B.RAMAN
In the wake of the first Xinjiang Work Conference, a joint conference of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee and the State Council, China’s cabinet, held at Beijing from May 17 to 19, 2010, to draft a blueprint for the region’s economic development until 2020, the Chinese authorities have embarked on a campaign in Xinjiang, which de-emphasises the Uighur ethnic identity of the province and highlights the Government's plans for its rapid economic development in order to bring it on par with other Chinese provinces.
2. The various documents and statements emanating from the conference, which was inaugurated by President Hu Jintao, underlined the plans of the Government for what was described as a leap-frog economic development of the province, but were silent on the Government's plans to protect the Uighur ethnic and Islamic religious identities of its Uighur population. However, subsequent comments by Chinese experts have indicated that the Government would follow a two-pronged policy based on rapid economic development and closer social integration in order to reduce Han-Uighur tensions which led to a serious outbreak of violence in July last year.
3.The "China Daily" of June 4,2010, quoted Prof.Qiang Shigong, Director of the Research Centre on the Rule of Law at Peking University, as saying as follows in an interview with a local journal called "South Wind Window", or "Nanfengchuang" after the Xinjiang Work conference:
"We need to adjust our Xinjiang policy according to the changes of social environment and approach the problem under the context of globalization.The economy’s development, although important, cannot create ethnic unity without the support of other polices, and on the contrary it may lead to social polarization and ethnic tensions because people of different ethnic backgrounds differ in their capability of adapting to the market. The ethnic integration in Xinjiang should not be understood as assimilation of non-Han Chinese. The Government should be sensitive to cultural diversities, and protect ethnic groups’ rights according to the law. "
4.He urged measures to weaken the identity of ethnic groups in policy-making, such as closing ethnic schools to promote more communication between different ethnic groups. He also said the promotion of Mandarin in ethnic regions could benefit local people in the current market economy environment. "To develop the economy and improve people’s lives doesn’t mean only helping people out of poverty. Instead, their education level and competitive capabilities should be enhanced fundamentally.The Han Chinese should take responsibility for the integration, and Han people should make more sacrifice and contribution to the goal," Qiang said. In his view, as the Government sends officials from other regions to work in Xinjiang, it should also encourage officials in Xinjiang to work in other regions.
5.The Xinjiang authorities have launched a door-to-door campaign to explain the new policies of the Government for the economoic development of the province to the people on the eve of the forthcoming anniversary of last year's outbreak of violence. According to Mr.Li Yi, head of the publicity department of the regional office of the Communist Party of China,over 9,000 officials and scholars would explain the Government's policies in schools, government departments, communities, villages, families and mosques across Xinjiang.
6. The Chinese authorities mistakenly seem to think that the feelings of alienation in the Uighur community are only because of the economic disparities between the Uighurs and the Han settlers. They do not seem to realise that these are more due to the unhappiness of the Uighurs over the failure of the Government to respect their ethnic and religious rights. (23-6-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, June 22, 2010
CHINA TO GO AHEAD WITH NUCLEAR DEAL WITH PAKISTAN, SAYS CHINA DAILY
B.RAMAN
Under the heading "China may finance Pakistan reactors", the "China Daily" has reported as follows on June 23,2010::
China will likely go ahead with financing the construction of two nuclear reactors in Pakistan despite concerns from other countries, say Chinese experts.
China is expected to announce its plans to build the reactors in Punjab province at a Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meeting in New Zealand on Thursday. Meanwhile the United States, with heavy lobbying from India, is reportedly raising doubts over the legitimacy of the deal.
One of the concerns is that Pakistan, as well as India, did not sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and therefore is technically not restricted from transferring the technology to a third party, posing a potential threat to the international community.
"This is not the first time China has helped Pakistan build nuclear reactors, and since it will be watched by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the deal is not going to have any problems," said Zhai Dequan, deputy secretary-general of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association.
Zhai said the US will not pressure China too much as it previously struck a deal with India. In 2008, the NSG - which represents the 46 countries that control the world's atomic trade - made an exemption allowing Washington to sell civil nuclear technology to New Delhi. Pakistan has stressed many times it wants the same recognition as India on civil nuclear usage.
"Pakistan is also fighting a war on terror for the US as well as for itself, and the country's loss is greater than the US and the other 42 coalition nations combined. The economic aid it has received is too little compared to its loss. Pakistan has an urgent need for more civil energy and that need should be looked after," said Zhai.
The US asked China to clarify the details of the deal last Wednesday, after intense urging from India, but stopped short of publicly opposing it. On Thursday ( My comment: Tuesday?) China said the reactors are for peaceful purposes, and will accept the IAEA's inspection. China joined the NSG in 2004 but has already built one reactor and started a second at Chashma, Punjab. The latest two reactors in the region will generate 650 megawatts each.
Although the deal is not likely to attract strong opposition, NSG members still do not want to see the transaction go forward, according to Mark Hibbs, nuclear policy expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Policy in Washington. However, Hibbs said the US-India deal set a precedent.
"There was no real agreement between the members about how to proceed," the Australian Radio quoted him as saying.
Fan Jishe, a scholar of US studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, argues that the nature of the Sino-Pakistani deal is different from that of the US-India deal.
"We do not need an exemption from the NSG, as requested by the US, since the deal was reached before we joined the group," Fan said.
Under the heading "China may finance Pakistan reactors", the "China Daily" has reported as follows on June 23,2010::
China will likely go ahead with financing the construction of two nuclear reactors in Pakistan despite concerns from other countries, say Chinese experts.
China is expected to announce its plans to build the reactors in Punjab province at a Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meeting in New Zealand on Thursday. Meanwhile the United States, with heavy lobbying from India, is reportedly raising doubts over the legitimacy of the deal.
One of the concerns is that Pakistan, as well as India, did not sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and therefore is technically not restricted from transferring the technology to a third party, posing a potential threat to the international community.
"This is not the first time China has helped Pakistan build nuclear reactors, and since it will be watched by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the deal is not going to have any problems," said Zhai Dequan, deputy secretary-general of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association.
Zhai said the US will not pressure China too much as it previously struck a deal with India. In 2008, the NSG - which represents the 46 countries that control the world's atomic trade - made an exemption allowing Washington to sell civil nuclear technology to New Delhi. Pakistan has stressed many times it wants the same recognition as India on civil nuclear usage.
"Pakistan is also fighting a war on terror for the US as well as for itself, and the country's loss is greater than the US and the other 42 coalition nations combined. The economic aid it has received is too little compared to its loss. Pakistan has an urgent need for more civil energy and that need should be looked after," said Zhai.
The US asked China to clarify the details of the deal last Wednesday, after intense urging from India, but stopped short of publicly opposing it. On Thursday ( My comment: Tuesday?) China said the reactors are for peaceful purposes, and will accept the IAEA's inspection. China joined the NSG in 2004 but has already built one reactor and started a second at Chashma, Punjab. The latest two reactors in the region will generate 650 megawatts each.
Although the deal is not likely to attract strong opposition, NSG members still do not want to see the transaction go forward, according to Mark Hibbs, nuclear policy expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Policy in Washington. However, Hibbs said the US-India deal set a precedent.
"There was no real agreement between the members about how to proceed," the Australian Radio quoted him as saying.
Fan Jishe, a scholar of US studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, argues that the nature of the Sino-Pakistani deal is different from that of the US-India deal.
"We do not need an exemption from the NSG, as requested by the US, since the deal was reached before we joined the group," Fan said.
Monday, June 21, 2010
INDIA-PAKISTAN: KEEPING THE FINGERS CROSSED
B.RAMAN
Between June 24 and July 15,one would be seeing three important bilateral interactions, not amounting to a resumption of the composite dialogue, between India and Pakistan.
2.On June 24, Mrs.Nirupama Rao, our Foreign Secretary, will be in Islamabad, for talks with her Pakistani counterpart. During her stay, she will be, inter alia, preparing the ground work for the visits to Islamabad of Mr. P.Chidambaram, the Home Minister, and Mr. S.M.Krishna, the Foreign Minister, which are to follow.
3. Mr. Chidambaram, accompanied by a team of senior officials from his Ministry and the Ministry of External Affairs, will be in Islamabad later this week to attend the meeting of the Home Ministers of SAARC under the chairmanship of Mr.Rehman Malik, Pakistan's Interior Minister, and a trusted confidante of President Asif Ali Zardari. Closer co-operation in counter-terrorism and the improvement of traditions of mutual legal assistance in criminal matters by the member-countries, both of which are presently more an exception than the rule, will be on the top of the agenda for the SAARC conference.
