with Mr.Hu and Mr.Wen over telephone.
3. The most productive of his visits so far has been his visit to Hang Zhou in the Zhejiang province and Guangzhou in the Guangdong province from August 21 to 24, 2009. During this visit, he sought Chinese participation in the development of hydel, thermal and solar energy projects, irrigation and fisheries and mobile telephone networks and in creating facilities for higher technical education, including the setting-up of a telecommunications university and research complex. Among the concrete results from this visit were:
* The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to promote cooperation in river fisheries and related technologies by representatives of the Indus River Fresh Water Fisheries Research Institute and the Pearl River Fishery Research Institute of Guangzhou.
* The signing of an MOU for the construction of a dam at Bunji in the Astore district of Gilgit-Baltistan by officials of Pakistan’s Ministry of Water and Power and China’s Three Gorges Project Corporation. The Chairman Board of Investment Saleem Mandviwala and Li Yang’an of the Chinese corporation signed the MoU. The dam, one of the eight hydel projects short-listed for construction by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), will have a capacity of generating 7,000 megawatts of electricity.
* The signing of an MOU on cooperation in drug regulation and production of hepatitis B and C vaccines.
* The signing of another MOU between the Sindh Agricultural University in Tandojam and the South China Agricultural University in the Guangzhou province for cooperation in agricultural research, plant protection and animal husbandry.
* The signing of two separate MsOU by the Board of Investment of Pakistan with the China Council for Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), Guangdong province and the Guangdong Sub Council of CCPIT.
4.Mr. Zardari attended a presentation on small and medium sized dams, water conservation and irrigation by the Zhejiang Design Institute of Water Conservancy and Hydroelectric Power. Li Yueming, the President of the institute, said they had carried out feasibility studies of a couple of medium-sized dams in the Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK).Shakeel Durrani, Chairman of the WAPDA, who was present on the occasion, said that Chinese companies were already working on a number of hydel projects in Pakistan, including Neelum-Jhelum and Gomal Zam and the raising of the height of the Mangla dam in the POK. He said the institute would be invited to bid for the construction of 12 small dams. Five of these dams were to be built in Balochistan, four in Sindh, two in Punjab and one in Khyber-Pakthoonwa.
5.In a report carried by the "News" of August 18, 2009, before Mr. Zardari's visit, Mr. Kamran Khan, its journalist, alleged that without inviting open bidding from interested companies and investors, the Pakistan Steel had signed a non-transparent secret MoU with the Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC) for a $2.2 billion expansion programme to raise its current production capacity of 1.1 million tons to five million tons. According to him, contrary to relevant government rules and regulations as well as basic norms of transparency, the Pakistan Steel didn’t place any advertisement in the local and international press to seek the best international offers before entering into secret negotiations with the Chinese company, which was long seeking to clinch this deal. He said: "The most shocking element of this MoU, available with this correspondent, which will bind Pakistan with an additional foreign loan of $2.2 billion, is a clause that requires complete secrecy of this understanding. Clause 6.1 of this MoU states: “This MoU and any discussions related to it shall remain strictly confidential between the parties and no public announcement shall be made without written consent of both parties.” Kamran Khan quoted a Pakistani official as saying: “This was not our requirement but the Chinese company asked for this secrecy clause and we agreed.”
6. During his interactions with local officials and businessmen in the course of this visit, Mr.Zardari kept pointing out that the Western regions of China now being developed were closer to Pakistani ports than to Chinese ports and invited ideas and proposals for developing rail and road communications between Pakistan and Xinjiang. Since taking over as the President, he has reportedly been pressing the Chinese for early implementation of the ideas mooted by Pakistan when Gen.Pervez Musharraf was in office for the construction of gas and oil pipelines between the Chinese-constructed port of Gwadar and Xinjiang and for the construction of a railwayline between Pakistan and Xinjiang. Pakistan had also mooted with Beijing the idea of China purchasing part of the gas which will be coming into Pakistan from Iran when the proposed Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline is completed.
7. The Chinese have not yet shown much interest in the proposal for pipelines between Gwadar and Xinjiang because of the bad security situation in Balochistan and in the proposal for the supply of gas from Iran to Xinjiang because of the difficulties which this project is expected to face due to the threatened US sanctions against foreign companies collaborating with Iran in energy projects. However, the Chinese have agreed to conduct a feasibility study on the proposed railway line between Pakistan and Xinjiang. Two MsOU were signed on October 28, 2009, and March 6,2010, between the Railways Ministry of Pakistan and China Railway Group Limited on the feasibility study. The progress made in this regard is expected to be discussed during Mr.Zardari's forthcoming visit to Beijing.
8. Despite the public controversy in Pakistan over the poor quality of the railway engines and other rolling stock supplied by Chinese companies to the Pakistan Railways, Mr.Zardari has reportedly been keen to seek Chinese help for improving management practices and maintenance facilities in the Pakistan Railways. He has also been pursuing the idea of a private railway company run by the Chinese which can use on payment the tracks of the Pakistan Railways.
9. Mr.Zardari's visit will be taking a place less than a month after the China Nuclear Industry Fifth Construction Company (CNIFCC) and the China Zhongyuan Engineering Corp, which specialises in foreign nuclear projects, signed at Shanghai on June 8, 2010, an agreement to work together on the third and fourth nuclear power plants at the Chashma complex. A Chinese language announcement regarding the signing was made on June 8 on the website of the Construction Company. China also reportedly informed the Nuclear Suppliers' Group during its recent meeting at Christ Church, New Zealand, of its decision to go ahead with the supply of Chashma IV and V to Pakistan. Pakistani sources say that while there were questions raised as to on what basis the Chinese claimed that these additional projects are not subject to NSG restrictions on the supply of nuclear equipment and technology to non-signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), there were no formal objections to the Chinese move.
10. All formalities for the inauguration of the construction, including arrangements for a soft Chinese loan to fund the construction, have been completed on the Chinese side, but a formal agreement between the Governments of China and Pakistan under which Pakistan will agree to place Chashma III and IV also under the safeguards and supervision of the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency is still to be signed. This will be similar to the earlier agreements about Chashma I and II. The signing of this formal agreement is likely to be discussed during Mr.Zardari's visit.
11. Recent comments by Chinese officials intriguingly indicate that China now projects not only the proposed Chashma IV and V, but even the wider agreement between the two Governments for civil nuclear co-operation as beyond the purview of the NSG as it was reached before China joined the NSG in 2004. This interpretation, if it prevails, would mean that China considered itself free to supply not only Chashma III and IV, but also four other nuclear power stations, not part of the Chashma grandfather project, which Musharraf had requested for. Musharraf, a Mohajir, as well as Mr.Zardari, a Sindhi, have been keen that at least one or two Chinese-aided nuclear power stations must be located in Karachi, the capital of the Sindh province, which has been going through a severe power crisis for some years now affecting local industrial production. Mr.Zardari is expected to press this issue further.
12. The Chinese will face difficulty in discussing nuclear matters with Mr.Zardari because the Pakistan Army does not trust him in nuclear matters just as it didn't trust Mrs.Benazir Bhutto when she was the Prime Minister. This lack of trust in Mr.Zardari became evident on November 27,2009, when Mr.Zardari gave up the chairmanship of the Nuclear National Command Authority and transferred it to Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani. Though this was made out as a decision taken by Mr. Zardari at his own initiative, it was believed to have been prompted by the Army.
13.But, even in the case of Mrs.Benazir Bhutto, the Army did not allow its distrust of her to come in the way of using her services during her second term as the Prime Minister for reaching a secret agreement with North Korea on the acquisition of North Korean missiles and related technology. It is therefore, unlikely to have any objections to Mr.Zardari using his friendships and contacts in China for facilitating an agreement for the construction of more Chinese nuclear power stations in Pakistan.
14. Mr.Zardari's forthcoming visit will coincide with the third joint counter-terrorism exercise between the armies of the two countries. The Chinese Ministry of National Defence announced on June 24 that the third joint counter-terrorism exercise will be held at Qingtongxia in northwest China's Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region from July 1 to 11. The first exercise was held in 2004, in Xinjiang's Taxkorgan Tajik Autonomous County bordering Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan. About 200 soldiers from both countries participated. The second exercise was held in 2006 in the Abbottabad area of Pakistan. About 400 soldiers from both sides participated. The third exercise was to have been held in China in 2008, but was postponed for unexplained reasons. According to Uighur sources, the authorities of the two countries were probably concerned that a joint exercise in the wake of the anger over the Chinese role in the Lal Masjid raid in July 2007 could lead to fresh attacks on Chinese nationals in Pakistan.
15.Though no joint exercise has been held since 2006, the close co-operation in counter-terrorism continues at two levels---between the two armies and between the Interior Ministry of Pakistan and the Ministry of Public Security of China. Mr.Rehman Malik, Pakistan's Interior Minister, had visited China in 2009 and again earlier this year to discuss counter-terrorism co-operation, including exchange of intelligence.
16.Replying to the debate on the budgetary demands of the Ministry of the Interior in the National Assembly on June 24, 2009, Mr.Malik said: “Due to the efforts of the President and the Prime Minister, the Chinese Government has provided $290 million for capacity building of our security forces.”
17. The decision of the Chinese authorities to assist Pakistani capacity-building in counter-terrorism was officially conveyed to Mr.Malik when he visited Beijing and Shanghai from June 9 to 12, 2009. The visit was preceded by the Pakistan Government’s handing over to the Chinese of 10 members of the Uighur diaspora in Pakistan despite objections from the Amnesty International, which feared that these Uighurs might be executed by China without proper trial, The Pakistani authorities, who officially revealed the handing-over on June 5, 2009, as reported by the "News" of June 6, claimed that these Uighurs, who were rounded up during the Pakistan Army's counter-insurgency operations in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), belonged to the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM).
18. The "News" of June , 2009, reported as follows: "According to some sources in Islamabad, the Chinese militants were extradited despite opposition by the Amnesty International. In March 2009, Tim Parritt, Deputy Director of the Amnesty International’s Asia-Pacific Programme, had observed that whatever these militants were accused of, the risks posed to them were extremely grave, if forcibly returned to China. He had maintained that under the international law, states were obliged not to expel, return or extradite any person to a country where they risk torture or other ill-treatment. However, the Pakistani authorities insist that all those who had been extradited to Beijing were involved in terrorist activities both in China and in Pakistan and had also developed links with al-Qaeda network in the tribal areas of Pakistan. They said the fact that the ETIM militants had extended their network of terrorist activities to Pakistan was evident from a threat they had conveyed to the Chinese Embassy in Islamabad, saying they intended to kidnap Chinese diplomats and consular officers stationed in the Pakistani federal capital with a view to highlighting their cause. The Chinese mission subsequently informed the Pakistani authorities in a letter that some members of the ETIM had already reached Islamabad and planned to kidnap their staffers from the federal capital. The letter reportedly pointed out that terrorist groups located in Pakistan, including al-Qaeda, had been providing support to the ETIM activists for the likely kidnappings. Subsequent investigations had established that the anonymous threat was issued by none other than the East Turkistan Islamic Movement and that the would-be kidnappers had first travelled to Jalalabad in Afghanistan to finalise their plans."
