B.RAMAN
About thirty innocent civilians and 20 other civilians serving as Special Police Officers (SPOs) are reported to have been killed on May 17,2010, when a group of Maoists (Naxals) blew up a rural public transport bus in the Dantewada District of the Chattisgarh State. The bus was reportedly blown up with a remote-controlled improvised explosive device (IED) using gelatin sticks. It was going fromSukma to Dantewada.
2.On April 6, 2010, 75 members of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and one District Police member were killed in a Maoist ambush in the thick forests of Mukrana in Dantewada. On May 8, seven CRPF members were killed when Maoists blew up a bullet-proof vehicle in the Bijapur district. The Maoists also killed six villagers, including a sarpanch (village chief) , near Teregaon in the Rajnandgaon district on May 16 and threw their bodies outside their villages.
3. These incidents coming in quick succession within a period of six weeks indicate a weak protective security strategy in the Chattisgarh State, which needs urgent attention. The ghastly mass casualty attack of May 17 on a public transport bus has revived calls for a selective use of air strikes in the Dantewada area, which has a thick jungle cover. Even if the Government authorises limited air strikes, they would not have an immediate impact in the terrain in the Dantewada area, which favours insurgents and poses problems in providing effective protective security to the civilians.
4. There is a danger that in retaliation for the air strikes the Maoists would step up their attacks on civilians and, if they are successful, it would further damage the credibility of the security forces in the eyes of the public. The immediate step required is the strengthening pf protective security measures in the Chattisgarh State in general and in the Dantewada area in particular. The State's determination and ability to protect the civilians has to be demonstrated first before we embark on extreme measures such as air strikes. We should avoid over-reaction in panic and rhetoric which distorts our response.
5.SPOs are not regular police officers on the permanent pay rolls of the State. They are civilians too, who come forward to assist the Police, in the performance of certain essential police tasks while continuing in their normal professions. They are given free food when they function as SPOs and a token payment.SPOs are useful in rural areas. They played a useful role in the counter-terrorism operations against the Khalistani terrorists in Punjab. They were often the targets of attack by the terrorists in order to punish villagers who volunteer to assist the police. Immediately after the death of Sukhdev Singh Babbar, the then leader of the Babbar Khalsa, in an encounter with the Punjab Police in August,1992, terrorists of the Babbar Khalsa attacked and killed in their villages not only a number of SPOs, but also their family members.
6. The targeted attack on the bus carrying about 20 SPOs and other civilians by the Maoists on May 17 was meant to punish the civilians who were helping the police as SPOs and to intimidate the public into not helping the police in any manner. The travel of such a large group of SPOs in a bus carrying civilians was unwise. The Maoists apparently knew this and decided to kill them with an IED even at the risk of killing a number of other civilians, who had nothing to do with the police. It was not an opportunistic planting of an IED after noticing the SPOs in the bus. It was an attack planned in advance after coming to know that such a large number of SPOs would be travelling by this bus.
7.The incident of April 6 exposed a certain casualness in the counter-insurgency approach of the local security forces and the latest attack on the bus shows disturbingly that this casualness continues unrectified six weeks after the earlier incident.
8. The Maoists should have known that their attempt to kill the SPOs by blowing a rural public transport bus could result in the deaths of a large number of civilians, who had nothing to do with the police. The fact that despite this they undertook this attack shows that the Maoists, in their strategy, have reached a stage where they are indifferent to the impat of their actions on the general public. They are prepared to face the risk of temporary spells of public aversion in order to achieve their objective of demoralising and discrediting the police. Will this be an isolated attack involving mass civilian fatalities, or is it going to become a trend?
9.Public transport attracts terrorists and insurgents----- urban transport in the case of the jihadis and rural transport in remote areas in the case of insurgents. Attacks on rural public transport are more difficult to prevent and it is more difficult to protect the travelling public in the rural areas than in urban areas. In the urban areas, attacks on public transport result in much larger casualties than in rural areas as we saw in Mumbai in July,2006, but the psychological impact on the public is the same---- whether in urban or rural areas.
10. In their attempts to discredit the Government of India's counter-insurgency strategy, the Maoists are focussing on Chattisgarh----Dantewada in particular.While there is a need for a pan-Indian strategy to deal with the Maoists under the leadership and co-ordination of the Government of India, a special strategy to protect the people of Chattisgarh and to neutralise Maoist activities in the Chattisgarh area has to be worked out based on a larger surge of better equipped, better motivated and better informed security forces to help the local police. The special strategy for Chattisgarh cannot wait till a pan-Indian strategy is worked out. ( 18-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, May 17, 2010
Sunday, May 16, 2010
MALDIVES TO RE-SETTLE TWO TERRORISM SUSPECTS FROM GUANTANAMO BAY
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.650
B.RAMAN
In a controversial decision, which should be of concern to India’s national security managers, President Mohamed Nasheed of the Maldives has accepted a request from the US Government to re-settle in Maldivian territory two terrorism suspects from the Guantanamo Bay military detention centre in Cuba. Talks in this regard have been going on with the US authorities since December last.
2.Under a policy initiated by the administration of President Barack Obama after it assumed office in January,2009, it is pledged to close down the military detention centre after transferring to normal judicial custody for trial in US territory according to the normal laws of the land those against whom there is evidence to justify a trial and transferring others against whom there is no such evidence either to the countries to which they belonged before they were arrested post-9/11 or to other countries which are prepared to accept them.
3. The implementation of this policy has slowed down due to the following reasons:
* Opposition to bringing Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, who orchestrated the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US, to New York for trial.
* Some of the suspects from Afghanistan and Yemen, who were released and re-settled in their country because there was no evidence against them to warrant a trial, took to terrorism after their release due to their anger against their alleged ill-treatment in the detention centre by the US. There is a danger that many others, who were arrested by the US authorities on mere suspicion without any evidence of their involvement in terrorism might similarly take to terrorism after their release due to their anger against the US. Yemenis, Pakistanis and Afghans constitute a bulk of such suspects in the detention centre.
* Difficulty in finding countries which would accept those whom the US did not want to send to their home country such as the Uighur suspects. China has been demanding that the Uighurs should be handed over to it for trial. Human rights organizations have been opposing this due to fears that they might be sentenced to death and executed by the Chinese authorities. While willing host- countries have been found to re-settle some of the Uighurs, others are without a willing host-country and hence continue to be at Guantanamo Bay.
4. Neither the Maldives nor the US have revealed the nationalities of the two suspects, who are to be transferred to the Maldives for re-settlement from Guantanamo Bay. Among the suspects detained at the centre in Cuba was a Maldivian national Ibrahim Fauzee who was picked up in Karachi in May 2002 and transferred to the Guantanamo Bay detention centre because he was living with an Al Qaeda suspect. He contended that he was not aware that the person with whom he was staying in Karachi had links with Al Qaeda. No evidence of involvement in terrorism could be found against him and he was reportedly released in 2005. His present whereabouts are not known. Nor is it known whether he is one of the two suspects to be accepted by the Maldives.
5. Since the Government of President Nasheed has been developing close relations with China, it is doubtful whether he would accept Uighurs since that could make Beijing unhappy. India should have legitimate cause for worry if under US pressure and offer of money, the Maldivian Government re-settles in its territory Pakistani or Afghan or Yemeni suspects. There is a strong possibility that these suspects, in their anger against the US, would take to terrorism from Maldivian territory where the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) has already set up a presence. The LET has been recruiting Maldivian nationals and allegedly training them in its camps in Pakistan and giving them exposure to the jihad in the Af-Pak region.
