B.RAMAN
How to counter the Islamic bomb-makers and the Islamic bomb-seekers?
2. That is the question that should have been addressed by the Nuclear Security Summit convened by President Barack Obama and being held in Washington DC on April 12 and 13, 2010. Our Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh, Yousef Raza Gilani, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, and President Hu Jintao of China are among the 37 Heads of State or Government attending the summit. Ten other countries are also attending, but not at the Head of State or Government level.
3. Under his policy of making overtures to the Islamic world, Obama has refrained from posing the main issue in all its stark reality. The stark reality is that a catastrophic threat to the lives and property of the non-Muslims of the world as well as large sections of the Muslims themselves comes from two pernicious ideas born in the mosques and madrasas of Pakistan and disseminated across the Ummah by Islamic fundamentalist elements.
4. The first pernicious idea is that of the Islamic bomb, which was first propounded by the late Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto. He was not a fundamentalist himself, but found it necessary to project Pakistan's quest for nuclear weapon capability as meant to protect the Islamic States from the nuclear capability of non-Islamic States---particularly India and Israel. He did not say that the States of India and Israel had an atomic bomb and hence the State of Pakistan should also have one to protect itself. He said that the Hindu and the Jewish religions had an atomic bomb and hence Islam should also have one.
5. He projected the image of an Islamic bomb in order to get funds for Pakistan's clandestine nuclear programme from Saudi Arabia, Libya and Iran. His idea of an Islamic bomb developed by Pakistan as a trustee and guardian of the Islamic world was readily borrowed by the Islamic parties of Pakistan, which project Pakistan's nuclear weapons and expertise as acquired on behalf of the entire Islamic world.
6. Many Pakistani nuclear scientists close to the Islamic parties subscribed to this idea of an Islamic bomb. A.Q.Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist, was one of them. For him and the scientists associated with him, his selling the uranium enrichment technology and equipment and nuclear weapon designs obtained from China to Iran and Libya was not an act of proliferation. It was an act of Islamic solidarity. Even though the Pakistan Government, under US pressure, took some action against him for his acts of proliferation to Iran and Libya, many in Pakistan in the civil society as a whole as well as in the Government and the nuclear scientists’ community do not believe that A.Q.Khan did anything wrong by helping his co-religionists in other States acquire a nuclear weapon capability.
7.Bhutto and others who followed him in Pakistan saw the Islamic bomb as meant to protect Pakistan and other Islamic States and to deter attacks on them by non-Muslim States. Osama bin Laden borrowed the concept of the Islamic bomb from the Pakistanis and expanded it further to project it as meant to protect the religion of Islam from threats from other religions----particularly Christianity and Judaism. He spoke of the religious right and obligation of the Muslims to acquire a nuclear weapon capability and use it if necessary to protect Islam. This was the second pernicious idea born in Pakistani madrasas such as the Binori madrasa of Karachi which bin Laden made his own.
8. Thus, from the concept of a deterrence available to a state to deter attacks on it by other nuclear weapon states, the atomic bomb became, in the eyes of bin Laden, not only a deterrent, but also an offensive weapon of jihad to impose the will of Islam on non-Muslims---particularly the Christians and the Jewish people.
9. This enlarged concept of the atomic bomb as a jihadi non-State weapon and not a State weapon found its supporters in Pakistan's nuclear scientists' community, who were inclined to help Al Qaeda and bin Laden in their quest for this capability. Sultan Bashiruddin Ahmed and Abdul Majid, retired Pakistani nuclear scientists, constituted a new breed of lone wolf proliferators to jihadi non-State actors.
10. Ever since Al Qaeda embarked on its quest for nuclear material and weapons capability, the concept of the nuclear weapon as a deterrent has lost it meaning. It may deter other States, but it does not deter jihadi non-State actors such as Al Qaeda. A nuclear State may be able to deter another nuclear State through threats of massive retaliation, but such threats will have no meaning or impact in the case of jihadi non-State actors. Fears of large casualties and environment damage act as a restraining factor in the case of nuclear weapon States. No such restraining factor will operate in the case of jihadi non-State actors. They are indifferent to the likely catastrophic consequences of their acts of nuclear terrorism. They will use an actual act of nuclear terrorism or the threat of an act of nuclear terrorism as a weapon of intimidation against non-Muslims. How to deal with this?
11. The only effective way of preventing Al Qaeda from acquiring a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb capability is by neutralising it beyond recovery and, till it is destroyed, by preventing it from acquiring the capability. Pakistan is the only State where it can acquire the material and the capability. It has a reservoir of support and sympathy in Pakistan. Otherwise, bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri, his No.2, might have been killed or captured by now. The pre-9/11 contacts of Sultan Bashiruddin Ahmed and Abdul Majid with bin Laden were an indication of the attraction of Al Qaeda and bin Laden to some members of the Pakistani nuclear scientists’ community.
12. Physical security of nuclear establishments in order to prevent nuclear material from getting into the hands of Al Qaeda and its associates is the first essential step for preventing nuclear terrorism. Another equally important step is the identification of pro-Al Qaeda elements in Pakistan’s military, intelligence and nuclear establishments and action to weed them out. Instead of discussing these measures in specific terms, the agenda of the Nuclear Summit seeks to evade a decision on the action that needs to be taken in and against Pakistan. This is not the way to ensure nuclear security. ( 12-4-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, April 12, 2010
CHINESE INROADS INTO SRI LANKA
B.RAMAN
INTRODUCTION
Sri Lanka has a right to develop close relations with China and Pakistan. India cannot legitimately oppose it.
At the same time, the Government of India has a duty to take note of the various aspects of the relations, which could be detrimental to our national security and evolve an appropriate policy response.
The policy response could be either actively countering their influence in Sri Lanka or actively promoting our interests in Sri Lanka or a mix of both.
Another response could be in the form of a mix of incentives and disincentives---- incentives to make it worthwhile for Sri Lanka to have closer relations with India than with China or Pakistan and disincentives if it is insensitive to India’s concerns and interests.
A good incentive could be by making the huge Indian market easily accessible to the goods and services of Sri Lanka, by making it worthwhile for Sri Lankan students to study in India, by sharing our IT expertise with Sri Lanka, by encouraging networking between the corporate worlds of the two countries etc
A strong disincentive could be by using our traditional pressure points in Sri Lanka such as the dependence of Sri Lanka’s tourism economy on Indian tourists, the goodwill for India in large sections of SL society etc
Unfortunately, we are yet to work out a comprehensive and workable policy response.
We are worried over the increasing Chinese influence and its implications for India’s security, but we do not articulate our concerns. We pretend as if Indian and Chinese interests will never clash in Sri Lanka and we try to give an impression that we can take it in our stride.
Our policy response, if at all there is any, is ad hoc and not strategic with the immediate and long-term interests influencing the response.
China’s policy, on the other hand, caters to its interests of today as well as its likely interests of tomorrow and the day after. There is nothing ad hoc about it.
China is not a South Asian power, but has acquired a robust South Asian presence through its carefully-cultivated relations with Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Bangladesh and Nepal.
China is not an Indian Ocean power, but it is seeking to acquire a robust Indian Ocean presence through its relations with Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius & Seychelles.
India is a South Asian and Indian Ocean power, but its South Asian and Indian Ocean influence is being eroded by the increasing inroads of China at the expense of India.
This presentation will focus essentially on China and not on Pakistan.The threat to us from Pakistan through Sri Lanka is more tactical than strategic, more subversive than military, more political than economic. China is a dragon, but Pakistan is still only a pinprick.
We should be alert to the possibility of China and Pakistan acting in tandem in Sri Lanka and the Maldives to undermine the Indian influence, but there is as yet no evidence of this possibility becoming a reality, but it could in the long-term.Our policy response should nip this bud before it starts blooming.Beyond this caution, I will not say anything else on Pakistan in this presentation.
General Observations & Quotes
Under President Mahinda Rajapaksa, Chinese presence and influence in Sri Lanka have increased.He has visited China thrice since assuming office. Increase in bilateral interactions and exchange of visits.Sri Lanka opened a consulate—its second one in China—in Chengdu, where Pakistan already has an active Consulate.The Chengdu Military Region coordinates China’s military strategy in South Asia.
“China and Sri Lanka are long standing friends. China never deserted Sri Lanka in its times of distress”---Rajapaksa in April 2008 while inaugurating the construction of Sri Lanka’s National Theatre of Performing Arts to be built with Chinese assistance.
“The friendly relationship between the two countries has stood long test and the two countries are tested friends. Sri Lanka has always firmly stood by and will never change its stance on one-China policy”—Rajapaksa on September 4,2009, while receiving a delegation of the Chinese Communist Party.
