B.RAMAN
Worried over nearly 10,000 Buddhist monks and nuns from the Tibet Autonomous Region, Sichuan and other neighboiuring areas rushing to the quake-hit Yushu area in the Western Qinghai province to organise rescue and relief work independently of the Government and the Chinese Red Cross, the Ministry of Public Security in the Qinghai province has imposed restrictions on rescue and relief work by monks and nuns. Under these restrictions, all those who had gone to the quake-hit area from outside the Yushu region have been ordered to go back to their areas. All monasteries have been told that only monks and nuns belonging to monasteries located in the Yushu area can participate in the rescue and relief work. Others have been banned from participating.
2. Initially, the Chinese did not try to prevent monks and nuns from the neighbouring areas from going to Yushu to organise rescue and relief work. According to reliable sources from the Yushu area, the Chinese became nervous and imposed the curbs when a monk publicly refused to shake hands with President Hu Jintao and hundreds of monks and nuns took out a candle light procession to pay homage to those killed. The police were taken aback when the processionists shouted slogans that His Holiness the Dalai Lama should be allowed to visit his home province to console his people in distress. It has been reported that the Chinese are also worried over the campaign mounted by Tibetan exiles in Western countries to demand that their host Governments should exercise pressure on Beijing to allow His Holiness to visit the quake-hit areas. ( 22-4-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China STudies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Thursday, April 22, 2010
Wednesday, April 21, 2010
COUNTER-TERRORISM---SOME THOUGHTS
B.RAMAN
( Observations made by me while addressing a National Seminar on "Fight Against Terrorism" organised by the Mumbai Police at Mumbai on April 21,2010. The keynote address on the state of terrorism was delivered by Shri M.K. Narayanan, Governor of West Bengal. Other speakers were Dr.Anil Kakodkar, former Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, Dr.Raghunath Mashelkar, former Director-General,, Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, and Shri G.Parthasarathy, former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan )
Two expressions often used by counter-terrorism analysts since the attempt to blow up the New York World Trade Centre in February,1993, are "acts of mass casualty terrorism" and "acts of catastrophic terrorism". These expressions have been defined by different experts in different manner. One of the definitions is based on the number of casualties inflicted by the terrorists. Under this definition, an act of catastrophic terrorism involves fatalities of more than 1000 and an act of mass casualty terrorism involves fatalities of more than 100. 9/11 in the US Homeland was an act of catastrophic terrorism. The terrorist attacks in Mumbai in March,1993, July,2006 and November,2008, were acts of mass casualty terrorism.
2. While other cities in the world have also suffered acts of high casualty terrorism, Mumbai and Beirut have been targeted repeatedly by terrorists. The acts of terrorism in Bali, Madrid and London did not involve orchestration by a foreign State. The acts of mass casualty terrorism in Mumbai involved orchestration by the State of Pakistan.
3. In his inaugural address, Shri D.Sivanandhan, Commissioner of Police, had analysed comprehensively the reasons for the repeated attacks in Mumbai. There is one reason not mentioned by him, which needs to be underlined---- namely the advantage of anonymity offered to a terrorist by a huge city like Mumbai. Anonymity tends to protect the terrorists from detection by the police.
4. What the Mumbai Police is confronted with is not just terrorism , but terrorism sponsored repeatedly against the residents of Mumbai by the State of Pakistan and its intelligence agencies. One should, therefore, talk of the "fight against State-sponsored Terrorism" and not just "Fight against Terrorism". If there was no orchestration by the State of Pakistan, the Mumbai Police would have been able to deal with the threat effectively. They have been facing difficulty because of the foreign sponsorship of terrorism.
5. Thus, counter-terrorism in Mumbai has two aspects--- action against terrorism and the terrorist organisations, which is the responsibility of the Mumbai Police and the Government of Maharashtra, and action against Pakistan, which is repeatedly sponsoring the terrorism. This is the responsibility of the Government of India. Unless the Government of India acts effectively against Pakistan for sponsoring acts of mass casualty terrorism against the residents of Mumbai, it will be unfair to blame the Mumbai Police and the Government of Maharashtra alone for not dealing with terrorism effectively.
6. If there is another act of mass casualty terrorism, there is a strong possibility that it will again be in Mumbai. The Mumbai Police should prepare themselves to face it. They have already taken various measures for revamping the counter-terrorism machinery in Mumbai. Strengthening the machinery alone is not adequate. It is equally important to strengthen the co-operation between the police and the community. The Security and Intelligence Committee of the British House of Commons, which went into deficiencies which led to the successful terrorist strikes in London in July,2005, pointed out that no counter-terrorism machinery however competent and no counter-terrorism doctrine however well thought-out, can deal effectively with terrorism unless there is effective police-community co-operation in counter-terrorism.
7. That the role of the community is important has to be realised by the police as well as the community and the two should work in tandem. After the London blasts, many new ideas have been introduced by the London Police for improving police-community co-operation against terrorism. I would like to underline in particular the appointment of counter-terrorism coordinators in important police stations to interact continuously with the public and the private business sector and the initiative taken by the business sector for sharing the additional expenses incurred by the police for promoting police-public co-operation against terrorism. Some of these ideas should be studied by the urban police in India and those considered worthy of emulation should be adapted to our needs.
8. The series of National Seminars on the "Fight Against Terrorism" being organised by the Mumbai Police in different parts of the city is a welcome and important exercise for promoting police-community co-operation against terrorism. This co-operation should be on a day-to-day basis instead of only at times of seminars like this. How to make police-community cooperation part of the counter-terrorism doctrine? That is an important question which should be addressed jointly by the leaders of the police and the community and an appropriate mechanism found. The Mumbai Police should move in this direction and give a lead to the other urban police of India.
9. In counter-terrorism, the quality of the leadership exercised by the political class is as important as the quality of the leadership exercised by the police, the intelligence set-up and other security agencies. While addressing a seminar in New Delhi in 2001, Shri Narayanan pointed out that while the Punjab Police, the intelligence set-up and other security agencies played an excellent role in bringing Khalistani terrorism under control, they might not have succeeded the way they did but for the equally commendable political leadership and co-operation in dealing with the menace. In dealing with Khalistani terrorism, the political and the professional classes were on the same page. Had this not been so, we might not have succeeded the way we did. In dealing with the state-sponsored jihadi terrorism too, we must try to ensure that the political and professional classes act in tandem and that the required political leadership is forthcoming. Without high-quality political leadership, the police alone, however brilliant and however well-endowed, cannot succeed.
