B.RAMAN
In his R.N.Kao Memorial lecture delivered at the headquarters of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) on January 19,2010, Vice-President Hamid Ansari has done well in raising in public issues such as accountability and parliamentary oversight to which the Indian intelligence community is still a stranger.
2.The concept of an accountable and competent intelligence community, which uses the need for secrecy only for protecting its operations and not for covering up its inadequacies and irregularities, has been accepted and implemented by the intelligence agencies of many democracies----parliamentary as well as Presidential types--- of the world during the last three decades. Nobody in those countries has since argued that these concepts have come in the way of the effectiveness of the intelligence process and hence should be re-considered. The overall consensus is that these changes have proved beneficial and hence should be continued and, if necessary, further refined.
3. In India too, these issues have been raised from time to time since the State of Emergency imposed by Indira Gandhi in 1975-77, but follow-up action has been avoided either because of resistance from sections of the intelligence community or because of the relcutance of the political leadership to introduce any changes which might dilute the scope for political misuse of the intelligence machinery for partisan purposes or both.
4. Accountability of intelligence agencies demands ,firstly, that they should have a legal existence and, secondly, that they should have a formal charter of their functions and responsibilities. Forty-two years after its formation in 1968, the R&AW still does not have a legal existence. It was set up by a brief executive order issued on behalf of Indira Gandhi in September 1968. Till today, this order has not been accorded parliamentary sanctity by having necessary legislation authorising its creation passed by the Parliament. No Government, which has held office since 1968, has considered it necessary to have an Act passed by the Parliament providing legal legitimacy to the R&AW. No one has raised the question as to how the various Governments have been incurring expenditure on the R&AW year after year without having its creation approved by the Parliament.
5. In the 1980s, when Indira Gandhi was the Prime Minister, a law was enacted by the Parliament banning strikes in the intelligence agencies. To my knowledge, that is the only Act of the Indian Parliament in which there is a reference to the R&AW by name. When that law was passed, nobody in the Parliament thought it fit to ask: What is this R&AW about? When was it created? Who created it? Has its creation been approved by the Parliament?
6. It goes to the credit of A.K.Verma, who headed the R&AW from 1987 to 90. that he took the initiative in drawing the attention of the Governments of Rajiv Gandhi and V.P.Singh to the fact that the R&AW had been functioning without a legal cover and a formal charter. He wanted the Government of the day to do something about it, but nothing was done.
7. The fact that the Intelligence Bureau , which was created by the British before 1947, and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), which came into existence after 1947, had been functioning without formal charters of their functions and responsibilities, was highlighted by the L.P.Singh Committee, which was set up by the Morarji Desai Government to enquire into the functioning of these two organisations during the State of Emergency. It not only stressed the need for formal charters to prevent their future misuse, but also prepared for the consideration of the Government detailed model charters for adoption. No action was taken on its recommendations by the Indira Gandhi Government which came back to power in 1980 or its successors. The report was consigned to the Archives---seen, but not read and implemented.
8. Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee and Shri Lal Krishna Advani were among those who were in the forefront of those who criticised----- during the election campaign of 1977---- the alleged misuse of the intelligence agencies by the Indira Gandhi Government during the Emergency. When Shri Vajpayee became the Prime Minister and Shri Advani the Home Minister in 1998, one naturally expected them to take the initiative in taking the L.P.Singh Committee report out of the Archives and implement it. The expectations were belied.
9. The Task Force for the revamping of the intelligence apparatus set up by the Vajpayee Government in 2000, which was headed by Shri G.C. Saxena, former head of the R&AW, recommended the acceptance by the Government of the principle of formal charters for the intelligence agencies. To give greater meat to its recommendations, it wanted to have a look at the detailed charters for the IB and the CBI proposed by the L.P.Singh Committee. The Home Minstry, then headed by Shri Advani, avoided making available to the Task Force the entire report of the L.P.Singh Committee. However, the Task Force's recommendation for formal charters was accepted and implemented by the Vajpayee Government. One does not know whether the recommendations of the L.P.Singh Committee were taken into consideration while drafting the charters.
10. The credit for first raising the idea of a parliamentary oversight on the intelligence community should go to Shri Jaswant Singh, who was the Chairman of the Estimates Committee of the Rajya Sabha when Shri V.P.Singh was the Prime Minister. Shri V.P.Singh saw merit in the idea and wanted it to be examined. There was no opposition to the idea from the intelligence professionals then in service including this writer, but when Shri V.P.Singh developed differences with the BJP, he did not pursue it.
11. Since then, none of the political parties has shown interest in making the intelligence agencies accountable for their performance and integrity and in making their professional performance subject to an independent assessment. Secrecy is an important operational principle for an intelligence agency. Unless an intelligence agency is able to ensure the secrecy of its operations, no source or agent will stick his neck out to work for it. Its capability for collecting technical intelligence will also be affected.
12. But secrecy should not be allowed to be used as an excuse for covering inefficiencies in performance and irregularities in functioning and financial management. Irregularities do occur in matters such as the personnel policy and diversion of the resources sanctioned by the Government for operational objectives for non-operational purposes. The public and the Parliament have a right to know to what extent the agencies have been producing results and what are the areas of their non-performance. The Parliament has a right to know what kind of financial controls are in place, who exercises those controls and to what extent they are effective. The Parliament has similarly a right to check whether the principle of secrecy in recruitment is being misused to pack the organisations with unsuitable persons, taken not for their qualifications, but for their connections.
13. It is possible to introduce some of these checks and balances in the functioning of our intelligence community without damaging their operational secrecy. There is reluctance from the political class because it sees the agencies as instruments for partisan exploitation and not for defending national interests. There is reluctance from sections of the intelligence officers themselves because they think that unchecked secrecy gives them an aura of power and influence which they do not want to lose.
14. Ansaris may come and Ansaris may go, but the intelligence agencies will go on functioning in the same manner with the complicity of the political class unless there is sustained public pressure on the political class and the agencies to change the culture of our agencies. I am not very optimistic because I do not see on the horizon any political leader who is genuinely convinced of the need for a change.
15. Every country gets the intelligence community it deserves. We will continue to have the community which we have deserved unless Shri Ansari's call is followed up. ( 20-1-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, January 19, 2010
Monday, January 18, 2010
GUARDING AGAINST SWARM ATTACKS ON NUCLEAR ESTABLISHMENTS
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.611
B.RAMAN
A swarm attack is a commando-style attack involving multiple targets and/ or multile modus operandi----that is a mix of the use of hand-held weapons and explosives. Since the Mumbai terrorist attack of November 26 to 29,2008, which was itself a major swarm attack, there have been seven more---- four in Kabul, Kandahar and Khost in Afghanistan by the Afghan Taliban and three in Lahore possibly by the Pakistani Taliban.
2. These attacks---particularly those in Kabul--- have had common features----a mix of the suicidal (fedayeen ) and suicide terrorism, facilitated by good intelligence at the disposal of the Taliban, a mix of suicide bombers on foot and vehicle-borne suicide bombers, fierce motivation, ability to stand and fight till death without losing courage, audacity in planning and execution and the ability to keep the planning a secret from governmental agencies.
3. The seventh commando-style swarm attack in Kabul on January 18,2010, on a number of governmental establishments, including the residence of President Hamid Karzai, and some private establishments too has creditably been beaten back by the Afghan Security forces. They were initially taken by surprise by the attacks, which reportedly involved about 20 terrorists---- 10 more than in Mumbai--- but they managed to recover fast and neutralise the surviving members of the Taliban group that attacked. The operation----involving the initial surprise attack by the Taliban and the counter-attack by the Afghan security forces---- which began at 9-35 AM was over before sunset.
4.There are two ways of analysing the attacks. One way of analysis would be to focus on the questions :were they timed to coincide with the swearing-in of some of his Ministers by President Karzai, the coming visit of Mr.Robert Gates, the US Defence Secretary, to this region and the international conference on Afghanistan in London on January 28,2010.
5. The second way would be to pose to ourselves the question---what do these attacks portend for the future? From the point of view of the future, certain ominous aspects need to be highlighted. The first is that the two Talibans---with the possible help of Al Qaeda based in North Waziristan---- have trained multiple swarm commando teams, which are available with them for swarm attacks of a strategic nature. The second is that their expertise in commando-style attacks continues to improve. The third is the possibility that Al Qaeda might, through the Talibans---- use a swarm style commando attack for overcoming physical security in a nuclear establishment----if not for getting hold of nuclear weapons or material, at least for creating mass panic.
6. Since March last year, I have been repeatedly writing about the commando-style swarm attacks, which have been taking place with persistent frequency in this region, meaning Pakistan, Afghanistan and India too and the importance of studying them from the professional angle and strengthening our preventive capability to counter them through enhanced multi-layer physical security in sensitive establishmens and our rapid action capability to neutralise them if the terrorists do succeed in attacking by surprise.
7. The latest attack in Kabul once again underlines the importance of these measures.I would like to repeat again what I have been saying and writing in the past: We should not live in a make-believe world thinking that these things happen only in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but they can't happen in India. They can.