“The Chinese Government endeavors to develop its friendship and cooperation with Sri Lanka on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence. Chinese enterprises are contracted to build the Hambantota port. Any vicious distortion of the normal business deal holds no water. Social stability, economic development and ethnic reconciliation of Sir Lanka serve the shared aspiration and fundamental interest of the Sri Lankan people. We sincerely hope this goal can be achieved at an early date” ---.Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Ma Zhaoxu at his regular press conference on May 12, 2009.
“Sri Lanka’s traditional donors, namely, the United States, Canada and the European Union, had receded into a very distant corner to be replaced by countries in the East. The new donors are neighbors; they are rich; and they conduct themselves differently. Asians don’t go around teaching each other how to behave.There are ways we deal with each other — perhaps a quiet chat, but not wagging the finger. Chinese assistance has grown fivefold in the last year to nearly $1 billion, eclipsing Sri Lanka’s longtime biggest donor, Japan” ---Palitha Kohona, Sri Lankan Foreign Secretary as quoted by the “New York Times” dated March 9,2008
Bilateral Trade
Trade between the two countries has doubled over the last 5 years from US$ 660 million to US$ 1.13 billion, making China the second largest exporter to Sri Lanka and the 13th largest export destination for Sri Lanka’s exports.
"We have paid far too much attention to the export markets in the US and now we need to move towards the Asian giant China. We have had an over dependence in the US market for our exports for too long," Prof. A. D. V. De S. Indraratna, President, Sri Lanka Economic Association.
Sri Lanka exports coconut fiber products, natural rubber, tea, spices, precious and semi-precious stones and ready made garments to China. There has been a significant increase of Sri Lankan exports to China since 2000, mainly due to the bulky export of mineral sands as zicronium ores , coir fiber and electrical components etc. The exports of mineral sands rose from Rs. 10 million in 2001 to Rs. 226 million in 2008. Only 0.45 per cent of Sri Lanka’s total exports go to China, but 12 per cent of its total imports come from China.
Project Assistance—Hambantota Port
The foundation for the construction of a modern port with Chinese assistance at Hambantota in southern Sri Lanka was formally laid in October,2007. The construction actually started in January,2008.
It is a 15-year project to be completed in stages. The entire project is estimated to cost US $ one billion. The present Chinese commitment is for the construction of the first stage only, which is estimated to cost US $ 360 million. China has agreed to give 85 per cent of this amount at concessional interest. The balance is being contributed by the Government of Sri Lanka.
The first stage of the 15-year (2008-2023) project is expected to be completed by the end of 2010. This stage envisages the construction of a 1000-metre jetty, which will enable the harbour to function as an industrial port for the import and export of industrial chemicals, fuel and heavy machinery. By 2023, Hambantota is projected to have a liquefied natural gas refinery, aviation fuel storage facilities, three separate docks giving the port a transshipment capacity and dry docks for ship repair and construction. The project also envisages that when completed the port will serve as a base for bunkering and refueling.
The draught (depth) of the new harbour will be 16 metres against 15 metres in Colombo. A 230 metre passage-entrance channel will be created at the breakwater which is 988 metres long on the west end and 311 metres long on the east end.
The Government hopes that as a refueling location Hambantota will have many advantages over the Colombo port or ports in South India. The construction has been undertaken by a consortium of Chinese companies headed by the China Harbour Engineering Company and the Sino Hydro Corporation.
The project doesn’t have a separate consultant. The Sri Lanka Port Authority (SLPA) is functioning as the client-cum-consultant while the China Harbour Engineering Co Ltd is the contractor. In September,2008,there were 328 Sri Lankans and 235 Chinese working at the site-engineers, administrative personnel and others. The present number is not known.
The first stage due to be ready by end 2010 will allow three
ships to berth. The final stage, for which there is no offer of funding yet from China, is planned to accommodate more than 30 ships, which is the present capacity at Colombo.
Reliable reports say that while the Sri Lankan authorities want Hambantota to emerge as a modern port with better facilities and efficiency than any of the ports in South India, they do not want the present importance of the Colombo port to be reduced. Colombo presently has the reputation of being the most modern and most efficient port in South Asia. They want this reputation to be maintained. There is no proposal at present to set up container yards and cater to container ships at Hambantota.
The present Chinese interest is in the use of the docking and refueling facilities that would come up in Hambantota for their commercial and naval ships. There is no proposal at present for a Chinese naval base at Hambantota.
New Container Terminal at Colombo
Chinese port operator China Merchants Holdings (International) is negotiating with the Sri Lankan authorities a contract for the construction of a new container terminal at Colombo. The company has bid for the contract jointly with a Sri Lankan company Aitken Spence.
Maththala Airport--Hambantota
On November 27,2009, Rajapaksa inaugurated the construction of Sri Lanka's second international airport at Maththala in Hambantota.
The new airport will be constructed on a plot of 2,000 hectares in Hambantota district at a cost of US$ 190 million. The Government of the People's Republic of China will provide financial assistance for the project with a soft loan through its Ex-Im Bank.. According to the Ports and Aviation Ministry, the construction of the airport will be completed in two phases. All basic facilities including runways, taxiways and parking facilities will be completed in the first phase to be completed by 2011. All other airport and aviation related facilities will be completed in the second phase. These include servicing and repairing centre for aircraft, hotels, pilot training centre, maintenance hub, private jet parking, and technical training centers. The Government hopes to commission the airport by the end of 2011 and land the first flight by December 2011.
Other Projects with Chinese Assistance
The construction of the Colombo--Katunayake Expressway.( US $ 248 million)
Improvement of the railways---US $ 100 million to be given by China’s Ex-Im Bank. Agreement signed on March 10,2010.
Norochcholai Coal Power Plant (US$855 million)
A flood protection system for Colombo suburbs of Kotte, Dehiwela-Mount Lavinia, Maharagama, Kesbewa and Moratuwa. ( US $ 59 million) To be given by China Construction Bank.
National Theatre of Performing Arts in Colombo ( US $ 21 million)
Sri Lanka's investment promotion agency, the Board of Investment, announced in July,2009, it has signed a deal with China's Huichen Investment to manage a special economic zone dedicated to Chinese investors. Huichen will invest US $28 million in the zone in Mirigama, north of Colombo, to improve infrastructure in the first phase over three years.The company, a conglomerate that specialises in infrastructure development and does coal and iron ore mining, will also market the zone and attract Chinese investors.
More than 50 per cent of the funding received by Sri Lanka from abroad for construction and development projects since Rajapaksa came to power came from China.
"Since 2007, Sri Lanka has been trying to launch a communication satellite. China has agreed to provide financial and technical assistance," Executive Director of the Institute of Policy Studies, Dr. Saman Kelegama was quoted as saying in November 2009. In May 2009, Priyantha Kariyapperuma, Director-General of the Telecommunications Regulatory Commission, had said that the Government had begun work on a space programme hoping to launch two communication satellites. "The University of Surrey specializes in satellite technology having created about 35 satellites. They have made a presentation to President Mahinda Rajapakse and have entered into an agreement to transfer technology and knowledge to our universities," he told the Island Financial Review. Kariyapperuma said a consortium of vice chancellors from universities with engineering faculties had been formed for this purpose. He said the Government planned to launch two communication satellites—a lower earth orbit satellite used mainly for images and a geo stationary communication satellite. The two satellites will be used not only for communication purposes but also for disaster management, agriculture planning, irrigation planning, town/urban planning and coastal conservation. He said the low earth orbiting satellite could be financed with domestic funds particularly from the Telecommunication Development Fund. The private sector would also be called to contribute to the development of the two satellites.
Chinese Project Assistance—Some Features
All except a thermal power plant in Sinhalese majority areas.
The Chinese have agreed to consider project proposals from the Tamil areas in future, including a proposal for improvement of road communications in the Jaffna peninsula.
Projects of Concern from India’s security point of view
Hambantota Port: Though at present there is no talk of a naval base, it could emerge ultimately to cater to the requirements of Chinese oil & gas tankers and anti-piracy patrols.
Communications satellite with Chinese assistance could be used for the collection of TECHINT about India’s nuclear and space establishments in South India.
Other Chinese Assistance
One million U.S. dollars in humanitarian aid to help internally displaced persons.
Technical assistance for demining operations in the Northern and Eastern Provinces .
China’s humanitarian assistance is meagre. Its assistance focuses on areas which could benefit its strategic goals.
Chinese Military Equipment Supplied for Use Against LTTE
Jian-7 fighter jets, anti-aircraft guns and JY-11 3D air surveillance radars .Average military supplies to Sri Lanka estimated at US $ 100 million per annum.
Exploration of Oil & Gas
The policy of the Rajapaksa Government is whatever benefit is offered to India, an equal benefit will be offered to China. It offered one block each without bids in the Gulf of Mannar area to India and China for exploration.
India’s Response
No public articulation of Indian concerns.
It is not known whether there has been any private articulation through diplomatic channels and, if so, how strong & effective.
With the SL Government having subdued the Tamils with Indian, Chinese and Pakistani assistance, India no longer has this pressure point in Sri Lanka.