19. During his stay in Beijing, Mr. Malik met State Councillor and Minister for Public Security Meng Jianzhu, the Communist Party of China Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkong and the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Wu Dawei, who hosted a dinner for him. There were no reports of any meeting with President Hu Jintao or Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. Talking to pressmen at Beijing, Mr. Malik said: "We have signed a number of agreements to build the capacity of our law enforcing agencies. We have signed agreements worth $ 300 million to acquire state of the art equipment to combat terrorism. The first consignment of these most needed equipment would be reaching Pakistan within three weeks. We want to ensure that our law enforcing agencies are well equipped, so that they could thwart with full force militancy. The equipment Pakistan needed included most modern mobile scanners that can detect hidden explosives and drugs. Initially, we would start employing these equipment in the metropolitan cities under threat of terrorism, like Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi and then gradually we plan to cover the entire country. "
20. On June 12, 2009, a blogspot of the "People's Daily" of China devoted to military issues had the following commentary: "Will China play a more "direct" role in both the Pakistan and Afghanistan conflicts? During the past two days, both Afghanistan and Pakistan are sending envoys to China to ask for China’s "direct" help in their fight against militants. The previous attempts to draw China into the conflicts by both NATO and US met with little success as China preferred to stay in the background and aid only in forms of financial and hardware support. China’s previous rejection to joining the military coalition is understandable as others have noted; while China does not view NATO/US missions in Afghanistan with suspicion compared to other Shanghai Co-operation Organisation states but allowing a military alliance to use China as a military supply route seem to undermine the Chinese Security-Umbrella that took 60 years and four wars to build. In addition, such an act violates China’s core foreign policy doctrine of non-interference in others' internal affairs. At the same time, the core Chinese military doctrine is changing with the release of the new “Outline of Military Training and Evaluation” which for the first time placed focus on Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) role for the PLA outside of China’s borders and anti-terror operation is considered part of the MOOTW. China is hosting the first “Non-traditional Security Forum of Armed Forces of ASEAN, China, Japan and ROK , something unthinkable just a few years ago. Maybe China is ready to move out of the “hide my capabilities and bide my time” phase to the “make some contributions” phase to be in line of what Hu coined the “harmonious world” (a.k.a, making the world safe for Confucianism) in his “Go Abroad” policy shift. It is also noted that both the Pakistan and Afghanistan’s request is coordinated and without "US/NATO involvement" which makes the request a bit more politically acceptable in China and the statement by Rehman Malik that "Pakistan has handed Chinese nationals accused of insurgent activity back to China and will continue to do so" is clearly aimed at audiences in China. Judging from China's Foreign Ministry Press Release, China might be ready to take a more direct role. China is ready to further expand and deepen our cooperation in various fields on the basis of mutual benefit so as to push forward our comprehensive partnership of cooperation."
21. Recent media reports emanating from the US about the existence of large mineral deposits in Afghanistan have given rise to speculation in Pakistan about the prospects of joint Pakistan-China projects for the exploration and exploitation of these minerals. China is already involved in the development of copper mines in Afghanistan. Its likely interest in the other minerals would make it receptive to suggestions in this regard from Pakistan. In the calculation of Pakistani officials, bringing in China in a big way for assisting in the economic development of Afghanistan would be one way of having the Indian role limited and ultimately reduced.
22.Why the recent indications of an enhanced Chinese interest in Pakistan? What role has the People's Liberation Army (PLA) played in it? On March 31, 2010, the China Studies Division of the Center for Naval Analyses of the US had hosted a half-day roundtable to discuss China’s relations with and activities in Pakistan. Among its conclusions were the following: "China-Pakistan relations have a strong military component, which some participants alleged makes the PLA a key player in China’s decisions involving Pakistan. Bilateral military cooperation ranges from naval cooperation, to past nuclear assistance, to arms sales, to combined military and anti-terror exercises.Roundtable participants held that PRC leaders much prefer the military-led governments of Pakistan’s past and appear less confident about the capabilities and effectiveness of the current, democratically elected civilian government in Pakistan. The United States and China share important existential concerns in Pakistan. Both view stability in Pakistan as an important policy goal, and both see their interests better served by secular government rule in Pakistan rather than by the ascension of a hard-line or fundamentalist regime. Close U.S.-China coordination on many issues involving Pakistan was assessed as likely to remain difficult given Beijing’s predilection for bilateral action. Moreover, while the United States and China at this juncture share common interests in Pakistan on an existential level, Washington and Beijing have neither the same threat assessment nor the same hierarchy of priorities that could facilitate robust coordinated action.
Even without close U.S.-China cooperation, participants felt there are good possibilities for complementary U.S. action, aid, and investment in Pakistan. It was suggested that the United States could capitalize on China’s aid and infrastructure investments in Pakistan by making complementary investments that would serve U.S. interests in Pakistan." A detailed report on the Round Table put out by the CNA is available at http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/D0022883.A1.China-Pak.pdf (30-6-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and also Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The Chinese Foreign Ministry has announced that at the invitation of the Chinese Government President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan will be visiting China from July 6 to 11,2010, for talks with President Hu Jintao, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and other Chinese leaders.This will be his second official visit to China at the invitation of the Chinese Government. His first visit was in October,2008, shortly after he took over as the President. In fact, after assuming office as the President, he chose China for his first official bilateral visit to emphasise the importance attached by him to his country's relations with China.
2. He had announced during his first visit that he would be visiting various Chinese provinces once a quarter to learn from the Chinese experience in economic development. In pursuance of this, he had visited China thrice last year. These visits were not undertaken at the invitation of the Chinese Government. He visited a number of Chinese provinces and discussed with the local officials and businessmen about their experience in developing their provinces. He also discussed with them prospects for co-operation between their provinces and Pakistan. During these visits, he did not go to Beijing. The Chinese Foreign Minister flew to one of the provinces being visited by Mr.Zardari and called on him. Before leaving for Pakistan, he spoke with Mr.Hu and Mr.Wen over telephone.
3. The most productive of his visits so far has been his visit to Hang Zhou in the Zhejiang province and Guangzhou in the Guangdong province from August 21 to 24, 2009. During this visit, he sought Chinese participation in the development of hydel, thermal and solar energy projects, irrigation and fisheries and mobile telephone networks and in creating facilities for higher technical education, including the setting-up of a telecommunications university and research complex. Among the concrete results from this visit were:
* The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to promote cooperation in river fisheries and related technologies by representatives of the Indus River Fresh Water Fisheries Research Institute and the Pearl River Fishery Research Institute of Guangzhou.
* The signing of an MOU for the construction of a dam at Bunji in the Astore district of Gilgit-Baltistan by officials of Pakistan’s Ministry of Water and Power and China’s Three Gorges Project Corporation. The Chairman Board of Investment Saleem Mandviwala and Li Yang’an of the Chinese corporation signed the MoU. The dam, one of the eight hydel projects short-listed for construction by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), will have a capacity of generating 7,000 megawatts of electricity.
* The signing of an MOU on cooperation in drug regulation and production of hepatitis B and C vaccines.
* The signing of another MOU between the Sindh Agricultural University in Tandojam and the South China Agricultural University in the Guangzhou province for cooperation in agricultural research, plant protection and animal husbandry.
* The signing of two separate MsOU by the Board of Investment of Pakistan with the China Council for Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), Guangdong province and the Guangdong Sub Council of CCPIT.
4.Mr. Zardari attended a presentation on small and medium sized dams, water conservation and irrigation by the Zhejiang Design Institute of Water Conservancy and Hydroelectric Power. Li Yueming, the President of the institute, said they had carried out feasibility studies of a couple of medium-sized dams in the Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK).Shakeel Durrani, Chairman of the WAPDA, who was present on the occasion, said that Chinese companies were already working on a number of hydel projects in Pakistan, including Neelum-Jhelum and Gomal Zam and the raising of the height of the Mangla dam in the POK. He said the institute would be invited to bid for the construction of 12 small dams. Five of these dams were to be built in Balochistan, four in Sindh, two in Punjab and one in Khyber-Pakthoonwa.
5.In a report carried by the "News" of August 18, 2009, before Mr. Zardari's visit, Mr. Kamran Khan, its journalist, alleged that without inviting open bidding from interested companies and investors, the Pakistan Steel had signed a non-transparent secret MoU with the Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC) for a $2.2 billion expansion programme to raise its current production capacity of 1.1 million tons to five million tons. According to him, contrary to relevant government rules and regulations as well as basic norms of transparency, the Pakistan Steel didn’t place any advertisement in the local and international press to seek the best international offers before entering into secret negotiations with the Chinese company, which was long seeking to clinch this deal. He said: "The most shocking element of this MoU, available with this correspondent, which will bind Pakistan with an additional foreign loan of $2.2 billion, is a clause that requires complete secrecy of this understanding. Clause 6.1 of this MoU states: “This MoU and any discussions related to it shall remain strictly confidential between the parties and no public announcement shall be made without written consent of both parties.” Kamran Khan quoted a Pakistani official as saying: “This was not our requirement but the Chinese company asked for this secrecy clause and we agreed.”
6. During his interactions with local officials and businessmen in the course of this visit, Mr.Zardari kept pointing out that the Western regions of China now being developed were closer to Pakistani ports than to Chinese ports and invited ideas and proposals for developing rail and road communications between Pakistan and Xinjiang. Since taking over as the President, he has reportedly been pressing the Chinese for early implementation of the ideas mooted by Pakistan when Gen.Pervez Musharraf was in office for the construction of gas and oil pipelines between the Chinese-constructed port of Gwadar and Xinjiang and for the construction of a railwayline between Pakistan and Xinjiang. Pakistan had also mooted with Beijing the idea of China purchasing part of the gas which will be coming into Pakistan from Iran when the proposed Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline is completed.
7. The Chinese have not yet shown much interest in the proposal for pipelines between Gwadar and Xinjiang because of the bad security situation in Balochistan and in the proposal for the supply of gas from Iran to Xinjiang because of the difficulties which this project is expected to face due to the threatened US sanctions against foreign companies collaborating with Iran in energy projects. However, the Chinese have agreed to conduct a feasibility study on the proposed railway line between Pakistan and Xinjiang. Two MsOU were signed on October 28, 2009, and March 6,2010, between the Railways Ministry of Pakistan and China Railway Group Limited on the feasibility study. The progress made in this regard is expected to be discussed during Mr.Zardari's forthcoming visit to Beijing.
