B.RAMAN
(What will be the impact of the global financial and economic melt-down on the Chinese economy? This question should be of interest to the other countries of the South and the South-East Asian region. If the Chinese economy is badly affected, they too are likely to feel the negative consequences of the down-turn in the Chinese economy. Keeping this in view, we have been bringing out a periodic "Chinese Economy Monitor" based on open information. This is the ninth in the series)
MY ASSESSMENT
If official Chinese statistics are to be believed, the Chinese economy is showing signs of coming out of the down-turn into which it has got consequent upon the global economic meltdown of 2008 and 2009. The Chinese authorities believe that the worst in the export sector will be over in 2010 and the unemployment situation which they faced consequent upon the closure of a large number of export-dependent industries, has been satisfactorily managed. New jobs are once again being created by boosting the domestic demand through the Government’s stimulus package and many of those who lost their jobs due to the decline in exports have managed to find new jobs. The widely-predicted social tensions due to the loss of millions of jobs have been belied. The Chinese people have taken in their stride the economic difficulties of the last two years. A lot of credit should go to President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabo for explaining the economic difficulties to the people through frequent touring in the affected parts of the country and the measures taken by the Government for alleviating the problems of the people. The warnings of Cassandras about a looming social explosion in China due to the economic difficulties have proved incorrect. At the same time, objective analysts---- Chinese as well as foreigners---- continue to be concerned over the inherent strength of the economy and over what they see as the lack of transparency in certain economic matters, which the Chinese authorities see as sensitive. One area of concern is the real estate sector. Many fear that there is a bubble developing which may result in an unpredicted explosion. The difficulties increasingly faced by the people in buying houses could result in large-scale social tensions. In a surprisingly forthright article on the subject, the “Global Times” of the party-owned “People’s Daily” group drew attention to the looming danger of a real estate bubble. How sensitive this subject has become for the Government would be evident from the fact that the Government allegedly ordered the discontinuance of a series of TV reportage on this subject, which was attracting a large number of viewers. Not many observers are convinced by the claims of the Government about the health of the Chinese banking sector. They suspect that there is an iceberg of hidden credits against which the economy might collide one day. Another example of disbelief in the Government claims relates to the automobile sector. The Government claims that there has been a dramatic increase in the domestic purchase of automobiles thereby reducing the dependence of the sector on exports. There is no reason to doubt the official statistics about the surge in the domestic sales of cars. These figures are corroborated by industry sources. But the skepticism arises from the fact that the increase in the domestic sales of automobiles has not been accompanied by a noticeable increase in the domestic consumption of petrol and diesel.
REAL ESTATE NERVOUSNESS
2.Mainland stocks fell for a fourth day on December 18,2009, the longest losing streak since August, due to concerns that the Government might step up measures to curb property speculation and new share sales will divert funds from existing equities. The Poly Real Estate Group Co slumped for a ninth day after the Government increased down payments on land purchases. The China Life Insurance Co, the nation's biggest insurer, dropped 2.6 percent to a two-month low. Initial public offerings on the ChiNext board have drawn almost 900 billion yuan in subscriptions, the China Securities Journal said on December 18."It looks like the Government is using new share sales as a way to avoid an asset bubble on the stock market," said Zhang Xiuqi, a Shanghai-based strategist at the China International Fund Management Co, which oversees about $10.2 billion. "The crackdown on the property industry is tougher than was previously expected." The Shanghai Composite Index fell 65.19, or 2.1 percent, to 3,113.89 at the close, the lowest since November 27. It dropped by 4.1 percent this week, a second weekly loss. The CSI 300 Index declined by 2.5 percent to 3,391.74. The Shanghai gauge had jumped by 71 percent this year as Government spending and a credit boom helped the nation's economic growth recover from its steepest slump in more than a decade. The Poly Real Estate, China's second-largest developer by market value, fell 7.5 percent to 21.88 yuan, capping a nine-day, 16 percent slump. Gemdale Corp, the fourth largest, lost 7.8 percent to 13.20 yuan. The Shanghai Shimao Co, a property developer controlled by billionaire Xu Rongmao, declined by 4.8 percent to 15.77 yuan. The Government set the down payment requirement for land purchases to at least 50 percent of the total price. The new down payment level is an increase from earlier levels, said Zhou Hu, a real estate analyst at Bohai Securities Co in Beijing. An index tracking 33 property stocks traded on the Shanghai Composite tumbled 5.4 percent , its biggest loss since Aug 31. Property stocks have slumped after the government said it would target "excessive" growth in property prices in some cities. That follows the Cabinet's statement last week that it will re-impose a sales tax on homes sold within five years, after cutting the period to two years in January. The country's property and stock markets are a "bubble" that will burst when inflation accelerates in 2011, former Morgan Stanley chief Asian economist Andy Xie said.
---“China Daily” of December 19,2009
HIDDEN CREDIT RISKS
3.Financial stocks also declined after the Fitch Ratings said Chinese banks' capital strength is likely to be more "strained" than it appears as lenders increasingly use off- balance sheet transactions to free up room for further loan growth. The growing amount of unreported loan transactions, including re-packaging loans into wealth management products to sell to investors and the outright sale of loans to other financial institutions, represent a "growing pool of hidden credit risk" and may lead to downward revisions for some Chinese banks in 2010 and 2011, Fitch said in its latest report.
---“China Daily” of December 19,2009.
