INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.648
B.RAMAN
Quoting local political sources in Jammu & Kashmir, the British Broadcasting Corporation reported in its web site on May 14,2010, that terrorists ( it calls them as always militants) have regrouped in Pakistan-Occupied KasHmir (POK).
2.It quoted Mr.Arif Shahid, Secretary-General of the All Parties National Alliance (APNA), as saying as follows: " Jihadi activities have been restarted during the last few weeks.Most of the activities are concentrated in the Neelum Valley along the Line of Control.Militants were based there in large numbers and have set up camps in the area. The men are not locals - they have long hair and beards. Most do not speak the local language."
3.The BBC added that local citizens in the Neelum Valley told it much the same thing. It quoted a local resident as saying: "We are scared.The armed men are moving around the area and are trying to cross the border. We can make out from their appearances and languages they are not from any part of Kashmir."
4.Mr Shahid said that he believed that the militants were planning to sabotage the ongoing Pakistan-India peace negotiations. He added: "They have set up camps in the region and many are crossing the border.This is the start of another proxy war."
5.According to the BBC, Mr.Shahid's comments were corroborated by Shaukat Maqbool Bhat, head of the anti-Indian Jammu Kashmir National Liberation Front (JKNLF).Bhat told the BBC: "The fighters are there and they are regularly crossing into India.The local people are very scared - they believe the [militant] crossings are going to restart artillery exchanges between the Pakistani and Indian armies."
6. An ominous part of the BBC report is the claim that the people who are re-grouping in the POK do not seem to be locals and speak a different language. Generally, Pakistani terrorists trained and infiltrated into J&K from the POK speak either one of the Kashmiri dialects or Punjabi. The local residents can identify both. The fact that the BBC's sources have not been able to identify the language spoken by the people re-grouping in the POK would indicate that these persons could be Pashtuns recruited either by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) or one of the Punjabi Taliban organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), the 313 Brigade of Ilyas Kashmiri, which used to be a wing of the HUJI, the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) or the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM).
7. Pakistan's political and military leadership, its intelligence agencies, its judiciary and civil society do not admit that there is terrorism in J&K. They always project what is happening in J&K as a freedom struggle. They justify the activities of these organisations in J&K on the ground that J&K is Pakistani territory where they have a right to act in solidarity with the Kashmiris.The Government of Pervez Musharraf as well as the present Government headed by Prime Minister Yousefv Raza Gilani make a clear distinction between the so-called freedom struggle in J&K and acts of terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K.
8. They regard whatever assurances they had given since January 2004 regarding not supporting terrorism as applicable only to Indian territory outside J&K. They also feel that while the US and other Western countries would be against any Pakistani-sponsored terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K, they would not react strongly against renewed acts of violence in J&K, which they regard as a disputed territory.
9. The TTP and the Punjabi Taliban organisations criticise the Pakistani Government on two grounds----- firstly, its implied support to the US Drone (pilotless planes) strikes in South and North Waziristan and, secondly, its alleged restrictions on the activities of the Pakistani terrorist organisations not only in Indian territory outside J&K, but also even in J&K.
10.The Pakistan Government is not in a position to stop the Drone strikes. Moreover, the Pakistan Army looks upon the Drone strikes as necessary for the success of its own ground operations against the TTP. However, to soften the TTP it would not hesitate to give it and its Punjabi associates a free hand in J&K. An increase in acts of terrorism in J&K, with the participation of not only Pakistani Punjabis, but also the Pashtuns of the Taliban, is a risk to be guarded against in the months and weeks to come. ( 15-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, May 14, 2010
Thursday, May 13, 2010
PAKISTAN: QUO VADIS?
B.RAMAN
Till 1971, Pakistan’s internal security threats arose from India in its Eastern wing and from Afghanistan in its Western wing. After the birth of Bangladesh in 1971, it no longer faces any internal security threats from India even though its army and intelligence agencies imagine without basis that it still does.
2.The traumatic effect of the Indian role in the birth of Bangladesh, which continues to influence the thinking and assessment of the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment, makes them see an Indian hand in every internal security problem they face----whether in Balochistan or in Sindh or in Khyber-Pakhtoonwa (formerly known as the North-West Frontier Province NWFP).
3.Its internal security fears from Afghanistan arise from the strong feelings of Islamic and ethnic solidarity between the Pashtuns on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. While the Pakistan Army feels confident that it will be able to crush separatist movements in Balochistan and Sindh despite the imagined Indian role, it does not have a similar confidence with regard to the Pashtuns. The fact that the Pashtuns constitute about 20 per cent of the total strength of the Army adds to its apprehensions.
4.Its past quest for a strategic depth in Afghanistan was motivated by military calculations---- the need for a greater elbow room for its Army and the Air Force in the event of a military conflict with India. Pakistani military leaders should know that the acquisition of a nuclear weapon capability by the two countries and the expected US presence in the Af-Pak region for some years to come have considerably reduced the chances of a direct military conflict.
5.Its present Afghan policy is influenced not by the perceived need for a strategic depth in the conventional sense, but by the newly-felt need to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a spring-board for destabilizing operations in its Pashtun belt. Its past quest for a strategic depth in Afghanistan was a defensive reaction. So is its present quest for the re-establishment of its influence in Afghanistan.
6.Deobandi extremism in Pakistan, which is at the basis of many of its internal security problems, was a product of the policies followed by the late Zia-ul-Haq between 1977 and 1988. His attempts to protect Pakistan from an overflow of the newly-triumphant Shia Revolution in Iran led to the aggravation of the ever present Shia-Sunni divide in the country. Terrorism in Pakistan was initially a bye-product of the Shia-Sunni violence. Many of the terrorist leaders of Pakistan today earned their jihadi spurs in the anti-Shia movement. They subsequently drifted away from anti-Shia violence and gravitated initially to the jihad against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan and then to the jihad against the Indian presence in Jammu & Kashmir.
7.However, a hard core of the anti-Shia elements in the Sipah-e-Sahaba (SES) and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) has persisted with the anti-Shia violence. They allied themselves with the Afghan Taliban when it was in power in Afghanistan and subsequently with Al Qaeda when it moved over into North Waziristan after 9/11. Suicide terrorism was brought into Pakistan by the anti-Shia elements.