8. Despite the public controversy in Pakistan over the poor quality of the railway engines and other rolling stock supplied by Chinese companies to the Pakistan Railways, Mr.Zardari has reportedly been keen to seek Chinese help for improving management practices and maintenance facilities in the Pakistan Railways. He has also been pursuing the idea of a private railway company run by the Chinese which can use on payment the tracks of the Pakistan Railways.
9. Mr.Zardari's visit will be taking a place less than a month after the China Nuclear Industry Fifth Construction Company (CNIFCC) and the China Zhongyuan Engineering Corp, which specialises in foreign nuclear projects, signed at Shanghai on June 8, 2010, an agreement to work together on the third and fourth nuclear power plants at the Chashma complex. A Chinese language announcement regarding the signing was made on June 8 on the website of the Construction Company. China also reportedly informed the Nuclear Suppliers' Group during its recent meeting at Christ Church, New Zealand, of its decision to go ahead with the supply of Chashma IV and V to Pakistan. Pakistani sources say that while there were questions raised as to on what basis the Chinese claimed that these additional projects are not subject to NSG restrictions on the supply of nuclear equipment and technology to non-signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), there were no formal objections to the Chinese move.
10. All formalities for the inauguration of the construction, including arrangements for a soft Chinese loan to fund the construction, have been completed on the Chinese side, but a formal agreement between the Governments of China and Pakistan under which Pakistan will agree to place Chashma III and IV also under the safeguards and supervision of the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency is still to be signed. This will be similar to the earlier agreements about Chashma I and II. The signing of this formal agreement is likely to be discussed during Mr.Zardari's visit.
11. Recent comments by Chinese officials intriguingly indicate that China now projects not only the proposed Chashma IV and V, but even the wider agreement between the two Governments for civil nuclear co-operation as beyond the purview of the NSG as it was reached before China joined the NSG in 2004. This interpretation, if it prevails, would mean that China considered itself free to supply not only Chashma III and IV, but also four other nuclear power stations, not part of the Chashma grandfather project, which Musharraf had requested for. Musharraf, a Mohajir, as well as Mr.Zardari, a Sindhi, have been keen that at least one or two Chinese-aided nuclear power stations must be located in Karachi, the capital of the Sindh province, which has been going through a severe power crisis for some years now affecting local industrial production. Mr.Zardari is expected to press this issue further.
12. The Chinese will face difficulty in discussing nuclear matters with Mr.Zardari because the Pakistan Army does not trust him in nuclear matters just as it didn't trust Mrs.Benazir Bhutto when she was the Prime Minister. This lack of trust in Mr.Zardari became evident on November 27,2009, when Mr.Zardari gave up the chairmanship of the Nuclear National Command Authority and transferred it to Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani. Though this was made out as a decision taken by Mr. Zardari at his own initiative, it was believed to have been prompted by the Army.
13.But, even in the case of Mrs.Benazir Bhutto, the Army did not allow its distrust of her to come in the way of using her services during her second term as the Prime Minister for reaching a secret agreement with North Korea on the acquisition of North Korean missiles and related technology. It is therefore, unlikely to have any objections to Mr.Zardari using his friendships and contacts in China for facilitating an agreement for the construction of more Chinese nuclear power stations in Pakistan.
14. Mr.Zardari's forthcoming visit will coincide with the third joint counter-terrorism exercise between the armies of the two countries. The Chinese Ministry of National Defence announced on June 24 that the third joint counter-terrorism exercise will be held at Qingtongxia in northwest China's Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region from July 1 to 11. The first exercise was held in 2004, in Xinjiang's Taxkorgan Tajik Autonomous County bordering Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan. About 200 soldiers from both countries participated. The second exercise was held in 2006 in the Abbottabad area of Pakistan. About 400 soldiers from both sides participated. The third exercise was to have been held in China in 2008, but was postponed for unexplained reasons. According to Uighur sources, the authorities of the two countries were probably concerned that a joint exercise in the wake of the anger over the Chinese role in the Lal Masjid raid in July 2007 could lead to fresh attacks on Chinese nationals in Pakistan.
15.Though no joint exercise has been held since 2006, the close co-operation in counter-terrorism continues at two levels---between the two armies and between the Interior Ministry of Pakistan and the Ministry of Public Security of China. Mr.Rehman Malik, Pakistan's Interior Minister, had visited China in 2009 and again earlier this year to discuss counter-terrorism co-operation, including exchange of intelligence.
16.Replying to the debate on the budgetary demands of the Ministry of the Interior in the National Assembly on June 24, 2009, Mr.Malik said: “Due to the efforts of the President and the Prime Minister, the Chinese Government has provided $290 million for capacity building of our security forces.”
17. The decision of the Chinese authorities to assist Pakistani capacity-building in counter-terrorism was officially conveyed to Mr.Malik when he visited Beijing and Shanghai from June 9 to 12, 2009. The visit was preceded by the Pakistan Government’s handing over to the Chinese of 10 members of the Uighur diaspora in Pakistan despite objections from the Amnesty International, which feared that these Uighurs might be executed by China without proper trial, The Pakistani authorities, who officially revealed the handing-over on June 5, 2009, as reported by the "News" of June 6, claimed that these Uighurs, who were rounded up during the Pakistan Army's counter-insurgency operations in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), belonged to the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM).
18. The "News" of June , 2009, reported as follows: "According to some sources in Islamabad, the Chinese militants were extradited despite opposition by the Amnesty International. In March 2009, Tim Parritt, Deputy Director of the Amnesty International’s Asia-Pacific Programme, had observed that whatever these militants were accused of, the risks posed to them were extremely grave, if forcibly returned to China. He had maintained that under the international law, states were obliged not to expel, return or extradite any person to a country where they risk torture or other ill-treatment. However, the Pakistani authorities insist that all those who had been extradited to Beijing were involved in terrorist activities both in China and in Pakistan and had also developed links with al-Qaeda network in the tribal areas of Pakistan. They said the fact that the ETIM militants had extended their network of terrorist activities to Pakistan was evident from a threat they had conveyed to the Chinese Embassy in Islamabad, saying they intended to kidnap Chinese diplomats and consular officers stationed in the Pakistani federal capital with a view to highlighting their cause. The Chinese mission subsequently informed the Pakistani authorities in a letter that some members of the ETIM had already reached Islamabad and planned to kidnap their staffers from the federal capital. The letter reportedly pointed out that terrorist groups located in Pakistan, including al-Qaeda, had been providing support to the ETIM activists for the likely kidnappings. Subsequent investigations had established that the anonymous threat was issued by none other than the East Turkistan Islamic Movement and that the would-be kidnappers had first travelled to Jalalabad in Afghanistan to finalise their plans."
19. During his stay in Beijing, Mr. Malik met State Councillor and Minister for Public Security Meng Jianzhu, the Communist Party of China Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkong and the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Wu Dawei, who hosted a dinner for him. There were no reports of any meeting with President Hu Jintao or Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. Talking to pressmen at Beijing, Mr. Malik said: "We have signed a number of agreements to build the capacity of our law enforcing agencies. We have signed agreements worth $ 300 million to acquire state of the art equipment to combat terrorism. The first consignment of these most needed equipment would be reaching Pakistan within three weeks. We want to ensure that our law enforcing agencies are well equipped, so that they could thwart with full force militancy. The equipment Pakistan needed included most modern mobile scanners that can detect hidden explosives and drugs. Initially, we would start employing these equipment in the metropolitan cities under threat of terrorism, like Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi and then gradually we plan to cover the entire country. "
20. On June 12, 2009, a blogspot of the "People's Daily" of China devoted to military issues had the following commentary: "Will China play a more "direct" role in both the Pakistan and Afghanistan conflicts? During the past two days, both Afghanistan and Pakistan are sending envoys to China to ask for China’s "direct" help in their fight against militants. The previous attempts to draw China into the conflicts by both NATO and US met with little success as China preferred to stay in the background and aid only in forms of financial and hardware support. China’s previous rejection to joining the military coalition is understandable as others have noted; while China does not view NATO/US missions in Afghanistan with suspicion compared to other Shanghai Co-operation Organisation states but allowing a military alliance to use China as a military supply route seem to undermine the Chinese Security-Umbrella that took 60 years and four wars to build. In addition, such an act violates China’s core foreign policy doctrine of non-interference in others' internal affairs. At the same time, the core Chinese military doctrine is changing with the release of the new “Outline of Military Training and Evaluation” which for the first time placed focus on Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) role for the PLA outside of China’s borders and anti-terror operation is considered part of the MOOTW. China is hosting the first “Non-traditional Security Forum of Armed Forces of ASEAN, China, Japan and ROK , something unthinkable just a few years ago. Maybe China is ready to move out of the “hide my capabilities and bide my time” phase to the “make some contributions” phase to be in line of what Hu coined the “harmonious world” (a.k.a, making the world safe for Confucianism) in his “Go Abroad” policy shift. It is also noted that both the Pakistan and Afghanistan’s request is coordinated and without "US/NATO involvement" which makes the request a bit more politically acceptable in China and the statement by Rehman Malik that "Pakistan has handed Chinese nationals accused of insurgent activity back to China and will continue to do so" is clearly aimed at audiences in China. Judging from China's Foreign Ministry Press Release, China might be ready to take a more direct role. China is ready to further expand and deepen our cooperation in various fields on the basis of mutual benefit so as to push forward our comprehensive partnership of cooperation."
21. Recent media reports emanating from the US about the existence of large mineral deposits in Afghanistan have given rise to speculation in Pakistan about the prospects of joint Pakistan-China projects for the exploration and exploitation of these minerals. China is already involved in the development of copper mines in Afghanistan. Its likely interest in the other minerals would make it receptive to suggestions in this regard from Pakistan. In the calculation of Pakistani officials, bringing in China in a big way for assisting in the economic development of Afghanistan would be one way of having the Indian role limited and ultimately reduced.
22.Why the recent indications of an enhanced Chinese interest in Pakistan? What role has the People's Liberation Army (PLA) played in it? On March 31, 2010, the China Studies Division of the Center for Naval Analyses of the US had hosted a half-day roundtable to discuss China’s relations with and activities in Pakistan. Among its conclusions were the following: "China-Pakistan relations have a strong military component, which some participants alleged makes the PLA a key player in China’s decisions involving Pakistan. Bilateral military cooperation ranges from naval cooperation, to past nuclear assistance, to arms sales, to combined military and anti-terror exercises.Roundtable participants held that PRC leaders much prefer the military-led governments of Pakistan’s past and appear less confident about the capabilities and effectiveness of the current, democratically elected civilian government in Pakistan. The United States and China share important existential concerns in Pakistan. Both view stability in Pakistan as an important policy goal, and both see their interests better served by secular government rule in Pakistan rather than by the ascension of a hard-line or fundamentalist regime. Close U.S.-China coordination on many issues involving Pakistan was assessed as likely to remain difficult given Beijing’s predilection for bilateral action. Moreover, while the United States and China at this juncture share common interests in Pakistan on an existential level, Washington and Beijing have neither the same threat assessment nor the same hierarchy of priorities that could facilitate robust coordinated action.
