B.RAMAN
As I watched on the TV channels visuals of Shri Rahul Gandhi traveling by the suburban train in Mumbai on February 5,2010, my mind went back to the initial days of V.P.Singh as the Prime Minister in 1989.
2. Those were the days of Khalistani terrorism. Terrorists trained by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence were running amok in Punjab and Delhi killing dozens of innocent civilians and security forces personnel. One of the promises made by V.P.Singh during the election campaign was to bring a healing touch to the Sikh community. Shri Simranjit Singh Mann, a former IPS officer, who had resigned from the service in protest against the way the Congress (I) was handling the problem, had emerged as a valued adviser of V.P.Singh.
3. Shortly after taking over as the Prime Minister, V.P.Singh, on the advice of Shri Mann, decided to visit the Golden Temple at Amritsar without security. Shri Mann assured him that there would be no threats to his security. V.P.Singh ordered that apart from the bodyguards in plain clothes no other security arrangements should be made for him.
4. The security agencies responsible for his security did not want to take chances. They deployed a large number of security personnel in plain clothes in the Temple itself and outside to ensure that nothing went wrong, without telling V.P.Singh anything about it.
5.From V.P.Singh’s perspective, it was a highly emotional and successful visit. After worshiping in the temple he traveled round the town in an open vehicle. There were thousands of Sikhs and others, who mobbed him and greeted him. Highly pleased by the reception that he got, he said that his security was safe in the hands of the people, who loved him so much. Where was the need for official security at the expense of the tax-payer? he asked.
6. He was not aware that hundreds of those, who mobbed him and hailed him, were not members of the public, but security forces personnel who had been asked to mingle with the crowds to protect him.
7.Subsequently, highly gratified by media accounts of his successful visit to Amritsar and mingling with the crowds, V.P.Singh decided to travel by train from Delhi to Jaipur. He rejected the advice of the security agencies not to do so.
8. He went to the Delhi railway station and got into the train. He was mobbed by large cheering crowds on the station platform. He took his place inside the compartment with what he thought were other members of the traveling public. He returned from Jaipur by train.
9. He was highly gratified by the warmth shown by the traveling public to him and decided to undertake more trips by train. He was not aware that many of those who cheered him at the railway station and that all those who were in the compartment with him were actually security forces personnel in mufti.
10. After he returned to Delhi, senior officers in charge of PM’s security told him the truth and explained that since it was their responsibility to protect him, they could not have taken chances. They also pointed out that such forays by him seemingly without security cost the tax-payer more than the usual security and weakened their capability to protect him.
11. Thereafter, he stopped indulging in such gimmicks in order to embarrass Rajiv Gandhi. The Congress (I) was raising a hue and cry about the downgrading of security for Rajiv Gandhi. He wanted to embarrass Rajiv Gandhi and his Party by showing that Rajiv Gandhi needed elaborate security because he, according to V.P.Singh, was not liked by the people, whereas he (V.P.Singh) did not need that kind of security because he was loved by the people. Wiser advice prevailed and he stopped doing this. (6-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, February 5, 2010
Thursday, February 4, 2010
INDO-PAK INTERACTIONS: NEED TO EXPAND BASKET OF ISSUES OF CONCERN
B.RAMAN
Since the beginning of this week, the Government of India has initiated two moves to expand the scope of the interactions with the Government of Pakistan, which have remained stunted since the 26/11 terrorist strikes by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in Mumbai. The terrorist attacks brought the structured, formalized composite dialogue on the various issues coming in the way of the normalization of bilateral relations to a state of suspension. They did not interrupt the normal official interactions between the two Governments. However, these have remained in low key with no new ideas or new initiatives.
2.While not making any substantive move to resume the composite dialogue despite repeated demands to do so from Pakistani leaders and entreaties in the same direction from the US, the Government of India has initiated two moves to re-vitalise the interactions at the political and professional levels, presumably in order to test the waters for a resumption of the composite dialogue process at a later stage.
3.The first move----at the political level--- is the decision that Shri P.Chidambaram, the Home Minister, should participate in the SAARC Home/Interior Ministers’ conference, which is scheduled to be held in Islamabad later this month, and hold bilateral discussions in the margins of the conference with Mr.Rehman Malik, his Pakistani counterpart. There has been no high-level political visit since 26/11.
4.The bilateral discussions, if approached seriously by the two Governments, should be useful in exchanging notes on the progress of the investigation and prosecution of the 26/11 conspiracy by the LET and in laying the groundwork for establishing a tradition of mutual legal assistance between the principal investigation agencies of the two countries. This has to be a political decision and only the two Ministers would be able to take such a decision.
5.Mr.Malik has been a trusted associate of President Asif Ali Zardari and was a confidante of the late Benazir Bhutto since 1996. Though his relations with Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani and the military-intelligence establishment are not very good, he should be able to speak with authority on behalf of Mr.Zardari. Moreover, he is an ex-police officer, who had held a senior position in Pakistan’s Federal Investigation Agency, which, inter alia, investigates and prosecutes major terrorism-related cases He has more the mindset of a Pakistani police officer than of an army officer and has not been known for obsessive anti-India feelings.
6. The second move---at the professional level---- is the reported invitation by Shrimati Nirupama Rao, our Foreign Secretary, to her Pakistani counterpart Mr.Salman Bashir, to visit New Delhi on mutually convenient dates “ to discuss terrorism and any other issue that could lead to peace between the two neighbours” as reported by the media.
7. While there should be no problem with regard to Shri Chidambaram’s visit to Islamabad and his bilateral discussions with Mr.Malik, it remains to be seen whether the Pakistani Foreign Office would go along with the wording of the reported invitation which does not make any reference to a resumption of the composite dialogue. There is a possibility though that the US will strongly nudge Pakistan to respond positively to the invitation without insisting on a reference to the composite dialogue.
8. There has been some valid criticism from sections of the New Delhi-based community of retired officers of what they view as the haste shown by the MEA in rushing with the invitation instead of waiting to see what transpires during the Home Minister’s visit. I subscribe to this criticism.
9. Now that an invitation has reportedly been issued, we have to examine what should be the agenda of the proposed interactions between the two Foreign Secretaries if Pakistan responds positively. While re-vitalising these interactions, it should be our endeavour to expand the basket of issues of concern to India, which have arisen since the format of the composite dialogue was agreed upon when Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee was the Prime Minister and which are not discussed specifically now.
10. While the issue of mutual legal assistance between the principal investigation agencies should be the concern of the two Home/Interior Ministers, there are two other issues, which should be brought within the scope of the interactions between the two Foreign Secretaries. These are the continuing threats to the security of the Indian diplomatic missions in Afghanistan and Bangladesh from Pakistan-based terrorists and action by Pakistan to neutralize those threats and the dangers of Al Qaeda and its associates getting hold of weapons of mass destruction material and how to prevent them.
11. Pakistan’s initial reaction to the addition of these issues could be negative, but that should not discourage us from raising them. ( 5-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Since the beginning of this week, the Government of India has initiated two moves to expand the scope of the interactions with the Government of Pakistan, which have remained stunted since the 26/11 terrorist strikes by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in Mumbai. The terrorist attacks brought the structured, formalized composite dialogue on the various issues coming in the way of the normalization of bilateral relations to a state of suspension. They did not interrupt the normal official interactions between the two Governments. However, these have remained in low key with no new ideas or new initiatives.