8. Annexed are two of my articles of last March on this subject. ( 19-1-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE I
How Secure Is Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal From A Commando-Style Attack? (March 6,2009) http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers31/paper3086.html
B. Raman
How secure is Pakistan's nuclear arsenal from a commando-style attack by jihadi terrorists operating from sanctuaries inside Pakistan?
2. That is the question which should be worrying security experts all over the world as they learn with horror----based on visual evidence from closed circuit TV (CCTV) cameras and oral evidence from members of the Sri Lankan cricket team and the British match umpires and referees--- how the 12 or so terrorists who attacked the SL cricket team had the Liberty Square of Lahore at their disposal for about 30 minutes and walked away after the attack without the least fear of being chased and caught either by the security forces or the public.
3. It was as if they were walking away from a golf green after a game of golf---unhurried, unconcerned and totally relaxed..
4. Seven police officers, who were in the escort party of the convoy, died in the exchange of fire. Their bravery must be acknowledged and saluted. But how about the dozens of other police officers, who were supposed to be on route security to prevent an ambush of the convoy? The British match officials have said that not a policeman was to be seen on the road. This, despite the Presidential-scale security reportedly promised by President Asif Ali Zardari to the SL team.
5. How about the staff of the police station located near the Square? Why didn't they rush out and confront the terrorists? How about the police vehicles, which were supposed to be on patrol along the route to look out for suspicious movements and characters? How about the rapid response commando teams, which were supposed to be there in the stadium and at the LIberty Square, which was known as a vulnerable point since all vehicular movements had to slow down there?
6. They just disappeared or were not posted at all. In all the CCTV footage, the only sign of police one sees is a police vehicle crossing a terrorist and not taking any action as if it was crossing a normal pedestrian.
7. How about the road blocks all over Lahore which were supposed to have been put up after a terrorist strike to prevent the terrorists from getting away?
8. Many compelling questions arise as one gets details of what happened and what did not happen in Lahore on March 3, 2009? Were there insiders in the security establishment, who had played a role in the conspiracy? Were there accomplices or jihadi sympathisers in the security establishment, who facilitated the terrorist strike? Do the political and military leaders of Pakistan realise the total security vacuum in their country, which has made it a safehaven to jihadi terrorists from all over the world, who are able to operate at will without any fear of the consequences?
9. It has become a cliche to say that the Pakistani leaders are in a denial mode. So was former President Megawati Sukarnoputri of Indonesia till the Bali terrorist strike of October, 2002. Thereafter, she realised the gravity of the situation and made amends for her past negligence. So was former President Begum Khalida Zia of Bangladesh till the the nearly 400 synchronised explosions organised by the Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen (JUM) in August, 2005. Thereafter, she realised the gravity of the situation and acted against the JUM.
10. Pakistan has been the scene of repeated terrorist strikes and the spawning ground of jihadi terrorism of various hues directed against other countries since 1981. Till today, neither the political nor the military leaders of Pakistan are prepared to admit this. After the Lahore attack on the SL team, Ilyas Khan, of the Islamabad Bureau of the British Broadcasting Corporation, reported as follows the same day: "Militant attacks in all parts of the world have been investigated and solved, but Pakistan is yet to solve even one out of the hundreds of attacks it has suffered since the 1980s."
11. In every major terrorist strike of Pakistan, there was evidence of insider involvement. Some junior officers of the Pakistani Air Force were found to have been involved in the conspiracy to kill former President Pervez Musharraf at Rawalpindi in December, 2003. The investigation brought out the startling fact that the conspirators had met in the staff quarters of one of the PAF officers in a PAF complex in the Islamabad-Rawalpindi area to finalise their attack.
12. Before and after the unsuccessful terrorist strike on her at Karachi on October 18, 2007, Benazir Bhutto had alleged that Qari Saifullah Akhtar, the Amir of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), and some serving and retired officers of the Pakistan Intelligence Bureau and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) were involved in the conspiracy to kill her. Saifullah was detained for some weeks for interrogation, but thereafter released without any action being taken against him. No action was taken against the officers named by her. Not even a formal enquiry.
13. After addressing a public meeting at Rawalpindi on December 27, 2007, she left for her home in her car. Neither the police escort party nor Rehman Malik, the present Internal Security Adviser, who was at that time the co-ordinator of her physical security, followed her. They left for home by a different route after the meeting was over. Benazir was shot dead as her car came out of the ground. Malik and other officers came to know only after they reached home that she had been shot dead.
14. One can go on giving such instances, which show a total lack of control over the security establishment, which has become a law unto itself and disturbing indicators of the extent and depth of penetration of the security set-up by the jihadi terrorists. Many countries in the world, including India, are badly affected by terrorism. In many countries of the world, including India, there are inefficiencies and inadequacies in the counter-terrorism apparatus. But in no country of the world is the security establishment so badly penetrated by the jihadi terrorists as it is in Pakistan.
15. The Pakistani leaders not only refuse to admit this. Even more alarming, they live in a world of self-delusion which makes them think that all these realities are the figments of imagination of others ill-disposed towards them.
16. If this is the real state of affairs, one has very valid reasons to worry about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Pakistani political and military leaders repeatedly assure the international community that their nuclear arsenal has tight physical security and that no terrorist can penetrate it and get hold of nuclear weapons or material. After seeing what has happened in Lahore, the international community cannot afford to accept the Pakistani assurances at their face value. It must subject the physical security of the arsenal to greater scrutiny by independent outside experts. Even if this is done, a 100 per cent security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal cannot be assured so long as the terrorist safehavens and infrastructure in Pakistan are not removed. Pakistan must be forced to do so through international pressure.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
ANNEXURE II
Need For Urgent Relook At Our Physical Security ( March 7,2009) (www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers31/paper3087.html )
B. Raman
In our preoccupation with what is happening and what could happen in Pakistan, we should not overlook the urgent need for having a relook at our physical security architecture in sensitive establishments such as the nuclear establishments, oil refineries, gas production infrastructure, road, rail and air transport, critical information infrastructure etc. As I have emphasised repeatedly in the past, physical security is the most important component of counter-terrorism. If it is strong, a terrorist attack can be thwarted even if the intelligence agencies fail. If it is weak, even the best of intelligence may not be able to thwart a terrorist attack. In both India and Pakistan, we have a weak culture of physical security. The main reason why the US has been able thus far to prevent a repeat of 9/11 is the strengthening of the physical security apparatus by the newly-created Department of Homeland Security.
2. What happened at Mumbai, Kabul and Lahore---namely, commando-style surprise attacks by small groups of well-trained terrorists wielding lethal hand-held weapons--- could happen again in India. We should not think that only Pakistan is vulnerable to such attacks. We too are vulnerable as demonstrated so tragically at Mumbai. Our security architecture may not be as bad as that of Pakistan, but Mumbai clearly showed that it is not as good as it should be.
3. There is an urgent need for two actions. Firstly, an audit of the physical security measures at all sensitive establishments----whether run by the Government or the private sector ---- in order to determine whether any physical security enhancements are called for. There is a need for dividing all sensitive establishments into two categories-----those where a single-layer of physical security would be enough and those where a double or multiple-layer of physical security would be necessary . The idea of a double or multiple-layer of physical security is that even if the terrorists manage to beat the outside gate or perimeter security, they will not have a free run of the establishment due to a second or more layers of armed physical security. To counter determined terrorists such as those one saw at Mumbai, Kabul and Lahore a single-layer of physical security may not be sufficient in sensitive establishments.
4. The second action required is to have a relook at our consequence management capabilities to deal with a situation should, despite revamped physical security, the terrorists manage to have access to sensitive establishments. The consequence management drill should take into account various issues such as control over media coverage, prevention of panic, minimisation of damage and lethality etc. It is important to associate the consequence management set-ups of the States with this exercise because it is ultimately they who would act as the protector of first resort through their consequence management capabilities till there is intervention by the consequence management community of the Govt. of India.
5. In Mumbai, the terrorists succeeded so dramatically because they targeted private establishments with no physical security measures except some anti-explosive capability. Since the security guards of these establishments were unarmed, they were helpless before the terrorists wielding sophisticated hand-held weapons. Once the terrorists managed to gain access to these establishments and take them under their control, the special intervention forces of the Govt. of India such as the National Security Guards (NSGs) found themselves unable to act fast enough without causing too many loss of lives.
6. Situated as we are in the sub-continental region where terrorism will continue to be a fact of life at least for another 10 years or more and keeping in view our ambition of emerging as a major economic power, we just cannot afford to take up the stand that the physical security of the private sector is its responsibility and that the Government's role will be limited to issuing periodic advisories regarding likely threats. The Government has to play a more proactive role in encouraging and helping at least establishments of a strategic nature such as those associated with the tourism industry, the information technology companies etc in improving their physical security. They already have some capability for checks for explosives, but the methods used by them are primitive and do not take into account dangers from suicide bombers and vehicle-borne suicide terrorists.
7. Their weakest capability----which is almost non-existent--- is in facing a commando-style surprise attack by small groups of terrorists with modern hand-held weapons. The only way of thwarting them is by having well-armed and well-trained guards. Do the present laws allow the employment of such guards? If not, should the laws be modified to permit them to employ such well-armed guards? Who is going to supervise their training and keep them under control to prevent the arms issued to them finding their way into the hands of terrorists? These are questions, which need urgent attention.