4. Media reports indicate that smaller countries such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives are unhappy that the SAARC, in its preoccupation with issues raised by India and Pakistan, has not been paying adequate attention to other regional security issues which are of greater interest to them such as regional co-operation in maritime counter-terrorism and counter-piracy. Being island countries, Sri Lanka and the Maldives have legitimate expectations that terrorism and law and order problems emanating from the sea and across the seas should receive greater attention than they have received in the past. This is an important subject. Its importance has been further enhanced by the Lashkar-e-Toiba's (LET) sea-borne attacks in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008.
5. Mr. Chidambaram will be utilising his stay in Islamabad for bilateral interactions with Mr.Malik and other important Pakistani leaders, including the Pakistani Foreign Minister, Mr.Shah Mahmood Qureshi. Comments emanating from different sources in Pakistan ----governmental as well as non-Governmental--- indicate that the Pakistani authorities are aware of the important position occupied by Mr.Chidambaram in the Cabinet of Dr.Manmohan Singh and the confidence reportedly reposed in him by Dr.Singh as well as Mrs.Sonia Gandhi, the leader of the Congress (I). As the Minister in charge of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, the perceptions of the post-26/11 Pakistani mindset, attitudes and policies formed by him during his visit to Pakistan would have an important role in influencing a decision by India on "What next?"
6. There is, therefore, a discernible keenness in Islamabad to see that Mr.Chidambaram's bilateral innteractions proceed smoothly without any jarring note. Such a jarring note could come either in the form of a new act of terrorism by jihadi elements from Pakistan either in Indian territory outside Jammu & Kashmir or on Indian nationals and interests in Afghanistan, committed before, during or in the days following his visit. Even if there be no fresh act of terrorism, even highly provocative and instigatory anti-India statements during this period by jihadi leaders such as Prof.Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed, the Amir of the Jammat-ud-Dawa, the political wing of the LET, could derail the exercise undertaken by Dr.Singh and Mr.Yousef Raza Gilani, the Pakistani Prime Minister. for creating an atmosphere of trust in the bilateral relations as a prelude to a resumption of a comprehensive dialogue on various issues bedevilling the relations between the two countries.
7. Trust-building will be the main objective of the interactions of Mr.Krishna in Pakistan from July 15. The meeting between Mr.Chidambaram and Mr.Malik the plans for which were drawn up long before the decision taken by the two Prime Ministers for a trust-building exercise in the margins of the SAARC summit in Thimpu, Bhutan, in April has acquired an added importance in the context of the visit of our Foreign Minister. How Mr. Chidambaram's visit proceeds would have an important bearing on the subsequent visit of Mr.Krishna.
8. If Mr.Chidambaram comes back with a feeling that the Pakistani political and military-cum-intelligence leadership continues to be as negative as ever in matters relating to counter-terrorism in general and counter-LET in particular, public and political pressures against any fresh diplomatic initiatives vis-a-vis Pakistan could increase thereby tying the hands of Mr.Krishna.
9. The Pakistani authorities are aware of this danger too and are hoping that the visits of Mr.Chidambaram and Mr.Krishna would not at least add to the current distrust, even if they don't result in winds of change and trust beginning to sweep across the sub-continent. Both Mr.Malik and Mr.Qureshi have been avoiding negative-seeming comments. One saw this during the recent summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) at Tashkant, which was attended by Mr.Zardari and Mr.Krishna as observers. Mr.Malik had accompanied Mr.Zardari.
10. Both Pakistan and India find themselves prisoners of self-created formulations, which hamper the search for a way out of the current darkness of distrust.By making any progress in sorting out other issues a hostage to the Kashmir issue, Pakistan has denied itself any room for policy flexibility. India has created a similar dead-end for itself by making progress in other issues a hostage to the issue of sincere Pakistani action against the jihadi terrorists in general and the LET in particular.
11. Breaking these self-created prisons is not going to be easy. It will be time-consuming. It will require a long spell of incident-free relations. Within this reality, are there ways of taking measures which could create trust? That is the question to be addressed during the visits of Mr.Chidambaram and Mr.Krishna. Distrust between India and Pakistan has three components--- the distrust between the general bureaucracies of the two countries, the distrust between the security bureaucracies, including the Army and the intelligence community and the distrust between the political leaderships.
12. The distrust between the political leaderships will be easier to break, provided the distrust between the bureacracies can be reduced. But,there is a vicious circle to be broken. The distrust between the political leaderships cannot be reduced unless that between the bureaucracies is addressed. The distrust between the bureaucracies cannot be reduced in the absence of trust between the political leaderships.
13. This calls for a beginning in the establishment of a network of relationships at various levels---political and bureaucratic---between the two countries. We have established such a network with China despite the continuing border dispute and despite our continuing distrust of the People's Liberation Army of China. There has not even been an attempt to build such a network between India and Pakistan. Is it possible to build such a network? If so, how to go about it?What role the Interior Ministry of Pakistan and the Home Ministry of India can play in this exercise as the starting blocks? These are questions which should be discussed during the forthcoming interactions.
14. Our insistence on Pakistani action against the LET and Sayeed is legitimate and should be continued. But we shoulde not allow this to become an over-obsession which nullifies all ideas and intitiatives of a positive nature. Over-obsession with certain issues has become the bane of Indo-Pakistan relations. If the two countries, their leaderships and bureaucracies could rid themselves of these over-obsessions, they may realise that a strategic relationship for mutual benefit between the two countries is not such a stupid idea after all. ( 22-6-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and also Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Between June 24 and July 15,one would be seeing three important bilateral interactions, not amounting to a resumption of the composite dialogue, between India and Pakistan.
2.On June 24, Mrs.Nirupama Rao, our Foreign Secretary, will be in Islamabad, for talks with her Pakistani counterpart. During her stay, she will be, inter alia, preparing the ground work for the visits to Islamabad of Mr. P.Chidambaram, the Home Minister, and Mr. S.M.Krishna, the Foreign Minister, which are to follow.
3. Mr. Chidambaram, accompanied by a team of senior officials from his Ministry and the Ministry of External Affairs, will be in Islamabad later this week to attend the meeting of the Home Ministers of SAARC under the chairmanship of Mr.Rehman Malik, Pakistan's Interior Minister, and a trusted confidante of President Asif Ali Zardari. Closer co-operation in counter-terrorism and the improvement of traditions of mutual legal assistance in criminal matters by the member-countries, both of which are presently more an exception than the rule, will be on the top of the agenda for the SAARC conference.
4. Media reports indicate that smaller countries such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives are unhappy that the SAARC, in its preoccupation with issues raised by India and Pakistan, has not been paying adequate attention to other regional security issues which are of greater interest to them such as regional co-operation in maritime counter-terrorism and counter-piracy. Being island countries, Sri Lanka and the Maldives have legitimate expectations that terrorism and law and order problems emanating from the sea and across the seas should receive greater attention than they have received in the past. This is an important subject. Its importance has been further enhanced by the Lashkar-e-Toiba's (LET) sea-borne attacks in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008.
5. Mr. Chidambaram will be utilising his stay in Islamabad for bilateral interactions with Mr.Malik and other important Pakistani leaders, including the Pakistani Foreign Minister, Mr.Shah Mahmood Qureshi. Comments emanating from different sources in Pakistan ----governmental as well as non-Governmental--- indicate that the Pakistani authorities are aware of the important position occupied by Mr.Chidambaram in the Cabinet of Dr.Manmohan Singh and the confidence reportedly reposed in him by Dr.Singh as well as Mrs.Sonia Gandhi, the leader of the Congress (I). As the Minister in charge of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, the perceptions of the post-26/11 Pakistani mindset, attitudes and policies formed by him during his visit to Pakistan would have an important role in influencing a decision by India on "What next?"