RIDING THE REAL ESTATE TIGER
4.In an article on the concerns over the state of the real estate market published on December 16,2009, the “Global Times” of the “People’s Daily” group wrote as follows: “With house prices skyrocketing in China's cities, urban residents are finding themselves stripped of purchasing power, causing concern of social unrest and prompting government measures to rein in prices, curb speculation and demand the construction of more low-cost homes. He Keng, an official with the Financial and Economic Committee of the National People's Congress, complained about the growing housing bubble in a CCTV interview over the weekend. "If even a vice minister-level official like me can't afford a decent home, it will be a huge problem for most ordinary people," he said. For the majority of the wage-earning public, the soaring prices have taken the dream of buying their own home further out of reach. It also explains why a TV series called "Snail House," which reflects people's difficulty in affording a house, has been an instant hit. It has also become controversial, as it was called to a halt after only 10 episodes broadcast by Beijing-based BTV, reportedly due to pressure from real estate developers. Noticing the smoldering public discontent, the central and local governments have been cautiously making small moves, trying to prevent the danger of an outpouring of anger that may jolt society as a whole. Shanghai Mayor Han Zheng said last week that house prices in the municipality are rising too fast and could eventually harm the interests of the Shanghai people. In southern China, the Guangzhou government has planned to release 80 square kilometers of land onto the market in order to curb soaring prices, local media reported Monday. An executive meeting of the State Council, chaired by Premier Wen Jiabao, announced on Monday that the central government would rein in the overheated momentum of housing prices by increasing the supply of low-cost homes, curbing speculation and strengthening the supervision of the real estate market. The stock market in Shanghai and Shenzhen saw real estate-related stocks falling across the board, some down 6-8 percent at closing Tuesday. Nanfang Daily reported Tuesday that major institutional investors dumped a net 2.9 billion yuan ($424.6 million) worth of real estate stocks on the yuan-denominated A-share market last week, representing over 11 percent of the net fund outflow of the entire market, the highest among all the sectors. However, analysts are not optimistic about the Government's determination to take steps to control housing prices, saying that the Government is at a dilemma in the face of growing social discontent and a recovering economy boosted largely by the real estate market and related industries. "The Government is riding on a tiger," a People's Daily senior editor, who asked to remain anonymous, told the Global Times. "It's dangerous to keep on riding, and even more risky to get off." "Restraining home prices from soaring too quickly in recent months is the government's intention," Chen Guoqiang, director of the real estate research center at Peking University, said yesterday. "But the government doesn't want the commercial real estate sector to fluctuate too much in 2010 because it needs to keep the real estate market booming to ensure the country's economy runs well," he said. Tian Yun, vice president of the China Macro Economics Institute, said, "the latest measures will be ineffective." "The current high prices are pushed by joint efforts by the central government and local governments," he explained. "State-owned enterprises have become the hands that are pushing the high prices, and local governments depend on high property prices to assure local expenditure," he said. Developers also prefer not to develop low-price housing, and how the government will execute its relevant policies remains a question, Yang said. Yi Xianrong, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, confirmed Tuesday that tightening credit lines would be the most effective way to curb the housing market, because the soaring home prices at present are caused by lax credit policies. Experts said the State Council's action guidelines announced Monday show its intent to restrict the credit policies for mortgage loans so as to curb speculation. "From what the guidelines indicate, the buyers who want to buy their second or third houses need to pay a down payment of no less than 40 percent of the total value," Chen Guoqiang said yesterday. "This means that profiting from fast re-sales will be under control." The Central Government also announced on December 9 that people must now keep their houses for five years before they can resell them, a change from the previous minimum of two years. Zhong Wei, director of the Financial Research Center at Beijing Normal University, said the growth of the real estate market is expected to slow down next year, with total sales of 3.3 trillion yuan, compared with this year's 3.6 trillion.”
-----“ Global Times” of December 16,2009
NEW JOBS
5.China created 9.4 million new jobs in urban areas in the first ten months, the Ministry of Human Resource and Social Security said on December 12. The number represented 104 percent of the whole year target for 2009, the Ministry said. Around 4.4 million laid-off workers were re-employed in the January-October period, or 88 percent of the 5-million goal for the whole year.
----- Xinhua News Agency of December 12,2009.
FOREIGN TRADE LOOKS UP
6.China's foreign trade is projected to grow 15 percent next year, according to a report released by the China Institute for WTO Studies on December 18. The report forecasts imports to increase by 15 percent and exports up 13 percent. With the external demand improving and the global economic recovery gaining momentum, "the declining trend of China's exports would come to an end next year," the report says.The Government stimulus package would boost imports through enhancing domestic demand, while the growing competitiveness of Chinese enterprises in the international market would increase exports, said Zhang Hanlin, head of the institute based in the University of International Business and Economics. Net exports would contribute 0.3 percent to China's GDP growth next year, said Zhang, compared with a minus 4.4 percent this year as predicted by the World Bank in a recent report.
---- Xinhua News Agency of December 18,2009.
PROTECTIONISM AGAINST CHINA
7.In the first 11 months this year, China's imports and exports totaled US$1.96 trillion, down 17.5 percent compared with the corresponding period last year, according to the General Administration of Customs. Exports dropped 1.2 percent year on year in November, but were up 2.6 percent from October, the fifth consecutive monthly increase. And imports rose 26.7 percent from year on year. However, the China Institute for WTO Studies report also warns of rising protectionism against Chinese products in 2010. Faced with worsening unemployment situation and shrinking market share, some countries tended to make China a scapegoat, said Zhang. "China will suffer from more trade frictions in the years to come." The report says, in the first nine months this year, 19 countries have launched 88 trade remedy investigations against China, involving 10 billion dollars, a year-on-year rise of 125 percent. China suffered 14 trade remedy investigations from the United States, involving US$5.84 billion, or 639 percent more than that of the corresponding period last year. Some countries might resort to new remedy measures which are often in disguised forms but with more destructive effects, Zhang said. ------ Xinhua News Agency of December 18,2009
TRADE IMPROVES IN NOVEMBER
8.China's imports and exports rose 9.8 percent in November year on year, ending a 12-month decline, to stand at 208.2 billion U.S. dollars, the General Administration of Customs announced on December 11. The trade surplus was 177.96 billion dollars in the January-November period, down 30.6 percent from a year earlier. Exports stood at 113.65 billion dollars in November, down 1.2 percent from a year earlier, but were up 2.6 percent from October for the fifth consecutive monthly increase. Imports rose 26.7 percent in November to 94.6 billion dollars. From January to November, the country's imports and exports totaled 1.96 trillion dollars, down 17.5 percent compared with the corresponding period last year. Imports for the first 11 months were 893.02 billion dollars, down 15.8 percent year on year; exports dropped 18.8 percent to 1.07 trillion dollars. The EU remained China's biggest trading partner, though bilateral trade declined 17 percent to 326.27 billion dollars in value in the first 11 months; the United States was second with trade at 266.54 billion dollars, down 13.4 percent; Japan followed with trade down 17.4 percent to 203.33 billion dollars. ----- Xinhua News Agency of December 11,2009
INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT UP
9.China's industrial output growth accelerated to 19.2 percent in November year on year, following a 16.1-percent increase in October, data from the National Bureau of Statistics showed on December 11. The figure increased 10.3 percent year on year over first 11 months this year, 0.9 percentage points higher than that of the first 10 months, said the NBS. Production of heavy industries was up 22.2 percent in November, and that for the light industries rose 12.6 percent. China's continued economic growth had brought the acceleration in industrial growth, said Sheng Laiyun, a spokesman with NBS. He also attributed the rapid growth to the sharp industrial decline in the corresponding period last year. In November 2008, China's industrial output growth slowed to 5.4 percent year on year. ---Xinhua News Agency of December 11,2009.