8. From the point of view of the physical security architecture. the distinction between the public and the private sector is disappearing. Many private companies are already in the fields of oil refining and gas exploration, production and transport. An increasing number of airports is now privately managed. We intend allowing private companies into the field of nuclear power production. The Government cannot evade the responsibility for ensuring that such private establishments have a high level of physical security. There is a need for a joint task force consisting of the representatives of the intelligence and security agencies and professional organisations of private industries such as the FICCI (Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industries), the CII ( the Confederation of Indian Industries) etc as well as representatives of foreign business organisations to go into the question of physical security enhancements for private establishments of strategic significance.
9. Practically all major private establishments----Indian as well as foreign--- have their own physical security set-up. It is important for senior intelligence and security officials at the State and Central levels to regularly interact with them to exchange threat and vulnerability perceptions and ideas as to how to strengthen physical security.
10. In an important article titled "The Coming Swarm" in the "New York Times" of February 15,2009, which should be required reading for all our physical security experts, John Acquilla, who teaches in the special operations program at the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey in California, wrote as follows: "It seems that a new “Mumbai model” of swarming, smaller-scale terrorist violence is emerging. The basic concept is that hitting several targets at once, even with just a few fighters at each site, can cause fits for elite counterterrorist forces that are often manpower-heavy, far away and organized to deal with only one crisis at a time. This approach certainly worked in Mumbai. The Indian security forces, many of which had to be flown in from New Delhi, simply had little ability to strike back at more than one site at a time. While it’s true that the assaults in Kabul seem to be echoes of Mumbai, the fact is that Al Qaeda and its affiliates have been using these sorts of swarm tactics for several years...... How are swarms to be countered? The simplest way is to create many more units able to respond to simultaneous, small-scale attacks and spread them around the country. This means jettisoning the idea of overwhelming force in favor of small units that are not “elite” but rather “good enough” to tangle with terrorist teams. In dealing with swarms, economizing on force is essential. ....For the defense of American cities against terrorist swarms, the key would be to use local police officers as the first line of defense instead of relying on the military. The first step would be to create lots of small counterterrorism posts throughout urban areas instead of keeping police officers in large, centralized precinct houses. This is consistent with existing notions of community-based policing...... At the federal level, we should stop thinking in terms of moving thousands of troops across the country and instead distribute small response units far more widely. Cities, states and Washington should work out clear rules in advance for using military forces in a counterterrorist role, to avoid any bickering or delay during a crisis. Reserve and National Guard units should train and field many more units able to take on small teams of terrorist gunmen and bombers. Think of them as latter-day Minutemen. Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey and Yemen all responded to Qaeda attacks with similar “packetizing” initiatives involving the police and armed forces; and while that hasn’t eliminated swarm attacks, the terrorists have been far less effective and many lives have been saved."
11.Jihadi terrorism in India outside Jammu & Kashmir is essentially an urban phenomenon. We cannot use against it the techniques learnt by us in dealing with the insurgency in the North-East and with Maoist terrorism in Central India, which is essentially a rural phenomenon. We need a different system of response, which is comprehensive enough to cover all likely targets of strategic significance----whether in the Government or private sector.
12. Even if we do not create an independent Ministry of Internal Security, we should create a separate Department of Physical Security in the Ministry of Home Affairs, which is, inter alia, responsible for counter-terrorism, to act as the nodal agency for all physical security measures on the pattern of the Department of Homeland Security of the US. This newly-created department should interact continuously with its US counterpart to pick its brains and profit from its expertise and experience.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
B.RAMAN
A swarm attack is a commando-style attack involving multiple targets and/ or multile modus operandi----that is a mix of the use of hand-held weapons and explosives. Since the Mumbai terrorist attack of November 26 to 29,2008, which was itself a major swarm attack, there have been seven more---- four in Kabul, Kandahar and Khost in Afghanistan by the Afghan Taliban and three in Lahore possibly by the Pakistani Taliban.
2. These attacks---particularly those in Kabul--- have had common features----a mix of the suicidal (fedayeen ) and suicide terrorism, facilitated by good intelligence at the disposal of the Taliban, a mix of suicide bombers on foot and vehicle-borne suicide bombers, fierce motivation, ability to stand and fight till death without losing courage, audacity in planning and execution and the ability to keep the planning a secret from governmental agencies.
3. The seventh commando-style swarm attack in Kabul on January 18,2010, on a number of governmental establishments, including the residence of President Hamid Karzai, and some private establishments too has creditably been beaten back by the Afghan Security forces. They were initially taken by surprise by the attacks, which reportedly involved about 20 terrorists---- 10 more than in Mumbai--- but they managed to recover fast and neutralise the surviving members of the Taliban group that attacked. The operation----involving the initial surprise attack by the Taliban and the counter-attack by the Afghan security forces---- which began at 9-35 AM was over before sunset.
4.There are two ways of analysing the attacks. One way of analysis would be to focus on the questions :were they timed to coincide with the swearing-in of some of his Ministers by President Karzai, the coming visit of Mr.Robert Gates, the US Defence Secretary, to this region and the international conference on Afghanistan in London on January 28,2010.
5. The second way would be to pose to ourselves the question---what do these attacks portend for the future? From the point of view of the future, certain ominous aspects need to be highlighted. The first is that the two Talibans---with the possible help of Al Qaeda based in North Waziristan---- have trained multiple swarm commando teams, which are available with them for swarm attacks of a strategic nature. The second is that their expertise in commando-style attacks continues to improve. The third is the possibility that Al Qaeda might, through the Talibans---- use a swarm style commando attack for overcoming physical security in a nuclear establishment----if not for getting hold of nuclear weapons or material, at least for creating mass panic.
6. Since March last year, I have been repeatedly writing about the commando-style swarm attacks, which have been taking place with persistent frequency in this region, meaning Pakistan, Afghanistan and India too and the importance of studying them from the professional angle and strengthening our preventive capability to counter them through enhanced multi-layer physical security in sensitive establishmens and our rapid action capability to neutralise them if the terrorists do succeed in attacking by surprise.
7. The latest attack in Kabul once again underlines the importance of these measures.I would like to repeat again what I have been saying and writing in the past: We should not live in a make-believe world thinking that these things happen only in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but they can't happen in India. They can.
8. Annexed are two of my articles of last March on this subject. ( 19-1-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE I
How Secure Is Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal From A Commando-Style Attack? (March 6,2009) http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers31/paper3086.html
B. Raman
How secure is Pakistan's nuclear arsenal from a commando-style attack by jihadi terrorists operating from sanctuaries inside Pakistan?
2. That is the question which should be worrying security experts all over the world as they learn with horror----based on visual evidence from closed circuit TV (CCTV) cameras and oral evidence from members of the Sri Lankan cricket team and the British match umpires and referees--- how the 12 or so terrorists who attacked the SL cricket team had the Liberty Square of Lahore at their disposal for about 30 minutes and walked away after the attack without the least fear of being chased and caught either by the security forces or the public.
3. It was as if they were walking away from a golf green after a game of golf---unhurried, unconcerned and totally relaxed..
4. Seven police officers, who were in the escort party of the convoy, died in the exchange of fire. Their bravery must be acknowledged and saluted. But how about the dozens of other police officers, who were supposed to be on route security to prevent an ambush of the convoy? The British match officials have said that not a policeman was to be seen on the road. This, despite the Presidential-scale security reportedly promised by President Asif Ali Zardari to the SL team.
5. How about the staff of the police station located near the Square? Why didn't they rush out and confront the terrorists? How about the police vehicles, which were supposed to be on patrol along the route to look out for suspicious movements and characters? How about the rapid response commando teams, which were supposed to be there in the stadium and at the LIberty Square, which was known as a vulnerable point since all vehicular movements had to slow down there?
6. They just disappeared or were not posted at all. In all the CCTV footage, the only sign of police one sees is a police vehicle crossing a terrorist and not taking any action as if it was crossing a normal pedestrian.
7. How about the road blocks all over Lahore which were supposed to have been put up after a terrorist strike to prevent the terrorists from getting away?
8. Many compelling questions arise as one gets details of what happened and what did not happen in Lahore on March 3, 2009? Were there insiders in the security establishment, who had played a role in the conspiracy? Were there accomplices or jihadi sympathisers in the security establishment, who facilitated the terrorist strike? Do the political and military leaders of Pakistan realise the total security vacuum in their country, which has made it a safehaven to jihadi terrorists from all over the world, who are able to operate at will without any fear of the consequences?
9. It has become a cliche to say that the Pakistani leaders are in a denial mode. So was former President Megawati Sukarnoputri of Indonesia till the Bali terrorist strike of October, 2002. Thereafter, she realised the gravity of the situation and made amends for her past negligence. So was former President Begum Khalida Zia of Bangladesh till the the nearly 400 synchronised explosions organised by the Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen (JUM) in August, 2005. Thereafter, she realised the gravity of the situation and acted against the JUM.