10. In India, we tend to be defeatist. We keep criticising ourselves and our police all the time. We are given to chest-beating about our so-called failures. We tend to forget that our track record against terrorism and insurgencies is not bad at all. We have had success stories in Nagaland, Mizoram, Tripura, Punjab and Tamil Nadu. We are not doing too badly in Jammu & Kashmir and in the fight against jihadi terrorism in other parts of India. Our record against the Maoist insurgency has been above average in Andhra Pradesh and poor in other States affected by it. The terrorists and insurgents have had some spectacular tactical successes to their credit--- the explosion on board the Kanishka aircraft of Air India in June 1985, the three acts of mass casualty terrorism in Mumbai and the Dantewada massacre of 76 policemen by the Maoists etc. But since India became independent in 1947, the terrorists and insurgents have not scored any notable strategic success. Strategically, the Indian State and its security set-up have ultimately prevailed despite the tactical set-backs. They never allowed fatigue to set in. Fatigue ultimately set in the ranks of the terrorists and insurgents and not in the ranks of the State. We have never conceded the illegitimate strategic demands of the terrorists and insurgents even though we might have conceded their tactical demands on occasions as happened at Kandahar in December, 1999. This is a unique record of which we ought to be proud of.
11. Let us by all means criticise our police, our intelligence agencies, other security agencies and the political class. They have much to answer for. But let us take care not to allow over-criticism to create defeatism. That is what Pakistan and its terrorist organisations want. We should not play into their hands. An ideal State would not allow the phenomenon of terrorism or insurgency to appear in its midst. But once it appears it takes a long time for the police and other security agencies to deal with it. A study of terrorism and insurgencies around the world would indicate that it takes around 15 to 20 years to deal with the menace. In India too, we have taken the same time. Once through our sins of commission and omission, we are faced with terrorism or insurgency, we need a lot of patience to deal with the menace. Impatience will prove counter-productive. It could make the police and other security forces over-react, thereby aggravating the problem.
12. There are copybook methods of dealing with acts of terrorism such as hijacking, blowing up aircraft, use of improvised explosive devices in public places etc, but there is no copybook method of dealing with terrorism and insurgencies. Our counter-terrorism techniques have to be nuanced and adapted individually to dealing with different kinds of terrorism and insurgencies. The techniques that we use against the jihadis we cannot use against the Maoists. The ruthlessness that we show towards Pakistanis we cannot show towards our own people. While dealing with our own people who have taken to terrorism and insurgencies, the rhetoric has to be non-provocative and non-escalatory and action has to be firm, but balanced.
13. International or global or trans-national terrorism of the jihadi variety cannot be countered effectively without international co-operation. There has been an improvement in international co-operation since 9/11, but this co-operation is still hampered by subjective and strategic factors. India has been a victim of this half-hearted co-operation. There is greater readiness on the part of the US and other countries of the West to co-operate with India against terrorism, but ifs and buts come in when it is a question of cooperation against Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. This half-hearted co-operation will continue and we must learn to live with it. Ultimately, our strategic success against Pakistan-sponsored terrorism will depend on our own capacity, our own determination and our own will to act. No international co-operation can be a substitute for the national will and determination to act.
14. Victim activism is weak in India. We saw in the US after 9/11 and we have seen among the Jewish people for years, the results which victim activism can achieve. If only we had victim activism in India similar to what one sees in the US and Israel, the relatives of the victims of the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai would have rallied in protest against the plea bargain entered into by the FBI with David Coleman Headley of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba who was an important co-conspirator in the 26/11 terrorist strikes. The total lack of protest from the relatives of those killed speaks poorly of the dormant state of victim activism in India.
15. Shri P.Chidambaram, the Home Minister, has to be commended for his determined efforts to revamp the counter-terrorism machinery after taking over as the Home Minister, but one is disturbed by what appears to be his uncritical admiration of American ideas, American systemic innovations and American-style rhetoric. By all means let us learn from the good practices of countries such as the US and Israel. But let us not blindly ape them. Our country is different. Our people are different. Our sensitivities are different. Uncritical admiration for American systems and approaches to counter-terrorism can prove counter-productive. ( 21-4-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
( Observations made by me while addressing a National Seminar on "Fight Against Terrorism" organised by the Mumbai Police at Mumbai on April 21,2010. The keynote address on the state of terrorism was delivered by Shri M.K. Narayanan, Governor of West Bengal. Other speakers were Dr.Anil Kakodkar, former Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, Dr.Raghunath Mashelkar, former Director-General,, Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, and Shri G.Parthasarathy, former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan )
Two expressions often used by counter-terrorism analysts since the attempt to blow up the New York World Trade Centre in February,1993, are "acts of mass casualty terrorism" and "acts of catastrophic terrorism". These expressions have been defined by different experts in different manner. One of the definitions is based on the number of casualties inflicted by the terrorists. Under this definition, an act of catastrophic terrorism involves fatalities of more than 1000 and an act of mass casualty terrorism involves fatalities of more than 100. 9/11 in the US Homeland was an act of catastrophic terrorism. The terrorist attacks in Mumbai in March,1993, July,2006 and November,2008, were acts of mass casualty terrorism.
2. While other cities in the world have also suffered acts of high casualty terrorism, Mumbai and Beirut have been targeted repeatedly by terrorists. The acts of terrorism in Bali, Madrid and London did not involve orchestration by a foreign State. The acts of mass casualty terrorism in Mumbai involved orchestration by the State of Pakistan.
3. In his inaugural address, Shri D.Sivanandhan, Commissioner of Police, had analysed comprehensively the reasons for the repeated attacks in Mumbai. There is one reason not mentioned by him, which needs to be underlined---- namely the advantage of anonymity offered to a terrorist by a huge city like Mumbai. Anonymity tends to protect the terrorists from detection by the police.
4. What the Mumbai Police is confronted with is not just terrorism , but terrorism sponsored repeatedly against the residents of Mumbai by the State of Pakistan and its intelligence agencies. One should, therefore, talk of the "fight against State-sponsored Terrorism" and not just "Fight against Terrorism". If there was no orchestration by the State of Pakistan, the Mumbai Police would have been able to deal with the threat effectively. They have been facing difficulty because of the foreign sponsorship of terrorism.
5. Thus, counter-terrorism in Mumbai has two aspects--- action against terrorism and the terrorist organisations, which is the responsibility of the Mumbai Police and the Government of Maharashtra, and action against Pakistan, which is repeatedly sponsoring the terrorism. This is the responsibility of the Government of India. Unless the Government of India acts effectively against Pakistan for sponsoring acts of mass casualty terrorism against the residents of Mumbai, it will be unfair to blame the Mumbai Police and the Government of Maharashtra alone for not dealing with terrorism effectively.
