INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO 615
B.RAMAN
The death of three US soldiers (Marines?), living under civilian cover in the Lower Dir District of the Malakand Division of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan, in an explosion which a struck a convoy in which they were reportedly traveling with some Pakistani security forces personnel on February 3,2010, has been confirmed by the US Embassy in Islamabad.
2. Initially, the killed Americans were projected as journalists or as employees of the US Agency For International Development (AID), but subsequently, the US Embassy admitted that they were military personnel deployed in the area on a training-cum- civil construction mission. They were posted in the area to train personnel of the Frontier Corps (FC), a para-military unit headquartered in Peshawar and consisting largely of Pashtuns recruited in the NWFP and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
3.Since 2005, there have been many reported instances of the penetration of the FC by the Pakistani Taliban and collusion of many FC personnel with the Taliban. There were also instances of the desertions of a large number of FC personnel to the Taliban during the fighting in the South Waziristan area.
4. Despite such instances, the US had proposed a project for the training of the FC personnel by members of the US Special Forces units and for undertaking civil construction projects in remote rural areas in the hope of thereby helping the FC win the hearts and minds of the local tribals and weaning them away from supporting the Taliban. This project, which was accepted by the Pakistan Government, has been under implementation for over a year.
5.The training project has two components. Under the first component, selected commissioned officers of the FC are taken to the US for special training. Under the second component, selected non-commissioned officers and other ranks are trained locally in the NEFP, but not in the FATA.
6.The three US military personnel killed on February 3 were reportedly proceeding in a convoy escorted by the FC to attend the inauguration of a school for girls constructed by the voluntary labour of the FC personnel and the US trainers. Available details regarding the incident are confusing. Some reports suggest the explosion was triggered off either by a suicide bomber or through a remote control device as the convoy was proceeding to the venue of the function. If this was so, it is not clear, as to how, many girls, who had assembled at the venue, were injured. A possibility is that the explosion struck the convoy just as it arrived at the venue.
7.It is also not clear whether the explosion specifically targeted the US military personnel or it merely targeted the girls school because the Taliban is opposed to girls’ education and the US personnel who were there got killed. A person, who claimed to be the spokesman of the Pakistani Taliban, has claimed that the Taliban carried out the attack and alleged that the three US military personnel were actually working for Blackwater, a US security firm employed by the US Government for physical security and training purposes in the Af-Pak area.
8.The Dir area of the Malakand Division is the native place of Sufi Mohammad, the founder of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), a component of the TTP, which had established its control over the Swat Valley of the Malakand Division under the leadership of Maulana Fazlullah, son-in-law of Sufi Mohammad, who is a native of Swat. In operations undertaken towards the end of 2008 and in the beginning of 2009, the Pakistani Army managed to eject the TNSM from the Malakand Division, including Lower and Upper Dir and Swat. Its leaders evaded capture or death and managed to escape.
9.The explosion of February 3 shows that while the TNSM and its associates in the area may have lost their territorial control in the area, they still have some capability for random attacks with explosive devices. The incident is unlikely to affect the training programme of the US. What is significant is not the success of the terrorists on February 3, but their inability to identify and target US military trainers till now despite the fact that they have been operating in the area for over a year now. This speaks well of the high level of security of the training programme.
10.In the meanwhile, rumours regarding the death of Hakimullah, the Amir of the TTP, on January 26, 2010, as a result of the injuries sustained by him in a US Drone strike on January 14,2010, continue to persist despite the repeated denial of these rumours by the TTP. There is no way of establishing the veracity of these rumours unless the TTP itself decides to admit the truth, if he is really dead, as it did after a delay in the case of the death of his predecessor Baitullah Mehsud in a Drone strike in August last.
11.What is clear is that despite the spectacular success of the TTP in getting seven CIA officers and one Jordanian intelligence officer killed in the Khost area of Afghanistan on December 30,2009, through a Jordanian double agent, it seems to be facing difficulties in Pakistani territory due to relentless air strikes by the US with its Drones and the Pakistani Army operations in the South Waziristan area. It has lost territorial control in the Mehsud area in South Waziristan and the disruption of its command and control has resulted in the senior leaders of the organization such as Hakimullah himself if he is still alive, Waliur Rehman, its leader in charge of South Waziristan, and Qari Hussain Mehsud, in charge of its suicide wing, being forced to move from place to place in non-Mehsud areas in order to escape attacks by the US Drones. This has added to their vulnerability and affected their ability to carry out spectacular terrorist strikes in the non-tribal areas. The TTP seems to be a weakened , but not a defeated force.
12. This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article titled CIA: Alive & Kicking at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers37/paper3610.html . (4-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, February 3, 2010
CHINA BLOWING HOT, BLOWING COLD
B.RAMAN
Is the tension in the relations between the US and China over the decision of President Barack Obama to notify the US Congress on January 29,2010, of his decision to clear the sale of a new arms package to Taiwan showing signs of cooling down?
2. It is less than a week since Mr.Obama cleared the sale, but some Chinese comments have already started referring to the consequent diplomatic tension in the past rather than in the present tense. A reference is made to it not as a continuing tension, but as the “recent” strain.
3. Does this mean that after having stepped up the rhetoric with blunt warnings of Chinese economic sanctions against US companies such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin, which manufacture the weapons and other military equipment that are proposed to be sold to Taiwan, the Chinese are trying to cool the crisis?
4. The threat of sanctions still remains, but the realization seems to be sinking in that the sanctions could prove to be a double-edged sword. For example, a half of the existing Chinese commercial aircraft fleet is of Boeing manufacture. If the Chinese impose sanctions against Boeing, what impact that would have on the maintenance of the aircraft acquired in the past and the continued availability of spare parts for them?
5. Next to the Beijing Olympics of August, 2008, the Chinese have attached a major importance and status symbol to the forthcoming World Trade Expo in Shanghai. Its success would to a considerable extent depend on the participation of American manufacturers and businessmen. If China tried to take punitive action against some US companies in retaliation for the Taiwan deal, what impact it might have on US participation in the Shanghai Expo?
6. China has to stood to benefit in recent years not only in its economic development, but also in its diplomatic standing in the international community as a result of the over-all improvement in its relations with the US. Individual areas of tension remain and will continue to remain, but should such areas be allowed to damage the over-all relationship?
7. The Obama Administration might be sticking to the policies of the previous Administration in matters such as those concerning Taiwan and human rights in Tibet, but it is not showing any indication of reverting to the policy of multilateral tie-ups with countries such as India, Japan and Australia in a manner that could be detrimental to China. Is it not in China’s interest to encourage the Obama Administration to continue to avoid such tie-ups which worry China?
8. One could see signs of an introspection in the articles carried by sections of the Chinese media , which are more balanced and less jingoistic than those published immediately after the decision of Mr.Obama. Even the titles of these articles speak of a desire to cool it. Examples: “ China & US On Steady Path To Warmer Relations” ( “Global Times” of Feb.2) ; “Old Issues, New Ways of Engagement” ( “Global Times” of February 4); “Keep Sino-US Soft Conflicts Under Control “ ( “China Daily” of February 4).
9. Even on the issue of the expected meeting of His Holiness the Dalai Lama with Mr.Obama possibly later this month, Chinese analysts have started making a distinction between Mr.Obama’s right to receive any foreign visitor, which may not be that deplorable, and his using such meetings for moralizing purposes such as highlighting the continuing US interest in Tibetan human rights, which would be deplorable.
10. A clear enunciation of the Chinese official thinking on the general issue of the importance attached by Beijing to China’s relations with the US and the sequel to the current tensions relating to arms sale to Taiwan and the proposed meeting with His Holiness might be given by Mr.Yang Jiechi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, during his participation in the annual Munich Security Conference starting on February 5. This is the first time a Chinese Foreign Minister is participating in this conference. (4-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd ), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Is the tension in the relations between the US and China over the decision of President Barack Obama to notify the US Congress on January 29,2010, of his decision to clear the sale of a new arms package to Taiwan showing signs of cooling down?
2. It is less than a week since Mr.Obama cleared the sale, but some Chinese comments have already started referring to the consequent diplomatic tension in the past rather than in the present tense. A reference is made to it not as a continuing tension, but as the “recent” strain.