RETAIL SALES UP---DRAMATIC SURGE IN DOMESTIC AUTO SALES
10.China's retail sales rose 15.8 percent year on year to 1.13 trillion yuan (166 billion U.S. dollars) in November, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) announced on December 11. The rise was 5 percentage points lower than that of a year earlier. It was also down 0.4 percentage points from that in October, the NBS data showed. In the first 11 months, total retail sales topped 11.27 trillion yuan, up 15.3 percent year on year. The rate was 6.6 percentage points down from that of the corresponding period last year, but unchanged from the first 10 months this year. In November, urban retail sales rose 16.5 percent year on year to 760.6 billion yuan, while those in counties and sub-county areas were up 14.4 percent to 373.3 billion yuan. Retail sales grew 14.5 percent year on year for grain and edible oils in November, 24.9 percent for household electric appliances, and 61.5 percent for autos. To stimulate domestic consumption, the government put into place a series of measures, including tax cuts for auto and property purchases and introduced subsidies for home appliances in rural areas. In November, auto sales reached 1.34 million units, bringing the total sales from January to November to 12.23 million, up 42.39 percent year on year, according to the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers. -----Xinhua News Agency of December 11,2009
FIRST PHASE OF CENTRAL ASIAN GAS PIPELINE COMMISSIONED
11.President Hu Jintao commissioned on December 14,2009,a landmark pipeline to transport Turkmen natural gas to China.Hu, together with Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, President of Turkmenistan, Islam Karimov, President of Uzbekistan, and Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of Kazakhstan, turned a symbolic wheel at a refinery in Samandepe in Turkmenistan's vast Karakum desert during a ceremony that opened the pipeline to start the first gas supply flowing. The 7,000-kilometer gas pipeline first runs for 1,800 kilometers in Central Asia – snaking through Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan – before linking up with a further 5,000-plus kilometers of pipeline in China's far-west Xinjiang region. The China National Petroleum Corp will eventually import up to 40 billion cubic meters of gas a year through the pipeline when it reaches full capacity in 2012-2013.
---- “Global Times” of December 15,2009.
12.The China-Central Asia natural gas pipeline starts from the border between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, runs through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and finally ends at Horgos City in China. It is a double-line pipeline, including line A and line B. Line A passing through the Central Asian States has a length of 1,833 kilometers. It was tested and put into operation at the beginning of December 2009. According to the project's construction plans, both lines will be completed and begin transporting natural gas in 2010. After the natural gas imported from Turkmenistan reaches China, the gas will be transported to other provinces and cities including Shanghai and Guangzhou through the Line B pipeline of the west-east natural gas transportation project. This pipeline is 4,978 kilometers long, and is designed with an annual gas transportation capacity of 30 billion cubic meters. The connection between the two pipelines can guarantee China a sufficient and steady natural gas supply. When interviewed by Chinese media, Turkmenistan President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov said that Turkmenistan will offer China 40 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually for the next 30 years. The China-Central Asia natural gas pipeline and the No. 2 pipeline play important roles in optimizing the energy structure and improving the environment. It is predicted that after the No. 2 pipeline is completed and put into operation, the proportion of the natural gas consumption to primary energy consumption will rise by 1 to 2 percentage points. Compared to coal consumption, the annual 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas consumption can reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 130 million tons per year. "China can become a steady purchaser of Central Asia's oil and natural gas resources," Xia Yishan, an energy issue expert at the China Institute of International Studies believes, "As China's economy develops and the Chinese people's environmental protection sense rises, China's demand on clean energy will increase sharply." Pan Guang, Director of the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation ) Research Center under the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, believes that China's huge foreign exchange purchasing capacity and advantageous geographical position are extremely attractive to Central Asia’s natural gas exporting countries.
----“ People’s Daily Online” of December 15,2009.
CHINESE OIL COMPANY’S INTEREST IN KURDISH REGION CREATES PROBLEMS WITH BAGHDAD
13 . Sinopec Group, China's second largest oil company, said on November 23,2009, that it remained active in its efforts to bid for oilfields in Iraq despite being rebuffed in the second round of bidding. "Sinopec is still in talks with the Iraqi Government over the bid," said a source from Sinopec who declined to be named. Sinopec's offer to pay participation fees to bid for oilfields on offer in Iraq's second bidding round was rebuffed by the Iraqi Government due to Sinopec's existing deals with the Kurdish regional government, Reuters reported. In June, Sinopec agreed to buy Swiss oil explorer Addax Petroleum Corp for $7.3 billion, which had signed deals with the Kurdish authorities in northern Iraq. The source from Sinopec said the contract with Addax was not likely to affect Sinopec's other businesses in Iraq, based, as it was, on an evaluation it did before purchasing the Swiss oil company. Baghdad's refusal, however, indicated that the Addax deal clearly had a negative impact on Sinopec's effort to further tap oil reserves in Iraq. "Sinopec asked to pay the participation fee to get the data package but we refused due to the deals they have with the Kurdish regional government," Reuters quoted Sabah Abdul Kadhim, head of the legal and commercial section of the Petroleum Contracts and Licensing Directorate, as saying. "Our position is clear. We will not deal with any oil companies that sign contracts with the Kurdish authorities without the approval of the central government," Kadhim was quoted as saying. Analysts said the failure of Sinopec in its bidding effort indicates that it is still not easy for Chinese oil producers to acquire overseas oil assets when deals are intertwined with sensitive political issues. "Oil, unlike many other resources, is closely linked with national interests and political issues," said Lin Boqiang, director of the China Center for Energy Economics Research at Xiamen University. "It is still not easy for Chinese oil companies to tap overseas oil reserves when resources become intertwined with political interests," he said. Lin, however, noted that Sinopec was not likely to give up easily and was expected to continue in its efforts to bid for Iraqi oilfields to expand its upstream oil asset overseas.-----“China Daily” of November 24,2009
OVERSEAS OIL PRODUCTION OF SINOPEC UP
14.Overseas crude oil output for Sinopec would touch 17 million tonnes in its total output of 60 million tonnes for this year. The acquisition of Addax Petroleum Corp this year has boosted the company's overseas oil production to a large extent, company spokesman Huang Wensheng was quoted by the China Daily as saying. The company pumped 9.01 million tonnes crude oil last year from its 35 overseas projects in Africa, South America, the Middle East and Russia, according to Huang. The refiner wrapped up the 7.3 billion U.S. dollars purchase of the Geneva-based Addax Petroleum Corp. in August, gaining reserves in Iraq's Kurdistan and West Africa. ------ Xinhua news agency of December 12,2009
CHINA GOES AHEAD WITH MYANMAR-YUNNAN PIPELINE DESPITE LOCAL OPPOSITION
15.A delegation of the China National Petroleum Corporation arrived in Rangoon on October 29 to discuss the gas pipeline project, which is to link western Burma’s coastal area to China’s Yunnan province and the recent spate of protests against it. The delegation was to hold talks with the Myanmar authorities about technical issues regarding the controversial project, which began in mid-September amid criticism by human rights groups. The 980-kilometre pipeline is part of a 30-year natural gas purchase and sale deal CNPC sealed in December , 2008, with a consortium of the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise, South Korea’s Daewoo International, ONGC Videsh Limited and Gail (India) Limited. The strategically important pipeline, which will transmit oil and natural gas from Africa and the Middle East, will shorten the transportation distance, and will pass through the Arakan (Rakhine) State, the Magwe division, the Mandalay division and Yunnan in China. Currently it is transported by tankers through the Malacca strait to China. The consortium found commercially viable gas deposits in A-1 and A-3 offshore blocks in Myanmar, which is also known as the Shwe gas project. ------Myanmar political exiles
20-12-09
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Saturday, December 19, 2009
Friday, December 18, 2009
GUN-RUNNING FROM NORTH KOREA: A US TRAP?