Even without close U.S.-China cooperation, participants felt there are good possibilities for complementary U.S. action, aid, and investment in Pakistan. It was suggested that the United States could capitalize on China’s aid and infrastructure investments in Pakistan by making complementary investments that would serve U.S. interests in Pakistan." A detailed report on the Round Table put out by the CNA is available at http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/D0022883.A1.China-Pak.pdf (30-6-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and also Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, June 28, 2010
DE-ESCALATION MOVES IN YELLOW SEA
B.RAMAN
( To be read in continuation of my earlier article titled " Hu Proposes, PLA Disposes)
There are apparent moves made by the US as well as China to de-escalate tensions due to Chinese objections to the prposed joint US-South Korea naval exercise in the Yellow Sea in which the nuclear-powered US aircraft-carrier USS George Washington was reportedly to participate.
2. The "China Daily" has inter alia reported as follows on June 29,2010: "Large-scale, anti-submarine drills were set for earlier this month in the ROK, but were postponed to give the US more time for preparations. They had been rescheduled for this week, but were delayed again and may take place in July. "If they insist on holding the drills under the current circumstances, it would only further escalate tensions in the region," said Zhai Dequan, deputy secretary-general of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association. "The US and ROK should continue to postpone or cancel the military drills," Zhai said. "
3.The " Global Times", published by the "People's Daily" group of the Communist Party of China, has reported as follows on the morning of June 29: "The planned US-South Korean military drill was postponed until July because the schedule remains unfinished, South Korea's Yonhap News Agency said Monday ( June 28)."
4. With the postponement of the proposed US-South Korea naval exercise, there has been an apparent attempt by Chinese circles also to play down the earlier interpretation of the live-ammunition exercise of the People's Liberation Army's Navy in the East China Sea as in response to the proposed US-South Korea naval exercise. Some Chinese commentators are now claiming that the dates for the Chinese drill were fixed sometime ago and that the Chinese drill was not connected with the US-South Korea exercise.However, while the US and South Korea have postponed their joint exercise, the PLA Navy is going ahead with its exercise as scheduled from June 30. It will continue till July 5.
5. While the "China Daily" coninues to display on its web site the hard-hitting article against the proposed US-South Korea joint exercise, the "Global Times" has come out with a little more balanced article on June 29 written by one Huang Jingjing. It says inter alia as follows:
"A public announcement saying that the Chinese navy will kick-off a six-day exercise tomorrow in the East China Sea that will feature live ammunition has stirred speculation about the timing of the drill.
"A fleet under the PLA will take part in the drill from tomorrow to July 5 in waters off Zhengjiang's east coast in the East China Sea, according to a notice published Sunday (June 27) on the local Wenzhou Evening News at the request of the fleet.
"The drill will be held from midnight to 6 pm every day. All irrelevant ships are prohibited from entering the region during the drill, the notice said.
"The notice gave no more details. However, many military observers and experts interpreted the drill in different ways.
"Some see it as a response to the joint military drill by the US and South Korea, which was originally set to begin Monday (June 28).
The drill reportedly includes US nuclear-powered aircraft carrier George Washington and was supposed to be held in waters off the west coast of South Korea, or the Yellow Sea, the waterway leading to China.
"It is reported that if the aircraft carrier enters the Yellow Sea, China's territorial sea, the entire North China region and the Liaodong Peninsula would be within its range, which was deemed a provocation to China, according to Hong Kong-based Ming Pao daily.
"The location of the Chinese drill is set to be held in the East China Sea, which would make the foreign navies entering the Yellow Sea uneasy," Song Zhongping, a military analysis for Hong Kong-based Phoenix TV, said on his blog on people. com.cn Monday (June 28).
He said the East China Sea is the only way into the Yellow Sea. He said it would be easy to form a favorable war situation for the Chinese navy to "shut the dogs up and beat them."
"However, the planned US-South Korean military drill was postponed until July because the schedule remains unfinished, South Korea's Yonhap News Agency said Monday.
"Some other military experts said the Chinese drill is just a routine exercise.
"The drill was planned early. It's a coincidence that it falls near the joint drill by South Korea and the US," Li Jie, a naval expert with the Beijing Naval Research Center, told the Global Times. "It's not only an exercise to improve defense ability, but a military action to coordinate with foreign policy."
"Song Xiaojun, another expert, did not think that China is holding the drill in response to the US-South Korea. China already fixed the date for its drill while the other drill's date has not been set, Song said."
6. At the same time, Chinese circles have expressed displeasure over the reported remarks of President Barack Obama at Toronto that while he understood President Hu Jintao's need to show restraint over his neighbor and ally, "there's a difference between restraint and willful blindness to consistent problems."
7.In an editorial on the subject, the "Global Times" of June 29 has stated as follows:
"US President Barack Obama groundlessly blamed China for "blindness" to North Korea's "belligerent behavior" in an alleged attack on the South Korean navel vessel the Cheonan while speaking at the G20 summit Monday (June 28).
"His words on such an important occasion, based on ignorance of China's consistent and difficult efforts in pushing for peace on the peninsula, have come as a shock to China and the world at large.
"As a close neighbor of North Korea, China and its people have immediate and vital stakes in peace and stability on the peninsula. China's worries over the North Korean nuclear issue are by no means less than those of the US.
"The US President should have taken these into consideration before making irresponsible and flippant remarks about China's role in the region.
"The facts speak for themselves, and very clearly so: China has made tremendous efforts in preventing the situation on the Korean Peninsula from getting out of control, including in the aftermath of the Cheonan incident.
"Without China's involvement, there would not have been the Six-Party Talks, and the outbreak of yet another Korean War might well have been a possibility.
"It is thus not China that is turning a blind eye to what North Korea has done and has not done.
"Instead, it is the leaders of countries such as the US that are turning a blind eye on purpose to China's efforts.
"The US President made the remarks only because China has not acted in accordance with the requests made by some countries. But those are unreasonable and irrational requests."
8. The controversy between the US and China on North Korea continues, but in politically measured tones to underline that the Chinese political leadership commands policy-making. ( 29-6-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
( To be read in continuation of my earlier article titled " Hu Proposes, PLA Disposes)
There are apparent moves made by the US as well as China to de-escalate tensions due to Chinese objections to the prposed joint US-South Korea naval exercise in the Yellow Sea in which the nuclear-powered US aircraft-carrier USS George Washington was reportedly to participate.
2. The "China Daily" has inter alia reported as follows on June 29,2010: "Large-scale, anti-submarine drills were set for earlier this month in the ROK, but were postponed to give the US more time for preparations. They had been rescheduled for this week, but were delayed again and may take place in July. "If they insist on holding the drills under the current circumstances, it would only further escalate tensions in the region," said Zhai Dequan, deputy secretary-general of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association. "The US and ROK should continue to postpone or cancel the military drills," Zhai said. "
3.The " Global Times", published by the "People's Daily" group of the Communist Party of China, has reported as follows on the morning of June 29: "The planned US-South Korean military drill was postponed until July because the schedule remains unfinished, South Korea's Yonhap News Agency said Monday ( June 28)."
4. With the postponement of the proposed US-South Korea naval exercise, there has been an apparent attempt by Chinese circles also to play down the earlier interpretation of the live-ammunition exercise of the People's Liberation Army's Navy in the East China Sea as in response to the proposed US-South Korea naval exercise. Some Chinese commentators are now claiming that the dates for the Chinese drill were fixed sometime ago and that the Chinese drill was not connected with the US-South Korea exercise.However, while the US and South Korea have postponed their joint exercise, the PLA Navy is going ahead with its exercise as scheduled from June 30. It will continue till July 5.
5. While the "China Daily" coninues to display on its web site the hard-hitting article against the proposed US-South Korea joint exercise, the "Global Times" has come out with a little more balanced article on June 29 written by one Huang Jingjing. It says inter alia as follows:
"A public announcement saying that the Chinese navy will kick-off a six-day exercise tomorrow in the East China Sea that will feature live ammunition has stirred speculation about the timing of the drill.
"A fleet under the PLA will take part in the drill from tomorrow to July 5 in waters off Zhengjiang's east coast in the East China Sea, according to a notice published Sunday (June 27) on the local Wenzhou Evening News at the request of the fleet.
"The drill will be held from midnight to 6 pm every day. All irrelevant ships are prohibited from entering the region during the drill, the notice said.
"The notice gave no more details. However, many military observers and experts interpreted the drill in different ways.
"Some see it as a response to the joint military drill by the US and South Korea, which was originally set to begin Monday (June 28).
The drill reportedly includes US nuclear-powered aircraft carrier George Washington and was supposed to be held in waters off the west coast of South Korea, or the Yellow Sea, the waterway leading to China.
"It is reported that if the aircraft carrier enters the Yellow Sea, China's territorial sea, the entire North China region and the Liaodong Peninsula would be within its range, which was deemed a provocation to China, according to Hong Kong-based Ming Pao daily.
"The location of the Chinese drill is set to be held in the East China Sea, which would make the foreign navies entering the Yellow Sea uneasy," Song Zhongping, a military analysis for Hong Kong-based Phoenix TV, said on his blog on people. com.cn Monday (June 28).
He said the East China Sea is the only way into the Yellow Sea. He said it would be easy to form a favorable war situation for the Chinese navy to "shut the dogs up and beat them."
"However, the planned US-South Korean military drill was postponed until July because the schedule remains unfinished, South Korea's Yonhap News Agency said Monday.
"Some other military experts said the Chinese drill is just a routine exercise.
"The drill was planned early. It's a coincidence that it falls near the joint drill by South Korea and the US," Li Jie, a naval expert with the Beijing Naval Research Center, told the Global Times. "It's not only an exercise to improve defense ability, but a military action to coordinate with foreign policy."
"Song Xiaojun, another expert, did not think that China is holding the drill in response to the US-South Korea. China already fixed the date for its drill while the other drill's date has not been set, Song said."
6. At the same time, Chinese circles have expressed displeasure over the reported remarks of President Barack Obama at Toronto that while he understood President Hu Jintao's need to show restraint over his neighbor and ally, "there's a difference between restraint and willful blindness to consistent problems."