3. Does this mean that after having stepped up the rhetoric with blunt warnings of Chinese economic sanctions against US companies such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin, which manufacture the weapons and other military equipment that are proposed to be sold to Taiwan, the Chinese are trying to cool the crisis?
4. The threat of sanctions still remains, but the realization seems to be sinking in that the sanctions could prove to be a double-edged sword. For example, a half of the existing Chinese commercial aircraft fleet is of Boeing manufacture. If the Chinese impose sanctions against Boeing, what impact that would have on the maintenance of the aircraft acquired in the past and the continued availability of spare parts for them?
5. Next to the Beijing Olympics of August, 2008, the Chinese have attached a major importance and status symbol to the forthcoming World Trade Expo in Shanghai. Its success would to a considerable extent depend on the participation of American manufacturers and businessmen. If China tried to take punitive action against some US companies in retaliation for the Taiwan deal, what impact it might have on US participation in the Shanghai Expo?
6. China has to stood to benefit in recent years not only in its economic development, but also in its diplomatic standing in the international community as a result of the over-all improvement in its relations with the US. Individual areas of tension remain and will continue to remain, but should such areas be allowed to damage the over-all relationship?
7. The Obama Administration might be sticking to the policies of the previous Administration in matters such as those concerning Taiwan and human rights in Tibet, but it is not showing any indication of reverting to the policy of multilateral tie-ups with countries such as India, Japan and Australia in a manner that could be detrimental to China. Is it not in China’s interest to encourage the Obama Administration to continue to avoid such tie-ups which worry China?
8. One could see signs of an introspection in the articles carried by sections of the Chinese media , which are more balanced and less jingoistic than those published immediately after the decision of Mr.Obama. Even the titles of these articles speak of a desire to cool it. Examples: “ China & US On Steady Path To Warmer Relations” ( “Global Times” of Feb.2) ; “Old Issues, New Ways of Engagement” ( “Global Times” of February 4); “Keep Sino-US Soft Conflicts Under Control “ ( “China Daily” of February 4).
9. Even on the issue of the expected meeting of His Holiness the Dalai Lama with Mr.Obama possibly later this month, Chinese analysts have started making a distinction between Mr.Obama’s right to receive any foreign visitor, which may not be that deplorable, and his using such meetings for moralizing purposes such as highlighting the continuing US interest in Tibetan human rights, which would be deplorable.
10. A clear enunciation of the Chinese official thinking on the general issue of the importance attached by Beijing to China’s relations with the US and the sequel to the current tensions relating to arms sale to Taiwan and the proposed meeting with His Holiness might be given by Mr.Yang Jiechi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, during his participation in the annual Munich Security Conference starting on February 5. This is the first time a Chinese Foreign Minister is participating in this conference. (4-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd ), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, February 2, 2010
AFTER THE DALAI LAMA, WHAT?
B.RAMAN
Even while pretending to avoid the discourtesy to His Holiness the Dalai Lama of discussing what could happen after him while he was still alive, the Chinese authorities have indirectly dwelt on this subject at a press conference held on February 2,2010, to brief the Beijing-based media on the outcome of the ninth round of the dialogue with Mr.Lodi Gyari and Mr.Kelsang Gyaltsen, the special emissaries of His Holiness , from January 26 to 31. It is understood that the dialogue consisted of one day of formal talks in Beijing and a visit to minority-inhabited areas for a briefing on China’s policy towards its ethnic minorities.
2. The Chinese Communist Party was represented in the talks with the representatives of His Holiness by Mr.Du Qinglin, Vice-Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and Mr. Zhu Weiqun, Executive Vice-Minister of the United Front Work Department of the CPC Central Committee. The media briefing was held by Mr.Zhu.
3. Mr.Zhu made it clear that it was not a Sino-Tibetan dialogue, but a meeting with two “private representatives” of the Dalai Lama on the future of His Holiness and his associates and not on the future of Tibet and the Tibetan people. He dismissed the Dalai Lama's claim of being the "legal representative" of Tibetans. He said: “The Chinese Government and the Government of Tibet Autonomous Region under its leadership are the only representatives of Tibetans.”
4. He said that during the talks, the Dalai Lama's “private representatives” refused to "revise a single word" in the Memorandum for All Tibetans to Enjoy Genuine Autonomy which they had presented at the previous round, nor did they make any concession. They insisted that the Dalai Lama is "a legal representative of broad Tibetans" and would like to talk with the Central Government about the "Tibet issue" and "the welfare of 6 million Tibetans," he said.
5 Mr.Zhu added: "The so-called 'Tibet government-in-exile' composed of those who defected to India and gathered there absolutely violates China's laws. The private representatives have no legal status to discuss with us the affairs about Tibet Autonomous Region. They are only the Dalai Lama's private representatives, so they can only talk about the prospect of the Dalai Lama, at most, the prospects of a small party around him."
6. Mr.Zhu also warned of serious damage to Sino-US relations if US leaders were to meet with the Dalai Lama, saying the move would "harm others but bring no profit to itself either." The US side would violate international rules by making such a decision. Such a move would be both irrational and harmful, he said. "If a country decides to do so, we will take necessary measures to help them realize this."
7. He said the talks with the representatives of the Dalai Lama "had some upside" as they let both sides know exactly their differences and how wide the differences were. He added: "It helps the Dalai Lama realize the position he has been in. The Central Government wanted to give the Dalai Lama a chance to correct his mistakes by holding talks with his envoys. The talks were not without result, as the Central Government arranged trips for the envoys to visit central Hunan Province to better understand the country and the regional ethnic autonomy policy.”
8. According to Mr.Zhu, when the previous round ended in November,2008, after the Chinese rejected the Memo presented by the representatives of the Dalai Lama, Mr.Lodi Gyari left saying they would not want any new round of talks, but this time after the latest round failed, Mr.Lodi Gyari said the talks will continue in the future.
9. Mr.Zhu objected to some of the past remarks of His Holiness describing himself as “ a son of India” and projecting Arunachal Pradesh, which the Chinese describe as southern Tibet, as belonging to India, and asked: "Can these act and words of the Dalai Lama improve relations with the Central government?" Mr. Zhu said it was imperative that the Dalai Lama should "match word to deed." What he sought to convey was that if His Holiness really felt that Tibet was part of China, he should not support India’s claim to Arunachal Pradesh.
10. He added that the Central Government wanted the Dalai Lama to abandon his alleged attempts to split the country, cease separatist activities, openly admit that Tibet was an inalienable part of China and Taiwan was an inalienable part of China and the Government of the People's Republic of China was the only legal government representing China.
11. The most interesting part of the briefing was about what could happen in Tibet after His Holiness. Mr.Zhu was asked by one of the journalists if he felt that the Tibetan issue would become more difficult to handle after the death of the Dalai Lama. He replied: “ Chinese people, including Tibetans, will decide the future of Tibet. It is not polite in China to talk about the possibility of a 75-year-old man passing away. We hope he can live a long life. The Central Government hoped the Dalai Lama could settle his affairs concerning his own prospects while still alive and would not pass away abroad. Since the armed rebellion in 1959, what did the Dalai Lama get except that he was pushed further and further away from the journey home? His followers should ponder what they should do when the Dalai Lama departed this life.”
12.Asked to comment on whether there would be an upsurge of violence and terrorist activities after the death of the Dalai Lama,Mr. Zhu said he believed most Tibetans living abroad loved peace and would like to contact their family and friends in Tibet and be engaged in Tibet's development. It could not be ruled out that a few people would turn to violence, but history had showed that violence and terrorist activities would inevitably end in failure. (3-2-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Even while pretending to avoid the discourtesy to His Holiness the Dalai Lama of discussing what could happen after him while he was still alive, the Chinese authorities have indirectly dwelt on this subject at a press conference held on February 2,2010, to brief the Beijing-based media on the outcome of the ninth round of the dialogue with Mr.Lodi Gyari and Mr.Kelsang Gyaltsen, the special emissaries of His Holiness , from January 26 to 31. It is understood that the dialogue consisted of one day of formal talks in Beijing and a visit to minority-inhabited areas for a briefing on China’s policy towards its ethnic minorities.