Economic pressure may still work because of the large flow of Indian tourists to Sri Lanka and their contribution to the Sri Lankan economy.
The present Government in New Delhi will be disinclined to use economic pressure or engage in a robust response to counter the growing influence of China in Sri Lanka.
One sees no prospect of reversing the gradual erosion of the Indian influence and the growth of the Chinese influence.
India should not keep its economic presence confined only to the Tamil areas. It should be active in the Sinhalese areas too.
India should vigorously exploit its advantages vis-à-vis China---huge Indian market next door to SL, our mastery of the English language, India’s robust corporate sector which should compete against the Chinese companies
• The private sector can compensate for the lack of Indian Government activism in Sri Lanka. The SL Govt. first approached an Indian company for the Hambantota project. When the response was negative, they approached China.When they invited bids for a new container terminal at Colombo, no Indian company responded. Only a Chinese company did.
( The presenter is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India,New Delhi, and Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. Also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Paper presented on April 12,2010, at a seminar on Sri Lanka jointly organised by the Indian Centre for South Asian Studies and the Centre For Asia Studies, both of Chennai.)
INTRODUCTION
Sri Lanka has a right to develop close relations with China and Pakistan. India cannot legitimately oppose it.
At the same time, the Government of India has a duty to take note of the various aspects of the relations, which could be detrimental to our national security and evolve an appropriate policy response.
The policy response could be either actively countering their influence in Sri Lanka or actively promoting our interests in Sri Lanka or a mix of both.
Another response could be in the form of a mix of incentives and disincentives---- incentives to make it worthwhile for Sri Lanka to have closer relations with India than with China or Pakistan and disincentives if it is insensitive to India’s concerns and interests.
A good incentive could be by making the huge Indian market easily accessible to the goods and services of Sri Lanka, by making it worthwhile for Sri Lankan students to study in India, by sharing our IT expertise with Sri Lanka, by encouraging networking between the corporate worlds of the two countries etc
A strong disincentive could be by using our traditional pressure points in Sri Lanka such as the dependence of Sri Lanka’s tourism economy on Indian tourists, the goodwill for India in large sections of SL society etc
Unfortunately, we are yet to work out a comprehensive and workable policy response.
We are worried over the increasing Chinese influence and its implications for India’s security, but we do not articulate our concerns. We pretend as if Indian and Chinese interests will never clash in Sri Lanka and we try to give an impression that we can take it in our stride.
Our policy response, if at all there is any, is ad hoc and not strategic with the immediate and long-term interests influencing the response.
China’s policy, on the other hand, caters to its interests of today as well as its likely interests of tomorrow and the day after. There is nothing ad hoc about it.
China is not a South Asian power, but has acquired a robust South Asian presence through its carefully-cultivated relations with Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Bangladesh and Nepal.
China is not an Indian Ocean power, but it is seeking to acquire a robust Indian Ocean presence through its relations with Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius & Seychelles.
India is a South Asian and Indian Ocean power, but its South Asian and Indian Ocean influence is being eroded by the increasing inroads of China at the expense of India.
This presentation will focus essentially on China and not on Pakistan.The threat to us from Pakistan through Sri Lanka is more tactical than strategic, more subversive than military, more political than economic. China is a dragon, but Pakistan is still only a pinprick.
We should be alert to the possibility of China and Pakistan acting in tandem in Sri Lanka and the Maldives to undermine the Indian influence, but there is as yet no evidence of this possibility becoming a reality, but it could in the long-term.Our policy response should nip this bud before it starts blooming.Beyond this caution, I will not say anything else on Pakistan in this presentation.
General Observations & Quotes
Under President Mahinda Rajapaksa, Chinese presence and influence in Sri Lanka have increased.He has visited China thrice since assuming office. Increase in bilateral interactions and exchange of visits.Sri Lanka opened a consulate—its second one in China—in Chengdu, where Pakistan already has an active Consulate.The Chengdu Military Region coordinates China’s military strategy in South Asia.
“China and Sri Lanka are long standing friends. China never deserted Sri Lanka in its times of distress”---Rajapaksa in April 2008 while inaugurating the construction of Sri Lanka’s National Theatre of Performing Arts to be built with Chinese assistance.
“The friendly relationship between the two countries has stood long test and the two countries are tested friends. Sri Lanka has always firmly stood by and will never change its stance on one-China policy”—Rajapaksa on September 4,2009, while receiving a delegation of the Chinese Communist Party.
“The Chinese Government endeavors to develop its friendship and cooperation with Sri Lanka on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence. Chinese enterprises are contracted to build the Hambantota port. Any vicious distortion of the normal business deal holds no water. Social stability, economic development and ethnic reconciliation of Sir Lanka serve the shared aspiration and fundamental interest of the Sri Lankan people. We sincerely hope this goal can be achieved at an early date” ---.Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Ma Zhaoxu at his regular press conference on May 12, 2009.
“Sri Lanka’s traditional donors, namely, the United States, Canada and the European Union, had receded into a very distant corner to be replaced by countries in the East. The new donors are neighbors; they are rich; and they conduct themselves differently. Asians don’t go around teaching each other how to behave.There are ways we deal with each other — perhaps a quiet chat, but not wagging the finger. Chinese assistance has grown fivefold in the last year to nearly $1 billion, eclipsing Sri Lanka’s longtime biggest donor, Japan” ---Palitha Kohona, Sri Lankan Foreign Secretary as quoted by the “New York Times” dated March 9,2008
Bilateral Trade
Trade between the two countries has doubled over the last 5 years from US$ 660 million to US$ 1.13 billion, making China the second largest exporter to Sri Lanka and the 13th largest export destination for Sri Lanka’s exports.
"We have paid far too much attention to the export markets in the US and now we need to move towards the Asian giant China. We have had an over dependence in the US market for our exports for too long," Prof. A. D. V. De S. Indraratna, President, Sri Lanka Economic Association.
Sri Lanka exports coconut fiber products, natural rubber, tea, spices, precious and semi-precious stones and ready made garments to China. There has been a significant increase of Sri Lankan exports to China since 2000, mainly due to the bulky export of mineral sands as zicronium ores , coir fiber and electrical components etc. The exports of mineral sands rose from Rs. 10 million in 2001 to Rs. 226 million in 2008. Only 0.45 per cent of Sri Lanka’s total exports go to China, but 12 per cent of its total imports come from China.
Project Assistance—Hambantota Port
The foundation for the construction of a modern port with Chinese assistance at Hambantota in southern Sri Lanka was formally laid in October,2007. The construction actually started in January,2008.
It is a 15-year project to be completed in stages. The entire project is estimated to cost US $ one billion. The present Chinese commitment is for the construction of the first stage only, which is estimated to cost US $ 360 million. China has agreed to give 85 per cent of this amount at concessional interest. The balance is being contributed by the Government of Sri Lanka.
The first stage of the 15-year (2008-2023) project is expected to be completed by the end of 2010. This stage envisages the construction of a 1000-metre jetty, which will enable the harbour to function as an industrial port for the import and export of industrial chemicals, fuel and heavy machinery. By 2023, Hambantota is projected to have a liquefied natural gas refinery, aviation fuel storage facilities, three separate docks giving the port a transshipment capacity and dry docks for ship repair and construction. The project also envisages that when completed the port will serve as a base for bunkering and refueling.
The draught (depth) of the new harbour will be 16 metres against 15 metres in Colombo. A 230 metre passage-entrance channel will be created at the breakwater which is 988 metres long on the west end and 311 metres long on the east end.
The Government hopes that as a refueling location Hambantota will have many advantages over the Colombo port or ports in South India. The construction has been undertaken by a consortium of Chinese companies headed by the China Harbour Engineering Company and the Sino Hydro Corporation.
The project doesn’t have a separate consultant. The Sri Lanka Port Authority (SLPA) is functioning as the client-cum-consultant while the China Harbour Engineering Co Ltd is the contractor. In September,2008,there were 328 Sri Lankans and 235 Chinese working at the site-engineers, administrative personnel and others. The present number is not known.
The first stage due to be ready by end 2010 will allow three
ships to berth. The final stage, for which there is no offer of funding yet from China, is planned to accommodate more than 30 ships, which is the present capacity at Colombo.
Reliable reports say that while the Sri Lankan authorities want Hambantota to emerge as a modern port with better facilities and efficiency than any of the ports in South India, they do not want the present importance of the Colombo port to be reduced. Colombo presently has the reputation of being the most modern and most efficient port in South Asia. They want this reputation to be maintained. There is no proposal at present to set up container yards and cater to container ships at Hambantota.
The present Chinese interest is in the use of the docking and refueling facilities that would come up in Hambantota for their commercial and naval ships. There is no proposal at present for a Chinese naval base at Hambantota.