6. The Maldives, which has many uninhabited islands, could attract Pakistani and Al Qaeda terrorists interested in sea-borne terrorist attacks similar to Mumbai 26/11. This would seriously add to India’s counter-terrorism concerns. It is doubtful whether the National Security Service (NSS) of the Maldives would be able to keep these suspects under effective surveillance and prevent them from taking to reprisal terrorism. The presence of these suspects in Maldivian territory would pose a threat not only to India and Sri Lanka, but also to the internal security of the Maldives itself.
7. If the two suspects being accepted by the Maldives are local nationals, India has no grounds for protesting. But if they are non-Maldivians, India has every reason to protest and request the Male Government not to accept them.
8. It is not clear whether the Maldivian Government kept India in the picture about its talks with the US on these suspects. If it had, India should have immediately advised it against accepting them. If it had not, it is a matter for surprise that President Nasheed kept India in the dark about a matter which could affect India’s national security.
9. The opposition members in the Maldives have strongly criticized the decision of President Nasheed on national security grounds. The National Security Committee of the Parliament is to discuss the matter on May 19. ( 17-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently , Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
In a controversial decision, which should be of concern to India’s national security managers, President Mohamed Nasheed of the Maldives has accepted a request from the US Government to re-settle in Maldivian territory two terrorism suspects from the Guantanamo Bay military detention centre in Cuba. Talks in this regard have been going on with the US authorities since December last.
2.Under a policy initiated by the administration of President Barack Obama after it assumed office in January,2009, it is pledged to close down the military detention centre after transferring to normal judicial custody for trial in US territory according to the normal laws of the land those against whom there is evidence to justify a trial and transferring others against whom there is no such evidence either to the countries to which they belonged before they were arrested post-9/11 or to other countries which are prepared to accept them.
3. The implementation of this policy has slowed down due to the following reasons:
* Opposition to bringing Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, who orchestrated the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US, to New York for trial.
* Some of the suspects from Afghanistan and Yemen, who were released and re-settled in their country because there was no evidence against them to warrant a trial, took to terrorism after their release due to their anger against their alleged ill-treatment in the detention centre by the US. There is a danger that many others, who were arrested by the US authorities on mere suspicion without any evidence of their involvement in terrorism might similarly take to terrorism after their release due to their anger against the US. Yemenis, Pakistanis and Afghans constitute a bulk of such suspects in the detention centre.
* Difficulty in finding countries which would accept those whom the US did not want to send to their home country such as the Uighur suspects. China has been demanding that the Uighurs should be handed over to it for trial. Human rights organizations have been opposing this due to fears that they might be sentenced to death and executed by the Chinese authorities. While willing host- countries have been found to re-settle some of the Uighurs, others are without a willing host-country and hence continue to be at Guantanamo Bay.
4. Neither the Maldives nor the US have revealed the nationalities of the two suspects, who are to be transferred to the Maldives for re-settlement from Guantanamo Bay. Among the suspects detained at the centre in Cuba was a Maldivian national Ibrahim Fauzee who was picked up in Karachi in May 2002 and transferred to the Guantanamo Bay detention centre because he was living with an Al Qaeda suspect. He contended that he was not aware that the person with whom he was staying in Karachi had links with Al Qaeda. No evidence of involvement in terrorism could be found against him and he was reportedly released in 2005. His present whereabouts are not known. Nor is it known whether he is one of the two suspects to be accepted by the Maldives.
5. Since the Government of President Nasheed has been developing close relations with China, it is doubtful whether he would accept Uighurs since that could make Beijing unhappy. India should have legitimate cause for worry if under US pressure and offer of money, the Maldivian Government re-settles in its territory Pakistani or Afghan or Yemeni suspects. There is a strong possibility that these suspects, in their anger against the US, would take to terrorism from Maldivian territory where the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) has already set up a presence. The LET has been recruiting Maldivian nationals and allegedly training them in its camps in Pakistan and giving them exposure to the jihad in the Af-Pak region.
6. The Maldives, which has many uninhabited islands, could attract Pakistani and Al Qaeda terrorists interested in sea-borne terrorist attacks similar to Mumbai 26/11. This would seriously add to India’s counter-terrorism concerns. It is doubtful whether the National Security Service (NSS) of the Maldives would be able to keep these suspects under effective surveillance and prevent them from taking to reprisal terrorism. The presence of these suspects in Maldivian territory would pose a threat not only to India and Sri Lanka, but also to the internal security of the Maldives itself.
7. If the two suspects being accepted by the Maldives are local nationals, India has no grounds for protesting. But if they are non-Maldivians, India has every reason to protest and request the Male Government not to accept them.
8. It is not clear whether the Maldivian Government kept India in the picture about its talks with the US on these suspects. If it had, India should have immediately advised it against accepting them. If it had not, it is a matter for surprise that President Nasheed kept India in the dark about a matter which could affect India’s national security.
9. The opposition members in the Maldives have strongly criticized the decision of President Nasheed on national security grounds. The National Security Committee of the Parliament is to discuss the matter on May 19. ( 17-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently , Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
IS COPY-CAT OF MUMBAI 26/11 POSSIBLE IN INDONESIA?
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.649
B.RAMAN
Is a copy-cat act of terrorism similar to the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai possible in Indonesia? That is a question that needs examination following the disclosures made by the Indonesian authorities about the intentions of a recently neutralised group of terrorists close to Al Qaeda and based in Aceh to organize such strikes in August,2010.
2. This group with an estimated strength of about 80 and led by Dulmatin, formerly of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), believed in targeted killings through hand-held weapons of non-Muslim foreigners and Muslims declared apostates for collaborating with non-Muslims to achieve an Islamic rule in Indonesia and other areas with a Muslim majority instead of indulging in indiscriminate killings of non-Muslims and Muslims alike with explosives like the JI and its splinter group headed by Noordin Top were doing. The sleeper cells of this new group were detected by the Indonesian authorities in February last and in operations lasting over three months, the Indonesian authorities have killed 13 members of the group including Dulmatin and arrested 58 others.
3. On the basis of the interrogation of the arrested persons, the Indonesian Police announced on May 14,2010, that they had foiled a plot by them to kill President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and foreigners in an attack during the independence day celebration on August 17, 2010. Bambang Hendarso Danuri, the national police chief, told a press conference: "They planned to target the Indonesian President (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono), state officials and foreign guests attending the ceremony.” He said that the planned attack was inspired by the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai carried out by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) of Pakistan. He added: “They planned to launch a series of assassinations in Java and Jakarta with their specific target foreigners, especially Americans, and the Indonesian President." They also planned to lay siege to hotels, "copying what had occurred in Mumbai." If the attack had succeeded, the militants would have "declared Indonesia as an Islamic state". According to the police chief, one of the arrested suspects was to collect firearms and a grenade launcher from an Islamist stronghold on Mindano, the main island in the southern Philippines, to be used in the planned attack.
4. While the splinter group from the JI led by Dulmatin might have wanted to emulate the LET and organize multi-target commando style swarm attacks with a mix of modus operandi involving the use of hand-held weapons and explosives, it is doubtful whether it had the capability to organize such attacks without proper training and the required weapons. The LET succeeded because it had a well-trained group at its disposal and enjoyed the sponsorship and training assistance of serving and retired officers of Pakistan’s Army and Inter-Services Intelligence.
5. While it is easy for a terrorist group to organize indiscriminate killings of civilians with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), Commando-style swarm attacks require proper training similar to the training given to the special forces of the Army. They require not only suitable weapons, but also modern communication sets to facilitate co-ordinated attacks.
6. There is no evidence to show that the Dulmatin group had the required capability, weaponry and other equipment. Moreover, whereas many members of the pre-2004 vintage of the JI had the benefit of training and jihadi inoculation in the Af-Pak region, there is no reason to believe that the post-2004 crop of South-East Asian, including Indonesian, jihadis---whether belonging to the JI or other groups---- have had similar training and jihadi inoculation outside the S-E-Asian region----either in the Af-Pak area or in Yemen.