2. The Chinese Communist Party was represented in the talks with the representatives of His Holiness by Mr.Du Qinglin, Vice-Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and Mr. Zhu Weiqun, Executive Vice-Minister of the United Front Work Department of the CPC Central Committee. The media briefing was held by Mr.Zhu.
3. Mr.Zhu made it clear that it was not a Sino-Tibetan dialogue, but a meeting with two “private representatives” of the Dalai Lama on the future of His Holiness and his associates and not on the future of Tibet and the Tibetan people. He dismissed the Dalai Lama's claim of being the "legal representative" of Tibetans. He said: “The Chinese Government and the Government of Tibet Autonomous Region under its leadership are the only representatives of Tibetans.”
4. He said that during the talks, the Dalai Lama's “private representatives” refused to "revise a single word" in the Memorandum for All Tibetans to Enjoy Genuine Autonomy which they had presented at the previous round, nor did they make any concession. They insisted that the Dalai Lama is "a legal representative of broad Tibetans" and would like to talk with the Central Government about the "Tibet issue" and "the welfare of 6 million Tibetans," he said.
5 Mr.Zhu added: "The so-called 'Tibet government-in-exile' composed of those who defected to India and gathered there absolutely violates China's laws. The private representatives have no legal status to discuss with us the affairs about Tibet Autonomous Region. They are only the Dalai Lama's private representatives, so they can only talk about the prospect of the Dalai Lama, at most, the prospects of a small party around him."
6. Mr.Zhu also warned of serious damage to Sino-US relations if US leaders were to meet with the Dalai Lama, saying the move would "harm others but bring no profit to itself either." The US side would violate international rules by making such a decision. Such a move would be both irrational and harmful, he said. "If a country decides to do so, we will take necessary measures to help them realize this."
7. He said the talks with the representatives of the Dalai Lama "had some upside" as they let both sides know exactly their differences and how wide the differences were. He added: "It helps the Dalai Lama realize the position he has been in. The Central Government wanted to give the Dalai Lama a chance to correct his mistakes by holding talks with his envoys. The talks were not without result, as the Central Government arranged trips for the envoys to visit central Hunan Province to better understand the country and the regional ethnic autonomy policy.”
8. According to Mr.Zhu, when the previous round ended in November,2008, after the Chinese rejected the Memo presented by the representatives of the Dalai Lama, Mr.Lodi Gyari left saying they would not want any new round of talks, but this time after the latest round failed, Mr.Lodi Gyari said the talks will continue in the future.
9. Mr.Zhu objected to some of the past remarks of His Holiness describing himself as “ a son of India” and projecting Arunachal Pradesh, which the Chinese describe as southern Tibet, as belonging to India, and asked: "Can these act and words of the Dalai Lama improve relations with the Central government?" Mr. Zhu said it was imperative that the Dalai Lama should "match word to deed." What he sought to convey was that if His Holiness really felt that Tibet was part of China, he should not support India’s claim to Arunachal Pradesh.
10. He added that the Central Government wanted the Dalai Lama to abandon his alleged attempts to split the country, cease separatist activities, openly admit that Tibet was an inalienable part of China and Taiwan was an inalienable part of China and the Government of the People's Republic of China was the only legal government representing China.
11. The most interesting part of the briefing was about what could happen in Tibet after His Holiness. Mr.Zhu was asked by one of the journalists if he felt that the Tibetan issue would become more difficult to handle after the death of the Dalai Lama. He replied: “ Chinese people, including Tibetans, will decide the future of Tibet. It is not polite in China to talk about the possibility of a 75-year-old man passing away. We hope he can live a long life. The Central Government hoped the Dalai Lama could settle his affairs concerning his own prospects while still alive and would not pass away abroad. Since the armed rebellion in 1959, what did the Dalai Lama get except that he was pushed further and further away from the journey home? His followers should ponder what they should do when the Dalai Lama departed this life.”
12.Asked to comment on whether there would be an upsurge of violence and terrorist activities after the death of the Dalai Lama,Mr. Zhu said he believed most Tibetans living abroad loved peace and would like to contact their family and friends in Tibet and be engaged in Tibet's development. It could not be ruled out that a few people would turn to violence, but history had showed that violence and terrorist activities would inevitably end in failure. (3-2-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
CHINA: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC CLAMOUR BUT AVOIDING OVER-REACTION BY STATE
B.RAMAN
In their reaction to the decision of President Barack Obama to go ahead with the sale of a new arms package to Taiwan, the Chinese authorities have been a following a dual tactics similar to what they had done before the Beijing Olympics of August 2008, when there was a threat of a boycott of the opening ceremony by some Western countries such as France over the issue of human rights in China.
2. This dual tactics consisted of encouraging a public clamour for strong retaliation against the West through sections of China’s media and Internet users in the form of boycott of Western goods, while the State itself sought to convey an impression of acting with restraint despite the perceived provocation from the West and the demands from the public for strong retaliation. The Chinese tactics worked. There was no boycott.
3. In reacting to the decision of the Obama Administration to go ahead with the long-pending arms sale to Taiwan, the Chinese have been encouraging their party and Government controlled media units such as the “Global Times” and the “China Daily” to demand strong action against the US companies such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin, which,inter alia, manufacture some of the weapons and military equipment, which are proposed to be sold to Taiwan, while the Government itself has till now restricted its retaliation to suspending military exchanges with the US, while talking of the available extra option of sanctions against the US companies.
4. At the same time, the Chinese have carefully avoided any talk of a wider retaliatory action such as suspending fresh investments in the US treasury bonds or even reducing their current holdings in the US bonds, which might damage the US economy.
5. The present Chinese concerns are confined to two issues: Firstly, securing a commitment from the US that there will be no more arms sales to Taiwan even if the present package is not re-considered under Beijing’s pressure and , secondly, to ensure that Mr.Obama does not revert to the past policies of the Clinton and Bush Administrations of maintaining interactions with His Holiness the Dalai Lama under some cover or the other. The Chinese have been sending out warnings that if Mr.Obama receives His Holiness during his visit to the US later this month, they would find it even more difficult to resist public clamour for a strong retaliation against the US than today.
6.While deciding on the appropriate options available to Beijing, the Chinese authorities are keen that the escalation of rhetoric on the Taiwan and the Dalai Lama issues does not damage China’s economic linkages with the US. The present Chinese economic recovery is largely due to their pumping money into their market in order to boost the domestic purchase of manufactured goods to compensate for the loss of overseas orders, particularly from the US. The Chinese realize that the continued recovery of their manufacturing sector would depend on the recovery of the US economy and the resumption of the flow of large orders from the US. They do not want to take any hasty action which could reverse the present trend towards economic recovery.
7. If China has a credible weapon against the US in the form of its bond holdings in the US, the US has an equally potent weapon against China in the form of the dependence of the Chinese manufacturing sector on the US market. The Chinese Government will therefore continue to be measured in its reaction while letting the public clamour for even stronger action continue for some time. ( 3-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
In their reaction to the decision of President Barack Obama to go ahead with the sale of a new arms package to Taiwan, the Chinese authorities have been a following a dual tactics similar to what they had done before the Beijing Olympics of August 2008, when there was a threat of a boycott of the opening ceremony by some Western countries such as France over the issue of human rights in China.
2. This dual tactics consisted of encouraging a public clamour for strong retaliation against the West through sections of China’s media and Internet users in the form of boycott of Western goods, while the State itself sought to convey an impression of acting with restraint despite the perceived provocation from the West and the demands from the public for strong retaliation. The Chinese tactics worked. There was no boycott.
3. In reacting to the decision of the Obama Administration to go ahead with the long-pending arms sale to Taiwan, the Chinese have been encouraging their party and Government controlled media units such as the “Global Times” and the “China Daily” to demand strong action against the US companies such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin, which,inter alia, manufacture some of the weapons and military equipment, which are proposed to be sold to Taiwan, while the Government itself has till now restricted its retaliation to suspending military exchanges with the US, while talking of the available extra option of sanctions against the US companies.
4. At the same time, the Chinese have carefully avoided any talk of a wider retaliatory action such as suspending fresh investments in the US treasury bonds or even reducing their current holdings in the US bonds, which might damage the US economy.