8.Zia’s genuine conviction as a Deobandi, who believed that Pakistan’s salvation lie in more and more of Islam and not less, strengthened the role of the religious clerics in Pakistani society and eliminated whatever secularist influence was there in the country and its institutions. The use of Islam as a destabilizing weapon against India, with a large Muslim population, started under him. Islam acquired a military significance and potency in the eyes of the post-1947 crop of military officers, who grew up to middle and senior levels of leadership under Zia.
9.Islam was also used as a domestic weapon against political leaders who sought to challenge the pre-eminent role which the Army had assumed for itself. Islam as an ideological and military weapon, which Zia in a well-calculated opportunistic move placed at the hands of the US for use against the Soviet troops and communism in Afghanistan, served the US well in the humiliating defeat and withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan.
10.More than 20 years after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, neither the US nor Pakistan has been able to put this weapon back in its sheath. There are new non-State wielders of this weapon----Al Qaeda and its associates against the US and its perceived allies even in the Islamic world and the Talibans and their allies against the Pakistani State and the US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan.
11.Those who live by militant Islam shall fall by militant Islam. That is the spectre threatening Pakistan today. The threat to Pakistan’s existence as a State arises no longer from India, but from militant Islam. Just as communism started swallowing its own children, militant Islam has started swallowing its own children in Pakistan.
12.The fight against terrorism in Pakistan has a military and an ideological dimension. The Pakistan Army is paying attention only to its military dimension. It is avoiding countering its ideological dimension. Unless Islam is demilitarized and sent back to the mosques and madrasas where it belongs, Pakistan stands in danger of being weakened and destabilized by its own creations. A Frankenstein’s monster is difficult to control. It is even more difficult to control a religious Frankenstein’s monster.
13.Pakistan was born in the name of Islam. Unless it is able to control this monster, it stands in danger of being bled to death in the name of Islam. Zia thought Islam would be Pakistan’s salvation. Instead, Islam as fashioned by him could become its curse. (14-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Directror, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Till 1971, Pakistan’s internal security threats arose from India in its Eastern wing and from Afghanistan in its Western wing. After the birth of Bangladesh in 1971, it no longer faces any internal security threats from India even though its army and intelligence agencies imagine without basis that it still does.
2.The traumatic effect of the Indian role in the birth of Bangladesh, which continues to influence the thinking and assessment of the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment, makes them see an Indian hand in every internal security problem they face----whether in Balochistan or in Sindh or in Khyber-Pakhtoonwa (formerly known as the North-West Frontier Province NWFP).
3.Its internal security fears from Afghanistan arise from the strong feelings of Islamic and ethnic solidarity between the Pashtuns on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. While the Pakistan Army feels confident that it will be able to crush separatist movements in Balochistan and Sindh despite the imagined Indian role, it does not have a similar confidence with regard to the Pashtuns. The fact that the Pashtuns constitute about 20 per cent of the total strength of the Army adds to its apprehensions.
4.Its past quest for a strategic depth in Afghanistan was motivated by military calculations---- the need for a greater elbow room for its Army and the Air Force in the event of a military conflict with India. Pakistani military leaders should know that the acquisition of a nuclear weapon capability by the two countries and the expected US presence in the Af-Pak region for some years to come have considerably reduced the chances of a direct military conflict.
5.Its present Afghan policy is influenced not by the perceived need for a strategic depth in the conventional sense, but by the newly-felt need to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a spring-board for destabilizing operations in its Pashtun belt. Its past quest for a strategic depth in Afghanistan was a defensive reaction. So is its present quest for the re-establishment of its influence in Afghanistan.
6.Deobandi extremism in Pakistan, which is at the basis of many of its internal security problems, was a product of the policies followed by the late Zia-ul-Haq between 1977 and 1988. His attempts to protect Pakistan from an overflow of the newly-triumphant Shia Revolution in Iran led to the aggravation of the ever present Shia-Sunni divide in the country. Terrorism in Pakistan was initially a bye-product of the Shia-Sunni violence. Many of the terrorist leaders of Pakistan today earned their jihadi spurs in the anti-Shia movement. They subsequently drifted away from anti-Shia violence and gravitated initially to the jihad against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan and then to the jihad against the Indian presence in Jammu & Kashmir.
7.However, a hard core of the anti-Shia elements in the Sipah-e-Sahaba (SES) and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) has persisted with the anti-Shia violence. They allied themselves with the Afghan Taliban when it was in power in Afghanistan and subsequently with Al Qaeda when it moved over into North Waziristan after 9/11. Suicide terrorism was brought into Pakistan by the anti-Shia elements.
8.Zia’s genuine conviction as a Deobandi, who believed that Pakistan’s salvation lie in more and more of Islam and not less, strengthened the role of the religious clerics in Pakistani society and eliminated whatever secularist influence was there in the country and its institutions. The use of Islam as a destabilizing weapon against India, with a large Muslim population, started under him. Islam acquired a military significance and potency in the eyes of the post-1947 crop of military officers, who grew up to middle and senior levels of leadership under Zia.
9.Islam was also used as a domestic weapon against political leaders who sought to challenge the pre-eminent role which the Army had assumed for itself. Islam as an ideological and military weapon, which Zia in a well-calculated opportunistic move placed at the hands of the US for use against the Soviet troops and communism in Afghanistan, served the US well in the humiliating defeat and withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan.
10.More than 20 years after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, neither the US nor Pakistan has been able to put this weapon back in its sheath. There are new non-State wielders of this weapon----Al Qaeda and its associates against the US and its perceived allies even in the Islamic world and the Talibans and their allies against the Pakistani State and the US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan.
11.Those who live by militant Islam shall fall by militant Islam. That is the spectre threatening Pakistan today. The threat to Pakistan’s existence as a State arises no longer from India, but from militant Islam. Just as communism started swallowing its own children, militant Islam has started swallowing its own children in Pakistan.
12.The fight against terrorism in Pakistan has a military and an ideological dimension. The Pakistan Army is paying attention only to its military dimension. It is avoiding countering its ideological dimension. Unless Islam is demilitarized and sent back to the mosques and madrasas where it belongs, Pakistan stands in danger of being weakened and destabilized by its own creations. A Frankenstein’s monster is difficult to control. It is even more difficult to control a religious Frankenstein’s monster.