6. If there is another act of mass casualty terrorism, there is a strong possibility that it will again be in Mumbai. The Mumbai Police should prepare themselves to face it. They have already taken various measures for revamping the counter-terrorism machinery in Mumbai. Strengthening the machinery alone is not adequate. It is equally important to strengthen the co-operation between the police and the community. The Security and Intelligence Committee of the British House of Commons, which went into deficiencies which led to the successful terrorist strikes in London in July,2005, pointed out that no counter-terrorism machinery however competent and no counter-terrorism doctrine however well thought-out, can deal effectively with terrorism unless there is effective police-community co-operation in counter-terrorism.
7. That the role of the community is important has to be realised by the police as well as the community and the two should work in tandem. After the London blasts, many new ideas have been introduced by the London Police for improving police-community co-operation against terrorism. I would like to underline in particular the appointment of counter-terrorism coordinators in important police stations to interact continuously with the public and the private business sector and the initiative taken by the business sector for sharing the additional expenses incurred by the police for promoting police-public co-operation against terrorism. Some of these ideas should be studied by the urban police in India and those considered worthy of emulation should be adapted to our needs.
8. The series of National Seminars on the "Fight Against Terrorism" being organised by the Mumbai Police in different parts of the city is a welcome and important exercise for promoting police-community co-operation against terrorism. This co-operation should be on a day-to-day basis instead of only at times of seminars like this. How to make police-community cooperation part of the counter-terrorism doctrine? That is an important question which should be addressed jointly by the leaders of the police and the community and an appropriate mechanism found. The Mumbai Police should move in this direction and give a lead to the other urban police of India.
9. In counter-terrorism, the quality of the leadership exercised by the political class is as important as the quality of the leadership exercised by the police, the intelligence set-up and other security agencies. While addressing a seminar in New Delhi in 2001, Shri Narayanan pointed out that while the Punjab Police, the intelligence set-up and other security agencies played an excellent role in bringing Khalistani terrorism under control, they might not have succeeded the way they did but for the equally commendable political leadership and co-operation in dealing with the menace. In dealing with Khalistani terrorism, the political and the professional classes were on the same page. Had this not been so, we might not have succeeded the way we did. In dealing with the state-sponsored jihadi terrorism too, we must try to ensure that the political and professional classes act in tandem and that the required political leadership is forthcoming. Without high-quality political leadership, the police alone, however brilliant and however well-endowed, cannot succeed.
10. In India, we tend to be defeatist. We keep criticising ourselves and our police all the time. We are given to chest-beating about our so-called failures. We tend to forget that our track record against terrorism and insurgencies is not bad at all. We have had success stories in Nagaland, Mizoram, Tripura, Punjab and Tamil Nadu. We are not doing too badly in Jammu & Kashmir and in the fight against jihadi terrorism in other parts of India. Our record against the Maoist insurgency has been above average in Andhra Pradesh and poor in other States affected by it. The terrorists and insurgents have had some spectacular tactical successes to their credit--- the explosion on board the Kanishka aircraft of Air India in June 1985, the three acts of mass casualty terrorism in Mumbai and the Dantewada massacre of 76 policemen by the Maoists etc. But since India became independent in 1947, the terrorists and insurgents have not scored any notable strategic success. Strategically, the Indian State and its security set-up have ultimately prevailed despite the tactical set-backs. They never allowed fatigue to set in. Fatigue ultimately set in the ranks of the terrorists and insurgents and not in the ranks of the State. We have never conceded the illegitimate strategic demands of the terrorists and insurgents even though we might have conceded their tactical demands on occasions as happened at Kandahar in December, 1999. This is a unique record of which we ought to be proud of.
11. Let us by all means criticise our police, our intelligence agencies, other security agencies and the political class. They have much to answer for. But let us take care not to allow over-criticism to create defeatism. That is what Pakistan and its terrorist organisations want. We should not play into their hands. An ideal State would not allow the phenomenon of terrorism or insurgency to appear in its midst. But once it appears it takes a long time for the police and other security agencies to deal with it. A study of terrorism and insurgencies around the world would indicate that it takes around 15 to 20 years to deal with the menace. In India too, we have taken the same time. Once through our sins of commission and omission, we are faced with terrorism or insurgency, we need a lot of patience to deal with the menace. Impatience will prove counter-productive. It could make the police and other security forces over-react, thereby aggravating the problem.
12. There are copybook methods of dealing with acts of terrorism such as hijacking, blowing up aircraft, use of improvised explosive devices in public places etc, but there is no copybook method of dealing with terrorism and insurgencies. Our counter-terrorism techniques have to be nuanced and adapted individually to dealing with different kinds of terrorism and insurgencies. The techniques that we use against the jihadis we cannot use against the Maoists. The ruthlessness that we show towards Pakistanis we cannot show towards our own people. While dealing with our own people who have taken to terrorism and insurgencies, the rhetoric has to be non-provocative and non-escalatory and action has to be firm, but balanced.
13. International or global or trans-national terrorism of the jihadi variety cannot be countered effectively without international co-operation. There has been an improvement in international co-operation since 9/11, but this co-operation is still hampered by subjective and strategic factors. India has been a victim of this half-hearted co-operation. There is greater readiness on the part of the US and other countries of the West to co-operate with India against terrorism, but ifs and buts come in when it is a question of cooperation against Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. This half-hearted co-operation will continue and we must learn to live with it. Ultimately, our strategic success against Pakistan-sponsored terrorism will depend on our own capacity, our own determination and our own will to act. No international co-operation can be a substitute for the national will and determination to act.
14. Victim activism is weak in India. We saw in the US after 9/11 and we have seen among the Jewish people for years, the results which victim activism can achieve. If only we had victim activism in India similar to what one sees in the US and Israel, the relatives of the victims of the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai would have rallied in protest against the plea bargain entered into by the FBI with David Coleman Headley of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba who was an important co-conspirator in the 26/11 terrorist strikes. The total lack of protest from the relatives of those killed speaks poorly of the dormant state of victim activism in India.