7.In an editorial on the subject, the "Global Times" of June 29 has stated as follows:
"US President Barack Obama groundlessly blamed China for "blindness" to North Korea's "belligerent behavior" in an alleged attack on the South Korean navel vessel the Cheonan while speaking at the G20 summit Monday (June 28).
"His words on such an important occasion, based on ignorance of China's consistent and difficult efforts in pushing for peace on the peninsula, have come as a shock to China and the world at large.
"As a close neighbor of North Korea, China and its people have immediate and vital stakes in peace and stability on the peninsula. China's worries over the North Korean nuclear issue are by no means less than those of the US.
"The US President should have taken these into consideration before making irresponsible and flippant remarks about China's role in the region.
"The facts speak for themselves, and very clearly so: China has made tremendous efforts in preventing the situation on the Korean Peninsula from getting out of control, including in the aftermath of the Cheonan incident.
"Without China's involvement, there would not have been the Six-Party Talks, and the outbreak of yet another Korean War might well have been a possibility.
"It is thus not China that is turning a blind eye to what North Korea has done and has not done.
"Instead, it is the leaders of countries such as the US that are turning a blind eye on purpose to China's efforts.
"The US President made the remarks only because China has not acted in accordance with the requests made by some countries. But those are unreasonable and irrational requests."
8. The controversy between the US and China on North Korea continues, but in politically measured tones to underline that the Chinese political leadership commands policy-making. ( 29-6-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
HU PROPOSES, PLA DISPOSES
B.RAMAN
As President Hu Jintao took a series of steps to repair relations with the US which have come under a strain following the decision of the Barack Obama Administration earlier this year to sell a new arms package to Taiwan and the meeting of His Holiness the Dalai Lama with Mr.Obama in the White House during his visit to Washingtom DC, the goodwill sought to be re-generated between the political leaderships of the two countries is under threat of fresh dilution as a result of measures taken by the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA).
2. Among the measures taken by Mr.Hu to repair relations with the US were the Chinese support for sanctions by the UN against Iran on the nuclear issue, the Chinese decision to let the yuan float slightly in relation to the US dollar and Mr.Hu's acceptance of an invitation extended by Mr.Obama during their meeting in the margins of the G-20 summit at Toronto to pay a State visit to Washington DC later this year. According to all accounts, the meeting between Mr.Obama and Mr.Hu at Toronto went off cordially though the Chinese did not come out with a decision to lift the suspension of exchange of visits by military and defence officials of the two countries, which was imposed by them in protest against the sale of the arms package to Taiwan.Recently, they had refused to lift this suspension and extend an invitation to Mr.Robert Gates, the US Defence Secretary, to visit China after his visit to Singapore to attend an Asian Security Conference. It was reported that while Mr.Hu readily accepted the invitation from Mr.Obama to pay a State visit to Washington DC, he did not respond positively to a suggestion from Mr.Obama for a visit by Mr.Gates to China.
3. The interpretation by many China analysts that the strong line taken by Beijing on military-related issues after the announcement of the arms sales to Taiwan must have been on the insistence of the PLA leadership is likely to be further strengthened by the strong Chinese reaction to the proposed participation of the nuclear-powered US aircraft carrier USS George Washington in a joint naval exercise with the South Korean Navy in the Yellow Sea. This exercise and the participation of the US carrier in it were reportedly decided upon by the Obama Administration as part of a series of cautionary measures in the wake of the incident in March in which a South Korean Naval vessel sank after being hit by a torpedo allegedly fired by a North Korean ship. A number of South Korean naval personnel were killed. China has so far avoided supporting any move for economic sanctions or other punitive measures against North Korea in this connection.
4.A wave of criticism in Chinese blog spots and internet chat rooms of the proposed naval exercise in the Yellow Sea and the participation of the US carrier has been followed by an announcement by the PLA on June 28 that the PLA would be conducting live ammunition exercises in the East China Sea from June 30 to July 5. Sections of the Chinese media have made no secret of the fact that these exercises are in response to the US-South Korea naval exercise and the participation of the US carrier in it. A strongly worded commentary under the title "US Military Presence in the Yellow Sea" by one Huang Xiangyang uploaded on the web site of the " China Daily" on June 28, stated as follows:
"In a terse news release, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) announced on Monday that it will conduct live ammunition exercises in the East China Sea from June 30 to July 5. No reason was given for this seemingly unusual military arrangement--the last time the East China Sea was turned into a shooting ranch was in March 1996, when the PLA conducted ballistic missile exercises by firing surface-to-surface rockets from the mainland to sea targets to deter then-Taiwan leader Lee Teng-hui from his political stunt of seeking the island's independence.
"Anyone with basic knowledge on geopolitics and military strategy would get the message behind the timing of the announcement. It is definitely not total coincidence that such sensitive news is made public on the same day that a joint military drill by the US and South Korean navies is scheduled to start in the Yellow Sea, citing threats from North Korea.
"But the Yellow Sea is no common place where a country can flex its muscles. It is historically China's front yard. In 1894 the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) fought a sea battle here with Japan in a vain attempt to retain the empire's fast-fading influence over the rest of Asia. For Chinese, the Yellow Sea has no less military significance to China's sovereignty and national security than the Gulf of Mexico has to the United States.
"Despite repeated complaints from China, the Pentagon has shown no signs of refraining from testing the country's strategic bottom line by going ahead with the plan to show off its military force. With the nuclear-powered aircraft USS George Washington set to participate in the joint exercise, China's key cities such as Beijing and Tianjin, as well as parts of its economically prosperous eastern coast are exposed under direct military threat from US forces. Given that the Pentagon has a history of dropping "missed bombs" on a country's embassy, such worries are by no means baseless.
"There is a Chinese saying that even a rabbit--meek and gentle though it may be--will fight back when cornered. It is justified that a wave of public outcry and vehement calls for tit-for-tat military arrangement has emerged in countless online chat rooms in response to the US military adventure at China's doorstep. We see the US ignoring Chinese security concerns as an act meant to cause humiliation. And the latest announcement of the firing practice, to some extent, helps assuage simmering sentiment.
"Because of the US policy toward Taiwan, characterized by continuing arms sales to the island, which has hurt China's "core national interest," the PLA has put its military contact with the Pentagon on hold. The sense of enmity has not eased, although US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has "stated for the record that the United States does not consider China as an enemy but as a partner." This is because Chinese culture values action over words. The US military presence in the Yellow Sea regardless of China's concerns, in addition to its never-ending reconnaissance activities along China's coastline, only reinforces Chinese impression of Uncle Sam as a double dealer.
"In 1996, the US sent two aircraft carriers near the Taiwan Straits--in the first act of American coercion against China in nearly four decades--to countermeasure Beijing's missile tests. It has been considered a provocative move to trample on China's dignity. Compared with the United States, China is still weak. But to emerge as a great nation in the world community, China has to stand up to the United States militarily, especially near its own shores."
5. It will be interesting to find out whether Mr.Hu raised the issue of the joint naval exercise in equally strong terms with Mr.Obama at Toronto. If not and if it is the PLA which has reacted strongly, it will be a clear indication that the Chinese political and military leaderships are not on the same page with regard to the relations with the US.( 28-6-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
As President Hu Jintao took a series of steps to repair relations with the US which have come under a strain following the decision of the Barack Obama Administration earlier this year to sell a new arms package to Taiwan and the meeting of His Holiness the Dalai Lama with Mr.Obama in the White House during his visit to Washingtom DC, the goodwill sought to be re-generated between the political leaderships of the two countries is under threat of fresh dilution as a result of measures taken by the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA).
2. Among the measures taken by Mr.Hu to repair relations with the US were the Chinese support for sanctions by the UN against Iran on the nuclear issue, the Chinese decision to let the yuan float slightly in relation to the US dollar and Mr.Hu's acceptance of an invitation extended by Mr.Obama during their meeting in the margins of the G-20 summit at Toronto to pay a State visit to Washington DC later this year. According to all accounts, the meeting between Mr.Obama and Mr.Hu at Toronto went off cordially though the Chinese did not come out with a decision to lift the suspension of exchange of visits by military and defence officials of the two countries, which was imposed by them in protest against the sale of the arms package to Taiwan.Recently, they had refused to lift this suspension and extend an invitation to Mr.Robert Gates, the US Defence Secretary, to visit China after his visit to Singapore to attend an Asian Security Conference. It was reported that while Mr.Hu readily accepted the invitation from Mr.Obama to pay a State visit to Washington DC, he did not respond positively to a suggestion from Mr.Obama for a visit by Mr.Gates to China.
3. The interpretation by many China analysts that the strong line taken by Beijing on military-related issues after the announcement of the arms sales to Taiwan must have been on the insistence of the PLA leadership is likely to be further strengthened by the strong Chinese reaction to the proposed participation of the nuclear-powered US aircraft carrier USS George Washington in a joint naval exercise with the South Korean Navy in the Yellow Sea. This exercise and the participation of the US carrier in it were reportedly decided upon by the Obama Administration as part of a series of cautionary measures in the wake of the incident in March in which a South Korean Naval vessel sank after being hit by a torpedo allegedly fired by a North Korean ship. A number of South Korean naval personnel were killed. China has so far avoided supporting any move for economic sanctions or other punitive measures against North Korea in this connection.
4.A wave of criticism in Chinese blog spots and internet chat rooms of the proposed naval exercise in the Yellow Sea and the participation of the US carrier has been followed by an announcement by the PLA on June 28 that the PLA would be conducting live ammunition exercises in the East China Sea from June 30 to July 5. Sections of the Chinese media have made no secret of the fact that these exercises are in response to the US-South Korea naval exercise and the participation of the US carrier in it. A strongly worded commentary under the title "US Military Presence in the Yellow Sea" by one Huang Xiangyang uploaded on the web site of the " China Daily" on June 28, stated as follows:
"In a terse news release, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) announced on Monday that it will conduct live ammunition exercises in the East China Sea from June 30 to July 5. No reason was given for this seemingly unusual military arrangement--the last time the East China Sea was turned into a shooting ranch was in March 1996, when the PLA conducted ballistic missile exercises by firing surface-to-surface rockets from the mainland to sea targets to deter then-Taiwan leader Lee Teng-hui from his political stunt of seeking the island's independence.
"Anyone with basic knowledge on geopolitics and military strategy would get the message behind the timing of the announcement. It is definitely not total coincidence that such sensitive news is made public on the same day that a joint military drill by the US and South Korean navies is scheduled to start in the Yellow Sea, citing threats from North Korea.
"But the Yellow Sea is no common place where a country can flex its muscles. It is historically China's front yard. In 1894 the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) fought a sea battle here with Japan in a vain attempt to retain the empire's fast-fading influence over the rest of Asia. For Chinese, the Yellow Sea has no less military significance to China's sovereignty and national security than the Gulf of Mexico has to the United States.