5. The present Chinese concerns are confined to two issues: Firstly, securing a commitment from the US that there will be no more arms sales to Taiwan even if the present package is not re-considered under Beijing’s pressure and , secondly, to ensure that Mr.Obama does not revert to the past policies of the Clinton and Bush Administrations of maintaining interactions with His Holiness the Dalai Lama under some cover or the other. The Chinese have been sending out warnings that if Mr.Obama receives His Holiness during his visit to the US later this month, they would find it even more difficult to resist public clamour for a strong retaliation against the US than today.
6.While deciding on the appropriate options available to Beijing, the Chinese authorities are keen that the escalation of rhetoric on the Taiwan and the Dalai Lama issues does not damage China’s economic linkages with the US. The present Chinese economic recovery is largely due to their pumping money into their market in order to boost the domestic purchase of manufactured goods to compensate for the loss of overseas orders, particularly from the US. The Chinese realize that the continued recovery of their manufacturing sector would depend on the recovery of the US economy and the resumption of the flow of large orders from the US. They do not want to take any hasty action which could reverse the present trend towards economic recovery.
7. If China has a credible weapon against the US in the form of its bond holdings in the US, the US has an equally potent weapon against China in the form of the dependence of the Chinese manufacturing sector on the US market. The Chinese Government will therefore continue to be measured in its reaction while letting the public clamour for even stronger action continue for some time. ( 3-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Sunday, January 31, 2010
CHINA WANTS DALAI LAMA TO BE REALISTIC
B.RAMAN
His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s Special Envoy Lodi G. Gyari and Envoy Kelsang Gyaltsen arrived in China on January 26,2010, for the ninth round of discussions with the representatives of the Chinese leadership.The eighth round terminated without any agreement in November 2008. The present dialogue started in 2002. They were accompanied by senior assistants Tenzin P. Atisha, Bhuchung K. Tsering, both members of the Tibetan Task Force on Negotiations, and Jigmey Passang from the Secretariat of the Tibetan Task Force. As the talks progress, China seems to have suspended for the time being its campaign of demonisation of His Holiness. Even overseas supporters of His Holiness concede that the Chinese Government and the Communist Party have toned their rhetoric against His Holiness.
2. Messages coming out of commentaries and editorials on the resumption of the talks after an interval of 14 months are that unless His Holiness adopts a more realistic attitude in the present round of talks, there will be no useful outcome. By a realistic attitude, the Chinese mean His Holiness accepting the present constitutional and political status of the Tibet Autonomous Region without raising demands for a merger of all Tibetan inhabited areas and without insisting on the expansion of the autonomous powers of the re-constituted Tibetan region. After the failure of the last round, the Chinese had also stated that the Dalai Lama should stop raising the issue of the alleged Han colonization of Tibet and should accept the need for the continued presence of the People’s Liberation Army troops in the Tibet Autonomous Region. While accepting that Tibet is a part of China, His Holiness reportedly wants for it a special status similar to the status enjoyed by Hong Kong. The Chinese have already ruled this out.
3.In a commentary titled “Dalai Should Seize Chance Provided by Talks” published on January 28,2010, the “Global Times” run by the party-owned “People’s Daily” group, explained in the following words what the Chinese expected of His Holiness: “Now, at the age of 75, time is not on the side of the Dalai Lama. Though the March 14 riots in Tibet in 2008, plotted by the Dalai clique, caught the world's attention for a while, it is always the progress of China, including Tibet, which has impressed the world. For his own sake, the Dalai Lama needs to make the most of the opportunity provided by the current round of talks with the central government. As the new round of talks in eight years, also the first since November 2008, is underway, it is time for him to reflect on the discussions thus far, the reasons for them getting stalled and adopt a more realistic approach to keep the dialogue going with the central government. Only when he gives up "Tibetan independence", eschews separatist activities, and acknowledges Tibet as an inalienable part of China can the talks yield results. Any unrealistic request – such as greater "autonomy" in Tibet and some Tibetan-populated regions, proposed by his envoys during the last talks – are certain to be turned down. The realistic appreciation of Tibet – and not as a mysterious Shangri-la steeped in esoteric religious and cultural traditions – can help clear up the misunderstanding between China and some Western countries over Tibet. The mystification of Tibet has added to the confusion, and even prejudice against the Chinese central government's policy in Tibet. Some sections of the West have gone further by playing the Tibet card to embarrass China, either out of ignorance of Tibet's past and present, or in pursuit of their own political agenda. That explains why the Dalai clique's deliberate agitation and disguised attempt to seek "Tibetan independence" in the name of "autonomy" could once gain some momentum in the West. But more Westerners have come to realize that supporting the Dalai Lama will be in vain and do them no good.”
4. Overseas supporters of His Holiness say that the Chinese initiative for holding another round of talks with the representatives of His Holiness was preceded by the holding in Beijing of a Tibet strategy session from January 18 to 20, 2010. Since the People’s Liberation Army occupied Tibet in 1949-50, Chinese leaders are reported to have held five such strategy sessions under the name the Tibet Work Forum. The latest session called the Fifth Tibet Work Forum was reported to have been attended by about 300 Party, Government and military leaders playing a role in policy-making on Tibet.
5. The strategy session was held at a time when China had successfully weathered international pressure on it on the question of the human rights of the Tibetans. During his visit to China in November last, President Barack Obama was reported to have suggested the resumption of the talks with the representatives of His Holiness. However, it is not clear whether his raising the issue played any role in the Chinese decision to resume the dialogue with His Holiness.
6. Why was a new strategy session held at this time when there is seeming normalcy in Tibet after the anti-Chinese uprising of 2008 and when the international pressure on China on the human rights issue has eased after its successful holding of the Beijing Olympics in August,2008? Does it indicate Chinese nervousness about a fresh spell of trouble in Tibet after the exit of His Holiness, particularly if the person nominated by the Chinese as His Holiness’ reincarnation is not accepted by large sections of the Tibetan population? Do the Chinese want to explore the possibility of reaching a compromise with His Holiness on the modalities for his succession in order to avoid a controversy and fresh violence? Will the Chinese take the initiative in proposing any new ideas to the emissaries of His Holiness instead of merely reacting negatively to suggestions emanating from His Holiness and rejecting them as they were in the habit of doing in the past? While advising the Dalai Lama to be realistic, are the Chinese prepared to be realistic themselves and realize that future peace in Tibet depends on an uncontested succession process endorsed by His Holiness?
7.These are important and relevant questions, but no answers are forthcoming in the Chinese commentaries on the ongoing talks. The International Campaign For Tibet, a Washington DC based organization of His Holiness’ supporters, has come out with a detailed analysis of the recent strategy session on Tibet held by the Chinese leadership. Some interesting points emerging from the analysis are quoted below:
The Fifth Tibet Work Forum concluded days before the envoys of the Dalai Lama, led by Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari, arrived in China for the ninth round of the Sino-Tibetan dialogue. Speculation on the timing of the ninth round of dialogue so soon after the Fifth Tibet Work Forum has raised expectation that this could be a pivotal moment for Tibet.
The Fifth Tibet Work Forum was the first since the protests and crackdown beginning in March, 2008; the fourth was held in June, 2001. It was not announced in the official media until two days after the meeting was over, and the only prior indication that it was about to take place was a series of brief online articles in the state media in English referring to previous Tibet Work Forums. Since then, a carefully-chosen selection of statements from the meeting has been published in the official press, including speeches by Party Secretary and President Hu Jintao, and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao.
Reports on the Fifth Tibet Work Forum in the official media do not indicate a policy shift on Tibet – the emphasis is still on consolidating central control by further assimilation of Tibet into a ‘unified’ Chinese state – but there is a difference in tone and approach, with a notable lack of virulent rhetoric against the Dalai Lama, which is usually such a prevalent feature of official comment and reporting on Tibet.
Reports indicate that there is more of an emphasis on improving conditions in rural areas, although this emphasis still exists within a model of economic development based on infrastructure construction and resource extraction that has shown to deepen the marginalization and poverty of Tibetans. While this new focus on improving conditions in rural areas could be a positive step, the strategy for Tibet’s development as a whole needs to be addressed. The reports suggest that there is less emphasis on the large amount of funds spent on major ‘aid and development’ projects compared to previous Party and government planning documents on Tibet, which may signal a recognition that flooding Tibet with money does not automatically secure loyalty to the state. Tibetans from some of the most ‘developed’ areas of Tibet including Lhasa and parts of eastern Tibet were at the forefront of protests from March 2008 onwards.