7. The Dulmatin group was essentially a collection of indigenous elements, indigenously motivated, trained and armed with no benefit of sponsorship and assistance of the intelligence agency of any other country----either in the region or outside. While the security forces of the region should guard themselves against the dangers of 26/11 style terrorist attacks, the possibility of such attacks is still low to medium. ( 16-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
Is a copy-cat act of terrorism similar to the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai possible in Indonesia? That is a question that needs examination following the disclosures made by the Indonesian authorities about the intentions of a recently neutralised group of terrorists close to Al Qaeda and based in Aceh to organize such strikes in August,2010.
2. This group with an estimated strength of about 80 and led by Dulmatin, formerly of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), believed in targeted killings through hand-held weapons of non-Muslim foreigners and Muslims declared apostates for collaborating with non-Muslims to achieve an Islamic rule in Indonesia and other areas with a Muslim majority instead of indulging in indiscriminate killings of non-Muslims and Muslims alike with explosives like the JI and its splinter group headed by Noordin Top were doing. The sleeper cells of this new group were detected by the Indonesian authorities in February last and in operations lasting over three months, the Indonesian authorities have killed 13 members of the group including Dulmatin and arrested 58 others.
3. On the basis of the interrogation of the arrested persons, the Indonesian Police announced on May 14,2010, that they had foiled a plot by them to kill President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and foreigners in an attack during the independence day celebration on August 17, 2010. Bambang Hendarso Danuri, the national police chief, told a press conference: "They planned to target the Indonesian President (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono), state officials and foreign guests attending the ceremony.” He said that the planned attack was inspired by the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai carried out by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) of Pakistan. He added: “They planned to launch a series of assassinations in Java and Jakarta with their specific target foreigners, especially Americans, and the Indonesian President." They also planned to lay siege to hotels, "copying what had occurred in Mumbai." If the attack had succeeded, the militants would have "declared Indonesia as an Islamic state". According to the police chief, one of the arrested suspects was to collect firearms and a grenade launcher from an Islamist stronghold on Mindano, the main island in the southern Philippines, to be used in the planned attack.
4. While the splinter group from the JI led by Dulmatin might have wanted to emulate the LET and organize multi-target commando style swarm attacks with a mix of modus operandi involving the use of hand-held weapons and explosives, it is doubtful whether it had the capability to organize such attacks without proper training and the required weapons. The LET succeeded because it had a well-trained group at its disposal and enjoyed the sponsorship and training assistance of serving and retired officers of Pakistan’s Army and Inter-Services Intelligence.
5. While it is easy for a terrorist group to organize indiscriminate killings of civilians with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), Commando-style swarm attacks require proper training similar to the training given to the special forces of the Army. They require not only suitable weapons, but also modern communication sets to facilitate co-ordinated attacks.
6. There is no evidence to show that the Dulmatin group had the required capability, weaponry and other equipment. Moreover, whereas many members of the pre-2004 vintage of the JI had the benefit of training and jihadi inoculation in the Af-Pak region, there is no reason to believe that the post-2004 crop of South-East Asian, including Indonesian, jihadis---whether belonging to the JI or other groups---- have had similar training and jihadi inoculation outside the S-E-Asian region----either in the Af-Pak area or in Yemen.
7. The Dulmatin group was essentially a collection of indigenous elements, indigenously motivated, trained and armed with no benefit of sponsorship and assistance of the intelligence agency of any other country----either in the region or outside. While the security forces of the region should guard themselves against the dangers of 26/11 style terrorist attacks, the possibility of such attacks is still low to medium. ( 16-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Saturday, May 15, 2010
INDIAN DEPENDENCE ON CHINESE EQUIPMENT & TECHNOLOGY
B.RAMAN
The Pakistan Railways is reportedly facing a crisis because of the unserviceability of 32 of the 69 locomotives bought from a Chinese company. It has been alleged that the Railways were forced to buy these locomotives by President Asif Ali Zardari and his advisers even though expert opinion in the Railways was against buying locomotives from a Chinese company, which turned out to be sub-standard. It has been reported that to keep the Railways going, they are thinking of ordering 75 new locomotives from non-Chinese sources. The text of a report on this subject carried by "The News" of Pakistan on May 15,2010, is attached.
2. This has an important lesson for India, which has been developing a dependence on Chinese equipment and technology in key sectors of the economy such as electricity production and mobile telephone networks. Procurement of mobile telephone network equipment and technology from Chinese companies by Indian private companies on which there were no major restrictions till last year, has now been slowed down following concerns reportedly voiced by the Indian intelligence agencies over the security implications of a growing dependence on Chinese equipment and technology in this sensitive sector. It has been reported that the Government has not cleared any proposal for fresh procurement during the last four months and has undertaken a study of the concerns voiced by the intelligence agencies. In the meanwhile, pressure has been mounted on the Government to reverese its curbs by the Chinese authorities through their Embassy in New Delhi and by officials of the Chinese companies.
3. A point made by the Chinese companies is that while India has suspended the procurement of mobile telephone network equipment and technology from China on security grounds, it continues to import similar equipment and technology from Western countries. The question posed by them is:If similar Western equipment and technology do not pose a security threat, why should Chinese equipment and technology pose a threat? An insinuation made is that the real reason for the suspension of the procurement from China is not secuity, but concealed commercial motives to favour Western companies.
4. Even if what the Chinese companies say is correct, the Government's caution in buying similar equipment and technology from China, even at much lower prices, is understandable because China is still perceived in India as a possible adversary. India and China had fought a war in 1962 and one should factor into our decision-making the possibility that there could be another military conflict if the border dispute is not satisfactoily settled.When the intelligence agencies talk of the security implications, they keep in view not only the circumstances of today, but also what could happen in future if the bilateral relations deteriorate.
5. While the Chinese and their supporters in India are unhappy over the curbs imposed by India on security grounds, they tend to play down the fact that the Chinese themselves had imposed similar restrictions on security grounds on Indian information technology companies in China. Mr.Zhu Rongji, the former Chinese Prime Minister, had allowed Indian IT companies to open branches in Shanghai. But for many years, they were not allowed to have a presence in Beijing. Chinese Governmental and non-Governmental entities were secretly advised not to give any contracts to the Indian companies. The Indian companies survived in Shanghai with the contracts won by them from the local offices of Western multinationals. Only now the Chinese have allowed Indian IT companies to have a presence in Beijing and other cities and permitted some of their banks to award contracts to the Indian companies. Even now, will the Chinese authorities allow Indian IT companies to operate in Tibet and Xinjiang?
6. While security is and ought to be an important consideration in the case of telecommunication equipment, serviceability of the equipment and assured future supplies of spare parts should be equally important considerations in sectors relating to key segments of our economy such as power production. The Pakistan Railways developed an unhealthy dependence on Chinese equipment and it is now threatened with serious dislocation despite the excellent state-to-state relations between the two countries.
7. We have been developing a dependence on the Chinese for our thermal power stations because the Chinese power equipment like their telecommunication equipment is much cheaper as compared to Western and Japanese equipment and the Chinese have a reputation of completing their projects in time. Other important considerations such as the quality and serviceability of the equipment and the guarantee of future supplies of spare parts are not given the attention they deserve.
8. Before deciding to order any equipment and technolgy from the West, an important question considered by us is: What are the chances of the Western Governments suspending the supply of spare parts in future to exercise political pressure on India? The US had not hesitated to use this weapon on some occasions in the past. If tomorrow there is a military conflict between India and Pakistan and the Chinese authorities, to help out Pakistan, suspend the supply of spare parts for our power projects set up with their assistance, what will happen to our power production and the economy as a whole?