New Container Terminal at Colombo
Chinese port operator China Merchants Holdings (International) is negotiating with the Sri Lankan authorities a contract for the construction of a new container terminal at Colombo. The company has bid for the contract jointly with a Sri Lankan company Aitken Spence.
Maththala Airport--Hambantota
On November 27,2009, Rajapaksa inaugurated the construction of Sri Lanka's second international airport at Maththala in Hambantota.
The new airport will be constructed on a plot of 2,000 hectares in Hambantota district at a cost of US$ 190 million. The Government of the People's Republic of China will provide financial assistance for the project with a soft loan through its Ex-Im Bank.. According to the Ports and Aviation Ministry, the construction of the airport will be completed in two phases. All basic facilities including runways, taxiways and parking facilities will be completed in the first phase to be completed by 2011. All other airport and aviation related facilities will be completed in the second phase. These include servicing and repairing centre for aircraft, hotels, pilot training centre, maintenance hub, private jet parking, and technical training centers. The Government hopes to commission the airport by the end of 2011 and land the first flight by December 2011.
Other Projects with Chinese Assistance
The construction of the Colombo--Katunayake Expressway.( US $ 248 million)
Improvement of the railways---US $ 100 million to be given by China’s Ex-Im Bank. Agreement signed on March 10,2010.
Norochcholai Coal Power Plant (US$855 million)
A flood protection system for Colombo suburbs of Kotte, Dehiwela-Mount Lavinia, Maharagama, Kesbewa and Moratuwa. ( US $ 59 million) To be given by China Construction Bank.
National Theatre of Performing Arts in Colombo ( US $ 21 million)
Sri Lanka's investment promotion agency, the Board of Investment, announced in July,2009, it has signed a deal with China's Huichen Investment to manage a special economic zone dedicated to Chinese investors. Huichen will invest US $28 million in the zone in Mirigama, north of Colombo, to improve infrastructure in the first phase over three years.The company, a conglomerate that specialises in infrastructure development and does coal and iron ore mining, will also market the zone and attract Chinese investors.
More than 50 per cent of the funding received by Sri Lanka from abroad for construction and development projects since Rajapaksa came to power came from China.
"Since 2007, Sri Lanka has been trying to launch a communication satellite. China has agreed to provide financial and technical assistance," Executive Director of the Institute of Policy Studies, Dr. Saman Kelegama was quoted as saying in November 2009. In May 2009, Priyantha Kariyapperuma, Director-General of the Telecommunications Regulatory Commission, had said that the Government had begun work on a space programme hoping to launch two communication satellites. "The University of Surrey specializes in satellite technology having created about 35 satellites. They have made a presentation to President Mahinda Rajapakse and have entered into an agreement to transfer technology and knowledge to our universities," he told the Island Financial Review. Kariyapperuma said a consortium of vice chancellors from universities with engineering faculties had been formed for this purpose. He said the Government planned to launch two communication satellites—a lower earth orbit satellite used mainly for images and a geo stationary communication satellite. The two satellites will be used not only for communication purposes but also for disaster management, agriculture planning, irrigation planning, town/urban planning and coastal conservation. He said the low earth orbiting satellite could be financed with domestic funds particularly from the Telecommunication Development Fund. The private sector would also be called to contribute to the development of the two satellites.
Chinese Project Assistance—Some Features
All except a thermal power plant in Sinhalese majority areas.
The Chinese have agreed to consider project proposals from the Tamil areas in future, including a proposal for improvement of road communications in the Jaffna peninsula.
Projects of Concern from India’s security point of view
Hambantota Port: Though at present there is no talk of a naval base, it could emerge ultimately to cater to the requirements of Chinese oil & gas tankers and anti-piracy patrols.
Communications satellite with Chinese assistance could be used for the collection of TECHINT about India’s nuclear and space establishments in South India.
Other Chinese Assistance
One million U.S. dollars in humanitarian aid to help internally displaced persons.
Technical assistance for demining operations in the Northern and Eastern Provinces .
China’s humanitarian assistance is meagre. Its assistance focuses on areas which could benefit its strategic goals.
Chinese Military Equipment Supplied for Use Against LTTE
Jian-7 fighter jets, anti-aircraft guns and JY-11 3D air surveillance radars .Average military supplies to Sri Lanka estimated at US $ 100 million per annum.
Exploration of Oil & Gas
The policy of the Rajapaksa Government is whatever benefit is offered to India, an equal benefit will be offered to China. It offered one block each without bids in the Gulf of Mannar area to India and China for exploration.
India’s Response
No public articulation of Indian concerns.
It is not known whether there has been any private articulation through diplomatic channels and, if so, how strong & effective.
With the SL Government having subdued the Tamils with Indian, Chinese and Pakistani assistance, India no longer has this pressure point in Sri Lanka.
Economic pressure may still work because of the large flow of Indian tourists to Sri Lanka and their contribution to the Sri Lankan economy.
The present Government in New Delhi will be disinclined to use economic pressure or engage in a robust response to counter the growing influence of China in Sri Lanka.
One sees no prospect of reversing the gradual erosion of the Indian influence and the growth of the Chinese influence.
India should not keep its economic presence confined only to the Tamil areas. It should be active in the Sinhalese areas too.
India should vigorously exploit its advantages vis-à-vis China---huge Indian market next door to SL, our mastery of the English language, India’s robust corporate sector which should compete against the Chinese companies
• The private sector can compensate for the lack of Indian Government activism in Sri Lanka. The SL Govt. first approached an Indian company for the Hambantota project. When the response was negative, they approached China.When they invited bids for a new container terminal at Colombo, no Indian company responded. Only a Chinese company did.
( The presenter is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India,New Delhi, and Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. Also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Paper presented on April 12,2010, at a seminar on Sri Lanka jointly organised by the Indian Centre for South Asian Studies and the Centre For Asia Studies, both of Chennai.)
Thursday, April 8, 2010
COUNTER-INSURGENCY: USE OF AIR POWER VS USE OF AIR FORCE
B.RAMAN
There is a confusing debate in our electronic media about the pros and cons of using air power against the Maoist insurgents. The debate has been triggered off by remarks made by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Home Minister P.Chidambaram about all options remaining open, including the use of air power. These comments were made after the Maoists succeeded in butchering 75 personnel of the Central Reserve Police Force plus one member of the District Police in a deadly ambush in the forests of the Dantewada District of Chattisgarh on April 6, 2010.
2. There are three concepts involved---use of air power, use of air strikes and use of the Air Force in the operations against the insurgents. Air power is a wide term implying the use of air-borne assets such as aircraft, helicopters and armed or unarmed Drones (pilotless planes) for performing various operational tasks such as intelligence collection, electronic monitoring of ground signals, logistics, humanitarian relief and attacks on the ground positions of the insurgents.
3.Air strike is a restricted term meaning the use of air-borne assets only for the purpose of attacking the insurgents' ground positions.Use of the Air Force means using the air-borne assets of the Air Force.
4. In the history of India's counter-insurgency, we have used air strikes by the Air Force only once----in 1966 when the Mizo National Front (MNF), in a surprise attack, overran practically the whole of Mizoram, including Aizawl, its capital. To dislodge the MNF insurgents from Aizawl, air strikes by the Air Force of a limited duration were ordered. Apart from that we have not used air strikes by the Air Force for dealing with internal security situations. A basic principle followed by many countries is that one cannot resort to air strikes in one's own territory against one's own people.
5.Air strikes on one's own nationals tend to aggravate an insurgency situation by causing casualties of civilians, damaging the environment in forest areas and driving more people to join the ranks of the insurgents. They also attract the attention and criticism of international human rights organisations such as the Amnesty International and humanitarian relief organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
6. There are cases of some nations resorting to air strikes by their Air Froce against their own nationals for dealing with an insurgency.Examples: Pakistan's use of its Air Force against the Baloch nationalists and the Pakistani Taliban, Russia's use of the Air Force against the Chechens and Sri Lanka's use of its Air Force against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In Pakistan and Russia it has aggravated the insurgency problem. In Sri Lanka, the air strikes helped in crushing the insurgency, but it has been facing an embarrassing sequel in the form of international demands for an enquiry into the way it crushed the LTTE.
7. The use of air strikes by our Air Force against the Maoist positions on the ground would be inadvisable. It could brutalise our counter-insurgency operations. Over the years, India has made for itself a name as a role-model in its restrained counter-insurgency approach. We have dealt with serious situations without resorting to air strikes and the use of heavy artillery. We should not deviate from our exemplary record of the past in dealing with alienated sections of our population who have taken to arms against the State.
8. Use of air power without air strikes is permissible in counter-insurgency situations. We are already using air power for dealing with internal security situations. For special interventions for terminating a terrorist attack, we use aircraft under the control of the Aviation Research Centre (ARC), a civilian organisation, piloted by Air Force officers taken on deputation by the ARC. They go into action not on behalf of the Air Force, but on behalf of a civilian wing of the Government (the ARC). Similarly, even in Dantewada on April 6, we used air power for logistics and humanitarian purposes such as the evacuation of the injured.