B.RAMAN
A somewhat amateurish attempt to clandestinely transport a large consignment of weapons from North Korea to an as yet unknown destination has ended in the consignment, the aircraft transporting it and its crew falling into the hands of security officials from the US and Thailand, who are presently interrogating the crew and examining the consignment and its documentation.
2. The aircraft, which was transporting the consignment, has been identified as an Ilyushin 76 of a dubious background whose operators figured on the black-list of many countries either because of their poor safety standards or because of the suspicion that they were involved in gun-running. The aircraft had a crew of five of whom four were reportedly from Kazakhstan and the fifth was from Belarus.
3.The “Wall Street Journal” has quoted the AeroTransport Data Bank, an Internet service that tracks aircraft, as saying that the plane had recently been seen at airports in Podgorica, Montenegro, and Bujumbura, Burundi. According to the same paper, Russia's Interfax News Agency has cited a senior transport ministry official in Khazakstan, Radilbek Adimolda, as saying at a news conference that the detained Ilyushin-76 was previously owned by a Kazakh airline, East Wing. The plane was acquired in October by Air West Georgia. The WSJ also says that the East Wing is on the European Union's blacklist of airlines prohibited from flying in the EU because they violate global air-safety rules. According to AeroTransport Data Bank, East Wing is the successor to another Kazakh airline, GST Aero Co., which also is on the EU blacklist. The WSJ has reported that investigators at Amnesty International and other advocacy organizations have linked GST to international arms trafficking. Mr. Adimolda said the four Kazakh members of the crew were listed among East Wing's staff, but were on unpaid leave.
4.The aircraft, without any consignment on board, came to Bangkok from the United Arab Emirates on December 9. It was reportedly allowed by the Thai authorities to refuel at the Don Mueang airport in Bangkok. After refueling, it took off for Pyongyang. When it returned to Don Mueang from Pyongyang with the consignment on December 12 the Thai authorities arrested the crew and took the plane in their custody for examination of its consignment.
5. It has been reported that both during the onward and return journey the aircraft was allowed to land in a Thai military airport for refueling. This is surprising and indicates that US intelligence officials were probably already in touch with the crew before the aircraft left the UAE for Pyongyang and facilitated its refueling at the airport in Bangkok in order to lay a trap for capturing the arms consignment during the return journey. If the crew had not been co-operating with the Americans, they would have got suspicious by the ease with which they were able to get the aircraft refueled during the onward journey and avoided re-touching Bangkok during the return journey.
6. According to media reports in Thailand and South Korea, the plane was carrying about 35 tons of arms and ammunition, including surface-to-air missile parts. Though the crew have reportedly been saying that they were under the impression that the consignment consisted of oil drilling equipment and that they were not aware that it contained weapons, this is not believable. The Americans, who are closely involved in the investigation and the interrogation of the crew, must be able to find out who had ordered the consignment. The needle of suspicion points to Pakistan or Iran.
7. If it was Iran, by now, the US would have gone to town with their allegations against Teheran. The fact that they have not yet done so indicates that they are not yet certain on this. Pakistan has been clandestinely purchasing missiles and missile parts from North Korea and has been using its own aircraft as well as hired planes to transport them.
8. It is an important success for the US in its efforts to stop gun-running by North Korea, but it is unlikely to have any deterrent effect on North Korea. It will continue to look for opportunities for gun-running in order to earn foreign exchange. ( 18-12-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
A somewhat amateurish attempt to clandestinely transport a large consignment of weapons from North Korea to an as yet unknown destination has ended in the consignment, the aircraft transporting it and its crew falling into the hands of security officials from the US and Thailand, who are presently interrogating the crew and examining the consignment and its documentation.
2. The aircraft, which was transporting the consignment, has been identified as an Ilyushin 76 of a dubious background whose operators figured on the black-list of many countries either because of their poor safety standards or because of the suspicion that they were involved in gun-running. The aircraft had a crew of five of whom four were reportedly from Kazakhstan and the fifth was from Belarus.
3.The “Wall Street Journal” has quoted the AeroTransport Data Bank, an Internet service that tracks aircraft, as saying that the plane had recently been seen at airports in Podgorica, Montenegro, and Bujumbura, Burundi. According to the same paper, Russia's Interfax News Agency has cited a senior transport ministry official in Khazakstan, Radilbek Adimolda, as saying at a news conference that the detained Ilyushin-76 was previously owned by a Kazakh airline, East Wing. The plane was acquired in October by Air West Georgia. The WSJ also says that the East Wing is on the European Union's blacklist of airlines prohibited from flying in the EU because they violate global air-safety rules. According to AeroTransport Data Bank, East Wing is the successor to another Kazakh airline, GST Aero Co., which also is on the EU blacklist. The WSJ has reported that investigators at Amnesty International and other advocacy organizations have linked GST to international arms trafficking. Mr. Adimolda said the four Kazakh members of the crew were listed among East Wing's staff, but were on unpaid leave.