10. Pakistan has been the scene of repeated terrorist strikes and the spawning ground of jihadi terrorism of various hues directed against other countries since 1981. Till today, neither the political nor the military leaders of Pakistan are prepared to admit this. After the Lahore attack on the SL team, Ilyas Khan, of the Islamabad Bureau of the British Broadcasting Corporation, reported as follows the same day: "Militant attacks in all parts of the world have been investigated and solved, but Pakistan is yet to solve even one out of the hundreds of attacks it has suffered since the 1980s."
11. In every major terrorist strike of Pakistan, there was evidence of insider involvement. Some junior officers of the Pakistani Air Force were found to have been involved in the conspiracy to kill former President Pervez Musharraf at Rawalpindi in December, 2003. The investigation brought out the startling fact that the conspirators had met in the staff quarters of one of the PAF officers in a PAF complex in the Islamabad-Rawalpindi area to finalise their attack.
12. Before and after the unsuccessful terrorist strike on her at Karachi on October 18, 2007, Benazir Bhutto had alleged that Qari Saifullah Akhtar, the Amir of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), and some serving and retired officers of the Pakistan Intelligence Bureau and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) were involved in the conspiracy to kill her. Saifullah was detained for some weeks for interrogation, but thereafter released without any action being taken against him. No action was taken against the officers named by her. Not even a formal enquiry.
13. After addressing a public meeting at Rawalpindi on December 27, 2007, she left for her home in her car. Neither the police escort party nor Rehman Malik, the present Internal Security Adviser, who was at that time the co-ordinator of her physical security, followed her. They left for home by a different route after the meeting was over. Benazir was shot dead as her car came out of the ground. Malik and other officers came to know only after they reached home that she had been shot dead.
14. One can go on giving such instances, which show a total lack of control over the security establishment, which has become a law unto itself and disturbing indicators of the extent and depth of penetration of the security set-up by the jihadi terrorists. Many countries in the world, including India, are badly affected by terrorism. In many countries of the world, including India, there are inefficiencies and inadequacies in the counter-terrorism apparatus. But in no country of the world is the security establishment so badly penetrated by the jihadi terrorists as it is in Pakistan.
15. The Pakistani leaders not only refuse to admit this. Even more alarming, they live in a world of self-delusion which makes them think that all these realities are the figments of imagination of others ill-disposed towards them.
16. If this is the real state of affairs, one has very valid reasons to worry about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Pakistani political and military leaders repeatedly assure the international community that their nuclear arsenal has tight physical security and that no terrorist can penetrate it and get hold of nuclear weapons or material. After seeing what has happened in Lahore, the international community cannot afford to accept the Pakistani assurances at their face value. It must subject the physical security of the arsenal to greater scrutiny by independent outside experts. Even if this is done, a 100 per cent security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal cannot be assured so long as the terrorist safehavens and infrastructure in Pakistan are not removed. Pakistan must be forced to do so through international pressure.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
ANNEXURE II
Need For Urgent Relook At Our Physical Security ( March 7,2009) (www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers31/paper3087.html )
B. Raman
In our preoccupation with what is happening and what could happen in Pakistan, we should not overlook the urgent need for having a relook at our physical security architecture in sensitive establishments such as the nuclear establishments, oil refineries, gas production infrastructure, road, rail and air transport, critical information infrastructure etc. As I have emphasised repeatedly in the past, physical security is the most important component of counter-terrorism. If it is strong, a terrorist attack can be thwarted even if the intelligence agencies fail. If it is weak, even the best of intelligence may not be able to thwart a terrorist attack. In both India and Pakistan, we have a weak culture of physical security. The main reason why the US has been able thus far to prevent a repeat of 9/11 is the strengthening of the physical security apparatus by the newly-created Department of Homeland Security.
2. What happened at Mumbai, Kabul and Lahore---namely, commando-style surprise attacks by small groups of well-trained terrorists wielding lethal hand-held weapons--- could happen again in India. We should not think that only Pakistan is vulnerable to such attacks. We too are vulnerable as demonstrated so tragically at Mumbai. Our security architecture may not be as bad as that of Pakistan, but Mumbai clearly showed that it is not as good as it should be.
3. There is an urgent need for two actions. Firstly, an audit of the physical security measures at all sensitive establishments----whether run by the Government or the private sector ---- in order to determine whether any physical security enhancements are called for. There is a need for dividing all sensitive establishments into two categories-----those where a single-layer of physical security would be enough and those where a double or multiple-layer of physical security would be necessary . The idea of a double or multiple-layer of physical security is that even if the terrorists manage to beat the outside gate or perimeter security, they will not have a free run of the establishment due to a second or more layers of armed physical security. To counter determined terrorists such as those one saw at Mumbai, Kabul and Lahore a single-layer of physical security may not be sufficient in sensitive establishments.
4. The second action required is to have a relook at our consequence management capabilities to deal with a situation should, despite revamped physical security, the terrorists manage to have access to sensitive establishments. The consequence management drill should take into account various issues such as control over media coverage, prevention of panic, minimisation of damage and lethality etc. It is important to associate the consequence management set-ups of the States with this exercise because it is ultimately they who would act as the protector of first resort through their consequence management capabilities till there is intervention by the consequence management community of the Govt. of India.
5. In Mumbai, the terrorists succeeded so dramatically because they targeted private establishments with no physical security measures except some anti-explosive capability. Since the security guards of these establishments were unarmed, they were helpless before the terrorists wielding sophisticated hand-held weapons. Once the terrorists managed to gain access to these establishments and take them under their control, the special intervention forces of the Govt. of India such as the National Security Guards (NSGs) found themselves unable to act fast enough without causing too many loss of lives.
6. Situated as we are in the sub-continental region where terrorism will continue to be a fact of life at least for another 10 years or more and keeping in view our ambition of emerging as a major economic power, we just cannot afford to take up the stand that the physical security of the private sector is its responsibility and that the Government's role will be limited to issuing periodic advisories regarding likely threats. The Government has to play a more proactive role in encouraging and helping at least establishments of a strategic nature such as those associated with the tourism industry, the information technology companies etc in improving their physical security. They already have some capability for checks for explosives, but the methods used by them are primitive and do not take into account dangers from suicide bombers and vehicle-borne suicide terrorists.
7. Their weakest capability----which is almost non-existent--- is in facing a commando-style surprise attack by small groups of terrorists with modern hand-held weapons. The only way of thwarting them is by having well-armed and well-trained guards. Do the present laws allow the employment of such guards? If not, should the laws be modified to permit them to employ such well-armed guards? Who is going to supervise their training and keep them under control to prevent the arms issued to them finding their way into the hands of terrorists? These are questions, which need urgent attention.
8. From the point of view of the physical security architecture. the distinction between the public and the private sector is disappearing. Many private companies are already in the fields of oil refining and gas exploration, production and transport. An increasing number of airports is now privately managed. We intend allowing private companies into the field of nuclear power production. The Government cannot evade the responsibility for ensuring that such private establishments have a high level of physical security. There is a need for a joint task force consisting of the representatives of the intelligence and security agencies and professional organisations of private industries such as the FICCI (Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industries), the CII ( the Confederation of Indian Industries) etc as well as representatives of foreign business organisations to go into the question of physical security enhancements for private establishments of strategic significance.
9. Practically all major private establishments----Indian as well as foreign--- have their own physical security set-up. It is important for senior intelligence and security officials at the State and Central levels to regularly interact with them to exchange threat and vulnerability perceptions and ideas as to how to strengthen physical security.
10. In an important article titled "The Coming Swarm" in the "New York Times" of February 15,2009, which should be required reading for all our physical security experts, John Acquilla, who teaches in the special operations program at the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey in California, wrote as follows: "It seems that a new “Mumbai model” of swarming, smaller-scale terrorist violence is emerging. The basic concept is that hitting several targets at once, even with just a few fighters at each site, can cause fits for elite counterterrorist forces that are often manpower-heavy, far away and organized to deal with only one crisis at a time. This approach certainly worked in Mumbai. The Indian security forces, many of which had to be flown in from New Delhi, simply had little ability to strike back at more than one site at a time. While it’s true that the assaults in Kabul seem to be echoes of Mumbai, the fact is that Al Qaeda and its affiliates have been using these sorts of swarm tactics for several years...... How are swarms to be countered? The simplest way is to create many more units able to respond to simultaneous, small-scale attacks and spread them around the country. This means jettisoning the idea of overwhelming force in favor of small units that are not “elite” but rather “good enough” to tangle with terrorist teams. In dealing with swarms, economizing on force is essential. ....For the defense of American cities against terrorist swarms, the key would be to use local police officers as the first line of defense instead of relying on the military. The first step would be to create lots of small counterterrorism posts throughout urban areas instead of keeping police officers in large, centralized precinct houses. This is consistent with existing notions of community-based policing...... At the federal level, we should stop thinking in terms of moving thousands of troops across the country and instead distribute small response units far more widely. Cities, states and Washington should work out clear rules in advance for using military forces in a counterterrorist role, to avoid any bickering or delay during a crisis. Reserve and National Guard units should train and field many more units able to take on small teams of terrorist gunmen and bombers. Think of them as latter-day Minutemen. Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey and Yemen all responded to Qaeda attacks with similar “packetizing” initiatives involving the police and armed forces; and while that hasn’t eliminated swarm attacks, the terrorists have been far less effective and many lives have been saved."
