B.RAMAN
Dear Shri Menon,
I welcome your appointment as the National Security Adviser and wish you well in your new assignment. My purpose in writing this open letter to you is to share with you my thinking on the tasks ahead of you. Since retiring from the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) on August 31, 1994, I have written over a hundred articles on national security management. This letter will repeat some of the points figuring in those articles which are still valid and some others to which I will be giving open expression for the first time.
2. The importance of an action-oriented analytical process was highlighted by Lord Franks of the UK, who was asked by the British Government to enquire into the failure of Britain's national security managers to anticipate and forestall the Argentine occupation of the Falklands Islands in 1982, which led to a brief, but fierce naval conflict. Lord Franks concluded that though there was no secret intelligence regarding the Argentine intentions and plans, there was considerable open source reporting in the US and Argentine media on this, but these reports were not taken seriously and analysed either in the Foreign Office or in the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) to see what those reports implied and what action was called for. Hence, the so-called surprise.
3. The US National Commission, which enquired into the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US Homeland, stressed the importance of the culture of joint action for dealing effectively with terrorism. It pointed out that effective coordination alone would not be adequate unless it was supplemented by the operating principle of joint action by all those having any responsibility for counter-terrorism. This principle implies that every piece of intelligence is analysed jointly by everyone responsible for counter-terrorism and acted upon. One of the main purposes of the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC), which came into being in 2004 under the supervision of the Director, National Intelligence, (DNI), would be to enforce this responsibility for joint action. Every counter-terrorism agency would be individually and jointly responsible for ensuring that significant pieces of intelligence are promptly analysed and acted upon.
4. The recent enquiries by officials of the Barack Obama Administration into the failed attempt by a Nigerian student to blow up a US commercial flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day brought out that even more than five years after the NCTC was set up, the culture of an action-oriented analytical approach has not taken hold in the US national security establishment.
5. The father of the student alerted a US diplomat and a CIA officer in Nigeria that his son had got radicalised and was suspected to be in Yemen. The diplomat conveyed the information to the State Department and the CIA officer to his agency's headquarters. Both passed on the information to the NCTC. Days before the student boarded the plane at Amsterdam, the information that he is a security risk was available in the data bases of the US Embassy in Nigeria, the State Department, the CIA and the NCTC, but it was not subjected to a joint analysis to see what the information implied and what joint action on it was called for.
6. In his statement in the Lok Sabha after taking over as the Home Minister after the 26/11 terrorist strike, Shri P.Chidambaram mentioned that he found that responsibility for follow-up action on intelligence reports was diffused. In December last year, the "Hindustan Times" had reported that twice in September, 2008, the R&AW had reported about the Lashkar-e-Toiba's plans for a sea-borne terrorist attack in Mumbai. The paper also quoted a senior unnamed official of the R&AW as saying that its responsibility was to collect and disseminate intelligence and that follow-up action on the intelligence disseminated was not its responsibility. This showed the total absence of the culture of joint action in our national security establishment. This should be a matter of serious concern and needs to be addressed.
7. The Kargil conflict of 1999 revealed a serious deficiency in our analysis and follow-up action process. Every year, the Indian Army had been withdrawing its troops from the Kargil heights during winter. Before the onset of the winter of 1998-99, there were intelligence reports of unusual Pakistani Army activity in the Gilgit-Baltistan area. In the middle of 1998, Shri Shyamal Dutta, the then Director of the Intelligence Bureau, had analysed these activities and sent his assessment to the Prime Minister's Office and other Ministries concerned. One would have expected an immediate meeting of the JIC to consider the implications of these developments and to recommend to the Government whether in the light of these developments the annual winter withdrawal by the Army should be cancelled. Nothing was done in Delhi and the decision to withdraw as usual was taken locally. The result: the Pakistani occupation of the heights.
8. One would have thought that in the light of the detailed lessons drawn by the Kargil Review Committee, the analysis and follow-up action process would have improved. Unfortunately, this was not so. This became evident during the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. The two reports received in September,2008, about the danger of a sea-borne attack by the LET were analysed and security was upgraded by the Mumbai police, the naval authorities and those in charge of physical security in the Taj Hotel. Subsequently, nothing happened for seven weeks. There were no fresh reports.
9. There should have been an analysis in Delhi on what this lack of activity and absence of fresh reports implied. Did it mean that the threat no longer existed and that the security could be down-graded? These were very important questions which should have been examined in Delhi and instructions issued to the concerned authorities in Mumbai as to whether the high-level of security should continue or could be downgraded. This was not done and there were no fresh instructions to Mumbai from Delhi. The local authorities in Mumbai downgraded the security on their own, presuming that the threat was less likely. Delhi was not aware of this till the terrorists struck on 26/11.
10. The analysis, assessment and follow-up action process has been in a state of neglect for many years. Nothing illustrates this more than the state of the JIC. In 1983, Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister, bifurcated the JIC and created a separate JIC for internal security. Two years later, Rajiv Gandhi reversed her decision and re-merged them. Officers of the IB and the R&AW started monopolising the post of the JIC Chairman. When Shri Inder Gujral was the Prime Minister, a move was made to consider military officers too for this post. As no consensus could be reached on this, the post was kept vacant for nearly three years and the chief of the R&AW was asked to hold additional charge as the Chairman of the JIC. He did not have adequate time to discharge this responsibility. The JIC functioned with no head and only half a body. There was a dramatic drop in the flow of military intelligence reports to the JIC.
11. The Atal Behari Vajpayee Government, which created a new national security management mechanism headed by the NSA, felt that with the creation of the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), the JIC had become superfluous and made it a subordinate division of the NSCS with very limited independent powers of analysis, assessment and follow-up action. The Task Force for the Revamping of the Intelligence Apparatus headed by Shri G.C.Saxena, former head of the R&AW, recommended in 2000 that the JIC should be rescued from the limbo to which it had remained confined for about five years and restored to its original authority. It took another six years to implement its recommendation.
12. Previously, for nearly a decade, we had no body for analysis, assessment and follow-up action, today we have three---- the JIC of the old vintage, the NSCS of the 1998-99 creation and the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), which came into existence in 1999 as a body of non-governmental analysts and advisers on national security. From a state of practically no analysis, we have gravitated to one of a plethora of analysis. Analysis for analysis sake without orienting it towards action has become the name of the game.
13. There is a need to re-visit the national security management system created in 1998-99 and subsequently modified by the revival of the JIC in order to ensure that the JIC, the NSCS, the NSAB and the NCTC, to be created in the Ministry of Home Affairs, work in a co-ordinated manner instead of adding to the prevailing confusion. The main responsibility of the JIC and the NCTC should be action-oriented analysis and follow-up action---- the JIC in respect of non-terrorism related threats to national security and the NCTC focusing on terrorism-related threats. The NSCS should confine itself to policy-related analysis to examine how past and present policies in national security matters have been working and whether any changes are called for. The NSAB should provide the inputs for the policy-related work of the NSCS. It should be encouraged to function as the generator of new ideas on specific issues to be referred to it by the PM and the NSA.
Warm regards,
Yours sincerely,
B.Raman, Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi.
Shri Shiv Shankar Menon,
NSA,
New Delhi.
Friday, January 22, 2010
Thursday, January 21, 2010
M.K.NARAYANAN
B.RAMAN
M.K.Narayanan ( also known as MK or MIKE) and I were contemporaries in college, but we had not known each other as students. I met him for the first time in July,1967, when I joined the Intelligence Bureau (IB) as a Joint Assistant Director (JAD). MK, six years senior to me in the Indian Police Service, had joined the IB some years earlier and was working as an Assistant Director ( AD) in a Division dealing with communism. Though very young in the intelligence profession, he had already made a name as a brilliant analyst and was held in great respect by his seniors and other colleagues.
2. He used to share a room with another officer in the South Block. All the young officers of the IB religiously used to gather in his room every day for a shared lunch. It used to be an uproarious gathering discussing men, matters and memories in a humourous manner. MK had always been known for his keen---- and often debunking--- sense of humour and he used to keep everybody laughing. His humour endeared him to many, but caused misunderstandings with others who could not appreciate the humour in his remarks.
3. R.N.Kao was a Joint Director then and occupied a room two rooms after MK's. He used to regularly go home for lunch, but often, before going home, he would peep into MK's lunch club as we used to call it, greet all of us and leave.
4. MK used to talk to Kao as freely and as humourously as he used to talk to me and other juniors without the least sign of nervousness. If I am asked to name three qualities of MK, which I valued most, I would mention his sense of personal dignity, his high standards of personal integrity and his human relationships.
5. MK had the privilege of serving under or with titans of the intelligence profession such as B.N.Mallick, Kao,M.M.L.Hooja, A.K. Dave, K.Sankaran Nair and G.C.Saxena. I had seen him in the company of all these officers except Mallick. He used to show great respect to them and treated them with deference, but I had never seen him exhibit servility or submissiveness to any of them. Even though he was years junior to them, he would talk to them on equal terms and would not hesitate to give his views right or wrong---firmly, but politely.
6. I could cite many instances of his personal integrity, but would confine myself to two. As the head of the IB, he rarely used special aircraft. He invariably chose to travel by the commercial flights of the Indian Airlines. In 2000-2001, he and I served as members of the National Security Advisory Board. The rules permitted the outstation members of the NSAB to stay in a comfortable hotel approved by the Government. MK, who used to come from Chennai, often preferred staying in a small guest house of the IB.
7. His human relationships were and are legendary. He was easily accessible in his office to anyone wanting to see him. He never stood on formalities in meeting people. He knew everyone working in his Divisions by name, by face and by family background. He took keen interest in their personal problems and never hesitated to help them. His staff even at the lowest of the lower levels worshipped him and could cite instances when they took their problems to MK, he found the time to help them. Over the years, the IB has built up excellent traditions of human relationships that are retained even today. MK's contribution to these traditions was immense.
8. I had often seen sections of the media writing that he owed his appointment as the National Security Adviser to his contacts with Mrs. Sonia Gandhi. I never believed such stories. MK has never been known to curry favour with political leaders in order to secure an official position. He was a great networker and maintained excellent relations with many people on both sides of the political spectrum. He got along as famously with V.P.Singh and Chandrasekhar as he did with Rajiv Gandhi. He got along as famously with Atal Behari Vajpayee and Lal Krishna Advani as he did with Narasimha Rao. He believed that good relations with political leaders helped him in his profession, but he did not look upon such relationships as a means of advancing his career. He was definitely not a careerist, who kept calculating how to go up the ladder.
9. MK is a religious, God-fearing man though in his personal conversations he hardly ever talks of religion or God. I had heard it from reliable sources that when in Delhi he never fails to spend a few minutes every day worshipping in a particular Hanuman temple to which he is attached and that every day he never goes to bed without doing pooja at home however late in the night it might be.
10. In the IB, he had held a large variety of responsibilities before becoming its chief---- as an expert on national and international communism and Dravidian politics, counter-intelligence, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. His role in dealing with the tribal insurgency in Tripura was highly commended. His contribution to counter-terrorism in J&K and Punjab was very significant. One knows a senior professional by the number of juniors he trained and made them shine. Outstanding IB officers such as A.S.Dulat (J&K) and Ajit Doval (counter-terrorism) greatly benefitted from their training under MK. You name any outstanding officer of the IB, you would find that MK was his mentor at some stage or the other. You will also find that excellent inter-personal relationships was a strong quality of all proteges of MK. He made them imbibe the importance of good team work for success in the intelligence profession.
