B.RAMAN
The Chinese Government has quietly put Google and President Barack Obama in their place.
2. In January this year, Google had expressed its intention to review its presence in China if the Chinese Government continued to insist that its search engines should black out items and web sites of political dissidents. It also protested against the alleged snooping of the e-mail addresses of Tibetan and other separatist elements using the Google mail service by the Chinese authorities.
3. The Chinese authorities, while regretting the decision of Google, had pointed out that the restrictions imposed in the interest of national security by the Chinese Government were in force even when Google entered the Chinese market. They looked upon the move of Google for a so-called review as politically motivated without any legal justification and made it clear that Google was welcome to continue to function in China provided it observed the Chinese regulations relating to the Internet. They rejected with indignation Google’s allegations of cyber snooping by Beijing.
4. Members of the Obama Administration, including Mrs.Hilary Clinton, the Secretary of State, came out in support of Google, but this did not have any effect on Beijing. Since then there has been a stalemate with neither Google nor the Chinese Government making any further move in the matter.
5. In the latest development, the Chinese authorities have strongly denied that any talks on the issues raised by Google were going on with its officials. They have bluntly made it clear that while they would be happy if Google decided to continue in China and observe its Internet regulations, they would be equally happy to facilitate its exit from the Chinese market if it wanted to quit.
6.The “China Daily” reported as follows on March 6,2010: “China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology refuted that China has been involved in any negotiations with Google since the US search engine threatened on January 21 to pull back from the country."We have yet to have any direct contacts or negotiations with them on this topic," said Miao Wei, vice-minister of the MIIT, at the sidelines of the annual session of the National People's Congress. Google had never filed reports over alleged Internet regulations and cyber attacks to the ministry or requested for negotiations, said Miao. It had also never informed the ministry that it was planning to withdraw from China. He said China respects Google's right to decide whether to continue its business in the country. "If Google decides to continue its business in China and abides by China's laws, it's welcome to stay," Miao said. "If the company chooses to withdraw from the Chinese market, it must go through certain procedures according to the law and regulations and deal with customers' problems that may arise." Miao also said he didn't think the Google incident should affect relations between China and the US."It's not a huge problem that should impact the relationship of two countries," he said. He said China doesn't want to see an Internet technical incident upgraded to a political dispute.He also said China welcomes Google to provide further information about the hacker attacks it claimed. "We will definitely investigate on the issue, because we are the victims of hackers too."Google had studied China's laws and regulations before it entered the Chinese market in 2007 and had pledged in written form to abide by the laws and regulations.”
7.The Chinese have similarly put Obama in his place over his decisions to sell a fresh package of arms to Taiwan and to receive His Holiness the Dalai Lama in the White House last month. The Chinese had initially reacted strongly against these decisions and announced the postponement of exchanges of military level visits between the two countries over the Taiwan issue. They had also threatened to impose sanctions against US companies selling military equipment to Taiwan under the proposed package. They have since played down these threats and permitted the US naval ship USS Nimitz to visit Hong Kong.
8. On Tibet, they had strongly criticised the Mr.Obama's meeting with His Holiness, but refrained from openly threatening any retaliatory action. However, Chinese officials were spreading word that President Hu Jintao may not attend the Nuclear Security Summit to be held in the US next month to which Obama attaches considerable importance to express Beijing's unhappiness over the sale of arms to Taiwan and over the meeting with His Holiness.
9.Chinese sources see a link between the speculation about a likely boycott of the nuclear security summit by Mr.Hu Jintao and Mr.Obama's decision to send Mr.James Steinberg, Deputy Secretary of State, and Mr.Jeffrey Bader , a White House aide, to Beijing last week reportedly to remove misunderstandings arising from the decisions to sell more arms to Taiwan and to receive His Holiness. The visiting US officials were reported to have reassured their Chinese interlocutors that Mr.Obama's decisions did not mean any change in the US position on the one-China policy and that Tibet was an integral part of China
10. Commenting on the visit of the two officials to Beijing, Mr.Philip Crowley, a State Department spokesman, said on March 4,2010, that the US and China "agreed on the high importance each attaches to the relationships and their commitment to building a positive, cooperative and comprehensive relationship." He added that the US responded to China's concerns on Taiwan "by reiterating that it has followed a consistent approach, pursued by both administrations of both political parties, on a 'One China' policy."
11. Briefing the media in Beijing, Qin Gang, a spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said that the US had agreed to "take China's position seriously, honor China's core interests and major concerns" and to act to improve relations. Mr. Yang Jiechi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, also commented on the relations with the US while briefing the media on March 7,2010, on China’s foreign policy in the margins of the annual session of the National People’s Congress, the Chinese Parliament, being held since March 5,2010. He urged the US to take seriously China's position and respect China's core interests and major concerns with credible steps.
12. He added: "The United States should properly handle relevant sensitive issues and work with the Chinese side to return the China-US relationship to the track of stable development. The China-US relationship had a good start after President Obama took office last year. However, the US arms sales to Taiwan and the US leader’s meeting with the Dalai Lama caused a serious disturbance to the China-US ties and posed difficulty to the cooperation between the two countries. Such a situation is not in the interest of either side, and the responsibility for the difficulty in Sino-US relations does not lie with China."
13. Referring to the talks with the two visiting US officials, he said: “"The Chinese side stated in full its principled position on China-US relations and on major issues, including Taiwan and Tibet related issues. We pointed out that the relevant moves taken by the US side had seriously violated the principles set out in the three China-US joint communiques and the China-US joint statement. The moves undermined China's core interests and the overall interests of China-US relations, and China is firmly opposed to these moves."
14. While the US has thus taken the initiative to cool the bilateral tensions by reassuring Beijing that there has been no change in its one-China policy and on Tibet being an integral part of China, it is not yet clear whether the Chinese are sufficiently satisfied by the US assurances and whether President Hu will attend the nuclear security summit. (8-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Sunday, March 7, 2010
Saturday, March 6, 2010
CHINA IN MALDIVES
B.RAMAN
The Government-controlled Xinhua news agency of China has disseminated the following report on March 6,2010:
"China UnionPay (CUP) began cash withdrawal services for card holders in 95 percent of automatic teller machines in the Maldives, after launching a partnership with the island nation's biggest bank Friday (March 5).Following cooperation between the CUP and the Bank of Maldives, CUP card payment services will expand to 90 percent of point-of-sale (POS) terminals in Maldives. The move aims to better serve card users as China has become the Maldives' fastest growing tourist source country since 2008, with visitors hitting 40,000 a year, said Cai Jianbo, CUP first executive Vice-President. The international network of the CUP reaches 84 countries and regions. CUP launched a card payment service in Brunei on Tuesday." ((7-3-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
A note on Sino-Maldives Relations disseminated by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on August 19,2009 )
Sino-Maldives relations
Political Relations
Maldivesis called "Liushan Guo" or "Liuyang Guo" in Chinese history. In Yongle 10th year (1412) and Xuande 5th year (1430) of the Ming Dynasty, leading a fleet of merchant ships, Zheng He reached Maldives twice. Since Yongle 14th year, King of Maldives Yusof sent his envoys three times to China. In Foreign Splendors written by Zheng He and his entourage Ma Huan and Maritime Marvels by Fei Xin were true and detailed records of Maldives' geographical position, climate, products and customs. In Male Museum are China's porcelain and coins unearthed there on display, a witness to China's friendly contacts and trade relations with Maldives in history. Due to the imperialist invasion afterward, Sino-Maldives relations were suspended for several centuries.
In the early 1960s, Chinese and Maldives ambassadors to Sri Lanka started visiting each other. China supported Maldives in its struggle for national independence by ridding itself of the British colonial rule. On October 14, 1972, China and Maldives established diplomatic relations, and Chinese ambassador to Sri Lanka was concurrently accredited to Maldives. In 1980, Maldives Foreign Minister Jamil officially paid a friendly visit to China. In 1984, Maldives President Gayoom paid a state visit to China. In 1993, Foreign Minister Jameel visited China again. In 2000, Maldives State Minister of Defence and National Security Sattar visited China and in 2001, Foreign Minister Jameel, Speaker Hameed and Brigadier Zahir, General Chief of Staff for National Security Force visited China one after another.
On the other hand, Chinese Vice-Premier cum Foreign Minister Huang Hua, Vice-Premier cum Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, Vice-Chairperson of the Standing Committee of the NPC Chen Muhua, and Chairman of the CCPCC Li Ruihuan, General Chief of Staff of the PLA Fu Quanyou and Premier Zhu Rongji visited Maldives respectively in 1981, 1994, 1997, 1999 and 2001. On the occasion of 30th anniversary of the establishment of the Sino-Maldives diplomatic relations in 2002, President Jiang Zemin and Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan exchanged congratulatory messages respectively with President Gayoom and Foreign Minister Jameel. On May 26, 2009, Maldives opens its Chinese embassy in Beijing. Mr. Ahmed Latheef becomes Maldives' first Ambassador to China.
Economic and Trade Relations and Economic-Technological Cooperation
In 1981,China and Maldives started their economic and technological cooperation. In 1982, they restored direct trade. In 2002, Sino-Maldives trade volume totaled US$2.977 million, of which China's exports accounted for US$2.975 million and its imports US$2,000.
Since 1972, China has provided Maldives with aid totaling RMB74.7875 million. Starting form 1985, Chinese companies began entering project-contracting market in Maldives. By the end of 2001, the accumulated volume for their contracted projects in Maldives had reached US$46.37 million, with their turnover reaching US$40 million.
Sino-Maldives economic cooperation and trade volume are very insignificant. Hong Kong and Singapore serve as transit ports fro most of China's exports to Maldives. China's major products to Maldives are rice and consumer goods.
China and Maldives have seen infrequent contacts and cooperation in other fields. Between 20 and 30 September 2002, at the invitation of the Central Military Commission, Maldives State Minister of Defence and National Security paid a friendly visit to China, which was the first official contact between the Chinese and Maldives armies.
On May 18, 1998, the governments of Maldivesand SAR Hong Kong of China signed the transit agreement for civil flights.