9. Similarly, for years, we have been using the surveillance aircraft of the ARC for intelligence collection purposes while dealing with an insurgency through methods such as aerial photography, electronic monitoring of ground signals etc. It is totally in order for us to continue to use air power for such purposes. It will be equally in order for us to undertake a post-mortem of the adequacy of the airpower available for use in counter-insurgency situations. If there are deficiencies, how to remove them?
10. There are two ways of removing the deficiencies--- augment the air power of para-military organisations such as the CRPF and the Border Security Force (BSF) and supplement their air power by using the air-borne assets of the Air Force. After 1966, we have not used the air-borne assets controlled by the Air Force in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism situations. If we want to use the assets of the Air Force in future on a regular basis, procedural complications might arise because the assets of the Air Force were sanctioned and acquired for use against external adversaries and not for use in internal security situations. That is why the Air Force chief seems to have some reservations on this issue.
11. A correct solution, which will not prove controversial, will be to undertake a crash programme for augmenting the air power of the para-military forces and the ARC.
12. Barring the example of Operation Blue Star in the Golden Temple at Amritsar in 1984, we have avoided using the Armed Forces for counter-insurgency situations in areas away from the border. In the bordering areas, the cross-border dimensions make the use of the armed forces for an active role become unavoidable. But we do avoid in other areas. We should continue doing so. We would not like the Maoists, who have taken to arms against the police and the para-military forces, to start looking upon the armed forces also as their enemies and begin attacking them.
13. The Armed Forces should be used only in a desperate ground situation. The situation in the Maoist-controlled areas is serious, but not desperate. Chidambaram's image as a no-nonsense professional to the core has taken a beating after the way he mishandled the case for the extradition of David Coleman Headley, of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), and the Maoist insurgency . Instead of drawing the right lessons from the set-backs suffered by him so far, he is tending to lose patience and embark on even more escalatory methods. This could prove counter-productive. ( 9-4-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
There is a confusing debate in our electronic media about the pros and cons of using air power against the Maoist insurgents. The debate has been triggered off by remarks made by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Home Minister P.Chidambaram about all options remaining open, including the use of air power. These comments were made after the Maoists succeeded in butchering 75 personnel of the Central Reserve Police Force plus one member of the District Police in a deadly ambush in the forests of the Dantewada District of Chattisgarh on April 6, 2010.
2. There are three concepts involved---use of air power, use of air strikes and use of the Air Force in the operations against the insurgents. Air power is a wide term implying the use of air-borne assets such as aircraft, helicopters and armed or unarmed Drones (pilotless planes) for performing various operational tasks such as intelligence collection, electronic monitoring of ground signals, logistics, humanitarian relief and attacks on the ground positions of the insurgents.
3.Air strike is a restricted term meaning the use of air-borne assets only for the purpose of attacking the insurgents' ground positions.Use of the Air Force means using the air-borne assets of the Air Force.
4. In the history of India's counter-insurgency, we have used air strikes by the Air Force only once----in 1966 when the Mizo National Front (MNF), in a surprise attack, overran practically the whole of Mizoram, including Aizawl, its capital. To dislodge the MNF insurgents from Aizawl, air strikes by the Air Force of a limited duration were ordered. Apart from that we have not used air strikes by the Air Force for dealing with internal security situations. A basic principle followed by many countries is that one cannot resort to air strikes in one's own territory against one's own people.
5.Air strikes on one's own nationals tend to aggravate an insurgency situation by causing casualties of civilians, damaging the environment in forest areas and driving more people to join the ranks of the insurgents. They also attract the attention and criticism of international human rights organisations such as the Amnesty International and humanitarian relief organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
6. There are cases of some nations resorting to air strikes by their Air Froce against their own nationals for dealing with an insurgency.Examples: Pakistan's use of its Air Force against the Baloch nationalists and the Pakistani Taliban, Russia's use of the Air Force against the Chechens and Sri Lanka's use of its Air Force against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In Pakistan and Russia it has aggravated the insurgency problem. In Sri Lanka, the air strikes helped in crushing the insurgency, but it has been facing an embarrassing sequel in the form of international demands for an enquiry into the way it crushed the LTTE.
7. The use of air strikes by our Air Force against the Maoist positions on the ground would be inadvisable. It could brutalise our counter-insurgency operations. Over the years, India has made for itself a name as a role-model in its restrained counter-insurgency approach. We have dealt with serious situations without resorting to air strikes and the use of heavy artillery. We should not deviate from our exemplary record of the past in dealing with alienated sections of our population who have taken to arms against the State.
8. Use of air power without air strikes is permissible in counter-insurgency situations. We are already using air power for dealing with internal security situations. For special interventions for terminating a terrorist attack, we use aircraft under the control of the Aviation Research Centre (ARC), a civilian organisation, piloted by Air Force officers taken on deputation by the ARC. They go into action not on behalf of the Air Force, but on behalf of a civilian wing of the Government (the ARC). Similarly, even in Dantewada on April 6, we used air power for logistics and humanitarian purposes such as the evacuation of the injured.
9. Similarly, for years, we have been using the surveillance aircraft of the ARC for intelligence collection purposes while dealing with an insurgency through methods such as aerial photography, electronic monitoring of ground signals etc. It is totally in order for us to continue to use air power for such purposes. It will be equally in order for us to undertake a post-mortem of the adequacy of the airpower available for use in counter-insurgency situations. If there are deficiencies, how to remove them?
10. There are two ways of removing the deficiencies--- augment the air power of para-military organisations such as the CRPF and the Border Security Force (BSF) and supplement their air power by using the air-borne assets of the Air Force. After 1966, we have not used the air-borne assets controlled by the Air Force in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism situations. If we want to use the assets of the Air Force in future on a regular basis, procedural complications might arise because the assets of the Air Force were sanctioned and acquired for use against external adversaries and not for use in internal security situations. That is why the Air Force chief seems to have some reservations on this issue.
11. A correct solution, which will not prove controversial, will be to undertake a crash programme for augmenting the air power of the para-military forces and the ARC.
12. Barring the example of Operation Blue Star in the Golden Temple at Amritsar in 1984, we have avoided using the Armed Forces for counter-insurgency situations in areas away from the border. In the bordering areas, the cross-border dimensions make the use of the armed forces for an active role become unavoidable. But we do avoid in other areas. We should continue doing so. We would not like the Maoists, who have taken to arms against the police and the para-military forces, to start looking upon the armed forces also as their enemies and begin attacking them.
13. The Armed Forces should be used only in a desperate ground situation. The situation in the Maoist-controlled areas is serious, but not desperate. Chidambaram's image as a no-nonsense professional to the core has taken a beating after the way he mishandled the case for the extradition of David Coleman Headley, of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), and the Maoist insurgency . Instead of drawing the right lessons from the set-backs suffered by him so far, he is tending to lose patience and embark on even more escalatory methods. This could prove counter-productive. ( 9-4-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, April 7, 2010
ACTION PLAN TO DEAL WITH MAOIST INSURGENCY--- SOME SUGGESTIONS
B.RAMAN
1. Start a crash programme for the development of road and telecommunications infrastructure in the entire tribal belt of Central India. The Chinese realised that without effective road and rail communications, the internal security will be weak. They poured billions of dollars into infrastructure development programmes in the areas with internal security vulnerabilities. If one has only one usable road in a district, it will be unfair to blame the police for using the same road for their to and fro movements.
2.Provide effective security to road construction engineers and workers. They will become the target of attacks by Maoists to disrupt the construction.
3.It will be futile for the present to undertake operations to free the so-called liberated zones from the control of the Maoists. The State will incur large casualties without making headway. Prevent the terrorists from expanding the "liberated zones" which they have already set up by strengthening the State's presence and control in the areas where the Maoists have not yet been able to make inroads. The programme for the prevention of the expansion of the "liberated zones" should provide for physical security enhancements and a development-cum-humanitarian component to address the grievances and needs of the inhabitants. Maintenance of internal security and prompt identification and redressal of grievances should go hand in hand. Strengthen the grievances redressal machinery in the areas still under the State control.
4. Every district in the tribal belt should have two Additional Collectors. One should focus exclusively on internal security and the other exclusively on development and grievances redressal. They should work under the overall supervision of the Collector.
5.Undertake a programme for the rapid expansion of the police presence and capacity in the tribal areas still under the control of the State. Widely scattered police stations with small strengths will be counter-productive. Have a smaller number of well-located and well-connected police stations with substantial strengths and a good communications network. Issue mobile phones to all police station staff to facilitate quick communications. Connect all police stations with each other and with the District Police Headquarters through video-conferencing link-ups.