9. Are such questions carefully considered before allowing the procurement of Chinese equipment and tchnology? One has the impression that in our keenness to improve bilateral trade with China, which is racing towards the annual target of US $ 60 billion with China being the main benficiary with a big trade surplus in its favour, we are not paying attention to important questions such as what I have explained above.Let us by all means allow a free hand in India to Chinese manufacturers of consumer goods, but in respect of other goods of a sensitive nature which could affect our national security or future economic stability, we have to be more careful.
10.Since India and China will continue to be potential adversaries so long as the border dispute is not settled, the argument that we should treat the Chinese companies in the same way we treat the Western companies does not hold good. Security and guarantee of future supplies should be important considerations in the case of Western companies too, but certain risks which we can afford to take in the case of Western companies, we cannot in the case of Chinese companies. ( 16-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
FROM " THE NEWS" OF MAY 15,2010
Chinese suppliers fail to deliver
By Ahmad Noorani
ISLAMABAD: The shortage of locomotives in the Pakistan Railways has reached such a crisis stage that an emergency plan to procure 150 engines from reliable international suppliers has been put together as the Chinese suppliers have failed to deliver, senior officials of Railways told The News.
General Manager Railways Shahid Ahmad on Thursday night confirmed to The News that the top Railways management had finally decided to drop the idea of acquiring 75 locomotives from the Chinese company as 32 previously supplied engines out of 69 have been scrapped after they became unserviceable.
The 75 locomotives were ordered from China after President Zardari himself intervened and forced the Railways to oblige the Chinese suppliers despite large-scale opposition within the Railways Ministry. Railways Minister Ghulam Ahmad Bilour had gone on record against the Chinese suppliers but he was given a shut-up call.
The GM Railways disclosed that already an advertisement to purchase 150 locomotives has been published internationally and now the Railways will ensure that no substandard locomotives are procured.
Sources say the Chinese supplier has also refused to honour the warranty on these 32 locomotives as they are rotting in Railways sheds in Karachi and Lahore. Purchase of 69 sub-standard locomotives from China by spending billions of rupees was one of the initial mega corruption scandals against General Pervez Musharraf and his team.
However, vested interests succeeded to even get the present government fall in line and to award the contract of another 75 locomotives from the same Chinese company. “12 locomotives of 2,000 HP and 20 locomotives of 3,000 HP, all under warranty, have now been totally scrapped. There is no way that these could be used and a great loss has been inflicted on the national exchequer,” GM Shahid said.
He added: “The total cost of these locomotives has proved to be very high as these outdated engines have a very high maintenance cost. Whenever we want to change a very important device in the engine, a turbo super charger, it become out of order within two to three months because of inferior quality of the engine and causes unbearable loss to the locomotive itself.”
The senior Railways official revealed that 15 per cent advance amount has already been paid to the Chinese company and now a letter has been sent to them seeking a reply within 14 days regarding complete breakdown of the 32 locomotives costing Pakistan billions of rupees.
He said after receiving the reply of this letter proceedings to get back 15 per cent advance amount would be initiated. He said the Pakistan Railways needs sturdy and tough diesel engines as it runs services on long routes from Karachi to Peshawar which also include hilly areas.
The GM said the Pakistan Railways is in dire need of the engines otherwise the whole railway system was going to collapse. The Pakistan Railways procured 69 locomotives from China in 2001 which were technically approved by the then management of Pakistan Railways in spite of excessive axle load. These locomotives did not perform very well and had developed lot of major faults that caused huge revenue losses. The cracking of underframe of more than 9 locomotives of 3,000 HP in 2005 is one example.
The Railways officials say in spite of this bad performance the previous Railways administration committed serious violations of tender conditions, PPRA Rules and international competitive bidding procedures and awarded the contract of another 75 locomotives to China. The recommendations of technical committee were ignored wherein they had disqualified the Chinese proposal thrice due to non-compliance of relevant clauses.
The Pakistan Railways is reportedly facing a crisis because of the unserviceability of 32 of the 69 locomotives bought from a Chinese company. It has been alleged that the Railways were forced to buy these locomotives by President Asif Ali Zardari and his advisers even though expert opinion in the Railways was against buying locomotives from a Chinese company, which turned out to be sub-standard. It has been reported that to keep the Railways going, they are thinking of ordering 75 new locomotives from non-Chinese sources. The text of a report on this subject carried by "The News" of Pakistan on May 15,2010, is attached.
2. This has an important lesson for India, which has been developing a dependence on Chinese equipment and technology in key sectors of the economy such as electricity production and mobile telephone networks. Procurement of mobile telephone network equipment and technology from Chinese companies by Indian private companies on which there were no major restrictions till last year, has now been slowed down following concerns reportedly voiced by the Indian intelligence agencies over the security implications of a growing dependence on Chinese equipment and technology in this sensitive sector. It has been reported that the Government has not cleared any proposal for fresh procurement during the last four months and has undertaken a study of the concerns voiced by the intelligence agencies. In the meanwhile, pressure has been mounted on the Government to reverese its curbs by the Chinese authorities through their Embassy in New Delhi and by officials of the Chinese companies.
3. A point made by the Chinese companies is that while India has suspended the procurement of mobile telephone network equipment and technology from China on security grounds, it continues to import similar equipment and technology from Western countries. The question posed by them is:If similar Western equipment and technology do not pose a security threat, why should Chinese equipment and technology pose a threat? An insinuation made is that the real reason for the suspension of the procurement from China is not secuity, but concealed commercial motives to favour Western companies.
4. Even if what the Chinese companies say is correct, the Government's caution in buying similar equipment and technology from China, even at much lower prices, is understandable because China is still perceived in India as a possible adversary. India and China had fought a war in 1962 and one should factor into our decision-making the possibility that there could be another military conflict if the border dispute is not satisfactoily settled.When the intelligence agencies talk of the security implications, they keep in view not only the circumstances of today, but also what could happen in future if the bilateral relations deteriorate.
5. While the Chinese and their supporters in India are unhappy over the curbs imposed by India on security grounds, they tend to play down the fact that the Chinese themselves had imposed similar restrictions on security grounds on Indian information technology companies in China. Mr.Zhu Rongji, the former Chinese Prime Minister, had allowed Indian IT companies to open branches in Shanghai. But for many years, they were not allowed to have a presence in Beijing. Chinese Governmental and non-Governmental entities were secretly advised not to give any contracts to the Indian companies. The Indian companies survived in Shanghai with the contracts won by them from the local offices of Western multinationals. Only now the Chinese have allowed Indian IT companies to have a presence in Beijing and other cities and permitted some of their banks to award contracts to the Indian companies. Even now, will the Chinese authorities allow Indian IT companies to operate in Tibet and Xinjiang?
6. While security is and ought to be an important consideration in the case of telecommunication equipment, serviceability of the equipment and assured future supplies of spare parts should be equally important considerations in sectors relating to key segments of our economy such as power production. The Pakistan Railways developed an unhealthy dependence on Chinese equipment and it is now threatened with serious dislocation despite the excellent state-to-state relations between the two countries.
7. We have been developing a dependence on the Chinese for our thermal power stations because the Chinese power equipment like their telecommunication equipment is much cheaper as compared to Western and Japanese equipment and the Chinese have a reputation of completing their projects in time. Other important considerations such as the quality and serviceability of the equipment and the guarantee of future supplies of spare parts are not given the attention they deserve.
8. Before deciding to order any equipment and technolgy from the West, an important question considered by us is: What are the chances of the Western Governments suspending the supply of spare parts in future to exercise political pressure on India? The US had not hesitated to use this weapon on some occasions in the past. If tomorrow there is a military conflict between India and Pakistan and the Chinese authorities, to help out Pakistan, suspend the supply of spare parts for our power projects set up with their assistance, what will happen to our power production and the economy as a whole?