15. Shri P.Chidambaram, the Home Minister, has to be commended for his determined efforts to revamp the counter-terrorism machinery after taking over as the Home Minister, but one is disturbed by what appears to be his uncritical admiration of American ideas, American systemic innovations and American-style rhetoric. By all means let us learn from the good practices of countries such as the US and Israel. But let us not blindly ape them. Our country is different. Our people are different. Our sensitivities are different. Uncritical admiration for American systems and approaches to counter-terrorism can prove counter-productive. ( 21-4-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, April 19, 2010
SECURITY FOR INTERNATIONAL SPORTS EVENTS
B.RAMAN
There are threats to the current and forthcoming international sports events in India from the following:
Indigenous terrorists acting on their own.
Indigenous terrorists acting at the instance of Pakistan.
Pakistani terrorists.
2.International sports events make attractive soft targets because of the large crowds, the participation of famous foreign sports personalities and foreign media coverage of the events. In the calculation of the terrorists, a successful attack at an international sports event will not only bring large publicity to their cause, but would also damage the credibility of the Indian Government and its security agencies.
3.The undetected planting of explosive devices outside the Bangalore cricket stadium before an India Premier League cricket match on April 17,2010, shows continuing deficiencies in our intelligence and physical security set-up despite the revamping of our counter-terrorism machinery post/26/11. Even if there has been an improvement in the counter-terrorism machinery of the Government of India, a similar improvement has not been there at the State level. In the US, the Department of Homeland Security has the total responsibility for security against terrorists anywhere in US territory. In India, the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Government of India has to share the responsibility with the States.This often weakens security particularly if different parties are in power in New Delhi and the States.
4.More than the IPL tournament,which ends on April 25, the Commonwealth Games due later this year should be a matter of great concern. Next to the Beijing Olympics of August 2008, it is going to involve the largest gathering of sportsmen and other sports personalities in Asia. If the terrorists want to attack it, they would have started their preparations by now by setting up sleeper cells and by finding out ways of infiltrating the stadia and games villages.
5.Pakistan and the Pakistani terrorist organisations would have a strong motive for attempting to disrupt the Commonwealth Games in order to create a poor image of the Indian organising capability as compared to the manner in which Beijing successfully handled the security of the Olympics. A full-fledged security set-up dedicated to the security of the Games should have been in position by now. One does not get the impression that this is so.
6.The decision to change the venue of the semi-finals of the IPL from Bangalore to Mumbai was inevitable, but was it done by the IPL managing committee after consulting the authorities of the Governments of India and Maharashtra? Do they have the required manpower and technical resources to handle two semi-finals and one final? The security drill should not be left purely in the hands of the State. The Government of India should play the leadership role in coordination and follow-up action.
7.The Govt. of India has been playing the leadership role in respect of the security arrangements for the Commonwealth Games, but one has the impression that this is not so in respect of the IPL matches. The security consultants to the IPL and the State Police seem to be handling the security with the role of the Govt. of India reduced to the minimum necessary. The Government of India should play a more active role after what happened at Bangalore.
8.In a statement made in the Lok Sabha after 26/11, Shri P.Chidambaram, the Home Minister of the Government of India, said that one of the reasons for the terrorists' success in Mumbai was because the responsibility for follow-up action was diffused. From what happened at Bangalore, one gets the impression that it continues to be diffused. We have not learnt the lessons of 26/11. ( 21-4-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
There are threats to the current and forthcoming international sports events in India from the following:
Indigenous terrorists acting on their own.
Indigenous terrorists acting at the instance of Pakistan.
Pakistani terrorists.
2.International sports events make attractive soft targets because of the large crowds, the participation of famous foreign sports personalities and foreign media coverage of the events. In the calculation of the terrorists, a successful attack at an international sports event will not only bring large publicity to their cause, but would also damage the credibility of the Indian Government and its security agencies.
3.The undetected planting of explosive devices outside the Bangalore cricket stadium before an India Premier League cricket match on April 17,2010, shows continuing deficiencies in our intelligence and physical security set-up despite the revamping of our counter-terrorism machinery post/26/11. Even if there has been an improvement in the counter-terrorism machinery of the Government of India, a similar improvement has not been there at the State level. In the US, the Department of Homeland Security has the total responsibility for security against terrorists anywhere in US territory. In India, the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Government of India has to share the responsibility with the States.This often weakens security particularly if different parties are in power in New Delhi and the States.
4.More than the IPL tournament,which ends on April 25, the Commonwealth Games due later this year should be a matter of great concern. Next to the Beijing Olympics of August 2008, it is going to involve the largest gathering of sportsmen and other sports personalities in Asia. If the terrorists want to attack it, they would have started their preparations by now by setting up sleeper cells and by finding out ways of infiltrating the stadia and games villages.
5.Pakistan and the Pakistani terrorist organisations would have a strong motive for attempting to disrupt the Commonwealth Games in order to create a poor image of the Indian organising capability as compared to the manner in which Beijing successfully handled the security of the Olympics. A full-fledged security set-up dedicated to the security of the Games should have been in position by now. One does not get the impression that this is so.
6.The decision to change the venue of the semi-finals of the IPL from Bangalore to Mumbai was inevitable, but was it done by the IPL managing committee after consulting the authorities of the Governments of India and Maharashtra? Do they have the required manpower and technical resources to handle two semi-finals and one final? The security drill should not be left purely in the hands of the State. The Government of India should play the leadership role in coordination and follow-up action.
7.The Govt. of India has been playing the leadership role in respect of the security arrangements for the Commonwealth Games, but one has the impression that this is not so in respect of the IPL matches. The security consultants to the IPL and the State Police seem to be handling the security with the role of the Govt. of India reduced to the minimum necessary. The Government of India should play a more active role after what happened at Bangalore.
8.In a statement made in the Lok Sabha after 26/11, Shri P.Chidambaram, the Home Minister of the Government of India, said that one of the reasons for the terrorists' success in Mumbai was because the responsibility for follow-up action was diffused. From what happened at Bangalore, one gets the impression that it continues to be diffused. We have not learnt the lessons of 26/11. ( 21-4-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
QUAKE-HIT TIBETANS WANT DALAI LAMA TO VISIT & CONSOLE THEM
B.RAMAN
Tibetan monks and others, who have survived the April 14,2010, earthquake in the Qinghai Province , the birthplace of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, have appealed to President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabo to allow His Holiness to visit the quake-hit areas to supervise the rescue and relief efforts and to "offer salvation for our dead and prayers for the victims."