6. There is, therefore, a discernible keenness in Islamabad to see that Mr.Chidambaram's bilateral innteractions proceed smoothly without any jarring note. Such a jarring note could come either in the form of a new act of terrorism by jihadi elements from Pakistan either in Indian territory outside Jammu & Kashmir or on Indian nationals and interests in Afghanistan, committed before, during or in the days following his visit. Even if there be no fresh act of terrorism, even highly provocative and instigatory anti-India statements during this period by jihadi leaders such as Prof.Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed, the Amir of the Jammat-ud-Dawa, the political wing of the LET, could derail the exercise undertaken by Dr.Singh and Mr.Yousef Raza Gilani, the Pakistani Prime Minister. for creating an atmosphere of trust in the bilateral relations as a prelude to a resumption of a comprehensive dialogue on various issues bedevilling the relations between the two countries.
7. Trust-building will be the main objective of the interactions of Mr.Krishna in Pakistan from July 15. The meeting between Mr.Chidambaram and Mr.Malik the plans for which were drawn up long before the decision taken by the two Prime Ministers for a trust-building exercise in the margins of the SAARC summit in Thimpu, Bhutan, in April has acquired an added importance in the context of the visit of our Foreign Minister. How Mr. Chidambaram's visit proceeds would have an important bearing on the subsequent visit of Mr.Krishna.
8. If Mr.Chidambaram comes back with a feeling that the Pakistani political and military-cum-intelligence leadership continues to be as negative as ever in matters relating to counter-terrorism in general and counter-LET in particular, public and political pressures against any fresh diplomatic initiatives vis-a-vis Pakistan could increase thereby tying the hands of Mr.Krishna.
9. The Pakistani authorities are aware of this danger too and are hoping that the visits of Mr.Chidambaram and Mr.Krishna would not at least add to the current distrust, even if they don't result in winds of change and trust beginning to sweep across the sub-continent. Both Mr.Malik and Mr.Qureshi have been avoiding negative-seeming comments. One saw this during the recent summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) at Tashkant, which was attended by Mr.Zardari and Mr.Krishna as observers. Mr.Malik had accompanied Mr.Zardari.
10. Both Pakistan and India find themselves prisoners of self-created formulations, which hamper the search for a way out of the current darkness of distrust.By making any progress in sorting out other issues a hostage to the Kashmir issue, Pakistan has denied itself any room for policy flexibility. India has created a similar dead-end for itself by making progress in other issues a hostage to the issue of sincere Pakistani action against the jihadi terrorists in general and the LET in particular.
11. Breaking these self-created prisons is not going to be easy. It will be time-consuming. It will require a long spell of incident-free relations. Within this reality, are there ways of taking measures which could create trust? That is the question to be addressed during the visits of Mr.Chidambaram and Mr.Krishna. Distrust between India and Pakistan has three components--- the distrust between the general bureaucracies of the two countries, the distrust between the security bureaucracies, including the Army and the intelligence community and the distrust between the political leaderships.
12. The distrust between the political leaderships will be easier to break, provided the distrust between the bureacracies can be reduced. But,there is a vicious circle to be broken. The distrust between the political leaderships cannot be reduced unless that between the bureaucracies is addressed. The distrust between the bureaucracies cannot be reduced in the absence of trust between the political leaderships.
13. This calls for a beginning in the establishment of a network of relationships at various levels---political and bureaucratic---between the two countries. We have established such a network with China despite the continuing border dispute and despite our continuing distrust of the People's Liberation Army of China. There has not even been an attempt to build such a network between India and Pakistan. Is it possible to build such a network? If so, how to go about it?What role the Interior Ministry of Pakistan and the Home Ministry of India can play in this exercise as the starting blocks? These are questions which should be discussed during the forthcoming interactions.
14. Our insistence on Pakistani action against the LET and Sayeed is legitimate and should be continued. But we shoulde not allow this to become an over-obsession which nullifies all ideas and intitiatives of a positive nature. Over-obsession with certain issues has become the bane of Indo-Pakistan relations. If the two countries, their leaderships and bureaucracies could rid themselves of these over-obsessions, they may realise that a strategic relationship for mutual benefit between the two countries is not such a stupid idea after all. ( 22-6-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and also Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Sunday, June 20, 2010
CHINA DETERMINED TO ENSURE INDIA-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR BALANCE
B.RAMAN
The perceptions of an increasingly feel good atmosphere in the relations between India and China since the Copenhagen summit of last year should not divert attention from the ground reality, which continues to be marked by the Chinese leadership’s determination to strengthen the feeling of security of Pakistan vis-à-vis India, to maintain a nuclear balance between India and Pakistan and to counter the reported plans of the Indian Army to develop a capability for a two-front war with a counter Sino-Pakistani capability to pose a two-front threat to India.
2. The talk in India of an increasingly feel good atmosphere has been caused by the absence of seemingly hostile rhetoric in China’s pronouncements regarding India, the warmth extended to our President, Mrs.Pratibha Patil, during her recent visit to China to mark the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries and the balanced Chinese response to the restrictions sought to be imposed by India on the award of sensitive telecommunication contracts to Chinese companies. Chinese reactions to developments such as the reported approval of the Government of India to the Army’s proposal to raise two new mountain divisions, deployment of Air Force units to protect Arunachal Pradesh and the Indian debate over a possible two front doctrine have been relatively free of polemics.
3.This feel good atmosphere and the restrained language on both sides as contrasted with the rhetoric of last year need to be welcomed and ought to continue. At the same time, it will be unwise to let our focus move away from disturbing elements in China’s policy towards Pakistan and Islamabad’s expectations from China, which have become evident recently.
4. The first disturbing element is China’s continued assistance to Pakistan to expand its reprocessing capability, which will further add to its military nuclear capability. The second is its surprising decision after a four-year hesitation to respond positively to Pakistan’s repeated requests for two more nuclear power stations similar in design and capacity to Chashma I and Chashma II. Chashma I has already been commissioned. Chashma II is under construction.
5. The international community and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which China joined in 2004, could not object to Chashma I and II both of which were justified by China as already on-going projects when it joined the NSG and hence not subject to the ban on the supply of nuclear equipment and technologies to States which are not signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
6. Chinese attempts initiated in 2006 to give two more nuclear power stations to Pakistan under the same 1991 contract were objected to by the administration of Mr.George Bush . The US objections were taken note of by Beijing, which put in cold storage its proposal for giving two more nuclear power stations to Pakistan without abandoning it.
7.In a surprise decision earlier this year, China decided to take this proposal out of the cold storage and go ahead with it after informing the NSG----without seeking its formal approval--- at the plenary meeting of the NSG in New Zealand this week. The indications from Beijing are that the Chinese Government would go ahead with its move even if there be objections from the NSG. Whether the two additional nuclear power stations would be part of the old contract beyond the purview of the NSG or would have to be under a new contract which could be concluded only with an exemption granted by the NSG is a matter of interpretation. Beijing seems to be determined to stick to its interpretation that these are part of the old contract beyond the purview of the NSG.
8.Intriguing questions for Indian analysts are: What made the Chinese political leadership, which was receptive to the concerns and views of the Bush Administration on this issue, revive the proposal and go ahead with it even at the risk of misunderstanding with the Obama Administration? Was it pressure from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) not to let the balance of nuclear capabilities between India and Pakistan be upset in favour of India as a result of the Indo-US Civil nuclear co-operation agreement of 2005 and the subsequent lifting by the NSG of the restrictions on the sale of nuclear equipment and technology to India? Does the PLA view the continued maintenance of a nuclear balance between India and Pakistan as in China’s national interest?
9.It was Pakistan, which raised in 2006, when Gen.Pervez Musharraf was in power, the question of China maintaining the balance by supplying additional nuclear power stations to Pakistan if the US refused to extend to Pakistan the same consideration as it had extended to India. Now voices are being raised in Pakistan about the importance of Pakistan persuading China to lease out a nuclear-powered submarine to Pakistan to neutralize any advantage accruing to India by its reported efforts to lease a nuclear-powered submarine from Russia. This idea has also figured in an article written by Commander Muhammad Azam Khan, a retired officer of the Pakistan Navy, under the title “Options For the Pakistan Navy” which had appeared in the summer issue of the US Naval War College Review available at http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/cc6209f2-7f01-4bb7-ac24-8c301c62f015/S-2--Options-for-the-Pakistan-Navy
10. There is no evidence to indicate that Pakistan has formally taken up such an idea with the Chinese, but one has to closely monitor any developments having a bearing on this.
11.Sino-Indian atmospherics are better than they were last year, but that does not mean any significant change in Chinese perceptions and strategy relating to India and Pakistan. The improvement of relations with India has not diminished in the Chinese eyes the importance of strengthening Pakistan’s conventional and nuclear capabilities against India.