11. There has been a number of articles on MK's contribution as the NSA. Nobody can talk knowledgeably and authoritatively on this except Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh. The NSA reports directly to the PM, who uses him as a sounding-board for new ideas and initiatives. The relationship between a Prime Minister and his NSA is often more informal than formal. It has to be that way. Nobody can claim to know the kind of close informal relationship that prevailed and continues to prevail between Dr.Manmohan Singh and MK.
12. Even without much direct access to reliable information, one could have a good sense of MK's style of functioning as the NSA. Some examples of MK's initiatives:
When he realised that there were serious reservations over the Indo-US nuclear co-operation agreement in sections of the community of retired nuclear scientists, he arranged an interaction for them with the Prime Minister so that they could share their concerns with the PM. He did not just dismiss their concerns, but felt it necessary that the Prime Minister should be aware of them before he went ahead with the agreement.
He managed to establish a folksy relationship with his counterparts in the George Bush Administration which smoothened the negotiations. Both MK and Bush shared a penchant for such folksy relationship. I was told that when Mr. Bush visited India in April 2006, he put his hand around the shoulders of MK and whispered into his ears: " I want this agreement".
He set up a Task Force headed by Shri K.Subrahmanyam, the doyen of strategic analysts, to give inputs to the PM on how to progress Indo-US relations.
He set up a similar Task Force reportedly headed by Shri C.V.Ranganathan, former Indian Ambassador to China, to provide inputs on Sino-Indian relations.
He revived the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which was in limbo under Deve Gowda, Inder Gujral and Vajpayee, and re-invigorated its working as the main analytical tool of the Government.
He increased the number of academics nominated to the NSAB, which used to be packed with retired Government servants.
He set up a Task Force headed by Dr.S.D.Pradhan, who was formerly in the NSC Secretariat, to make recommendations on how to improve the functioning of the intelligence agencies.
He sought to give a strategic dimension to our intelligence collection capabilities by visualising what kind of new capabilities we are likely to need in the years ahead and how to create them. In this context, he paid attention to improving the capabilities relating to weapons of mass destruction terrorism.
13. Without knowing the details of the various initiatives taken by MK and the results achieved, it will be unfair to criticise his record. Only the Prime Minister will know all these details and will be the right person to judge fairly.
14.One might ask with validity, if MK had done all these things, why did the PM decide to shift him from the post and replace him with Shiv Shankar Menon, former Foreign Secretary. The Prime Minister's first term in office was devoted to establishing the foundations of a new relationship with the US and the European Union countries. MK had no mental reservations on this, whereas diplomats of the Foreign Office, who had won their professional spurs in the years of the cold war, might have dragged their feet in implementing this policy. The PM found in MK the right person for giving shape to his ideas.
15. It is my impression that the PM wants to devote his second term to new initiatives for improving relations with Pakistan. MK, as a hardened intelligence professional, found it difficult to rid himself of his suspicions and reservations vis-a-vis Pakistan. Anyone from the intelligence community might have dragged his feet in concretising the PM's ideas for a new approach towards Pakistan. He wanted a distinguished diplomat with an open mind on Pakistan. He felt that Menon would be the right person for the job.
16. How about China? One feels that the Prime Minister himself is not very certain how fast to move forward in our relations with China. The lingering memories of 1962 and the strong distrust of China in the Indian civil society continue to come in the way of any meaningful initiatives for finding a solution to the border dispute. Will the Prime Minister feel more confident now in thinking of new ideas for pushing forward the border talks? Unless he does so, it would be unfair to expect any significant results from the new NSA.
17. MK's tenure had its negative record too. The first related to his perceived inability to build up an effective command and control in the Government of India for counter-terrorism. The second was his failure to improve morale and man management in the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) and to strengthen cohesion in the Indian intelligence community. A US expert who watched the 26/11 terrorist strikes on the TV, had remarked that he got the impression that there was no single command and control and that nobody appeared to be in total charge of the situation. His observations were not wrong. This was a measure of MK's failure to build up our counter-terrorism capabilities and leadership.
18. MK, who had no experience of diplomacy, did extremely well in high-level diplomacy. He was considered the leading internal security expert of this country, but he was not as successful in this area.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
M.K.Narayanan ( also known as MK or MIKE) and I were contemporaries in college, but we had not known each other as students. I met him for the first time in July,1967, when I joined the Intelligence Bureau (IB) as a Joint Assistant Director (JAD). MK, six years senior to me in the Indian Police Service, had joined the IB some years earlier and was working as an Assistant Director ( AD) in a Division dealing with communism. Though very young in the intelligence profession, he had already made a name as a brilliant analyst and was held in great respect by his seniors and other colleagues.
2. He used to share a room with another officer in the South Block. All the young officers of the IB religiously used to gather in his room every day for a shared lunch. It used to be an uproarious gathering discussing men, matters and memories in a humourous manner. MK had always been known for his keen---- and often debunking--- sense of humour and he used to keep everybody laughing. His humour endeared him to many, but caused misunderstandings with others who could not appreciate the humour in his remarks.
3. R.N.Kao was a Joint Director then and occupied a room two rooms after MK's. He used to regularly go home for lunch, but often, before going home, he would peep into MK's lunch club as we used to call it, greet all of us and leave.
4. MK used to talk to Kao as freely and as humourously as he used to talk to me and other juniors without the least sign of nervousness. If I am asked to name three qualities of MK, which I valued most, I would mention his sense of personal dignity, his high standards of personal integrity and his human relationships.
5. MK had the privilege of serving under or with titans of the intelligence profession such as B.N.Mallick, Kao,M.M.L.Hooja, A.K. Dave, K.Sankaran Nair and G.C.Saxena. I had seen him in the company of all these officers except Mallick. He used to show great respect to them and treated them with deference, but I had never seen him exhibit servility or submissiveness to any of them. Even though he was years junior to them, he would talk to them on equal terms and would not hesitate to give his views right or wrong---firmly, but politely.
6. I could cite many instances of his personal integrity, but would confine myself to two. As the head of the IB, he rarely used special aircraft. He invariably chose to travel by the commercial flights of the Indian Airlines. In 2000-2001, he and I served as members of the National Security Advisory Board. The rules permitted the outstation members of the NSAB to stay in a comfortable hotel approved by the Government. MK, who used to come from Chennai, often preferred staying in a small guest house of the IB.
7. His human relationships were and are legendary. He was easily accessible in his office to anyone wanting to see him. He never stood on formalities in meeting people. He knew everyone working in his Divisions by name, by face and by family background. He took keen interest in their personal problems and never hesitated to help them. His staff even at the lowest of the lower levels worshipped him and could cite instances when they took their problems to MK, he found the time to help them. Over the years, the IB has built up excellent traditions of human relationships that are retained even today. MK's contribution to these traditions was immense.
8. I had often seen sections of the media writing that he owed his appointment as the National Security Adviser to his contacts with Mrs. Sonia Gandhi. I never believed such stories. MK has never been known to curry favour with political leaders in order to secure an official position. He was a great networker and maintained excellent relations with many people on both sides of the political spectrum. He got along as famously with V.P.Singh and Chandrasekhar as he did with Rajiv Gandhi. He got along as famously with Atal Behari Vajpayee and Lal Krishna Advani as he did with Narasimha Rao. He believed that good relations with political leaders helped him in his profession, but he did not look upon such relationships as a means of advancing his career. He was definitely not a careerist, who kept calculating how to go up the ladder.
9. MK is a religious, God-fearing man though in his personal conversations he hardly ever talks of religion or God. I had heard it from reliable sources that when in Delhi he never fails to spend a few minutes every day worshipping in a particular Hanuman temple to which he is attached and that every day he never goes to bed without doing pooja at home however late in the night it might be.
10. In the IB, he had held a large variety of responsibilities before becoming its chief---- as an expert on national and international communism and Dravidian politics, counter-intelligence, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. His role in dealing with the tribal insurgency in Tripura was highly commended. His contribution to counter-terrorism in J&K and Punjab was very significant. One knows a senior professional by the number of juniors he trained and made them shine. Outstanding IB officers such as A.S.Dulat (J&K) and Ajit Doval (counter-terrorism) greatly benefitted from their training under MK. You name any outstanding officer of the IB, you would find that MK was his mentor at some stage or the other. You will also find that excellent inter-personal relationships was a strong quality of all proteges of MK. He made them imbibe the importance of good team work for success in the intelligence profession.
11. There has been a number of articles on MK's contribution as the NSA. Nobody can talk knowledgeably and authoritatively on this except Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh. The NSA reports directly to the PM, who uses him as a sounding-board for new ideas and initiatives. The relationship between a Prime Minister and his NSA is often more informal than formal. It has to be that way. Nobody can claim to know the kind of close informal relationship that prevailed and continues to prevail between Dr.Manmohan Singh and MK.
12. Even without much direct access to reliable information, one could have a good sense of MK's style of functioning as the NSA. Some examples of MK's initiatives:
When he realised that there were serious reservations over the Indo-US nuclear co-operation agreement in sections of the community of retired nuclear scientists, he arranged an interaction for them with the Prime Minister so that they could share their concerns with the PM. He did not just dismiss their concerns, but felt it necessary that the Prime Minister should be aware of them before he went ahead with the agreement.
He managed to establish a folksy relationship with his counterparts in the George Bush Administration which smoothened the negotiations. Both MK and Bush shared a penchant for such folksy relationship. I was told that when Mr. Bush visited India in April 2006, he put his hand around the shoulders of MK and whispered into his ears: " I want this agreement".
He set up a Task Force headed by Shri K.Subrahmanyam, the doyen of strategic analysts, to give inputs to the PM on how to progress Indo-US relations.
He set up a similar Task Force reportedly headed by Shri C.V.Ranganathan, former Indian Ambassador to China, to provide inputs on Sino-Indian relations.
He revived the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which was in limbo under Deve Gowda, Inder Gujral and Vajpayee, and re-invigorated its working as the main analytical tool of the Government.
He increased the number of academics nominated to the NSAB, which used to be packed with retired Government servants.
He set up a Task Force headed by Dr.S.D.Pradhan, who was formerly in the NSC Secretariat, to make recommendations on how to improve the functioning of the intelligence agencies.
He sought to give a strategic dimension to our intelligence collection capabilities by visualising what kind of new capabilities we are likely to need in the years ahead and how to create them. In this context, he paid attention to improving the capabilities relating to weapons of mass destruction terrorism.
13. Without knowing the details of the various initiatives taken by MK and the results achieved, it will be unfair to criticise his record. Only the Prime Minister will know all these details and will be the right person to judge fairly.
14.One might ask with validity, if MK had done all these things, why did the PM decide to shift him from the post and replace him with Shiv Shankar Menon, former Foreign Secretary. The Prime Minister's first term in office was devoted to establishing the foundations of a new relationship with the US and the European Union countries. MK had no mental reservations on this, whereas diplomats of the Foreign Office, who had won their professional spurs in the years of the cold war, might have dragged their feet in implementing this policy. The PM found in MK the right person for giving shape to his ideas.
15. It is my impression that the PM wants to devote his second term to new initiatives for improving relations with Pakistan. MK, as a hardened intelligence professional, found it difficult to rid himself of his suspicions and reservations vis-a-vis Pakistan. Anyone from the intelligence community might have dragged his feet in concretising the PM's ideas for a new approach towards Pakistan. He wanted a distinguished diplomat with an open mind on Pakistan. He felt that Menon would be the right person for the job.