9. Are such questions carefully considered before allowing the procurement of Chinese equipment and tchnology? One has the impression that in our keenness to improve bilateral trade with China, which is racing towards the annual target of US $ 60 billion with China being the main benficiary with a big trade surplus in its favour, we are not paying attention to important questions such as what I have explained above.Let us by all means allow a free hand in India to Chinese manufacturers of consumer goods, but in respect of other goods of a sensitive nature which could affect our national security or future economic stability, we have to be more careful.
10.Since India and China will continue to be potential adversaries so long as the border dispute is not settled, the argument that we should treat the Chinese companies in the same way we treat the Western companies does not hold good. Security and guarantee of future supplies should be important considerations in the case of Western companies too, but certain risks which we can afford to take in the case of Western companies, we cannot in the case of Chinese companies. ( 16-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
FROM " THE NEWS" OF MAY 15,2010
Chinese suppliers fail to deliver
By Ahmad Noorani
ISLAMABAD: The shortage of locomotives in the Pakistan Railways has reached such a crisis stage that an emergency plan to procure 150 engines from reliable international suppliers has been put together as the Chinese suppliers have failed to deliver, senior officials of Railways told The News.
General Manager Railways Shahid Ahmad on Thursday night confirmed to The News that the top Railways management had finally decided to drop the idea of acquiring 75 locomotives from the Chinese company as 32 previously supplied engines out of 69 have been scrapped after they became unserviceable.
The 75 locomotives were ordered from China after President Zardari himself intervened and forced the Railways to oblige the Chinese suppliers despite large-scale opposition within the Railways Ministry. Railways Minister Ghulam Ahmad Bilour had gone on record against the Chinese suppliers but he was given a shut-up call.
The GM Railways disclosed that already an advertisement to purchase 150 locomotives has been published internationally and now the Railways will ensure that no substandard locomotives are procured.
Sources say the Chinese supplier has also refused to honour the warranty on these 32 locomotives as they are rotting in Railways sheds in Karachi and Lahore. Purchase of 69 sub-standard locomotives from China by spending billions of rupees was one of the initial mega corruption scandals against General Pervez Musharraf and his team.
However, vested interests succeeded to even get the present government fall in line and to award the contract of another 75 locomotives from the same Chinese company. “12 locomotives of 2,000 HP and 20 locomotives of 3,000 HP, all under warranty, have now been totally scrapped. There is no way that these could be used and a great loss has been inflicted on the national exchequer,” GM Shahid said.
He added: “The total cost of these locomotives has proved to be very high as these outdated engines have a very high maintenance cost. Whenever we want to change a very important device in the engine, a turbo super charger, it become out of order within two to three months because of inferior quality of the engine and causes unbearable loss to the locomotive itself.”
The senior Railways official revealed that 15 per cent advance amount has already been paid to the Chinese company and now a letter has been sent to them seeking a reply within 14 days regarding complete breakdown of the 32 locomotives costing Pakistan billions of rupees.
He said after receiving the reply of this letter proceedings to get back 15 per cent advance amount would be initiated. He said the Pakistan Railways needs sturdy and tough diesel engines as it runs services on long routes from Karachi to Peshawar which also include hilly areas.
The GM said the Pakistan Railways is in dire need of the engines otherwise the whole railway system was going to collapse. The Pakistan Railways procured 69 locomotives from China in 2001 which were technically approved by the then management of Pakistan Railways in spite of excessive axle load. These locomotives did not perform very well and had developed lot of major faults that caused huge revenue losses. The cracking of underframe of more than 9 locomotives of 3,000 HP in 2005 is one example.
The Railways officials say in spite of this bad performance the previous Railways administration committed serious violations of tender conditions, PPRA Rules and international competitive bidding procedures and awarded the contract of another 75 locomotives to China. The recommendations of technical committee were ignored wherein they had disqualified the Chinese proposal thrice due to non-compliance of relevant clauses.
Friday, May 14, 2010
WARNING SIGNALS FROM POK
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.648
B.RAMAN
Quoting local political sources in Jammu & Kashmir, the British Broadcasting Corporation reported in its web site on May 14,2010, that terrorists ( it calls them as always militants) have regrouped in Pakistan-Occupied KasHmir (POK).
2.It quoted Mr.Arif Shahid, Secretary-General of the All Parties National Alliance (APNA), as saying as follows: " Jihadi activities have been restarted during the last few weeks.Most of the activities are concentrated in the Neelum Valley along the Line of Control.Militants were based there in large numbers and have set up camps in the area. The men are not locals - they have long hair and beards. Most do not speak the local language."
3.The BBC added that local citizens in the Neelum Valley told it much the same thing. It quoted a local resident as saying: "We are scared.The armed men are moving around the area and are trying to cross the border. We can make out from their appearances and languages they are not from any part of Kashmir."
4.Mr Shahid said that he believed that the militants were planning to sabotage the ongoing Pakistan-India peace negotiations. He added: "They have set up camps in the region and many are crossing the border.This is the start of another proxy war."
5.According to the BBC, Mr.Shahid's comments were corroborated by Shaukat Maqbool Bhat, head of the anti-Indian Jammu Kashmir National Liberation Front (JKNLF).Bhat told the BBC: "The fighters are there and they are regularly crossing into India.The local people are very scared - they believe the [militant] crossings are going to restart artillery exchanges between the Pakistani and Indian armies."
6. An ominous part of the BBC report is the claim that the people who are re-grouping in the POK do not seem to be locals and speak a different language. Generally, Pakistani terrorists trained and infiltrated into J&K from the POK speak either one of the Kashmiri dialects or Punjabi. The local residents can identify both. The fact that the BBC's sources have not been able to identify the language spoken by the people re-grouping in the POK would indicate that these persons could be Pashtuns recruited either by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) or one of the Punjabi Taliban organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), the 313 Brigade of Ilyas Kashmiri, which used to be a wing of the HUJI, the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) or the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM).
7. Pakistan's political and military leadership, its intelligence agencies, its judiciary and civil society do not admit that there is terrorism in J&K. They always project what is happening in J&K as a freedom struggle. They justify the activities of these organisations in J&K on the ground that J&K is Pakistani territory where they have a right to act in solidarity with the Kashmiris.The Government of Pervez Musharraf as well as the present Government headed by Prime Minister Yousefv Raza Gilani make a clear distinction between the so-called freedom struggle in J&K and acts of terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K.
8. They regard whatever assurances they had given since January 2004 regarding not supporting terrorism as applicable only to Indian territory outside J&K. They also feel that while the US and other Western countries would be against any Pakistani-sponsored terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K, they would not react strongly against renewed acts of violence in J&K, which they regard as a disputed territory.
9. The TTP and the Punjabi Taliban organisations criticise the Pakistani Government on two grounds----- firstly, its implied support to the US Drone (pilotless planes) strikes in South and North Waziristan and, secondly, its alleged restrictions on the activities of the Pakistani terrorist organisations not only in Indian territory outside J&K, but also even in J&K.
10.The Pakistan Government is not in a position to stop the Drone strikes. Moreover, the Pakistan Army looks upon the Drone strikes as necessary for the success of its own ground operations against the TTP. However, to soften the TTP it would not hesitate to give it and its Punjabi associates a free hand in J&K. An increase in acts of terrorism in J&K, with the participation of not only Pakistani Punjabis, but also the Pashtuns of the Taliban, is a risk to be guarded against in the months and weeks to come. ( 15-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
Quoting local political sources in Jammu & Kashmir, the British Broadcasting Corporation reported in its web site on May 14,2010, that terrorists ( it calls them as always militants) have regrouped in Pakistan-Occupied KasHmir (POK).