12. This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article titled “US Nod for Chashma III & IV? “ available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers38/paper3788.html . ( 21-6-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The perceptions of an increasingly feel good atmosphere in the relations between India and China since the Copenhagen summit of last year should not divert attention from the ground reality, which continues to be marked by the Chinese leadership’s determination to strengthen the feeling of security of Pakistan vis-à-vis India, to maintain a nuclear balance between India and Pakistan and to counter the reported plans of the Indian Army to develop a capability for a two-front war with a counter Sino-Pakistani capability to pose a two-front threat to India.
2. The talk in India of an increasingly feel good atmosphere has been caused by the absence of seemingly hostile rhetoric in China’s pronouncements regarding India, the warmth extended to our President, Mrs.Pratibha Patil, during her recent visit to China to mark the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries and the balanced Chinese response to the restrictions sought to be imposed by India on the award of sensitive telecommunication contracts to Chinese companies. Chinese reactions to developments such as the reported approval of the Government of India to the Army’s proposal to raise two new mountain divisions, deployment of Air Force units to protect Arunachal Pradesh and the Indian debate over a possible two front doctrine have been relatively free of polemics.
3.This feel good atmosphere and the restrained language on both sides as contrasted with the rhetoric of last year need to be welcomed and ought to continue. At the same time, it will be unwise to let our focus move away from disturbing elements in China’s policy towards Pakistan and Islamabad’s expectations from China, which have become evident recently.
4. The first disturbing element is China’s continued assistance to Pakistan to expand its reprocessing capability, which will further add to its military nuclear capability. The second is its surprising decision after a four-year hesitation to respond positively to Pakistan’s repeated requests for two more nuclear power stations similar in design and capacity to Chashma I and Chashma II. Chashma I has already been commissioned. Chashma II is under construction.
5. The international community and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which China joined in 2004, could not object to Chashma I and II both of which were justified by China as already on-going projects when it joined the NSG and hence not subject to the ban on the supply of nuclear equipment and technologies to States which are not signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
6. Chinese attempts initiated in 2006 to give two more nuclear power stations to Pakistan under the same 1991 contract were objected to by the administration of Mr.George Bush . The US objections were taken note of by Beijing, which put in cold storage its proposal for giving two more nuclear power stations to Pakistan without abandoning it.
7.In a surprise decision earlier this year, China decided to take this proposal out of the cold storage and go ahead with it after informing the NSG----without seeking its formal approval--- at the plenary meeting of the NSG in New Zealand this week. The indications from Beijing are that the Chinese Government would go ahead with its move even if there be objections from the NSG. Whether the two additional nuclear power stations would be part of the old contract beyond the purview of the NSG or would have to be under a new contract which could be concluded only with an exemption granted by the NSG is a matter of interpretation. Beijing seems to be determined to stick to its interpretation that these are part of the old contract beyond the purview of the NSG.
8.Intriguing questions for Indian analysts are: What made the Chinese political leadership, which was receptive to the concerns and views of the Bush Administration on this issue, revive the proposal and go ahead with it even at the risk of misunderstanding with the Obama Administration? Was it pressure from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) not to let the balance of nuclear capabilities between India and Pakistan be upset in favour of India as a result of the Indo-US Civil nuclear co-operation agreement of 2005 and the subsequent lifting by the NSG of the restrictions on the sale of nuclear equipment and technology to India? Does the PLA view the continued maintenance of a nuclear balance between India and Pakistan as in China’s national interest?
9.It was Pakistan, which raised in 2006, when Gen.Pervez Musharraf was in power, the question of China maintaining the balance by supplying additional nuclear power stations to Pakistan if the US refused to extend to Pakistan the same consideration as it had extended to India. Now voices are being raised in Pakistan about the importance of Pakistan persuading China to lease out a nuclear-powered submarine to Pakistan to neutralize any advantage accruing to India by its reported efforts to lease a nuclear-powered submarine from Russia. This idea has also figured in an article written by Commander Muhammad Azam Khan, a retired officer of the Pakistan Navy, under the title “Options For the Pakistan Navy” which had appeared in the summer issue of the US Naval War College Review available at http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/cc6209f2-7f01-4bb7-ac24-8c301c62f015/S-2--Options-for-the-Pakistan-Navy
10. There is no evidence to indicate that Pakistan has formally taken up such an idea with the Chinese, but one has to closely monitor any developments having a bearing on this.
11.Sino-Indian atmospherics are better than they were last year, but that does not mean any significant change in Chinese perceptions and strategy relating to India and Pakistan. The improvement of relations with India has not diminished in the Chinese eyes the importance of strengthening Pakistan’s conventional and nuclear capabilities against India.
12. This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article titled “US Nod for Chashma III & IV? “ available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers38/paper3788.html . ( 21-6-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Saturday, June 19, 2010
AFTER KANISHKA, MUMBAI 26/11-----AFTER 26/11?
B.RAMAN
In 2006, the Canadian Government had appointed a Commission of Inquiry headed by former Supreme Court justice John Major to enquire into the crash of an aircraft of Air India named Kanishka on June 23,1985. The crash was caused by an explosive device suspected to have been planted in a piece of unaccompanied baggage by Sikh extremists belonging to the Babbar Khalsa headed by the late Talwinder Singh Parmar of Vancouver, Canada.329 civilians---270 of them Canadian nationals, 27 British nationals, 22 Indian nationals and 10 other foreign nationals---- were killed. The majority of the Canadian and British nationals killed were of Indian origin. The 22 Indians killed included 20 members of the crew. The flight was operating on the Montréal-London-Delhi-Bombay route. It was blown up in midair by a bomb in Irish airspace.
2.The report of the John Major Commission was released on June 17, 2010. The Commission has found that a "cascading series of errors" by the Government of Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), which was set up only in 1984, allowed the terrorist attack to take place.We have been carrying relevant extracts from the report on the web site of the South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG) at www.southasiaanalysis.org.
3.The terms of reference of the Commission were restricted to finding out whether intelligence relating to the plans of the Sikh extremists based in Canada to blow up a flight of the Air India originating from a Canadian airport existed, if so, whether the disaster could have been prevented and why it was not prevented. The Commission's enquiry did not cover the role of Pakistan in assisting the Babbar Khalsa in organising acts of terrorism against Indian targets. This was not in its terms of reference. After the explosion, Parmar fled to Pakistan, where he was given sanctuary by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). He operated from Pakistan against India till 1992 ----- for seven years --- and crossed over into India from Pakistan in 1992 following Western pressure on Pakistan to have him arrested and handed over to India for investigation and trial. He was killed in an encounter by the Punjab Police in 1992. The role of Pakistan in giving shelter to the main conspirator in the plot which blew up the Kanishka and continuing to help him and sponsor his acts of terrorism was also not gone into by the Major Commission. It was not in its terms of reference either.
4. When the Kanishka aircraft was blown up, Gen.Zia-ul-Haq was in power in Pakistan and was playing an active role in assisting the Central Intelligence Agency of the US in its operations against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. In gratitude for this assistance, many transgressions of Pakistan were overlooked by the Western Governments. One of these transgressions was its assistance to the Babbar Khalsa which blew up the Kanishka and not extending mutual legal assistance to India in the investigation of the case. The second transgression was its clandestine acquisition of a military nuclear capability with the collusion of China.
5. Mrs.Benazir Bhutto came to power with the reluctant approval of the Pakistani Army and the ISI, then headed by Lt.Gen.Hamid Gul, following the elections held after the death of Zia in a plane crash in August,1988. After assuming office, she started exercising pressure on the ISI to stop playing what she used to call the Sikh card against India. There was pressure on the ISI from the Western Governments too.
6. The ISI asked the Government of Mr.Nawaz Sharif, which was then in power in Punjab as the Chief Minister, to take over the responsibility for assisting the Khalistani terrorists, including Parmar, and for funding and training them. The Nawaz Government readily agreed to this and asked the Special Branch of the Punjab Police to take over from the ISI the responsibility for assisting the Khalistani terrorists. It appointed Brig.Imtiaz, who headed the political division of the ISI under Zia, as adviser to the SB to supervise this project. He had been removed from the ISI by Benazir, who intensely disliked him.