4.The aircraft, without any consignment on board, came to Bangkok from the United Arab Emirates on December 9. It was reportedly allowed by the Thai authorities to refuel at the Don Mueang airport in Bangkok. After refueling, it took off for Pyongyang. When it returned to Don Mueang from Pyongyang with the consignment on December 12 the Thai authorities arrested the crew and took the plane in their custody for examination of its consignment.
5. It has been reported that both during the onward and return journey the aircraft was allowed to land in a Thai military airport for refueling. This is surprising and indicates that US intelligence officials were probably already in touch with the crew before the aircraft left the UAE for Pyongyang and facilitated its refueling at the airport in Bangkok in order to lay a trap for capturing the arms consignment during the return journey. If the crew had not been co-operating with the Americans, they would have got suspicious by the ease with which they were able to get the aircraft refueled during the onward journey and avoided re-touching Bangkok during the return journey.
6. According to media reports in Thailand and South Korea, the plane was carrying about 35 tons of arms and ammunition, including surface-to-air missile parts. Though the crew have reportedly been saying that they were under the impression that the consignment consisted of oil drilling equipment and that they were not aware that it contained weapons, this is not believable. The Americans, who are closely involved in the investigation and the interrogation of the crew, must be able to find out who had ordered the consignment. The needle of suspicion points to Pakistan or Iran.
7. If it was Iran, by now, the US would have gone to town with their allegations against Teheran. The fact that they have not yet done so indicates that they are not yet certain on this. Pakistan has been clandestinely purchasing missiles and missile parts from North Korea and has been using its own aircraft as well as hired planes to transport them.
8. It is an important success for the US in its efforts to stop gun-running by North Korea, but it is unlikely to have any deterrent effect on North Korea. It will continue to look for opportunities for gun-running in order to earn foreign exchange. ( 18-12-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Thursday, December 17, 2009
PAKISTAN: WHAT NEXT?
B.RAMAN
In the wake of the Pakistani Supreme Court ruling setting aside the withdrawal of the corruption cases against about 8000 public servants and political leaders, including President Asif Ali Zardari, by Pervez Musharraf through his National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), Pakistan faces a tricky political situation, which would need careful watch. A worrisome beneficiary of this situation would be the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the various anti-India terrorist groups of Punjab known collectively as the Punjabi Taliban. If the situation is not carefully handled, it could add to the difficulties of the US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan.
2. Personally, Zardari has only two options---- either leave office in dignity after asking Bilawal Bhutto, now studying in London, to take over the responsibility for the day-to-day management of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and fight out the corruption cases against him in court or face the prospect of being forced to leave office in humiliation by a public agitation if he refuses to leave office by using his immunity against criminal investigation and prosecution.
3. It may be recalled that in her so-called political will, the late Benazir Bhutto had nominated Zardari as her successor as the leader of the party, but Zardari suggested that since Bilawal was not yet of the required age to be able to contest the elections, Zardari should only manage the affairs of the party as its acting or co- President while grooming Bilawal to ultimately take over all responsibilities relating to the party. Thus, the position today is that while Bilawal is the de jure head of the PPP, Zardari is its de facto head.
4. One has reasons to fear a creeping political confrontation between Zardari, who has been weakened beyond repair as the President of Pakistan, but continues to remain strong as the acting President of the PPP, and Yousef Raza Gilani, who has grown stronger as the Prime Minister with the tacit support of the Army, but has very little following in the party.
5. Though the PPP has a large base of support in Pakistan as a whole, its core strength comes from Sindh, which remains loyal to Zardari till now. Any open confrontation between Zardari and Gilani and any suspicion in Sindh that Gilani and the Army are acting in tandem to force the exit of Zardari through a public agitation could turn the confrontation between Zardari on the one side and Gilani and the Army on the other into a Sindhi-Punjabi confrontation. At a time when Pakistan is facing growing political violence in Balochistan due to the alienation of the Balochs and a growing jihadi violence in the tribal belt due to the alienation of the Pashtuns after the military raid into the Lal Masjid of Islamabad in July,2007, it cannot afford to have anti-Punjabi violence in Sindh. If one remembers the instances of attacks on Punjabis in Sindh after the assassination of Benazir, one will not rule out the possibility of a recrudescence of similar incidents if Zardari is sought to be humiliated by Gilani and the Army, with the support of political leaders from Punjab belonging to the Pakistan Muslim League of Nawaz Sharif, the former Prime Minister.
6. The PPP, though strong in Sindh, is not a united party. There are under the surface differences between the original Sindhi adherents of the Party, who remain loyal to the Bhutto family, and the supporters of Zardari who came into the party and allegedly captured it after Zardari married Benazir.
7. The forced exit of Zardari in humiliation could open a new Pandora's Box with the danger of a Sindhi anger against the Army further complicating the internal security situation already rendered difficult by the Baloch and Pashtun anger against the Army.
8. If the Army is wise, it would keep out of the messy political situation and avoid taking sides in the looming three-cornered political confrontation----- Zardari vs Gilani, Zardari vs Nawaz and the loyalists of Zardari vs those of Zulfiquar Ali and Benazir Bhutto.
9.If Zardari decides to leave office in dignity and asks Bilawal to take over as the de facto and the de jure President of the Party, he might still be able to retrieve the situation and prevent further political instability in Pakistan. (18-12-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
In the wake of the Pakistani Supreme Court ruling setting aside the withdrawal of the corruption cases against about 8000 public servants and political leaders, including President Asif Ali Zardari, by Pervez Musharraf through his National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), Pakistan faces a tricky political situation, which would need careful watch. A worrisome beneficiary of this situation would be the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the various anti-India terrorist groups of Punjab known collectively as the Punjabi Taliban. If the situation is not carefully handled, it could add to the difficulties of the US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan.
2. Personally, Zardari has only two options---- either leave office in dignity after asking Bilawal Bhutto, now studying in London, to take over the responsibility for the day-to-day management of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and fight out the corruption cases against him in court or face the prospect of being forced to leave office in humiliation by a public agitation if he refuses to leave office by using his immunity against criminal investigation and prosecution.
3. It may be recalled that in her so-called political will, the late Benazir Bhutto had nominated Zardari as her successor as the leader of the party, but Zardari suggested that since Bilawal was not yet of the required age to be able to contest the elections, Zardari should only manage the affairs of the party as its acting or co- President while grooming Bilawal to ultimately take over all responsibilities relating to the party. Thus, the position today is that while Bilawal is the de jure head of the PPP, Zardari is its de facto head.