16. How about China? One feels that the Prime Minister himself is not very certain how fast to move forward in our relations with China. The lingering memories of 1962 and the strong distrust of China in the Indian civil society continue to come in the way of any meaningful initiatives for finding a solution to the border dispute. Will the Prime Minister feel more confident now in thinking of new ideas for pushing forward the border talks? Unless he does so, it would be unfair to expect any significant results from the new NSA.
17. MK's tenure had its negative record too. The first related to his perceived inability to build up an effective command and control in the Government of India for counter-terrorism. The second was his failure to improve morale and man management in the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) and to strengthen cohesion in the Indian intelligence community. A US expert who watched the 26/11 terrorist strikes on the TV, had remarked that he got the impression that there was no single command and control and that nobody appeared to be in total charge of the situation. His observations were not wrong. This was a measure of MK's failure to build up our counter-terrorism capabilities and leadership.
18. MK, who had no experience of diplomacy, did extremely well in high-level diplomacy. He was considered the leading internal security expert of this country, but he was not as successful in this area.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, January 20, 2010
GATES' VISIT TO DELHI: STRATEGIC COURSE-CORRECTION
B.RAMAN
The contours of the strategic course correction in its relations with India, Pakistan and China, which the administration of President Barack Obama has undertaken since it assumed office a year ago, became evident once again during the just-concluded two-day visit of Dr.Robert Gates, the US Defence Secretary, to New Delhi coinciding unintentionally with the end of Mr.Obama's first year in office.
2. The conventional wisdom that the Pentagon and the State Department look at India through two different prisms, with the Pentagon under Mr.Obama visualising a much larger role for India than one confined to the sub-continent as seen by the State Department, would have fewer takers after Dr.Gates' visit. Dr.Gates is in the unique position of having served as the Defence Secretary during the last two years of the second term of Mr. George Bush, and continuing in the same position under Mr.Obama.
3. Under Mr.Bush, he was a supporter of the multi-dimensional strategic relationship with India, covering civilian nuclear co-operation, military supply relationship, networking between the armed forces of the two countries, a high-profile role for India in maritime security and maritime counter-terrorism and an important role for India as a respected interlocutor of the US in assessing the implications of China's rise as a modern military power in the wake of its rise as an economic power aspiring for a parity of status with the US.
4. Under Mr.Bush, the interactions of Dr.Gates, his predecessor (Mr.Donald Rumsfeld) and their advisers and officials in the Pentagon with their Indian counterparts used to have a rich agenda with a much larger arc of vision---- with Indo-Pakistan tensions forming only a small part of it. During Dr.Gates' just-concluded stay in Delhi, one saw the transition that he has made in adjusting himself to Mr.Obama's vision of India as the pre-eminent power of South Asia, whose role will be important for the success of Mr.Obama's Af-Pak strategy. He has also adjusted himself to Mr.Obama's objective of quietly ridding the developing Indo-US strategic relationship of the preoccupation with China, which was an important characteristic of the India-related policies of the Bush Administration. Dr.Gates came to India as a supporter of the mid-course correction in the Obama Administration's policies towards India which have been underway for a year now.
5.China seems to have figured as expected in Dr.Gates' talks with Indian leaders and officials and in his interactions with the media, but not as a driving force of the Indo-US strategic relationship. As one reads and analyses the various comments made by Dr. Gates, one is at a loss to understand whether there is any driving force at all under the Obama Administration----except perhaps Washington's anxiety to prevent any escalation in Indo-Pak tensions due to terrorism from derailing Mr.Obama's objectives in the Af-Pak region.
6." The Hindu" of January 21,2010, has quoted Dr.Gates as having remarked as follows during his interactions with the media on January 20: "While the discussions with the Indian leaders on China were generic in nature, both sides talked about Beijing's military modernisation plan. In the same breath, he said Washington preferred to engage more with China to avoid any miscalculation. "
7. Pakistan-centric issues ---- strategic as well as tactical--- received a disproportionately large attention as compared to broader issues which used to figure more prominently in the past. India's relevance as a US partner in a much larger geopolitical context hardly found mention. We in India cannot escape part of the responsibility for the reversion to the past practice of looking at India in a restricted Indo-Pakistan context. By refusing to rid ourselves of our consuming fixation with Pakistan, we have unwittingly created an impression that what matters to India is keeping Pakistan under control---- a few statements supportive of India and critical of Pakistan on the terrorism issue and the Indians will be happy. That is the prevailing reading in Washington DC----whether in the White House, the State Department or the Pentagon and we saw that reflected during Dr.Gates' visit.
8. We have not yet realised the full implications of the mid-course corrections in Washington DC and we have not yet examined whether in the face of the unmistakable signs of a much narrower definition of the Indo-US strategic relations by the Obama Administration, any mid-course corrections of our own policies are called for. There is definitely a need for such an examination in respect of our relations with China.
9. As the scope for convergence of Indo-US perceptions and policies relating to China gets increasingly reduced during Mr.Obama's term in office, it is important for us to strike out on our own in re-fashioning our policies towards China. There is a need for examining the wisdom of enlarging our engagement with China beyond trade to strategic security related issues of common concern and interest to the two countries. Maritime counter-terrorism is one such issue. Co-operation between India and China against maritime terrorism and in ensuring sea lane security is of much greater importance than co-operation in maritime counter-terrorism with the US. Our continuing differences and unhappiness with China over the border issue and the alleged Chinese troop intrusions into Indian territory should not come in the way of identifying new areas of convergence with China.
10. Even in respect of Pakistan, the time has come to have a re-look at our policies to decide to what extent our fixation with certain issues has served us well. Is it possible to give a strategic depth to our relations with Pakistan? How to go about it? These are questions which need to be posed.
11. India's relevance and acceptability as a major Asian power will be determined not by our continuing to hang on to the US coattails, but by our chartering our own independent course based on our national interests and future aspirations. While the US has been steadily doing its course-corrections, we should not remain glued to our past policies. ( 21-1-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The contours of the strategic course correction in its relations with India, Pakistan and China, which the administration of President Barack Obama has undertaken since it assumed office a year ago, became evident once again during the just-concluded two-day visit of Dr.Robert Gates, the US Defence Secretary, to New Delhi coinciding unintentionally with the end of Mr.Obama's first year in office.
2. The conventional wisdom that the Pentagon and the State Department look at India through two different prisms, with the Pentagon under Mr.Obama visualising a much larger role for India than one confined to the sub-continent as seen by the State Department, would have fewer takers after Dr.Gates' visit. Dr.Gates is in the unique position of having served as the Defence Secretary during the last two years of the second term of Mr. George Bush, and continuing in the same position under Mr.Obama.
3. Under Mr.Bush, he was a supporter of the multi-dimensional strategic relationship with India, covering civilian nuclear co-operation, military supply relationship, networking between the armed forces of the two countries, a high-profile role for India in maritime security and maritime counter-terrorism and an important role for India as a respected interlocutor of the US in assessing the implications of China's rise as a modern military power in the wake of its rise as an economic power aspiring for a parity of status with the US.
4. Under Mr.Bush, the interactions of Dr.Gates, his predecessor (Mr.Donald Rumsfeld) and their advisers and officials in the Pentagon with their Indian counterparts used to have a rich agenda with a much larger arc of vision---- with Indo-Pakistan tensions forming only a small part of it. During Dr.Gates' just-concluded stay in Delhi, one saw the transition that he has made in adjusting himself to Mr.Obama's vision of India as the pre-eminent power of South Asia, whose role will be important for the success of Mr.Obama's Af-Pak strategy. He has also adjusted himself to Mr.Obama's objective of quietly ridding the developing Indo-US strategic relationship of the preoccupation with China, which was an important characteristic of the India-related policies of the Bush Administration. Dr.Gates came to India as a supporter of the mid-course correction in the Obama Administration's policies towards India which have been underway for a year now.
5.China seems to have figured as expected in Dr.Gates' talks with Indian leaders and officials and in his interactions with the media, but not as a driving force of the Indo-US strategic relationship. As one reads and analyses the various comments made by Dr. Gates, one is at a loss to understand whether there is any driving force at all under the Obama Administration----except perhaps Washington's anxiety to prevent any escalation in Indo-Pak tensions due to terrorism from derailing Mr.Obama's objectives in the Af-Pak region.
6." The Hindu" of January 21,2010, has quoted Dr.Gates as having remarked as follows during his interactions with the media on January 20: "While the discussions with the Indian leaders on China were generic in nature, both sides talked about Beijing's military modernisation plan. In the same breath, he said Washington preferred to engage more with China to avoid any miscalculation. "
7. Pakistan-centric issues ---- strategic as well as tactical--- received a disproportionately large attention as compared to broader issues which used to figure more prominently in the past. India's relevance as a US partner in a much larger geopolitical context hardly found mention. We in India cannot escape part of the responsibility for the reversion to the past practice of looking at India in a restricted Indo-Pakistan context. By refusing to rid ourselves of our consuming fixation with Pakistan, we have unwittingly created an impression that what matters to India is keeping Pakistan under control---- a few statements supportive of India and critical of Pakistan on the terrorism issue and the Indians will be happy. That is the prevailing reading in Washington DC----whether in the White House, the State Department or the Pentagon and we saw that reflected during Dr.Gates' visit.
8. We have not yet realised the full implications of the mid-course corrections in Washington DC and we have not yet examined whether in the face of the unmistakable signs of a much narrower definition of the Indo-US strategic relations by the Obama Administration, any mid-course corrections of our own policies are called for. There is definitely a need for such an examination in respect of our relations with China.
9. As the scope for convergence of Indo-US perceptions and policies relating to China gets increasingly reduced during Mr.Obama's term in office, it is important for us to strike out on our own in re-fashioning our policies towards China. There is a need for examining the wisdom of enlarging our engagement with China beyond trade to strategic security related issues of common concern and interest to the two countries. Maritime counter-terrorism is one such issue. Co-operation between India and China against maritime terrorism and in ensuring sea lane security is of much greater importance than co-operation in maritime counter-terrorism with the US. Our continuing differences and unhappiness with China over the border issue and the alleged Chinese troop intrusions into Indian territory should not come in the way of identifying new areas of convergence with China.
10. Even in respect of Pakistan, the time has come to have a re-look at our policies to decide to what extent our fixation with certain issues has served us well. Is it possible to give a strategic depth to our relations with Pakistan? How to go about it? These are questions which need to be posed.
11. India's relevance and acceptability as a major Asian power will be determined not by our continuing to hang on to the US coattails, but by our chartering our own independent course based on our national interests and future aspirations. While the US has been steadily doing its course-corrections, we should not remain glued to our past policies. ( 21-1-2010)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, January 19, 2010
CHANGING THE INDIAN INTELLIGENCE CULTURE
B.RAMAN
In his R.N.Kao Memorial lecture delivered at the headquarters of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) on January 19,2010, Vice-President Hamid Ansari has done well in raising in public issues such as accountability and parliamentary oversight to which the Indian intelligence community is still a stranger.
2.The concept of an accountable and competent intelligence community, which uses the need for secrecy only for protecting its operations and not for covering up its inadequacies and irregularities, has been accepted and implemented by the intelligence agencies of many democracies----parliamentary as well as Presidential types--- of the world during the last three decades. Nobody in those countries has since argued that these concepts have come in the way of the effectiveness of the intelligence process and hence should be re-considered. The overall consensus is that these changes have proved beneficial and hence should be continued and, if necessary, further refined.