7. What happened in Pakistan after the Kanishka disaster is now being repeated after the terrorist strikes of 26/11 in Mumbai carried out by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) with the prior knowledge and possibly tacit if not open approval of the ISI. One hundred and sixty-six persons, including 25 foreigners of different nationalities, were killed. Till the Kanishka disaster of June 1985, the repeated warnings of the Indian intelligence and security agencies about the emergence of the Babbar Khalsa as an international terrorist organisation were not treated seriously by their Western counterparts.
8. The Major Commission report clearly brings out that there was a considerable flow of intelligence and warnings from the Government of India about the plans of the Babbar Khalsa branch in Canada to blow up an Air India plane originating from Canada. There were also similar warnings and requests for physical security enhancements from Air India to Candian security offcials responsible for aviation security. The Major Commission report indicates that these warnings and intelligence, which had emanated from the Government of India and Air India, were not seriously acted upon by the Canadian authorities. The reports from the Government of India were attributed by them to the Indian tendency to "cry wolf". Air India's warnings were attributed to its alleged desire to obtain security enhancements without paying for it. The result: 329 innocent civilians perished. The disaster could have been easily prevented and their lives saved, if the warnings from the Govt. of India and Air India had been acted upon.
9. This could not be done because of the tendency of the Canadian authorities to view any intelligence warning emanating from India with a prejudiced mind through the prism of Inda's disputes with Pakistan. This prejudiced mindset is not unique to the Canadian authorities. It is shared by the authorities of other Western Governments too. Have they learnt any lessons from the Kanishka disaster?
10. No. The same prejudiced mind was seen between 9/11 and the London explosions of July,2005, in their tendency to dismiss Indian warnings of the emergence of the LET as an international terrorist organisation on par with Al Qaeda. They started paying serious attention to the LET only after the London explosions of 2005 and then after the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai.Just as they were looking at the Indian warnings regarding the Babbar Khalsa through the India-Pakistan prism, they continue to view even today the Indian warnings regarding the LET through the India-Pakistan prism.
11. In the actions taken by them after the Kanishka disaster, they made a distinction between the role of the Babbar Khalsa in indulging in terrorism and the role of the ISI in assisting it. Post-1985, they acted against the Babbar Khalsa as a terrorist organisation and co-operated with India in monitoring its activities, but they refrained from acting against the ISI. After the Kanishka explosion, it took about 10 years for the Babbar Khalsa to be brought under control. During this period, many more innocent civilians perished at its hands .
12.History has been repeating itself since 26/11. The Western Governments are now taking seriously the threat posed by the LET to them, but, at the same time, they are refraining from acting against the ISI without whose support the LET cannot survive for long. Unless there is simultaneous action against the LET and the ISI, the threat from the LET will continue for a long time.
13.After 26/11, the ISI is behaving exactly as it behaved after the Kanishka disaster. Because of the Western pressure and the close monitoring of the activities of the LET, it has asked the Special Branch of the Punjab Police to take over the responsibility for keeping the LET and its political wing the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD) alive and active and for funding their activities. The Punjab Government of Chief Minister Shabaz Sharif, the brother of Mr. Nawaz, is going along with this.
14. The "Dawn" of Karachi reported on June 16,2010, that according to the supplementary budget for 2009-10 recently submitted to the Punjab Provincial Assembly for post-facto approval, the Government of Mr.Shabaz Sharif gave a grant of Rs79 million to the Markaz-i-Taiba, the headquarters of the JED and the LET at Muridke in Punjab. In addition,another sum of Rs3 million was given as grants to the schools run by the JUD in different districts of Punjab.Punjab Law Minister Rana Sanaullah Khan, who has been accused by his critics of having contacts with the Sunni extremist Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, which is playing a leading role in the Punjabi Taliban, has admitted to having given the money to the JUD.
15. One does not see any sign that the West is moving to act against the continued nursing of the LET by the ISI, either directly, if possible, or through the Punjab Police. Unless this is stopped, disasters of the Kanishka and Mumbai kind will be repeated.The prejudiced view of Indian intelligence warnings and assesssments brought out in the Major Commission report continues even today 25 years after the Kanishka disaster---not only in Canada, but also in other Western countries. So long as they are not able to rid themselves of this prejudiced mindset, threats of mass casualty terrorism planned and carried out from Pakistani territory or with the assistance of its ISI will continue to confront not only India, but also the West. (20-6-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
In 2006, the Canadian Government had appointed a Commission of Inquiry headed by former Supreme Court justice John Major to enquire into the crash of an aircraft of Air India named Kanishka on June 23,1985. The crash was caused by an explosive device suspected to have been planted in a piece of unaccompanied baggage by Sikh extremists belonging to the Babbar Khalsa headed by the late Talwinder Singh Parmar of Vancouver, Canada.329 civilians---270 of them Canadian nationals, 27 British nationals, 22 Indian nationals and 10 other foreign nationals---- were killed. The majority of the Canadian and British nationals killed were of Indian origin. The 22 Indians killed included 20 members of the crew. The flight was operating on the Montréal-London-Delhi-Bombay route. It was blown up in midair by a bomb in Irish airspace.
2.The report of the John Major Commission was released on June 17, 2010. The Commission has found that a "cascading series of errors" by the Government of Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), which was set up only in 1984, allowed the terrorist attack to take place.We have been carrying relevant extracts from the report on the web site of the South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG) at www.southasiaanalysis.org.
3.The terms of reference of the Commission were restricted to finding out whether intelligence relating to the plans of the Sikh extremists based in Canada to blow up a flight of the Air India originating from a Canadian airport existed, if so, whether the disaster could have been prevented and why it was not prevented. The Commission's enquiry did not cover the role of Pakistan in assisting the Babbar Khalsa in organising acts of terrorism against Indian targets. This was not in its terms of reference. After the explosion, Parmar fled to Pakistan, where he was given sanctuary by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). He operated from Pakistan against India till 1992 ----- for seven years --- and crossed over into India from Pakistan in 1992 following Western pressure on Pakistan to have him arrested and handed over to India for investigation and trial. He was killed in an encounter by the Punjab Police in 1992. The role of Pakistan in giving shelter to the main conspirator in the plot which blew up the Kanishka and continuing to help him and sponsor his acts of terrorism was also not gone into by the Major Commission. It was not in its terms of reference either.
4. When the Kanishka aircraft was blown up, Gen.Zia-ul-Haq was in power in Pakistan and was playing an active role in assisting the Central Intelligence Agency of the US in its operations against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. In gratitude for this assistance, many transgressions of Pakistan were overlooked by the Western Governments. One of these transgressions was its assistance to the Babbar Khalsa which blew up the Kanishka and not extending mutual legal assistance to India in the investigation of the case. The second transgression was its clandestine acquisition of a military nuclear capability with the collusion of China.
5. Mrs.Benazir Bhutto came to power with the reluctant approval of the Pakistani Army and the ISI, then headed by Lt.Gen.Hamid Gul, following the elections held after the death of Zia in a plane crash in August,1988. After assuming office, she started exercising pressure on the ISI to stop playing what she used to call the Sikh card against India. There was pressure on the ISI from the Western Governments too.
6. The ISI asked the Government of Mr.Nawaz Sharif, which was then in power in Punjab as the Chief Minister, to take over the responsibility for assisting the Khalistani terrorists, including Parmar, and for funding and training them. The Nawaz Government readily agreed to this and asked the Special Branch of the Punjab Police to take over from the ISI the responsibility for assisting the Khalistani terrorists. It appointed Brig.Imtiaz, who headed the political division of the ISI under Zia, as adviser to the SB to supervise this project. He had been removed from the ISI by Benazir, who intensely disliked him.
7. What happened in Pakistan after the Kanishka disaster is now being repeated after the terrorist strikes of 26/11 in Mumbai carried out by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) with the prior knowledge and possibly tacit if not open approval of the ISI. One hundred and sixty-six persons, including 25 foreigners of different nationalities, were killed. Till the Kanishka disaster of June 1985, the repeated warnings of the Indian intelligence and security agencies about the emergence of the Babbar Khalsa as an international terrorist organisation were not treated seriously by their Western counterparts.