The Government-controlled Xinhua news agency of China has disseminated the following report on March 6,2010:
"China UnionPay (CUP) began cash withdrawal services for card holders in 95 percent of automatic teller machines in the Maldives, after launching a partnership with the island nation's biggest bank Friday (March 5).Following cooperation between the CUP and the Bank of Maldives, CUP card payment services will expand to 90 percent of point-of-sale (POS) terminals in Maldives. The move aims to better serve card users as China has become the Maldives' fastest growing tourist source country since 2008, with visitors hitting 40,000 a year, said Cai Jianbo, CUP first executive Vice-President. The international network of the CUP reaches 84 countries and regions. CUP launched a card payment service in Brunei on Tuesday." ((7-3-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
A note on Sino-Maldives Relations disseminated by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on August 19,2009 )
Sino-Maldives relations
Political Relations
Maldivesis called "Liushan Guo" or "Liuyang Guo" in Chinese history. In Yongle 10th year (1412) and Xuande 5th year (1430) of the Ming Dynasty, leading a fleet of merchant ships, Zheng He reached Maldives twice. Since Yongle 14th year, King of Maldives Yusof sent his envoys three times to China. In Foreign Splendors written by Zheng He and his entourage Ma Huan and Maritime Marvels by Fei Xin were true and detailed records of Maldives' geographical position, climate, products and customs. In Male Museum are China's porcelain and coins unearthed there on display, a witness to China's friendly contacts and trade relations with Maldives in history. Due to the imperialist invasion afterward, Sino-Maldives relations were suspended for several centuries.
In the early 1960s, Chinese and Maldives ambassadors to Sri Lanka started visiting each other. China supported Maldives in its struggle for national independence by ridding itself of the British colonial rule. On October 14, 1972, China and Maldives established diplomatic relations, and Chinese ambassador to Sri Lanka was concurrently accredited to Maldives. In 1980, Maldives Foreign Minister Jamil officially paid a friendly visit to China. In 1984, Maldives President Gayoom paid a state visit to China. In 1993, Foreign Minister Jameel visited China again. In 2000, Maldives State Minister of Defence and National Security Sattar visited China and in 2001, Foreign Minister Jameel, Speaker Hameed and Brigadier Zahir, General Chief of Staff for National Security Force visited China one after another.
On the other hand, Chinese Vice-Premier cum Foreign Minister Huang Hua, Vice-Premier cum Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, Vice-Chairperson of the Standing Committee of the NPC Chen Muhua, and Chairman of the CCPCC Li Ruihuan, General Chief of Staff of the PLA Fu Quanyou and Premier Zhu Rongji visited Maldives respectively in 1981, 1994, 1997, 1999 and 2001. On the occasion of 30th anniversary of the establishment of the Sino-Maldives diplomatic relations in 2002, President Jiang Zemin and Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan exchanged congratulatory messages respectively with President Gayoom and Foreign Minister Jameel. On May 26, 2009, Maldives opens its Chinese embassy in Beijing. Mr. Ahmed Latheef becomes Maldives' first Ambassador to China.
Economic and Trade Relations and Economic-Technological Cooperation
In 1981,China and Maldives started their economic and technological cooperation. In 1982, they restored direct trade. In 2002, Sino-Maldives trade volume totaled US$2.977 million, of which China's exports accounted for US$2.975 million and its imports US$2,000.
Since 1972, China has provided Maldives with aid totaling RMB74.7875 million. Starting form 1985, Chinese companies began entering project-contracting market in Maldives. By the end of 2001, the accumulated volume for their contracted projects in Maldives had reached US$46.37 million, with their turnover reaching US$40 million.
Sino-Maldives economic cooperation and trade volume are very insignificant. Hong Kong and Singapore serve as transit ports fro most of China's exports to Maldives. China's major products to Maldives are rice and consumer goods.
China and Maldives have seen infrequent contacts and cooperation in other fields. Between 20 and 30 September 2002, at the invitation of the Central Military Commission, Maldives State Minister of Defence and National Security paid a friendly visit to China, which was the first official contact between the Chinese and Maldives armies.
On May 18, 1998, the governments of Maldivesand SAR Hong Kong of China signed the transit agreement for civil flights.
Thursday, March 4, 2010
FRESH FEARS OF MARITIME TERRORISM
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO.626
B.RAMAN
The years following the Al Qaeda attack on the US naval ship USS Cole in Aden in October,2000, saw an increase in fears of sea-borne terrorism either on coastal targets or on sea-moving targets such as oil/gas tankers, container ships etc. There were also fears of a possible Al Qaeda-inspired attack to block maritime choke-points such as the Malacca Strait.
2. These fears were caused by the flow of human intelligence as well as by the interrogation of arrested suspects. These fears reached the zenith in the months following the US invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. Consequently, there was increased international and regional co-operation in the form of exchange of intelligence and assessments, joint or co-ordinated naval patrolling, joint naval exercises, intensified action against piracy in the Malacca Strait etc.
3. Post-2005, these fears got diluted partly due to the absence of any terrorist attack from the sea, partly due to the preoccupation of Al Qaeda and its allies with land-based operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and partly due to the effective action taken against piracy in the Malacca Strait region.
4.In recent months, there has been a revival of the fears about a possible maritime terrorist strike due to the following reasons: Firstly, an increase in incidents of piracy by Somali/Yemeni pirates and the inability of the international community to deal effectively with the problem till now; secondly, an increase in the activities of Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia, both of which have a large number of sea-faring men who might be prepared to help Al Qaeda in sea-borne attacks; thirdly, the successful sea-borne terrorist strikes mounted by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) on land-based targets in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008, and the failure of the Indian Navy and other Navies operating in the seas of the region to detect the plans of the LET and the movement of the LET boat carrying the terrorists from Karachi to Mumbai; and fourthly, the strengthening of physical security for land-based targets, which has necessitated the terrorists once again turning their attention to sea-based targets.
5. The enormous publicity, which the LET got for its sea-borne attack in Mumbai, demonstrated the propaganda value of sea-borne attacks, where the surprise element is more. It is to be expected that not only Al Qaeda, but also other Al Qaeda allied elements such as those of the Jemmah Islamiyah and the Yemeni and Somali members of Al Qaeda might once again be tempted to think in terms of acts of maritime terrorism to prove that their capabilities are intact.
6. It is in this context that one has to see reports from Singapore that an unidentified terrorist g.roup is planning attacks against oil tankers in the Malacca Strait.The Singapore Shipping Association has been quoted as saying on March 2,2010, that it had received an advisory from the Singapore Navy Information Fusion Centre about "an indication that a terrorist group is planning attacks on oil tankers in the Malacca Strait." It added: "This does not preclude possible attacks on other large vessels with dangerous cargo." The Navy Centre's advisory reportedly said:"The terrorists' intent is probably to achieve widespread publicity and showcase that it remains a viable group." It reminded shipping operators that the militants could use smaller vessels such as dinghies and speedboats to attack oil tankers. It recommended that ships should "strengthen their onboard security measures and adopt community reporting to increase awareness and strengthen the safety of all seafarers," according to the Association.
7. It is necessay for the Indian counter-terrorism agencies too and the Indian Navy and Coast Guard to re-focus on the likelihood of fresh sea-borne terrorist strikes against Indian targets either on land or on the high seas in the waters to the west of India. Protection of sealanes against pirates and terrorists acting separatrely of each other or in tandem and prevention and countering of acts of maritime terrorism require close regional co-operation with the navies of countries such as the US, Japan, China,Pakistan,Sri Lanka, the ASEAN and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Australia. Such co-operation should address issues such as intelligence collection and sharing, joint or co-ordinated operations, mutual assistance on the high seas, joint exercises etc. It is important for India to take the initiative in this matter.
8. The two joint counter-terrorism exercises between India and China held so far were land-based. The first was held in Yunnan and the second in Karnataka. The next Sino-Indian joint exercise should focus on co-ordinated action and mutual assistance against maritime terrorism with the involvement of the navies of not only India and China, but also the US, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan and Australia. We should not allow the continuing differences with China over the border dispute to come in the way of evolving a co-operative mechanism against maritime terrorism and piracy.
9. Our adversarial relationship with Pakistan would not permit us to think in terms of joint maritime counter-terrorism exercises with Pakistan, but intelligence-sharing arrangements should be possible and advisable despite the continuing serious differences between the two countries on the issue of Pakistani inaction against terrorism.We must develop slowly habits of mutual assistance with Pakistan----in the field of investigation of terrorism-related cases and prevention of maritime terrorist incidents.( 5-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary ( retd), Cabinet Secretariat. Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
The years following the Al Qaeda attack on the US naval ship USS Cole in Aden in October,2000, saw an increase in fears of sea-borne terrorism either on coastal targets or on sea-moving targets such as oil/gas tankers, container ships etc. There were also fears of a possible Al Qaeda-inspired attack to block maritime choke-points such as the Malacca Strait.
2. These fears were caused by the flow of human intelligence as well as by the interrogation of arrested suspects. These fears reached the zenith in the months following the US invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. Consequently, there was increased international and regional co-operation in the form of exchange of intelligence and assessments, joint or co-ordinated naval patrolling, joint naval exercises, intensified action against piracy in the Malacca Strait etc.
3. Post-2005, these fears got diluted partly due to the absence of any terrorist attack from the sea, partly due to the preoccupation of Al Qaeda and its allies with land-based operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and partly due to the effective action taken against piracy in the Malacca Strait region.
4.In recent months, there has been a revival of the fears about a possible maritime terrorist strike due to the following reasons: Firstly, an increase in incidents of piracy by Somali/Yemeni pirates and the inability of the international community to deal effectively with the problem till now; secondly, an increase in the activities of Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia, both of which have a large number of sea-faring men who might be prepared to help Al Qaeda in sea-borne attacks; thirdly, the successful sea-borne terrorist strikes mounted by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) on land-based targets in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008, and the failure of the Indian Navy and other Navies operating in the seas of the region to detect the plans of the LET and the movement of the LET boat carrying the terrorists from Karachi to Mumbai; and fourthly, the strengthening of physical security for land-based targets, which has necessitated the terrorists once again turning their attention to sea-based targets.