2.While not making any substantive move to resume the composite dialogue despite repeated demands to do so from Pakistani leaders and entreaties in the same direction from the US, the Government of India has initiated two moves to re-vitalise the interactions at the political and professional levels, presumably in order to test the waters for a resumption of the composite dialogue process at a later stage.
3.The first move----at the political level--- is the decision that Shri P.Chidambaram, the Home Minister, should participate in the SAARC Home/Interior Ministers’ conference, which is scheduled to be held in Islamabad later this month, and hold bilateral discussions in the margins of the conference with Mr.Rehman Malik, his Pakistani counterpart. There has been no high-level political visit since 26/11.
4.The bilateral discussions, if approached seriously by the two Governments, should be useful in exchanging notes on the progress of the investigation and prosecution of the 26/11 conspiracy by the LET and in laying the groundwork for establishing a tradition of mutual legal assistance between the principal investigation agencies of the two countries. This has to be a political decision and only the two Ministers would be able to take such a decision.
5.Mr.Malik has been a trusted associate of President Asif Ali Zardari and was a confidante of the late Benazir Bhutto since 1996. Though his relations with Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani and the military-intelligence establishment are not very good, he should be able to speak with authority on behalf of Mr.Zardari. Moreover, he is an ex-police officer, who had held a senior position in Pakistan’s Federal Investigation Agency, which, inter alia, investigates and prosecutes major terrorism-related cases He has more the mindset of a Pakistani police officer than of an army officer and has not been known for obsessive anti-India feelings.
6. The second move---at the professional level---- is the reported invitation by Shrimati Nirupama Rao, our Foreign Secretary, to her Pakistani counterpart Mr.Salman Bashir, to visit New Delhi on mutually convenient dates “ to discuss terrorism and any other issue that could lead to peace between the two neighbours” as reported by the media.
7. While there should be no problem with regard to Shri Chidambaram’s visit to Islamabad and his bilateral discussions with Mr.Malik, it remains to be seen whether the Pakistani Foreign Office would go along with the wording of the reported invitation which does not make any reference to a resumption of the composite dialogue. There is a possibility though that the US will strongly nudge Pakistan to respond positively to the invitation without insisting on a reference to the composite dialogue.
8. There has been some valid criticism from sections of the New Delhi-based community of retired officers of what they view as the haste shown by the MEA in rushing with the invitation instead of waiting to see what transpires during the Home Minister’s visit. I subscribe to this criticism.
9. Now that an invitation has reportedly been issued, we have to examine what should be the agenda of the proposed interactions between the two Foreign Secretaries if Pakistan responds positively. While re-vitalising these interactions, it should be our endeavour to expand the basket of issues of concern to India, which have arisen since the format of the composite dialogue was agreed upon when Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee was the Prime Minister and which are not discussed specifically now.
10. While the issue of mutual legal assistance between the principal investigation agencies should be the concern of the two Home/Interior Ministers, there are two other issues, which should be brought within the scope of the interactions between the two Foreign Secretaries. These are the continuing threats to the security of the Indian diplomatic missions in Afghanistan and Bangladesh from Pakistan-based terrorists and action by Pakistan to neutralize those threats and the dangers of Al Qaeda and its associates getting hold of weapons of mass destruction material and how to prevent them.
11. Pakistan’s initial reaction to the addition of these issues could be negative, but that should not discourage us from raising them. ( 5-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, February 3, 2010
THE TEHRIK-E-TALIBAN PAKISTAN---AN UPDATE
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO 615
B.RAMAN
The death of three US soldiers (Marines?), living under civilian cover in the Lower Dir District of the Malakand Division of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan, in an explosion which a struck a convoy in which they were reportedly traveling with some Pakistani security forces personnel on February 3,2010, has been confirmed by the US Embassy in Islamabad.
2. Initially, the killed Americans were projected as journalists or as employees of the US Agency For International Development (AID), but subsequently, the US Embassy admitted that they were military personnel deployed in the area on a training-cum- civil construction mission. They were posted in the area to train personnel of the Frontier Corps (FC), a para-military unit headquartered in Peshawar and consisting largely of Pashtuns recruited in the NWFP and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
3.Since 2005, there have been many reported instances of the penetration of the FC by the Pakistani Taliban and collusion of many FC personnel with the Taliban. There were also instances of the desertions of a large number of FC personnel to the Taliban during the fighting in the South Waziristan area.
4. Despite such instances, the US had proposed a project for the training of the FC personnel by members of the US Special Forces units and for undertaking civil construction projects in remote rural areas in the hope of thereby helping the FC win the hearts and minds of the local tribals and weaning them away from supporting the Taliban. This project, which was accepted by the Pakistan Government, has been under implementation for over a year.
5.The training project has two components. Under the first component, selected commissioned officers of the FC are taken to the US for special training. Under the second component, selected non-commissioned officers and other ranks are trained locally in the NEFP, but not in the FATA.
6.The three US military personnel killed on February 3 were reportedly proceeding in a convoy escorted by the FC to attend the inauguration of a school for girls constructed by the voluntary labour of the FC personnel and the US trainers. Available details regarding the incident are confusing. Some reports suggest the explosion was triggered off either by a suicide bomber or through a remote control device as the convoy was proceeding to the venue of the function. If this was so, it is not clear, as to how, many girls, who had assembled at the venue, were injured. A possibility is that the explosion struck the convoy just as it arrived at the venue.
7.It is also not clear whether the explosion specifically targeted the US military personnel or it merely targeted the girls school because the Taliban is opposed to girls’ education and the US personnel who were there got killed. A person, who claimed to be the spokesman of the Pakistani Taliban, has claimed that the Taliban carried out the attack and alleged that the three US military personnel were actually working for Blackwater, a US security firm employed by the US Government for physical security and training purposes in the Af-Pak area.
8.The Dir area of the Malakand Division is the native place of Sufi Mohammad, the founder of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), a component of the TTP, which had established its control over the Swat Valley of the Malakand Division under the leadership of Maulana Fazlullah, son-in-law of Sufi Mohammad, who is a native of Swat. In operations undertaken towards the end of 2008 and in the beginning of 2009, the Pakistani Army managed to eject the TNSM from the Malakand Division, including Lower and Upper Dir and Swat. Its leaders evaded capture or death and managed to escape.
9.The explosion of February 3 shows that while the TNSM and its associates in the area may have lost their territorial control in the area, they still have some capability for random attacks with explosive devices. The incident is unlikely to affect the training programme of the US. What is significant is not the success of the terrorists on February 3, but their inability to identify and target US military trainers till now despite the fact that they have been operating in the area for over a year now. This speaks well of the high level of security of the training programme.
10.In the meanwhile, rumours regarding the death of Hakimullah, the Amir of the TTP, on January 26, 2010, as a result of the injuries sustained by him in a US Drone strike on January 14,2010, continue to persist despite the repeated denial of these rumours by the TTP. There is no way of establishing the veracity of these rumours unless the TTP itself decides to admit the truth, if he is really dead, as it did after a delay in the case of the death of his predecessor Baitullah Mehsud in a Drone strike in August last.