13.Pakistan was born in the name of Islam. Unless it is able to control this monster, it stands in danger of being bled to death in the name of Islam. Zia thought Islam would be Pakistan’s salvation. Instead, Islam as fashioned by him could become its curse. (14-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Directror, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, May 12, 2010
INDIA-PAKISTAN: NEED FOR POLICE-POLICE RELATIONS
B.RAMAN
Shri P.Chidambaram, our Home Minister, is to visit Islamabad in the last week of June to attend the SAARC Home Ministers' conference due on June 26,2010. He is to be accompanied among others by Smt.Nirupama Rao, the Foreign Secretary. During his stay in Islamabad, he is expected to have bilateral discussions with Mr.Rehman Malik, the Pakiwstani Interior Minister.
2. Mr.Malik was an officer of the Pakistani Police Service, the Pakistani equivalent of the Indian Police Service. He used to be No.2 (Additional Director-General) in the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) during the second tenure of Benazir Bhutto as the Prime Minister (1993-96). The FIA is Pakistan's equivalent of our Central Bureau of Investigation and National Investigation Agency combined. It plays an active role in the investigation of serious terrorism cases.
3.He was closely associated with the Bhutto family and paid heavily for it. When Mr.Farooq Leghari, the then President, dismissed her in 1996 with the implicit consent of the Army, he suspended Malik and had him arrested and prosecuted on corruption charges. He jumped bail and went to London where he started looking after the physical security of Benazir. He continued to exercise this responsibility till her assassination in Rawalpindi on December 27,2007.
4. Following her assassination, there were allegations of negligence against him. Despite this, Mr Asif Ali Zardari, who later became the President, retained his tremendous confidence in him. He was initially appointed Adviser on Internal Security and subsequently Minister of the Interior. He is a controversial and unpopular person, who has been the persistent target of the detractors of Zardari, who continue to accuse him of indulging in corruption when he was in the FIA for which, according to them, he should be held accountable. They also continue to accuse him of negligence, which, according to them, contributed to the assassination of Benazir.
5.All this has not shaken Zardari's confidence in him. The Chinese, who know this, cultivate him. He has just now returned from China after his second visit to discuss Sino-Pakistan co-operation in counter-terrorism and Chinese assistance for capacity-building in the civilian counter-terrorism agencies. The Chinese have not been putting all their eggs in the military basket. They maintain lines of communications with the civilian security bureaucracy too. During Mr.Malik's recent visit to China they announced an aid package of US $ 180 million for capacity-building in counter-terrorism. It is not clear whether this is an additional package or this was merely a reference to the package announced during his first visit to China.
6. Mr.Zardari's faith in Mr.Malik would be evident from the fact that shortly after the Government of Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani assumed office in 2008, an attempt was made to transfer the control of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to the Ministry of the Interior, which would have made it the overlord of the Pakistani intelligence community minus the Intelligence Directorates-General of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. If this attempt had succeeded, the Army's role in internal security management would have been curtailed. The Army protested and got the order reversed.
7. Mr.Zardari has inherited Benazir's idea that the only way of curtailing the internal role of the ISI is by re-building the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which comes under the Ministry of the Interior, demilitarising it by once again restoring the pre-eminence of the Pakistani Police Service in the organisation and by reversing the process of castration of the Police and other segments of the civilian security bureaucracy by the Army over the years since its debacle in the then East Pakistan in 1971.
8. The Army has not been opposing Mr.Zardari's attempts to restore to the IB its past pre-eminent role in internal security management because some of his ideas in this regard enjoy the blessings of the US , which too feels that one way of reducing the role of the ISI without provoking the Army is by strengthening the role of the police and the IB.
9. These are developments which India should be happy about.In our preoccupation with the ISI's use of jihadi terrorist organisations against India, we have not been paying any attention to the advisability of building a relationship with the Pakistani Police and IB. The IB has been playing an increasingly active role in the collection of intelligence about India, just as our IB and Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) have been playing an active role in the collection of intelligence about Pakistan. In the past, the Government of Pervez Musharraf had used serving and retired officers of the IB in peripheral countries such as Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Nepal for assisting the ISI in its operations against India. The close personal and professional relationships of the Pakistani police officers with their counterparts in these countries were sought to be used for this purpose. It is likely that the IB will continue to be used by the ISI for this purpose in future too.
10. Since 1947, no attempt has been made by any Government in New Delhi to build a police-police relationship between the two countries through means such as exchanges of visits by senior police officers, liaison between the professional police organisations such as the FIA and the IB in Pakistan and the Central Bureau of Investigation and the IB in India and laying down the ground rules for mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. The only relationship, which has continued even in the worst of times, has been between the narcotics control agencies of the two countries.
11. During his forthcoming visit to Islamabad, Shri Chidambaram should be accompanied not only by the Foreign Secretary and the Home Secretary, but also by the heads of our IB, the CBI and the newly-created National Investigation Agency (NIA) to lay the groundwork for a police- police relationship. It is in our strategic interest to contribute to a strengthening of the role of the civilian security bureaucracy in Pakistan's internal security management.
12. Arguments such as the lack of adequate co-operation of Pakistan's Interior Ministry in the investigation and prosecution of the Pakistan-based co-conspirators involved in the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, the continuing dominance of the military in national security management in Pakistan which might not permit any hobnobbing by the police officers etc should not be allowed to inhibit any initiatives in this regard.
13. The Joint Counter-Terrorism Mechanism set up at the meeting between Gen.Musharraf and Dr.Manmohan Singh at Havana in September,2006, was born dead. There is no point in hugging on to it. It should be given a decent burial and we should try the proposed experiment of a police-police relationship even if there be a risk of failure due to the negative attitude of the Pakistani Army. ( 13-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies.E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Shri P.Chidambaram, our Home Minister, is to visit Islamabad in the last week of June to attend the SAARC Home Ministers' conference due on June 26,2010. He is to be accompanied among others by Smt.Nirupama Rao, the Foreign Secretary. During his stay in Islamabad, he is expected to have bilateral discussions with Mr.Rehman Malik, the Pakiwstani Interior Minister.
2. Mr.Malik was an officer of the Pakistani Police Service, the Pakistani equivalent of the Indian Police Service. He used to be No.2 (Additional Director-General) in the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) during the second tenure of Benazir Bhutto as the Prime Minister (1993-96). The FIA is Pakistan's equivalent of our Central Bureau of Investigation and National Investigation Agency combined. It plays an active role in the investigation of serious terrorism cases.
3.He was closely associated with the Bhutto family and paid heavily for it. When Mr.Farooq Leghari, the then President, dismissed her in 1996 with the implicit consent of the Army, he suspended Malik and had him arrested and prosecuted on corruption charges. He jumped bail and went to London where he started looking after the physical security of Benazir. He continued to exercise this responsibility till her assassination in Rawalpindi on December 27,2007.