5. The enormous publicity, which the LET got for its sea-borne attack in Mumbai, demonstrated the propaganda value of sea-borne attacks, where the surprise element is more. It is to be expected that not only Al Qaeda, but also other Al Qaeda allied elements such as those of the Jemmah Islamiyah and the Yemeni and Somali members of Al Qaeda might once again be tempted to think in terms of acts of maritime terrorism to prove that their capabilities are intact.
6. It is in this context that one has to see reports from Singapore that an unidentified terrorist g.roup is planning attacks against oil tankers in the Malacca Strait.The Singapore Shipping Association has been quoted as saying on March 2,2010, that it had received an advisory from the Singapore Navy Information Fusion Centre about "an indication that a terrorist group is planning attacks on oil tankers in the Malacca Strait." It added: "This does not preclude possible attacks on other large vessels with dangerous cargo." The Navy Centre's advisory reportedly said:"The terrorists' intent is probably to achieve widespread publicity and showcase that it remains a viable group." It reminded shipping operators that the militants could use smaller vessels such as dinghies and speedboats to attack oil tankers. It recommended that ships should "strengthen their onboard security measures and adopt community reporting to increase awareness and strengthen the safety of all seafarers," according to the Association.
7. It is necessay for the Indian counter-terrorism agencies too and the Indian Navy and Coast Guard to re-focus on the likelihood of fresh sea-borne terrorist strikes against Indian targets either on land or on the high seas in the waters to the west of India. Protection of sealanes against pirates and terrorists acting separatrely of each other or in tandem and prevention and countering of acts of maritime terrorism require close regional co-operation with the navies of countries such as the US, Japan, China,Pakistan,Sri Lanka, the ASEAN and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Australia. Such co-operation should address issues such as intelligence collection and sharing, joint or co-ordinated operations, mutual assistance on the high seas, joint exercises etc. It is important for India to take the initiative in this matter.
8. The two joint counter-terrorism exercises between India and China held so far were land-based. The first was held in Yunnan and the second in Karnataka. The next Sino-Indian joint exercise should focus on co-ordinated action and mutual assistance against maritime terrorism with the involvement of the navies of not only India and China, but also the US, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan and Australia. We should not allow the continuing differences with China over the border dispute to come in the way of evolving a co-operative mechanism against maritime terrorism and piracy.
9. Our adversarial relationship with Pakistan would not permit us to think in terms of joint maritime counter-terrorism exercises with Pakistan, but intelligence-sharing arrangements should be possible and advisable despite the continuing serious differences between the two countries on the issue of Pakistani inaction against terrorism.We must develop slowly habits of mutual assistance with Pakistan----in the field of investigation of terrorism-related cases and prevention of maritime terrorist incidents.( 5-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary ( retd), Cabinet Secretariat. Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, March 3, 2010
WHAT NEXT IN PAKISTAN'S PASHTUN BELT?
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.625
B.RAMAN
The Pakistan Army and the US intelligence are making headway in the battle against jihadi terrorism --- the indigenous as well as the global varieties--- in Pakistan's Pashtun tribal belt in the Malakand Division of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
2. They are working in tandem in some places such as the Swat Valley of the Malakand Division and South Waziristan in the FATA and separately of each other in co-ordinated, but not joint operations in other areas such as the Bajaur and the North Waziristan Agencies of the FATA. While the Pakistan Army has been exclusively handling the ground situation in the Bajaur Agency with very little US involvement, the US has been keeping up relentless pressure on the terrorists in North Waziristan and occasionally in South Waziristan through its Drone (pilotless planes) strikes.
3.There is a gentlemen's agreement between Islamabad and Washington that the former will keep making proforma protests against the Drone strikes without trying to stop them. If Pakistan protests really and vehemently, the US will have to stop them. The US is able to continue them because the Pakistani protests are a charade. Pakistan knows it is benefiting from the Drone strikes and wants them to continue. Fears that disproportionate civilian casualties might add to anti-American feelings have been belied. Civilian casualties there have been, but they are not as heavy as made out by some US analysts. Even the Pakistani civil society and the local tribal population no longer protest against the civilian casualties. They have realised that by eliminating the jihadi terrorist leaders of not only Al Qaeda, but also indigenous organisations such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) and trans-border organisations such as the anti-Chinese Islamic Movement of East Turkestan (IMET) the US has given them some relief from the intimidation and terror imposed on the local population by these terrorist groups.
4. There are signs of a jihadi fatigue in the Pakistani Pashtun belt. This fatigue should account for the remarkable decline in public protests over the Drone strikes. It has also contributed to the increasing flow of valuable intelligence to the US agencies. Almost all the successful US Drone strikes were intelligence-driven. Initially, the intelligence came overwhelmingly from technical sources. Now, they are coming more and more from human sources. When there is popular fatigue with the terrorists, intelligence flow improves. We are witnessing this in the tribal belt.
5. The remarkable successes of the US intelligence in North Waziristan have been accompanied by the headway made by the Pakistani security forces in the Swat Valley, South Waziristan and the Bajaur Agency. These operations cannot be described as successful in terms of identified terrorist leaders neutralised by the Pakistan Army. Many of the terrorist leaders operating in these areas have escaped capture by the Pakistan Army. Their trained followers have dispersed and peeled off. They have retained a capability for re-grouping and striking back at a later stage if the Army pressure eases.
6. Despite this, the Pakistan Army operations have been successful in the sense that it has been able to re-establish territorial control over Swat, South Waziristan and the Bajaur Agency and deny the use of this territory to the terrorists. Is this territorial control ephemeral or will it be enduring? The training and equipment given by the US to Pakistani para-military forces such as the Frontier Corps have improved their morale and made them fight better to wrest control of the territory from the terrorists, but their ability to hold on to the "newly liberated" territory in the face of a renewed assault is yet to be tested.
7. Any comprehensive operation in this area has to have three components---liberate, hold on to it and develop. Only the first component is now being attempted by the Army with US assistance. US policy-makers and Pakistani civilian leaders are yet to pay attention to the other two components. Holding on to the "liberated" territory demands massive investments for a crash development of roads and other means of communications. One sees no signs of any such investments and related activity. It also demands a robust civilian governing machinery which enforces the civilian authority, brings the liberated areas into the national political mainstream from which the entire FATA had remained excluded ever since Pakistan became independent in 1947 and undertakes massive economic development programmes.
8. The elected civilian Government in Islamabad has shown very little interest in the civilian follow-up to the military actions. It has left all the initiatives in the FATA in the hands of the Army. There is hardly any thinking or discussion in Islamabad or the rest of the country on how to increase the extent and effectiveness of the civilian governing machinery in the tribal belt. The civilian leaders have no interest in the tasks of governance in the tribal areas. Even US policy-makers and experts have shown not much inteterest in following up on the military successes by undertaking a programme for changing the political and economic landscape of the tribal areas.
9. This total lack of interest in "what next" could facilitate re-grouping and a come-back by the terrorists and insurgents. (4-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
The Pakistan Army and the US intelligence are making headway in the battle against jihadi terrorism --- the indigenous as well as the global varieties--- in Pakistan's Pashtun tribal belt in the Malakand Division of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
2. They are working in tandem in some places such as the Swat Valley of the Malakand Division and South Waziristan in the FATA and separately of each other in co-ordinated, but not joint operations in other areas such as the Bajaur and the North Waziristan Agencies of the FATA. While the Pakistan Army has been exclusively handling the ground situation in the Bajaur Agency with very little US involvement, the US has been keeping up relentless pressure on the terrorists in North Waziristan and occasionally in South Waziristan through its Drone (pilotless planes) strikes.
3.There is a gentlemen's agreement between Islamabad and Washington that the former will keep making proforma protests against the Drone strikes without trying to stop them. If Pakistan protests really and vehemently, the US will have to stop them. The US is able to continue them because the Pakistani protests are a charade. Pakistan knows it is benefiting from the Drone strikes and wants them to continue. Fears that disproportionate civilian casualties might add to anti-American feelings have been belied. Civilian casualties there have been, but they are not as heavy as made out by some US analysts. Even the Pakistani civil society and the local tribal population no longer protest against the civilian casualties. They have realised that by eliminating the jihadi terrorist leaders of not only Al Qaeda, but also indigenous organisations such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) and trans-border organisations such as the anti-Chinese Islamic Movement of East Turkestan (IMET) the US has given them some relief from the intimidation and terror imposed on the local population by these terrorist groups.
4. There are signs of a jihadi fatigue in the Pakistani Pashtun belt. This fatigue should account for the remarkable decline in public protests over the Drone strikes. It has also contributed to the increasing flow of valuable intelligence to the US agencies. Almost all the successful US Drone strikes were intelligence-driven. Initially, the intelligence came overwhelmingly from technical sources. Now, they are coming more and more from human sources. When there is popular fatigue with the terrorists, intelligence flow improves. We are witnessing this in the tribal belt.
5. The remarkable successes of the US intelligence in North Waziristan have been accompanied by the headway made by the Pakistani security forces in the Swat Valley, South Waziristan and the Bajaur Agency. These operations cannot be described as successful in terms of identified terrorist leaders neutralised by the Pakistan Army. Many of the terrorist leaders operating in these areas have escaped capture by the Pakistan Army. Their trained followers have dispersed and peeled off. They have retained a capability for re-grouping and striking back at a later stage if the Army pressure eases.
6. Despite this, the Pakistan Army operations have been successful in the sense that it has been able to re-establish territorial control over Swat, South Waziristan and the Bajaur Agency and deny the use of this territory to the terrorists. Is this territorial control ephemeral or will it be enduring? The training and equipment given by the US to Pakistani para-military forces such as the Frontier Corps have improved their morale and made them fight better to wrest control of the territory from the terrorists, but their ability to hold on to the "newly liberated" territory in the face of a renewed assault is yet to be tested.