11.Jihadi terrorism in India outside Jammu & Kashmir is essentially an urban phenomenon. We cannot use against it the techniques learnt by us in dealing with the insurgency in the North-East and with Maoist terrorism in Central India, which is essentially a rural phenomenon. We need a different system of response, which is comprehensive enough to cover all likely targets of strategic significance----whether in the Government or private sector.
12. Even if we do not create an independent Ministry of Internal Security, we should create a separate Department of Physical Security in the Ministry of Home Affairs, which is, inter alia, responsible for counter-terrorism, to act as the nodal agency for all physical security measures on the pattern of the Department of Homeland Security of the US. This newly-created department should interact continuously with its US counterpart to pick its brains and profit from its expertise and experience.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
Sunday, January 17, 2010
GOOGLE, CHINA LOOKING FOR FACE-SAVING PATCH-UP?
B.RAMAN
Both Google and Beijing seem to be looking for a face-saving patch-up, which could enable Google to stay on in China if Beijing promises to undertake a review of its Internet censorship and security regulations, if not immediately, at least in the foreseeable future.
2.This is evident from the statements and comments emanating from both sides. A spokesperson of Google was reported to have told the Bloomberg news agency on January 16,2010, that it is operating business as usual in China, is still censoring search results on google.cn and its employees in China are still going to work. The Reuters news agency quoted Google's China office as saying that it would hold talks with the Chinese Government over the next few weeks.
3.The "Global Times", published by the party-owned "People's Daily" group, quoted Google as saying that its planned retreat from China is limited to google.cn, hinting that other services such as android phones and Gmail will not be affected. The "Global Times" further said: "A spokesman of the Google company who declined to be named said that Chinese users will possibly be able to continue using the search engine in Chinese through Google.com. "The only thing we have announced is this: We will be talking to the Chinese authorities about the possibility of operating an uncensored search service within China. If it is impossible to operate an uncensored service within the law, we will close Google.cn," said the spokesman. "We will obviously continue to offer Chinese-language search on our global search engine.Beyond that, we are making no announcements on any other aspect of our business."
4. An article carried by the " Global Times" on January 17,2010, under the title "Google-China split would be loss for both sides" said: "Google CEO Eric Schmidt had a famous "5,000-year plan" for China, "We will take a long-term view to win in China. The Chinese have 5,000 years of history. Google has 5,000 years of patience in China." Yet Schmidt's promised patience for developing in China seems to be fading away now. The company's "threat" to pull out of China amid concerns over censorship and cyber attacks has shocked the world and brought down Google's share price by 1.3 percent. The price dip reflects investors' worries over a huge potential business loss from the parting of ways. With its roughly 33.2 percent share of China's $1 billion search market in 2009, Google's possible exit would signal that it is giving up a booming Chinese market with 350 million Web surfers. Its strategic loss would be greater than its business loss. While other search engines, Chinese and foreign, would predictably grab a slice of the business abandoned by Google, the Internet giant's inability to localize and tackle difficulties in China would be an incalculable loss to its long-term commitment to innovation. Google's "New approach to China," as spelled out in the title of its recent statement, would do no good to China, either. Should the world's most populous nation fail to provide a foothold to the world's top search engine, it would imply a setback to China and serious loss to China's Net culture. The information highway demands not only safe driving but also free flow of traffic. And, in the interests of the majority's right to know, free flow of information should take precedence in a civil society. In a transitional society like China, the existence of censorship can be justified, as allowing full play to multifarious and disorderly search results poses unprecedented risks to vulnerable netizens and social stability. But the Government must face up to the challenge of where and how to put the checkpoints on the highway. A sensitive and shrewd Government should have the vision and savvy to place the right kind of checkpoints at the right place and at the right time for ensuring the free flow of highway traffic as much as possible in the public interest. When Google entered China's market about five years ago, it named itself "Gu Ge" (Grain Song) in Chinese. Google and China going their separate ways would hurt both sides. Let the song of sowing and expectation continue to be heard in China, for a win-win situation. "
5. In an editorial on the subject the next day, the "Global Times" said: "The world's top search engine needs to reflect on why it is lagging behind a local rival in China and why it is not getting as much support from Chinese Web users as it had expected. .....Technology and business should not be affected by political interests and diplomatic concerns. Though Chinese people have called for further steps to be taken by the Government to ensure free flow of information, it is always in their interest to have any foreign company operating in China abide by Chinese laws. Certainly, Google cannot be an exception. A split between Google and China will hurt both sides. And the Internet giant would lose further ground among its supporters if it is made a political football. Conciliatory negotiation may help in solving any issue. The West's arrogance will not work."
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Both Google and Beijing seem to be looking for a face-saving patch-up, which could enable Google to stay on in China if Beijing promises to undertake a review of its Internet censorship and security regulations, if not immediately, at least in the foreseeable future.
2.This is evident from the statements and comments emanating from both sides. A spokesperson of Google was reported to have told the Bloomberg news agency on January 16,2010, that it is operating business as usual in China, is still censoring search results on google.cn and its employees in China are still going to work. The Reuters news agency quoted Google's China office as saying that it would hold talks with the Chinese Government over the next few weeks.
3.The "Global Times", published by the party-owned "People's Daily" group, quoted Google as saying that its planned retreat from China is limited to google.cn, hinting that other services such as android phones and Gmail will not be affected. The "Global Times" further said: "A spokesman of the Google company who declined to be named said that Chinese users will possibly be able to continue using the search engine in Chinese through Google.com. "The only thing we have announced is this: We will be talking to the Chinese authorities about the possibility of operating an uncensored search service within China. If it is impossible to operate an uncensored service within the law, we will close Google.cn," said the spokesman. "We will obviously continue to offer Chinese-language search on our global search engine.Beyond that, we are making no announcements on any other aspect of our business."
4. An article carried by the " Global Times" on January 17,2010, under the title "Google-China split would be loss for both sides" said: "Google CEO Eric Schmidt had a famous "5,000-year plan" for China, "We will take a long-term view to win in China. The Chinese have 5,000 years of history. Google has 5,000 years of patience in China." Yet Schmidt's promised patience for developing in China seems to be fading away now. The company's "threat" to pull out of China amid concerns over censorship and cyber attacks has shocked the world and brought down Google's share price by 1.3 percent. The price dip reflects investors' worries over a huge potential business loss from the parting of ways. With its roughly 33.2 percent share of China's $1 billion search market in 2009, Google's possible exit would signal that it is giving up a booming Chinese market with 350 million Web surfers. Its strategic loss would be greater than its business loss. While other search engines, Chinese and foreign, would predictably grab a slice of the business abandoned by Google, the Internet giant's inability to localize and tackle difficulties in China would be an incalculable loss to its long-term commitment to innovation. Google's "New approach to China," as spelled out in the title of its recent statement, would do no good to China, either. Should the world's most populous nation fail to provide a foothold to the world's top search engine, it would imply a setback to China and serious loss to China's Net culture. The information highway demands not only safe driving but also free flow of traffic. And, in the interests of the majority's right to know, free flow of information should take precedence in a civil society. In a transitional society like China, the existence of censorship can be justified, as allowing full play to multifarious and disorderly search results poses unprecedented risks to vulnerable netizens and social stability. But the Government must face up to the challenge of where and how to put the checkpoints on the highway. A sensitive and shrewd Government should have the vision and savvy to place the right kind of checkpoints at the right place and at the right time for ensuring the free flow of highway traffic as much as possible in the public interest. When Google entered China's market about five years ago, it named itself "Gu Ge" (Grain Song) in Chinese. Google and China going their separate ways would hurt both sides. Let the song of sowing and expectation continue to be heard in China, for a win-win situation. "
5. In an editorial on the subject the next day, the "Global Times" said: "The world's top search engine needs to reflect on why it is lagging behind a local rival in China and why it is not getting as much support from Chinese Web users as it had expected. .....Technology and business should not be affected by political interests and diplomatic concerns. Though Chinese people have called for further steps to be taken by the Government to ensure free flow of information, it is always in their interest to have any foreign company operating in China abide by Chinese laws. Certainly, Google cannot be an exception. A split between Google and China will hurt both sides. And the Internet giant would lose further ground among its supporters if it is made a political football. Conciliatory negotiation may help in solving any issue. The West's arrogance will not work."
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
CHINA SEES DOUBLE STANDARDS BY GOOGLE
B.RAMAN
China has responded firmly but with balance to Google’s decision not to accept any more censorship on its search engines and its threat to review and, if left with no other alternative, to close down its operations in China if the censorship and the alleged State-sponsored web snooping continue.
2. The Chinese response has been to reiterate the right of the State to impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of security and stability while avoiding any statement or action that might result in a break with Google, which could be bad for the international image of the country. At the same time, the Chinese have ruled out any major change in their Internet security policy just because of the threat held out by Google.
3. Jiang Yu, a spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said that China’s policy would continue to be one of encouragement of an open Internet under proper regulations. She said: “The Internet is open in China, where the Government always encourages its development and has created a favorable environment for its healthy development. China, like other countries, will regulate the Internet industry in line with the law. China welcomes international Internet companies to conduct business within the country according to law."