4. One has reasons to fear a creeping political confrontation between Zardari, who has been weakened beyond repair as the President of Pakistan, but continues to remain strong as the acting President of the PPP, and Yousef Raza Gilani, who has grown stronger as the Prime Minister with the tacit support of the Army, but has very little following in the party.
5. Though the PPP has a large base of support in Pakistan as a whole, its core strength comes from Sindh, which remains loyal to Zardari till now. Any open confrontation between Zardari and Gilani and any suspicion in Sindh that Gilani and the Army are acting in tandem to force the exit of Zardari through a public agitation could turn the confrontation between Zardari on the one side and Gilani and the Army on the other into a Sindhi-Punjabi confrontation. At a time when Pakistan is facing growing political violence in Balochistan due to the alienation of the Balochs and a growing jihadi violence in the tribal belt due to the alienation of the Pashtuns after the military raid into the Lal Masjid of Islamabad in July,2007, it cannot afford to have anti-Punjabi violence in Sindh. If one remembers the instances of attacks on Punjabis in Sindh after the assassination of Benazir, one will not rule out the possibility of a recrudescence of similar incidents if Zardari is sought to be humiliated by Gilani and the Army, with the support of political leaders from Punjab belonging to the Pakistan Muslim League of Nawaz Sharif, the former Prime Minister.
6. The PPP, though strong in Sindh, is not a united party. There are under the surface differences between the original Sindhi adherents of the Party, who remain loyal to the Bhutto family, and the supporters of Zardari who came into the party and allegedly captured it after Zardari married Benazir.
7. The forced exit of Zardari in humiliation could open a new Pandora's Box with the danger of a Sindhi anger against the Army further complicating the internal security situation already rendered difficult by the Baloch and Pashtun anger against the Army.
8. If the Army is wise, it would keep out of the messy political situation and avoid taking sides in the looming three-cornered political confrontation----- Zardari vs Gilani, Zardari vs Nawaz and the loyalists of Zardari vs those of Zulfiquar Ali and Benazir Bhutto.
9.If Zardari decides to leave office in dignity and asks Bilawal to take over as the de facto and the de jure President of the Party, he might still be able to retrieve the situation and prevent further political instability in Pakistan. (18-12-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, December 16, 2009
ANOTHER US-CREATED MESS IN PAKISTAN
B.RAMAN
You can depend on the US to do it--- create yet another mess in Pakistan.
2. The December 16,2009, ruling of the full-bench of the Pakistan Supreme Court declaring null and void Pervez Musharraf's National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), which paved the way for the US-desired return of Benazir Bhutto and her husband Asif Ali Zardari from political exile in 2007 to participate in the elections to the National Assembly, is a slap in the face not only for Zardari, now the President of Pakistan, but also for US policy-makers, who worked behind the scenes to pressure Musharraf to issue the NRO.
3. The NRO, widely unpopular in Pakistan and seen by many as the result of US machinations to prevent the return of Nawaz Sharif to power, closed all pending corruption cases against her and Zardari to enable them to return to active political life. She promised the US that if she returned to power she would work in tandem with Musharraf in co-operating with the US in its war against terrorism in the Af-Pak region.
4. Being the cunning person that he was and still is, Musharraf made the NRO applicable --- without any US objection --- not only to Benazir and Zardari, whom the US wanted to help, but also to about 8000 other public servants and political leaders in Pakistan, who were facing corruption cases. The US shouts from the roof-top about the need for action by President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan against corruption,but became a party to the cover-up of thousands of corruption cases in Pakistan in order to facilitate the return of Benazir to power to carry out the US agenda.
5. Action against corruption in Afghanistan will be good for the fight against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. Cover-up of corruption in Pakistan will be necessary for the war against terrorism. That was the US logic and morality.
6.Commenting on the US-encouraged move for a patch-up between Musharraf and Benazir in an article of September 2,2007, titled "US PARADROP FOR A NEOBENAZIR" ( http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers24/paper2353.html ),I wrote as follows: "The much talked about US plans for a political paradrop of a neo Benazir Bhutto into Pakistan in the hope of providing the badly-needed oxygen to President General Pervez Musharraf and saving the country from Al Qaeda, the Neo Taliban and an assortment of other pro-Al Qaeda and anti-US jihadi terrorist groups is likely to create a third mess in a row for the US after the earlier two in Afghanistan and Iraq...... Sections of the US media have quoted US officials as justifying the proposed Musharraf-Benazir patch-up as the best of the bad options available. So they said, when they gave unqualified backing to Musharraf post 9/11. So they are saying now. US calculations of political stability in Pakistan under such a patch-up may be belied..... Pakistan and its nuclear arsenal need to be protected from the hands of Al Qaeda and other jihadi terrorists. Nobody can find fault with the over-all US objective, but it has been going about it in the wrong way. It should have allowed genuine democracy to take its own course, even at the risk of political forces not well disposed towards the US coming to power. Instead, by giving the impression of taking sides even before the elections and by making its ill-advised preferences known before the elections, it has given rise to the strong possibility of more instability, not less, more terrorism, not less.Even if Benazir comes to power in an election rigged by the Army,she will be seen as Pakistan's Hamid Karzai, who came to power not by the will of the people, but by riding on the shoulders of the US."
7.Things did not work out the way the US was hoping they would. Benazir was assassinated on December 27,2007, allegedly by the Pakistani Taliban then led by the late Baitullah Mehsud even before she could contest the elections. Yousef Raza Gilani, who was nominated by Zardari as the Prime Minister after the elections hoping he would be a weakling who would carry out his wishes, has proved to be a strong and cunning leader, who has quietly won the support of the Army. Musharraf could not survive in power and had to leave office and his country in total ignominy. Zardari, who succeeded Musharraf as the President much to the satisfaction of the US, finds his credibility steadily weakened. The weakening of his credibility started because of the perception that he succumbed to US pressure not to humiliate Musharraf by arresting and prosecuting him for his misdeeds and that he was quietly allowing the US drone strikes against Al Qaeda and Taliban hide-outs in the tribal areas.
8. Zardari's failure to have the NRO approved by the Parliament for want of the required majority and the latest slap in the face from the Supreme Court would further damage his credibility. The only way Zardari can survive in office is by using his immunity as the President against criminal investigation and prosecution. If he tries to do it, he is going to be a President who is constantly at the mercy of his Prime Minister and Chief of the Army Staff.