4. Following her assassination, there were allegations of negligence against him. Despite this, Mr Asif Ali Zardari, who later became the President, retained his tremendous confidence in him. He was initially appointed Adviser on Internal Security and subsequently Minister of the Interior. He is a controversial and unpopular person, who has been the persistent target of the detractors of Zardari, who continue to accuse him of indulging in corruption when he was in the FIA for which, according to them, he should be held accountable. They also continue to accuse him of negligence, which, according to them, contributed to the assassination of Benazir.
5.All this has not shaken Zardari's confidence in him. The Chinese, who know this, cultivate him. He has just now returned from China after his second visit to discuss Sino-Pakistan co-operation in counter-terrorism and Chinese assistance for capacity-building in the civilian counter-terrorism agencies. The Chinese have not been putting all their eggs in the military basket. They maintain lines of communications with the civilian security bureaucracy too. During Mr.Malik's recent visit to China they announced an aid package of US $ 180 million for capacity-building in counter-terrorism. It is not clear whether this is an additional package or this was merely a reference to the package announced during his first visit to China.
6. Mr.Zardari's faith in Mr.Malik would be evident from the fact that shortly after the Government of Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani assumed office in 2008, an attempt was made to transfer the control of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to the Ministry of the Interior, which would have made it the overlord of the Pakistani intelligence community minus the Intelligence Directorates-General of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. If this attempt had succeeded, the Army's role in internal security management would have been curtailed. The Army protested and got the order reversed.
7. Mr.Zardari has inherited Benazir's idea that the only way of curtailing the internal role of the ISI is by re-building the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which comes under the Ministry of the Interior, demilitarising it by once again restoring the pre-eminence of the Pakistani Police Service in the organisation and by reversing the process of castration of the Police and other segments of the civilian security bureaucracy by the Army over the years since its debacle in the then East Pakistan in 1971.
8. The Army has not been opposing Mr.Zardari's attempts to restore to the IB its past pre-eminent role in internal security management because some of his ideas in this regard enjoy the blessings of the US , which too feels that one way of reducing the role of the ISI without provoking the Army is by strengthening the role of the police and the IB.
9. These are developments which India should be happy about.In our preoccupation with the ISI's use of jihadi terrorist organisations against India, we have not been paying any attention to the advisability of building a relationship with the Pakistani Police and IB. The IB has been playing an increasingly active role in the collection of intelligence about India, just as our IB and Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) have been playing an active role in the collection of intelligence about Pakistan. In the past, the Government of Pervez Musharraf had used serving and retired officers of the IB in peripheral countries such as Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Nepal for assisting the ISI in its operations against India. The close personal and professional relationships of the Pakistani police officers with their counterparts in these countries were sought to be used for this purpose. It is likely that the IB will continue to be used by the ISI for this purpose in future too.
10. Since 1947, no attempt has been made by any Government in New Delhi to build a police-police relationship between the two countries through means such as exchanges of visits by senior police officers, liaison between the professional police organisations such as the FIA and the IB in Pakistan and the Central Bureau of Investigation and the IB in India and laying down the ground rules for mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. The only relationship, which has continued even in the worst of times, has been between the narcotics control agencies of the two countries.
11. During his forthcoming visit to Islamabad, Shri Chidambaram should be accompanied not only by the Foreign Secretary and the Home Secretary, but also by the heads of our IB, the CBI and the newly-created National Investigation Agency (NIA) to lay the groundwork for a police- police relationship. It is in our strategic interest to contribute to a strengthening of the role of the civilian security bureaucracy in Pakistan's internal security management.
12. Arguments such as the lack of adequate co-operation of Pakistan's Interior Ministry in the investigation and prosecution of the Pakistan-based co-conspirators involved in the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, the continuing dominance of the military in national security management in Pakistan which might not permit any hobnobbing by the police officers etc should not be allowed to inhibit any initiatives in this regard.
13. The Joint Counter-Terrorism Mechanism set up at the meeting between Gen.Musharraf and Dr.Manmohan Singh at Havana in September,2006, was born dead. There is no point in hugging on to it. It should be given a decent burial and we should try the proposed experiment of a police-police relationship even if there be a risk of failure due to the negative attitude of the Pakistani Army. ( 13-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies.E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, May 11, 2010
DECLASSIFICATION
I have been in receipt of the following comments from a reader of my article in rediff.com in the US:
"Several of us in the scholarly community have been commenting on your piece on sources, I thought you’d be interested in the remarks of one young scholar who’s done extensive archival work in several countries:
"I agree with his premise though he's not entirely correct that there has been no declassification at all. A number of MEA files from the 1950s have been declassified--though MOD has declassified almost nothing. And one can find other documents in ministers and senior bureaucrats' papers (incl from the 1960s and 1970s) at Teen Murti. At this point, for example, all the memcons from the Sino-Indian border talks are available in these collections (they were not included in the white papers); files re the Korean War, correspondence between Delhi and the Indian agencies in Tibet re Tibet and the Sino-Indian border, and reports from the Indian embassies in Beijing and Washington in the 1950s are available at the National Archives. Re the reports Raman mentions, while the Raghavan committee report might not be available, one can find primary material on the formation of R&AW in the Haksar papers.
"The bigger challenge I think is making the declassification process more systematic and transparent. At the moment it's very ad hoc and arbitrary and this allows MEA/MOD to keep anything it can deem "in the interest of national security" classified. The Right to Information Act doesn't really serve as a work-around because of its national security exemption (which the MEA has learned to use better post-fracas over a RTI filed for the Sharm-el-Sheikh statement files)."
"Several of us in the scholarly community have been commenting on your piece on sources, I thought you’d be interested in the remarks of one young scholar who’s done extensive archival work in several countries:
"I agree with his premise though he's not entirely correct that there has been no declassification at all. A number of MEA files from the 1950s have been declassified--though MOD has declassified almost nothing. And one can find other documents in ministers and senior bureaucrats' papers (incl from the 1960s and 1970s) at Teen Murti. At this point, for example, all the memcons from the Sino-Indian border talks are available in these collections (they were not included in the white papers); files re the Korean War, correspondence between Delhi and the Indian agencies in Tibet re Tibet and the Sino-Indian border, and reports from the Indian embassies in Beijing and Washington in the 1950s are available at the National Archives. Re the reports Raman mentions, while the Raghavan committee report might not be available, one can find primary material on the formation of R&AW in the Haksar papers.