2. Their petition, which has been carried in the Chinese language by boxun.com, a web site run by a group of Chinese political dissidents and exiles, states as follows: "Dear President Hu and Premier Wen. When we suffered the enormous natural disaster of the earthquake, your Party and government immediately dispatched officials and soldiers and forces from all areas of society to rescue us, the victims, and we in the disaster area are extremely thankful for the government's help. But we are masses with a religious faith and for generations upon generations we Buddhists have believed in Gwalya Rinpoche the Dalai Lama. At such a time as this when we have suffered such a terrible blow we are in urgent need of the Dalai Lama to come to our disaster area and provide salvation for our dead and comfort for our wounded souls. President Hu and Premier Wen, we request that in your gracious benevolence you may satisfy the wishes of the people in the disaster area. We Tibetan victims in our tens of thousands plead with the Party and central government to set aside your grudges against the Dalai Lama for the sake of the people in the disaster area. We only wish the Dalai Lama to come to the disaster area to offer salvation for our dead and prayers for the victims. There is no other purpose to this than that of religious faith. It is only by means of the Dalai Lama visiting here to pray for our comfort that the wounds in our souls may be healed, and aside from this there is no better means. " (http://news.boxun.com/news/gb/china/2010/04/201004160551.shtml )
3. Over 11,000 Tibetans have been injured by the quake. The deaths of many of them have pushed the total number of fatalities to 2000. It could go up further as more injured die. Despite the deaths of a large number of Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns, the surviving monks and nuns have mounted a massive rescue and relief effort on their own without depending on the rescue and relief campaign of the Government. They were among the first to reach the quake-hit areas before Government officials could reach there. They have been complaining that while the rescue and relief efforts of the Government and the Chinese Red Cross have been highlighted by the Chinese and international media, the stupendous efforts of the monasteries and monks have not received the attention they deserved.
4. Apart from the massive human tragedy, Tibetan Buddhism and culture have also suffered damages due to the destruction by the quake of a number of monasteries and Tibetan cultural heritage sites in the area and the deaths of a large number of monks and nuns. No estimate of the monks and nuns killed are available, but their number is believed to be high.
5. Among the historic monasteries which have suffered damages are the 1300-year old Thrangu monastery, one of the most historically important monasteries of the world, a center for retreat for several previous incarnations of the Karmapa Lama - the head of the Karma Kagyu school of Buddhism--- and the Mahakala shrine. The quake-hit areas have historic and spiritual links with His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Karma Kagyu school of Buddhism headed by the Karmapa Lama.
6. His Holiness the Dalai Lama and his officials have appealed to the Chinese to allow His Holiness to visit the quake-hit areas, but it is certain the Chinese will not allow him. Nor will the international community exercise pressure on Beijing to allow His Holiness to visit the areas. It is important for international broadcasting stations broadcasting programmes in the Tibetan language, including the external services of All India Radio, to broadcast the prayers of His Holiness to the people of the area. ( 20-4-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tibetan monks and others, who have survived the April 14,2010, earthquake in the Qinghai Province , the birthplace of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, have appealed to President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabo to allow His Holiness to visit the quake-hit areas to supervise the rescue and relief efforts and to "offer salvation for our dead and prayers for the victims."
2. Their petition, which has been carried in the Chinese language by boxun.com, a web site run by a group of Chinese political dissidents and exiles, states as follows: "Dear President Hu and Premier Wen. When we suffered the enormous natural disaster of the earthquake, your Party and government immediately dispatched officials and soldiers and forces from all areas of society to rescue us, the victims, and we in the disaster area are extremely thankful for the government's help. But we are masses with a religious faith and for generations upon generations we Buddhists have believed in Gwalya Rinpoche the Dalai Lama. At such a time as this when we have suffered such a terrible blow we are in urgent need of the Dalai Lama to come to our disaster area and provide salvation for our dead and comfort for our wounded souls. President Hu and Premier Wen, we request that in your gracious benevolence you may satisfy the wishes of the people in the disaster area. We Tibetan victims in our tens of thousands plead with the Party and central government to set aside your grudges against the Dalai Lama for the sake of the people in the disaster area. We only wish the Dalai Lama to come to the disaster area to offer salvation for our dead and prayers for the victims. There is no other purpose to this than that of religious faith. It is only by means of the Dalai Lama visiting here to pray for our comfort that the wounds in our souls may be healed, and aside from this there is no better means. " (http://news.boxun.com/news/gb/china/2010/04/201004160551.shtml )
3. Over 11,000 Tibetans have been injured by the quake. The deaths of many of them have pushed the total number of fatalities to 2000. It could go up further as more injured die. Despite the deaths of a large number of Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns, the surviving monks and nuns have mounted a massive rescue and relief effort on their own without depending on the rescue and relief campaign of the Government. They were among the first to reach the quake-hit areas before Government officials could reach there. They have been complaining that while the rescue and relief efforts of the Government and the Chinese Red Cross have been highlighted by the Chinese and international media, the stupendous efforts of the monasteries and monks have not received the attention they deserved.
4. Apart from the massive human tragedy, Tibetan Buddhism and culture have also suffered damages due to the destruction by the quake of a number of monasteries and Tibetan cultural heritage sites in the area and the deaths of a large number of monks and nuns. No estimate of the monks and nuns killed are available, but their number is believed to be high.
5. Among the historic monasteries which have suffered damages are the 1300-year old Thrangu monastery, one of the most historically important monasteries of the world, a center for retreat for several previous incarnations of the Karmapa Lama - the head of the Karma Kagyu school of Buddhism--- and the Mahakala shrine. The quake-hit areas have historic and spiritual links with His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Karma Kagyu school of Buddhism headed by the Karmapa Lama.
6. His Holiness the Dalai Lama and his officials have appealed to the Chinese to allow His Holiness to visit the quake-hit areas, but it is certain the Chinese will not allow him. Nor will the international community exercise pressure on Beijing to allow His Holiness to visit the areas. It is important for international broadcasting stations broadcasting programmes in the Tibetan language, including the external services of All India Radio, to broadcast the prayers of His Holiness to the people of the area. ( 20-4-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
WHY INDIA MAINTAINING A LOW PROFILE IN TIBETANS' HOUR OF TRAGEDY?
B.RAMAN
A 7.1-magnitude earthquake rocked the Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of Yushu in northwest China's Qinghai Province, on April 14,2010,
killing 1,339 persons----the majority of them Tibetans.Another 332 persons have been reported missing.
2. The epicenter was about 50 km west of the Jiegu Township, the government seat of the Yushu Prefecture, and about 800 km from Xining, the provincial capital. The prefecture has a total area of 267,000 square kilometers and, according to the Chinese media, a population of about 252,700 people, 97 per cent of whom are ethnic Tibetans.