Reports from the Fifth Tibet Work Forum demonstrate that Tibet is not of marginal concern but is a core issue to the Party, as evidenced by the strategic significance of Tibet laid out in the published statements. Compared to previous high-level meetings and in line with global concerns on climate change, the Fifth Tibet Work Forum emphasizes security issues linked to the environment of the Tibetan plateau, which is the source of Asia’s major rivers. The Party’s assertion of control over Tibet’s natural resources and fragile eco-system is in the context of an increasing international awareness of the global significance of the impact of climate change in Tibet. Many scientists characterize the Tibetan plateau as the earth’s ‘third pole’ because it has the biggest ice-fields outside the Arctic and Antarctic.
While the Fourth Tibet Work Forum in 2001 focused on the Tibet Autonomous Region, the Fifth includes all Tibetan areas in Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai provinces – encompassing the eastern Tibetan regions of Amdo and Kham – which may indicate a trend towards regional integration of policies across all Tibetan areas of the PRC. Government statements have typically represented only the Tibet Autonomous Region as ‘Tibet.’ The protests that began in March 2008 spread to all Tibetan areas in the PRC, indicating a shared Tibetan identity, a commonality of grievances, concerns and a determination to express a shared loyalty to the Dalai Lama.
The Chinese authorities have announced that they would hold the First Work Forum on the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (East Turkestan) after the regional capital Urumchi erupted in protests and rioting in July 2009. The strategy for Xinjiang is framed with a stronger emphasis on the “fight against splittism” and independence activism than in the Fifth Tibet Work Forum statements seen to date. This could indicate a distinction in the way the Party is now handling policy on Xinjiang and Tibet. ( 1-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Cennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s Special Envoy Lodi G. Gyari and Envoy Kelsang Gyaltsen arrived in China on January 26,2010, for the ninth round of discussions with the representatives of the Chinese leadership.The eighth round terminated without any agreement in November 2008. The present dialogue started in 2002. They were accompanied by senior assistants Tenzin P. Atisha, Bhuchung K. Tsering, both members of the Tibetan Task Force on Negotiations, and Jigmey Passang from the Secretariat of the Tibetan Task Force. As the talks progress, China seems to have suspended for the time being its campaign of demonisation of His Holiness. Even overseas supporters of His Holiness concede that the Chinese Government and the Communist Party have toned their rhetoric against His Holiness.
2. Messages coming out of commentaries and editorials on the resumption of the talks after an interval of 14 months are that unless His Holiness adopts a more realistic attitude in the present round of talks, there will be no useful outcome. By a realistic attitude, the Chinese mean His Holiness accepting the present constitutional and political status of the Tibet Autonomous Region without raising demands for a merger of all Tibetan inhabited areas and without insisting on the expansion of the autonomous powers of the re-constituted Tibetan region. After the failure of the last round, the Chinese had also stated that the Dalai Lama should stop raising the issue of the alleged Han colonization of Tibet and should accept the need for the continued presence of the People’s Liberation Army troops in the Tibet Autonomous Region. While accepting that Tibet is a part of China, His Holiness reportedly wants for it a special status similar to the status enjoyed by Hong Kong. The Chinese have already ruled this out.
3.In a commentary titled “Dalai Should Seize Chance Provided by Talks” published on January 28,2010, the “Global Times” run by the party-owned “People’s Daily” group, explained in the following words what the Chinese expected of His Holiness: “Now, at the age of 75, time is not on the side of the Dalai Lama. Though the March 14 riots in Tibet in 2008, plotted by the Dalai clique, caught the world's attention for a while, it is always the progress of China, including Tibet, which has impressed the world. For his own sake, the Dalai Lama needs to make the most of the opportunity provided by the current round of talks with the central government. As the new round of talks in eight years, also the first since November 2008, is underway, it is time for him to reflect on the discussions thus far, the reasons for them getting stalled and adopt a more realistic approach to keep the dialogue going with the central government. Only when he gives up "Tibetan independence", eschews separatist activities, and acknowledges Tibet as an inalienable part of China can the talks yield results. Any unrealistic request – such as greater "autonomy" in Tibet and some Tibetan-populated regions, proposed by his envoys during the last talks – are certain to be turned down. The realistic appreciation of Tibet – and not as a mysterious Shangri-la steeped in esoteric religious and cultural traditions – can help clear up the misunderstanding between China and some Western countries over Tibet. The mystification of Tibet has added to the confusion, and even prejudice against the Chinese central government's policy in Tibet. Some sections of the West have gone further by playing the Tibet card to embarrass China, either out of ignorance of Tibet's past and present, or in pursuit of their own political agenda. That explains why the Dalai clique's deliberate agitation and disguised attempt to seek "Tibetan independence" in the name of "autonomy" could once gain some momentum in the West. But more Westerners have come to realize that supporting the Dalai Lama will be in vain and do them no good.”
4. Overseas supporters of His Holiness say that the Chinese initiative for holding another round of talks with the representatives of His Holiness was preceded by the holding in Beijing of a Tibet strategy session from January 18 to 20, 2010. Since the People’s Liberation Army occupied Tibet in 1949-50, Chinese leaders are reported to have held five such strategy sessions under the name the Tibet Work Forum. The latest session called the Fifth Tibet Work Forum was reported to have been attended by about 300 Party, Government and military leaders playing a role in policy-making on Tibet.
5. The strategy session was held at a time when China had successfully weathered international pressure on it on the question of the human rights of the Tibetans. During his visit to China in November last, President Barack Obama was reported to have suggested the resumption of the talks with the representatives of His Holiness. However, it is not clear whether his raising the issue played any role in the Chinese decision to resume the dialogue with His Holiness.
6. Why was a new strategy session held at this time when there is seeming normalcy in Tibet after the anti-Chinese uprising of 2008 and when the international pressure on China on the human rights issue has eased after its successful holding of the Beijing Olympics in August,2008? Does it indicate Chinese nervousness about a fresh spell of trouble in Tibet after the exit of His Holiness, particularly if the person nominated by the Chinese as His Holiness’ reincarnation is not accepted by large sections of the Tibetan population? Do the Chinese want to explore the possibility of reaching a compromise with His Holiness on the modalities for his succession in order to avoid a controversy and fresh violence? Will the Chinese take the initiative in proposing any new ideas to the emissaries of His Holiness instead of merely reacting negatively to suggestions emanating from His Holiness and rejecting them as they were in the habit of doing in the past? While advising the Dalai Lama to be realistic, are the Chinese prepared to be realistic themselves and realize that future peace in Tibet depends on an uncontested succession process endorsed by His Holiness?
7.These are important and relevant questions, but no answers are forthcoming in the Chinese commentaries on the ongoing talks. The International Campaign For Tibet, a Washington DC based organization of His Holiness’ supporters, has come out with a detailed analysis of the recent strategy session on Tibet held by the Chinese leadership. Some interesting points emerging from the analysis are quoted below:
The Fifth Tibet Work Forum concluded days before the envoys of the Dalai Lama, led by Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari, arrived in China for the ninth round of the Sino-Tibetan dialogue. Speculation on the timing of the ninth round of dialogue so soon after the Fifth Tibet Work Forum has raised expectation that this could be a pivotal moment for Tibet.
The Fifth Tibet Work Forum was the first since the protests and crackdown beginning in March, 2008; the fourth was held in June, 2001. It was not announced in the official media until two days after the meeting was over, and the only prior indication that it was about to take place was a series of brief online articles in the state media in English referring to previous Tibet Work Forums. Since then, a carefully-chosen selection of statements from the meeting has been published in the official press, including speeches by Party Secretary and President Hu Jintao, and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao.
Reports on the Fifth Tibet Work Forum in the official media do not indicate a policy shift on Tibet – the emphasis is still on consolidating central control by further assimilation of Tibet into a ‘unified’ Chinese state – but there is a difference in tone and approach, with a notable lack of virulent rhetoric against the Dalai Lama, which is usually such a prevalent feature of official comment and reporting on Tibet.