"The bigger challenge I think is making the declassification process more systematic and transparent. At the moment it's very ad hoc and arbitrary and this allows MEA/MOD to keep anything it can deem "in the interest of national security" classified. The Right to Information Act doesn't really serve as a work-around because of its national security exemption (which the MEA has learned to use better post-fracas over a RTI filed for the Sharm-el-Sheikh statement files)."
Monday, May 10, 2010
PAKISTAN-BASED TERRORISM: DIMINISHING US OPTIONS
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO 647
B.RAMAN
The US is faced with diminishing options in its efforts to neutralise Al Qaeda, the Talibans and other terrorist organisations operating from North Waziristan in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Any successful terrorist strike in the US Homeland would most probably originate from this area----whether it be one involving conventional modus operandi or one involving the use of weapons of mass destruction material.
2. So long as the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory----- particularly in North Waziristan which has been and which will continue to be the launching pad of strikes directed at the US---- is not neutralised once and for all, the US cannot be free of the fear of the terrorists succeeding one day.
3. The present US operations in North Waziristan are focussed on the neutralisation of senior and middle level leaders of Al Qaeda and other organisations operating from sanctuaries in this area. The Drone (pilotless plane) strikes on their hide-outs and vehicular movements have not been without success, but most of those killed were easily replaceable.
4. But eliminating the leaders alone will not be adequate. It is equally necessary to destroy their infrastructure. The damage suffered by the terrorist infrastructure from the Drone strikes has been insignificant. The ground-based infrastructure can be destroyed only through ground operations---- classical or covert--- and Cruise missile strikes. Predator strikes from Drones will not destroy infrastructure.
5. Ground-based operations---- whether of the hit and run variety or the hit and stay kind--- would need the involvement of ground troops of the US or Pakistan or both. Involvement of US troops in ground-based operations, whether alone or in tandem with Pakistani troops, could prove messy and counter-productive. The Pakistani Army is reluctant to undertake any operations in this area because of its dependence on the non-Al Qaeda groups based in this area such as the Haqqani network, the 313 Brigade of Ilyas Kashmiri, the Punjabi Taliban groups etc for advancing its own strategic agenda against India and Afghanistan.
6. Having followed since 9/11 a policy of incentives for action and nothing but incentives with no disincentives for inaction,the US finds itself helpless to counter Pakistani inaction. Its policy is inhibited by the fear that any punitive action against Pakistan might end even the inadequate co-operation that it has presently been getting from Pakistan.
7. If the US is not able to use its ground forces and is reluctant to force Pakistan to use its forces through appropriate disincentives if it does not do so, it has only one alternative left----encourage the Afghan Army and special forces to undertake covert actions in North Waziristan directed against the infrastructure. This is an option worth exploring even if the chances for success appear low at present. The Afghan elements to be used for covert actions should be appropriately trained and equipped.
8. Cruise missile attacks can be more effective against infrastructure than Predator strikes from Drones if those are sustained and without respite. The civilian casualties may go up, but the risk has to be faced in the absence of other alternatives. The Cruise missile attacks of 1998 against Al Qaeda's training infrastructure were ineffective because it was an one-shot affair. To be effective, they have to be sustained.
9. Instead of continuing to depend only on Drone strikes, the US should adopt a three-pronged strategy of a sustained campaign involving the use of Drones, Cruise missiles and the Afghan covert action forces. ( 10-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
The US is faced with diminishing options in its efforts to neutralise Al Qaeda, the Talibans and other terrorist organisations operating from North Waziristan in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Any successful terrorist strike in the US Homeland would most probably originate from this area----whether it be one involving conventional modus operandi or one involving the use of weapons of mass destruction material.
2. So long as the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory----- particularly in North Waziristan which has been and which will continue to be the launching pad of strikes directed at the US---- is not neutralised once and for all, the US cannot be free of the fear of the terrorists succeeding one day.
3. The present US operations in North Waziristan are focussed on the neutralisation of senior and middle level leaders of Al Qaeda and other organisations operating from sanctuaries in this area. The Drone (pilotless plane) strikes on their hide-outs and vehicular movements have not been without success, but most of those killed were easily replaceable.
4. But eliminating the leaders alone will not be adequate. It is equally necessary to destroy their infrastructure. The damage suffered by the terrorist infrastructure from the Drone strikes has been insignificant. The ground-based infrastructure can be destroyed only through ground operations---- classical or covert--- and Cruise missile strikes. Predator strikes from Drones will not destroy infrastructure.
5. Ground-based operations---- whether of the hit and run variety or the hit and stay kind--- would need the involvement of ground troops of the US or Pakistan or both. Involvement of US troops in ground-based operations, whether alone or in tandem with Pakistani troops, could prove messy and counter-productive. The Pakistani Army is reluctant to undertake any operations in this area because of its dependence on the non-Al Qaeda groups based in this area such as the Haqqani network, the 313 Brigade of Ilyas Kashmiri, the Punjabi Taliban groups etc for advancing its own strategic agenda against India and Afghanistan.
6. Having followed since 9/11 a policy of incentives for action and nothing but incentives with no disincentives for inaction,the US finds itself helpless to counter Pakistani inaction. Its policy is inhibited by the fear that any punitive action against Pakistan might end even the inadequate co-operation that it has presently been getting from Pakistan.
7. If the US is not able to use its ground forces and is reluctant to force Pakistan to use its forces through appropriate disincentives if it does not do so, it has only one alternative left----encourage the Afghan Army and special forces to undertake covert actions in North Waziristan directed against the infrastructure. This is an option worth exploring even if the chances for success appear low at present. The Afghan elements to be used for covert actions should be appropriately trained and equipped.
8. Cruise missile attacks can be more effective against infrastructure than Predator strikes from Drones if those are sustained and without respite. The civilian casualties may go up, but the risk has to be faced in the absence of other alternatives. The Cruise missile attacks of 1998 against Al Qaeda's training infrastructure were ineffective because it was an one-shot affair. To be effective, they have to be sustained.
9. Instead of continuing to depend only on Drone strikes, the US should adopt a three-pronged strategy of a sustained campaign involving the use of Drones, Cruise missiles and the Afghan covert action forces. ( 10-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
DECLASSIFICATION
Why India should declassify historical documents
rediff.com of May 10, 2010 18:12 IST
The government's policy of keeping all such information permanently classified under the Official Secrets Act has resulted in a situation in which no authentic account of national security management is available, writes B Raman.