3.Yushu is located at about 4,000 meters above the sea level. The high altitude, thin air, freezing temperatures and electricity shortages have hampered the rescue operations. Braving these difficulties, the Chinese authorities led from the front by President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabo have mobilised massive rescue and relief work. On hearng about the quake, Prime Minister Wen rushed to the affected areas to supervise the rescue and relief operations mounted by the local authorities, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Chinese Red Cross. President Hu cut short his travel in Latin America and rushed to Yushu to join Wen in supervising the rescue and relief operations.
4. The fact that the Qinghai-Tibet Railway line, which is about 360 kms away from the epi centre, has remained undamaged by the quake has helped the Chinese authorities in rushing relief material and personnel to the affected areas.
5. The rapidity and efficiency with which the Chinese authorities have mobilised the relief operations have been highlighted by the Western media, which look upon it as an indicator of the competence and efficiency of China's disaster relief machinery. They have also seen in the impressive relief operations a Chinese keenness to express their solidarity with the Tibetans at their hour of tragedy and wean them away from their feelings of alienation towards the Hans. In their reports from the quake-hit areas, Chinese media have been projecting those who are engaged in the rescue and relief operations as the Tibetans' " Han uncles" and as the "Han uncles" of the PLA.
6. Large sections of the Han population in the rest of China and China's netizen community (about 380 million) have also rallied to the support of the Tibetans affected by the quake by making donations and appealing for donations from others." Tonight we are all Tibetans," said a message appealing for donations.
7. Even His Holiness the Dalai Lama has expressed his appreciation of the way the rescue and relief operations have been organised in this area in which His Holiness himself and the previous Panchen Lama were born. His Holiness has also noted with appreciation the role played by Prime Minister Wen in supervising the operations. His Holiness has said in his message: "I also applaud the Chinese authorities for visiting the affected areas, especially Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, who has not only personally offered comfort to the affected communities, but has also overseen the relief work. I am very appreciative too that the media have been free to report on the tragedy and its aftermath."
8. The Chinese authorities have welcomed assistance from the international community to supplement their efforts. Messages of sympathy and solidarity with the affected people have been pouring into China. The Government-owned Xinhua news agency has been publishing details of these messages and of the foreign help received. A careful monitoring of these details surprisingly show that India and our Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh do not figure in this list. Even the names of Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Maldives and their leaders figure.
9. One is certain India too must have expressed its solidarity and contributed its assistance. If so, why this is being treated in such a low-profile manner? Why are India and our Prime Minister not in the forefront of those in the international community rushing to the assistance of the affected Tibetans? What is preventing or discouraging us from doing so? (19-4-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
A 7.1-magnitude earthquake rocked the Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of Yushu in northwest China's Qinghai Province, on April 14,2010,
killing 1,339 persons----the majority of them Tibetans.Another 332 persons have been reported missing.
2. The epicenter was about 50 km west of the Jiegu Township, the government seat of the Yushu Prefecture, and about 800 km from Xining, the provincial capital. The prefecture has a total area of 267,000 square kilometers and, according to the Chinese media, a population of about 252,700 people, 97 per cent of whom are ethnic Tibetans.
3.Yushu is located at about 4,000 meters above the sea level. The high altitude, thin air, freezing temperatures and electricity shortages have hampered the rescue operations. Braving these difficulties, the Chinese authorities led from the front by President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabo have mobilised massive rescue and relief work. On hearng about the quake, Prime Minister Wen rushed to the affected areas to supervise the rescue and relief operations mounted by the local authorities, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Chinese Red Cross. President Hu cut short his travel in Latin America and rushed to Yushu to join Wen in supervising the rescue and relief operations.
4. The fact that the Qinghai-Tibet Railway line, which is about 360 kms away from the epi centre, has remained undamaged by the quake has helped the Chinese authorities in rushing relief material and personnel to the affected areas.
5. The rapidity and efficiency with which the Chinese authorities have mobilised the relief operations have been highlighted by the Western media, which look upon it as an indicator of the competence and efficiency of China's disaster relief machinery. They have also seen in the impressive relief operations a Chinese keenness to express their solidarity with the Tibetans at their hour of tragedy and wean them away from their feelings of alienation towards the Hans. In their reports from the quake-hit areas, Chinese media have been projecting those who are engaged in the rescue and relief operations as the Tibetans' " Han uncles" and as the "Han uncles" of the PLA.
6. Large sections of the Han population in the rest of China and China's netizen community (about 380 million) have also rallied to the support of the Tibetans affected by the quake by making donations and appealing for donations from others." Tonight we are all Tibetans," said a message appealing for donations.
7. Even His Holiness the Dalai Lama has expressed his appreciation of the way the rescue and relief operations have been organised in this area in which His Holiness himself and the previous Panchen Lama were born. His Holiness has also noted with appreciation the role played by Prime Minister Wen in supervising the operations. His Holiness has said in his message: "I also applaud the Chinese authorities for visiting the affected areas, especially Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, who has not only personally offered comfort to the affected communities, but has also overseen the relief work. I am very appreciative too that the media have been free to report on the tragedy and its aftermath."
8. The Chinese authorities have welcomed assistance from the international community to supplement their efforts. Messages of sympathy and solidarity with the affected people have been pouring into China. The Government-owned Xinhua news agency has been publishing details of these messages and of the foreign help received. A careful monitoring of these details surprisingly show that India and our Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh do not figure in this list. Even the names of Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Maldives and their leaders figure.
9. One is certain India too must have expressed its solidarity and contributed its assistance. If so, why this is being treated in such a low-profile manner? Why are India and our Prime Minister not in the forefront of those in the international community rushing to the assistance of the affected Tibetans? What is preventing or discouraging us from doing so? (19-4-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Sunday, April 18, 2010
THE TERRORISTS IN INDIA'S MIDST
APRIL 19, 2010 ( http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704508904575191402670256886.html )
The Terrorists in India's Midst
Saturday's Bangalore bombing underscores the need to address homegrown Muslim terrorism.
By BAHUKUTUMBI RAMAN
India's counterterrorism teams had another rude surprise Saturday when two explosions outside a cricket stadium in Bangalore injured 17 people—nine of them policemen. The explosions raise serious questions about the Congress Party's progress in anticipating and preventing domestic terrorist attacks.
The government had been warned of Saturday's strike, which occurred before the start of an Indian Premier League cricket match. In February, Ilyas Kashmiri, a Pakistani terrorist with ties to al Qaeda, warned of new terrorist strikes in India directed against the IPL and the Commonwealth Games due later this year. Security for the IPL tournament was tightened up and the Indian government assured nervous Commonwealth officials that the terrorists would not be allowed to succeed.