11.What is clear is that despite the spectacular success of the TTP in getting seven CIA officers and one Jordanian intelligence officer killed in the Khost area of Afghanistan on December 30,2009, through a Jordanian double agent, it seems to be facing difficulties in Pakistani territory due to relentless air strikes by the US with its Drones and the Pakistani Army operations in the South Waziristan area. It has lost territorial control in the Mehsud area in South Waziristan and the disruption of its command and control has resulted in the senior leaders of the organization such as Hakimullah himself if he is still alive, Waliur Rehman, its leader in charge of South Waziristan, and Qari Hussain Mehsud, in charge of its suicide wing, being forced to move from place to place in non-Mehsud areas in order to escape attacks by the US Drones. This has added to their vulnerability and affected their ability to carry out spectacular terrorist strikes in the non-tribal areas. The TTP seems to be a weakened , but not a defeated force.
12. This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article titled CIA: Alive & Kicking at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers37/paper3610.html . (4-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
The death of three US soldiers (Marines?), living under civilian cover in the Lower Dir District of the Malakand Division of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan, in an explosion which a struck a convoy in which they were reportedly traveling with some Pakistani security forces personnel on February 3,2010, has been confirmed by the US Embassy in Islamabad.
2. Initially, the killed Americans were projected as journalists or as employees of the US Agency For International Development (AID), but subsequently, the US Embassy admitted that they were military personnel deployed in the area on a training-cum- civil construction mission. They were posted in the area to train personnel of the Frontier Corps (FC), a para-military unit headquartered in Peshawar and consisting largely of Pashtuns recruited in the NWFP and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
3.Since 2005, there have been many reported instances of the penetration of the FC by the Pakistani Taliban and collusion of many FC personnel with the Taliban. There were also instances of the desertions of a large number of FC personnel to the Taliban during the fighting in the South Waziristan area.
4. Despite such instances, the US had proposed a project for the training of the FC personnel by members of the US Special Forces units and for undertaking civil construction projects in remote rural areas in the hope of thereby helping the FC win the hearts and minds of the local tribals and weaning them away from supporting the Taliban. This project, which was accepted by the Pakistan Government, has been under implementation for over a year.
5.The training project has two components. Under the first component, selected commissioned officers of the FC are taken to the US for special training. Under the second component, selected non-commissioned officers and other ranks are trained locally in the NEFP, but not in the FATA.
6.The three US military personnel killed on February 3 were reportedly proceeding in a convoy escorted by the FC to attend the inauguration of a school for girls constructed by the voluntary labour of the FC personnel and the US trainers. Available details regarding the incident are confusing. Some reports suggest the explosion was triggered off either by a suicide bomber or through a remote control device as the convoy was proceeding to the venue of the function. If this was so, it is not clear, as to how, many girls, who had assembled at the venue, were injured. A possibility is that the explosion struck the convoy just as it arrived at the venue.
7.It is also not clear whether the explosion specifically targeted the US military personnel or it merely targeted the girls school because the Taliban is opposed to girls’ education and the US personnel who were there got killed. A person, who claimed to be the spokesman of the Pakistani Taliban, has claimed that the Taliban carried out the attack and alleged that the three US military personnel were actually working for Blackwater, a US security firm employed by the US Government for physical security and training purposes in the Af-Pak area.
8.The Dir area of the Malakand Division is the native place of Sufi Mohammad, the founder of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), a component of the TTP, which had established its control over the Swat Valley of the Malakand Division under the leadership of Maulana Fazlullah, son-in-law of Sufi Mohammad, who is a native of Swat. In operations undertaken towards the end of 2008 and in the beginning of 2009, the Pakistani Army managed to eject the TNSM from the Malakand Division, including Lower and Upper Dir and Swat. Its leaders evaded capture or death and managed to escape.
9.The explosion of February 3 shows that while the TNSM and its associates in the area may have lost their territorial control in the area, they still have some capability for random attacks with explosive devices. The incident is unlikely to affect the training programme of the US. What is significant is not the success of the terrorists on February 3, but their inability to identify and target US military trainers till now despite the fact that they have been operating in the area for over a year now. This speaks well of the high level of security of the training programme.
10.In the meanwhile, rumours regarding the death of Hakimullah, the Amir of the TTP, on January 26, 2010, as a result of the injuries sustained by him in a US Drone strike on January 14,2010, continue to persist despite the repeated denial of these rumours by the TTP. There is no way of establishing the veracity of these rumours unless the TTP itself decides to admit the truth, if he is really dead, as it did after a delay in the case of the death of his predecessor Baitullah Mehsud in a Drone strike in August last.
11.What is clear is that despite the spectacular success of the TTP in getting seven CIA officers and one Jordanian intelligence officer killed in the Khost area of Afghanistan on December 30,2009, through a Jordanian double agent, it seems to be facing difficulties in Pakistani territory due to relentless air strikes by the US with its Drones and the Pakistani Army operations in the South Waziristan area. It has lost territorial control in the Mehsud area in South Waziristan and the disruption of its command and control has resulted in the senior leaders of the organization such as Hakimullah himself if he is still alive, Waliur Rehman, its leader in charge of South Waziristan, and Qari Hussain Mehsud, in charge of its suicide wing, being forced to move from place to place in non-Mehsud areas in order to escape attacks by the US Drones. This has added to their vulnerability and affected their ability to carry out spectacular terrorist strikes in the non-tribal areas. The TTP seems to be a weakened , but not a defeated force.
12. This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article titled CIA: Alive & Kicking at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers37/paper3610.html . (4-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
CHINA BLOWING HOT, BLOWING COLD
B.RAMAN
Is the tension in the relations between the US and China over the decision of President Barack Obama to notify the US Congress on January 29,2010, of his decision to clear the sale of a new arms package to Taiwan showing signs of cooling down?
2. It is less than a week since Mr.Obama cleared the sale, but some Chinese comments have already started referring to the consequent diplomatic tension in the past rather than in the present tense. A reference is made to it not as a continuing tension, but as the “recent” strain.
3. Does this mean that after having stepped up the rhetoric with blunt warnings of Chinese economic sanctions against US companies such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin, which manufacture the weapons and other military equipment that are proposed to be sold to Taiwan, the Chinese are trying to cool the crisis?
4. The threat of sanctions still remains, but the realization seems to be sinking in that the sanctions could prove to be a double-edged sword. For example, a half of the existing Chinese commercial aircraft fleet is of Boeing manufacture. If the Chinese impose sanctions against Boeing, what impact that would have on the maintenance of the aircraft acquired in the past and the continued availability of spare parts for them?
5. Next to the Beijing Olympics of August, 2008, the Chinese have attached a major importance and status symbol to the forthcoming World Trade Expo in Shanghai. Its success would to a considerable extent depend on the participation of American manufacturers and businessmen. If China tried to take punitive action against some US companies in retaliation for the Taiwan deal, what impact it might have on US participation in the Shanghai Expo?
6. China has to stood to benefit in recent years not only in its economic development, but also in its diplomatic standing in the international community as a result of the over-all improvement in its relations with the US. Individual areas of tension remain and will continue to remain, but should such areas be allowed to damage the over-all relationship?
7. The Obama Administration might be sticking to the policies of the previous Administration in matters such as those concerning Taiwan and human rights in Tibet, but it is not showing any indication of reverting to the policy of multilateral tie-ups with countries such as India, Japan and Australia in a manner that could be detrimental to China. Is it not in China’s interest to encourage the Obama Administration to continue to avoid such tie-ups which worry China?