6. Prepare an urgent database of the modus operandi used by the Maoists in different incidents for setting off landmines, explosive devices and booby-traps. The Maoists are learning their modus operandi and skills not from the Internet and from Al Qaeda and other jihadi terrorist groups. They are learning them by studying the MO used by the Chinese PLA, by the Vietcong in Vietnam, by the Pathet Lao in Laos, by the White Flag Communists in Myanmar, by the Communists in Malaya and by the Maoists in the Philippines and Nepal. The jihadis' MO are urban-specific for use in urban conglomerations. The Maoists' MO are jungle-specific. They are making effective use of material available in the jungles for their booby-traps. Update this data-base after every incident and create widespread awareness of these MO in the police force. Teach the police force appropriate techniques for countering these MO.
7.The Maoists are building up their holdings of hand-held weapons through successful raids on police stations and armouries. It is a matter of serious concern that they are repeatedly able to do it. Enhance physical security in all police establishments where weapons are kept. Hold officers in charge of armouries responsible and take action against them every time the Maoists launch a successful raid for the capture of arms and ammunition.
8. Don't make an unintelligent foray into Maoists "liberated zones" and strongholds and get trapped. Think of ways of trapping the Maoists by goading them into attacking the strongholds of the State and be prepared to inflict heavy casualties on them when they do so.
9. Think of ways of preventing the flow of essential articles like rice etc into the Maoists "liberated zones" and strongholds in order to starve them.
10. Set up an Auxiliary Intelligence Corps like the Territorial Army or the Auxiliary Air Force. It should consist of part-time volunteers for intelligence collection by people in other professions who want to or are willing to help the intelligence agencies. Their links with the intelligence agencies must be protected by making the training of short duration and one-to-one instead of in a class where everyone becomes aware of the identities of others. After the training, give them mobile telephones and instruct them as to how to remain in touch with their controlling officers in guarded SMS messages using domestic codes. Pay them well---- a certain amount unrelated to their production of intelligence plus an additional amount for each piece of useful intelligence collected by them. They should be capable of operating autonomously without the need for frequent briefings by their controllers. This would be the State's answer to the sleeping cells of the insurgents.
11. Decimation operations inside the "liberated zones" should be centrally planned and implemented without the local formations taking the initiative for such operations. In this way, operational security could be better maintained. (8-4-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary ( retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
1. Start a crash programme for the development of road and telecommunications infrastructure in the entire tribal belt of Central India. The Chinese realised that without effective road and rail communications, the internal security will be weak. They poured billions of dollars into infrastructure development programmes in the areas with internal security vulnerabilities. If one has only one usable road in a district, it will be unfair to blame the police for using the same road for their to and fro movements.
2.Provide effective security to road construction engineers and workers. They will become the target of attacks by Maoists to disrupt the construction.
3.It will be futile for the present to undertake operations to free the so-called liberated zones from the control of the Maoists. The State will incur large casualties without making headway. Prevent the terrorists from expanding the "liberated zones" which they have already set up by strengthening the State's presence and control in the areas where the Maoists have not yet been able to make inroads. The programme for the prevention of the expansion of the "liberated zones" should provide for physical security enhancements and a development-cum-humanitarian component to address the grievances and needs of the inhabitants. Maintenance of internal security and prompt identification and redressal of grievances should go hand in hand. Strengthen the grievances redressal machinery in the areas still under the State control.
4. Every district in the tribal belt should have two Additional Collectors. One should focus exclusively on internal security and the other exclusively on development and grievances redressal. They should work under the overall supervision of the Collector.
5.Undertake a programme for the rapid expansion of the police presence and capacity in the tribal areas still under the control of the State. Widely scattered police stations with small strengths will be counter-productive. Have a smaller number of well-located and well-connected police stations with substantial strengths and a good communications network. Issue mobile phones to all police station staff to facilitate quick communications. Connect all police stations with each other and with the District Police Headquarters through video-conferencing link-ups.
6. Prepare an urgent database of the modus operandi used by the Maoists in different incidents for setting off landmines, explosive devices and booby-traps. The Maoists are learning their modus operandi and skills not from the Internet and from Al Qaeda and other jihadi terrorist groups. They are learning them by studying the MO used by the Chinese PLA, by the Vietcong in Vietnam, by the Pathet Lao in Laos, by the White Flag Communists in Myanmar, by the Communists in Malaya and by the Maoists in the Philippines and Nepal. The jihadis' MO are urban-specific for use in urban conglomerations. The Maoists' MO are jungle-specific. They are making effective use of material available in the jungles for their booby-traps. Update this data-base after every incident and create widespread awareness of these MO in the police force. Teach the police force appropriate techniques for countering these MO.
7.The Maoists are building up their holdings of hand-held weapons through successful raids on police stations and armouries. It is a matter of serious concern that they are repeatedly able to do it. Enhance physical security in all police establishments where weapons are kept. Hold officers in charge of armouries responsible and take action against them every time the Maoists launch a successful raid for the capture of arms and ammunition.
8. Don't make an unintelligent foray into Maoists "liberated zones" and strongholds and get trapped. Think of ways of trapping the Maoists by goading them into attacking the strongholds of the State and be prepared to inflict heavy casualties on them when they do so.
9. Think of ways of preventing the flow of essential articles like rice etc into the Maoists "liberated zones" and strongholds in order to starve them.
10. Set up an Auxiliary Intelligence Corps like the Territorial Army or the Auxiliary Air Force. It should consist of part-time volunteers for intelligence collection by people in other professions who want to or are willing to help the intelligence agencies. Their links with the intelligence agencies must be protected by making the training of short duration and one-to-one instead of in a class where everyone becomes aware of the identities of others. After the training, give them mobile telephones and instruct them as to how to remain in touch with their controlling officers in guarded SMS messages using domestic codes. Pay them well---- a certain amount unrelated to their production of intelligence plus an additional amount for each piece of useful intelligence collected by them. They should be capable of operating autonomously without the need for frequent briefings by their controllers. This would be the State's answer to the sleeping cells of the insurgents.
11. Decimation operations inside the "liberated zones" should be centrally planned and implemented without the local formations taking the initiative for such operations. In this way, operational security could be better maintained. (8-4-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary ( retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Tuesday, April 6, 2010
INDIA UNDER THE CARPET HITS BACK
B.RAMAN
There are two Indias.
The dazzling India which we see every day on our TV channels, in the spins of our political leaders and in the writings of our so-called strategic analysts. This is the India which, according to them, is moving rapidly forward to take up its position as a world power, which is courted by the other nations of the world.
But there is another India which we rarely see or write about. This is the India of grinding poverty---- a victim of social exploitation of the worst kind, where the inhabitants---mainly tribals--- are treated like chattels and domestic animals by the upper caste political leaders, landlords and forest contractors.
We rarely see India of negative images because it has been sought to be pushed under the carpet by the dazzling India, which feels embarrassed to admit to the world that such an India exists 63 years after independence.
It is this India kept pushed under the carpet, which has managed to struggle its way out from under the carpet and is hitting out with ferocity at all its perceived exploiters---- whether in the Government or in the society.
It is this India coming out from under the carpet, which is flocking to the banners of the Maoist ideologues and taking to arms against the Government and its social exploiters. For it, the Government is not of the people, by the people and for the people, but of the exploiters, by the exploiters and for the exploiters.
Unless we have the moral courage to admit this harsh reality we are going to see more and more incidents of utter savagery as we saw on April 6,2010, in the Dantewada district of Chattisgarh where a group of Maoists ---estimated at between 300 and 1000--- ambushed and butchered about 75 members of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), who had gone into the jungles for counter-insurgency operations.
This is not the first incident of butchery of the security forces in the history of our counter-insurgency operations. This will not be the last unless and until we realize that counter-insurgency is not only about putting down violence against the State and Society, but also about making resort to violence unnecessary by addressing the problems and grievances of the tribals.
It would be very easy to dismiss the Maoist insurgency as the political manipulation of illiterate or semi-literate tribals by Maoist ideologues from cities to achieve political power through the barrel of the gun. Yes, there is an element of cynical political manipulation of the tribals by many city-bred Maoist ideologues.
But the claim of political manipulation alone cannot explain how hundreds and hundreds of tribals are flocking to the banners of the Maoists. Intense anger over the failures of successive Governments to recognize and address their problems are driving them to heed the calls of the ideologues to massacre their perceived class enemies.
Unless and until we have a two-pronged approach to the problem---better counter-insurgency to put down violence and better governance and administration to remove the expoitation of the tribals by the non-tribals and improve their quality of life, blood will continue to flow in the jungles and roads of the tribal homelands in Central India.