So far, no group has claimed responsibility for the violence, but the way the bombing was carried out suggests a local signature. The most likely suspect is the Indian Mujahideen, which organized a series of explosions in 2007 and 2008 in cities, including Bangalore and the tourist mecca of Jaipur. The group is also suspected of carrying out the Pune blast in February, which killed 17 people. No arrests have yet been made in that investigation.
Saturday's attack, combined with the as yet unresolved Pune bombing, has called into question the effectiveness of the measures taken by Home Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram to revamp the antiterror investigation machinery. Since taking office after the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, Mr. Chidambaram has set up a National Investigation Agency to improve the investigation of terrorist attacks and the prosecution of terrorists.
The government contends it has prevented a large number of other terrorist attacks of which the public has no knowledge, and that authorities are now in a better position to prevent a repeat of the Mumbai massacre. Police successfully defused a bomb in Bangalore Saturday, and three more unexploded devices Sunday. But their failure to detect the two bombs planted Saturday by the terrorists near the stadium's entrance gates is likely to increase public skepticism of the government's efforts.
To be fair, Mr. Chidambaram is trying to strengthen India's counterterrorism machinery after a long period of neglect under his predecessor, Shivraj Patil. It will take time for the results to be seen.
But Mr. Chidambaram must do more than just strengthen the government's antiterror machinery. This is only one aspect of the problem. He must also act aggressively to counter the radicalization of Indian Muslims. While the intelligence and security agencies enjoy a free hand in dealing with foreign terrorists on Indian soil, they often find their hands tied when faced with Indian terrorists, such as the Indian Mujahideen. These homegrown terrorists often have local grievances, or were turned at the instigation of Pakistani intelligence agencies and terrorist organizations.
This is a tough task. India has the second largest Muslim community in the world after Indonesia and the Indian Muslims constitute an important voter base. In many northern states, where the Congress Party dominates, the Muslim vote is crucial for victory.
While Indian Muslims support the actions of the intelligence and security agencies against Pakistani terrorists, they often protest when the government takes action against their own community, making it hard for authorities' to conduct thorough investigations. That is why the success rate in the investigation and prosecution of Pakistani terrorists is high, but low in the case of Indian Muslims involved in terrorism.
It is important for Mr. Chidambaram and the rest of the Congress Party-led
government to address Muslims' legitimate grievances. But it is equally important to give security agencies a free hand in dealing with Indian Muslims who take to terrorism, by giving the authorities the additional legal powers they need for successful investigation and prosecution. If this isn't done, Saturday's bombing won't be the last.
Mr. Raman served in India's external intelligence agency from 1968 to 1994 and on the government of India's National Security Advisory Board from 2000 to 2002. He is currently director of the Institute for Topical Studies in Chennai.
Copyright 2009 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved
This copy is for your personal, non-commercial use only. Distribution and use of this material are governed by our Subscriber Agreement and by copyright law. For non-personal use or to order multiple copies, please contact Dow Jones Reprints at 1-800-843-0008 or visit
The Terrorists in India's Midst
Saturday's Bangalore bombing underscores the need to address homegrown Muslim terrorism.
By BAHUKUTUMBI RAMAN
India's counterterrorism teams had another rude surprise Saturday when two explosions outside a cricket stadium in Bangalore injured 17 people—nine of them policemen. The explosions raise serious questions about the Congress Party's progress in anticipating and preventing domestic terrorist attacks.
The government had been warned of Saturday's strike, which occurred before the start of an Indian Premier League cricket match. In February, Ilyas Kashmiri, a Pakistani terrorist with ties to al Qaeda, warned of new terrorist strikes in India directed against the IPL and the Commonwealth Games due later this year. Security for the IPL tournament was tightened up and the Indian government assured nervous Commonwealth officials that the terrorists would not be allowed to succeed.
So far, no group has claimed responsibility for the violence, but the way the bombing was carried out suggests a local signature. The most likely suspect is the Indian Mujahideen, which organized a series of explosions in 2007 and 2008 in cities, including Bangalore and the tourist mecca of Jaipur. The group is also suspected of carrying out the Pune blast in February, which killed 17 people. No arrests have yet been made in that investigation.
Saturday's attack, combined with the as yet unresolved Pune bombing, has called into question the effectiveness of the measures taken by Home Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram to revamp the antiterror investigation machinery. Since taking office after the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, Mr. Chidambaram has set up a National Investigation Agency to improve the investigation of terrorist attacks and the prosecution of terrorists.
The government contends it has prevented a large number of other terrorist attacks of which the public has no knowledge, and that authorities are now in a better position to prevent a repeat of the Mumbai massacre. Police successfully defused a bomb in Bangalore Saturday, and three more unexploded devices Sunday. But their failure to detect the two bombs planted Saturday by the terrorists near the stadium's entrance gates is likely to increase public skepticism of the government's efforts.
To be fair, Mr. Chidambaram is trying to strengthen India's counterterrorism machinery after a long period of neglect under his predecessor, Shivraj Patil. It will take time for the results to be seen.
But Mr. Chidambaram must do more than just strengthen the government's antiterror machinery. This is only one aspect of the problem. He must also act aggressively to counter the radicalization of Indian Muslims. While the intelligence and security agencies enjoy a free hand in dealing with foreign terrorists on Indian soil, they often find their hands tied when faced with Indian terrorists, such as the Indian Mujahideen. These homegrown terrorists often have local grievances, or were turned at the instigation of Pakistani intelligence agencies and terrorist organizations.
This is a tough task. India has the second largest Muslim community in the world after Indonesia and the Indian Muslims constitute an important voter base. In many northern states, where the Congress Party dominates, the Muslim vote is crucial for victory.
While Indian Muslims support the actions of the intelligence and security agencies against Pakistani terrorists, they often protest when the government takes action against their own community, making it hard for authorities' to conduct thorough investigations. That is why the success rate in the investigation and prosecution of Pakistani terrorists is high, but low in the case of Indian Muslims involved in terrorism.
It is important for Mr. Chidambaram and the rest of the Congress Party-led
government to address Muslims' legitimate grievances. But it is equally important to give security agencies a free hand in dealing with Indian Muslims who take to terrorism, by giving the authorities the additional legal powers they need for successful investigation and prosecution. If this isn't done, Saturday's bombing won't be the last.
Mr. Raman served in India's external intelligence agency from 1968 to 1994 and on the government of India's National Security Advisory Board from 2000 to 2002. He is currently director of the Institute for Topical Studies in Chennai.