3. In India too, these issues have been raised from time to time since the State of Emergency imposed by Indira Gandhi in 1975-77, but follow-up action has been avoided either because of resistance from sections of the intelligence community or because of the relcutance of the political leadership to introduce any changes which might dilute the scope for political misuse of the intelligence machinery for partisan purposes or both.
4. Accountability of intelligence agencies demands ,firstly, that they should have a legal existence and, secondly, that they should have a formal charter of their functions and responsibilities. Forty-two years after its formation in 1968, the R&AW still does not have a legal existence. It was set up by a brief executive order issued on behalf of Indira Gandhi in September 1968. Till today, this order has not been accorded parliamentary sanctity by having necessary legislation authorising its creation passed by the Parliament. No Government, which has held office since 1968, has considered it necessary to have an Act passed by the Parliament providing legal legitimacy to the R&AW. No one has raised the question as to how the various Governments have been incurring expenditure on the R&AW year after year without having its creation approved by the Parliament.
5. In the 1980s, when Indira Gandhi was the Prime Minister, a law was enacted by the Parliament banning strikes in the intelligence agencies. To my knowledge, that is the only Act of the Indian Parliament in which there is a reference to the R&AW by name. When that law was passed, nobody in the Parliament thought it fit to ask: What is this R&AW about? When was it created? Who created it? Has its creation been approved by the Parliament?
6. It goes to the credit of A.K.Verma, who headed the R&AW from 1987 to 90. that he took the initiative in drawing the attention of the Governments of Rajiv Gandhi and V.P.Singh to the fact that the R&AW had been functioning without a legal cover and a formal charter. He wanted the Government of the day to do something about it, but nothing was done.
7. The fact that the Intelligence Bureau , which was created by the British before 1947, and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), which came into existence after 1947, had been functioning without formal charters of their functions and responsibilities, was highlighted by the L.P.Singh Committee, which was set up by the Morarji Desai Government to enquire into the functioning of these two organisations during the State of Emergency. It not only stressed the need for formal charters to prevent their future misuse, but also prepared for the consideration of the Government detailed model charters for adoption. No action was taken on its recommendations by the Indira Gandhi Government which came back to power in 1980 or its successors. The report was consigned to the Archives---seen, but not read and implemented.
8. Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee and Shri Lal Krishna Advani were among those who were in the forefront of those who criticised----- during the election campaign of 1977---- the alleged misuse of the intelligence agencies by the Indira Gandhi Government during the Emergency. When Shri Vajpayee became the Prime Minister and Shri Advani the Home Minister in 1998, one naturally expected them to take the initiative in taking the L.P.Singh Committee report out of the Archives and implement it. The expectations were belied.
9. The Task Force for the revamping of the intelligence apparatus set up by the Vajpayee Government in 2000, which was headed by Shri G.C. Saxena, former head of the R&AW, recommended the acceptance by the Government of the principle of formal charters for the intelligence agencies. To give greater meat to its recommendations, it wanted to have a look at the detailed charters for the IB and the CBI proposed by the L.P.Singh Committee. The Home Minstry, then headed by Shri Advani, avoided making available to the Task Force the entire report of the L.P.Singh Committee. However, the Task Force's recommendation for formal charters was accepted and implemented by the Vajpayee Government. One does not know whether the recommendations of the L.P.Singh Committee were taken into consideration while drafting the charters.
10. The credit for first raising the idea of a parliamentary oversight on the intelligence community should go to Shri Jaswant Singh, who was the Chairman of the Estimates Committee of the Rajya Sabha when Shri V.P.Singh was the Prime Minister. Shri V.P.Singh saw merit in the idea and wanted it to be examined. There was no opposition to the idea from the intelligence professionals then in service including this writer, but when Shri V.P.Singh developed differences with the BJP, he did not pursue it.
11. Since then, none of the political parties has shown interest in making the intelligence agencies accountable for their performance and integrity and in making their professional performance subject to an independent assessment. Secrecy is an important operational principle for an intelligence agency. Unless an intelligence agency is able to ensure the secrecy of its operations, no source or agent will stick his neck out to work for it. Its capability for collecting technical intelligence will also be affected.
12. But secrecy should not be allowed to be used as an excuse for covering inefficiencies in performance and irregularities in functioning and financial management. Irregularities do occur in matters such as the personnel policy and diversion of the resources sanctioned by the Government for operational objectives for non-operational purposes. The public and the Parliament have a right to know to what extent the agencies have been producing results and what are the areas of their non-performance. The Parliament has a right to know what kind of financial controls are in place, who exercises those controls and to what extent they are effective. The Parliament has similarly a right to check whether the principle of secrecy in recruitment is being misused to pack the organisations with unsuitable persons, taken not for their qualifications, but for their connections.
13. It is possible to introduce some of these checks and balances in the functioning of our intelligence community without damaging their operational secrecy. There is reluctance from the political class because it sees the agencies as instruments for partisan exploitation and not for defending national interests. There is reluctance from sections of the intelligence officers themselves because they think that unchecked secrecy gives them an aura of power and influence which they do not want to lose.
14. Ansaris may come and Ansaris may go, but the intelligence agencies will go on functioning in the same manner with the complicity of the political class unless there is sustained public pressure on the political class and the agencies to change the culture of our agencies. I am not very optimistic because I do not see on the horizon any political leader who is genuinely convinced of the need for a change.
15. Every country gets the intelligence community it deserves. We will continue to have the community which we have deserved unless Shri Ansari's call is followed up. ( 20-1-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
In his R.N.Kao Memorial lecture delivered at the headquarters of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) on January 19,2010, Vice-President Hamid Ansari has done well in raising in public issues such as accountability and parliamentary oversight to which the Indian intelligence community is still a stranger.
2.The concept of an accountable and competent intelligence community, which uses the need for secrecy only for protecting its operations and not for covering up its inadequacies and irregularities, has been accepted and implemented by the intelligence agencies of many democracies----parliamentary as well as Presidential types--- of the world during the last three decades. Nobody in those countries has since argued that these concepts have come in the way of the effectiveness of the intelligence process and hence should be re-considered. The overall consensus is that these changes have proved beneficial and hence should be continued and, if necessary, further refined.
3. In India too, these issues have been raised from time to time since the State of Emergency imposed by Indira Gandhi in 1975-77, but follow-up action has been avoided either because of resistance from sections of the intelligence community or because of the relcutance of the political leadership to introduce any changes which might dilute the scope for political misuse of the intelligence machinery for partisan purposes or both.
4. Accountability of intelligence agencies demands ,firstly, that they should have a legal existence and, secondly, that they should have a formal charter of their functions and responsibilities. Forty-two years after its formation in 1968, the R&AW still does not have a legal existence. It was set up by a brief executive order issued on behalf of Indira Gandhi in September 1968. Till today, this order has not been accorded parliamentary sanctity by having necessary legislation authorising its creation passed by the Parliament. No Government, which has held office since 1968, has considered it necessary to have an Act passed by the Parliament providing legal legitimacy to the R&AW. No one has raised the question as to how the various Governments have been incurring expenditure on the R&AW year after year without having its creation approved by the Parliament.
5. In the 1980s, when Indira Gandhi was the Prime Minister, a law was enacted by the Parliament banning strikes in the intelligence agencies. To my knowledge, that is the only Act of the Indian Parliament in which there is a reference to the R&AW by name. When that law was passed, nobody in the Parliament thought it fit to ask: What is this R&AW about? When was it created? Who created it? Has its creation been approved by the Parliament?
6. It goes to the credit of A.K.Verma, who headed the R&AW from 1987 to 90. that he took the initiative in drawing the attention of the Governments of Rajiv Gandhi and V.P.Singh to the fact that the R&AW had been functioning without a legal cover and a formal charter. He wanted the Government of the day to do something about it, but nothing was done.
7. The fact that the Intelligence Bureau , which was created by the British before 1947, and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), which came into existence after 1947, had been functioning without formal charters of their functions and responsibilities, was highlighted by the L.P.Singh Committee, which was set up by the Morarji Desai Government to enquire into the functioning of these two organisations during the State of Emergency. It not only stressed the need for formal charters to prevent their future misuse, but also prepared for the consideration of the Government detailed model charters for adoption. No action was taken on its recommendations by the Indira Gandhi Government which came back to power in 1980 or its successors. The report was consigned to the Archives---seen, but not read and implemented.
8. Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee and Shri Lal Krishna Advani were among those who were in the forefront of those who criticised----- during the election campaign of 1977---- the alleged misuse of the intelligence agencies by the Indira Gandhi Government during the Emergency. When Shri Vajpayee became the Prime Minister and Shri Advani the Home Minister in 1998, one naturally expected them to take the initiative in taking the L.P.Singh Committee report out of the Archives and implement it. The expectations were belied.
9. The Task Force for the revamping of the intelligence apparatus set up by the Vajpayee Government in 2000, which was headed by Shri G.C. Saxena, former head of the R&AW, recommended the acceptance by the Government of the principle of formal charters for the intelligence agencies. To give greater meat to its recommendations, it wanted to have a look at the detailed charters for the IB and the CBI proposed by the L.P.Singh Committee. The Home Minstry, then headed by Shri Advani, avoided making available to the Task Force the entire report of the L.P.Singh Committee. However, the Task Force's recommendation for formal charters was accepted and implemented by the Vajpayee Government. One does not know whether the recommendations of the L.P.Singh Committee were taken into consideration while drafting the charters.
10. The credit for first raising the idea of a parliamentary oversight on the intelligence community should go to Shri Jaswant Singh, who was the Chairman of the Estimates Committee of the Rajya Sabha when Shri V.P.Singh was the Prime Minister. Shri V.P.Singh saw merit in the idea and wanted it to be examined. There was no opposition to the idea from the intelligence professionals then in service including this writer, but when Shri V.P.Singh developed differences with the BJP, he did not pursue it.
11. Since then, none of the political parties has shown interest in making the intelligence agencies accountable for their performance and integrity and in making their professional performance subject to an independent assessment. Secrecy is an important operational principle for an intelligence agency. Unless an intelligence agency is able to ensure the secrecy of its operations, no source or agent will stick his neck out to work for it. Its capability for collecting technical intelligence will also be affected.
12. But secrecy should not be allowed to be used as an excuse for covering inefficiencies in performance and irregularities in functioning and financial management. Irregularities do occur in matters such as the personnel policy and diversion of the resources sanctioned by the Government for operational objectives for non-operational purposes. The public and the Parliament have a right to know to what extent the agencies have been producing results and what are the areas of their non-performance. The Parliament has a right to know what kind of financial controls are in place, who exercises those controls and to what extent they are effective. The Parliament has similarly a right to check whether the principle of secrecy in recruitment is being misused to pack the organisations with unsuitable persons, taken not for their qualifications, but for their connections.
13. It is possible to introduce some of these checks and balances in the functioning of our intelligence community without damaging their operational secrecy. There is reluctance from the political class because it sees the agencies as instruments for partisan exploitation and not for defending national interests. There is reluctance from sections of the intelligence officers themselves because they think that unchecked secrecy gives them an aura of power and influence which they do not want to lose.