2.It quoted Mr.Arif Shahid, Secretary-General of the All Parties National Alliance (APNA), as saying as follows: " Jihadi activities have been restarted during the last few weeks.Most of the activities are concentrated in the Neelum Valley along the Line of Control.Militants were based there in large numbers and have set up camps in the area. The men are not locals - they have long hair and beards. Most do not speak the local language."
3.The BBC added that local citizens in the Neelum Valley told it much the same thing. It quoted a local resident as saying: "We are scared.The armed men are moving around the area and are trying to cross the border. We can make out from their appearances and languages they are not from any part of Kashmir."
4.Mr Shahid said that he believed that the militants were planning to sabotage the ongoing Pakistan-India peace negotiations. He added: "They have set up camps in the region and many are crossing the border.This is the start of another proxy war."
5.According to the BBC, Mr.Shahid's comments were corroborated by Shaukat Maqbool Bhat, head of the anti-Indian Jammu Kashmir National Liberation Front (JKNLF).Bhat told the BBC: "The fighters are there and they are regularly crossing into India.The local people are very scared - they believe the [militant] crossings are going to restart artillery exchanges between the Pakistani and Indian armies."
6. An ominous part of the BBC report is the claim that the people who are re-grouping in the POK do not seem to be locals and speak a different language. Generally, Pakistani terrorists trained and infiltrated into J&K from the POK speak either one of the Kashmiri dialects or Punjabi. The local residents can identify both. The fact that the BBC's sources have not been able to identify the language spoken by the people re-grouping in the POK would indicate that these persons could be Pashtuns recruited either by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) or one of the Punjabi Taliban organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), the 313 Brigade of Ilyas Kashmiri, which used to be a wing of the HUJI, the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) or the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM).
7. Pakistan's political and military leadership, its intelligence agencies, its judiciary and civil society do not admit that there is terrorism in J&K. They always project what is happening in J&K as a freedom struggle. They justify the activities of these organisations in J&K on the ground that J&K is Pakistani territory where they have a right to act in solidarity with the Kashmiris.The Government of Pervez Musharraf as well as the present Government headed by Prime Minister Yousefv Raza Gilani make a clear distinction between the so-called freedom struggle in J&K and acts of terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K.
8. They regard whatever assurances they had given since January 2004 regarding not supporting terrorism as applicable only to Indian territory outside J&K. They also feel that while the US and other Western countries would be against any Pakistani-sponsored terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K, they would not react strongly against renewed acts of violence in J&K, which they regard as a disputed territory.
9. The TTP and the Punjabi Taliban organisations criticise the Pakistani Government on two grounds----- firstly, its implied support to the US Drone (pilotless planes) strikes in South and North Waziristan and, secondly, its alleged restrictions on the activities of the Pakistani terrorist organisations not only in Indian territory outside J&K, but also even in J&K.
10.The Pakistan Government is not in a position to stop the Drone strikes. Moreover, the Pakistan Army looks upon the Drone strikes as necessary for the success of its own ground operations against the TTP. However, to soften the TTP it would not hesitate to give it and its Punjabi associates a free hand in J&K. An increase in acts of terrorism in J&K, with the participation of not only Pakistani Punjabis, but also the Pashtuns of the Taliban, is a risk to be guarded against in the months and weeks to come. ( 15-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Thursday, May 13, 2010
PAKISTAN: QUO VADIS?
B.RAMAN
Till 1971, Pakistan’s internal security threats arose from India in its Eastern wing and from Afghanistan in its Western wing. After the birth of Bangladesh in 1971, it no longer faces any internal security threats from India even though its army and intelligence agencies imagine without basis that it still does.
2.The traumatic effect of the Indian role in the birth of Bangladesh, which continues to influence the thinking and assessment of the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment, makes them see an Indian hand in every internal security problem they face----whether in Balochistan or in Sindh or in Khyber-Pakhtoonwa (formerly known as the North-West Frontier Province NWFP).
3.Its internal security fears from Afghanistan arise from the strong feelings of Islamic and ethnic solidarity between the Pashtuns on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. While the Pakistan Army feels confident that it will be able to crush separatist movements in Balochistan and Sindh despite the imagined Indian role, it does not have a similar confidence with regard to the Pashtuns. The fact that the Pashtuns constitute about 20 per cent of the total strength of the Army adds to its apprehensions.
4.Its past quest for a strategic depth in Afghanistan was motivated by military calculations---- the need for a greater elbow room for its Army and the Air Force in the event of a military conflict with India. Pakistani military leaders should know that the acquisition of a nuclear weapon capability by the two countries and the expected US presence in the Af-Pak region for some years to come have considerably reduced the chances of a direct military conflict.
5.Its present Afghan policy is influenced not by the perceived need for a strategic depth in the conventional sense, but by the newly-felt need to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a spring-board for destabilizing operations in its Pashtun belt. Its past quest for a strategic depth in Afghanistan was a defensive reaction. So is its present quest for the re-establishment of its influence in Afghanistan.
6.Deobandi extremism in Pakistan, which is at the basis of many of its internal security problems, was a product of the policies followed by the late Zia-ul-Haq between 1977 and 1988. His attempts to protect Pakistan from an overflow of the newly-triumphant Shia Revolution in Iran led to the aggravation of the ever present Shia-Sunni divide in the country. Terrorism in Pakistan was initially a bye-product of the Shia-Sunni violence. Many of the terrorist leaders of Pakistan today earned their jihadi spurs in the anti-Shia movement. They subsequently drifted away from anti-Shia violence and gravitated initially to the jihad against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan and then to the jihad against the Indian presence in Jammu & Kashmir.
7.However, a hard core of the anti-Shia elements in the Sipah-e-Sahaba (SES) and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) has persisted with the anti-Shia violence. They allied themselves with the Afghan Taliban when it was in power in Afghanistan and subsequently with Al Qaeda when it moved over into North Waziristan after 9/11. Suicide terrorism was brought into Pakistan by the anti-Shia elements.
8.Zia’s genuine conviction as a Deobandi, who believed that Pakistan’s salvation lie in more and more of Islam and not less, strengthened the role of the religious clerics in Pakistani society and eliminated whatever secularist influence was there in the country and its institutions. The use of Islam as a destabilizing weapon against India, with a large Muslim population, started under him. Islam acquired a military significance and potency in the eyes of the post-1947 crop of military officers, who grew up to middle and senior levels of leadership under Zia.
9.Islam was also used as a domestic weapon against political leaders who sought to challenge the pre-eminent role which the Army had assumed for itself. Islam as an ideological and military weapon, which Zia in a well-calculated opportunistic move placed at the hands of the US for use against the Soviet troops and communism in Afghanistan, served the US well in the humiliating defeat and withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan.
10.More than 20 years after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, neither the US nor Pakistan has been able to put this weapon back in its sheath. There are new non-State wielders of this weapon----Al Qaeda and its associates against the US and its perceived allies even in the Islamic world and the Talibans and their allies against the Pakistani State and the US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan.
11.Those who live by militant Islam shall fall by militant Islam. That is the spectre threatening Pakistan today. The threat to Pakistan’s existence as a State arises no longer from India, but from militant Islam. Just as communism started swallowing its own children, militant Islam has started swallowing its own children in Pakistan.
12.The fight against terrorism in Pakistan has a military and an ideological dimension. The Pakistan Army is paying attention only to its military dimension. It is avoiding countering its ideological dimension. Unless Islam is demilitarized and sent back to the mosques and madrasas where it belongs, Pakistan stands in danger of being weakened and destabilized by its own creations. A Frankenstein’s monster is difficult to control. It is even more difficult to control a religious Frankenstein’s monster.