8. One could see signs of an introspection in the articles carried by sections of the Chinese media , which are more balanced and less jingoistic than those published immediately after the decision of Mr.Obama. Even the titles of these articles speak of a desire to cool it. Examples: “ China & US On Steady Path To Warmer Relations” ( “Global Times” of Feb.2) ; “Old Issues, New Ways of Engagement” ( “Global Times” of February 4); “Keep Sino-US Soft Conflicts Under Control “ ( “China Daily” of February 4).
9. Even on the issue of the expected meeting of His Holiness the Dalai Lama with Mr.Obama possibly later this month, Chinese analysts have started making a distinction between Mr.Obama’s right to receive any foreign visitor, which may not be that deplorable, and his using such meetings for moralizing purposes such as highlighting the continuing US interest in Tibetan human rights, which would be deplorable.
10. A clear enunciation of the Chinese official thinking on the general issue of the importance attached by Beijing to China’s relations with the US and the sequel to the current tensions relating to arms sale to Taiwan and the proposed meeting with His Holiness might be given by Mr.Yang Jiechi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, during his participation in the annual Munich Security Conference starting on February 5. This is the first time a Chinese Foreign Minister is participating in this conference. (4-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd ), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Is the tension in the relations between the US and China over the decision of President Barack Obama to notify the US Congress on January 29,2010, of his decision to clear the sale of a new arms package to Taiwan showing signs of cooling down?
2. It is less than a week since Mr.Obama cleared the sale, but some Chinese comments have already started referring to the consequent diplomatic tension in the past rather than in the present tense. A reference is made to it not as a continuing tension, but as the “recent” strain.
3. Does this mean that after having stepped up the rhetoric with blunt warnings of Chinese economic sanctions against US companies such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin, which manufacture the weapons and other military equipment that are proposed to be sold to Taiwan, the Chinese are trying to cool the crisis?
4. The threat of sanctions still remains, but the realization seems to be sinking in that the sanctions could prove to be a double-edged sword. For example, a half of the existing Chinese commercial aircraft fleet is of Boeing manufacture. If the Chinese impose sanctions against Boeing, what impact that would have on the maintenance of the aircraft acquired in the past and the continued availability of spare parts for them?
5. Next to the Beijing Olympics of August, 2008, the Chinese have attached a major importance and status symbol to the forthcoming World Trade Expo in Shanghai. Its success would to a considerable extent depend on the participation of American manufacturers and businessmen. If China tried to take punitive action against some US companies in retaliation for the Taiwan deal, what impact it might have on US participation in the Shanghai Expo?
6. China has to stood to benefit in recent years not only in its economic development, but also in its diplomatic standing in the international community as a result of the over-all improvement in its relations with the US. Individual areas of tension remain and will continue to remain, but should such areas be allowed to damage the over-all relationship?
7. The Obama Administration might be sticking to the policies of the previous Administration in matters such as those concerning Taiwan and human rights in Tibet, but it is not showing any indication of reverting to the policy of multilateral tie-ups with countries such as India, Japan and Australia in a manner that could be detrimental to China. Is it not in China’s interest to encourage the Obama Administration to continue to avoid such tie-ups which worry China?
8. One could see signs of an introspection in the articles carried by sections of the Chinese media , which are more balanced and less jingoistic than those published immediately after the decision of Mr.Obama. Even the titles of these articles speak of a desire to cool it. Examples: “ China & US On Steady Path To Warmer Relations” ( “Global Times” of Feb.2) ; “Old Issues, New Ways of Engagement” ( “Global Times” of February 4); “Keep Sino-US Soft Conflicts Under Control “ ( “China Daily” of February 4).
9. Even on the issue of the expected meeting of His Holiness the Dalai Lama with Mr.Obama possibly later this month, Chinese analysts have started making a distinction between Mr.Obama’s right to receive any foreign visitor, which may not be that deplorable, and his using such meetings for moralizing purposes such as highlighting the continuing US interest in Tibetan human rights, which would be deplorable.
10. A clear enunciation of the Chinese official thinking on the general issue of the importance attached by Beijing to China’s relations with the US and the sequel to the current tensions relating to arms sale to Taiwan and the proposed meeting with His Holiness might be given by Mr.Yang Jiechi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, during his participation in the annual Munich Security Conference starting on February 5. This is the first time a Chinese Foreign Minister is participating in this conference. (4-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd ), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, February 2, 2010
AFTER THE DALAI LAMA, WHAT?
B.RAMAN
Even while pretending to avoid the discourtesy to His Holiness the Dalai Lama of discussing what could happen after him while he was still alive, the Chinese authorities have indirectly dwelt on this subject at a press conference held on February 2,2010, to brief the Beijing-based media on the outcome of the ninth round of the dialogue with Mr.Lodi Gyari and Mr.Kelsang Gyaltsen, the special emissaries of His Holiness , from January 26 to 31. It is understood that the dialogue consisted of one day of formal talks in Beijing and a visit to minority-inhabited areas for a briefing on China’s policy towards its ethnic minorities.
2. The Chinese Communist Party was represented in the talks with the representatives of His Holiness by Mr.Du Qinglin, Vice-Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and Mr. Zhu Weiqun, Executive Vice-Minister of the United Front Work Department of the CPC Central Committee. The media briefing was held by Mr.Zhu.
3. Mr.Zhu made it clear that it was not a Sino-Tibetan dialogue, but a meeting with two “private representatives” of the Dalai Lama on the future of His Holiness and his associates and not on the future of Tibet and the Tibetan people. He dismissed the Dalai Lama's claim of being the "legal representative" of Tibetans. He said: “The Chinese Government and the Government of Tibet Autonomous Region under its leadership are the only representatives of Tibetans.”
4. He said that during the talks, the Dalai Lama's “private representatives” refused to "revise a single word" in the Memorandum for All Tibetans to Enjoy Genuine Autonomy which they had presented at the previous round, nor did they make any concession. They insisted that the Dalai Lama is "a legal representative of broad Tibetans" and would like to talk with the Central Government about the "Tibet issue" and "the welfare of 6 million Tibetans," he said.
5 Mr.Zhu added: "The so-called 'Tibet government-in-exile' composed of those who defected to India and gathered there absolutely violates China's laws. The private representatives have no legal status to discuss with us the affairs about Tibet Autonomous Region. They are only the Dalai Lama's private representatives, so they can only talk about the prospect of the Dalai Lama, at most, the prospects of a small party around him."
6. Mr.Zhu also warned of serious damage to Sino-US relations if US leaders were to meet with the Dalai Lama, saying the move would "harm others but bring no profit to itself either." The US side would violate international rules by making such a decision. Such a move would be both irrational and harmful, he said. "If a country decides to do so, we will take necessary measures to help them realize this."
7. He said the talks with the representatives of the Dalai Lama "had some upside" as they let both sides know exactly their differences and how wide the differences were. He added: "It helps the Dalai Lama realize the position he has been in. The Central Government wanted to give the Dalai Lama a chance to correct his mistakes by holding talks with his envoys. The talks were not without result, as the Central Government arranged trips for the envoys to visit central Hunan Province to better understand the country and the regional ethnic autonomy policy.”
8. According to Mr.Zhu, when the previous round ended in November,2008, after the Chinese rejected the Memo presented by the representatives of the Dalai Lama, Mr.Lodi Gyari left saying they would not want any new round of talks, but this time after the latest round failed, Mr.Lodi Gyari said the talks will continue in the future.