"Despite repeated complaints from China, the Pentagon has shown no signs of refraining from testing the country's strategic bottom line by going ahead with the plan to show off its military force. With the nuclear-powered aircraft USS George Washington set to participate in the joint exercise, China's key cities such as Beijing and Tianjin, as well as parts of its economically prosperous eastern coast are exposed under direct military threat from US forces. Given that the Pentagon has a history of dropping "missed bombs" on a country's embassy, such worries are by no means baseless.
"There is a Chinese saying that even a rabbit--meek and gentle though it may be--will fight back when cornered. It is justified that a wave of public outcry and vehement calls for tit-for-tat military arrangement has emerged in countless online chat rooms in response to the US military adventure at China's doorstep. We see the US ignoring Chinese security concerns as an act meant to cause humiliation. And the latest announcement of the firing practice, to some extent, helps assuage simmering sentiment.
"Because of the US policy toward Taiwan, characterized by continuing arms sales to the island, which has hurt China's "core national interest," the PLA has put its military contact with the Pentagon on hold. The sense of enmity has not eased, although US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has "stated for the record that the United States does not consider China as an enemy but as a partner." This is because Chinese culture values action over words. The US military presence in the Yellow Sea regardless of China's concerns, in addition to its never-ending reconnaissance activities along China's coastline, only reinforces Chinese impression of Uncle Sam as a double dealer.
"In 1996, the US sent two aircraft carriers near the Taiwan Straits--in the first act of American coercion against China in nearly four decades--to countermeasure Beijing's missile tests. It has been considered a provocative move to trample on China's dignity. Compared with the United States, China is still weak. But to emerge as a great nation in the world community, China has to stand up to the United States militarily, especially near its own shores."
5. It will be interesting to find out whether Mr.Hu raised the issue of the joint naval exercise in equally strong terms with Mr.Obama at Toronto. If not and if it is the PLA which has reacted strongly, it will be a clear indication that the Chinese political and military leaderships are not on the same page with regard to the relations with the US.( 28-6-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
SMOKING OUT BIN LADEN FROM HIS "DEEP HIDING"
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO. 660
B.RAMAN
In an interview to ABC TV channel’s “This Week” Programme on June 27,2010, Mr.Leon Panetta, Director of the USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), is reported to have stated as follows: “ Osama bin Laden remains in very deep hiding but consistent pressure will flush him out. While hard data on him has been slight since the 2001 attacks, the CIA and US forces have killed or captured at least half the leadership of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. We took down the No. three in their leadership (Mustafa Abu al-Yazid) a few weeks ago. We continue to disrupt them. We continue to impact on their command and control. We continue to impact on their ability to plan attacks in this country. Al Qaeda’s depleted numbers had shrunk dramatically. The pressure is definitely on bin Laden and Al Qaeda number two Ayman al-Zawahiri. I think at most, we’re looking at maybe 50 to 100 (Al Qaeda members), maybe less. If we keep that pressure on, we think ultimately we can flush out bin Laden and Zawahiri and get after them. President Barack Obama had made going after Al Qaeda the fundamental purpose of the Afghan military mission. We’ve got to disrupt and dismantle Al Qaeda and their militant allies so they never attack this country again. bin Laden remains in very deep hiding in a tribal area in Pakistan surrounded by tremendous security. The terrain is probably the most difficult in the world. It has been years since the United States has had good intelligence on the whereabouts of bin laden, although he is thought to be in Pakistan.”
2.It is nine years since the US intelligence agencies and military forces in the Af-Pak area started their hunt for Osama bin Laden after he was believed to have escaped into Pakistan’s tribal areas through the Tora Bora area of Afghanistan. They have had no success in getting at him. At least in the case of al-Zawahiri, his No.2, there was a report in January 2006 of a near miss in the Bajaur agency, but in the case of bin Laden there have been no reports of even a near miss. Neither the periodically enhanced cash reward offers nor stepped-up attacks by the Drones (pilotless planes) of the CIA have got him. The Drone strikes---helped by improved human and technical intelligence--- have been increasingly successful against leaders and cadres of the Taliban, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan and the Punjabi Taliban organizations. There have been some successful hits against other leaders of Al Qaeda too, but not against bin Laden.
3. The Drone strikes have been largely confined to North and South Waziristan and occasionally the Bajaur agency. If bin Laden is in one of these agencies, he is most likely to be hit one of these days if the US keeps up its Drone strikes because Al Qaeda and its alles do not have a wide choice of hide-outs. The fact that there has not even been a speculation that bin Laden was anywhere near the areas which have so far been hit by the Drones would give rise to questions as to whether he could be in one of the Waziristans, where he is often placed by the US intelligence. Other likely tribal areas of his hiding are in the Chitral area of Pakistan and in the Nuristan area of Afghanistan. There has been no concrete indication from those areas either.
4. The announcements of huge cash rewards for information leading to his capture or death amounting to millions of US dollars have been widely disseminated all over the tribal areas in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan and in its Khyber-Pakhtoonkwa province (formerly known as the North_West Frontier Province ). The absence of any leads about him from the Pashtun areas could be attributed to the loyalty of large sections of Pashtuns to him and to their aversion to helping the US in getting rid of him. But not all Pashtuns like bin Laden or are loyal to him to that extent. The Shias among the Pashtuns particularly in the Kurram Agency of the FATA and in parts of Khyber-Pakhtoonkwa and the Pashtun members of the Awami National Party, which is a member of the ruling coalition in Islamabad and is the head of the coalition in Peshawar, dislike him. They have no interest in protecting him.
5. The fact that neither the interested reward-seekers nor the CIA Drones have been able to get any inkling of the whereabouts of bin Laden would once again bring to the fore the question which I had raised from time to time in the past. That is, is he really hiding in the tribal areas as assessed by the CIA or is he hiding in the non-tribal areas with the help of Pashtun migrants in those areas. The Drones cannot reach him in the non-tribal areas. There will be many non-tribals interested in the huge cash rewards, but they may not have access to information about him. It is easier to get information in the sparsely-populated tribal areas than in the densely-populated non-tribal areas. In the past, some top-guns of Al Qaeda were found hiding in the non-tribal areas---- Abu Zubaidah in Faislabad in Punjab, Ramzi Binalshibh in Karachi and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad in Rawalpindi. Many Afghan Taliban leaders were found hiding in Karachi and other places and not in Balochistan as used to be assumed.
6. While continuing to maintain the present hunt for bin Laden in the tribal areas, it is, therefore, important to extend it to the non-tribal areas too. Karachi, which has more Pashtuns than even Peshawar, needs attention. So too Quetta in Balochistan, which has a large Afghan refugee population, who have given shelter to the leaders of the Afghan Taliban. The strong-holds of the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) in the Punjab and Gilgit-Baltistan are other areas calling for search. Of all the Punjabi Taliban organizations, the LEJ and the JEM are the closest to Al Qaeda.
7. The question of Drone strikes in the non-tribal areas does not arise. The CIA cannot expect the Pakistani intelligence and Police to co-operate in the search in the non-tribal areas. The CIA has to organize its own search operations with the help of anti-Al Qaeda communities such as those of the Mohajirs in Karachi, the Balochs in the Quetta area and the anti-LEJ Shias in Punjab and Gilgit-Baltistan. ( 28-6-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and also Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventy-one2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
In an interview to ABC TV channel’s “This Week” Programme on June 27,2010, Mr.Leon Panetta, Director of the USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), is reported to have stated as follows: “ Osama bin Laden remains in very deep hiding but consistent pressure will flush him out. While hard data on him has been slight since the 2001 attacks, the CIA and US forces have killed or captured at least half the leadership of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. We took down the No. three in their leadership (Mustafa Abu al-Yazid) a few weeks ago. We continue to disrupt them. We continue to impact on their command and control. We continue to impact on their ability to plan attacks in this country. Al Qaeda’s depleted numbers had shrunk dramatically. The pressure is definitely on bin Laden and Al Qaeda number two Ayman al-Zawahiri. I think at most, we’re looking at maybe 50 to 100 (Al Qaeda members), maybe less. If we keep that pressure on, we think ultimately we can flush out bin Laden and Zawahiri and get after them. President Barack Obama had made going after Al Qaeda the fundamental purpose of the Afghan military mission. We’ve got to disrupt and dismantle Al Qaeda and their militant allies so they never attack this country again. bin Laden remains in very deep hiding in a tribal area in Pakistan surrounded by tremendous security. The terrain is probably the most difficult in the world. It has been years since the United States has had good intelligence on the whereabouts of bin laden, although he is thought to be in Pakistan.”
2.It is nine years since the US intelligence agencies and military forces in the Af-Pak area started their hunt for Osama bin Laden after he was believed to have escaped into Pakistan’s tribal areas through the Tora Bora area of Afghanistan. They have had no success in getting at him. At least in the case of al-Zawahiri, his No.2, there was a report in January 2006 of a near miss in the Bajaur agency, but in the case of bin Laden there have been no reports of even a near miss. Neither the periodically enhanced cash reward offers nor stepped-up attacks by the Drones (pilotless planes) of the CIA have got him. The Drone strikes---helped by improved human and technical intelligence--- have been increasingly successful against leaders and cadres of the Taliban, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan and the Punjabi Taliban organizations. There have been some successful hits against other leaders of Al Qaeda too, but not against bin Laden.
3. The Drone strikes have been largely confined to North and South Waziristan and occasionally the Bajaur agency. If bin Laden is in one of these agencies, he is most likely to be hit one of these days if the US keeps up its Drone strikes because Al Qaeda and its alles do not have a wide choice of hide-outs. The fact that there has not even been a speculation that bin Laden was anywhere near the areas which have so far been hit by the Drones would give rise to questions as to whether he could be in one of the Waziristans, where he is often placed by the US intelligence. Other likely tribal areas of his hiding are in the Chitral area of Pakistan and in the Nuristan area of Afghanistan. There has been no concrete indication from those areas either.
4. The announcements of huge cash rewards for information leading to his capture or death amounting to millions of US dollars have been widely disseminated all over the tribal areas in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan and in its Khyber-Pakhtoonkwa province (formerly known as the North_West Frontier Province ). The absence of any leads about him from the Pashtun areas could be attributed to the loyalty of large sections of Pashtuns to him and to their aversion to helping the US in getting rid of him. But not all Pashtuns like bin Laden or are loyal to him to that extent. The Shias among the Pashtuns particularly in the Kurram Agency of the FATA and in parts of Khyber-Pakhtoonkwa and the Pashtun members of the Awami National Party, which is a member of the ruling coalition in Islamabad and is the head of the coalition in Peshawar, dislike him. They have no interest in protecting him.