13.Pakistan was born in the name of Islam. Unless it is able to control this monster, it stands in danger of being bled to death in the name of Islam. Zia thought Islam would be Pakistan’s salvation. Instead, Islam as fashioned by him could become its curse. (14-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Directror, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Till 1971, Pakistan’s internal security threats arose from India in its Eastern wing and from Afghanistan in its Western wing. After the birth of Bangladesh in 1971, it no longer faces any internal security threats from India even though its army and intelligence agencies imagine without basis that it still does.
2.The traumatic effect of the Indian role in the birth of Bangladesh, which continues to influence the thinking and assessment of the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment, makes them see an Indian hand in every internal security problem they face----whether in Balochistan or in Sindh or in Khyber-Pakhtoonwa (formerly known as the North-West Frontier Province NWFP).
3.Its internal security fears from Afghanistan arise from the strong feelings of Islamic and ethnic solidarity between the Pashtuns on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. While the Pakistan Army feels confident that it will be able to crush separatist movements in Balochistan and Sindh despite the imagined Indian role, it does not have a similar confidence with regard to the Pashtuns. The fact that the Pashtuns constitute about 20 per cent of the total strength of the Army adds to its apprehensions.
4.Its past quest for a strategic depth in Afghanistan was motivated by military calculations---- the need for a greater elbow room for its Army and the Air Force in the event of a military conflict with India. Pakistani military leaders should know that the acquisition of a nuclear weapon capability by the two countries and the expected US presence in the Af-Pak region for some years to come have considerably reduced the chances of a direct military conflict.
5.Its present Afghan policy is influenced not by the perceived need for a strategic depth in the conventional sense, but by the newly-felt need to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a spring-board for destabilizing operations in its Pashtun belt. Its past quest for a strategic depth in Afghanistan was a defensive reaction. So is its present quest for the re-establishment of its influence in Afghanistan.
6.Deobandi extremism in Pakistan, which is at the basis of many of its internal security problems, was a product of the policies followed by the late Zia-ul-Haq between 1977 and 1988. His attempts to protect Pakistan from an overflow of the newly-triumphant Shia Revolution in Iran led to the aggravation of the ever present Shia-Sunni divide in the country. Terrorism in Pakistan was initially a bye-product of the Shia-Sunni violence. Many of the terrorist leaders of Pakistan today earned their jihadi spurs in the anti-Shia movement. They subsequently drifted away from anti-Shia violence and gravitated initially to the jihad against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan and then to the jihad against the Indian presence in Jammu & Kashmir.
7.However, a hard core of the anti-Shia elements in the Sipah-e-Sahaba (SES) and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) has persisted with the anti-Shia violence. They allied themselves with the Afghan Taliban when it was in power in Afghanistan and subsequently with Al Qaeda when it moved over into North Waziristan after 9/11. Suicide terrorism was brought into Pakistan by the anti-Shia elements.
8.Zia’s genuine conviction as a Deobandi, who believed that Pakistan’s salvation lie in more and more of Islam and not less, strengthened the role of the religious clerics in Pakistani society and eliminated whatever secularist influence was there in the country and its institutions. The use of Islam as a destabilizing weapon against India, with a large Muslim population, started under him. Islam acquired a military significance and potency in the eyes of the post-1947 crop of military officers, who grew up to middle and senior levels of leadership under Zia.
9.Islam was also used as a domestic weapon against political leaders who sought to challenge the pre-eminent role which the Army had assumed for itself. Islam as an ideological and military weapon, which Zia in a well-calculated opportunistic move placed at the hands of the US for use against the Soviet troops and communism in Afghanistan, served the US well in the humiliating defeat and withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan.
10.More than 20 years after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, neither the US nor Pakistan has been able to put this weapon back in its sheath. There are new non-State wielders of this weapon----Al Qaeda and its associates against the US and its perceived allies even in the Islamic world and the Talibans and their allies against the Pakistani State and the US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan.
11.Those who live by militant Islam shall fall by militant Islam. That is the spectre threatening Pakistan today. The threat to Pakistan’s existence as a State arises no longer from India, but from militant Islam. Just as communism started swallowing its own children, militant Islam has started swallowing its own children in Pakistan.
12.The fight against terrorism in Pakistan has a military and an ideological dimension. The Pakistan Army is paying attention only to its military dimension. It is avoiding countering its ideological dimension. Unless Islam is demilitarized and sent back to the mosques and madrasas where it belongs, Pakistan stands in danger of being weakened and destabilized by its own creations. A Frankenstein’s monster is difficult to control. It is even more difficult to control a religious Frankenstein’s monster.
13.Pakistan was born in the name of Islam. Unless it is able to control this monster, it stands in danger of being bled to death in the name of Islam. Zia thought Islam would be Pakistan’s salvation. Instead, Islam as fashioned by him could become its curse. (14-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Directror, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, May 12, 2010
INDIA-PAKISTAN: NEED FOR POLICE-POLICE RELATIONS
B.RAMAN
Shri P.Chidambaram, our Home Minister, is to visit Islamabad in the last week of June to attend the SAARC Home Ministers' conference due on June 26,2010. He is to be accompanied among others by Smt.Nirupama Rao, the Foreign Secretary. During his stay in Islamabad, he is expected to have bilateral discussions with Mr.Rehman Malik, the Pakiwstani Interior Minister.
2. Mr.Malik was an officer of the Pakistani Police Service, the Pakistani equivalent of the Indian Police Service. He used to be No.2 (Additional Director-General) in the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) during the second tenure of Benazir Bhutto as the Prime Minister (1993-96). The FIA is Pakistan's equivalent of our Central Bureau of Investigation and National Investigation Agency combined. It plays an active role in the investigation of serious terrorism cases.
3.He was closely associated with the Bhutto family and paid heavily for it. When Mr.Farooq Leghari, the then President, dismissed her in 1996 with the implicit consent of the Army, he suspended Malik and had him arrested and prosecuted on corruption charges. He jumped bail and went to London where he started looking after the physical security of Benazir. He continued to exercise this responsibility till her assassination in Rawalpindi on December 27,2007.
4. Following her assassination, there were allegations of negligence against him. Despite this, Mr Asif Ali Zardari, who later became the President, retained his tremendous confidence in him. He was initially appointed Adviser on Internal Security and subsequently Minister of the Interior. He is a controversial and unpopular person, who has been the persistent target of the detractors of Zardari, who continue to accuse him of indulging in corruption when he was in the FIA for which, according to them, he should be held accountable. They also continue to accuse him of negligence, which, according to them, contributed to the assassination of Benazir.
5.All this has not shaken Zardari's confidence in him. The Chinese, who know this, cultivate him. He has just now returned from China after his second visit to discuss Sino-Pakistan co-operation in counter-terrorism and Chinese assistance for capacity-building in the civilian counter-terrorism agencies. The Chinese have not been putting all their eggs in the military basket. They maintain lines of communications with the civilian security bureaucracy too. During Mr.Malik's recent visit to China they announced an aid package of US $ 180 million for capacity-building in counter-terrorism. It is not clear whether this is an additional package or this was merely a reference to the package announced during his first visit to China.
6. Mr.Zardari's faith in Mr.Malik would be evident from the fact that shortly after the Government of Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani assumed office in 2008, an attempt was made to transfer the control of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to the Ministry of the Interior, which would have made it the overlord of the Pakistani intelligence community minus the Intelligence Directorates-General of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. If this attempt had succeeded, the Army's role in internal security management would have been curtailed. The Army protested and got the order reversed.
7. Mr.Zardari has inherited Benazir's idea that the only way of curtailing the internal role of the ISI is by re-building the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which comes under the Ministry of the Interior, demilitarising it by once again restoring the pre-eminence of the Pakistani Police Service in the organisation and by reversing the process of castration of the Police and other segments of the civilian security bureaucracy by the Army over the years since its debacle in the then East Pakistan in 1971.