14. Ansaris may come and Ansaris may go, but the intelligence agencies will go on functioning in the same manner with the complicity of the political class unless there is sustained public pressure on the political class and the agencies to change the culture of our agencies. I am not very optimistic because I do not see on the horizon any political leader who is genuinely convinced of the need for a change.
15. Every country gets the intelligence community it deserves. We will continue to have the community which we have deserved unless Shri Ansari's call is followed up. ( 20-1-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, January 18, 2010
GUARDING AGAINST SWARM ATTACKS ON NUCLEAR ESTABLISHMENTS
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.611
B.RAMAN
A swarm attack is a commando-style attack involving multiple targets and/ or multile modus operandi----that is a mix of the use of hand-held weapons and explosives. Since the Mumbai terrorist attack of November 26 to 29,2008, which was itself a major swarm attack, there have been seven more---- four in Kabul, Kandahar and Khost in Afghanistan by the Afghan Taliban and three in Lahore possibly by the Pakistani Taliban.
2. These attacks---particularly those in Kabul--- have had common features----a mix of the suicidal (fedayeen ) and suicide terrorism, facilitated by good intelligence at the disposal of the Taliban, a mix of suicide bombers on foot and vehicle-borne suicide bombers, fierce motivation, ability to stand and fight till death without losing courage, audacity in planning and execution and the ability to keep the planning a secret from governmental agencies.
3. The seventh commando-style swarm attack in Kabul on January 18,2010, on a number of governmental establishments, including the residence of President Hamid Karzai, and some private establishments too has creditably been beaten back by the Afghan Security forces. They were initially taken by surprise by the attacks, which reportedly involved about 20 terrorists---- 10 more than in Mumbai--- but they managed to recover fast and neutralise the surviving members of the Taliban group that attacked. The operation----involving the initial surprise attack by the Taliban and the counter-attack by the Afghan security forces---- which began at 9-35 AM was over before sunset.
4.There are two ways of analysing the attacks. One way of analysis would be to focus on the questions :were they timed to coincide with the swearing-in of some of his Ministers by President Karzai, the coming visit of Mr.Robert Gates, the US Defence Secretary, to this region and the international conference on Afghanistan in London on January 28,2010.
5. The second way would be to pose to ourselves the question---what do these attacks portend for the future? From the point of view of the future, certain ominous aspects need to be highlighted. The first is that the two Talibans---with the possible help of Al Qaeda based in North Waziristan---- have trained multiple swarm commando teams, which are available with them for swarm attacks of a strategic nature. The second is that their expertise in commando-style attacks continues to improve. The third is the possibility that Al Qaeda might, through the Talibans---- use a swarm style commando attack for overcoming physical security in a nuclear establishment----if not for getting hold of nuclear weapons or material, at least for creating mass panic.
6. Since March last year, I have been repeatedly writing about the commando-style swarm attacks, which have been taking place with persistent frequency in this region, meaning Pakistan, Afghanistan and India too and the importance of studying them from the professional angle and strengthening our preventive capability to counter them through enhanced multi-layer physical security in sensitive establishmens and our rapid action capability to neutralise them if the terrorists do succeed in attacking by surprise.
7. The latest attack in Kabul once again underlines the importance of these measures.I would like to repeat again what I have been saying and writing in the past: We should not live in a make-believe world thinking that these things happen only in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but they can't happen in India. They can.
8. Annexed are two of my articles of last March on this subject. ( 19-1-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE I
How Secure Is Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal From A Commando-Style Attack? (March 6,2009) http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers31/paper3086.html
B. Raman
How secure is Pakistan's nuclear arsenal from a commando-style attack by jihadi terrorists operating from sanctuaries inside Pakistan?
2. That is the question which should be worrying security experts all over the world as they learn with horror----based on visual evidence from closed circuit TV (CCTV) cameras and oral evidence from members of the Sri Lankan cricket team and the British match umpires and referees--- how the 12 or so terrorists who attacked the SL cricket team had the Liberty Square of Lahore at their disposal for about 30 minutes and walked away after the attack without the least fear of being chased and caught either by the security forces or the public.
3. It was as if they were walking away from a golf green after a game of golf---unhurried, unconcerned and totally relaxed..
4. Seven police officers, who were in the escort party of the convoy, died in the exchange of fire. Their bravery must be acknowledged and saluted. But how about the dozens of other police officers, who were supposed to be on route security to prevent an ambush of the convoy? The British match officials have said that not a policeman was to be seen on the road. This, despite the Presidential-scale security reportedly promised by President Asif Ali Zardari to the SL team.
5. How about the staff of the police station located near the Square? Why didn't they rush out and confront the terrorists? How about the police vehicles, which were supposed to be on patrol along the route to look out for suspicious movements and characters? How about the rapid response commando teams, which were supposed to be there in the stadium and at the LIberty Square, which was known as a vulnerable point since all vehicular movements had to slow down there?
6. They just disappeared or were not posted at all. In all the CCTV footage, the only sign of police one sees is a police vehicle crossing a terrorist and not taking any action as if it was crossing a normal pedestrian.
7. How about the road blocks all over Lahore which were supposed to have been put up after a terrorist strike to prevent the terrorists from getting away?
8. Many compelling questions arise as one gets details of what happened and what did not happen in Lahore on March 3, 2009? Were there insiders in the security establishment, who had played a role in the conspiracy? Were there accomplices or jihadi sympathisers in the security establishment, who facilitated the terrorist strike? Do the political and military leaders of Pakistan realise the total security vacuum in their country, which has made it a safehaven to jihadi terrorists from all over the world, who are able to operate at will without any fear of the consequences?
9. It has become a cliche to say that the Pakistani leaders are in a denial mode. So was former President Megawati Sukarnoputri of Indonesia till the Bali terrorist strike of October, 2002. Thereafter, she realised the gravity of the situation and made amends for her past negligence. So was former President Begum Khalida Zia of Bangladesh till the the nearly 400 synchronised explosions organised by the Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen (JUM) in August, 2005. Thereafter, she realised the gravity of the situation and acted against the JUM.
10. Pakistan has been the scene of repeated terrorist strikes and the spawning ground of jihadi terrorism of various hues directed against other countries since 1981. Till today, neither the political nor the military leaders of Pakistan are prepared to admit this. After the Lahore attack on the SL team, Ilyas Khan, of the Islamabad Bureau of the British Broadcasting Corporation, reported as follows the same day: "Militant attacks in all parts of the world have been investigated and solved, but Pakistan is yet to solve even one out of the hundreds of attacks it has suffered since the 1980s."
11. In every major terrorist strike of Pakistan, there was evidence of insider involvement. Some junior officers of the Pakistani Air Force were found to have been involved in the conspiracy to kill former President Pervez Musharraf at Rawalpindi in December, 2003. The investigation brought out the startling fact that the conspirators had met in the staff quarters of one of the PAF officers in a PAF complex in the Islamabad-Rawalpindi area to finalise their attack.
12. Before and after the unsuccessful terrorist strike on her at Karachi on October 18, 2007, Benazir Bhutto had alleged that Qari Saifullah Akhtar, the Amir of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), and some serving and retired officers of the Pakistan Intelligence Bureau and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) were involved in the conspiracy to kill her. Saifullah was detained for some weeks for interrogation, but thereafter released without any action being taken against him. No action was taken against the officers named by her. Not even a formal enquiry.
13. After addressing a public meeting at Rawalpindi on December 27, 2007, she left for her home in her car. Neither the police escort party nor Rehman Malik, the present Internal Security Adviser, who was at that time the co-ordinator of her physical security, followed her. They left for home by a different route after the meeting was over. Benazir was shot dead as her car came out of the ground. Malik and other officers came to know only after they reached home that she had been shot dead.
14. One can go on giving such instances, which show a total lack of control over the security establishment, which has become a law unto itself and disturbing indicators of the extent and depth of penetration of the security set-up by the jihadi terrorists. Many countries in the world, including India, are badly affected by terrorism. In many countries of the world, including India, there are inefficiencies and inadequacies in the counter-terrorism apparatus. But in no country of the world is the security establishment so badly penetrated by the jihadi terrorists as it is in Pakistan.
15. The Pakistani leaders not only refuse to admit this. Even more alarming, they live in a world of self-delusion which makes them think that all these realities are the figments of imagination of others ill-disposed towards them.
16. If this is the real state of affairs, one has very valid reasons to worry about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Pakistani political and military leaders repeatedly assure the international community that their nuclear arsenal has tight physical security and that no terrorist can penetrate it and get hold of nuclear weapons or material. After seeing what has happened in Lahore, the international community cannot afford to accept the Pakistani assurances at their face value. It must subject the physical security of the arsenal to greater scrutiny by independent outside experts. Even if this is done, a 100 per cent security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal cannot be assured so long as the terrorist safehavens and infrastructure in Pakistan are not removed. Pakistan must be forced to do so through international pressure.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
ANNEXURE II
Need For Urgent Relook At Our Physical Security ( March 7,2009) (www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers31/paper3087.html )
B. Raman
In our preoccupation with what is happening and what could happen in Pakistan, we should not overlook the urgent need for having a relook at our physical security architecture in sensitive establishments such as the nuclear establishments, oil refineries, gas production infrastructure, road, rail and air transport, critical information infrastructure etc. As I have emphasised repeatedly in the past, physical security is the most important component of counter-terrorism. If it is strong, a terrorist attack can be thwarted even if the intelligence agencies fail. If it is weak, even the best of intelligence may not be able to thwart a terrorist attack. In both India and Pakistan, we have a weak culture of physical security. The main reason why the US has been able thus far to prevent a repeat of 9/11 is the strengthening of the physical security apparatus by the newly-created Department of Homeland Security.
2. What happened at Mumbai, Kabul and Lahore---namely, commando-style surprise attacks by small groups of well-trained terrorists wielding lethal hand-held weapons--- could happen again in India. We should not think that only Pakistan is vulnerable to such attacks. We too are vulnerable as demonstrated so tragically at Mumbai. Our security architecture may not be as bad as that of Pakistan, but Mumbai clearly showed that it is not as good as it should be.
3. There is an urgent need for two actions. Firstly, an audit of the physical security measures at all sensitive establishments----whether run by the Government or the private sector ---- in order to determine whether any physical security enhancements are called for. There is a need for dividing all sensitive establishments into two categories-----those where a single-layer of physical security would be enough and those where a double or multiple-layer of physical security would be necessary . The idea of a double or multiple-layer of physical security is that even if the terrorists manage to beat the outside gate or perimeter security, they will not have a free run of the establishment due to a second or more layers of armed physical security. To counter determined terrorists such as those one saw at Mumbai, Kabul and Lahore a single-layer of physical security may not be sufficient in sensitive establishments.
4. The second action required is to have a relook at our consequence management capabilities to deal with a situation should, despite revamped physical security, the terrorists manage to have access to sensitive establishments. The consequence management drill should take into account various issues such as control over media coverage, prevention of panic, minimisation of damage and lethality etc. It is important to associate the consequence management set-ups of the States with this exercise because it is ultimately they who would act as the protector of first resort through their consequence management capabilities till there is intervention by the consequence management community of the Govt. of India.
5. In Mumbai, the terrorists succeeded so dramatically because they targeted private establishments with no physical security measures except some anti-explosive capability. Since the security guards of these establishments were unarmed, they were helpless before the terrorists wielding sophisticated hand-held weapons. Once the terrorists managed to gain access to these establishments and take them under their control, the special intervention forces of the Govt. of India such as the National Security Guards (NSGs) found themselves unable to act fast enough without causing too many loss of lives.