Tribal India had always posed law and order problems. The tribal homelands in the North-East did so when Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi were Prime Ministers. They put down the Chinese and Pakistani supported tribal insurgency in the North-East with a firm hand. At the same time, they interacted vigorously with the tribal people and addressed their problems in an attempt to wean them away from violence. Nehru started a special service called the Indian Frontier Administration Service (IFAS) and inducted the best officers from other services into it to improve governance in the tribal areas not only in the North-East, but also in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands. They were always ready for a dialogue with the tribal leaders---even with those who had taken to arms against the State.
They addressed poverty and social injustice not only in the tribal areas, but also in the rest of the country. Indira Gandhi used to start her day every day by mingling with poor and exploited people outside her residence and listening to their tales of woe. Her shoulders were always available to the poor and exploited to rest their head on and cry.
After Rajiv Gandhi, we have had a succession of Prime Ministers without a human touch in governance and administration in the tribal areas. They tend to look upon the tribal revolt in Central India as purely a problem of law and order, but not also as a problem with human dimensions.
The Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh is rarely seen or heard. He hardly ever mingles with the poor and downtrodden in the tribal belt of Central India. He deals with the tribal belt of Central India in the same way as the Pakistani leaders deal with the tribals of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)---- as mainly a problem to be tackled by the security forces as if the political class has no responsibility for leadership.
There is hardly a medium and long-term strategy --- with a judicious mix of the law and order and hearts and minds dimensions. All new ideas on counter-insurgency coming up are about how to make the security forces more effective. It is important for them to be effective . But it is equally---if not more---important for the political leadership to be seen by the tribals as caring and sensitive to their anger and bitterness towards their exploiters.
The time has come for the Prime Minister to take up in his hands the responsibility for working out a comprehensive political, operational and human strategy for dealing with the problems of the tribal homelands in Central India
If we continue to dither as we are doing now, Mao Zedong may have his last laugh in India. (7-4-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
There are two Indias.
The dazzling India which we see every day on our TV channels, in the spins of our political leaders and in the writings of our so-called strategic analysts. This is the India which, according to them, is moving rapidly forward to take up its position as a world power, which is courted by the other nations of the world.
But there is another India which we rarely see or write about. This is the India of grinding poverty---- a victim of social exploitation of the worst kind, where the inhabitants---mainly tribals--- are treated like chattels and domestic animals by the upper caste political leaders, landlords and forest contractors.
We rarely see India of negative images because it has been sought to be pushed under the carpet by the dazzling India, which feels embarrassed to admit to the world that such an India exists 63 years after independence.
It is this India kept pushed under the carpet, which has managed to struggle its way out from under the carpet and is hitting out with ferocity at all its perceived exploiters---- whether in the Government or in the society.
It is this India coming out from under the carpet, which is flocking to the banners of the Maoist ideologues and taking to arms against the Government and its social exploiters. For it, the Government is not of the people, by the people and for the people, but of the exploiters, by the exploiters and for the exploiters.
Unless we have the moral courage to admit this harsh reality we are going to see more and more incidents of utter savagery as we saw on April 6,2010, in the Dantewada district of Chattisgarh where a group of Maoists ---estimated at between 300 and 1000--- ambushed and butchered about 75 members of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), who had gone into the jungles for counter-insurgency operations.
This is not the first incident of butchery of the security forces in the history of our counter-insurgency operations. This will not be the last unless and until we realize that counter-insurgency is not only about putting down violence against the State and Society, but also about making resort to violence unnecessary by addressing the problems and grievances of the tribals.
It would be very easy to dismiss the Maoist insurgency as the political manipulation of illiterate or semi-literate tribals by Maoist ideologues from cities to achieve political power through the barrel of the gun. Yes, there is an element of cynical political manipulation of the tribals by many city-bred Maoist ideologues.
But the claim of political manipulation alone cannot explain how hundreds and hundreds of tribals are flocking to the banners of the Maoists. Intense anger over the failures of successive Governments to recognize and address their problems are driving them to heed the calls of the ideologues to massacre their perceived class enemies.
Unless and until we have a two-pronged approach to the problem---better counter-insurgency to put down violence and better governance and administration to remove the expoitation of the tribals by the non-tribals and improve their quality of life, blood will continue to flow in the jungles and roads of the tribal homelands in Central India.
Tribal India had always posed law and order problems. The tribal homelands in the North-East did so when Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi were Prime Ministers. They put down the Chinese and Pakistani supported tribal insurgency in the North-East with a firm hand. At the same time, they interacted vigorously with the tribal people and addressed their problems in an attempt to wean them away from violence. Nehru started a special service called the Indian Frontier Administration Service (IFAS) and inducted the best officers from other services into it to improve governance in the tribal areas not only in the North-East, but also in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands. They were always ready for a dialogue with the tribal leaders---even with those who had taken to arms against the State.
They addressed poverty and social injustice not only in the tribal areas, but also in the rest of the country. Indira Gandhi used to start her day every day by mingling with poor and exploited people outside her residence and listening to their tales of woe. Her shoulders were always available to the poor and exploited to rest their head on and cry.
After Rajiv Gandhi, we have had a succession of Prime Ministers without a human touch in governance and administration in the tribal areas. They tend to look upon the tribal revolt in Central India as purely a problem of law and order, but not also as a problem with human dimensions.
The Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh is rarely seen or heard. He hardly ever mingles with the poor and downtrodden in the tribal belt of Central India. He deals with the tribal belt of Central India in the same way as the Pakistani leaders deal with the tribals of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)---- as mainly a problem to be tackled by the security forces as if the political class has no responsibility for leadership.
There is hardly a medium and long-term strategy --- with a judicious mix of the law and order and hearts and minds dimensions. All new ideas on counter-insurgency coming up are about how to make the security forces more effective. It is important for them to be effective . But it is equally---if not more---important for the political leadership to be seen by the tribals as caring and sensitive to their anger and bitterness towards their exploiters.
The time has come for the Prime Minister to take up in his hands the responsibility for working out a comprehensive political, operational and human strategy for dealing with the problems of the tribal homelands in Central India
If we continue to dither as we are doing now, Mao Zedong may have his last laugh in India. (7-4-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
INDIA'S BLACK DAY IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY
Maoist rebels kill 75 Indian police
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/06/maoist-rebels-kill-indian-soldiers
Victims ambushed at dawn in thick forest in Chhattisgarh
Jason Burke, South Asia correspondent
guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 6 April 2010 11.52 BST
Article history
Maoist rebels exercise at a base in the Abujh Marh forests, Chattisgarh, in 2007. Photograph: Mustafa Quraishi/AP
At least 75 paramilitary policemen were killed in a dawn ambush by Maoist rebels in thick forest in central India today. The loss was one of the worst in a single attack by the insurgents in many years and highlights the increasingly serious problem extremist leftwing violence poses to the country.
Several hundred fighters from the Communist party of India (Maoist) appeared to have used mines and small arms against a unit of 120 men from the central reserve police force.
The force was taking part in a months-long operation in the central state of Chhattisgarh aimed at re-establishing state authority in thousands of square miles of territory now under the sway of the insurgents. This year has seen a series of such attacks though the latest is by far the most ambitious and deadly.
"Something has gone very wrong," the Indian home minister, Palaniappan Chidambaram, said. "They seem to have walked into a trap."
The Indian prime minister, Manmohan Singh, who has recently described the Maoists as the greatest internal security threat currently facing his country, described his shock.
B Raman, a former senior policeman and intelligence operative, said that it would "go down as a black day" in the history of India's counter-insurgency efforts. "It is a very serious incident. It shows above all the level of popular support the Maoists have in that area, especially if the strength of the ambush force was as high as is thought," Raman told the Guardian.
Although government officials, police and alleged "informers" are often among their targets, Maoists also regularly attack rail lines and factories. A statement from a captured Maoist leader released to media a few weeks ago revealed how the group extorts hundreds of millions of pounds from local companies every year.
The insurgents largely operate in remote areas where strategically important and precious resources such as bauxite, uranium, iron ore and diamonds are found. "The growing activities of Maoists are threatening iron ore mining," said Ashok Surana, head of a leading industrial body, Mini Steel Plant Association. They are also known as Naxalites, after Naxalbari, a village in the state of West Bengal where their movement was born in 1967 in a heady mix of rural protest and urban ideology.
A first wave of agitation was crushed in the early 1970s. Since then violence has mounted as the Maoists exploit resentment among very poor, marginalised rural communities which have not benefited from India's recent economic growth.
"There is a lot of exploitation, poverty, land loss and alienation," said Raman.
Maoists say they are fighting for the rights of "tribal" or adivasi communities. They are now present in nearly a third of India's 630 districts. The rebels carried out more than 1,000 attacks last year, killing more than 600 people.
GK Pillai, a senior interior ministry official, said last month that the campaign against the Maoists would take 10 years at least. He said the hardest fighting was still to come. Yesterday Pillai promised "much firmer action".