7. Any comprehensive operation in this area has to have three components---liberate, hold on to it and develop. Only the first component is now being attempted by the Army with US assistance. US policy-makers and Pakistani civilian leaders are yet to pay attention to the other two components. Holding on to the "liberated" territory demands massive investments for a crash development of roads and other means of communications. One sees no signs of any such investments and related activity. It also demands a robust civilian governing machinery which enforces the civilian authority, brings the liberated areas into the national political mainstream from which the entire FATA had remained excluded ever since Pakistan became independent in 1947 and undertakes massive economic development programmes.
8. The elected civilian Government in Islamabad has shown very little interest in the civilian follow-up to the military actions. It has left all the initiatives in the FATA in the hands of the Army. There is hardly any thinking or discussion in Islamabad or the rest of the country on how to increase the extent and effectiveness of the civilian governing machinery in the tribal belt. The civilian leaders have no interest in the tasks of governance in the tribal areas. Even US policy-makers and experts have shown not much inteterest in following up on the military successes by undertaking a programme for changing the political and economic landscape of the tribal areas.
9. This total lack of interest in "what next" could facilitate re-grouping and a come-back by the terrorists and insurgents. (4-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
INDIA, PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN & THE US
B.RAMAN
Here are my answers to four questions e-mailed to me on March 3,2010, by a correspondent of the "Washington Post":
Question: Is the Indian government growing increasingly frustrated over the Obama administration's policy of reconciliation with the so called good Taliban? And why or how will this impact India and U.S. relations? What position does this put India in?
Answer:"Frustrated" is not the word. India is increasingly concerned over the US belief that there are good fundamentalists and bad fundamentalists and that it can do business with the good fundamentalists and bring them into the mainstream. India looks upon the "war" against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan as directed not only against these organisations, but also against their ideology of religious obscurantism by projecting before the Afghan people the ideas of a secular and liberal democratic society.If it makes a deal with the so-called good Taliban even if they do not give up their medieval ideas, the US will be admitting beforehand that it has lost the ideological battle. It will not be good for Afghanistan and other Muslim countries. And it will not be good for India, which has the second largest Muslim community in the world.
Question: Is India worried that Pakistan is getting too strong b/c the U.S. is courting Pakistan in its fight? And why is this a concern to India ie - despite Mumbai, despite everything, is there a growing feeling in Delhi that Pakistan will hoodwink the world?
Answer:India is worried over the US readiness to close its eyes to Pakistan's use of terrorism against India so long as Pakistan acts against terrorism directed against the US and helps the US in preventing another 9/11 in the US homeland. Pakistan is confident that so long as it helps the US against the Taliban and Al Qaeda it does not have to fear any adverse consequences from its continued use of terrorism against India. It is this confidence which should explain its inaction against the Lashkar-e-Toiba and other Punjabi terrorist organisations whose activities are directed against India.Pakistan has been hoodwinking the US not today, but for the last 30 years ever since it started using terrorism against India.It will continue to hoodwink the world brazenly so long it has the confidence that no action will be taken against it.
Question:Is Afghanistan the new Kashmir, a place india and Pakistan are fighting it out?
Answer:In Kashmir, India is resisting Pakistani attempts since 1989 to annex Indian territory through a proxy war using terrorist organisations trained in Pakistan. In Afghanistan, India has been resisting Pakistani efforts to exclude it from playing its due role as a historic ally of Afghanistan and as a well-wisher of the Afghan people who has been trying to help them convert their country into a modern democratic state. In Kashmir, it is a confrontation over territory which belongs to India. In Afghanistan it is a political and ideological confrontation.
Question: How big is India's intelligence presense in Afghanistan - is it robust? Is it as big as Pakistan claims? Does anyone know?
Answer: I would not know whether India has an intelligence presence in Afghanistan and, if so, how big is it. (3-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Here are my answers to four questions e-mailed to me on March 3,2010, by a correspondent of the "Washington Post":
Question: Is the Indian government growing increasingly frustrated over the Obama administration's policy of reconciliation with the so called good Taliban? And why or how will this impact India and U.S. relations? What position does this put India in?
Answer:"Frustrated" is not the word. India is increasingly concerned over the US belief that there are good fundamentalists and bad fundamentalists and that it can do business with the good fundamentalists and bring them into the mainstream. India looks upon the "war" against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan as directed not only against these organisations, but also against their ideology of religious obscurantism by projecting before the Afghan people the ideas of a secular and liberal democratic society.If it makes a deal with the so-called good Taliban even if they do not give up their medieval ideas, the US will be admitting beforehand that it has lost the ideological battle. It will not be good for Afghanistan and other Muslim countries. And it will not be good for India, which has the second largest Muslim community in the world.
Question: Is India worried that Pakistan is getting too strong b/c the U.S. is courting Pakistan in its fight? And why is this a concern to India ie - despite Mumbai, despite everything, is there a growing feeling in Delhi that Pakistan will hoodwink the world?
Answer:India is worried over the US readiness to close its eyes to Pakistan's use of terrorism against India so long as Pakistan acts against terrorism directed against the US and helps the US in preventing another 9/11 in the US homeland. Pakistan is confident that so long as it helps the US against the Taliban and Al Qaeda it does not have to fear any adverse consequences from its continued use of terrorism against India. It is this confidence which should explain its inaction against the Lashkar-e-Toiba and other Punjabi terrorist organisations whose activities are directed against India.Pakistan has been hoodwinking the US not today, but for the last 30 years ever since it started using terrorism against India.It will continue to hoodwink the world brazenly so long it has the confidence that no action will be taken against it.
Question:Is Afghanistan the new Kashmir, a place india and Pakistan are fighting it out?
Answer:In Kashmir, India is resisting Pakistani attempts since 1989 to annex Indian territory through a proxy war using terrorist organisations trained in Pakistan. In Afghanistan, India has been resisting Pakistani efforts to exclude it from playing its due role as a historic ally of Afghanistan and as a well-wisher of the Afghan people who has been trying to help them convert their country into a modern democratic state. In Kashmir, it is a confrontation over territory which belongs to India. In Afghanistan it is a political and ideological confrontation.
Question: How big is India's intelligence presense in Afghanistan - is it robust? Is it as big as Pakistan claims? Does anyone know?
Answer: I would not know whether India has an intelligence presence in Afghanistan and, if so, how big is it. (3-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, March 2, 2010
INDIAN EGGS IN SAUDI BASKET
B.RAMAN
The Indian interest in closer relations with Saudi Arabia dates back to the period from 1980 to 84 when Indira Gandhi was the Prime Minister. As she was generally in the habit of doing, she initially sent a senior official of the Indian intelligence community on a secret visit to Saudi Arabia to test the waters for making an overture to the then ruling family. R.N.Kao, who was then the Senior Adviser to her, did the spade work in paving the way for a visit by her to Saudi Arabia. The then Indian Ambassador to Saudi Arabia played a significant role in convincing her about the positive feelings for India in the Saudi ruling family. These preliminary steps culminated in a successful visit by her to Saudi Arabia in 1982.
2. Her interest in closer relations with Saudi Arabia had four objectives---- to strengthen India's energy security, to use the good offices of Saudi Arabia to persuade Pakistan to stop supporting the Khalistan movement, to remove suspicions in the Islamic world in general and in Saudi Arabia in particular about India's Afghan policy which was widely perceived in the West and the Islamic world as supporting the Soviet interests in Afghanistan and to retain the continued support of the Indian Muslim community for the Congress (I).
3. The high expectations aroused by her visit did not materialise. Saudi Arabia was not able to or was not in a position to make Pakistan stop supporting the Khalistan movement. While the economic ties between the two countries continued to grow in fits and starts, there were no political or long-term strategic dividends from the visit. Even hopes that the visit could pave the way for a formal liaison relationship between the intelligence agencies of the two countries resulting in intelligence-sharing arrangements were belied.
4. Among the reasons for the disappointing sequel were---firstly, Indira Gandhi's preoccupation with countering the Khalistan movement which ultimately led to her assassination in October,1984, and, secondly, the emergence of Pakistan as a frontline state in the jihad against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the consequent reluctance of Saudi Arabia and the US to exercise pressure on Pakistan to make it stop supporting the Khalistan movement.
5. Under Rajiv Gandhi and Narasimha Rao as Prime Ministers, the exercise to upgrade our relations with Saudi Arabia was given a low priority. Both of them realised that India had to fight Khalistani terrorism and Pakistani sponsorship of it in its own way and through its own means and that it would be futile to expect the US or Saudi Arabia or any other country to exercise pressure on Pakistan. How to make the Pakistani use of Khalistani terrorism prohibitively costly to Islamabad? That became the main objective of Rajiv Gandhi and Narasimha Rao.
6. Any scope for a new look at India's relations with Saudi Arabia was considerably reduced by the success of the Afghan Mujahideen supported by the US, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in overthrowing the India-friendly Government of Najibullah in Kabul and capturing power in 1992, the emergence of the Taliban in 1994 and its capture of power in Kabul in 1996, the Saudi support for the Taliban Government and the Saudi sympathies for the Pakistan-backed jihadi terrorist organisations in Jammu & Kashmir post-1989.
7. Faced with these developments, India started exploring new diplomatic and operational options --- with some success. Iran played a central role in the Indian search for new options. Among these options, one could mention India enlisting the support of Iran to defeat the move of the Benazir Bhutto Government to have India condemned in the UN Human Rights Commission on the Kashmir issue in 1994 and the covert alliance with Iran and Russia to help the Northern Alliance in its fight against the Taliban. India's relations with Iran reached the height of their development under Narasimha Rao. Iran became the toast of the Indian diplomacy in the Islamic world just as Saudi Arabia seems to be becoming of the Manmohan Singh Government's diplomacy. Narasimha Rao braved the displeasure of the US Government in developing India's relations with Iran and of the Arab world in developing relations with Israel. Iran and Israel became the two fulcra around which Indian overt and covert diplomacy to counter Pakistan turned.
8. The Manmohan Singh Government's renewed interest in developing closer relations with Saudi Arabia could be traced to his visit to Washington in July, 2005, during which the civilian nuclear co-operation agreement with the US was signed. New Delhi had to pay an unadmitted price for this agreement----downgrading its relations with Iran. The Indian vote against Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and the low priority given by India to its participation in the project for the construction of a gas pipeline from Iran to India via Pakistan were the outcome of Dr.Manmohan Singh's visit to the US and the new strategic co-operation with the US. New Delhi, which had consistently resisted US pressure on its Iran policy, became increasingly amenable to pressure from Washington. Result: Iran quietly retaliated on energy co-operation with India.