4.In a statement on its official blog site, David Drummond , Google's corporate development and chief legal officer, had said that the company intended to "review the feasibility of our business operations in China." According to him, its disputes with the Government and unidentified attacks targeting Google's services in China forced the company to make the review and possibly to "shut down Google.cn" and potentially its China offices.
5. While reiterating the right of the State to impose reasonable restrictions, the Chinese authorities have strongly denied that Governmental agencies had any hand in cyber attacks on Google. The spokesperson of the Foreign Office pointed out that Chinese laws "prohibit hacker attacks in any form."
6.Wang Chen, Director of China's State Council Information Office, said on January 14,2010, in an interview to the “People’s Daily”: “China firmly opposes cyber attacks because China itself is a victim of such attacks. Every country needs to effectively regulate the Internet and to make sure their own problems on the web do not affect other countries. Internet security has become a significant problem that does not only involve China but also other countries."
7. Comments made by Chinese non-governmental analysts and Internet users make two points. Firstly, the decision of the Google’s executives to review the continuance of its operations in China appear to have been triggered off by its failure to make a commercial breakthrough in China after nearly four years of its operations in China and by its inability to face the competition of Chinese search engines, which continue to enjoy a monopoly of the Chinese market. Instead of admitting its commercial inadequacies, it has been trying to blame the alleged web censorship and snooping for its decision to review its future operations. They accuse Google of looking for moral scapegoats to cover up its commercial failure. In this connection, they point out that the so-called censorship regulations were there even in 2006 when Google entered the Chinese market. It did not find anything morally wrong with them at that time, but it has now, after its failure to break through in the local market, started talking of morality issues.
8. Secondly, they allege that Google has been guilty of double standards. They point out that there are regulations in the US prohibiting access to children to pornographic sites. Similarly, after 9/11, to prevent terrorists from having access to pictures and other information which could be useful for planning a terrorist strike, the US Government has been asking Google to remove certain photographs and other materials from the web. The Google found nothing wrong in such requests or instructions emanating from the US security agencies and carried out their wishes, but when Chinese agencies issue such instructions they are accused of misuse of authority and coming in the way of the free use of the Internet.
9. The Chinese are hoping that ultimately Google will realise that it had over-reacted to the difficulties faced by it in China and will decide to continue its operations in China in its long-term business interests. However, if Google sticks to its threat and decides to wind up its operations after the proposed review, the Chinese are prepared to face it. They are confident that any decision of Google to wind up will not have any impact on China’s relations with the US and on the confidence of international companies in the business environment in China.
( 17-1-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
China has responded firmly but with balance to Google’s decision not to accept any more censorship on its search engines and its threat to review and, if left with no other alternative, to close down its operations in China if the censorship and the alleged State-sponsored web snooping continue.
2. The Chinese response has been to reiterate the right of the State to impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of security and stability while avoiding any statement or action that might result in a break with Google, which could be bad for the international image of the country. At the same time, the Chinese have ruled out any major change in their Internet security policy just because of the threat held out by Google.
3. Jiang Yu, a spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said that China’s policy would continue to be one of encouragement of an open Internet under proper regulations. She said: “The Internet is open in China, where the Government always encourages its development and has created a favorable environment for its healthy development. China, like other countries, will regulate the Internet industry in line with the law. China welcomes international Internet companies to conduct business within the country according to law."
4.In a statement on its official blog site, David Drummond , Google's corporate development and chief legal officer, had said that the company intended to "review the feasibility of our business operations in China." According to him, its disputes with the Government and unidentified attacks targeting Google's services in China forced the company to make the review and possibly to "shut down Google.cn" and potentially its China offices.
5. While reiterating the right of the State to impose reasonable restrictions, the Chinese authorities have strongly denied that Governmental agencies had any hand in cyber attacks on Google. The spokesperson of the Foreign Office pointed out that Chinese laws "prohibit hacker attacks in any form."
6.Wang Chen, Director of China's State Council Information Office, said on January 14,2010, in an interview to the “People’s Daily”: “China firmly opposes cyber attacks because China itself is a victim of such attacks. Every country needs to effectively regulate the Internet and to make sure their own problems on the web do not affect other countries. Internet security has become a significant problem that does not only involve China but also other countries."
7. Comments made by Chinese non-governmental analysts and Internet users make two points. Firstly, the decision of the Google’s executives to review the continuance of its operations in China appear to have been triggered off by its failure to make a commercial breakthrough in China after nearly four years of its operations in China and by its inability to face the competition of Chinese search engines, which continue to enjoy a monopoly of the Chinese market. Instead of admitting its commercial inadequacies, it has been trying to blame the alleged web censorship and snooping for its decision to review its future operations. They accuse Google of looking for moral scapegoats to cover up its commercial failure. In this connection, they point out that the so-called censorship regulations were there even in 2006 when Google entered the Chinese market. It did not find anything morally wrong with them at that time, but it has now, after its failure to break through in the local market, started talking of morality issues.
8. Secondly, they allege that Google has been guilty of double standards. They point out that there are regulations in the US prohibiting access to children to pornographic sites. Similarly, after 9/11, to prevent terrorists from having access to pictures and other information which could be useful for planning a terrorist strike, the US Government has been asking Google to remove certain photographs and other materials from the web. The Google found nothing wrong in such requests or instructions emanating from the US security agencies and carried out their wishes, but when Chinese agencies issue such instructions they are accused of misuse of authority and coming in the way of the free use of the Internet.
9. The Chinese are hoping that ultimately Google will realise that it had over-reacted to the difficulties faced by it in China and will decide to continue its operations in China in its long-term business interests. However, if Google sticks to its threat and decides to wind up its operations after the proposed review, the Chinese are prepared to face it. They are confident that any decision of Google to wind up will not have any impact on China’s relations with the US and on the confidence of international companies in the business environment in China.
( 17-1-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Saturday, January 16, 2010
CIA: ALIVE & KICKING
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.610
B.RAMAN
The Chapman Base tragedy in the Khost area of Afghanistan in which seven CIA officers were killed by a Jordanian betrayor won over by the Pakistani Taliban on December 30,2009, has not affected the morale of the CIA. Its morale is high and its officers, in co-ordination with the officers of the US technical intelligence agencies, have gone after Hakimullah Mehsud, the Amir of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), as the Pakistani Taliban is known, with a determination worthy of emulation.
2.This is the message coming out loud and clear from a Drone strike on a group of terrorists in the Shaktoi village on the border between South and North Waziristan on January 14,2009. While it is not clear whether the CIA knew that Hakimullah was among the terrorists in the meeting, it is clear that it knew that a gathering of Arab, Uzbeck and Pakistani terrorists of the TTP was taking place and attacked them killing 10 of them---two of them reportedly Arabs and the remaining Uzbecks and Pakistanis. The fact that there has been no public demonstration against the strike indicates that there were no civilian fatalities.
3.Pakistani media speculation that Hakimullah was among those killed has not been corroborated. The indicators from local sources are that he was present in the area, but was not among the casualties. A TTP spokesman has himself admitted that Hakimullah was present in the area targeted by the Drone,but had left before the Drone attack. Other reports that Hakimullah sustained an injury, which is not life threatening, have not been admitted by the TTP.
4. The accuracy of the information and the precision of the strike speak well of the CIA’s undamaged capability to go after the TTP and should be a reminder to Hakimullah of the fate of Baitullah, his predecessor, who was killed by a Drone strike near the same area in August last.
5. Some local sources say that after the death of Baitullah, Hakimullah is afraid of being betrayed by a fellow Mehsud and hence spends more time in the camps of Al Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in North Waziristan than in the camps of the TTP in South Waziristan or in the Orakzai area. ( (17-1-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
The Chapman Base tragedy in the Khost area of Afghanistan in which seven CIA officers were killed by a Jordanian betrayor won over by the Pakistani Taliban on December 30,2009, has not affected the morale of the CIA. Its morale is high and its officers, in co-ordination with the officers of the US technical intelligence agencies, have gone after Hakimullah Mehsud, the Amir of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), as the Pakistani Taliban is known, with a determination worthy of emulation.
2.This is the message coming out loud and clear from a Drone strike on a group of terrorists in the Shaktoi village on the border between South and North Waziristan on January 14,2009. While it is not clear whether the CIA knew that Hakimullah was among the terrorists in the meeting, it is clear that it knew that a gathering of Arab, Uzbeck and Pakistani terrorists of the TTP was taking place and attacked them killing 10 of them---two of them reportedly Arabs and the remaining Uzbecks and Pakistanis. The fact that there has been no public demonstration against the strike indicates that there were no civilian fatalities.
3.Pakistani media speculation that Hakimullah was among those killed has not been corroborated. The indicators from local sources are that he was present in the area, but was not among the casualties. A TTP spokesman has himself admitted that Hakimullah was present in the area targeted by the Drone,but had left before the Drone attack. Other reports that Hakimullah sustained an injury, which is not life threatening, have not been admitted by the TTP.
4. The accuracy of the information and the precision of the strike speak well of the CIA’s undamaged capability to go after the TTP and should be a reminder to Hakimullah of the fate of Baitullah, his predecessor, who was killed by a Drone strike near the same area in August last.