9. At a time when the State of Pakistan is reeling under the repeated blows delivered by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the form of devastating suicide attacks on soft and hard targets even in the non-tribal belt, a weakened and unpopular President will not be able to provide the kind of political leadership which Pakistan needs at this critical juncture.
10. If the US is wiser after the latest blow, it will let the democratic process take its natural course in Pakistan instead of meddling once again to shore up the position of Zardari or any other political leader. What Pakistan needs today is a political leader who can be seen by large sections of its people as owing his position to the support of his people and not to US support and as having the political will to stand up to US pressure. ( 17-12-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
You can depend on the US to do it--- create yet another mess in Pakistan.
2. The December 16,2009, ruling of the full-bench of the Pakistan Supreme Court declaring null and void Pervez Musharraf's National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), which paved the way for the US-desired return of Benazir Bhutto and her husband Asif Ali Zardari from political exile in 2007 to participate in the elections to the National Assembly, is a slap in the face not only for Zardari, now the President of Pakistan, but also for US policy-makers, who worked behind the scenes to pressure Musharraf to issue the NRO.
3. The NRO, widely unpopular in Pakistan and seen by many as the result of US machinations to prevent the return of Nawaz Sharif to power, closed all pending corruption cases against her and Zardari to enable them to return to active political life. She promised the US that if she returned to power she would work in tandem with Musharraf in co-operating with the US in its war against terrorism in the Af-Pak region.
4. Being the cunning person that he was and still is, Musharraf made the NRO applicable --- without any US objection --- not only to Benazir and Zardari, whom the US wanted to help, but also to about 8000 other public servants and political leaders in Pakistan, who were facing corruption cases. The US shouts from the roof-top about the need for action by President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan against corruption,but became a party to the cover-up of thousands of corruption cases in Pakistan in order to facilitate the return of Benazir to power to carry out the US agenda.
5. Action against corruption in Afghanistan will be good for the fight against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. Cover-up of corruption in Pakistan will be necessary for the war against terrorism. That was the US logic and morality.
6.Commenting on the US-encouraged move for a patch-up between Musharraf and Benazir in an article of September 2,2007, titled "US PARADROP FOR A NEOBENAZIR" ( http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers24/paper2353.html ),I wrote as follows: "The much talked about US plans for a political paradrop of a neo Benazir Bhutto into Pakistan in the hope of providing the badly-needed oxygen to President General Pervez Musharraf and saving the country from Al Qaeda, the Neo Taliban and an assortment of other pro-Al Qaeda and anti-US jihadi terrorist groups is likely to create a third mess in a row for the US after the earlier two in Afghanistan and Iraq...... Sections of the US media have quoted US officials as justifying the proposed Musharraf-Benazir patch-up as the best of the bad options available. So they said, when they gave unqualified backing to Musharraf post 9/11. So they are saying now. US calculations of political stability in Pakistan under such a patch-up may be belied..... Pakistan and its nuclear arsenal need to be protected from the hands of Al Qaeda and other jihadi terrorists. Nobody can find fault with the over-all US objective, but it has been going about it in the wrong way. It should have allowed genuine democracy to take its own course, even at the risk of political forces not well disposed towards the US coming to power. Instead, by giving the impression of taking sides even before the elections and by making its ill-advised preferences known before the elections, it has given rise to the strong possibility of more instability, not less, more terrorism, not less.Even if Benazir comes to power in an election rigged by the Army,she will be seen as Pakistan's Hamid Karzai, who came to power not by the will of the people, but by riding on the shoulders of the US."
7.Things did not work out the way the US was hoping they would. Benazir was assassinated on December 27,2007, allegedly by the Pakistani Taliban then led by the late Baitullah Mehsud even before she could contest the elections. Yousef Raza Gilani, who was nominated by Zardari as the Prime Minister after the elections hoping he would be a weakling who would carry out his wishes, has proved to be a strong and cunning leader, who has quietly won the support of the Army. Musharraf could not survive in power and had to leave office and his country in total ignominy. Zardari, who succeeded Musharraf as the President much to the satisfaction of the US, finds his credibility steadily weakened. The weakening of his credibility started because of the perception that he succumbed to US pressure not to humiliate Musharraf by arresting and prosecuting him for his misdeeds and that he was quietly allowing the US drone strikes against Al Qaeda and Taliban hide-outs in the tribal areas.
8. Zardari's failure to have the NRO approved by the Parliament for want of the required majority and the latest slap in the face from the Supreme Court would further damage his credibility. The only way Zardari can survive in office is by using his immunity as the President against criminal investigation and prosecution. If he tries to do it, he is going to be a President who is constantly at the mercy of his Prime Minister and Chief of the Army Staff.
9. At a time when the State of Pakistan is reeling under the repeated blows delivered by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the form of devastating suicide attacks on soft and hard targets even in the non-tribal belt, a weakened and unpopular President will not be able to provide the kind of political leadership which Pakistan needs at this critical juncture.
10. If the US is wiser after the latest blow, it will let the democratic process take its natural course in Pakistan instead of meddling once again to shore up the position of Zardari or any other political leader. What Pakistan needs today is a political leader who can be seen by large sections of its people as owing his position to the support of his people and not to US support and as having the political will to stand up to US pressure. ( 17-12-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, December 15, 2009
HEADLEY:A QUADRUPLE AGENT
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR—PAPER NO 592
B.RAMAN
Please refer to my article of December 15,2009, titled “ Headley’s Case Figures in Senate Committee” available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers36/paper3549.html .
2. A reader in the US has drawn my attention to some other references to the Headley case in the transcript of the Committee hearing. I had missed these references in my earlier article. These are annexed.
3. While forwarding these references, the reader has also made the following observations. I am not in a position to comment on his observations:
a) There have been multiple classified hearings prior to recent public revelations wherein Headley was discussed. I base this on the highlighted comment made by Senator Lieberman and by looking at the committee's calendar. It would be reasonable to infer that at least some key government elements in the US were aware of Headley's actions for a while now
(b) Also based on the same discussion, it appears that the relevant US agencies were possibly downplaying Headley's actions as only a threat outside of the US as opposed to threats to the US directly.
(c) If a well informed person like Senator Lieberman can publicly raise questions on how long Headley was being allowed to operate from the US, then so should Indian authorities.
4.In my article of November 10,2009, titled “ FBI Affidavit Against Headley: References to India” available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers35/paper3496.html I had extracted references to India from the affidavits filed by the FBI in the Chicago court. The significant extracts are again re-produced below:
On July 3, 2009, Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A sent HEADLEY an email in which Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A said, "i need to see you for some new investment plans."