9. Mr.Zhu objected to some of the past remarks of His Holiness describing himself as “ a son of India” and projecting Arunachal Pradesh, which the Chinese describe as southern Tibet, as belonging to India, and asked: "Can these act and words of the Dalai Lama improve relations with the Central government?" Mr. Zhu said it was imperative that the Dalai Lama should "match word to deed." What he sought to convey was that if His Holiness really felt that Tibet was part of China, he should not support India’s claim to Arunachal Pradesh.
10. He added that the Central Government wanted the Dalai Lama to abandon his alleged attempts to split the country, cease separatist activities, openly admit that Tibet was an inalienable part of China and Taiwan was an inalienable part of China and the Government of the People's Republic of China was the only legal government representing China.
11. The most interesting part of the briefing was about what could happen in Tibet after His Holiness. Mr.Zhu was asked by one of the journalists if he felt that the Tibetan issue would become more difficult to handle after the death of the Dalai Lama. He replied: “ Chinese people, including Tibetans, will decide the future of Tibet. It is not polite in China to talk about the possibility of a 75-year-old man passing away. We hope he can live a long life. The Central Government hoped the Dalai Lama could settle his affairs concerning his own prospects while still alive and would not pass away abroad. Since the armed rebellion in 1959, what did the Dalai Lama get except that he was pushed further and further away from the journey home? His followers should ponder what they should do when the Dalai Lama departed this life.”
12.Asked to comment on whether there would be an upsurge of violence and terrorist activities after the death of the Dalai Lama,Mr. Zhu said he believed most Tibetans living abroad loved peace and would like to contact their family and friends in Tibet and be engaged in Tibet's development. It could not be ruled out that a few people would turn to violence, but history had showed that violence and terrorist activities would inevitably end in failure. (3-2-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Even while pretending to avoid the discourtesy to His Holiness the Dalai Lama of discussing what could happen after him while he was still alive, the Chinese authorities have indirectly dwelt on this subject at a press conference held on February 2,2010, to brief the Beijing-based media on the outcome of the ninth round of the dialogue with Mr.Lodi Gyari and Mr.Kelsang Gyaltsen, the special emissaries of His Holiness , from January 26 to 31. It is understood that the dialogue consisted of one day of formal talks in Beijing and a visit to minority-inhabited areas for a briefing on China’s policy towards its ethnic minorities.
2. The Chinese Communist Party was represented in the talks with the representatives of His Holiness by Mr.Du Qinglin, Vice-Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and Mr. Zhu Weiqun, Executive Vice-Minister of the United Front Work Department of the CPC Central Committee. The media briefing was held by Mr.Zhu.
3. Mr.Zhu made it clear that it was not a Sino-Tibetan dialogue, but a meeting with two “private representatives” of the Dalai Lama on the future of His Holiness and his associates and not on the future of Tibet and the Tibetan people. He dismissed the Dalai Lama's claim of being the "legal representative" of Tibetans. He said: “The Chinese Government and the Government of Tibet Autonomous Region under its leadership are the only representatives of Tibetans.”
4. He said that during the talks, the Dalai Lama's “private representatives” refused to "revise a single word" in the Memorandum for All Tibetans to Enjoy Genuine Autonomy which they had presented at the previous round, nor did they make any concession. They insisted that the Dalai Lama is "a legal representative of broad Tibetans" and would like to talk with the Central Government about the "Tibet issue" and "the welfare of 6 million Tibetans," he said.
5 Mr.Zhu added: "The so-called 'Tibet government-in-exile' composed of those who defected to India and gathered there absolutely violates China's laws. The private representatives have no legal status to discuss with us the affairs about Tibet Autonomous Region. They are only the Dalai Lama's private representatives, so they can only talk about the prospect of the Dalai Lama, at most, the prospects of a small party around him."
6. Mr.Zhu also warned of serious damage to Sino-US relations if US leaders were to meet with the Dalai Lama, saying the move would "harm others but bring no profit to itself either." The US side would violate international rules by making such a decision. Such a move would be both irrational and harmful, he said. "If a country decides to do so, we will take necessary measures to help them realize this."
7. He said the talks with the representatives of the Dalai Lama "had some upside" as they let both sides know exactly their differences and how wide the differences were. He added: "It helps the Dalai Lama realize the position he has been in. The Central Government wanted to give the Dalai Lama a chance to correct his mistakes by holding talks with his envoys. The talks were not without result, as the Central Government arranged trips for the envoys to visit central Hunan Province to better understand the country and the regional ethnic autonomy policy.”
8. According to Mr.Zhu, when the previous round ended in November,2008, after the Chinese rejected the Memo presented by the representatives of the Dalai Lama, Mr.Lodi Gyari left saying they would not want any new round of talks, but this time after the latest round failed, Mr.Lodi Gyari said the talks will continue in the future.
9. Mr.Zhu objected to some of the past remarks of His Holiness describing himself as “ a son of India” and projecting Arunachal Pradesh, which the Chinese describe as southern Tibet, as belonging to India, and asked: "Can these act and words of the Dalai Lama improve relations with the Central government?" Mr. Zhu said it was imperative that the Dalai Lama should "match word to deed." What he sought to convey was that if His Holiness really felt that Tibet was part of China, he should not support India’s claim to Arunachal Pradesh.
10. He added that the Central Government wanted the Dalai Lama to abandon his alleged attempts to split the country, cease separatist activities, openly admit that Tibet was an inalienable part of China and Taiwan was an inalienable part of China and the Government of the People's Republic of China was the only legal government representing China.
11. The most interesting part of the briefing was about what could happen in Tibet after His Holiness. Mr.Zhu was asked by one of the journalists if he felt that the Tibetan issue would become more difficult to handle after the death of the Dalai Lama. He replied: “ Chinese people, including Tibetans, will decide the future of Tibet. It is not polite in China to talk about the possibility of a 75-year-old man passing away. We hope he can live a long life. The Central Government hoped the Dalai Lama could settle his affairs concerning his own prospects while still alive and would not pass away abroad. Since the armed rebellion in 1959, what did the Dalai Lama get except that he was pushed further and further away from the journey home? His followers should ponder what they should do when the Dalai Lama departed this life.”
12.Asked to comment on whether there would be an upsurge of violence and terrorist activities after the death of the Dalai Lama,Mr. Zhu said he believed most Tibetans living abroad loved peace and would like to contact their family and friends in Tibet and be engaged in Tibet's development. It could not be ruled out that a few people would turn to violence, but history had showed that violence and terrorist activities would inevitably end in failure. (3-2-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
CHINA: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC CLAMOUR BUT AVOIDING OVER-REACTION BY STATE
B.RAMAN
In their reaction to the decision of President Barack Obama to go ahead with the sale of a new arms package to Taiwan, the Chinese authorities have been a following a dual tactics similar to what they had done before the Beijing Olympics of August 2008, when there was a threat of a boycott of the opening ceremony by some Western countries such as France over the issue of human rights in China.
2. This dual tactics consisted of encouraging a public clamour for strong retaliation against the West through sections of China’s media and Internet users in the form of boycott of Western goods, while the State itself sought to convey an impression of acting with restraint despite the perceived provocation from the West and the demands from the public for strong retaliation. The Chinese tactics worked. There was no boycott.