Knowledgeable public debate on national security issues is hampered by the lack of the required information which would facilitate such debate. The government's policy of keeping all such information permanently classified under the Official Secrets Act has resulted in a situation in which no authentic account of national security management is available. Whatever studies have been done in public were based on open source information and leaks, which are often incomplete and unauthenticated.
In many countries, classified reports which would be of use for such studies are periodically declassified and made available to the research scholars and the other sections of the public after excising sections which could hamper future operations. In India, the political class and the bureaucracy have seen to it that there has been no declassification since 1947. V P Singh [ Images ], when he was the prime minister in 1989-90, wanted to change this, but had no time to have this issue examined due to his partisan political preoccupations.
There is a need for sustained public pressure on the government to change this policy. Among the documents of historic value which could be declassified after appropriate editing without damaging national security are the following:
* The Henderson-Brooks Committee report on the poor performance of the Indian Army [ Images ] in the Sino-Indian war of 1962.
* The report of the B S Raghavan IAS committee on the allegations of intelligence failure during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965.
* The report of the B S Raghavan Committee on allegations of intelligence failure in Mizoram. These two reports by Raghavan contributed to the decision of Indira Gandhi [ Images ] to bifurcate the Intelligence Bureau and create the R&AW in September 1968.
* The report of the L P Singh Committee on the misuse of intelligence agencies and the Central Bureau of Investigation during the Emergency between 1975 and 1977. L P Singh, former home secretary, and the other members of the committee except B S Raghavan, its member-secretary, are no more.
* The report of the K Sankaran Nair Committee constituted in the early 1980s to recommend the restructuring of the cadre of the R&AW.
The National Democratic Alliance government headed by Atal Bihari Vajpayee [ Images ] released to the public the report of the Kargil [ Images ] Review Committee headed by K Subrahmanyam, which went into operational and intelligence failures during the Kargil conflict of 1999. It also released to the public the reports of the various task forces appointed by it to review the national security apparatus after excising sensitive portions. But it did not accept the recommendation of the first National Security Advisory Board headed by Subrahmanyam that the annual reports of the NSAB except those relating to the nuclear deterrent should also be released to the public. The NSAB reports are largely based on open source information.
There are other documents of historic value which should be made available to the public. When he was senior adviser to Indira Gandhi after 1980, R N Kao, who headed the R&AW from 1968 to 1977, had a retired officer of the information service who had served in the R&AW in the past appointed in the R&AW to prepare a factual account of the role of the R&AW in the liberation of Bangladesh after going through the records of the organisation and interviewing the people concerned.
He had made some progress, but his work remained incomplete when Kao resigned in 1984 after the assassination of Indira Gandhi. This post was abolished and the work discontinued after the resignation of Kao. What happened to his incomplete study? Where are those papers? Why this work is not being completed? Nobody knows.
Kao had also got a special study done on the US National Security Council. It is understood its conclusion was that an NSC of the US model would not suit India. What happened to it? When the NDA government set up a special task force in 1998 headed by K C Pant to recommend the setting-up of an NSC mechanism in India, Kao wanted to send this study to it. Nobody knew where it was.
Before Operation Blue Star [ Get Quote ], Indira Gandhi tried frantically to avoid sending the army into the Golden Temple [ Images ] by entering into secret talks with the overseas leaders of the Khalistan movement and the leaders of the Shiromani Akali Dal [ Images ] in Punjab [ Images ]. Kao co-ordinated this exercise. On his instructions, all these discussions were secretly recorded for the information of Indira Gandhi, who wanted to protect herself against any future misrepresentation. These recordings form an important part of the exercise, which preceded her decision to send the army into the Golden Temple. Nobody knows what happened to these recordings.
A former IFS officer, who was a great admirer of Kao, persuaded Kao in the last years of his life to record his memoirs by talking into a tape recorder. Kao agreed to it and recoded his memoirs as a police officer and also about some aspects of his work as the head of the R&AW. He insisted on the recordings being transcribed and corrected by him.
The corrected versions have been preserved in a national institution set up to perpetuate the memory of Jawaharlal Nehru [ Images ] to be released to the public some years after his death. It is hoped that these valuable recordings are not lost as had happened to other documents and that they are released to the public in accordance with Kao's wishes.
The officers, who participated in the Sri Lanka [ Images ] operations, are dying one after the other. In a few years from now, no one with a first-hand knowledge will be available. Before that happens, a detailed study should be made of the conflicting roles of different agencies and the Tamil Nadu police, which contributed to the failure of the Indian Peace Keeping Force, and released to the public.
B Raman
rediff.com of May 10, 2010 18:12 IST
The government's policy of keeping all such information permanently classified under the Official Secrets Act has resulted in a situation in which no authentic account of national security management is available, writes B Raman.
Knowledgeable public debate on national security issues is hampered by the lack of the required information which would facilitate such debate. The government's policy of keeping all such information permanently classified under the Official Secrets Act has resulted in a situation in which no authentic account of national security management is available. Whatever studies have been done in public were based on open source information and leaks, which are often incomplete and unauthenticated.
In many countries, classified reports which would be of use for such studies are periodically declassified and made available to the research scholars and the other sections of the public after excising sections which could hamper future operations. In India, the political class and the bureaucracy have seen to it that there has been no declassification since 1947. V P Singh [ Images ], when he was the prime minister in 1989-90, wanted to change this, but had no time to have this issue examined due to his partisan political preoccupations.
There is a need for sustained public pressure on the government to change this policy. Among the documents of historic value which could be declassified after appropriate editing without damaging national security are the following:
* The Henderson-Brooks Committee report on the poor performance of the Indian Army [ Images ] in the Sino-Indian war of 1962.
* The report of the B S Raghavan IAS committee on the allegations of intelligence failure during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965.
* The report of the B S Raghavan Committee on allegations of intelligence failure in Mizoram. These two reports by Raghavan contributed to the decision of Indira Gandhi [ Images ] to bifurcate the Intelligence Bureau and create the R&AW in September 1968.
* The report of the L P Singh Committee on the misuse of intelligence agencies and the Central Bureau of Investigation during the Emergency between 1975 and 1977. L P Singh, former home secretary, and the other members of the committee except B S Raghavan, its member-secretary, are no more.
* The report of the K Sankaran Nair Committee constituted in the early 1980s to recommend the restructuring of the cadre of the R&AW.