5. The fact that neither the interested reward-seekers nor the CIA Drones have been able to get any inkling of the whereabouts of bin Laden would once again bring to the fore the question which I had raised from time to time in the past. That is, is he really hiding in the tribal areas as assessed by the CIA or is he hiding in the non-tribal areas with the help of Pashtun migrants in those areas. The Drones cannot reach him in the non-tribal areas. There will be many non-tribals interested in the huge cash rewards, but they may not have access to information about him. It is easier to get information in the sparsely-populated tribal areas than in the densely-populated non-tribal areas. In the past, some top-guns of Al Qaeda were found hiding in the non-tribal areas---- Abu Zubaidah in Faislabad in Punjab, Ramzi Binalshibh in Karachi and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad in Rawalpindi. Many Afghan Taliban leaders were found hiding in Karachi and other places and not in Balochistan as used to be assumed.
6. While continuing to maintain the present hunt for bin Laden in the tribal areas, it is, therefore, important to extend it to the non-tribal areas too. Karachi, which has more Pashtuns than even Peshawar, needs attention. So too Quetta in Balochistan, which has a large Afghan refugee population, who have given shelter to the leaders of the Afghan Taliban. The strong-holds of the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) in the Punjab and Gilgit-Baltistan are other areas calling for search. Of all the Punjabi Taliban organizations, the LEJ and the JEM are the closest to Al Qaeda.
7. The question of Drone strikes in the non-tribal areas does not arise. The CIA cannot expect the Pakistani intelligence and Police to co-operate in the search in the non-tribal areas. The CIA has to organize its own search operations with the help of anti-Al Qaeda communities such as those of the Mohajirs in Karachi, the Balochs in the Quetta area and the anti-LEJ Shias in Punjab and Gilgit-Baltistan. ( 28-6-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and also Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventy-one2@gmail.com )
Saturday, June 26, 2010
P.CHIDAMBARAM & REHMAN MALIK
B.RAMAN
Mr.P.Chidambaram, our Home Minister, has exhibited refreshing firmness during his talks with Mr.Rehman Malik, Pakistan's Interior Minister, in Islamabad on June 25 and 26,2010. He had gone to Islamabad to attend the SAARC Home Ministers' meeting, which was held after a gap of more than two years and availed of this opportunity to hold detailed bilateral discussions with Mr.Malik on terrorism-related issues.The focus of the discussions between the two and of their media briefings was on terrorism in general and Pakistani action against the Pakistan-based perpetrators of the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai in particular. He had gone to Islamabad determined to show that the willingness of the Government of India to resume the bilateral dialogue on various contentious issues would not mean a dilution of the focus on terrorism.
2. In his remarks in Islamabad, Mr.Chidambaram took care not to directly blame the State of Pakistan for the acts of terrorism in Indian territory committed by the Pakistani organisations, which are now collectively referred to even by Pakistani analysts as the Punjabi Taliban. However, he did not hesitate to highlight directly or indirectly the inaction or unsatisfactory action of the State of Pakistan against the anti-India terrorists in general and the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in particular.
3. While keeping up an unrelenting pressure on Pakistan for action against the LET and its perpetrators of the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, including Hafeez Mohammad Sayeed, the Amir of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JED), the political wing of the LET, he saw to it that his observations and pressure did not spoil the current cordial atmosphere in the bilateral relations and would not come in the way of meaningful , forward-looking discussions during the visit of Mr.S.M.Krishna, our Minister for External Affairs, to Islamabad next month.
4. Keep up the pressure on Pakistan on the issue of terrorism, but at the same time don't allow justified concerns over terrorism stunt fresh thinking on other issues. That seems to be the new motto of the Government of India. It is apparent Mr.Chidambaram shares this motto despite his ill-concealed disappointment with Pakistan for failing to do all that it can and should to bring to book the Pakistan-based perpetrators of 26/11.
5. However, despite the refreshing firmness of Mr.Chidambaram, one felt disappointed to notice an apparent lack of adequate attention to questions of importance like the establishment of a networking relationship between India's Intelligence Bureau and its Pakistani counterpart, which comes under Mr.Malik, between the National Investigation Agency (NIA) of India and the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) of Pakistan both of which are the central investigation agencies for terrorism-related cases and frequent interactions between senior police officers of the two countries. Mr.Malik did speak of the FIA and India's Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), which already interact with each other during INTERPOL meetings, jointly investigating the 26/11 case. No elucidation on this was forthcoming from Mr.Chidambaram, who appeared to be over-focussed on the 26/11 case --- rightly so--- but under-focussed on the need for a web of institutional relationships between the intelligence collection and investigating agencies of our Home Ministry and Pakistan's Interior Ministry.
6.Mr.Malik suffers from professional and political handicaps as compared to Mr.Chidambaram. de jure, Mr.Chidambaram is the political head of only the IB and the NIA, but de facto, in counter-terrorism matters, all agencies of the Indian intelligence community----whether civilian or military---- report to him, keep him informed and carry out his instructions , even if they come under the control of the Prime Minister or the Defence Minister. Mr.Malik, an ex-police officer, is the political head of only Pakistan's FIA and IB, which has only limited powers and resources as compared to the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and other military intelligence agencies.
7. In India, the military intelligence agencies play a role in counter-terrorism and in counter-insurgency only in the border areas. In the rest of the country, it is Mr.Chidambaram as the Home Minister, who is the czar of counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence. In Pakistan, the ISI and other military intelligence agencies, which have more powers and resources than the institutions of the Interior Ministry, do not recognise the overlordship of Mr.Malik in counter-terrorism. They do not always keep him informed of all the intelligence coming to their notice and carry out his instructions. The heads of the military intelligence agencies avoid attending meetings convened by him.
8. Additional problems arise in Pakistan because the Army and the ISI do not look upon the LET as a terrorist organisation. The LET is the virtual covert action division of the ISI and its operations in India and Afghanistan against India are viewed as covert actions in Pakistan's national interests. If Mr.Malik wants to take effective action against the LET, he cannot do so due to the perception of the LET as the covert action wing of the ISI.
9. Despite these limitations of Mr.Malik and his Interior Ministry, we must build up our contacts with them and the Pakistani police and encourage other countries such as the US and those of the European Union to do so in order to contribute in the medium and long-term to building up the status and powers of the Interior Ministry in Pakistan's internal security management. In the years after Pakistan's independence, the Internal Security Ministry used to be the overlord of internal security management. After losing control of East Pakistan in 1971, the Army and the ISI have taken over this responsibility, reducing the Internal Security Ministry to a virtual non-entity.
10.The present civilian Government in Pakistan is trying to re-empower the Internal Security Ministry. This is a process which all democratic Governments should encourage. China has been doing so. It has given the Ministry over US $ 300 million for capacity-building. It had invited Mr.Malik twice to China to discuss counter-terrorism co-operation. It has two programmes for counter-terrorism co-operation with Pakistan---one between the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Pakistan Army and the other between China’s Ministry of Public Security, which is responsible for internal security and intelligence, and Pakistan’s Interior Ministry.
10. It is hoped that Mr.Chidambaram would adopt this objective and work for it in the months to come.(27-6-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Mr.P.Chidambaram, our Home Minister, has exhibited refreshing firmness during his talks with Mr.Rehman Malik, Pakistan's Interior Minister, in Islamabad on June 25 and 26,2010. He had gone to Islamabad to attend the SAARC Home Ministers' meeting, which was held after a gap of more than two years and availed of this opportunity to hold detailed bilateral discussions with Mr.Malik on terrorism-related issues.The focus of the discussions between the two and of their media briefings was on terrorism in general and Pakistani action against the Pakistan-based perpetrators of the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai in particular. He had gone to Islamabad determined to show that the willingness of the Government of India to resume the bilateral dialogue on various contentious issues would not mean a dilution of the focus on terrorism.
2. In his remarks in Islamabad, Mr.Chidambaram took care not to directly blame the State of Pakistan for the acts of terrorism in Indian territory committed by the Pakistani organisations, which are now collectively referred to even by Pakistani analysts as the Punjabi Taliban. However, he did not hesitate to highlight directly or indirectly the inaction or unsatisfactory action of the State of Pakistan against the anti-India terrorists in general and the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in particular.
3. While keeping up an unrelenting pressure on Pakistan for action against the LET and its perpetrators of the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, including Hafeez Mohammad Sayeed, the Amir of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JED), the political wing of the LET, he saw to it that his observations and pressure did not spoil the current cordial atmosphere in the bilateral relations and would not come in the way of meaningful , forward-looking discussions during the visit of Mr.S.M.Krishna, our Minister for External Affairs, to Islamabad next month.
4. Keep up the pressure on Pakistan on the issue of terrorism, but at the same time don't allow justified concerns over terrorism stunt fresh thinking on other issues. That seems to be the new motto of the Government of India. It is apparent Mr.Chidambaram shares this motto despite his ill-concealed disappointment with Pakistan for failing to do all that it can and should to bring to book the Pakistan-based perpetrators of 26/11.
5. However, despite the refreshing firmness of Mr.Chidambaram, one felt disappointed to notice an apparent lack of adequate attention to questions of importance like the establishment of a networking relationship between India's Intelligence Bureau and its Pakistani counterpart, which comes under Mr.Malik, between the National Investigation Agency (NIA) of India and the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) of Pakistan both of which are the central investigation agencies for terrorism-related cases and frequent interactions between senior police officers of the two countries. Mr.Malik did speak of the FIA and India's Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), which already interact with each other during INTERPOL meetings, jointly investigating the 26/11 case. No elucidation on this was forthcoming from Mr.Chidambaram, who appeared to be over-focussed on the 26/11 case --- rightly so--- but under-focussed on the need for a web of institutional relationships between the intelligence collection and investigating agencies of our Home Ministry and Pakistan's Interior Ministry.
6.Mr.Malik suffers from professional and political handicaps as compared to Mr.Chidambaram. de jure, Mr.Chidambaram is the political head of only the IB and the NIA, but de facto, in counter-terrorism matters, all agencies of the Indian intelligence community----whether civilian or military---- report to him, keep him informed and carry out his instructions , even if they come under the control of the Prime Minister or the Defence Minister. Mr.Malik, an ex-police officer, is the political head of only Pakistan's FIA and IB, which has only limited powers and resources as compared to the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and other military intelligence agencies.
7. In India, the military intelligence agencies play a role in counter-terrorism and in counter-insurgency only in the border areas. In the rest of the country, it is Mr.Chidambaram as the Home Minister, who is the czar of counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence. In Pakistan, the ISI and other military intelligence agencies, which have more powers and resources than the institutions of the Interior Ministry, do not recognise the overlordship of Mr.Malik in counter-terrorism. They do not always keep him informed of all the intelligence coming to their notice and carry out his instructions. The heads of the military intelligence agencies avoid attending meetings convened by him.