5. Some local sources say that after the death of Baitullah, Hakimullah is afraid of being betrayed by a fellow Mehsud and hence spends more time in the camps of Al Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in North Waziristan than in the camps of the TTP in South Waziristan or in the Orakzai area. ( (17-1-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, January 15, 2010
WILL OBAMA CONTINUE TO STAND BY GOOGLE AGAINST BEIJING?
B.RAMAN
Will President Barack Obama continue to stand by Google in its dispute with the Government of China over its misuse of the Internet for State-sponsored cyber harassment of political dissidents opposed to one-party rule and cyber espionage not only on States perceived as threats to China’s security , but also on the leaders of ethnic minority groups of China such as His Holiness the Dalai Lama and Rebiya Kadeer, the Uighur leader, or will he let down Google as he let down the human rights activists after paying some lip sympathy to them?
2. That is an issue that needs to be closely monitored in the wake of Google’s notice to China on January 12,2010, that it might be forced to close down its operations in China if Beijing continued to insist on censorship of the results of Google’s search engine in order to deny public access to information about the activities of political dissidents and human rights activists. Google is also reportedly annoyed over the growing Chinese practice of web snooping.
3.The controls, already being exercised by the Chinese State and particularly its Ministry for Public Security over the Internet were further enhanced last month in the so-called interest of national security. “The Internet has become an important avenue through which anti-China forces infiltrate, sabotage and magnify their capabilities for destruction,” wrote Meng Jianzhu, the Minister for Public Security, in the December 1 issue of “Qiushi”, a magazine published by the Communist Party’s Central Committee. He added: “Therefore it represents a new challenge to the public security authority in maintaining national security and social stability.”
4.During the widespread disturbances against the Government by the Uighurs in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region last year, the protesters and their overseas supporters used the Internet to keep in touch with each other and to disseminate information about the happenings in Xinjiang. The followers of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and his overseas supporters have also been making similar use of the Internet. The Chinese authorities have also been noting with concern the use of the Internet by political dissidents in Iran to keep up their protests against President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
5. Apart from attacks of disruption allegedly launched by the Ministry for Public Security on servers being used by the dissidents at home and abroad, the Ministry has also been trying to forcibly close down individual web sites seeking to propagate alternative or inconvenient points of view by projecting them falsely as pornographic.
6. A Bill introduced in the US Congress last year by Rep. Chris Smith that sought to impose restrictions on Internet companies doing business in countries that use the Internet for spying or censorship failed to win support. He has promised to revive the Bill in the wake of the Google announcement.
7. The Paris-based Reporters Without Borders group, which has been strongly critical of the Chinese Government restrictions on the free use of the Internet, has called upon information technology and internet companies to form a united front to resist the Chinese misuse of the Internet, but the prospects of such a united front even among American companies doing business in China are not very bright. Microsoft has already marked its distance from Google with the following statement: “"We don't have any indiciation that our corporate network or any of our mail properties were attacked. We work closely with authorities and other technology companies like Google on Internet safety issues, and we will continue to actively monitor this situation."
8. The Chinese are confident that they will be able to get away with their Internet censorship and misuse not only because there is no unity among Western Internet companies, but also because in the Chinese perception, in the midst of the present economic difficulties, the Obama Administration does not have the political will or even the option to act strongly. The Chinese are, therefore, not unduly concerned over the strong statement of support by Robert Gibbs, a spokesman of the White House, on January 13,2010, to the position taken up by Google. (17-1-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Will President Barack Obama continue to stand by Google in its dispute with the Government of China over its misuse of the Internet for State-sponsored cyber harassment of political dissidents opposed to one-party rule and cyber espionage not only on States perceived as threats to China’s security , but also on the leaders of ethnic minority groups of China such as His Holiness the Dalai Lama and Rebiya Kadeer, the Uighur leader, or will he let down Google as he let down the human rights activists after paying some lip sympathy to them?
2. That is an issue that needs to be closely monitored in the wake of Google’s notice to China on January 12,2010, that it might be forced to close down its operations in China if Beijing continued to insist on censorship of the results of Google’s search engine in order to deny public access to information about the activities of political dissidents and human rights activists. Google is also reportedly annoyed over the growing Chinese practice of web snooping.
3.The controls, already being exercised by the Chinese State and particularly its Ministry for Public Security over the Internet were further enhanced last month in the so-called interest of national security. “The Internet has become an important avenue through which anti-China forces infiltrate, sabotage and magnify their capabilities for destruction,” wrote Meng Jianzhu, the Minister for Public Security, in the December 1 issue of “Qiushi”, a magazine published by the Communist Party’s Central Committee. He added: “Therefore it represents a new challenge to the public security authority in maintaining national security and social stability.”
4.During the widespread disturbances against the Government by the Uighurs in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region last year, the protesters and their overseas supporters used the Internet to keep in touch with each other and to disseminate information about the happenings in Xinjiang. The followers of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and his overseas supporters have also been making similar use of the Internet. The Chinese authorities have also been noting with concern the use of the Internet by political dissidents in Iran to keep up their protests against President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
5. Apart from attacks of disruption allegedly launched by the Ministry for Public Security on servers being used by the dissidents at home and abroad, the Ministry has also been trying to forcibly close down individual web sites seeking to propagate alternative or inconvenient points of view by projecting them falsely as pornographic.
6. A Bill introduced in the US Congress last year by Rep. Chris Smith that sought to impose restrictions on Internet companies doing business in countries that use the Internet for spying or censorship failed to win support. He has promised to revive the Bill in the wake of the Google announcement.
7. The Paris-based Reporters Without Borders group, which has been strongly critical of the Chinese Government restrictions on the free use of the Internet, has called upon information technology and internet companies to form a united front to resist the Chinese misuse of the Internet, but the prospects of such a united front even among American companies doing business in China are not very bright. Microsoft has already marked its distance from Google with the following statement: “"We don't have any indiciation that our corporate network or any of our mail properties were attacked. We work closely with authorities and other technology companies like Google on Internet safety issues, and we will continue to actively monitor this situation."
8. The Chinese are confident that they will be able to get away with their Internet censorship and misuse not only because there is no unity among Western Internet companies, but also because in the Chinese perception, in the midst of the present economic difficulties, the Obama Administration does not have the political will or even the option to act strongly. The Chinese are, therefore, not unduly concerned over the strong statement of support by Robert Gibbs, a spokesman of the White House, on January 13,2010, to the position taken up by Google. (17-1-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER
B.RAMAN
The institution of a National Security Adviser (NSA) came into being in the US in the wake of the absence of inter-departmental co-ordination in defence-related policy-making that prevailed during and before the Second World War. The NSA’s role was to harmonise the views and inputs of different departments and project to the President the available options which had inter-departmental support. Once the President chose the option, it was the task of the NSA to co-ordinate the implementation. Thus, the NSA was essentially a policy synthesizer and co-ordinator and not a policy innovator.
2. As the National Security Council (NSC) of which the President was the political head and the NSA the executive head grew up in strength and power, different NSAs started imparting to the institution of the NSA their own individual stamp. Under Dr.Henry Kissinger, who was the NSA under President Richard Nixon, the NSA became a policy innovator, who often gave to the President policy options, which were not necessarily the product of inter-departmental synthesis. He left the responsibility for the co-ordination of the implementation of the policy approved by the President largely to his juniors.
3. Since then, there have been other instances of NSAs venturing out from the domain of policy co-ordination to that of innovation. Zbigniew Brzezinski who was the NSA under President Jimmy Carter, is an example. NSAs, who kep themselves strictly confined to the original role of co-ordinator, hardly left their mark in the history of policy-making. Not so policy innovators, who are remembered even today.
4.NSAs are members of the executive staff ( White House staff ) of the President. Their appointment by the President is not subject to confirmation by the Senate. They do not enjoy the same position in the Administration as the independent heads of different departments such as the Secretary of State, of Defence etc. They do not have the same political clout as the departmental heads, who are in a better position to introduce policy innovation than the NSA. Some NSAs really shone in their brilliance when they gravitated from the office of the NSA to that of the Secretary of State. Kissinger and Ms. Condoleezza Rice were examples. How many remember the role of Rice as the NSA during the first term of George Bush as the President? Her initiative and original ideas in policy-making came into their own only after she became the Secretary of State during Bush’s second term.
5. In India, till 1989, the responsibility for policy co-ordination in national security related matters was shared by the Cabinet Secretary and the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, both of whom came directly under the Prime Minister. They performed jointly the task of policy synthesis, formulation and implementation. In times of crisis, they became policy innovators instead of remaining merely policy co-ordinators. One saw this under Mrs.Indira Gandhi in the months before and during the Indo-Pak war of 1971.
6. A post of NSA to co-ordinate policy-making in national security matters was created when V.P.Singh was the Prime Minister. M.K.Narayanan, who was the Director of the Intelligence Bureau under Rajiv Gandhi, held this post for less than a year. It ceased to exist till 1999 when it was re-created along with a full-fledged National Security Council mechanism by the Government of Atal Behari Vajpayee in pursuance of recommendations made by a Task Force headed by K.C.Pant, the then Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission.