8. The Army has not been opposing Mr.Zardari's attempts to restore to the IB its past pre-eminent role in internal security management because some of his ideas in this regard enjoy the blessings of the US , which too feels that one way of reducing the role of the ISI without provoking the Army is by strengthening the role of the police and the IB.
9. These are developments which India should be happy about.In our preoccupation with the ISI's use of jihadi terrorist organisations against India, we have not been paying any attention to the advisability of building a relationship with the Pakistani Police and IB. The IB has been playing an increasingly active role in the collection of intelligence about India, just as our IB and Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) have been playing an active role in the collection of intelligence about Pakistan. In the past, the Government of Pervez Musharraf had used serving and retired officers of the IB in peripheral countries such as Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Nepal for assisting the ISI in its operations against India. The close personal and professional relationships of the Pakistani police officers with their counterparts in these countries were sought to be used for this purpose. It is likely that the IB will continue to be used by the ISI for this purpose in future too.
10. Since 1947, no attempt has been made by any Government in New Delhi to build a police-police relationship between the two countries through means such as exchanges of visits by senior police officers, liaison between the professional police organisations such as the FIA and the IB in Pakistan and the Central Bureau of Investigation and the IB in India and laying down the ground rules for mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. The only relationship, which has continued even in the worst of times, has been between the narcotics control agencies of the two countries.
11. During his forthcoming visit to Islamabad, Shri Chidambaram should be accompanied not only by the Foreign Secretary and the Home Secretary, but also by the heads of our IB, the CBI and the newly-created National Investigation Agency (NIA) to lay the groundwork for a police- police relationship. It is in our strategic interest to contribute to a strengthening of the role of the civilian security bureaucracy in Pakistan's internal security management.
12. Arguments such as the lack of adequate co-operation of Pakistan's Interior Ministry in the investigation and prosecution of the Pakistan-based co-conspirators involved in the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, the continuing dominance of the military in national security management in Pakistan which might not permit any hobnobbing by the police officers etc should not be allowed to inhibit any initiatives in this regard.
13. The Joint Counter-Terrorism Mechanism set up at the meeting between Gen.Musharraf and Dr.Manmohan Singh at Havana in September,2006, was born dead. There is no point in hugging on to it. It should be given a decent burial and we should try the proposed experiment of a police-police relationship even if there be a risk of failure due to the negative attitude of the Pakistani Army. ( 13-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies.E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Shri P.Chidambaram, our Home Minister, is to visit Islamabad in the last week of June to attend the SAARC Home Ministers' conference due on June 26,2010. He is to be accompanied among others by Smt.Nirupama Rao, the Foreign Secretary. During his stay in Islamabad, he is expected to have bilateral discussions with Mr.Rehman Malik, the Pakiwstani Interior Minister.
2. Mr.Malik was an officer of the Pakistani Police Service, the Pakistani equivalent of the Indian Police Service. He used to be No.2 (Additional Director-General) in the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) during the second tenure of Benazir Bhutto as the Prime Minister (1993-96). The FIA is Pakistan's equivalent of our Central Bureau of Investigation and National Investigation Agency combined. It plays an active role in the investigation of serious terrorism cases.
3.He was closely associated with the Bhutto family and paid heavily for it. When Mr.Farooq Leghari, the then President, dismissed her in 1996 with the implicit consent of the Army, he suspended Malik and had him arrested and prosecuted on corruption charges. He jumped bail and went to London where he started looking after the physical security of Benazir. He continued to exercise this responsibility till her assassination in Rawalpindi on December 27,2007.
4. Following her assassination, there were allegations of negligence against him. Despite this, Mr Asif Ali Zardari, who later became the President, retained his tremendous confidence in him. He was initially appointed Adviser on Internal Security and subsequently Minister of the Interior. He is a controversial and unpopular person, who has been the persistent target of the detractors of Zardari, who continue to accuse him of indulging in corruption when he was in the FIA for which, according to them, he should be held accountable. They also continue to accuse him of negligence, which, according to them, contributed to the assassination of Benazir.
5.All this has not shaken Zardari's confidence in him. The Chinese, who know this, cultivate him. He has just now returned from China after his second visit to discuss Sino-Pakistan co-operation in counter-terrorism and Chinese assistance for capacity-building in the civilian counter-terrorism agencies. The Chinese have not been putting all their eggs in the military basket. They maintain lines of communications with the civilian security bureaucracy too. During Mr.Malik's recent visit to China they announced an aid package of US $ 180 million for capacity-building in counter-terrorism. It is not clear whether this is an additional package or this was merely a reference to the package announced during his first visit to China.
6. Mr.Zardari's faith in Mr.Malik would be evident from the fact that shortly after the Government of Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani assumed office in 2008, an attempt was made to transfer the control of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to the Ministry of the Interior, which would have made it the overlord of the Pakistani intelligence community minus the Intelligence Directorates-General of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. If this attempt had succeeded, the Army's role in internal security management would have been curtailed. The Army protested and got the order reversed.
7. Mr.Zardari has inherited Benazir's idea that the only way of curtailing the internal role of the ISI is by re-building the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which comes under the Ministry of the Interior, demilitarising it by once again restoring the pre-eminence of the Pakistani Police Service in the organisation and by reversing the process of castration of the Police and other segments of the civilian security bureaucracy by the Army over the years since its debacle in the then East Pakistan in 1971.
8. The Army has not been opposing Mr.Zardari's attempts to restore to the IB its past pre-eminent role in internal security management because some of his ideas in this regard enjoy the blessings of the US , which too feels that one way of reducing the role of the ISI without provoking the Army is by strengthening the role of the police and the IB.
9. These are developments which India should be happy about.In our preoccupation with the ISI's use of jihadi terrorist organisations against India, we have not been paying any attention to the advisability of building a relationship with the Pakistani Police and IB. The IB has been playing an increasingly active role in the collection of intelligence about India, just as our IB and Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) have been playing an active role in the collection of intelligence about Pakistan. In the past, the Government of Pervez Musharraf had used serving and retired officers of the IB in peripheral countries such as Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Nepal for assisting the ISI in its operations against India. The close personal and professional relationships of the Pakistani police officers with their counterparts in these countries were sought to be used for this purpose. It is likely that the IB will continue to be used by the ISI for this purpose in future too.
10. Since 1947, no attempt has been made by any Government in New Delhi to build a police-police relationship between the two countries through means such as exchanges of visits by senior police officers, liaison between the professional police organisations such as the FIA and the IB in Pakistan and the Central Bureau of Investigation and the IB in India and laying down the ground rules for mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. The only relationship, which has continued even in the worst of times, has been between the narcotics control agencies of the two countries.
11. During his forthcoming visit to Islamabad, Shri Chidambaram should be accompanied not only by the Foreign Secretary and the Home Secretary, but also by the heads of our IB, the CBI and the newly-created National Investigation Agency (NIA) to lay the groundwork for a police- police relationship. It is in our strategic interest to contribute to a strengthening of the role of the civilian security bureaucracy in Pakistan's internal security management.
12. Arguments such as the lack of adequate co-operation of Pakistan's Interior Ministry in the investigation and prosecution of the Pakistan-based co-conspirators involved in the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, the continuing dominance of the military in national security management in Pakistan which might not permit any hobnobbing by the police officers etc should not be allowed to inhibit any initiatives in this regard.
13. The Joint Counter-Terrorism Mechanism set up at the meeting between Gen.Musharraf and Dr.Manmohan Singh at Havana in September,2006, was born dead. There is no point in hugging on to it. It should be given a decent burial and we should try the proposed experiment of a police-police relationship even if there be a risk of failure due to the negative attitude of the Pakistani Army. ( 13-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies.E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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