Reports indicate that there is more of an emphasis on improving conditions in rural areas, although this emphasis still exists within a model of economic development based on infrastructure construction and resource extraction that has shown to deepen the marginalization and poverty of Tibetans. While this new focus on improving conditions in rural areas could be a positive step, the strategy for Tibet’s development as a whole needs to be addressed. The reports suggest that there is less emphasis on the large amount of funds spent on major ‘aid and development’ projects compared to previous Party and government planning documents on Tibet, which may signal a recognition that flooding Tibet with money does not automatically secure loyalty to the state. Tibetans from some of the most ‘developed’ areas of Tibet including Lhasa and parts of eastern Tibet were at the forefront of protests from March 2008 onwards.
Reports from the Fifth Tibet Work Forum demonstrate that Tibet is not of marginal concern but is a core issue to the Party, as evidenced by the strategic significance of Tibet laid out in the published statements. Compared to previous high-level meetings and in line with global concerns on climate change, the Fifth Tibet Work Forum emphasizes security issues linked to the environment of the Tibetan plateau, which is the source of Asia’s major rivers. The Party’s assertion of control over Tibet’s natural resources and fragile eco-system is in the context of an increasing international awareness of the global significance of the impact of climate change in Tibet. Many scientists characterize the Tibetan plateau as the earth’s ‘third pole’ because it has the biggest ice-fields outside the Arctic and Antarctic.
While the Fourth Tibet Work Forum in 2001 focused on the Tibet Autonomous Region, the Fifth includes all Tibetan areas in Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai provinces – encompassing the eastern Tibetan regions of Amdo and Kham – which may indicate a trend towards regional integration of policies across all Tibetan areas of the PRC. Government statements have typically represented only the Tibet Autonomous Region as ‘Tibet.’ The protests that began in March 2008 spread to all Tibetan areas in the PRC, indicating a shared Tibetan identity, a commonality of grievances, concerns and a determination to express a shared loyalty to the Dalai Lama.
The Chinese authorities have announced that they would hold the First Work Forum on the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (East Turkestan) after the regional capital Urumchi erupted in protests and rioting in July 2009. The strategy for Xinjiang is framed with a stronger emphasis on the “fight against splittism” and independence activism than in the Fifth Tibet Work Forum statements seen to date. This could indicate a distinction in the way the Party is now handling policy on Xinjiang and Tibet. ( 1-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Cennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
CHINA CONFUSED & OUTRAGED BY OBAMA'S GOOGLE & TAIWAN CARDS
B.RAMAN
At a time when Chinese officials and non-Governmental analysts have been highly confused by the unusually strong line taken by Mrs.Hilary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, in support of Internet freedom in the wake of Google’s threat to stop censoring its search engine in China and its protests over alleged Chinese web snooping into the Google mail accounts of Chinese political dissidents and Tibetan and Uighur nationalists, they have been in for another shock by the decision of the administration of President Barack Obama to notify the Congress on January 29,2010, of its plans to sell a fresh package of arms to Taiwan in disregard of Chinese protests and sensitivities on the subject.
2. Mrs.Clinton’s strong statement on the question of Internet freedom has already given rise to Chinese allegations of the US reverting to its past policy of “information imperialism” and adopting double standards with regard to restrictions on the Internet in the interest of national security. As a result, earlier speculation and even expectations that the Chinese authorities and Google could reach a face-saving compromise to facilitate the continued operation of the Google in the Chinese market have been belied so far.
3. The continuing controversy over the Google was till now viewed by the Chinese authorities as an aberration and not as reflective of any change of policy by the Obama Administration towards China. However, the Administration’s notification to the Congress of its plan to sell to Taiwan US $ 6.4 billion worth of Patriot missiles, Black Hawk helicopters and minesweepers has come as a second surprise to Beijing. It is learnt that the Chinese authorities were aware for some time that the sale of this package was under the consideration of the Obama Administration, but were confident that after the smooth visit of Mr.Obama to China in November last and the importance attached by him to China’s role as an Asian power with stakes even in South Asia, he will not go ahead with the sale.
4. His surprise (to the Chinese) decision to go ahead with the sale has evoked strong resentment in official circles and has been strongly criticized by non-governmental analysts, who have accused him of being insincere and projected his decision as a wake-up call to China about the real Obama.
5.In its strong reaction within 24 hours of the notification, the Chinese Government has suspended (not cancelled) all military exchanges with the US. Mr.Qian Lihua, Director of the Foreign Affairs office of the Chinese Defence Ministry, lodged a strong protest with the US Defence Attache in Beijing. A press release issued by his office on the protest said: "The Chinese military expresses grave indignation and strongly condemns such a move to grossly interfere in China's internal affairs and harm China's national security interests. The Taiwan issue is related to China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and concerns China's core interests. The US arms sales to Taiwan gravely violates the three joint communiques between China and the United States, and seriously endangers China's national security and harms China's reunification course. Such a move also constitutes severe violation of the agreements reached by the top leaders of both sides on the China-US relations in the new situation. It runs counter to the principles of the joint statement issued during US President Barack Obama's visit to China in November last year.”
6. A strong commentary on the US notification by the “China Daily” published on January 31,2010, said: “ The latest US arms sale to Taiwan has once again come up as a wake-up call. It cannot but let us be clear that in a world where the law of the jungle still prevails, China, like any other developing country, cannot remain aloof from bullies. It is painful to come to such reality. The feeling gripped us when our embassy was bombed in Belgrade; when our ace pilot was knocked down into the sea by a spy plane at door step. It is gripping us now….
More than 20 years after the end of the Cold War, the US is still bent on integrating Taiwan into the American defense strategy in Asia, and still dreaming of using the island as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" to contain the growth of China. Forget about the pledge that "the United States does not seek to contain China" made by Mr Barack Obama when he was in Beijing just two months ago. Sincerity is subject to proof by action, not by words….China's response, no matter how vehement, is justified. No country worthy of respect can sit idle while its national security is endangered and core interests damaged. When someone spits on you, you have to get back. Compared with the US, China is still weak, both economically and militarily. The counter-measures that China has taken -- ranging from repeated protests to plans to halt military exchanges and punish US companies involved in the arms sale, may not be forceful enough to make Washington smart and mend its ways. But a message has to be sent: From now on, the US shall not expect cooperation from China on a wide range of major regional and international issues. If you don't care about our interests, why should we care about yours? China must never waver to make sure that it means what it says.”
7. The Chinese have also been surprised by indications from Washington DC that Mr.Obama intended meeting His Holiness the Dalai Lama at a convenient time. He had avoided meeting His Holiness during his last visit to the US which came shortly before Mr.Obama’s visit to China.
8. Chinese analysts are confused as to why this sudden change in the policies of Mr.Obama on two issues----Taiwan and Tibet--- which are among the core concerns of China. Barring what the US viewed as China’s unhelpful stance at the recent Copenhagen summit on climate and Beijing’s dispute with Google, the relations between the two countries have been proceeding smoothly and the Chinese, in Beijing’s perception, have been co-operating with the US in its efforts to stabilize the global economy.
9. Even presuming that the Obama Administration might have been unhappy over the Chinese role in Copenhagen, its dispute with Google over web snooping, its failure to exercise sufficient pressure on North Korea to return to talks on the nuclear issue and its opposition to robust sanctions against Iran, would that be sufficient cause to go ahead with the arms sale to Taiwan at the risk of serious damage to Sino-US relations? That is a question to which the Chinese have not yet been able to find an answer. (31-1-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
At a time when Chinese officials and non-Governmental analysts have been highly confused by the unusually strong line taken by Mrs.Hilary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, in support of Internet freedom in the wake of Google’s threat to stop censoring its search engine in China and its protests over alleged Chinese web snooping into the Google mail accounts of Chinese political dissidents and Tibetan and Uighur nationalists, they have been in for another shock by the decision of the administration of President Barack Obama to notify the Congress on January 29,2010, of its plans to sell a fresh package of arms to Taiwan in disregard of Chinese protests and sensitivities on the subject.
2. Mrs.Clinton’s strong statement on the question of Internet freedom has already given rise to Chinese allegations of the US reverting to its past policy of “information imperialism” and adopting double standards with regard to restrictions on the Internet in the interest of national security. As a result, earlier speculation and even expectations that the Chinese authorities and Google could reach a face-saving compromise to facilitate the continued operation of the Google in the Chinese market have been belied so far.