7. The Task Force was reportedly in favour of the creation of an independent NSA, who will function along with the CS and the Principal Secretary under the Prime Minister. It envisaged a policy-making and co-ordinating troika advising the Prime Minister. Vajpayee approved the re-creation of the post of the NSA, but instead of appointing an independent person to hold it, he asked Brajesh Mishra, his Principal Secretary in the Prime Minister’s Office, to wear a second hat as the NSA. Many questioned the wisdom of this decision and felt that national security policy-making would not get undivided attention if the post is not held by an independent person. Despite this, Vajpayee felt that there would be advantages if the Principal Secretary also functioned as the NSA.
8. In the US, the NSA has no substantive role as the co-ordinator and/or innovator of intelligence-related policy-making. Before 2004, this task was being performed by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in his additional role as the Director, Central Intelligence, in which capacity he was the principal adviser to the President in intelligence-related matters. In 2004, Bush accepted a recommendation of the National Commission, which enquired into the 9/11 terrorist strikes, to create a post of Director, National Intelligence, to function directly under the President and co-ordinate the functioning of the multiplicity of intelligence agencies and their policy-making. This responsibility is no longer exercised by the Director of the CIA.
9. In India, the administrative co-ordination of the functioning of the intelligence agencies was being and is even now exercised by the CS. There was no formal mechanism for operational co-ordination. The Task Force for the revamping of the intelligence apparatus under G.C.Saxena, former head of the R&AW, set up by the Vajpayee Government in 2000 suggested that the Principal Secretary to the PM should exercise this function in his capacity as the NSA. This was accepted.
10. When Manmohan Singh became the Prime Minister in 2004, he split the functions of the NSA from those of the Principal Secretary and made J.N.Dixit, former Foreign Secretary, as an independent NSA. He also appointed Narayanan as the Internal Security Adviser. In addition to advising the PM on all matters relating to external policy-making, Dixit also exercised the function of operational intelligence co-ordinator. Narayanan, as the Internal Security Adviser, had no formal role in intelligence co-ordination.
11. After the death of Dixit in January 2005, Narayanan was designated as the NSA exercising all functions relating to external and internal security and intelligence co-ordination. Questions have been raised since then by some about the wisdom of appointing an expert in internal security matters to be in charge of external-policy making where, it was argued, experience in diplomacy was essential.
12. In the US, after 9/11, a post of Adviser to the President on Homeland Security has been created to advise the President on all homeland security matters from his office in the White House. Thus, there are two posts--- the Secretary for Homeland Security, who is the political head of the Homeland Security Department, and the Adviser on Homeland Security, who is a member of the executive staff of the President.
13.The introduction of this arrangement is justified because internal or homeland security requires a kind of expertise different from external policy making and the ability to co-ordinate the internal security functions of not only all the federal Departments, but also of the States. A person with a purely academic or diplomatic experience may not be able to do justice to this.
14. in India too, external and internal policy making in national security matters require two different kinds of professional background, expertise and professional networking at the central and state levels. There have been reports that the Government is contemplating the appointment of a new NSA.
15. If so, this is also the right time to consider the following questions: Would it be advisable to have a separate adviser for internal security working in the PMO? Who will be responsible for intelligence co-ordination and policy-making? Should India also have a separate intelligence adviser and co-ordinator working directly under the Prime Minister similar to the arrangement in many countries, including the USA and the UK? (16-1-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
The institution of a National Security Adviser (NSA) came into being in the US in the wake of the absence of inter-departmental co-ordination in defence-related policy-making that prevailed during and before the Second World War. The NSA’s role was to harmonise the views and inputs of different departments and project to the President the available options which had inter-departmental support. Once the President chose the option, it was the task of the NSA to co-ordinate the implementation. Thus, the NSA was essentially a policy synthesizer and co-ordinator and not a policy innovator.
2. As the National Security Council (NSC) of which the President was the political head and the NSA the executive head grew up in strength and power, different NSAs started imparting to the institution of the NSA their own individual stamp. Under Dr.Henry Kissinger, who was the NSA under President Richard Nixon, the NSA became a policy innovator, who often gave to the President policy options, which were not necessarily the product of inter-departmental synthesis. He left the responsibility for the co-ordination of the implementation of the policy approved by the President largely to his juniors.
3. Since then, there have been other instances of NSAs venturing out from the domain of policy co-ordination to that of innovation. Zbigniew Brzezinski who was the NSA under President Jimmy Carter, is an example. NSAs, who kep themselves strictly confined to the original role of co-ordinator, hardly left their mark in the history of policy-making. Not so policy innovators, who are remembered even today.
4.NSAs are members of the executive staff ( White House staff ) of the President. Their appointment by the President is not subject to confirmation by the Senate. They do not enjoy the same position in the Administration as the independent heads of different departments such as the Secretary of State, of Defence etc. They do not have the same political clout as the departmental heads, who are in a better position to introduce policy innovation than the NSA. Some NSAs really shone in their brilliance when they gravitated from the office of the NSA to that of the Secretary of State. Kissinger and Ms. Condoleezza Rice were examples. How many remember the role of Rice as the NSA during the first term of George Bush as the President? Her initiative and original ideas in policy-making came into their own only after she became the Secretary of State during Bush’s second term.
5. In India, till 1989, the responsibility for policy co-ordination in national security related matters was shared by the Cabinet Secretary and the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, both of whom came directly under the Prime Minister. They performed jointly the task of policy synthesis, formulation and implementation. In times of crisis, they became policy innovators instead of remaining merely policy co-ordinators. One saw this under Mrs.Indira Gandhi in the months before and during the Indo-Pak war of 1971.
6. A post of NSA to co-ordinate policy-making in national security matters was created when V.P.Singh was the Prime Minister. M.K.Narayanan, who was the Director of the Intelligence Bureau under Rajiv Gandhi, held this post for less than a year. It ceased to exist till 1999 when it was re-created along with a full-fledged National Security Council mechanism by the Government of Atal Behari Vajpayee in pursuance of recommendations made by a Task Force headed by K.C.Pant, the then Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission.
7. The Task Force was reportedly in favour of the creation of an independent NSA, who will function along with the CS and the Principal Secretary under the Prime Minister. It envisaged a policy-making and co-ordinating troika advising the Prime Minister. Vajpayee approved the re-creation of the post of the NSA, but instead of appointing an independent person to hold it, he asked Brajesh Mishra, his Principal Secretary in the Prime Minister’s Office, to wear a second hat as the NSA. Many questioned the wisdom of this decision and felt that national security policy-making would not get undivided attention if the post is not held by an independent person. Despite this, Vajpayee felt that there would be advantages if the Principal Secretary also functioned as the NSA.
8. In the US, the NSA has no substantive role as the co-ordinator and/or innovator of intelligence-related policy-making. Before 2004, this task was being performed by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in his additional role as the Director, Central Intelligence, in which capacity he was the principal adviser to the President in intelligence-related matters. In 2004, Bush accepted a recommendation of the National Commission, which enquired into the 9/11 terrorist strikes, to create a post of Director, National Intelligence, to function directly under the President and co-ordinate the functioning of the multiplicity of intelligence agencies and their policy-making. This responsibility is no longer exercised by the Director of the CIA.
9. In India, the administrative co-ordination of the functioning of the intelligence agencies was being and is even now exercised by the CS. There was no formal mechanism for operational co-ordination. The Task Force for the revamping of the intelligence apparatus under G.C.Saxena, former head of the R&AW, set up by the Vajpayee Government in 2000 suggested that the Principal Secretary to the PM should exercise this function in his capacity as the NSA. This was accepted.
10. When Manmohan Singh became the Prime Minister in 2004, he split the functions of the NSA from those of the Principal Secretary and made J.N.Dixit, former Foreign Secretary, as an independent NSA. He also appointed Narayanan as the Internal Security Adviser. In addition to advising the PM on all matters relating to external policy-making, Dixit also exercised the function of operational intelligence co-ordinator. Narayanan, as the Internal Security Adviser, had no formal role in intelligence co-ordination.
11. After the death of Dixit in January 2005, Narayanan was designated as the NSA exercising all functions relating to external and internal security and intelligence co-ordination. Questions have been raised since then by some about the wisdom of appointing an expert in internal security matters to be in charge of external-policy making where, it was argued, experience in diplomacy was essential.
12. In the US, after 9/11, a post of Adviser to the President on Homeland Security has been created to advise the President on all homeland security matters from his office in the White House. Thus, there are two posts--- the Secretary for Homeland Security, who is the political head of the Homeland Security Department, and the Adviser on Homeland Security, who is a member of the executive staff of the President.
13.The introduction of this arrangement is justified because internal or homeland security requires a kind of expertise different from external policy making and the ability to co-ordinate the internal security functions of not only all the federal Departments, but also of the States. A person with a purely academic or diplomatic experience may not be able to do justice to this.
14. in India too, external and internal policy making in national security matters require two different kinds of professional background, expertise and professional networking at the central and state levels. There have been reports that the Government is contemplating the appointment of a new NSA.
15. If so, this is also the right time to consider the following questions: Would it be advisable to have a separate adviser for internal security working in the PMO? Who will be responsible for intelligence co-ordination and policy-making? Should India also have a separate intelligence adviser and co-ordinator working directly under the Prime Minister similar to the arrangement in many countries, including the USA and the UK? (16-1-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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