3. In reacting to the decision of the Obama Administration to go ahead with the long-pending arms sale to Taiwan, the Chinese have been encouraging their party and Government controlled media units such as the “Global Times” and the “China Daily” to demand strong action against the US companies such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin, which,inter alia, manufacture some of the weapons and military equipment, which are proposed to be sold to Taiwan, while the Government itself has till now restricted its retaliation to suspending military exchanges with the US, while talking of the available extra option of sanctions against the US companies.
4. At the same time, the Chinese have carefully avoided any talk of a wider retaliatory action such as suspending fresh investments in the US treasury bonds or even reducing their current holdings in the US bonds, which might damage the US economy.
5. The present Chinese concerns are confined to two issues: Firstly, securing a commitment from the US that there will be no more arms sales to Taiwan even if the present package is not re-considered under Beijing’s pressure and , secondly, to ensure that Mr.Obama does not revert to the past policies of the Clinton and Bush Administrations of maintaining interactions with His Holiness the Dalai Lama under some cover or the other. The Chinese have been sending out warnings that if Mr.Obama receives His Holiness during his visit to the US later this month, they would find it even more difficult to resist public clamour for a strong retaliation against the US than today.
6.While deciding on the appropriate options available to Beijing, the Chinese authorities are keen that the escalation of rhetoric on the Taiwan and the Dalai Lama issues does not damage China’s economic linkages with the US. The present Chinese economic recovery is largely due to their pumping money into their market in order to boost the domestic purchase of manufactured goods to compensate for the loss of overseas orders, particularly from the US. The Chinese realize that the continued recovery of their manufacturing sector would depend on the recovery of the US economy and the resumption of the flow of large orders from the US. They do not want to take any hasty action which could reverse the present trend towards economic recovery.
7. If China has a credible weapon against the US in the form of its bond holdings in the US, the US has an equally potent weapon against China in the form of the dependence of the Chinese manufacturing sector on the US market. The Chinese Government will therefore continue to be measured in its reaction while letting the public clamour for even stronger action continue for some time. ( 3-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
In their reaction to the decision of President Barack Obama to go ahead with the sale of a new arms package to Taiwan, the Chinese authorities have been a following a dual tactics similar to what they had done before the Beijing Olympics of August 2008, when there was a threat of a boycott of the opening ceremony by some Western countries such as France over the issue of human rights in China.
2. This dual tactics consisted of encouraging a public clamour for strong retaliation against the West through sections of China’s media and Internet users in the form of boycott of Western goods, while the State itself sought to convey an impression of acting with restraint despite the perceived provocation from the West and the demands from the public for strong retaliation. The Chinese tactics worked. There was no boycott.
3. In reacting to the decision of the Obama Administration to go ahead with the long-pending arms sale to Taiwan, the Chinese have been encouraging their party and Government controlled media units such as the “Global Times” and the “China Daily” to demand strong action against the US companies such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin, which,inter alia, manufacture some of the weapons and military equipment, which are proposed to be sold to Taiwan, while the Government itself has till now restricted its retaliation to suspending military exchanges with the US, while talking of the available extra option of sanctions against the US companies.
4. At the same time, the Chinese have carefully avoided any talk of a wider retaliatory action such as suspending fresh investments in the US treasury bonds or even reducing their current holdings in the US bonds, which might damage the US economy.
5. The present Chinese concerns are confined to two issues: Firstly, securing a commitment from the US that there will be no more arms sales to Taiwan even if the present package is not re-considered under Beijing’s pressure and , secondly, to ensure that Mr.Obama does not revert to the past policies of the Clinton and Bush Administrations of maintaining interactions with His Holiness the Dalai Lama under some cover or the other. The Chinese have been sending out warnings that if Mr.Obama receives His Holiness during his visit to the US later this month, they would find it even more difficult to resist public clamour for a strong retaliation against the US than today.
6.While deciding on the appropriate options available to Beijing, the Chinese authorities are keen that the escalation of rhetoric on the Taiwan and the Dalai Lama issues does not damage China’s economic linkages with the US. The present Chinese economic recovery is largely due to their pumping money into their market in order to boost the domestic purchase of manufactured goods to compensate for the loss of overseas orders, particularly from the US. The Chinese realize that the continued recovery of their manufacturing sector would depend on the recovery of the US economy and the resumption of the flow of large orders from the US. They do not want to take any hasty action which could reverse the present trend towards economic recovery.
7. If China has a credible weapon against the US in the form of its bond holdings in the US, the US has an equally potent weapon against China in the form of the dependence of the Chinese manufacturing sector on the US market. The Chinese Government will therefore continue to be measured in its reaction while letting the public clamour for even stronger action continue for some time. ( 3-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Sunday, January 31, 2010
CHINA WANTS DALAI LAMA TO BE REALISTIC
B.RAMAN
His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s Special Envoy Lodi G. Gyari and Envoy Kelsang Gyaltsen arrived in China on January 26,2010, for the ninth round of discussions with the representatives of the Chinese leadership.The eighth round terminated without any agreement in November 2008. The present dialogue started in 2002. They were accompanied by senior assistants Tenzin P. Atisha, Bhuchung K. Tsering, both members of the Tibetan Task Force on Negotiations, and Jigmey Passang from the Secretariat of the Tibetan Task Force. As the talks progress, China seems to have suspended for the time being its campaign of demonisation of His Holiness. Even overseas supporters of His Holiness concede that the Chinese Government and the Communist Party have toned their rhetoric against His Holiness.
2. Messages coming out of commentaries and editorials on the resumption of the talks after an interval of 14 months are that unless His Holiness adopts a more realistic attitude in the present round of talks, there will be no useful outcome. By a realistic attitude, the Chinese mean His Holiness accepting the present constitutional and political status of the Tibet Autonomous Region without raising demands for a merger of all Tibetan inhabited areas and without insisting on the expansion of the autonomous powers of the re-constituted Tibetan region. After the failure of the last round, the Chinese had also stated that the Dalai Lama should stop raising the issue of the alleged Han colonization of Tibet and should accept the need for the continued presence of the People’s Liberation Army troops in the Tibet Autonomous Region. While accepting that Tibet is a part of China, His Holiness reportedly wants for it a special status similar to the status enjoyed by Hong Kong. The Chinese have already ruled this out.
3.In a commentary titled “Dalai Should Seize Chance Provided by Talks” published on January 28,2010, the “Global Times” run by the party-owned “People’s Daily” group, explained in the following words what the Chinese expected of His Holiness: “Now, at the age of 75, time is not on the side of the Dalai Lama. Though the March 14 riots in Tibet in 2008, plotted by the Dalai clique, caught the world's attention for a while, it is always the progress of China, including Tibet, which has impressed the world. For his own sake, the Dalai Lama needs to make the most of the opportunity provided by the current round of talks with the central government. As the new round of talks in eight years, also the first since November 2008, is underway, it is time for him to reflect on the discussions thus far, the reasons for them getting stalled and adopt a more realistic approach to keep the dialogue going with the central government. Only when he gives up "Tibetan independence", eschews separatist activities, and acknowledges Tibet as an inalienable part of China can the talks yield results. Any unrealistic request – such as greater "autonomy" in Tibet and some Tibetan-populated regions, proposed by his envoys during the last talks – are certain to be turned down. The realistic appreciation of Tibet – and not as a mysterious Shangri-la steeped in esoteric religious and cultural traditions – can help clear up the misunderstanding between China and some Western countries over Tibet. The mystification of Tibet has added to the confusion, and even prejudice against the Chinese central government's policy in Tibet. Some sections of the West have gone further by playing the Tibet card to embarrass China, either out of ignorance of Tibet's past and present, or in pursuit of their own political agenda. That explains why the Dalai clique's deliberate agitation and disguised attempt to seek "Tibetan independence" in the name of "autonomy" could once gain some momentum in the West. But more Westerners have come to realize that supporting the Dalai Lama will be in vain and do them no good.”