9. The need to find alternate sources for India's increasing energy requirements in the face of the post-2005 unhelpful attitude of Iran once again made New Delhi turn to Saudi Arabia for its energy security. Our relations with Saudi Arabia have acquired a Pakistani dimension after the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. Despite the terrorist strikes, the continuing Pakistani support to organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) put the Manmohan Singh Government in a dilemma---to retaliate or not to retaliate. Dr. Manmohan Singh is not a man of confrontation. Even though in response to public anger and political pressure from sections of his own party and other political parties, he suspended the composite dialogue with Pakistan and wriggled out of the agreement reached by him with Pakistani Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani at Sharm-el-Sheikh in July last, he has not given up his hopes of reaching some sort of an agreement with Pakistan which would make Pakistan discontinue the use of terrorism against India in Indian and Afghan territories as a prelude to the resumption of the composite dialogue with Pakistan on Kashmir and other issues.
10. Just as Indira Gandhi sought to use ----unsuccessfully---the help of Saudi Arabia to make Pakistan stop supporting the Khalistanis, Dr.Manmohan Singh has sought the good offices of the Saudi King to make Pakistan stop supporting anti-India terrorism so that "he could walk the extra mile" with Pakistan as he put it. We are in for disappointment if we believe that Saudi Arabia will exercise pressure on Pakistan, another Sunni state, to stop supporting anti-India Sunni/Wahabi terrorist groups. There is a convergence between the views of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan on the issue of jihadi Sunni terrorism directed against India. Both condemn jihadi Sunni terrorism in the Indian territory outside Jammu & Kashmir, but both look upon what is going on in J&K as a "freedom struggle". In the unlikely event of Saudi Arabia interceding with Pakistan to give satisfaction to India on the question of terrorism in hinterland India outside Kashmir, it would expect India to give satisfaction to Pakistan on Kashmir. Would Dr.Manmohan Singh be prepared to do it?
11. Some of the recent statements of Dr.Manmohan Singh in Saudi Arabia are likely to be misinterpreted by Islamabad as indicating the beginning of a battle fatigue in New Delhi. It would make Pakistan even more determined than hitherto to keep up the pressure on India through terrorism to force a change in the status quo. Even if Saudi Arabia sincerely tries to exercise pressure on Pakistan on the terrorism issue, Pakistan is unlikely to give in at a time when it thinks that battle fatigue is setting in. It is one thing to strengthen our energy security by developing our relations with Saudi Arabia , but it is another to put our eggs in the Saudi basket in matters relating to our core concerns about Pakistani sponsorship of terrorism and Kashmir.
12. India is a frontline State in the battle against global Sunni/Wahabi jihadi terrorism. It has to fight the battle on its own, through its own means with the help of like-minded States. Saudi Arabia is definitely not a like-minded State in this regard. Another worrisome aspect of the recent visit (February 27 to March 1, 2010) of Dr.Manmohan Singh to Saudi Arabia is his support to the Arab point of view on a peace settlement with Israel without consideration to the core concerns and sensitivities of Israel, which has been a steadfast well-wisher of India and has been quietly playing a helpful role in our attempts to modernise our Armed Forces to counter the modernisation of the Chinese Armed Forces.
13.Just as Dr.Manmohan Singh paid a price in terms of Iran in his keenness to get closer to the US, he seems to be prepared to pay a price in terms of Israel in his keenness to get closer to Saudi Arabia. We supported the Arabs right or wrong to the detriment of Israel before 1967. What did we get in return? It will be very unfortunate if we revert to our pre-1967 policies in our keenness to cultivate Saudi Arabia. (3-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institutue For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The Indian interest in closer relations with Saudi Arabia dates back to the period from 1980 to 84 when Indira Gandhi was the Prime Minister. As she was generally in the habit of doing, she initially sent a senior official of the Indian intelligence community on a secret visit to Saudi Arabia to test the waters for making an overture to the then ruling family. R.N.Kao, who was then the Senior Adviser to her, did the spade work in paving the way for a visit by her to Saudi Arabia. The then Indian Ambassador to Saudi Arabia played a significant role in convincing her about the positive feelings for India in the Saudi ruling family. These preliminary steps culminated in a successful visit by her to Saudi Arabia in 1982.
2. Her interest in closer relations with Saudi Arabia had four objectives---- to strengthen India's energy security, to use the good offices of Saudi Arabia to persuade Pakistan to stop supporting the Khalistan movement, to remove suspicions in the Islamic world in general and in Saudi Arabia in particular about India's Afghan policy which was widely perceived in the West and the Islamic world as supporting the Soviet interests in Afghanistan and to retain the continued support of the Indian Muslim community for the Congress (I).
3. The high expectations aroused by her visit did not materialise. Saudi Arabia was not able to or was not in a position to make Pakistan stop supporting the Khalistan movement. While the economic ties between the two countries continued to grow in fits and starts, there were no political or long-term strategic dividends from the visit. Even hopes that the visit could pave the way for a formal liaison relationship between the intelligence agencies of the two countries resulting in intelligence-sharing arrangements were belied.
4. Among the reasons for the disappointing sequel were---firstly, Indira Gandhi's preoccupation with countering the Khalistan movement which ultimately led to her assassination in October,1984, and, secondly, the emergence of Pakistan as a frontline state in the jihad against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the consequent reluctance of Saudi Arabia and the US to exercise pressure on Pakistan to make it stop supporting the Khalistan movement.
5. Under Rajiv Gandhi and Narasimha Rao as Prime Ministers, the exercise to upgrade our relations with Saudi Arabia was given a low priority. Both of them realised that India had to fight Khalistani terrorism and Pakistani sponsorship of it in its own way and through its own means and that it would be futile to expect the US or Saudi Arabia or any other country to exercise pressure on Pakistan. How to make the Pakistani use of Khalistani terrorism prohibitively costly to Islamabad? That became the main objective of Rajiv Gandhi and Narasimha Rao.
6. Any scope for a new look at India's relations with Saudi Arabia was considerably reduced by the success of the Afghan Mujahideen supported by the US, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in overthrowing the India-friendly Government of Najibullah in Kabul and capturing power in 1992, the emergence of the Taliban in 1994 and its capture of power in Kabul in 1996, the Saudi support for the Taliban Government and the Saudi sympathies for the Pakistan-backed jihadi terrorist organisations in Jammu & Kashmir post-1989.
7. Faced with these developments, India started exploring new diplomatic and operational options --- with some success. Iran played a central role in the Indian search for new options. Among these options, one could mention India enlisting the support of Iran to defeat the move of the Benazir Bhutto Government to have India condemned in the UN Human Rights Commission on the Kashmir issue in 1994 and the covert alliance with Iran and Russia to help the Northern Alliance in its fight against the Taliban. India's relations with Iran reached the height of their development under Narasimha Rao. Iran became the toast of the Indian diplomacy in the Islamic world just as Saudi Arabia seems to be becoming of the Manmohan Singh Government's diplomacy. Narasimha Rao braved the displeasure of the US Government in developing India's relations with Iran and of the Arab world in developing relations with Israel. Iran and Israel became the two fulcra around which Indian overt and covert diplomacy to counter Pakistan turned.
8. The Manmohan Singh Government's renewed interest in developing closer relations with Saudi Arabia could be traced to his visit to Washington in July, 2005, during which the civilian nuclear co-operation agreement with the US was signed. New Delhi had to pay an unadmitted price for this agreement----downgrading its relations with Iran. The Indian vote against Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and the low priority given by India to its participation in the project for the construction of a gas pipeline from Iran to India via Pakistan were the outcome of Dr.Manmohan Singh's visit to the US and the new strategic co-operation with the US. New Delhi, which had consistently resisted US pressure on its Iran policy, became increasingly amenable to pressure from Washington. Result: Iran quietly retaliated on energy co-operation with India.
9. The need to find alternate sources for India's increasing energy requirements in the face of the post-2005 unhelpful attitude of Iran once again made New Delhi turn to Saudi Arabia for its energy security. Our relations with Saudi Arabia have acquired a Pakistani dimension after the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. Despite the terrorist strikes, the continuing Pakistani support to organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) put the Manmohan Singh Government in a dilemma---to retaliate or not to retaliate. Dr. Manmohan Singh is not a man of confrontation. Even though in response to public anger and political pressure from sections of his own party and other political parties, he suspended the composite dialogue with Pakistan and wriggled out of the agreement reached by him with Pakistani Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani at Sharm-el-Sheikh in July last, he has not given up his hopes of reaching some sort of an agreement with Pakistan which would make Pakistan discontinue the use of terrorism against India in Indian and Afghan territories as a prelude to the resumption of the composite dialogue with Pakistan on Kashmir and other issues.
10. Just as Indira Gandhi sought to use ----unsuccessfully---the help of Saudi Arabia to make Pakistan stop supporting the Khalistanis, Dr.Manmohan Singh has sought the good offices of the Saudi King to make Pakistan stop supporting anti-India terrorism so that "he could walk the extra mile" with Pakistan as he put it. We are in for disappointment if we believe that Saudi Arabia will exercise pressure on Pakistan, another Sunni state, to stop supporting anti-India Sunni/Wahabi terrorist groups. There is a convergence between the views of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan on the issue of jihadi Sunni terrorism directed against India. Both condemn jihadi Sunni terrorism in the Indian territory outside Jammu & Kashmir, but both look upon what is going on in J&K as a "freedom struggle". In the unlikely event of Saudi Arabia interceding with Pakistan to give satisfaction to India on the question of terrorism in hinterland India outside Kashmir, it would expect India to give satisfaction to Pakistan on Kashmir. Would Dr.Manmohan Singh be prepared to do it?