Copyright 2009 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved
This copy is for your personal, non-commercial use only. Distribution and use of this material are governed by our Subscriber Agreement and by copyright law. For non-personal use or to order multiple copies, please contact Dow Jones Reprints at 1-800-843-0008 or visit
Saturday, April 17, 2010
POST-SANITISATION BLASTS IN BANGALORE: LOCAL INDIAN MUJAHIDEEN HAND?
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO. 640
B.RAMAN
Unidentified elements had planted three improvised explosive devices (IEDs) of low sophistication outside a stadium in Bangalore where an IPL cricket match between Mumbai Indians and Royal Challengers, Bangalore, was played on the afternoon of April 17,2010 All the three IEDs would appear to have been planted in the open space outside the stadium after the anti-explosive sanitisation of the inside of the stadium as well as outside had been done thrice by the police.
2. Two of the IEDs exploded before the match was to start. According to some reports, they had been timed to explode after the start of the match, but both exploded prematurely. These reports do not carry adequate conviction because when an IED is planted outside a stadium it is timed to explode as the people are entering the stadium before the start of the match in order to cause casualties and panic. The fact that all the IEDs were planted outside the stadium would indicate that the perpetrators had timed them to explode as the spectators were entering the stadium and not after they had entered. While two of the IEDs exploded near two of the entrances, the the third failed to explode and was detected and defused.
3. It is likely that the IEDs were planted after the third anti-exoposive sanitisation of the day had been completed. This would indicate the possibility that the perpetrators had mingled with the spectators gathering outside before entering the stadium and evaded being noticed by the police as they planted the IEDs. The police would appear to have been confident of the effectiveness of the sanitisation inside the stadium. Moreover, all the spectators and others entering the stadium had to pass through IED detectors at the gates in order to prevent IEDs being smuggled in. The police were so confident that nobody would be able to smuggle in an IED inside the sanitised stadium that they allowed the match to go ahead as scheduled after a delay of one hour during which they did another sanitisation.
4. Sanitisation inside an enclosed space like a hall or a room or even a stadium can be effective, but there are problems in maintaining the effective state of sanitisation in an open space outside a hall or a room or a stadium. The terrorists had taken advantage of this to plant the IEDs unnoticed after the third sanitisation had been completed. The need for a tighter watch on people gathering outside the stadium after the final sanitisation has been done has to be kept in view during the remaining IPL matches. This would require much larger manpower. The Government should make this available to the police.
5. The two explosions injured 17 persons--- nine of them policemen. It would be unwise to presume that the perpetrators did not want to cause fatalities and that they wanted to cause only nervousness and panic among the foreign players and officials participating in the IPL tournament. The low casualties could be attributed to the lack of powerful explosive material with the terrorists and their inadequate expertise in assembling the devices.
6. Local Muslims belonging to the Indian Mujahideen ought to be the primary suspects. The IM had carried out serial explosions in Uttar Pradesh, Jaipur, Bangalore, Ahmedabad and Delhi in 2007-08 and tried unsuccessfully to carry out explosions in Surat. While the explosions were quite lethal in UP, Jaipur, Ahmedabad and Delhi, they were not that lethal in Bangalore and Surat due to the inadequate assembling expertise of the perpetrators at these two places. This would indicate that the IM has well-trained experts in IEDs as well as untrained or inadequately trained perpetrators. Like the Bangalore blasts of July,2008, those of April 17,2010, would appear to have been carried out by inadequately trained perpetrators----most probably locals. ( 18-4-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
Unidentified elements had planted three improvised explosive devices (IEDs) of low sophistication outside a stadium in Bangalore where an IPL cricket match between Mumbai Indians and Royal Challengers, Bangalore, was played on the afternoon of April 17,2010 All the three IEDs would appear to have been planted in the open space outside the stadium after the anti-explosive sanitisation of the inside of the stadium as well as outside had been done thrice by the police.
2. Two of the IEDs exploded before the match was to start. According to some reports, they had been timed to explode after the start of the match, but both exploded prematurely. These reports do not carry adequate conviction because when an IED is planted outside a stadium it is timed to explode as the people are entering the stadium before the start of the match in order to cause casualties and panic. The fact that all the IEDs were planted outside the stadium would indicate that the perpetrators had timed them to explode as the spectators were entering the stadium and not after they had entered. While two of the IEDs exploded near two of the entrances, the the third failed to explode and was detected and defused.
3. It is likely that the IEDs were planted after the third anti-exoposive sanitisation of the day had been completed. This would indicate the possibility that the perpetrators had mingled with the spectators gathering outside before entering the stadium and evaded being noticed by the police as they planted the IEDs. The police would appear to have been confident of the effectiveness of the sanitisation inside the stadium. Moreover, all the spectators and others entering the stadium had to pass through IED detectors at the gates in order to prevent IEDs being smuggled in. The police were so confident that nobody would be able to smuggle in an IED inside the sanitised stadium that they allowed the match to go ahead as scheduled after a delay of one hour during which they did another sanitisation.
4. Sanitisation inside an enclosed space like a hall or a room or even a stadium can be effective, but there are problems in maintaining the effective state of sanitisation in an open space outside a hall or a room or a stadium. The terrorists had taken advantage of this to plant the IEDs unnoticed after the third sanitisation had been completed. The need for a tighter watch on people gathering outside the stadium after the final sanitisation has been done has to be kept in view during the remaining IPL matches. This would require much larger manpower. The Government should make this available to the police.
5. The two explosions injured 17 persons--- nine of them policemen. It would be unwise to presume that the perpetrators did not want to cause fatalities and that they wanted to cause only nervousness and panic among the foreign players and officials participating in the IPL tournament. The low casualties could be attributed to the lack of powerful explosive material with the terrorists and their inadequate expertise in assembling the devices.
6. Local Muslims belonging to the Indian Mujahideen ought to be the primary suspects. The IM had carried out serial explosions in Uttar Pradesh, Jaipur, Bangalore, Ahmedabad and Delhi in 2007-08 and tried unsuccessfully to carry out explosions in Surat. While the explosions were quite lethal in UP, Jaipur, Ahmedabad and Delhi, they were not that lethal in Bangalore and Surat due to the inadequate assembling expertise of the perpetrators at these two places. This would indicate that the IM has well-trained experts in IEDs as well as untrained or inadequately trained perpetrators. Like the Bangalore blasts of July,2008, those of April 17,2010, would appear to have been carried out by inadequately trained perpetrators----most probably locals. ( 18-4-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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