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/06/maoist-rebels-kill-indian-soldiers
Victims ambushed at dawn in thick forest in Chhattisgarh
Jason Burke, South Asia correspondent
guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 6 April 2010 11.52 BST
Article history
Maoist rebels exercise at a base in the Abujh Marh forests, Chattisgarh, in 2007. Photograph: Mustafa Quraishi/AP
At least 75 paramilitary policemen were killed in a dawn ambush by Maoist rebels in thick forest in central India today. The loss was one of the worst in a single attack by the insurgents in many years and highlights the increasingly serious problem extremist leftwing violence poses to the country.
Several hundred fighters from the Communist party of India (Maoist) appeared to have used mines and small arms against a unit of 120 men from the central reserve police force.
The force was taking part in a months-long operation in the central state of Chhattisgarh aimed at re-establishing state authority in thousands of square miles of territory now under the sway of the insurgents. This year has seen a series of such attacks though the latest is by far the most ambitious and deadly.
"Something has gone very wrong," the Indian home minister, Palaniappan Chidambaram, said. "They seem to have walked into a trap."
The Indian prime minister, Manmohan Singh, who has recently described the Maoists as the greatest internal security threat currently facing his country, described his shock.
B Raman, a former senior policeman and intelligence operative, said that it would "go down as a black day" in the history of India's counter-insurgency efforts. "It is a very serious incident. It shows above all the level of popular support the Maoists have in that area, especially if the strength of the ambush force was as high as is thought," Raman told the Guardian.
Although government officials, police and alleged "informers" are often among their targets, Maoists also regularly attack rail lines and factories. A statement from a captured Maoist leader released to media a few weeks ago revealed how the group extorts hundreds of millions of pounds from local companies every year.
The insurgents largely operate in remote areas where strategically important and precious resources such as bauxite, uranium, iron ore and diamonds are found. "The growing activities of Maoists are threatening iron ore mining," said Ashok Surana, head of a leading industrial body, Mini Steel Plant Association. They are also known as Naxalites, after Naxalbari, a village in the state of West Bengal where their movement was born in 1967 in a heady mix of rural protest and urban ideology.
A first wave of agitation was crushed in the early 1970s. Since then violence has mounted as the Maoists exploit resentment among very poor, marginalised rural communities which have not benefited from India's recent economic growth.
"There is a lot of exploitation, poverty, land loss and alienation," said Raman.
Maoists say they are fighting for the rights of "tribal" or adivasi communities. They are now present in nearly a third of India's 630 districts. The rebels carried out more than 1,000 attacks last year, killing more than 600 people.
GK Pillai, a senior interior ministry official, said last month that the campaign against the Maoists would take 10 years at least. He said the hardest fighting was still to come. Yesterday Pillai promised "much firmer action".
6/4: INDIA'S BLACK DAY IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY
B.RAMAN
6/4 will go down as a black day in the history of India's counter-insurgency just as 26/11 became a black day in the history of Indian counter-terrorism.
2. In a well-prepared and well-executed attack of unprecedented mobilisation, precision and savagery a large number of Maoists (Naxalites_) --- estimated by the local police to be about 1000 strong--- ambushed a combined party of over 80 members of the Central Resereve Police Force (CRPF) and the District Police returning from road security duty and managed to kill 72 members of the CRPF and one member of the District police force on April 6,2010. The Maoists had reportedly taken up position on a hill overlooking the route by which the party was returning after performing its task. It is not clear whether the route was a regular road or a motorable jungle track. The ambush took place in the thick Mukrana forests of Chhattisgarh's Dantewada district.
3. The fact that the Maoists were able to mobilise such a large number of persons for the ambush would indicate that they had advance indication of the return of the CRPF party by that route. They might have had advance intelligence of the plans of the party or they might have assessed that the CRPF might be returning by this road after watching the CRPF men conduct search and destroy operations in the area for three days.
4. A rule of precaution in counter-insurgency operation is that you don't use the same route for going to an operational area and for returning from there. Often, this precaution is not followed by the security forces either due to carelessness or due to the fact that the security forces do not have much of a choice due to the poor development of roads in the jungle areas in which the Maoists operate.
5. One may recall an incident a couple of years ago when a large police party had gone by boat from Andhra Pradesh into Orissa . The Maoists had noticed them going and had correctly assessed that the AP police party would be returning by the same route. When they did, a large number of Maoists had taken up position on a raised feature overlooking the river and they literally mowed down over 50 members of the police party.
6. We had probably not learnt the right lessons from the river ambush and facilitated a deadly road ambush in thick forests by not following basic dos and donts of counter-insurgency. The CRPF and the District Police have to perform a thankless task for want of proper road and telecommunications networks in the Maoist-infected areas. While the Maoists are trained to treck long distances by foot, the security forces tend to be road and vehicles-bound. They become sitting ducks for the insurgents, who surprise them with explosives and landmines and then mow them down with hand-held weapons. The reflexes of the security forces tend to be weak as could be seen from the fact that there have been very few instances of an ambushed security forces patrol recovering from the ambush and retaliating against the Maoists. Ambushes always tend to be fatal for the security forces with very few instances of successful counter-ambushes by the security forces.
7. Continuing serious deficiencies in rural policing and in police-rural communities relationships have been coming in the way of village help for the police by way of preventive intelligence. Counter-intelligence in the rural areas to prevent the penetration of the security forces by the Maoists is also weak. The fact that only one member of the District Police was killed in the ambush of April 6 as against 72 members of the CRPF makes one suspect possible collusion between the Maoists and some members of the District Police. Since the Maoist and the District Police recruits are recruited from the same rural stock, possibilities of penetration of the new police recruits by the Maoists are high.
8. The time has come to think in terms of using helicopter patrols and spotter drones in our counter-insurgency operations against the Maoists in areas covered by thick jungles. An important question to be examined in this connection is how to prevent civilian casualties of villagers and residents of jungles and avoid environmental damage. (6-4-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (Retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
6/4 will go down as a black day in the history of India's counter-insurgency just as 26/11 became a black day in the history of Indian counter-terrorism.
2. In a well-prepared and well-executed attack of unprecedented mobilisation, precision and savagery a large number of Maoists (Naxalites_) --- estimated by the local police to be about 1000 strong--- ambushed a combined party of over 80 members of the Central Resereve Police Force (CRPF) and the District Police returning from road security duty and managed to kill 72 members of the CRPF and one member of the District police force on April 6,2010. The Maoists had reportedly taken up position on a hill overlooking the route by which the party was returning after performing its task. It is not clear whether the route was a regular road or a motorable jungle track. The ambush took place in the thick Mukrana forests of Chhattisgarh's Dantewada district.
3. The fact that the Maoists were able to mobilise such a large number of persons for the ambush would indicate that they had advance indication of the return of the CRPF party by that route. They might have had advance intelligence of the plans of the party or they might have assessed that the CRPF might be returning by this road after watching the CRPF men conduct search and destroy operations in the area for three days.
4. A rule of precaution in counter-insurgency operation is that you don't use the same route for going to an operational area and for returning from there. Often, this precaution is not followed by the security forces either due to carelessness or due to the fact that the security forces do not have much of a choice due to the poor development of roads in the jungle areas in which the Maoists operate.
5. One may recall an incident a couple of years ago when a large police party had gone by boat from Andhra Pradesh into Orissa . The Maoists had noticed them going and had correctly assessed that the AP police party would be returning by the same route. When they did, a large number of Maoists had taken up position on a raised feature overlooking the river and they literally mowed down over 50 members of the police party.
6. We had probably not learnt the right lessons from the river ambush and facilitated a deadly road ambush in thick forests by not following basic dos and donts of counter-insurgency. The CRPF and the District Police have to perform a thankless task for want of proper road and telecommunications networks in the Maoist-infected areas. While the Maoists are trained to treck long distances by foot, the security forces tend to be road and vehicles-bound. They become sitting ducks for the insurgents, who surprise them with explosives and landmines and then mow them down with hand-held weapons. The reflexes of the security forces tend to be weak as could be seen from the fact that there have been very few instances of an ambushed security forces patrol recovering from the ambush and retaliating against the Maoists. Ambushes always tend to be fatal for the security forces with very few instances of successful counter-ambushes by the security forces.
7. Continuing serious deficiencies in rural policing and in police-rural communities relationships have been coming in the way of village help for the police by way of preventive intelligence. Counter-intelligence in the rural areas to prevent the penetration of the security forces by the Maoists is also weak. The fact that only one member of the District Police was killed in the ambush of April 6 as against 72 members of the CRPF makes one suspect possible collusion between the Maoists and some members of the District Police. Since the Maoist and the District Police recruits are recruited from the same rural stock, possibilities of penetration of the new police recruits by the Maoists are high.
8. The time has come to think in terms of using helicopter patrols and spotter drones in our counter-insurgency operations against the Maoists in areas covered by thick jungles. An important question to be examined in this connection is how to prevent civilian casualties of villagers and residents of jungles and avoid environmental damage. (6-4-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (Retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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