11. Some of the recent statements of Dr.Manmohan Singh in Saudi Arabia are likely to be misinterpreted by Islamabad as indicating the beginning of a battle fatigue in New Delhi. It would make Pakistan even more determined than hitherto to keep up the pressure on India through terrorism to force a change in the status quo. Even if Saudi Arabia sincerely tries to exercise pressure on Pakistan on the terrorism issue, Pakistan is unlikely to give in at a time when it thinks that battle fatigue is setting in. It is one thing to strengthen our energy security by developing our relations with Saudi Arabia , but it is another to put our eggs in the Saudi basket in matters relating to our core concerns about Pakistani sponsorship of terrorism and Kashmir.
12. India is a frontline State in the battle against global Sunni/Wahabi jihadi terrorism. It has to fight the battle on its own, through its own means with the help of like-minded States. Saudi Arabia is definitely not a like-minded State in this regard. Another worrisome aspect of the recent visit (February 27 to March 1, 2010) of Dr.Manmohan Singh to Saudi Arabia is his support to the Arab point of view on a peace settlement with Israel without consideration to the core concerns and sensitivities of Israel, which has been a steadfast well-wisher of India and has been quietly playing a helpful role in our attempts to modernise our Armed Forces to counter the modernisation of the Chinese Armed Forces.
13.Just as Dr.Manmohan Singh paid a price in terms of Iran in his keenness to get closer to the US, he seems to be prepared to pay a price in terms of Israel in his keenness to get closer to Saudi Arabia. We supported the Arabs right or wrong to the detriment of Israel before 1967. What did we get in return? It will be very unfortunate if we revert to our pre-1967 policies in our keenness to cultivate Saudi Arabia. (3-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institutue For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, March 1, 2010
THE JIHADI TERRORISM IN INDIA: THE SAUDI CONNECTION
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO. 624
B.RAMAN
During his just-concluded visit (February 27 to March 1, 2010) to Saudi Arabia, Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh is reported to have taken up with the Saudi leaders the question of Pakistan’s continued sponsorship of terrorism against India and sought their good offices for persuading Pakistan to act against anti-Indian terrorism directed from Pakistani territory.
2. Like Pakistan, Saudi Arabia has been following a dual policy on terrorism. It has taken ruthless action against Al Qaeda elements posing a threat to its internal security. At the same time, it has avoided taking action against Wahabi organizations which have been supporting terrorism in other countries. Many of the so-called charity organizations, which have been funding terrorist organizations in other countries including India and Bangladesh, are of Saudi origin. Despite international pressure on Saudi Arabia to act against such charity organizations and stop the flow of funds to global jihadi terrorism, the action taken by the Saudi authorities has been unsatisfactory.
3.It would be futile to expect that Saudi Arabia could be of assistance to India in dealing with jihadi terrorism emanating from Pakistan or Bangladesh. There has been a long history of links between jihadi terrorist elements in India and Saudi Arabia ever since the demolition of the Babri Masjid in December,1992. In December 1993, coinciding with the first anniversary of the demolition of the masjid , there was a number of explosions in different railway trains in North India. The interrogation of one of the suspects arrested during the investigation revealed that the Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) had organised them.
4. The suspect also alleged that C.A.M.Basheer, who was the President of the SIMI in the 1980s, had, along with one or two other members of the SIMI, attended a training course in the use of arms and ammunition and explosives in a camp of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) of Pakistan in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) run by one Salauddin, a Sudanese national, in the late 1980s. During the training, the JEI arranged a meeting between the SIMI activists and Lal Singh, alias Manjit Singh of the International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF), Canada, who was then living in Lahore. Lal Singh was arrested by the Gujarat Police in the middle of 1992 when he crossed over into India.
5. The JEI urged the SIMI and the ISYF to co-operate with each other for the "liberation" of the Sikhs of Punjab and the Kashmiris of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). The co-operation project was code-named "K-2", standing for Kashmir-Khalistan. It was also stated that Qazi Hussain Ahmed, the then Amir of the JEI, had nominated Amirul Azim, the then Propaganda Secretary of the JEI, as the co-ordinator of the project.
6. The suspect also stated that the JEI had asked Basheer to send more members of the SIMI to Pakistan for training, but he could not do so due to logistic problems. In the early 1990s, Amirul Azim, accompanied by Salauddin, the Sudanese instructor, entered India via Bangladesh and met Basheer and his associates for discussing their future plans. They were told that in view of the difficulties experienced by them in sending more activists to Pakistan for training, instructions had been given to the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), the Kashmiri terrorist organisation, which is a wing of the JEI, to train SIMI cadres in its camps in J&K itself. The SIMI was asked to send its future batches to J&K for training.
7. Despite intensive searches by the police of different States, Basheer and his associates, who had allegedly undergone training in Pakistan, could not be arrested. Basheer, who must now be around 48, is from Parambayam in Kerala. After studying in the Union Christian College, Aluva, near Kochi, he worked for a brief while in the Safdarjung airport of New Delhi before taking to terrorism and absconding. Subsequent reports indicated that he had taken up residence in Saudi Arabia from where he was guiding the activities of the SIMI in India and organising its branches in other countries of the Gulf. In Saudi Arabia, he was also reported to have floated a new organisation called
the Muslim Development Force .
8. In 1992, the "Time" magazine of the US had carried an interview with one Commander Abu Abdel Aziz, with a picture of his in his henna-dyed beard and Afghan style fatigue. After the "Time", "al-Sharq al-Awsat", a Saudi-owned, London-based daily, ran a front-page story on Abu Abdel Aziz and his activities in Bosnia. In August 1994, "Al-Sirat Al-Mustaqeem (The Straight Path)", an Islamic journal published in Pakistan (Issue No. 33), carried an interview with Abu Abdel Aziz. The journal, without identifying his nationality, reported that Abu Abdel Aziz spoke perfect Urdu and that he had spent extended periods in Kashmir. It was stated that Abu Abdel Aziz's followers, believed to be mostly Indian Muslims from the Gulf, were part of the seventh battalion of the Bosnian Army (SEDMI KORPUS, ARMIJA REPUBLIKE BH).
9. In the interview, he made the following points:
* "I was one of those who heard about Jihad in Afghanistan when it started. I used to hear about it, but was hesitant about (the purity and intention of) this Jihad. One of those who came to our land (presumably Saudi Arabia) was Sheikh Dr. Abdallah Azzam. I heard him rallying the youth to come forth and (join him) to go to Afghanistan. This was in 1984 -- I think. I decided to go and check the matter for myself. This was the beginning (of my journey with) Jihad. Then the conquest of Kabul came.
* "A new Jihad started in Bosnia, (we moved there), and we are with it. As to Arab Mujahideen (in Bosnia), they do not have a separate battalion. There is a battalion for non-Bosnian fighters. Arabs are a minority compared to those of the Mujahideen (gathered from around the World). This battalion is under a unified command and is called Kateebat al-Mujahideen (Mujahideen Battalion), or "El-Mudzahidin" as they call them in Bosnian. Militarily, it has a link to the Bosnian government under the general command of the Bosnian Armed Forces. It is in fact part of the seventh battalion (SEDMI KORPUS, ARMIJA REPUBLIKE BH) of the Bosnian Army. I am a field commander under the "General Unified Armed Command". We have full jurisdiction in the region we are responsible for (Editor's note: Mostly central Bosnia). The general command of the Muslim forces wants to see results, it does not dictate strategy or action.
* "I met several prominent Ulema. Among them Sheikh Nasir ad-Din al-Albani, Sheikh Abdel Aziz Bin Baz and Sheikh Muhammad Bin Otheimin and others in the Gulf area. Sheikh Nasir ad-Din al-Albani is one of the great Ulema of this time and one seeks guidance in the light of his knowledge and view. (I say) in my last meeting with him, he was supportive of Jihad in Bosnia-Herzeg (as a religious duty). However, he told us not to attack - that is we, the Arab Mujahideen.Since we were the smaller the Sheikh was afraid we might get killed in large numbers if we engaged people in the fight. However, he requested that we dig in and be at the most advanced defense-lines (Khat ad-Difa` al-Awwal) to defend those persecuted.
* "The rest of the Ulema support Jihad by any means (defensive or offensive). You must understand that - militarily speaking - the number of those killed in defense is (far) higher than those killed in attack. This is due to the fact that in attack, clashes and skirmishes take place between Mujahideen and Kuffar (non-believers).The Kafir (unbeliever) does not throw himself arbitrarily in the cross-fire for fear of killing his companions. This fact lowers the number of the dead and this is the most important fact of the matter.
* "Jihad in Kashmir is still going on. It is healthy. Our Kashmiri brothers have achieved a lot. Some of our Mujahideen brethren, whether Arab or (Ajam non-Arab), such as the Pakistanis and our brethren from South-East Asia, have also helped. Their actions have been very successful, especially in the lands under Indian government control. Mujahideen execute hit-and-run operations. However there is a lack of support by Islamic governments and a lack of media coverage by Islamic outlets, on the level of atrocity and destruction by the non-believers in those lands."
10. Subsequently, this Abu Abdel Aziz appeared at a conference of the LET (Lashkar-e-Toiba) at its headquarters in Muridke, near Lahore, in November,1994. He was introduced to the audience as an Indian Muslim living in Saudi Arabia, who was playing a heroic role in helping the Muslims of Bosnia in their fight against the Christian Serbs and in helping the Kashmiris fighting against the Government of India.
11. Other reports indicated that in May 1995, like-minded jihadi groups had formed a "Rapid Deployment Force" called "Katiba (Kateebat?) al Mujahideen" (Batallion of the Mujahideen) at a meeting held in the Philippines. The meeting was attended among others by "al-Sheikh Abu Abdul Aziz," described as the Chief Commander of the 7th Brigade of Muslim forces in Bosnia, Salamat Hashan, the Chairman of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Philippines), Abdul Karim, Chairman of the Islamic Front (Eritrea) and Prof. Hafiz Mohd Saeed, Amir MDI (Markaz Dawa Al Irshad, as the political wing of the LET was then known), Pakistan. "Al-Sheikh Abu Abdul Aziz" and Abu Abdel Aziz were probably identical, but one was not certain on the basis of available evidence.