4. Overseas supporters of His Holiness say that the Chinese initiative for holding another round of talks with the representatives of His Holiness was preceded by the holding in Beijing of a Tibet strategy session from January 18 to 20, 2010. Since the People’s Liberation Army occupied Tibet in 1949-50, Chinese leaders are reported to have held five such strategy sessions under the name the Tibet Work Forum. The latest session called the Fifth Tibet Work Forum was reported to have been attended by about 300 Party, Government and military leaders playing a role in policy-making on Tibet.
5. The strategy session was held at a time when China had successfully weathered international pressure on it on the question of the human rights of the Tibetans. During his visit to China in November last, President Barack Obama was reported to have suggested the resumption of the talks with the representatives of His Holiness. However, it is not clear whether his raising the issue played any role in the Chinese decision to resume the dialogue with His Holiness.
6. Why was a new strategy session held at this time when there is seeming normalcy in Tibet after the anti-Chinese uprising of 2008 and when the international pressure on China on the human rights issue has eased after its successful holding of the Beijing Olympics in August,2008? Does it indicate Chinese nervousness about a fresh spell of trouble in Tibet after the exit of His Holiness, particularly if the person nominated by the Chinese as His Holiness’ reincarnation is not accepted by large sections of the Tibetan population? Do the Chinese want to explore the possibility of reaching a compromise with His Holiness on the modalities for his succession in order to avoid a controversy and fresh violence? Will the Chinese take the initiative in proposing any new ideas to the emissaries of His Holiness instead of merely reacting negatively to suggestions emanating from His Holiness and rejecting them as they were in the habit of doing in the past? While advising the Dalai Lama to be realistic, are the Chinese prepared to be realistic themselves and realize that future peace in Tibet depends on an uncontested succession process endorsed by His Holiness?
7.These are important and relevant questions, but no answers are forthcoming in the Chinese commentaries on the ongoing talks. The International Campaign For Tibet, a Washington DC based organization of His Holiness’ supporters, has come out with a detailed analysis of the recent strategy session on Tibet held by the Chinese leadership. Some interesting points emerging from the analysis are quoted below:
The Fifth Tibet Work Forum concluded days before the envoys of the Dalai Lama, led by Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari, arrived in China for the ninth round of the Sino-Tibetan dialogue. Speculation on the timing of the ninth round of dialogue so soon after the Fifth Tibet Work Forum has raised expectation that this could be a pivotal moment for Tibet.
The Fifth Tibet Work Forum was the first since the protests and crackdown beginning in March, 2008; the fourth was held in June, 2001. It was not announced in the official media until two days after the meeting was over, and the only prior indication that it was about to take place was a series of brief online articles in the state media in English referring to previous Tibet Work Forums. Since then, a carefully-chosen selection of statements from the meeting has been published in the official press, including speeches by Party Secretary and President Hu Jintao, and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao.
Reports on the Fifth Tibet Work Forum in the official media do not indicate a policy shift on Tibet – the emphasis is still on consolidating central control by further assimilation of Tibet into a ‘unified’ Chinese state – but there is a difference in tone and approach, with a notable lack of virulent rhetoric against the Dalai Lama, which is usually such a prevalent feature of official comment and reporting on Tibet.
Reports indicate that there is more of an emphasis on improving conditions in rural areas, although this emphasis still exists within a model of economic development based on infrastructure construction and resource extraction that has shown to deepen the marginalization and poverty of Tibetans. While this new focus on improving conditions in rural areas could be a positive step, the strategy for Tibet’s development as a whole needs to be addressed. The reports suggest that there is less emphasis on the large amount of funds spent on major ‘aid and development’ projects compared to previous Party and government planning documents on Tibet, which may signal a recognition that flooding Tibet with money does not automatically secure loyalty to the state. Tibetans from some of the most ‘developed’ areas of Tibet including Lhasa and parts of eastern Tibet were at the forefront of protests from March 2008 onwards.
Reports from the Fifth Tibet Work Forum demonstrate that Tibet is not of marginal concern but is a core issue to the Party, as evidenced by the strategic significance of Tibet laid out in the published statements. Compared to previous high-level meetings and in line with global concerns on climate change, the Fifth Tibet Work Forum emphasizes security issues linked to the environment of the Tibetan plateau, which is the source of Asia’s major rivers. The Party’s assertion of control over Tibet’s natural resources and fragile eco-system is in the context of an increasing international awareness of the global significance of the impact of climate change in Tibet. Many scientists characterize the Tibetan plateau as the earth’s ‘third pole’ because it has the biggest ice-fields outside the Arctic and Antarctic.
While the Fourth Tibet Work Forum in 2001 focused on the Tibet Autonomous Region, the Fifth includes all Tibetan areas in Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai provinces – encompassing the eastern Tibetan regions of Amdo and Kham – which may indicate a trend towards regional integration of policies across all Tibetan areas of the PRC. Government statements have typically represented only the Tibet Autonomous Region as ‘Tibet.’ The protests that began in March 2008 spread to all Tibetan areas in the PRC, indicating a shared Tibetan identity, a commonality of grievances, concerns and a determination to express a shared loyalty to the Dalai Lama.
The Chinese authorities have announced that they would hold the First Work Forum on the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (East Turkestan) after the regional capital Urumchi erupted in protests and rioting in July 2009. The strategy for Xinjiang is framed with a stronger emphasis on the “fight against splittism” and independence activism than in the Fifth Tibet Work Forum statements seen to date. This could indicate a distinction in the way the Party is now handling policy on Xinjiang and Tibet. ( 1-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Cennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s Special Envoy Lodi G. Gyari and Envoy Kelsang Gyaltsen arrived in China on January 26,2010, for the ninth round of discussions with the representatives of the Chinese leadership.The eighth round terminated without any agreement in November 2008. The present dialogue started in 2002. They were accompanied by senior assistants Tenzin P. Atisha, Bhuchung K. Tsering, both members of the Tibetan Task Force on Negotiations, and Jigmey Passang from the Secretariat of the Tibetan Task Force. As the talks progress, China seems to have suspended for the time being its campaign of demonisation of His Holiness. Even overseas supporters of His Holiness concede that the Chinese Government and the Communist Party have toned their rhetoric against His Holiness.
2. Messages coming out of commentaries and editorials on the resumption of the talks after an interval of 14 months are that unless His Holiness adopts a more realistic attitude in the present round of talks, there will be no useful outcome. By a realistic attitude, the Chinese mean His Holiness accepting the present constitutional and political status of the Tibet Autonomous Region without raising demands for a merger of all Tibetan inhabited areas and without insisting on the expansion of the autonomous powers of the re-constituted Tibetan region. After the failure of the last round, the Chinese had also stated that the Dalai Lama should stop raising the issue of the alleged Han colonization of Tibet and should accept the need for the continued presence of the People’s Liberation Army troops in the Tibet Autonomous Region. While accepting that Tibet is a part of China, His Holiness reportedly wants for it a special status similar to the status enjoyed by Hong Kong. The Chinese have already ruled this out.