8. The Major Commission report clearly brings out that there was a considerable flow of intelligence and warnings from the Government of India about the plans of the Babbar Khalsa branch in Canada to blow up an Air India plane originating from Canada. There were also similar warnings and requests for physical security enhancements from Air India to Candian security offcials responsible for aviation security. The Major Commission report indicates that these warnings and intelligence, which had emanated from the Government of India and Air India, were not seriously acted upon by the Canadian authorities. The reports from the Government of India were attributed by them to the Indian tendency to "cry wolf". Air India's warnings were attributed to its alleged desire to obtain security enhancements without paying for it. The result: 329 innocent civilians perished. The disaster could have been easily prevented and their lives saved, if the warnings from the Govt. of India and Air India had been acted upon.
9. This could not be done because of the tendency of the Canadian authorities to view any intelligence warning emanating from India with a prejudiced mind through the prism of Inda's disputes with Pakistan. This prejudiced mindset is not unique to the Canadian authorities. It is shared by the authorities of other Western Governments too. Have they learnt any lessons from the Kanishka disaster?
10. No. The same prejudiced mind was seen between 9/11 and the London explosions of July,2005, in their tendency to dismiss Indian warnings of the emergence of the LET as an international terrorist organisation on par with Al Qaeda. They started paying serious attention to the LET only after the London explosions of 2005 and then after the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai.Just as they were looking at the Indian warnings regarding the Babbar Khalsa through the India-Pakistan prism, they continue to view even today the Indian warnings regarding the LET through the India-Pakistan prism.
11. In the actions taken by them after the Kanishka disaster, they made a distinction between the role of the Babbar Khalsa in indulging in terrorism and the role of the ISI in assisting it. Post-1985, they acted against the Babbar Khalsa as a terrorist organisation and co-operated with India in monitoring its activities, but they refrained from acting against the ISI. After the Kanishka explosion, it took about 10 years for the Babbar Khalsa to be brought under control. During this period, many more innocent civilians perished at its hands .
12.History has been repeating itself since 26/11. The Western Governments are now taking seriously the threat posed by the LET to them, but, at the same time, they are refraining from acting against the ISI without whose support the LET cannot survive for long. Unless there is simultaneous action against the LET and the ISI, the threat from the LET will continue for a long time.
13.After 26/11, the ISI is behaving exactly as it behaved after the Kanishka disaster. Because of the Western pressure and the close monitoring of the activities of the LET, it has asked the Special Branch of the Punjab Police to take over the responsibility for keeping the LET and its political wing the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD) alive and active and for funding their activities. The Punjab Government of Chief Minister Shabaz Sharif, the brother of Mr. Nawaz, is going along with this.
14. The "Dawn" of Karachi reported on June 16,2010, that according to the supplementary budget for 2009-10 recently submitted to the Punjab Provincial Assembly for post-facto approval, the Government of Mr.Shabaz Sharif gave a grant of Rs79 million to the Markaz-i-Taiba, the headquarters of the JED and the LET at Muridke in Punjab. In addition,another sum of Rs3 million was given as grants to the schools run by the JUD in different districts of Punjab.Punjab Law Minister Rana Sanaullah Khan, who has been accused by his critics of having contacts with the Sunni extremist Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, which is playing a leading role in the Punjabi Taliban, has admitted to having given the money to the JUD.
15. One does not see any sign that the West is moving to act against the continued nursing of the LET by the ISI, either directly, if possible, or through the Punjab Police. Unless this is stopped, disasters of the Kanishka and Mumbai kind will be repeated.The prejudiced view of Indian intelligence warnings and assesssments brought out in the Major Commission report continues even today 25 years after the Kanishka disaster---not only in Canada, but also in other Western countries. So long as they are not able to rid themselves of this prejudiced mindset, threats of mass casualty terrorism planned and carried out from Pakistani territory or with the assistance of its ISI will continue to confront not only India, but also the West. (20-6-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
KANISHKA DISASTER---SALIENT POINTS OF MAJOR COMMISSION REPORT (5)
B.RAMAN
( In 2006, the Canadian Government had appointed a Commission of Inquiry headed by former Supreme Court justice John Major to enquire into the crash of an aircraft of Air India named Kanishka on June 23,1985. The crash was caused by an explosive device suspected to have been planted in a piece of unaccompanied baggage by Sikh extremists belonging to the Babbar Khalsa headed by the late Talwinder Singh Parmar of Vancouver, Canada. The report of the Commission was released on June 17, 2010. The Commission has found that a "cascading series of errors" by the Government of Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service allowed the terrorist attack to take place.This is the fifth instalment of relevant extracts from the report.)
The central unanswered question that Canadians, and especially the
families of the victims of the bombing of Flight 182, have hoped a Public Inquiry
might reveal is whether the Government and its institutions had information
prior to the bombing that could have allowed the authorities to prevent it.
The answer is complex. There is no evidence that the Government was aware in
advance of the details of the events of June 22, 1985. That is the basis for the oftrepeated statement that there was no knowledge of any “specifi c threat” against
Flight 182.
To pose the issue in this form is, however, to miss the point. In 1985, “specifi c
threat” was a technical term tied to emergency protocols put into place when
the authorities received a call-in threat that identifi ed a target, in circumstances
where there was not enough time to conduct a proper investigation or
assessment of the threat. This sort of “specifi c threat” justifi ed emergency
measures because of the magnitude of potential consequences even if it wasn’t
possible to assess the likelihood of their occurrence.
It is one thing to say that, had there been such a “specifi c threat,” detailing a time,place and method of a planned attack on Flight 182, emergency measures would
have been implemented to hunt down the bomb. It is entirely something else
to suggest that, in the absence of such a detailed, precise and “specifi c” threat,
nothing further could or should have been done to prevent the bombing.
The claim that there was no “specifi c threat” to the June 22, 1985 departure of
Flight 182 is accurate only in a limited and literal sense. No one source provided
detailed information to any one agency in one place and at one time about
the plan to blow up Flight 182 on June 23, 1985. On the other hand, various
agencies of government had extremely important pieces of information that,
taken together, would have led a competent analyst to conclude that Flight 182
was in danger of being bombed by known Sikh extremists.
Prior to the bombing, CSIS, the RCMP, the Department of External Aff airs, local
police forces and Transport Canada were collectively in possession of the
following information about Sikh extremism and threats to Indian interests:
• A plot to bomb one and possibly two Air India planes was allegedly
being hatched by Sikh extremists in British Columbia in the fall
of 1984;
• In the fall of 1984, Ajaib Singh Bagri was allegedly nominated to a
committee planning the hijacking of an Air India plane;
• Talwinder Singh Parmar’s group, the Babbar Khalsa, was reportedly
working on a “highly secret project” in the spring of 1985, and
Parmar had been assessed as the greatest threat in Canada to
Indian diplomatic missions and personnel;
• In early June, Parmar and associates conducted experiments in the
woods involving a loud explosion;
• During a June 12, 1985 meeting, a prominent Sikh extremist stated
– in response to questions about the lack of attacks on Indian
offi cials - that something big would happen in two weeks; and
• In late May and early June, Air India warned that sabotage attempts
against Air India planes were likely to be made by Sikh extremists
using time-delayed devices in registered baggage, that special
vigilance was warranted on items like transistor radios, and
that police should oversee the loading of registered luggage
onto airplanes.
James Bartleman, who at the time he gave his evidence was Lieutenant Governor
of Ontario, and in 1985 was Director General (DG) of the Intelligence Analysis and
Security Bureau at External Aff airs, testifi ed that shortly prior to the bombing, he saw, as part of the material he received electronically from CSE on a daily basis,
information that indicated that Flight 182 would be targeted. He was not able to
assess the reliability of the information but thought it important to ensure that
the authorities were aware of the information and were dealing with it. When he
brought the information to the attention of an RCMP offi cial who was attending
a security meeting in the building, he was met with a hostile reception and an
indication that the RCMP was aware of the matter and had it in hand. On June
23, 1985, when he was informed of the bombing, he thought immediately that
this was the materialization of the threat, and that the authorities had been
unable to prevent it.
Counsel from the Department of Justice, on behalf of the Government and all
its agencies, approached Bartleman’s evidence as though it was the only prebombing
indication of the danger to Air India Flight 182. In an entirely misguided
approach, Bartleman was aggressively cross-examined and witnesses were
called to attempt to call into question the details of his evidence.
Intelligence specialists often observe that an item of information, although
apparently insignifi cant in itself, may in fact be the missing piece to a puzzle
that helps a foreign or hostile group or agency see a pattern or draw conclusions
that have profound intelligence value. This “mosaic eff ect” metaphor is typically
used by intelligence agencies, sometimes excessively, to describe the potentially
dangerous consequences that can result from the disclosure of their own
information and to justify the need for secrecy. It is an equally apt description of
how gathering and sharing information can help an agency’s own intelligence
eff ort.