8. Additional problems arise in Pakistan because the Army and the ISI do not look upon the LET as a terrorist organisation. The LET is the virtual covert action division of the ISI and its operations in India and Afghanistan against India are viewed as covert actions in Pakistan's national interests. If Mr.Malik wants to take effective action against the LET, he cannot do so due to the perception of the LET as the covert action wing of the ISI.
9. Despite these limitations of Mr.Malik and his Interior Ministry, we must build up our contacts with them and the Pakistani police and encourage other countries such as the US and those of the European Union to do so in order to contribute in the medium and long-term to building up the status and powers of the Interior Ministry in Pakistan's internal security management. In the years after Pakistan's independence, the Internal Security Ministry used to be the overlord of internal security management. After losing control of East Pakistan in 1971, the Army and the ISI have taken over this responsibility, reducing the Internal Security Ministry to a virtual non-entity.
10.The present civilian Government in Pakistan is trying to re-empower the Internal Security Ministry. This is a process which all democratic Governments should encourage. China has been doing so. It has given the Ministry over US $ 300 million for capacity-building. It had invited Mr.Malik twice to China to discuss counter-terrorism co-operation. It has two programmes for counter-terrorism co-operation with Pakistan---one between the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Pakistan Army and the other between China’s Ministry of Public Security, which is responsible for internal security and intelligence, and Pakistan’s Interior Ministry.
10. It is hoped that Mr.Chidambaram would adopt this objective and work for it in the months to come.(27-6-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
WHAT AILS INDIAN INTELLIGENCE?
B.RAMAN
(Written for the “Times of India” at their request. A slightly edited version of this has been carried by them at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Home/Sunday-TOI/Special-Report/It-is-unintelligent-to-have-no-humint-or-hi-tech/articleshow/6096416.cms )
Indian intelligence agencies are good in crisis management after a threat to national security has materialized, but inadequate in preventing a crisis.
Their often-demonstrated failure to prevent a national security crisis can be attributed to a lack of quality control in their internal management. This poor quality control is evident in their outdated recruitment procedures, which tend to presume mistakenly that police officers naturally make good intelligence officers and their poor man management which often leads to internal frictions.
Poor team work which affects their ability to co-ordinate and the tendency to treat the intelligence profession like any other government job where seniority prevails over merit are also an outcome of this. So too is their failure to keep pace with developments in science and technology which are adding to the threats and the over-focus on short-term tactics and the under-focus on a long-term strategy to foresee, forestall and control a national security crisis.
Unlike other countries, techniques of national security and intelligence management have not received in India the attention they deserve either in the agencies themselves, or at the senior levels of the general bureaucracy or in the political leadership. The result: The agencies tend to drift from crisis to crisis, from failure to failure and from surprise to surprise. The poor techniques are reflected in the low standards of our intelligence training schools and in the poor quality of research on national security and intelligence management in our think-tanks and academic institutions.
National security and intelligence management is not treated as a science to be constantly developed, but as an esoteric subject beyond the understanding of the generalists and hence better left to the intelligence careerists.
Intelligence careerism stands in the way of our agencies coming up to national requirements and expectations. It also thwarts professionalism. We have many intelligence careerists, but not that many intelligence professionals. One finds professionals in increasing numbers in foreign agencies, but not in India.
Our political class, which sees intelligence as an exploitable instrument of political survival and not as an indispensable instrument of national survival, has also contributed to this state of affairs.
Our agencies are not without good points. Our intelligence officers may be poor collectors of preventive intelligence, but make good analysts of the limited intelligence they collect. Foreign intelligence officers are good collectors, but poor analysts.
The John Major Commission of Canada, which enquired into the blowing-up of the Kanishka aircraft of Air India by the Babbar Khalsa in 1985, has highlighted how the Canadian officers failed to analyse adequately the flood of intelligence reports available.
Crisis management comes to us instinctively. Despite being taken by surprise initially, we manage to prevail at the end. We saw this during the Indo-Pak war of 1965 and the Kargil conflict of 1999, and in the way we prevailed over the Mizo National Front, the Khalistani terrorists in Punjab and Al Ummah in Tamil Nadu. Even in Kashmir, though taken by surprise in 1989, we have retrieved lost ground after what appeared to be a hopeless situation in the 1990s.
Despite these good points, our agencies have failed to come up to expectations because there has been no continuous, independent and transparent evaluation of their performance. Our agencies continue to be evaluators of their own performance whereas in foreign countries, particularly in the West, their performance is regularly subject to external evaluation by the parliament as well as other bodies of experts not necessarily from the profession.
Detailed enquiries like those into the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US, the London blasts of July 2005 in the UK and the recent Kanishka enquiry in Canada are more an exception than the rule in India. Our Parliament does not even know how much it is voting for the intelligence budgets and how that money is being spent. The intelligence allocations are concealed in the general budgets of other Ministries and Departments and are voted without independent scrutiny.
Intelligence agencies and chiefs can do no wrong. They are manned by honourable men who will not transgress laws and rules of propriety. So it used to be assumed before the Second World War, but no longer so. The post-Watergate enquiries in the US brought out that there are as many incompetents, opportunists and even law-breakers in the intelligence profession as in any other public service. The result: The opening-up of intelligence agencies to the extent possible due to security considerations to external evaluation. India is one of the very few democratic countries where the agencies continue to be closed houses not open to an external performance audit. Unless this changes, our intelligence management will not change for the better.
Past threats came more from state than non-state actors. Post-Second World War threats come as much from non-state as state actors. Before the World War, the intelligence profession was admired. It was seen as a profession of anonymous patriots of the highest order. The public considered it their duty and privilege to co-operate with them.
The intelligence profession is now tolerated as necessary, but it is no longer admired because of its seeming helplessness against the plethora of non-state actors. Public co-operation has consequently decreased. This has had a negative impact on the flow of human intelligence. Our ability to collect intelligence through gadgets has been improving, but not our ability to use human resources for intelligence collection.
How to deal with the new situation we are facing, which is marked more by threats to internal than external security? This is a question which needs attention. (25-6-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi. E-mail: seventryone2@gmail.com )
(Written for the “Times of India” at their request. A slightly edited version of this has been carried by them at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Home/Sunday-TOI/Special-Report/It-is-unintelligent-to-have-no-humint-or-hi-tech/articleshow/6096416.cms )
Indian intelligence agencies are good in crisis management after a threat to national security has materialized, but inadequate in preventing a crisis.
Their often-demonstrated failure to prevent a national security crisis can be attributed to a lack of quality control in their internal management. This poor quality control is evident in their outdated recruitment procedures, which tend to presume mistakenly that police officers naturally make good intelligence officers and their poor man management which often leads to internal frictions.
Poor team work which affects their ability to co-ordinate and the tendency to treat the intelligence profession like any other government job where seniority prevails over merit are also an outcome of this. So too is their failure to keep pace with developments in science and technology which are adding to the threats and the over-focus on short-term tactics and the under-focus on a long-term strategy to foresee, forestall and control a national security crisis.
Unlike other countries, techniques of national security and intelligence management have not received in India the attention they deserve either in the agencies themselves, or at the senior levels of the general bureaucracy or in the political leadership. The result: The agencies tend to drift from crisis to crisis, from failure to failure and from surprise to surprise. The poor techniques are reflected in the low standards of our intelligence training schools and in the poor quality of research on national security and intelligence management in our think-tanks and academic institutions.
National security and intelligence management is not treated as a science to be constantly developed, but as an esoteric subject beyond the understanding of the generalists and hence better left to the intelligence careerists.
Intelligence careerism stands in the way of our agencies coming up to national requirements and expectations. It also thwarts professionalism. We have many intelligence careerists, but not that many intelligence professionals. One finds professionals in increasing numbers in foreign agencies, but not in India.
Our political class, which sees intelligence as an exploitable instrument of political survival and not as an indispensable instrument of national survival, has also contributed to this state of affairs.
Our agencies are not without good points. Our intelligence officers may be poor collectors of preventive intelligence, but make good analysts of the limited intelligence they collect. Foreign intelligence officers are good collectors, but poor analysts.
The John Major Commission of Canada, which enquired into the blowing-up of the Kanishka aircraft of Air India by the Babbar Khalsa in 1985, has highlighted how the Canadian officers failed to analyse adequately the flood of intelligence reports available.
Crisis management comes to us instinctively. Despite being taken by surprise initially, we manage to prevail at the end. We saw this during the Indo-Pak war of 1965 and the Kargil conflict of 1999, and in the way we prevailed over the Mizo National Front, the Khalistani terrorists in Punjab and Al Ummah in Tamil Nadu. Even in Kashmir, though taken by surprise in 1989, we have retrieved lost ground after what appeared to be a hopeless situation in the 1990s.
Despite these good points, our agencies have failed to come up to expectations because there has been no continuous, independent and transparent evaluation of their performance. Our agencies continue to be evaluators of their own performance whereas in foreign countries, particularly in the West, their performance is regularly subject to external evaluation by the parliament as well as other bodies of experts not necessarily from the profession.
Detailed enquiries like those into the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US, the London blasts of July 2005 in the UK and the recent Kanishka enquiry in Canada are more an exception than the rule in India. Our Parliament does not even know how much it is voting for the intelligence budgets and how that money is being spent. The intelligence allocations are concealed in the general budgets of other Ministries and Departments and are voted without independent scrutiny.
Intelligence agencies and chiefs can do no wrong. They are manned by honourable men who will not transgress laws and rules of propriety. So it used to be assumed before the Second World War, but no longer so. The post-Watergate enquiries in the US brought out that there are as many incompetents, opportunists and even law-breakers in the intelligence profession as in any other public service. The result: The opening-up of intelligence agencies to the extent possible due to security considerations to external evaluation. India is one of the very few democratic countries where the agencies continue to be closed houses not open to an external performance audit. Unless this changes, our intelligence management will not change for the better.
Past threats came more from state than non-state actors. Post-Second World War threats come as much from non-state as state actors. Before the World War, the intelligence profession was admired. It was seen as a profession of anonymous patriots of the highest order. The public considered it their duty and privilege to co-operate with them.
The intelligence profession is now tolerated as necessary, but it is no longer admired because of its seeming helplessness against the plethora of non-state actors. Public co-operation has consequently decreased. This has had a negative impact on the flow of human intelligence. Our ability to collect intelligence through gadgets has been improving, but not our ability to use human resources for intelligence collection.
How to deal with the new situation we are facing, which is marked more by threats to internal than external security? This is a question which needs attention. (25-6-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi. E-mail: seventryone2@gmail.com )
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