3.In a commentary titled “Dalai Should Seize Chance Provided by Talks” published on January 28,2010, the “Global Times” run by the party-owned “People’s Daily” group, explained in the following words what the Chinese expected of His Holiness: “Now, at the age of 75, time is not on the side of the Dalai Lama. Though the March 14 riots in Tibet in 2008, plotted by the Dalai clique, caught the world's attention for a while, it is always the progress of China, including Tibet, which has impressed the world. For his own sake, the Dalai Lama needs to make the most of the opportunity provided by the current round of talks with the central government. As the new round of talks in eight years, also the first since November 2008, is underway, it is time for him to reflect on the discussions thus far, the reasons for them getting stalled and adopt a more realistic approach to keep the dialogue going with the central government. Only when he gives up "Tibetan independence", eschews separatist activities, and acknowledges Tibet as an inalienable part of China can the talks yield results. Any unrealistic request – such as greater "autonomy" in Tibet and some Tibetan-populated regions, proposed by his envoys during the last talks – are certain to be turned down. The realistic appreciation of Tibet – and not as a mysterious Shangri-la steeped in esoteric religious and cultural traditions – can help clear up the misunderstanding between China and some Western countries over Tibet. The mystification of Tibet has added to the confusion, and even prejudice against the Chinese central government's policy in Tibet. Some sections of the West have gone further by playing the Tibet card to embarrass China, either out of ignorance of Tibet's past and present, or in pursuit of their own political agenda. That explains why the Dalai clique's deliberate agitation and disguised attempt to seek "Tibetan independence" in the name of "autonomy" could once gain some momentum in the West. But more Westerners have come to realize that supporting the Dalai Lama will be in vain and do them no good.”
4. Overseas supporters of His Holiness say that the Chinese initiative for holding another round of talks with the representatives of His Holiness was preceded by the holding in Beijing of a Tibet strategy session from January 18 to 20, 2010. Since the People’s Liberation Army occupied Tibet in 1949-50, Chinese leaders are reported to have held five such strategy sessions under the name the Tibet Work Forum. The latest session called the Fifth Tibet Work Forum was reported to have been attended by about 300 Party, Government and military leaders playing a role in policy-making on Tibet.
5. The strategy session was held at a time when China had successfully weathered international pressure on it on the question of the human rights of the Tibetans. During his visit to China in November last, President Barack Obama was reported to have suggested the resumption of the talks with the representatives of His Holiness. However, it is not clear whether his raising the issue played any role in the Chinese decision to resume the dialogue with His Holiness.
6. Why was a new strategy session held at this time when there is seeming normalcy in Tibet after the anti-Chinese uprising of 2008 and when the international pressure on China on the human rights issue has eased after its successful holding of the Beijing Olympics in August,2008? Does it indicate Chinese nervousness about a fresh spell of trouble in Tibet after the exit of His Holiness, particularly if the person nominated by the Chinese as His Holiness’ reincarnation is not accepted by large sections of the Tibetan population? Do the Chinese want to explore the possibility of reaching a compromise with His Holiness on the modalities for his succession in order to avoid a controversy and fresh violence? Will the Chinese take the initiative in proposing any new ideas to the emissaries of His Holiness instead of merely reacting negatively to suggestions emanating from His Holiness and rejecting them as they were in the habit of doing in the past? While advising the Dalai Lama to be realistic, are the Chinese prepared to be realistic themselves and realize that future peace in Tibet depends on an uncontested succession process endorsed by His Holiness?
7.These are important and relevant questions, but no answers are forthcoming in the Chinese commentaries on the ongoing talks. The International Campaign For Tibet, a Washington DC based organization of His Holiness’ supporters, has come out with a detailed analysis of the recent strategy session on Tibet held by the Chinese leadership. Some interesting points emerging from the analysis are quoted below:
The Fifth Tibet Work Forum concluded days before the envoys of the Dalai Lama, led by Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari, arrived in China for the ninth round of the Sino-Tibetan dialogue. Speculation on the timing of the ninth round of dialogue so soon after the Fifth Tibet Work Forum has raised expectation that this could be a pivotal moment for Tibet.
The Fifth Tibet Work Forum was the first since the protests and crackdown beginning in March, 2008; the fourth was held in June, 2001. It was not announced in the official media until two days after the meeting was over, and the only prior indication that it was about to take place was a series of brief online articles in the state media in English referring to previous Tibet Work Forums. Since then, a carefully-chosen selection of statements from the meeting has been published in the official press, including speeches by Party Secretary and President Hu Jintao, and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao.
Reports on the Fifth Tibet Work Forum in the official media do not indicate a policy shift on Tibet – the emphasis is still on consolidating central control by further assimilation of Tibet into a ‘unified’ Chinese state – but there is a difference in tone and approach, with a notable lack of virulent rhetoric against the Dalai Lama, which is usually such a prevalent feature of official comment and reporting on Tibet.
Reports indicate that there is more of an emphasis on improving conditions in rural areas, although this emphasis still exists within a model of economic development based on infrastructure construction and resource extraction that has shown to deepen the marginalization and poverty of Tibetans. While this new focus on improving conditions in rural areas could be a positive step, the strategy for Tibet’s development as a whole needs to be addressed. The reports suggest that there is less emphasis on the large amount of funds spent on major ‘aid and development’ projects compared to previous Party and government planning documents on Tibet, which may signal a recognition that flooding Tibet with money does not automatically secure loyalty to the state. Tibetans from some of the most ‘developed’ areas of Tibet including Lhasa and parts of eastern Tibet were at the forefront of protests from March 2008 onwards.
Reports from the Fifth Tibet Work Forum demonstrate that Tibet is not of marginal concern but is a core issue to the Party, as evidenced by the strategic significance of Tibet laid out in the published statements. Compared to previous high-level meetings and in line with global concerns on climate change, the Fifth Tibet Work Forum emphasizes security issues linked to the environment of the Tibetan plateau, which is the source of Asia’s major rivers. The Party’s assertion of control over Tibet’s natural resources and fragile eco-system is in the context of an increasing international awareness of the global significance of the impact of climate change in Tibet. Many scientists characterize the Tibetan plateau as the earth’s ‘third pole’ because it has the biggest ice-fields outside the Arctic and Antarctic.
While the Fourth Tibet Work Forum in 2001 focused on the Tibet Autonomous Region, the Fifth includes all Tibetan areas in Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai provinces – encompassing the eastern Tibetan regions of Amdo and Kham – which may indicate a trend towards regional integration of policies across all Tibetan areas of the PRC. Government statements have typically represented only the Tibet Autonomous Region as ‘Tibet.’ The protests that began in March 2008 spread to all Tibetan areas in the PRC, indicating a shared Tibetan identity, a commonality of grievances, concerns and a determination to express a shared loyalty to the Dalai Lama.
The Chinese authorities have announced that they would hold the First Work Forum on the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (East Turkestan) after the regional capital Urumchi erupted in protests and rioting in July 2009. The strategy for Xinjiang is framed with a stronger emphasis on the “fight against splittism” and independence activism than in the Fifth Tibet Work Forum statements seen to date. This could indicate a distinction in the way the Party is now handling policy on Xinjiang and Tibet. ( 1-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Cennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)