The essence of good intelligence analysis is that it pulls together disparate
facts and information from diverse sources to assemble a pattern in which one
can have confi dence. Once enough information has been assembled, even
seemingly insignifi cant new additions can lead to new insights and deeper
understanding.
However startling and important Bartleman’s testimony may be, it is not, as
the blistering assault on his credibility by some Government witnesses and the
Attorney General of Canada’s submissions would imply, the only evidence that
suggests that the Government had enough knowledge of the threat to Flight
182 to warrant a diff erent security response.
Even without the document that Bartleman described, there was more than
enough disparate pieces of information that, had they been assembled in one
place, would have not only pointed to the nature of the threat, but would have
provided corroboration for the seriousness of that threat, thereby highlighting
the need to implement measures aimed specifi cally at responding to the
possibility of sabotage by means of explosive devices concealed in checked
baggage. Bartleman’s evidence is best understood as simply one more piece in the
mosaic.
In 1985, the institutional arrangements in place and the prevailing practices
of Canadian information-gathering agencies were wholly defi cient in terms of
allowing the mosaic of the threat of Sikh extremism to be pieced together so as
to make visible the pattern that clearly pointed to the high risk of a bombing of
The consequence of these defi cient arrangements was that CSIS, the government
agency that was given the primary responsibility for threat assessment, did
not have suffi cient access to facts about the threat of Sikh extremism. Lacking
good access to sources of its own within the Sikh community, CSIS was heavily
dependant on other agencies, both foreign and domestic, for the information it
needed to understand the threat.
CSIS had an abundance of threat information from the Indian government about the situation in India and about what was going on in the Sikh community in Canada, but it was unable to corroborate it.Without corroborating information, however, the large volume of information from the Government of India gave the impression that it was “crying wolf.” ( To be continued)
( In 2006, the Canadian Government had appointed a Commission of Inquiry headed by former Supreme Court justice John Major to enquire into the crash of an aircraft of Air India named Kanishka on June 23,1985. The crash was caused by an explosive device suspected to have been planted in a piece of unaccompanied baggage by Sikh extremists belonging to the Babbar Khalsa headed by the late Talwinder Singh Parmar of Vancouver, Canada. The report of the Commission was released on June 17, 2010. The Commission has found that a "cascading series of errors" by the Government of Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service allowed the terrorist attack to take place.This is the fifth instalment of relevant extracts from the report.)
The central unanswered question that Canadians, and especially the
families of the victims of the bombing of Flight 182, have hoped a Public Inquiry
might reveal is whether the Government and its institutions had information
prior to the bombing that could have allowed the authorities to prevent it.
The answer is complex. There is no evidence that the Government was aware in
advance of the details of the events of June 22, 1985. That is the basis for the oftrepeated statement that there was no knowledge of any “specifi c threat” against
Flight 182.
To pose the issue in this form is, however, to miss the point. In 1985, “specifi c
threat” was a technical term tied to emergency protocols put into place when
the authorities received a call-in threat that identifi ed a target, in circumstances
where there was not enough time to conduct a proper investigation or
assessment of the threat. This sort of “specifi c threat” justifi ed emergency
measures because of the magnitude of potential consequences even if it wasn’t
possible to assess the likelihood of their occurrence.
It is one thing to say that, had there been such a “specifi c threat,” detailing a time,place and method of a planned attack on Flight 182, emergency measures would
have been implemented to hunt down the bomb. It is entirely something else
to suggest that, in the absence of such a detailed, precise and “specifi c” threat,
nothing further could or should have been done to prevent the bombing.
The claim that there was no “specifi c threat” to the June 22, 1985 departure of
Flight 182 is accurate only in a limited and literal sense. No one source provided
detailed information to any one agency in one place and at one time about
the plan to blow up Flight 182 on June 23, 1985. On the other hand, various
agencies of government had extremely important pieces of information that,
taken together, would have led a competent analyst to conclude that Flight 182
was in danger of being bombed by known Sikh extremists.
Prior to the bombing, CSIS, the RCMP, the Department of External Aff airs, local
police forces and Transport Canada were collectively in possession of the
following information about Sikh extremism and threats to Indian interests:
• A plot to bomb one and possibly two Air India planes was allegedly
being hatched by Sikh extremists in British Columbia in the fall
of 1984;
• In the fall of 1984, Ajaib Singh Bagri was allegedly nominated to a
committee planning the hijacking of an Air India plane;
• Talwinder Singh Parmar’s group, the Babbar Khalsa, was reportedly
working on a “highly secret project” in the spring of 1985, and
Parmar had been assessed as the greatest threat in Canada to
Indian diplomatic missions and personnel;
• In early June, Parmar and associates conducted experiments in the
woods involving a loud explosion;
• During a June 12, 1985 meeting, a prominent Sikh extremist stated
– in response to questions about the lack of attacks on Indian
offi cials - that something big would happen in two weeks; and
• In late May and early June, Air India warned that sabotage attempts
against Air India planes were likely to be made by Sikh extremists
using time-delayed devices in registered baggage, that special
vigilance was warranted on items like transistor radios, and
that police should oversee the loading of registered luggage
onto airplanes.
James Bartleman, who at the time he gave his evidence was Lieutenant Governor
of Ontario, and in 1985 was Director General (DG) of the Intelligence Analysis and
Security Bureau at External Aff airs, testifi ed that shortly prior to the bombing, he saw, as part of the material he received electronically from CSE on a daily basis,
information that indicated that Flight 182 would be targeted. He was not able to
assess the reliability of the information but thought it important to ensure that
the authorities were aware of the information and were dealing with it. When he
brought the information to the attention of an RCMP offi cial who was attending
a security meeting in the building, he was met with a hostile reception and an
indication that the RCMP was aware of the matter and had it in hand. On June
23, 1985, when he was informed of the bombing, he thought immediately that
this was the materialization of the threat, and that the authorities had been
unable to prevent it.
Counsel from the Department of Justice, on behalf of the Government and all
its agencies, approached Bartleman’s evidence as though it was the only prebombing
indication of the danger to Air India Flight 182. In an entirely misguided
approach, Bartleman was aggressively cross-examined and witnesses were
called to attempt to call into question the details of his evidence.
Intelligence specialists often observe that an item of information, although
apparently insignifi cant in itself, may in fact be the missing piece to a puzzle
that helps a foreign or hostile group or agency see a pattern or draw conclusions
that have profound intelligence value. This “mosaic eff ect” metaphor is typically
used by intelligence agencies, sometimes excessively, to describe the potentially
dangerous consequences that can result from the disclosure of their own
information and to justify the need for secrecy. It is an equally apt description of
how gathering and sharing information can help an agency’s own intelligence
eff ort.
The essence of good intelligence analysis is that it pulls together disparate
facts and information from diverse sources to assemble a pattern in which one
can have confi dence. Once enough information has been assembled, even
seemingly insignifi cant new additions can lead to new insights and deeper
understanding.
However startling and important Bartleman’s testimony may be, it is not, as
the blistering assault on his credibility by some Government witnesses and the
Attorney General of Canada’s submissions would imply, the only evidence that
suggests that the Government had enough knowledge of the threat to Flight
182 to warrant a diff erent security response.
Even without the document that Bartleman described, there was more than
enough disparate pieces of information that, had they been assembled in one
place, would have not only pointed to the nature of the threat, but would have
provided corroboration for the seriousness of that threat, thereby highlighting
the need to implement measures aimed specifi cally at responding to the
possibility of sabotage by means of explosive devices concealed in checked
baggage. Bartleman’s evidence is best understood as simply one more piece in the
mosaic.
In 1985, the institutional arrangements in place and the prevailing practices
of Canadian information-gathering agencies were wholly defi cient in terms of
allowing the mosaic of the threat of Sikh extremism to be pieced together so as
to make visible the pattern that clearly pointed to the high risk of a bombing of
The consequence of these defi cient arrangements was that CSIS, the government
agency that was given the primary responsibility for threat assessment, did
not have suffi cient access to facts about the threat of Sikh extremism. Lacking
good access to sources of its own within the Sikh community, CSIS was heavily
dependant on other agencies, both foreign and domestic, for the information it
needed to understand the threat.