The National Democratic Alliance government headed by Atal Bihari Vajpayee [ Images ] released to the public the report of the Kargil [ Images ] Review Committee headed by K Subrahmanyam, which went into operational and intelligence failures during the Kargil conflict of 1999. It also released to the public the reports of the various task forces appointed by it to review the national security apparatus after excising sensitive portions. But it did not accept the recommendation of the first National Security Advisory Board headed by Subrahmanyam that the annual reports of the NSAB except those relating to the nuclear deterrent should also be released to the public. The NSAB reports are largely based on open source information.
There are other documents of historic value which should be made available to the public. When he was senior adviser to Indira Gandhi after 1980, R N Kao, who headed the R&AW from 1968 to 1977, had a retired officer of the information service who had served in the R&AW in the past appointed in the R&AW to prepare a factual account of the role of the R&AW in the liberation of Bangladesh after going through the records of the organisation and interviewing the people concerned.
He had made some progress, but his work remained incomplete when Kao resigned in 1984 after the assassination of Indira Gandhi. This post was abolished and the work discontinued after the resignation of Kao. What happened to his incomplete study? Where are those papers? Why this work is not being completed? Nobody knows.
Kao had also got a special study done on the US National Security Council. It is understood its conclusion was that an NSC of the US model would not suit India. What happened to it? When the NDA government set up a special task force in 1998 headed by K C Pant to recommend the setting-up of an NSC mechanism in India, Kao wanted to send this study to it. Nobody knew where it was.
Before Operation Blue Star [ Get Quote ], Indira Gandhi tried frantically to avoid sending the army into the Golden Temple [ Images ] by entering into secret talks with the overseas leaders of the Khalistan movement and the leaders of the Shiromani Akali Dal [ Images ] in Punjab [ Images ]. Kao co-ordinated this exercise. On his instructions, all these discussions were secretly recorded for the information of Indira Gandhi, who wanted to protect herself against any future misrepresentation. These recordings form an important part of the exercise, which preceded her decision to send the army into the Golden Temple. Nobody knows what happened to these recordings.
A former IFS officer, who was a great admirer of Kao, persuaded Kao in the last years of his life to record his memoirs by talking into a tape recorder. Kao agreed to it and recoded his memoirs as a police officer and also about some aspects of his work as the head of the R&AW. He insisted on the recordings being transcribed and corrected by him.
The corrected versions have been preserved in a national institution set up to perpetuate the memory of Jawaharlal Nehru [ Images ] to be released to the public some years after his death. It is hoped that these valuable recordings are not lost as had happened to other documents and that they are released to the public in accordance with Kao's wishes.
The officers, who participated in the Sri Lanka [ Images ] operations, are dying one after the other. In a few years from now, no one with a first-hand knowledge will be available. Before that happens, a detailed study should be made of the conflicting roles of different agencies and the Tamil Nadu police, which contributed to the failure of the Indian Peace Keeping Force, and released to the public.
B Raman
Sunday, May 9, 2010
SECURITY FOCUS ON HUAWEI IN INDIA
SECURITY FOCUS ON HUAWEI IN INDIA
B.RAMAN
There has been an increasing focus by the Indian counter-intelligence agencies on the expanding presence, activities and business of the Chinese telecom giant Huawei, which is stated to have the largest mobile telephone business network in the world after Ericsson. Ever since the 1990s, there have been concerns in the Western countries over the suspected links of the company with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Chinese intelligence agencies. The concerns initially started from the fact that the head of the company is a retired officer of the PLA. There were subsequent suspicions and allegations that many of its employees not only in China, but also in its overseas offices were either serving or retired officers of the PLA or the Chinese intelligence.
2. In fact,on the basis of the allegations made by the "Washington Times" in 2007, the US Committee on Foreign Investment in the US (CFIUS) made a review of the security implications of business deals between Huawei and some American companies. It called for a report on the subject from the office of the Director of National Intelligence.
3.Huawei, which greatly values its business in the US, took note of the security-related concerns being increasingly voiced in the US about the dangers of doing business with it and allowing it to acquire US companies, and reportedly volunteered to employ US citizens to supervise its contracts, which could have security implications. This offer was made following reports that it might be interested in acquiring a unit of the Motorola.
4. Wikipedia gives the following instances of security-related fears and enquiries relating to Huawei in different countries:
* A report of the US Government's Strategic Studies Institute on Argentina published in September 2007 described Huawei as "known to bribe and trap clients". The report further detailed its alleged unfair business practices, such as customers being given "full-paid trips" to China and monetary "presents".
* In February 2009, President of Indonesian mobile carrier Excelcomindo Pratama confirmed a data theft attempt by a visiting Huawei employee who "snuck in to General Manager's Network Planning Office"..
* In 2005, the possibility of Huawei's bid on British telecommunications company Marconi led to a request from the Conservative Party to the British Government to "consider the implications for Britain's defense security". Marconi was later acquired by Swedish telecommunications giant Ericsson.
* In a 2008 Military Report to the Congress, the Pentagon stated that Huawei "maintains close ties" to the PLA. In the same year, the proposed acquisition of US-based communications company 3COM Corp by Huawei led to a US Congress investigation and a subsequent determination by the Director of National Intelligence that "3Com-Huawei merger would undermine U.S. national security".
* In March 2009, Alex Allan, the Chairman of the British Joint Intelligence Committee, briefed members of the British Cabinet about the "threat", allegedely posed by Huawei's equipment in the British national telecom network BT. ( My comment: The British media reported that the JIC Chairman had told the Cabinet at a special briefing that "Huawei components that form key parts of BT's new network might already contain malicious elements that could be activated by China and which could remotely disrupt or even permanently disable the network. Such action would have a significant impact on critical services such as power and water supplies, food distribution, the financial system and transport, which were dependent on computers using the communications network to operate." )
* In September 2009, the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation started investigating the alleged links between local Chinese Huawei employees and the Chinese military. ( My comment: This enquiry was started following complaints made to the Australian Government by some serving and former Australian employees of the Chinese company about its alleged suspicious activities).
5.In the US and other Western countries, the intelligence and security agencies keep a close watch on its activities. At the same time, this has not been allowed to come in the way of its legitimate business. This would be evident from the way it has been able to expand its business in the US and Europe despite all security-related fears and enquiries. Western countries follow a policy of allowing it to operate freely in areas and fields where there are no security-related concerns and curbing its activities where such concerns exist.