6. Situated as we are in the sub-continental region where terrorism will continue to be a fact of life at least for another 10 years or more and keeping in view our ambition of emerging as a major economic power, we just cannot afford to take up the stand that the physical security of the private sector is its responsibility and that the Government's role will be limited to issuing periodic advisories regarding likely threats. The Government has to play a more proactive role in encouraging and helping at least establishments of a strategic nature such as those associated with the tourism industry, the information technology companies etc in improving their physical security. They already have some capability for checks for explosives, but the methods used by them are primitive and do not take into account dangers from suicide bombers and vehicle-borne suicide terrorists.
7. Their weakest capability----which is almost non-existent--- is in facing a commando-style surprise attack by small groups of terrorists with modern hand-held weapons. The only way of thwarting them is by having well-armed and well-trained guards. Do the present laws allow the employment of such guards? If not, should the laws be modified to permit them to employ such well-armed guards? Who is going to supervise their training and keep them under control to prevent the arms issued to them finding their way into the hands of terrorists? These are questions, which need urgent attention.
8. From the point of view of the physical security architecture. the distinction between the public and the private sector is disappearing. Many private companies are already in the fields of oil refining and gas exploration, production and transport. An increasing number of airports is now privately managed. We intend allowing private companies into the field of nuclear power production. The Government cannot evade the responsibility for ensuring that such private establishments have a high level of physical security. There is a need for a joint task force consisting of the representatives of the intelligence and security agencies and professional organisations of private industries such as the FICCI (Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industries), the CII ( the Confederation of Indian Industries) etc as well as representatives of foreign business organisations to go into the question of physical security enhancements for private establishments of strategic significance.
9. Practically all major private establishments----Indian as well as foreign--- have their own physical security set-up. It is important for senior intelligence and security officials at the State and Central levels to regularly interact with them to exchange threat and vulnerability perceptions and ideas as to how to strengthen physical security.
10. In an important article titled "The Coming Swarm" in the "New York Times" of February 15,2009, which should be required reading for all our physical security experts, John Acquilla, who teaches in the special operations program at the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey in California, wrote as follows: "It seems that a new “Mumbai model” of swarming, smaller-scale terrorist violence is emerging. The basic concept is that hitting several targets at once, even with just a few fighters at each site, can cause fits for elite counterterrorist forces that are often manpower-heavy, far away and organized to deal with only one crisis at a time. This approach certainly worked in Mumbai. The Indian security forces, many of which had to be flown in from New Delhi, simply had little ability to strike back at more than one site at a time. While it’s true that the assaults in Kabul seem to be echoes of Mumbai, the fact is that Al Qaeda and its affiliates have been using these sorts of swarm tactics for several years...... How are swarms to be countered? The simplest way is to create many more units able to respond to simultaneous, small-scale attacks and spread them around the country. This means jettisoning the idea of overwhelming force in favor of small units that are not “elite” but rather “good enough” to tangle with terrorist teams. In dealing with swarms, economizing on force is essential. ....For the defense of American cities against terrorist swarms, the key would be to use local police officers as the first line of defense instead of relying on the military. The first step would be to create lots of small counterterrorism posts throughout urban areas instead of keeping police officers in large, centralized precinct houses. This is consistent with existing notions of community-based policing...... At the federal level, we should stop thinking in terms of moving thousands of troops across the country and instead distribute small response units far more widely. Cities, states and Washington should work out clear rules in advance for using military forces in a counterterrorist role, to avoid any bickering or delay during a crisis. Reserve and National Guard units should train and field many more units able to take on small teams of terrorist gunmen and bombers. Think of them as latter-day Minutemen. Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey and Yemen all responded to Qaeda attacks with similar “packetizing” initiatives involving the police and armed forces; and while that hasn’t eliminated swarm attacks, the terrorists have been far less effective and many lives have been saved."
11.Jihadi terrorism in India outside Jammu & Kashmir is essentially an urban phenomenon. We cannot use against it the techniques learnt by us in dealing with the insurgency in the North-East and with Maoist terrorism in Central India, which is essentially a rural phenomenon. We need a different system of response, which is comprehensive enough to cover all likely targets of strategic significance----whether in the Government or private sector.
12. Even if we do not create an independent Ministry of Internal Security, we should create a separate Department of Physical Security in the Ministry of Home Affairs, which is, inter alia, responsible for counter-terrorism, to act as the nodal agency for all physical security measures on the pattern of the Department of Homeland Security of the US. This newly-created department should interact continuously with its US counterpart to pick its brains and profit from its expertise and experience.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
B.RAMAN
A swarm attack is a commando-style attack involving multiple targets and/ or multile modus operandi----that is a mix of the use of hand-held weapons and explosives. Since the Mumbai terrorist attack of November 26 to 29,2008, which was itself a major swarm attack, there have been seven more---- four in Kabul, Kandahar and Khost in Afghanistan by the Afghan Taliban and three in Lahore possibly by the Pakistani Taliban.
2. These attacks---particularly those in Kabul--- have had common features----a mix of the suicidal (fedayeen ) and suicide terrorism, facilitated by good intelligence at the disposal of the Taliban, a mix of suicide bombers on foot and vehicle-borne suicide bombers, fierce motivation, ability to stand and fight till death without losing courage, audacity in planning and execution and the ability to keep the planning a secret from governmental agencies.
3. The seventh commando-style swarm attack in Kabul on January 18,2010, on a number of governmental establishments, including the residence of President Hamid Karzai, and some private establishments too has creditably been beaten back by the Afghan Security forces. They were initially taken by surprise by the attacks, which reportedly involved about 20 terrorists---- 10 more than in Mumbai--- but they managed to recover fast and neutralise the surviving members of the Taliban group that attacked. The operation----involving the initial surprise attack by the Taliban and the counter-attack by the Afghan security forces---- which began at 9-35 AM was over before sunset.
4.There are two ways of analysing the attacks. One way of analysis would be to focus on the questions :were they timed to coincide with the swearing-in of some of his Ministers by President Karzai, the coming visit of Mr.Robert Gates, the US Defence Secretary, to this region and the international conference on Afghanistan in London on January 28,2010.
5. The second way would be to pose to ourselves the question---what do these attacks portend for the future? From the point of view of the future, certain ominous aspects need to be highlighted. The first is that the two Talibans---with the possible help of Al Qaeda based in North Waziristan---- have trained multiple swarm commando teams, which are available with them for swarm attacks of a strategic nature. The second is that their expertise in commando-style attacks continues to improve. The third is the possibility that Al Qaeda might, through the Talibans---- use a swarm style commando attack for overcoming physical security in a nuclear establishment----if not for getting hold of nuclear weapons or material, at least for creating mass panic.
6. Since March last year, I have been repeatedly writing about the commando-style swarm attacks, which have been taking place with persistent frequency in this region, meaning Pakistan, Afghanistan and India too and the importance of studying them from the professional angle and strengthening our preventive capability to counter them through enhanced multi-layer physical security in sensitive establishmens and our rapid action capability to neutralise them if the terrorists do succeed in attacking by surprise.
7. The latest attack in Kabul once again underlines the importance of these measures.I would like to repeat again what I have been saying and writing in the past: We should not live in a make-believe world thinking that these things happen only in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but they can't happen in India. They can.
8. Annexed are two of my articles of last March on this subject. ( 19-1-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE I
How Secure Is Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal From A Commando-Style Attack? (March 6,2009) http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers31/paper3086.html
B. Raman
How secure is Pakistan's nuclear arsenal from a commando-style attack by jihadi terrorists operating from sanctuaries inside Pakistan?
2. That is the question which should be worrying security experts all over the world as they learn with horror----based on visual evidence from closed circuit TV (CCTV) cameras and oral evidence from members of the Sri Lankan cricket team and the British match umpires and referees--- how the 12 or so terrorists who attacked the SL cricket team had the Liberty Square of Lahore at their disposal for about 30 minutes and walked away after the attack without the least fear of being chased and caught either by the security forces or the public.
3. It was as if they were walking away from a golf green after a game of golf---unhurried, unconcerned and totally relaxed..
4. Seven police officers, who were in the escort party of the convoy, died in the exchange of fire. Their bravery must be acknowledged and saluted. But how about the dozens of other police officers, who were supposed to be on route security to prevent an ambush of the convoy? The British match officials have said that not a policeman was to be seen on the road. This, despite the Presidential-scale security reportedly promised by President Asif Ali Zardari to the SL team.
5. How about the staff of the police station located near the Square? Why didn't they rush out and confront the terrorists? How about the police vehicles, which were supposed to be on patrol along the route to look out for suspicious movements and characters? How about the rapid response commando teams, which were supposed to be there in the stadium and at the LIberty Square, which was known as a vulnerable point since all vehicular movements had to slow down there?
6. They just disappeared or were not posted at all. In all the CCTV footage, the only sign of police one sees is a police vehicle crossing a terrorist and not taking any action as if it was crossing a normal pedestrian.
7. How about the road blocks all over Lahore which were supposed to have been put up after a terrorist strike to prevent the terrorists from getting away?
8. Many compelling questions arise as one gets details of what happened and what did not happen in Lahore on March 3, 2009? Were there insiders in the security establishment, who had played a role in the conspiracy? Were there accomplices or jihadi sympathisers in the security establishment, who facilitated the terrorist strike? Do the political and military leaders of Pakistan realise the total security vacuum in their country, which has made it a safehaven to jihadi terrorists from all over the world, who are able to operate at will without any fear of the consequences?
9. It has become a cliche to say that the Pakistani leaders are in a denial mode. So was former President Megawati Sukarnoputri of Indonesia till the Bali terrorist strike of October, 2002. Thereafter, she realised the gravity of the situation and made amends for her past negligence. So was former President Begum Khalida Zia of Bangladesh till the the nearly 400 synchronised explosions organised by the Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen (JUM) in August, 2005. Thereafter, she realised the gravity of the situation and acted against the JUM.
10. Pakistan has been the scene of repeated terrorist strikes and the spawning ground of jihadi terrorism of various hues directed against other countries since 1981. Till today, neither the political nor the military leaders of Pakistan are prepared to admit this. After the Lahore attack on the SL team, Ilyas Khan, of the Islamabad Bureau of the British Broadcasting Corporation, reported as follows the same day: "Militant attacks in all parts of the world have been investigated and solved, but Pakistan is yet to solve even one out of the hundreds of attacks it has suffered since the 1980s."
11. In every major terrorist strike of Pakistan, there was evidence of insider involvement. Some junior officers of the Pakistani Air Force were found to have been involved in the conspiracy to kill former President Pervez Musharraf at Rawalpindi in December, 2003. The investigation brought out the startling fact that the conspirators had met in the staff quarters of one of the PAF officers in a PAF complex in the Islamabad-Rawalpindi area to finalise their attack.
12. Before and after the unsuccessful terrorist strike on her at Karachi on October 18, 2007, Benazir Bhutto had alleged that Qari Saifullah Akhtar, the Amir of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), and some serving and retired officers of the Pakistan Intelligence Bureau and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) were involved in the conspiracy to kill her. Saifullah was detained for some weeks for interrogation, but thereafter released without any action being taken against him. No action was taken against the officers named by her. Not even a formal enquiry.