12. The meeting reportedly agreed on the following (a) nationalities and frontiers on the basis of races was an un-Islamic perception; (b) to work in support of Muslims in all those parts of the world where action was being taken against them; (c) the Mujahideen of the newly formed Kateebat Al-Mujahideen would carry out militant operations and fight in Kashmir to eliminate un-Islamic perceptions of nationalities and frontiers.
13. Till 1997, Abu Abdel Aziz either used to attend the annual conventions of the LET at Muridke or his recorded speeches used to be telecast or he used to speak over phone. He disappeared from public view thereafter. There were rumours in Islamic circles in Pakistan that he had been arrested by the Saudi authorities, apparently because of his suspected links with Osama bin Laden, who is against the Saudi monarchy. In August, 2001, the police of Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh claimed to have arrested one Abdul Aziz alias Ashrafi, who had fought in Bosnia and Chechnya. From published reports, it was not clear whether they had questioned him about the identity of Abu Abdel Aziz and other Indian Muslims from the Gulf, who had allegedly fought in Bosnia and their subsequent whereabouts.
14. The real identity of Abu Abdel Aziz still remains a mystery. If he was an Indian Muslim living in Saudi Arabia, as claimed by the LET, what was his real name, to which part of India he belonged, what was his political affiliation, did he have any links with the SIMI? All that one could conjecture was that Basheer could not be operating under the alias Abu Abdel Aziz because the Pakistani Urdu media projected him as operating from Saudi Arabia since the early 1980s, whereas Basheer was reported to have moved over to Saudi Arabia only in the early 1990s, possibly after the Babri masjid demolition.
15. From the various reports received, one could make the following surmise:
* There were at least two Indian Muslims operating from Saudi Arabia and associated with jihadi terrorism.
* One of them referred to by Pakistani jihadis as Abu Abdel Aziz was linked to the LET. He had played what the jihadis considered as a legendary role in organising jihad in Bosnia and was also closely involved in assisting the jihadis in J&K.
* Basheer co-ordinated the activities of the SIMI in India and the Gulf from Saudi Arabia.
16. After the Gujarat riots of 2002 and coinciding with the 10th anniversary of the Babri Masjid demolition, reports started circulating in Pakistan that some of the Indian and Pakistani Muslims working in the Gulf, including Saudi Arabia, had started a drive for the collection of funds to be utilised for assisting the Muslim victims of the riots and for mounting acts of punishment terrorism in India to avenge the killings of Muslims in Gujarat. Compilations of Indian media reports about the anti-Muslim atrocities in Gujarat and video recordings of these atrocities were used as part of this fund collection drive.
17. In December 2002, the Tamil Nadu Police claimed to have unearthed a new organisation, apparently inspired and controlled by jihadi elements in Saudi Arabia, called the Muslim Defence Force (MDF). It was not clear whether this was identical with the Muslim Development Force of Basheer. Published reports about the Tamil Nadu Police's detection indicated as follows:
* One Abu Hamsa, alias Abdul Bari, an Indian Muslim living in Saudi Arabia and associated with the LET, and one Abu Omar, a Pakistani Muslim working there, had together formed the MDF after the Gujarat riots. They had also met a Muslim leader from Tamil Nadu who had gone to Saudi Arabia on haj pilgrimage.
* On his return to Tamil Nadu, this leader held a clandestine meeting at Tenkasi in Tiruvelveli district, which was attended by about 30 Muslims. At this meeting, plans for organising MDF activities in India were discussed.
* Subsequently, two of those, who had attended the Tenkasi meeting, went to Sri Lanka (the Eastern Province?), where they were to have another meeting with Abu Hamsa, but he did not turn up from Saudi Arabia. They, therefore, returned to Tamil Nadu without meeting him.
* Abu Hamsa alias Abdul Bari was wanted in connection with an explosion in Andhra Pradesh. He had given instructions to his contacts in Tamil Nadu to organise the activities of the MDF and also to float another organisation called New Vision to propagate Islam amongst the so-called backward classes of the Hindu community and recruit them for jihad.
* The associates of Abu Hamsa in Tamil Nadu were instructed to form an elite force to establish hide-outs and protect jihadi terrorists visiting Tamil Nadu and to recruit youth for training in jihad at an undisclosed destination in the Gulf.
* Amongst those arrested by the Tamil Nadu police during their investigation into the activities of the MDF was Noohu Thambi Hamid Bakri, an alleged sympathiser of the LET. He was stated to be the principal of the Ayesha Siddique Arabic College for Women at Kayalpattinam and also the President of the All-India Tauhid Jamath Federation. He also used to be associated with an organisation called the Kayal Islamic Defence Force, which is now believed to be dormant.
* It was Hamid Bakri, accompanied by one Zakkaria, who had met Abu Hamsa in Saudi Arabia and subsequently gone to Sri Lanka for another meeting, which did not materialise.In November, 2002, Zakkaria was allegedly in receipt of Rs.1,50,000 from Abu Hamsa in Saudi Arabia through hawala.
18. None of the reports relating to the unearthing of the activities of the MDF in Tamil Nadu had referred to any role of Basheer in this connection. However, his name again cropped up as possibly amongst the dramatis personae associated with the series of explosions in Mumbai since December, 2002.
19.For some years now there have been indicators of the clandestine creation of a jihadi web in Mumbai, south India and possibly in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka, with the SIMI and the LET playing an active role in this matter, either in tandem or separately of each other. Much of the inspiration and financial support for this came from Indian and Pakistani jihadi activists in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries.
20. The LET receives funds from the so-called charity organizations in Saudi Arabia. It has an office in Saudi Arabia to make recruitment of jihadis from the Indian Muslim community living in Saudi Arabia. It also recruits from Muslims of other countries visiting Saudi Arabia for pilgrimage.
21. It would have been more useful if the Prime Minister had taken up with the Saudi authorities the question of their acting against the LET activities from Saudi territory and stopping the flow of funds to the LET from Saudi organizations. He should have also raised the issue of the activities of absconding SIMI elements from Saudi Arabia. ( 2-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
During his just-concluded visit (February 27 to March 1, 2010) to Saudi Arabia, Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh is reported to have taken up with the Saudi leaders the question of Pakistan’s continued sponsorship of terrorism against India and sought their good offices for persuading Pakistan to act against anti-Indian terrorism directed from Pakistani territory.
2. Like Pakistan, Saudi Arabia has been following a dual policy on terrorism. It has taken ruthless action against Al Qaeda elements posing a threat to its internal security. At the same time, it has avoided taking action against Wahabi organizations which have been supporting terrorism in other countries. Many of the so-called charity organizations, which have been funding terrorist organizations in other countries including India and Bangladesh, are of Saudi origin. Despite international pressure on Saudi Arabia to act against such charity organizations and stop the flow of funds to global jihadi terrorism, the action taken by the Saudi authorities has been unsatisfactory.
3.It would be futile to expect that Saudi Arabia could be of assistance to India in dealing with jihadi terrorism emanating from Pakistan or Bangladesh. There has been a long history of links between jihadi terrorist elements in India and Saudi Arabia ever since the demolition of the Babri Masjid in December,1992. In December 1993, coinciding with the first anniversary of the demolition of the masjid , there was a number of explosions in different railway trains in North India. The interrogation of one of the suspects arrested during the investigation revealed that the Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) had organised them.
4. The suspect also alleged that C.A.M.Basheer, who was the President of the SIMI in the 1980s, had, along with one or two other members of the SIMI, attended a training course in the use of arms and ammunition and explosives in a camp of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) of Pakistan in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) run by one Salauddin, a Sudanese national, in the late 1980s. During the training, the JEI arranged a meeting between the SIMI activists and Lal Singh, alias Manjit Singh of the International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF), Canada, who was then living in Lahore. Lal Singh was arrested by the Gujarat Police in the middle of 1992 when he crossed over into India.
5. The JEI urged the SIMI and the ISYF to co-operate with each other for the "liberation" of the Sikhs of Punjab and the Kashmiris of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). The co-operation project was code-named "K-2", standing for Kashmir-Khalistan. It was also stated that Qazi Hussain Ahmed, the then Amir of the JEI, had nominated Amirul Azim, the then Propaganda Secretary of the JEI, as the co-ordinator of the project.
6. The suspect also stated that the JEI had asked Basheer to send more members of the SIMI to Pakistan for training, but he could not do so due to logistic problems. In the early 1990s, Amirul Azim, accompanied by Salauddin, the Sudanese instructor, entered India via Bangladesh and met Basheer and his associates for discussing their future plans. They were told that in view of the difficulties experienced by them in sending more activists to Pakistan for training, instructions had been given to the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), the Kashmiri terrorist organisation, which is a wing of the JEI, to train SIMI cadres in its camps in J&K itself. The SIMI was asked to send its future batches to J&K for training.
7. Despite intensive searches by the police of different States, Basheer and his associates, who had allegedly undergone training in Pakistan, could not be arrested. Basheer, who must now be around 48, is from Parambayam in Kerala. After studying in the Union Christian College, Aluva, near Kochi, he worked for a brief while in the Safdarjung airport of New Delhi before taking to terrorism and absconding. Subsequent reports indicated that he had taken up residence in Saudi Arabia from where he was guiding the activities of the SIMI in India and organising its branches in other countries of the Gulf. In Saudi Arabia, he was also reported to have floated a new organisation called
the Muslim Development Force .
8. In 1992, the "Time" magazine of the US had carried an interview with one Commander Abu Abdel Aziz, with a picture of his in his henna-dyed beard and Afghan style fatigue. After the "Time", "al-Sharq al-Awsat", a Saudi-owned, London-based daily, ran a front-page story on Abu Abdel Aziz and his activities in Bosnia. In August 1994, "Al-Sirat Al-Mustaqeem (The Straight Path)", an Islamic journal published in Pakistan (Issue No. 33), carried an interview with Abu Abdel Aziz. The journal, without identifying his nationality, reported that Abu Abdel Aziz spoke perfect Urdu and that he had spent extended periods in Kashmir. It was stated that Abu Abdel Aziz's followers, believed to be mostly Indian Muslims from the Gulf, were part of the seventh battalion of the Bosnian Army (SEDMI KORPUS, ARMIJA REPUBLIKE BH).