3. The continuing controversy over the Google was till now viewed by the Chinese authorities as an aberration and not as reflective of any change of policy by the Obama Administration towards China. However, the Administration’s notification to the Congress of its plan to sell to Taiwan US $ 6.4 billion worth of Patriot missiles, Black Hawk helicopters and minesweepers has come as a second surprise to Beijing. It is learnt that the Chinese authorities were aware for some time that the sale of this package was under the consideration of the Obama Administration, but were confident that after the smooth visit of Mr.Obama to China in November last and the importance attached by him to China’s role as an Asian power with stakes even in South Asia, he will not go ahead with the sale.
4. His surprise (to the Chinese) decision to go ahead with the sale has evoked strong resentment in official circles and has been strongly criticized by non-governmental analysts, who have accused him of being insincere and projected his decision as a wake-up call to China about the real Obama.
5.In its strong reaction within 24 hours of the notification, the Chinese Government has suspended (not cancelled) all military exchanges with the US. Mr.Qian Lihua, Director of the Foreign Affairs office of the Chinese Defence Ministry, lodged a strong protest with the US Defence Attache in Beijing. A press release issued by his office on the protest said: "The Chinese military expresses grave indignation and strongly condemns such a move to grossly interfere in China's internal affairs and harm China's national security interests. The Taiwan issue is related to China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and concerns China's core interests. The US arms sales to Taiwan gravely violates the three joint communiques between China and the United States, and seriously endangers China's national security and harms China's reunification course. Such a move also constitutes severe violation of the agreements reached by the top leaders of both sides on the China-US relations in the new situation. It runs counter to the principles of the joint statement issued during US President Barack Obama's visit to China in November last year.”
6. A strong commentary on the US notification by the “China Daily” published on January 31,2010, said: “ The latest US arms sale to Taiwan has once again come up as a wake-up call. It cannot but let us be clear that in a world where the law of the jungle still prevails, China, like any other developing country, cannot remain aloof from bullies. It is painful to come to such reality. The feeling gripped us when our embassy was bombed in Belgrade; when our ace pilot was knocked down into the sea by a spy plane at door step. It is gripping us now….
More than 20 years after the end of the Cold War, the US is still bent on integrating Taiwan into the American defense strategy in Asia, and still dreaming of using the island as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" to contain the growth of China. Forget about the pledge that "the United States does not seek to contain China" made by Mr Barack Obama when he was in Beijing just two months ago. Sincerity is subject to proof by action, not by words….China's response, no matter how vehement, is justified. No country worthy of respect can sit idle while its national security is endangered and core interests damaged. When someone spits on you, you have to get back. Compared with the US, China is still weak, both economically and militarily. The counter-measures that China has taken -- ranging from repeated protests to plans to halt military exchanges and punish US companies involved in the arms sale, may not be forceful enough to make Washington smart and mend its ways. But a message has to be sent: From now on, the US shall not expect cooperation from China on a wide range of major regional and international issues. If you don't care about our interests, why should we care about yours? China must never waver to make sure that it means what it says.”
7. The Chinese have also been surprised by indications from Washington DC that Mr.Obama intended meeting His Holiness the Dalai Lama at a convenient time. He had avoided meeting His Holiness during his last visit to the US which came shortly before Mr.Obama’s visit to China.
8. Chinese analysts are confused as to why this sudden change in the policies of Mr.Obama on two issues----Taiwan and Tibet--- which are among the core concerns of China. Barring what the US viewed as China’s unhelpful stance at the recent Copenhagen summit on climate and Beijing’s dispute with Google, the relations between the two countries have been proceeding smoothly and the Chinese, in Beijing’s perception, have been co-operating with the US in its efforts to stabilize the global economy.
9. Even presuming that the Obama Administration might have been unhappy over the Chinese role in Copenhagen, its dispute with Google over web snooping, its failure to exercise sufficient pressure on North Korea to return to talks on the nuclear issue and its opposition to robust sanctions against Iran, would that be sufficient cause to go ahead with the arms sale to Taiwan at the risk of serious damage to Sino-US relations? That is a question to which the Chinese have not yet been able to find an answer. (31-1-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, January 29, 2010
INDIA-PAKISTAN: MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE
B.RAMAN
The absence of major acts of jihadi terrorism in the Indian territory outside Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) since November 26,2008, is partly due to the disruption of the command and control of the so-called Indian Mujahideen and the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), partly due to the continuous pressure exercised by the US on the Government of Pakistan to keep the anti-Indian jihadi organisations under control, partly due to the intensified monitoring of the activities of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) by the US agencies after the discovery of the Chicago cell of the LET and partly due to the fact that the terrorists do require time to plan their acts of mass casualty or spectacular terrorism.
2. The disruption of the command and control of the IM and the SIMI has been made possible by the vigorous action taken against them by the Indian intelligence and police after the series of explosions in Bangalore, Ahmedabad and Delhi between May and September 2008. Many trained operatives of the IM and the SIMI are still absconding and have not been located and arrested. So long as they are not neutralised, the danger of a come-back will remain.
3. Despite our cynicism about the effectiveness of the US pressure against Pakistan, it will be churlish not to concede that the US has been more active and vigilant in Pakistan post-26/11 than it has been in the past.
4. The time factor is also important. Even the most well-funded, well-motivated and well-trained terrorist organisation---- whether it be Al Qaeda or the LET or any other organisation---- requires time to prepare and execute an act of mass casualty terrorism or a spectacular act, which gets considerable publicity, even if it does not cause large fatalities. Random explosions such as those organised by the IM and the SIMI do not require much preparation. One can have them at regular intervals provided one has the trained terrorists and the required materials for assembling an improvised explosive device.
5. Spectacular acts such as the Mumbai explosions of March,1993, the attack on the Indian Parliament House in New Delhi in December,2001, the suburbun train explosions at Mumbai in July,2006, and the 26/11 sea-borne attacks in Mumbai by the LET require a long time lead to prepare and execute. The fact that there have been only four such acts over a period of 17 years since March,1993, would show how much time is required between two successful acts of mass casualty or spectacular terrorism. The interrogation of David Coleman Headley of the Chicago cell of the LET has brought out that the LET took about two years to prepare for the 26/11 terrorist strikes. It took such a long time despite the fact that its activities were not closely monitored before 26/11 as they are now.
6. The 14 months of lull in major acts of jihadi terrorism in the Indian territory have enabled Shri P.Chidambaram, our Home Minister, to set in motion a comprehensive plan for revamping our counter-terrorism machinery. A good start has been made, but a lot still remains to be done.
7. This lull should also be utilised to revisit our policies towards Pakistan in respect of our fight against terrorism originating from Pakistani territory. Any re-examination of our policies should take into account the following ground realities.
While tactically Pakistan may be observing some restraint due to the post-26/11 US pressure, strategically it has not given up its policy of using terrorism as a weapon against India to bring about a change in the status quo in J&K.
The US seems satisfied so long as Islamabad observes a tactical restraint so that the US faces no complications in Afghanistan due to a fresh escalation of tensions between the two countries. The US has shown little interest in making Pakistan give up its strategic use of terrorism against India.
The restraint exercised by Pakistan's military-intelligent establishment on the LET and other Punjabi terrorist organisations of ISI inspiration has been only in respect of their acts of terrorism in hinterland India outside J&K. It does not apply to their acts of terrorism against Indian interests in foreign territory such as Afghanistan and Bangladesh.
8. Should these realities be allowed to contribute to a rigidity in our relations with Pakistan with no scope of any flexibility or should we experiment with some flexibility in order to see whether it produces results? There is no need for a change in our present policy of no resumption of the formal composite dialogue with Pakistan till it gives up its policy of using terrorism and acts decisively at least against the LET, if not against other jihadi terrorist organisations.
9.At the same time, one has to recognise that the sequel to 26/11 has been qualitatively different from the sequels to March,1993, December,2001, and July 2006. Till today, Pakistan has not admitted that March,1993, December,2001 and July,2006, were planned in Pakistani territory with the collusion of the ISI and orchestrated from there. No arrests were made and no prosecution was launched in Pakistani territory.