13. After addressing a public meeting at Rawalpindi on December 27, 2007, she left for her home in her car. Neither the police escort party nor Rehman Malik, the present Internal Security Adviser, who was at that time the co-ordinator of her physical security, followed her. They left for home by a different route after the meeting was over. Benazir was shot dead as her car came out of the ground. Malik and other officers came to know only after they reached home that she had been shot dead.
14. One can go on giving such instances, which show a total lack of control over the security establishment, which has become a law unto itself and disturbing indicators of the extent and depth of penetration of the security set-up by the jihadi terrorists. Many countries in the world, including India, are badly affected by terrorism. In many countries of the world, including India, there are inefficiencies and inadequacies in the counter-terrorism apparatus. But in no country of the world is the security establishment so badly penetrated by the jihadi terrorists as it is in Pakistan.
15. The Pakistani leaders not only refuse to admit this. Even more alarming, they live in a world of self-delusion which makes them think that all these realities are the figments of imagination of others ill-disposed towards them.
16. If this is the real state of affairs, one has very valid reasons to worry about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Pakistani political and military leaders repeatedly assure the international community that their nuclear arsenal has tight physical security and that no terrorist can penetrate it and get hold of nuclear weapons or material. After seeing what has happened in Lahore, the international community cannot afford to accept the Pakistani assurances at their face value. It must subject the physical security of the arsenal to greater scrutiny by independent outside experts. Even if this is done, a 100 per cent security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal cannot be assured so long as the terrorist safehavens and infrastructure in Pakistan are not removed. Pakistan must be forced to do so through international pressure.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
ANNEXURE II
Need For Urgent Relook At Our Physical Security ( March 7,2009) (www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers31/paper3087.html )
B. Raman
In our preoccupation with what is happening and what could happen in Pakistan, we should not overlook the urgent need for having a relook at our physical security architecture in sensitive establishments such as the nuclear establishments, oil refineries, gas production infrastructure, road, rail and air transport, critical information infrastructure etc. As I have emphasised repeatedly in the past, physical security is the most important component of counter-terrorism. If it is strong, a terrorist attack can be thwarted even if the intelligence agencies fail. If it is weak, even the best of intelligence may not be able to thwart a terrorist attack. In both India and Pakistan, we have a weak culture of physical security. The main reason why the US has been able thus far to prevent a repeat of 9/11 is the strengthening of the physical security apparatus by the newly-created Department of Homeland Security.
2. What happened at Mumbai, Kabul and Lahore---namely, commando-style surprise attacks by small groups of well-trained terrorists wielding lethal hand-held weapons--- could happen again in India. We should not think that only Pakistan is vulnerable to such attacks. We too are vulnerable as demonstrated so tragically at Mumbai. Our security architecture may not be as bad as that of Pakistan, but Mumbai clearly showed that it is not as good as it should be.
3. There is an urgent need for two actions. Firstly, an audit of the physical security measures at all sensitive establishments----whether run by the Government or the private sector ---- in order to determine whether any physical security enhancements are called for. There is a need for dividing all sensitive establishments into two categories-----those where a single-layer of physical security would be enough and those where a double or multiple-layer of physical security would be necessary . The idea of a double or multiple-layer of physical security is that even if the terrorists manage to beat the outside gate or perimeter security, they will not have a free run of the establishment due to a second or more layers of armed physical security. To counter determined terrorists such as those one saw at Mumbai, Kabul and Lahore a single-layer of physical security may not be sufficient in sensitive establishments.
4. The second action required is to have a relook at our consequence management capabilities to deal with a situation should, despite revamped physical security, the terrorists manage to have access to sensitive establishments. The consequence management drill should take into account various issues such as control over media coverage, prevention of panic, minimisation of damage and lethality etc. It is important to associate the consequence management set-ups of the States with this exercise because it is ultimately they who would act as the protector of first resort through their consequence management capabilities till there is intervention by the consequence management community of the Govt. of India.
5. In Mumbai, the terrorists succeeded so dramatically because they targeted private establishments with no physical security measures except some anti-explosive capability. Since the security guards of these establishments were unarmed, they were helpless before the terrorists wielding sophisticated hand-held weapons. Once the terrorists managed to gain access to these establishments and take them under their control, the special intervention forces of the Govt. of India such as the National Security Guards (NSGs) found themselves unable to act fast enough without causing too many loss of lives.
6. Situated as we are in the sub-continental region where terrorism will continue to be a fact of life at least for another 10 years or more and keeping in view our ambition of emerging as a major economic power, we just cannot afford to take up the stand that the physical security of the private sector is its responsibility and that the Government's role will be limited to issuing periodic advisories regarding likely threats. The Government has to play a more proactive role in encouraging and helping at least establishments of a strategic nature such as those associated with the tourism industry, the information technology companies etc in improving their physical security. They already have some capability for checks for explosives, but the methods used by them are primitive and do not take into account dangers from suicide bombers and vehicle-borne suicide terrorists.
7. Their weakest capability----which is almost non-existent--- is in facing a commando-style surprise attack by small groups of terrorists with modern hand-held weapons. The only way of thwarting them is by having well-armed and well-trained guards. Do the present laws allow the employment of such guards? If not, should the laws be modified to permit them to employ such well-armed guards? Who is going to supervise their training and keep them under control to prevent the arms issued to them finding their way into the hands of terrorists? These are questions, which need urgent attention.
8. From the point of view of the physical security architecture. the distinction between the public and the private sector is disappearing. Many private companies are already in the fields of oil refining and gas exploration, production and transport. An increasing number of airports is now privately managed. We intend allowing private companies into the field of nuclear power production. The Government cannot evade the responsibility for ensuring that such private establishments have a high level of physical security. There is a need for a joint task force consisting of the representatives of the intelligence and security agencies and professional organisations of private industries such as the FICCI (Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industries), the CII ( the Confederation of Indian Industries) etc as well as representatives of foreign business organisations to go into the question of physical security enhancements for private establishments of strategic significance.
9. Practically all major private establishments----Indian as well as foreign--- have their own physical security set-up. It is important for senior intelligence and security officials at the State and Central levels to regularly interact with them to exchange threat and vulnerability perceptions and ideas as to how to strengthen physical security.
10. In an important article titled "The Coming Swarm" in the "New York Times" of February 15,2009, which should be required reading for all our physical security experts, John Acquilla, who teaches in the special operations program at the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey in California, wrote as follows: "It seems that a new “Mumbai model” of swarming, smaller-scale terrorist violence is emerging. The basic concept is that hitting several targets at once, even with just a few fighters at each site, can cause fits for elite counterterrorist forces that are often manpower-heavy, far away and organized to deal with only one crisis at a time. This approach certainly worked in Mumbai. The Indian security forces, many of which had to be flown in from New Delhi, simply had little ability to strike back at more than one site at a time. While it’s true that the assaults in Kabul seem to be echoes of Mumbai, the fact is that Al Qaeda and its affiliates have been using these sorts of swarm tactics for several years...... How are swarms to be countered? The simplest way is to create many more units able to respond to simultaneous, small-scale attacks and spread them around the country. This means jettisoning the idea of overwhelming force in favor of small units that are not “elite” but rather “good enough” to tangle with terrorist teams. In dealing with swarms, economizing on force is essential. ....For the defense of American cities against terrorist swarms, the key would be to use local police officers as the first line of defense instead of relying on the military. The first step would be to create lots of small counterterrorism posts throughout urban areas instead of keeping police officers in large, centralized precinct houses. This is consistent with existing notions of community-based policing...... At the federal level, we should stop thinking in terms of moving thousands of troops across the country and instead distribute small response units far more widely. Cities, states and Washington should work out clear rules in advance for using military forces in a counterterrorist role, to avoid any bickering or delay during a crisis. Reserve and National Guard units should train and field many more units able to take on small teams of terrorist gunmen and bombers. Think of them as latter-day Minutemen. Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey and Yemen all responded to Qaeda attacks with similar “packetizing” initiatives involving the police and armed forces; and while that hasn’t eliminated swarm attacks, the terrorists have been far less effective and many lives have been saved."
11.Jihadi terrorism in India outside Jammu & Kashmir is essentially an urban phenomenon. We cannot use against it the techniques learnt by us in dealing with the insurgency in the North-East and with Maoist terrorism in Central India, which is essentially a rural phenomenon. We need a different system of response, which is comprehensive enough to cover all likely targets of strategic significance----whether in the Government or private sector.
12. Even if we do not create an independent Ministry of Internal Security, we should create a separate Department of Physical Security in the Ministry of Home Affairs, which is, inter alia, responsible for counter-terrorism, to act as the nodal agency for all physical security measures on the pattern of the Department of Homeland Security of the US. This newly-created department should interact continuously with its US counterpart to pick its brains and profit from its expertise and experience.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
Sunday, January 17, 2010
GOOGLE, CHINA LOOKING FOR FACE-SAVING PATCH-UP?
B.RAMAN
Both Google and Beijing seem to be looking for a face-saving patch-up, which could enable Google to stay on in China if Beijing promises to undertake a review of its Internet censorship and security regulations, if not immediately, at least in the foreseeable future.
2.This is evident from the statements and comments emanating from both sides. A spokesperson of Google was reported to have told the Bloomberg news agency on January 16,2010, that it is operating business as usual in China, is still censoring search results on google.cn and its employees in China are still going to work. The Reuters news agency quoted Google's China office as saying that it would hold talks with the Chinese Government over the next few weeks.
3.The "Global Times", published by the party-owned "People's Daily" group, quoted Google as saying that its planned retreat from China is limited to google.cn, hinting that other services such as android phones and Gmail will not be affected. The "Global Times" further said: "A spokesman of the Google company who declined to be named said that Chinese users will possibly be able to continue using the search engine in Chinese through Google.com. "The only thing we have announced is this: We will be talking to the Chinese authorities about the possibility of operating an uncensored search service within China. If it is impossible to operate an uncensored service within the law, we will close Google.cn," said the spokesman. "We will obviously continue to offer Chinese-language search on our global search engine.Beyond that, we are making no announcements on any other aspect of our business."
4. An article carried by the " Global Times" on January 17,2010, under the title "Google-China split would be loss for both sides" said: "Google CEO Eric Schmidt had a famous "5,000-year plan" for China, "We will take a long-term view to win in China. The Chinese have 5,000 years of history. Google has 5,000 years of patience in China." Yet Schmidt's promised patience for developing in China seems to be fading away now. The company's "threat" to pull out of China amid concerns over censorship and cyber attacks has shocked the world and brought down Google's share price by 1.3 percent. The price dip reflects investors' worries over a huge potential business loss from the parting of ways. With its roughly 33.2 percent share of China's $1 billion search market in 2009, Google's possible exit would signal that it is giving up a booming Chinese market with 350 million Web surfers. Its strategic loss would be greater than its business loss. While other search engines, Chinese and foreign, would predictably grab a slice of the business abandoned by Google, the Internet giant's inability to localize and tackle difficulties in China would be an incalculable loss to its long-term commitment to innovation. Google's "New approach to China," as spelled out in the title of its recent statement, would do no good to China, either. Should the world's most populous nation fail to provide a foothold to the world's top search engine, it would imply a setback to China and serious loss to China's Net culture. The information highway demands not only safe driving but also free flow of traffic. And, in the interests of the majority's right to know, free flow of information should take precedence in a civil society. In a transitional society like China, the existence of censorship can be justified, as allowing full play to multifarious and disorderly search results poses unprecedented risks to vulnerable netizens and social stability. But the Government must face up to the challenge of where and how to put the checkpoints on the highway. A sensitive and shrewd Government should have the vision and savvy to place the right kind of checkpoints at the right place and at the right time for ensuring the free flow of highway traffic as much as possible in the public interest. When Google entered China's market about five years ago, it named itself "Gu Ge" (Grain Song) in Chinese. Google and China going their separate ways would hurt both sides. Let the song of sowing and expectation continue to be heard in China, for a win-win situation. "
5. In an editorial on the subject the next day, the "Global Times" said: "The world's top search engine needs to reflect on why it is lagging behind a local rival in China and why it is not getting as much support from Chinese Web users as it had expected. .....Technology and business should not be affected by political interests and diplomatic concerns. Though Chinese people have called for further steps to be taken by the Government to ensure free flow of information, it is always in their interest to have any foreign company operating in China abide by Chinese laws. Certainly, Google cannot be an exception. A split between Google and China will hurt both sides. And the Internet giant would lose further ground among its supporters if it is made a political football. Conciliatory negotiation may help in solving any issue. The West's arrogance will not work."