9. In the interview, he made the following points:
* "I was one of those who heard about Jihad in Afghanistan when it started. I used to hear about it, but was hesitant about (the purity and intention of) this Jihad. One of those who came to our land (presumably Saudi Arabia) was Sheikh Dr. Abdallah Azzam. I heard him rallying the youth to come forth and (join him) to go to Afghanistan. This was in 1984 -- I think. I decided to go and check the matter for myself. This was the beginning (of my journey with) Jihad. Then the conquest of Kabul came.
* "A new Jihad started in Bosnia, (we moved there), and we are with it. As to Arab Mujahideen (in Bosnia), they do not have a separate battalion. There is a battalion for non-Bosnian fighters. Arabs are a minority compared to those of the Mujahideen (gathered from around the World). This battalion is under a unified command and is called Kateebat al-Mujahideen (Mujahideen Battalion), or "El-Mudzahidin" as they call them in Bosnian. Militarily, it has a link to the Bosnian government under the general command of the Bosnian Armed Forces. It is in fact part of the seventh battalion (SEDMI KORPUS, ARMIJA REPUBLIKE BH) of the Bosnian Army. I am a field commander under the "General Unified Armed Command". We have full jurisdiction in the region we are responsible for (Editor's note: Mostly central Bosnia). The general command of the Muslim forces wants to see results, it does not dictate strategy or action.
* "I met several prominent Ulema. Among them Sheikh Nasir ad-Din al-Albani, Sheikh Abdel Aziz Bin Baz and Sheikh Muhammad Bin Otheimin and others in the Gulf area. Sheikh Nasir ad-Din al-Albani is one of the great Ulema of this time and one seeks guidance in the light of his knowledge and view. (I say) in my last meeting with him, he was supportive of Jihad in Bosnia-Herzeg (as a religious duty). However, he told us not to attack - that is we, the Arab Mujahideen.Since we were the smaller the Sheikh was afraid we might get killed in large numbers if we engaged people in the fight. However, he requested that we dig in and be at the most advanced defense-lines (Khat ad-Difa` al-Awwal) to defend those persecuted.
* "The rest of the Ulema support Jihad by any means (defensive or offensive). You must understand that - militarily speaking - the number of those killed in defense is (far) higher than those killed in attack. This is due to the fact that in attack, clashes and skirmishes take place between Mujahideen and Kuffar (non-believers).The Kafir (unbeliever) does not throw himself arbitrarily in the cross-fire for fear of killing his companions. This fact lowers the number of the dead and this is the most important fact of the matter.
* "Jihad in Kashmir is still going on. It is healthy. Our Kashmiri brothers have achieved a lot. Some of our Mujahideen brethren, whether Arab or (Ajam non-Arab), such as the Pakistanis and our brethren from South-East Asia, have also helped. Their actions have been very successful, especially in the lands under Indian government control. Mujahideen execute hit-and-run operations. However there is a lack of support by Islamic governments and a lack of media coverage by Islamic outlets, on the level of atrocity and destruction by the non-believers in those lands."
10. Subsequently, this Abu Abdel Aziz appeared at a conference of the LET (Lashkar-e-Toiba) at its headquarters in Muridke, near Lahore, in November,1994. He was introduced to the audience as an Indian Muslim living in Saudi Arabia, who was playing a heroic role in helping the Muslims of Bosnia in their fight against the Christian Serbs and in helping the Kashmiris fighting against the Government of India.
11. Other reports indicated that in May 1995, like-minded jihadi groups had formed a "Rapid Deployment Force" called "Katiba (Kateebat?) al Mujahideen" (Batallion of the Mujahideen) at a meeting held in the Philippines. The meeting was attended among others by "al-Sheikh Abu Abdul Aziz," described as the Chief Commander of the 7th Brigade of Muslim forces in Bosnia, Salamat Hashan, the Chairman of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Philippines), Abdul Karim, Chairman of the Islamic Front (Eritrea) and Prof. Hafiz Mohd Saeed, Amir MDI (Markaz Dawa Al Irshad, as the political wing of the LET was then known), Pakistan. "Al-Sheikh Abu Abdul Aziz" and Abu Abdel Aziz were probably identical, but one was not certain on the basis of available evidence.
12. The meeting reportedly agreed on the following (a) nationalities and frontiers on the basis of races was an un-Islamic perception; (b) to work in support of Muslims in all those parts of the world where action was being taken against them; (c) the Mujahideen of the newly formed Kateebat Al-Mujahideen would carry out militant operations and fight in Kashmir to eliminate un-Islamic perceptions of nationalities and frontiers.
13. Till 1997, Abu Abdel Aziz either used to attend the annual conventions of the LET at Muridke or his recorded speeches used to be telecast or he used to speak over phone. He disappeared from public view thereafter. There were rumours in Islamic circles in Pakistan that he had been arrested by the Saudi authorities, apparently because of his suspected links with Osama bin Laden, who is against the Saudi monarchy. In August, 2001, the police of Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh claimed to have arrested one Abdul Aziz alias Ashrafi, who had fought in Bosnia and Chechnya. From published reports, it was not clear whether they had questioned him about the identity of Abu Abdel Aziz and other Indian Muslims from the Gulf, who had allegedly fought in Bosnia and their subsequent whereabouts.
14. The real identity of Abu Abdel Aziz still remains a mystery. If he was an Indian Muslim living in Saudi Arabia, as claimed by the LET, what was his real name, to which part of India he belonged, what was his political affiliation, did he have any links with the SIMI? All that one could conjecture was that Basheer could not be operating under the alias Abu Abdel Aziz because the Pakistani Urdu media projected him as operating from Saudi Arabia since the early 1980s, whereas Basheer was reported to have moved over to Saudi Arabia only in the early 1990s, possibly after the Babri masjid demolition.
15. From the various reports received, one could make the following surmise:
* There were at least two Indian Muslims operating from Saudi Arabia and associated with jihadi terrorism.
* One of them referred to by Pakistani jihadis as Abu Abdel Aziz was linked to the LET. He had played what the jihadis considered as a legendary role in organising jihad in Bosnia and was also closely involved in assisting the jihadis in J&K.
* Basheer co-ordinated the activities of the SIMI in India and the Gulf from Saudi Arabia.
16. After the Gujarat riots of 2002 and coinciding with the 10th anniversary of the Babri Masjid demolition, reports started circulating in Pakistan that some of the Indian and Pakistani Muslims working in the Gulf, including Saudi Arabia, had started a drive for the collection of funds to be utilised for assisting the Muslim victims of the riots and for mounting acts of punishment terrorism in India to avenge the killings of Muslims in Gujarat. Compilations of Indian media reports about the anti-Muslim atrocities in Gujarat and video recordings of these atrocities were used as part of this fund collection drive.
17. In December 2002, the Tamil Nadu Police claimed to have unearthed a new organisation, apparently inspired and controlled by jihadi elements in Saudi Arabia, called the Muslim Defence Force (MDF). It was not clear whether this was identical with the Muslim Development Force of Basheer. Published reports about the Tamil Nadu Police's detection indicated as follows:
* One Abu Hamsa, alias Abdul Bari, an Indian Muslim living in Saudi Arabia and associated with the LET, and one Abu Omar, a Pakistani Muslim working there, had together formed the MDF after the Gujarat riots. They had also met a Muslim leader from Tamil Nadu who had gone to Saudi Arabia on haj pilgrimage.
* On his return to Tamil Nadu, this leader held a clandestine meeting at Tenkasi in Tiruvelveli district, which was attended by about 30 Muslims. At this meeting, plans for organising MDF activities in India were discussed.
* Subsequently, two of those, who had attended the Tenkasi meeting, went to Sri Lanka (the Eastern Province?), where they were to have another meeting with Abu Hamsa, but he did not turn up from Saudi Arabia. They, therefore, returned to Tamil Nadu without meeting him.
* Abu Hamsa alias Abdul Bari was wanted in connection with an explosion in Andhra Pradesh. He had given instructions to his contacts in Tamil Nadu to organise the activities of the MDF and also to float another organisation called New Vision to propagate Islam amongst the so-called backward classes of the Hindu community and recruit them for jihad.
* The associates of Abu Hamsa in Tamil Nadu were instructed to form an elite force to establish hide-outs and protect jihadi terrorists visiting Tamil Nadu and to recruit youth for training in jihad at an undisclosed destination in the Gulf.
* Amongst those arrested by the Tamil Nadu police during their investigation into the activities of the MDF was Noohu Thambi Hamid Bakri, an alleged sympathiser of the LET. He was stated to be the principal of the Ayesha Siddique Arabic College for Women at Kayalpattinam and also the President of the All-India Tauhid Jamath Federation. He also used to be associated with an organisation called the Kayal Islamic Defence Force, which is now believed to be dormant.
* It was Hamid Bakri, accompanied by one Zakkaria, who had met Abu Hamsa in Saudi Arabia and subsequently gone to Sri Lanka for another meeting, which did not materialise.In November, 2002, Zakkaria was allegedly in receipt of Rs.1,50,000 from Abu Hamsa in Saudi Arabia through hawala.
18. None of the reports relating to the unearthing of the activities of the MDF in Tamil Nadu had referred to any role of Basheer in this connection. However, his name again cropped up as possibly amongst the dramatis personae associated with the series of explosions in Mumbai since December, 2002.
19.For some years now there have been indicators of the clandestine creation of a jihadi web in Mumbai, south India and possibly in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka, with the SIMI and the LET playing an active role in this matter, either in tandem or separately of each other. Much of the inspiration and financial support for this came from Indian and Pakistani jihadi activists in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries.
20. The LET receives funds from the so-called charity organizations in Saudi Arabia. It has an office in Saudi Arabia to make recruitment of jihadis from the Indian Muslim community living in Saudi Arabia. It also recruits from Muslims of other countries visiting Saudi Arabia for pilgrimage.
21. It would have been more useful if the Prime Minister had taken up with the Saudi authorities the question of their acting against the LET activities from Saudi territory and stopping the flow of funds to the LET from Saudi organizations. He should have also raised the issue of the activities of absconding SIMI elements from Saudi Arabia. ( 2-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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