CSIS had an abundance of threat information from the Indian government about the situation in India and about what was going on in the Sikh community in Canada, but it was unable to corroborate it.Without corroborating information, however, the large volume of information from the Government of India gave the impression that it was “crying wolf.” ( To be continued)
KANISHKA DISASTER--SALIENT POINTS OF MAJOR COMMISSION REPORT (4)
B.RAMAN
( In 2006, the Canadian Government had appointed a Commission of Inquiry headed by former Supreme Court justice John Major to enquire into the crash of an aircraft of Air India named Kanishka on June 23,1985. The crash was caused by an explosive device suspected to have been planted in a piece of unaccompanied baggage by Sikh extremists belonging to the Babbar Khalsa headed by the late Talwinder Singh Parmar of Vancouver, Canada. The report of the Commission was released on June 17, 2010. The Commission has found that a "cascading series of errors" by the Government of Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service allowed the terrorist attack to take place.This is the fourth instalment of relevant extracts from the report.)
Even the most important achievement of the surveillance, hearing the explosion
in the woods, was marred by the misinterpretation by the surveillants of what
they actually heard. The surveillants thought they heard a shotgun blast, when
in fact they heard an explosion intended to test the detonation system for the
bombs Parmar was building. Instead of leading to a realization that Parmar was
planning to blow something up, the surveillants’ belief that they heard a gunshot
supported the mistaken conclusion by the CSIS BC Region that the primary
danger from Parmar and the Babbar Khalsa was a possible assassination attempt
or armed assault.
But even this misinterpreted information, which at the very
least appears to demonstrate that Parmar and his group posed a serious threat
to commit a terrorist act, never made it into the formal CSIS threat assessment
process. Likewise, a number of other signifi cant pieces of threat information in
various hands were also never reported, further compromising the ability of the
CSIS HQ threat assessment process to put together the pieces of the puzzle in
time to raise an eff ective response to the threat that was to crystallize into the
terrorist attack on Flight 182.
The fate of the electronic surveillance on Parmar, fi nally approved in March 1985,
was no less problematic, and arguably constituted an even more serious failure
because of its consequences for the subsequent investigation of the bombing.
In this case too, resource issues were important. While listening devices can
record conversations, it takes human resources to transcribe, to translate if
necessary, and, ultimately, to analyze and interpret them. Each of these steps
proved problematic.
In order to safeguard security, CSIS, like the RCMP Security
Service before it, adopted stringent security qualifi cations for its translators,
including lengthy periods of Canadian residency as well as Citizenship.
As prudent as this may have seemed in the abstract, in practice it meant that
there was only a very small pool of potential translators available for recruitment.
In BC Region it meant that there were no Punjabi translators available at all.
To cope with this problem, the tapes of the Parmar intercepts were shipped to
Ottawa, where they were added to the workload of the already overburdened
Punjabi translator at CSIS Headquarters. Delays were inevitable and a serious
backlog ensued.
Shipping the tapes across the country meant that there was no meaningful
possibility for the BC investigators to interact with the translator, who was
essentially left to her own devices to extract, translate and summarize what
was related on the tapes. Although a Punjabi translator for the BC Region was
eventually recruited and began work on June 8, 1985, a signifi cant backlog of
translation work in BC remained throughout the pre-bombing period. There still
seems to have been little interaction with the investigators on the ground and
there remains some doubt as to how many, if any, of the “transcripts” that were
produced were in fact reviewed by the investigators.
The transcripts were prepared by a transcriber who reviewed and summarized
what she thought relevant in the English language content, adding material
from the Punjabi content based on the translators’ notes. The eff ectiveness of
this disjointed process became further impaired by the vacation schedules of
the transcriber and one of the investigators. One of the investigators was off
duty in the two weeks leading up to the bombing and the transcriber was away
just prior to, and for a week after, the bombing. Because the intercept tapes
were erased shortly after they were processed, there was no opportunity to go
back to the actual tapes for further analysis or to remedy any defi ciencies in the
transcription and translation process. Whatever information was not recorded
in the transcription notes was lost permanently.
As discussed elsewhere , disputes remain as to the actual content
of the tapes that were reviewed and of those that were caught in the backlog, as
well as about the adequacy and comprehensiveness of the review and analysis.
What is beyond doubt is that no material from the Parmar intercepts made its
way into the CSIS, or any other, threat assessment process in April – May or June
of 1985. ( To be continued)
( In 2006, the Canadian Government had appointed a Commission of Inquiry headed by former Supreme Court justice John Major to enquire into the crash of an aircraft of Air India named Kanishka on June 23,1985. The crash was caused by an explosive device suspected to have been planted in a piece of unaccompanied baggage by Sikh extremists belonging to the Babbar Khalsa headed by the late Talwinder Singh Parmar of Vancouver, Canada. The report of the Commission was released on June 17, 2010. The Commission has found that a "cascading series of errors" by the Government of Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service allowed the terrorist attack to take place.This is the fourth instalment of relevant extracts from the report.)
Even the most important achievement of the surveillance, hearing the explosion
in the woods, was marred by the misinterpretation by the surveillants of what
they actually heard. The surveillants thought they heard a shotgun blast, when
in fact they heard an explosion intended to test the detonation system for the
bombs Parmar was building. Instead of leading to a realization that Parmar was
planning to blow something up, the surveillants’ belief that they heard a gunshot
supported the mistaken conclusion by the CSIS BC Region that the primary
danger from Parmar and the Babbar Khalsa was a possible assassination attempt
or armed assault.
But even this misinterpreted information, which at the very
least appears to demonstrate that Parmar and his group posed a serious threat
to commit a terrorist act, never made it into the formal CSIS threat assessment
process. Likewise, a number of other signifi cant pieces of threat information in
various hands were also never reported, further compromising the ability of the
CSIS HQ threat assessment process to put together the pieces of the puzzle in
time to raise an eff ective response to the threat that was to crystallize into the
terrorist attack on Flight 182.
The fate of the electronic surveillance on Parmar, fi nally approved in March 1985,
was no less problematic, and arguably constituted an even more serious failure
because of its consequences for the subsequent investigation of the bombing.
In this case too, resource issues were important. While listening devices can
record conversations, it takes human resources to transcribe, to translate if
necessary, and, ultimately, to analyze and interpret them. Each of these steps
proved problematic.
In order to safeguard security, CSIS, like the RCMP Security
Service before it, adopted stringent security qualifi cations for its translators,
including lengthy periods of Canadian residency as well as Citizenship.
As prudent as this may have seemed in the abstract, in practice it meant that
there was only a very small pool of potential translators available for recruitment.
In BC Region it meant that there were no Punjabi translators available at all.
To cope with this problem, the tapes of the Parmar intercepts were shipped to
Ottawa, where they were added to the workload of the already overburdened
Punjabi translator at CSIS Headquarters. Delays were inevitable and a serious
backlog ensued.
Shipping the tapes across the country meant that there was no meaningful
possibility for the BC investigators to interact with the translator, who was
essentially left to her own devices to extract, translate and summarize what
was related on the tapes. Although a Punjabi translator for the BC Region was
eventually recruited and began work on June 8, 1985, a signifi cant backlog of
translation work in BC remained throughout the pre-bombing period. There still
seems to have been little interaction with the investigators on the ground and
there remains some doubt as to how many, if any, of the “transcripts” that were
produced were in fact reviewed by the investigators.
The transcripts were prepared by a transcriber who reviewed and summarized
what she thought relevant in the English language content, adding material
from the Punjabi content based on the translators’ notes. The eff ectiveness of
this disjointed process became further impaired by the vacation schedules of
the transcriber and one of the investigators. One of the investigators was off
duty in the two weeks leading up to the bombing and the transcriber was away
just prior to, and for a week after, the bombing. Because the intercept tapes
were erased shortly after they were processed, there was no opportunity to go
back to the actual tapes for further analysis or to remedy any defi ciencies in the
transcription and translation process. Whatever information was not recorded
in the transcription notes was lost permanently.
As discussed elsewhere , disputes remain as to the actual content
of the tapes that were reviewed and of those that were caught in the backlog, as
well as about the adequacy and comprehensiveness of the review and analysis.
What is beyond doubt is that no material from the Parmar intercepts made its
way into the CSIS, or any other, threat assessment process in April – May or June
of 1985. ( To be continued)
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