6. The suspicions and fears of the Indian intelligence agencies regarding the expanding presence and activities of the Chinese company arise from the results of the enquiries faced by the company in other countries, allegations of its close links with the PLA which cannot be dismissed lightly, the dangers of allowing it to operate from sensitive places such as Bangalore where it has an expanding research and development centre and the vulnerability to which our critical infrastruture could be exposed in times of a possible military conflict with China if we depend on hard and software supplied by Chinese companies.
7. One should not forget that Saddam Hussein lost his first Gulf War with the US in 1991 even before it started because the US from which he had procured most of his communication hardware and software managed to paralyse them before its troops went in . The headquarters of Saddam's army in Baghdad was totally cut off from all communications with its units in other parts of the country.
8. Prudence demands that in our enthusiam for expanding our economic ties with China, we should not allow suspect companies such as Huawei a free run of our country and access to our communications network, which could facilitate their collection of intelligence in times of peace and war and paralyse our critical infrastructure during any military conflict.
9. The Indian intelligence agencies have done the right thing in sounding the wake-up call. Instead of taking their warnings seriously and examining what mid-course corrections are called for in our policy of giving a free run to Chinese telecommunication companies, Shri Jairam Ramesh, Minister of State For Environment, has chosen to ridicule the intelligence agencies and the Ministry of Home Affairs for imposing what he has described as needless restrictions and for being paranoid about Chinese investments. He has been quoted as saying: " We are imagining demons where there are none."
10.One could not think of a more unfortunate, ill-informed and worrisome remark. ( 9-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies . E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
There has been an increasing focus by the Indian counter-intelligence agencies on the expanding presence, activities and business of the Chinese telecom giant Huawei, which is stated to have the largest mobile telephone business network in the world after Ericsson. Ever since the 1990s, there have been concerns in the Western countries over the suspected links of the company with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Chinese intelligence agencies. The concerns initially started from the fact that the head of the company is a retired officer of the PLA. There were subsequent suspicions and allegations that many of its employees not only in China, but also in its overseas offices were either serving or retired officers of the PLA or the Chinese intelligence.
2. In fact,on the basis of the allegations made by the "Washington Times" in 2007, the US Committee on Foreign Investment in the US (CFIUS) made a review of the security implications of business deals between Huawei and some American companies. It called for a report on the subject from the office of the Director of National Intelligence.
3.Huawei, which greatly values its business in the US, took note of the security-related concerns being increasingly voiced in the US about the dangers of doing business with it and allowing it to acquire US companies, and reportedly volunteered to employ US citizens to supervise its contracts, which could have security implications. This offer was made following reports that it might be interested in acquiring a unit of the Motorola.
4. Wikipedia gives the following instances of security-related fears and enquiries relating to Huawei in different countries:
* A report of the US Government's Strategic Studies Institute on Argentina published in September 2007 described Huawei as "known to bribe and trap clients". The report further detailed its alleged unfair business practices, such as customers being given "full-paid trips" to China and monetary "presents".
* In February 2009, President of Indonesian mobile carrier Excelcomindo Pratama confirmed a data theft attempt by a visiting Huawei employee who "snuck in to General Manager's Network Planning Office"..
* In 2005, the possibility of Huawei's bid on British telecommunications company Marconi led to a request from the Conservative Party to the British Government to "consider the implications for Britain's defense security". Marconi was later acquired by Swedish telecommunications giant Ericsson.
* In a 2008 Military Report to the Congress, the Pentagon stated that Huawei "maintains close ties" to the PLA. In the same year, the proposed acquisition of US-based communications company 3COM Corp by Huawei led to a US Congress investigation and a subsequent determination by the Director of National Intelligence that "3Com-Huawei merger would undermine U.S. national security".
* In March 2009, Alex Allan, the Chairman of the British Joint Intelligence Committee, briefed members of the British Cabinet about the "threat", allegedely posed by Huawei's equipment in the British national telecom network BT. ( My comment: The British media reported that the JIC Chairman had told the Cabinet at a special briefing that "Huawei components that form key parts of BT's new network might already contain malicious elements that could be activated by China and which could remotely disrupt or even permanently disable the network. Such action would have a significant impact on critical services such as power and water supplies, food distribution, the financial system and transport, which were dependent on computers using the communications network to operate." )
* In September 2009, the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation started investigating the alleged links between local Chinese Huawei employees and the Chinese military. ( My comment: This enquiry was started following complaints made to the Australian Government by some serving and former Australian employees of the Chinese company about its alleged suspicious activities).
5.In the US and other Western countries, the intelligence and security agencies keep a close watch on its activities. At the same time, this has not been allowed to come in the way of its legitimate business. This would be evident from the way it has been able to expand its business in the US and Europe despite all security-related fears and enquiries. Western countries follow a policy of allowing it to operate freely in areas and fields where there are no security-related concerns and curbing its activities where such concerns exist.
6. The suspicions and fears of the Indian intelligence agencies regarding the expanding presence and activities of the Chinese company arise from the results of the enquiries faced by the company in other countries, allegations of its close links with the PLA which cannot be dismissed lightly, the dangers of allowing it to operate from sensitive places such as Bangalore where it has an expanding research and development centre and the vulnerability to which our critical infrastruture could be exposed in times of a possible military conflict with China if we depend on hard and software supplied by Chinese companies.
7. One should not forget that Saddam Hussein lost his first Gulf War with the US in 1991 even before it started because the US from which he had procured most of his communication hardware and software managed to paralyse them before its troops went in . The headquarters of Saddam's army in Baghdad was totally cut off from all communications with its units in other parts of the country.
8. Prudence demands that in our enthusiam for expanding our economic ties with China, we should not allow suspect companies such as Huawei a free run of our country and access to our communications network, which could facilitate their collection of intelligence in times of peace and war and paralyse our critical infrastructure during any military conflict.
9. The Indian intelligence agencies have done the right thing in sounding the wake-up call. Instead of taking their warnings seriously and examining what mid-course corrections are called for in our policy of giving a free run to Chinese telecommunication companies, Shri Jairam Ramesh, Minister of State For Environment, has chosen to ridicule the intelligence agencies and the Ministry of Home Affairs for imposing what he has described as needless restrictions and for being paranoid about Chinese investments. He has been quoted as saying: " We are imagining demons where there are none."
10.One could not think of a more unfortunate, ill-informed and worrisome remark. ( 9-5-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies . E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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