10. However, in the case of 26/11, Pakistan has been forced to admit that the conspiracy originated in Pakistani territory and invloved important operatives of the LET, seven of whom have been arrested and prosecuted. We have valid reasons to suspect that Pakistan is not sincere in their prosecution and that they may ultimately be acquitted by the court after a charade of a trial.
11. We should not allow this suspicion----though well-founded--- to come in the way of our taking advantage of the seeming Pakistani willingness to co-operate with India in respect of action against those involved in the 26/11 terrorist strikes by establishing institutional linkages betweeen the National Investigation Agency of India and the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) of Pakistan, which are responsible for investigation and prosecution of the 26/11 terrorist strikes and other major acts of terrorism.
12. Such institutional linkages could help in the long run in promoting habits of mutual legal assistance between the two countries. Such mutual legal assistance has been totally absent between the investigation agencies of the two countries ever since they became independent in 1947. Since 26/11, there has been an attempt by the US and others to nudge Pakistan into changing its policy of no legal assistance to India. The exchange of dossiers of evidence between the two countries since 26/11 has got vitiated by the critical public posture of the two countries, which has not helped in any significant forward movement.
13. Shri Chidambaram should take advantage of the forthcoming meeting of the Home/Interior Ministers of the SAARC countries in Islamabad next month to lay the foundation for such institutional linkages. He should attend the meeting accompanied not only by the Home Secretary, but also by the Director of the Instelligence Bureau, the Directors-General of the NIA and the Border Security Force (BSF) and Shri Rakesh Maria, Joint Commissioner of the Mumbai Police, who co-ordinated the investigation of the 26/11 terrorist strikes and have a comprehensive discussion with Mr.Rehman Mallik, the Pakistani Interior Minister, as to how to successfully prosecute the conspirators .He should also propose the setting up of a hotline between the DsG of the NIA and the FIA to push forward the implementation of the decisions taken away from the glare of publicity.
14. We already have a functioning hot line between the DsG of Military Operations of the two Armies. There is a need to supplement it with a hotline between the principal investigation agencies of the two countries.
15. This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article of January 14,2010, titled " India-Pakistan: Need For A Sub-Composite Dialogue" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers37/paper3604.html ( 30-1-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The absence of major acts of jihadi terrorism in the Indian territory outside Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) since November 26,2008, is partly due to the disruption of the command and control of the so-called Indian Mujahideen and the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), partly due to the continuous pressure exercised by the US on the Government of Pakistan to keep the anti-Indian jihadi organisations under control, partly due to the intensified monitoring of the activities of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) by the US agencies after the discovery of the Chicago cell of the LET and partly due to the fact that the terrorists do require time to plan their acts of mass casualty or spectacular terrorism.
2. The disruption of the command and control of the IM and the SIMI has been made possible by the vigorous action taken against them by the Indian intelligence and police after the series of explosions in Bangalore, Ahmedabad and Delhi between May and September 2008. Many trained operatives of the IM and the SIMI are still absconding and have not been located and arrested. So long as they are not neutralised, the danger of a come-back will remain.
3. Despite our cynicism about the effectiveness of the US pressure against Pakistan, it will be churlish not to concede that the US has been more active and vigilant in Pakistan post-26/11 than it has been in the past.
4. The time factor is also important. Even the most well-funded, well-motivated and well-trained terrorist organisation---- whether it be Al Qaeda or the LET or any other organisation---- requires time to prepare and execute an act of mass casualty terrorism or a spectacular act, which gets considerable publicity, even if it does not cause large fatalities. Random explosions such as those organised by the IM and the SIMI do not require much preparation. One can have them at regular intervals provided one has the trained terrorists and the required materials for assembling an improvised explosive device.
5. Spectacular acts such as the Mumbai explosions of March,1993, the attack on the Indian Parliament House in New Delhi in December,2001, the suburbun train explosions at Mumbai in July,2006, and the 26/11 sea-borne attacks in Mumbai by the LET require a long time lead to prepare and execute. The fact that there have been only four such acts over a period of 17 years since March,1993, would show how much time is required between two successful acts of mass casualty or spectacular terrorism. The interrogation of David Coleman Headley of the Chicago cell of the LET has brought out that the LET took about two years to prepare for the 26/11 terrorist strikes. It took such a long time despite the fact that its activities were not closely monitored before 26/11 as they are now.
6. The 14 months of lull in major acts of jihadi terrorism in the Indian territory have enabled Shri P.Chidambaram, our Home Minister, to set in motion a comprehensive plan for revamping our counter-terrorism machinery. A good start has been made, but a lot still remains to be done.
7. This lull should also be utilised to revisit our policies towards Pakistan in respect of our fight against terrorism originating from Pakistani territory. Any re-examination of our policies should take into account the following ground realities.
While tactically Pakistan may be observing some restraint due to the post-26/11 US pressure, strategically it has not given up its policy of using terrorism as a weapon against India to bring about a change in the status quo in J&K.
The US seems satisfied so long as Islamabad observes a tactical restraint so that the US faces no complications in Afghanistan due to a fresh escalation of tensions between the two countries. The US has shown little interest in making Pakistan give up its strategic use of terrorism against India.
The restraint exercised by Pakistan's military-intelligent establishment on the LET and other Punjabi terrorist organisations of ISI inspiration has been only in respect of their acts of terrorism in hinterland India outside J&K. It does not apply to their acts of terrorism against Indian interests in foreign territory such as Afghanistan and Bangladesh.
8. Should these realities be allowed to contribute to a rigidity in our relations with Pakistan with no scope of any flexibility or should we experiment with some flexibility in order to see whether it produces results? There is no need for a change in our present policy of no resumption of the formal composite dialogue with Pakistan till it gives up its policy of using terrorism and acts decisively at least against the LET, if not against other jihadi terrorist organisations.
9.At the same time, one has to recognise that the sequel to 26/11 has been qualitatively different from the sequels to March,1993, December,2001, and July 2006. Till today, Pakistan has not admitted that March,1993, December,2001 and July,2006, were planned in Pakistani territory with the collusion of the ISI and orchestrated from there. No arrests were made and no prosecution was launched in Pakistani territory.
10. However, in the case of 26/11, Pakistan has been forced to admit that the conspiracy originated in Pakistani territory and invloved important operatives of the LET, seven of whom have been arrested and prosecuted. We have valid reasons to suspect that Pakistan is not sincere in their prosecution and that they may ultimately be acquitted by the court after a charade of a trial.
11. We should not allow this suspicion----though well-founded--- to come in the way of our taking advantage of the seeming Pakistani willingness to co-operate with India in respect of action against those involved in the 26/11 terrorist strikes by establishing institutional linkages betweeen the National Investigation Agency of India and the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) of Pakistan, which are responsible for investigation and prosecution of the 26/11 terrorist strikes and other major acts of terrorism.
12. Such institutional linkages could help in the long run in promoting habits of mutual legal assistance between the two countries. Such mutual legal assistance has been totally absent between the investigation agencies of the two countries ever since they became independent in 1947. Since 26/11, there has been an attempt by the US and others to nudge Pakistan into changing its policy of no legal assistance to India. The exchange of dossiers of evidence between the two countries since 26/11 has got vitiated by the critical public posture of the two countries, which has not helped in any significant forward movement.
13. Shri Chidambaram should take advantage of the forthcoming meeting of the Home/Interior Ministers of the SAARC countries in Islamabad next month to lay the foundation for such institutional linkages. He should attend the meeting accompanied not only by the Home Secretary, but also by the Director of the Instelligence Bureau, the Directors-General of the NIA and the Border Security Force (BSF) and Shri Rakesh Maria, Joint Commissioner of the Mumbai Police, who co-ordinated the investigation of the 26/11 terrorist strikes and have a comprehensive discussion with Mr.Rehman Mallik, the Pakistani Interior Minister, as to how to successfully prosecute the conspirators .He should also propose the setting up of a hotline between the DsG of the NIA and the FIA to push forward the implementation of the decisions taken away from the glare of publicity.
14. We already have a functioning hot line between the DsG of Military Operations of the two Armies. There is a need to supplement it with a hotline between the principal investigation agencies of the two countries.
15. This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article of January 14,2010, titled " India-Pakistan: Need For A Sub-Composite Dialogue" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers37/paper3604.html ( 30-1-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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