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Both Google and Beijing seem to be looking for a face-saving patch-up, which could enable Google to stay on in China if Beijing promises to undertake a review of its Internet censorship and security regulations, if not immediately, at least in the foreseeable future.
2.This is evident from the statements and comments emanating from both sides. A spokesperson of Google was reported to have told the Bloomberg news agency on January 16,2010, that it is operating business as usual in China, is still censoring search results on google.cn and its employees in China are still going to work. The Reuters news agency quoted Google's China office as saying that it would hold talks with the Chinese Government over the next few weeks.
3.The "Global Times", published by the party-owned "People's Daily" group, quoted Google as saying that its planned retreat from China is limited to google.cn, hinting that other services such as android phones and Gmail will not be affected. The "Global Times" further said: "A spokesman of the Google company who declined to be named said that Chinese users will possibly be able to continue using the search engine in Chinese through Google.com. "The only thing we have announced is this: We will be talking to the Chinese authorities about the possibility of operating an uncensored search service within China. If it is impossible to operate an uncensored service within the law, we will close Google.cn," said the spokesman. "We will obviously continue to offer Chinese-language search on our global search engine.Beyond that, we are making no announcements on any other aspect of our business."
4. An article carried by the " Global Times" on January 17,2010, under the title "Google-China split would be loss for both sides" said: "Google CEO Eric Schmidt had a famous "5,000-year plan" for China, "We will take a long-term view to win in China. The Chinese have 5,000 years of history. Google has 5,000 years of patience in China." Yet Schmidt's promised patience for developing in China seems to be fading away now. The company's "threat" to pull out of China amid concerns over censorship and cyber attacks has shocked the world and brought down Google's share price by 1.3 percent. The price dip reflects investors' worries over a huge potential business loss from the parting of ways. With its roughly 33.2 percent share of China's $1 billion search market in 2009, Google's possible exit would signal that it is giving up a booming Chinese market with 350 million Web surfers. Its strategic loss would be greater than its business loss. While other search engines, Chinese and foreign, would predictably grab a slice of the business abandoned by Google, the Internet giant's inability to localize and tackle difficulties in China would be an incalculable loss to its long-term commitment to innovation. Google's "New approach to China," as spelled out in the title of its recent statement, would do no good to China, either. Should the world's most populous nation fail to provide a foothold to the world's top search engine, it would imply a setback to China and serious loss to China's Net culture. The information highway demands not only safe driving but also free flow of traffic. And, in the interests of the majority's right to know, free flow of information should take precedence in a civil society. In a transitional society like China, the existence of censorship can be justified, as allowing full play to multifarious and disorderly search results poses unprecedented risks to vulnerable netizens and social stability. But the Government must face up to the challenge of where and how to put the checkpoints on the highway. A sensitive and shrewd Government should have the vision and savvy to place the right kind of checkpoints at the right place and at the right time for ensuring the free flow of highway traffic as much as possible in the public interest. When Google entered China's market about five years ago, it named itself "Gu Ge" (Grain Song) in Chinese. Google and China going their separate ways would hurt both sides. Let the song of sowing and expectation continue to be heard in China, for a win-win situation. "
5. In an editorial on the subject the next day, the "Global Times" said: "The world's top search engine needs to reflect on why it is lagging behind a local rival in China and why it is not getting as much support from Chinese Web users as it had expected. .....Technology and business should not be affected by political interests and diplomatic concerns. Though Chinese people have called for further steps to be taken by the Government to ensure free flow of information, it is always in their interest to have any foreign company operating in China abide by Chinese laws. Certainly, Google cannot be an exception. A split between Google and China will hurt both sides. And the Internet giant would lose further ground among its supporters if it is made a political football. Conciliatory negotiation may help in solving any issue. The West's arrogance will not work."
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
CHINA SEES DOUBLE STANDARDS BY GOOGLE
B.RAMAN
China has responded firmly but with balance to Google’s decision not to accept any more censorship on its search engines and its threat to review and, if left with no other alternative, to close down its operations in China if the censorship and the alleged State-sponsored web snooping continue.
2. The Chinese response has been to reiterate the right of the State to impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of security and stability while avoiding any statement or action that might result in a break with Google, which could be bad for the international image of the country. At the same time, the Chinese have ruled out any major change in their Internet security policy just because of the threat held out by Google.
3. Jiang Yu, a spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said that China’s policy would continue to be one of encouragement of an open Internet under proper regulations. She said: “The Internet is open in China, where the Government always encourages its development and has created a favorable environment for its healthy development. China, like other countries, will regulate the Internet industry in line with the law. China welcomes international Internet companies to conduct business within the country according to law."
4.In a statement on its official blog site, David Drummond , Google's corporate development and chief legal officer, had said that the company intended to "review the feasibility of our business operations in China." According to him, its disputes with the Government and unidentified attacks targeting Google's services in China forced the company to make the review and possibly to "shut down Google.cn" and potentially its China offices.
5. While reiterating the right of the State to impose reasonable restrictions, the Chinese authorities have strongly denied that Governmental agencies had any hand in cyber attacks on Google. The spokesperson of the Foreign Office pointed out that Chinese laws "prohibit hacker attacks in any form."
6.Wang Chen, Director of China's State Council Information Office, said on January 14,2010, in an interview to the “People’s Daily”: “China firmly opposes cyber attacks because China itself is a victim of such attacks. Every country needs to effectively regulate the Internet and to make sure their own problems on the web do not affect other countries. Internet security has become a significant problem that does not only involve China but also other countries."
7. Comments made by Chinese non-governmental analysts and Internet users make two points. Firstly, the decision of the Google’s executives to review the continuance of its operations in China appear to have been triggered off by its failure to make a commercial breakthrough in China after nearly four years of its operations in China and by its inability to face the competition of Chinese search engines, which continue to enjoy a monopoly of the Chinese market. Instead of admitting its commercial inadequacies, it has been trying to blame the alleged web censorship and snooping for its decision to review its future operations. They accuse Google of looking for moral scapegoats to cover up its commercial failure. In this connection, they point out that the so-called censorship regulations were there even in 2006 when Google entered the Chinese market. It did not find anything morally wrong with them at that time, but it has now, after its failure to break through in the local market, started talking of morality issues.
8. Secondly, they allege that Google has been guilty of double standards. They point out that there are regulations in the US prohibiting access to children to pornographic sites. Similarly, after 9/11, to prevent terrorists from having access to pictures and other information which could be useful for planning a terrorist strike, the US Government has been asking Google to remove certain photographs and other materials from the web. The Google found nothing wrong in such requests or instructions emanating from the US security agencies and carried out their wishes, but when Chinese agencies issue such instructions they are accused of misuse of authority and coming in the way of the free use of the Internet.
9. The Chinese are hoping that ultimately Google will realise that it had over-reacted to the difficulties faced by it in China and will decide to continue its operations in China in its long-term business interests. However, if Google sticks to its threat and decides to wind up its operations after the proposed review, the Chinese are prepared to face it. They are confident that any decision of Google to wind up will not have any impact on China’s relations with the US and on the confidence of international companies in the business environment in China.
( 17-1-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
China has responded firmly but with balance to Google’s decision not to accept any more censorship on its search engines and its threat to review and, if left with no other alternative, to close down its operations in China if the censorship and the alleged State-sponsored web snooping continue.
2. The Chinese response has been to reiterate the right of the State to impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of security and stability while avoiding any statement or action that might result in a break with Google, which could be bad for the international image of the country. At the same time, the Chinese have ruled out any major change in their Internet security policy just because of the threat held out by Google.
3. Jiang Yu, a spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said that China’s policy would continue to be one of encouragement of an open Internet under proper regulations. She said: “The Internet is open in China, where the Government always encourages its development and has created a favorable environment for its healthy development. China, like other countries, will regulate the Internet industry in line with the law. China welcomes international Internet companies to conduct business within the country according to law."
4.In a statement on its official blog site, David Drummond , Google's corporate development and chief legal officer, had said that the company intended to "review the feasibility of our business operations in China." According to him, its disputes with the Government and unidentified attacks targeting Google's services in China forced the company to make the review and possibly to "shut down Google.cn" and potentially its China offices.
5. While reiterating the right of the State to impose reasonable restrictions, the Chinese authorities have strongly denied that Governmental agencies had any hand in cyber attacks on Google. The spokesperson of the Foreign Office pointed out that Chinese laws "prohibit hacker attacks in any form."
6.Wang Chen, Director of China's State Council Information Office, said on January 14,2010, in an interview to the “People’s Daily”: “China firmly opposes cyber attacks because China itself is a victim of such attacks. Every country needs to effectively regulate the Internet and to make sure their own problems on the web do not affect other countries. Internet security has become a significant problem that does not only involve China but also other countries."
7. Comments made by Chinese non-governmental analysts and Internet users make two points. Firstly, the decision of the Google’s executives to review the continuance of its operations in China appear to have been triggered off by its failure to make a commercial breakthrough in China after nearly four years of its operations in China and by its inability to face the competition of Chinese search engines, which continue to enjoy a monopoly of the Chinese market. Instead of admitting its commercial inadequacies, it has been trying to blame the alleged web censorship and snooping for its decision to review its future operations. They accuse Google of looking for moral scapegoats to cover up its commercial failure. In this connection, they point out that the so-called censorship regulations were there even in 2006 when Google entered the Chinese market. It did not find anything morally wrong with them at that time, but it has now, after its failure to break through in the local market, started talking of morality issues.
8. Secondly, they allege that Google has been guilty of double standards. They point out that there are regulations in the US prohibiting access to children to pornographic sites. Similarly, after 9/11, to prevent terrorists from having access to pictures and other information which could be useful for planning a terrorist strike, the US Government has been asking Google to remove certain photographs and other materials from the web. The Google found nothing wrong in such requests or instructions emanating from the US security agencies and carried out their wishes, but when Chinese agencies issue such instructions they are accused of misuse of authority and coming in the way of the free use of the Internet.
9. The Chinese are hoping that ultimately Google will realise that it had over-reacted to the difficulties faced by it in China and will decide to continue its operations in China in its long-term business interests. However, if Google sticks to its threat and decides to wind up its operations after the proposed review, the Chinese are prepared to face it. They are confident that any decision of Google to wind up will not have any impact on China’s relations with the US and on the confidence of international companies in the business environment in China.
( 17-1-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)