On July 8, 2009, HEADLEY sent Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A an email which stated, in part: "What do you want me to do? Where are you interested in making investments?"
In another email on July 8, 2009, HEADLEY told Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A that "I think when we get a chance we should revisit our last location again and say hi to Rahul. "Following his arrest, HEADLEY acknowledged that, in this email, "Rahul" refers to a prominent Indian actor with the first name "Rahul."
Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A replied to the above email on July 8, 2009 and told HEADLEY in an email that "to see Rahul is a good idea coz have some work for you over there too. Matters are good enough to move forward...."
On July 9, 2009, HEADLEY responded: "When you say "move forward" do you mean in the North direction or towards Rahul? Also in the future if we need to meet to discuss anything, do I have to come all the way over there or can we meet somewhere in the middle like Africa or Middle East?"
The same day, Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A responded that "I mean towards Rahul."
On July 10, 2009, HEADLEY sent an email to Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A in which he stated: "I would like to know a few things if you can tell me:1) What is the status with the Northern project, is it still postponed indefinitely? 2) The visit to Rahul's place, is it for checking out real estate property like before, or something different and if so tell me what you can please. Also is it exactly in Rahul's city or different one? 3) How long do you think I will need to stay at Rahul's place to complete this task? 4) Will I have to stay there continuously for a while, or back and forth like before?"
Based on my (FBI agent's) review of this and other communications, I believe that HEADLEY had inquired of Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A whether the Denmark project was on hold, and whether the visit to India that Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A had asked him to undertake was for the purpose of surveilling targets for a new terrorist attack.
Later on July 10, 2009, Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A responded to HEADLEY's email, stating, in part, that: "There are some investment plans with me, not exactly at Rahul's city but near that. Rest we can decide when meet according to your ease".
In an email to Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A on July 16, 2009, HEADLEY stated, in part: "One very important thing I need to know please is that how long do you need me for, meaning how long should it take me to finish my work, in your opinion. And is it really urgent? Before it seemed that the Northern Project was really urgent."
After Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A responded on July 18, 2009, that "it may take somewhere between 2 to 4 weeks," HEADLEY replied on July 19, 2009, that "I think I can manage it," and that he would be available in October. He closed his email by asking "Is the Northern Investment definitely postponed for now?"
Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A and HEADLEY continued to exchange emails through late August 2009, when HEADLEY told Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A that he "will be there end of next month."
I (FBI agent) understand these emails to reflect that beginning in July 2009, Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A was placing a higher priority on using HEADLEY to assist in planning a new attack in India than on completing the planned attack in Denmark.
5. By studying these extracts submitted by the FBI along with other FBI documents submitted by the FBI to the court and US media reports about Headley’s links with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),one can make the following assessment:
(a). Headley was not a double agent, but a quadruple agent. He initially started working for the DEA around 1998. Even if one presumes that initially the FBI and the CIA were not aware of this, they should have become aware of this by 2004 when the National Counter-Terrorism Centre with a common charter and a common data-base was set up by the Bush Administration under the newly-created post of Director National Intelligence (DNI).
(b).He started working for the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) sometime in 2005. It is not clear whether he joined the LET at his own instance or at the instance of the FBI or the CIA or both in order to penetrate it. He was already visiting Pakistan at the instance of the DEA since 1998. Since 2006, he started visiting India too. The DEA and the FBI would have been aware of his visits since every time a conscious agent of an agency travels abroad his passport is scrutinized by the controlling agency on his return. This is a security precaution followed by all intelligence agencies.
( c). He started working for the 313 Brigade of Ilyas Kashmiri towards the end of 2008 and agreed to visit Copenhagen to collect operational information for a possible terrorist attack. This was probably not at the instance of the FBI, which came to know accidentally of Headley volunteering himself to undertake a task in Copenhagen while monitoring the chat room of the old students of the Army Cadet School at Hasan Abdal. Both Headley and Rana studied in the school. The FBI put Headley under electronic surveillance after obtaining orders of a relevant court.
(d). While doing the electronic surveillance to monitor his involvement in the Northern or Copenhagen or Micky Mouse project for the 313 Brigade, the FBI came across a series of E-mail intercepts in July and August,2009, which showed that Headley had helped the LET in preparing itself for the 26/11 terrorist strikes and had agreed to help the LET in carrying out another terrorist strike in India for which he was to visit India. The FBI started monitoring the meetings and conversations of Headley and Rana and recorded their conversation of September 7,2009, in a car which clearly indicated their involvement in the 26/11 terrorist strike.
(e). The communications between Headley and his LET handler intercepted by the FBI in July and August also indicated that he was planning to visit India in October to prepare the ground for another terrorist strike. The FBI had two options---either allow him to go to India, alert the Indian intelligence and keep him under surveillance or arrest him before he left for Pakistan and India. If he had been allowed to go to India, watched there and arrested by the Indian intelligence, his past contacts with the US agencies and his role in 26/11 would have come to the notice of the Indian authorities. There is no evidence so far to show that till July 2009 the FBI was aware of his active role in 26/11. They were probably only aware of his frequent visits to Pakistan and India on behalf of the DEA operations. The FBI arrested him when he was about to leave for Pakistan and India on October 3.
(f). He was also in touch with serving and retired officers of the Pakistan Army.
6. Headley’s case reflects poorly not only on the US agencies, but also on the Indian agencies. The ease with which he and Rana allegedly obtained multiple-entry business visas from Indian consular authorities despite their Pakistani origin and with which they repeatedly visited India without any alarm bell ringing in our airport immigration control shows shockingly lax immigration controls. Rana was a Canadian citizen living and working in Chicago. Was the clearance of the Indian High Commission in Ottawa obtained before issuing him a visa? Did Headley obtain the clearance of the Governments of Maharashtra and India before opening an immigration consultancy office in Mumbai? Did he inform the Income-Tax authorities? Did he obtain an income-tax clearance certificate before leaving India after each stay? (16-12-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE ( From the transcript of the hearing of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security )
LIEBERMAN: Let me ask you two questions that come off of the Headley case for me.One is it has been reported that Headley changed his name. He was a child of -- one parent was a Pakistani, one parent was American. He changed his name. His original name was Daood Gilani. And he changed it to David Headley, allegedly to reduce scrutiny by immigration and customs officials while traveling.And I wonder, just as this is a test case, what -- what can be done to try to avoid, to block this kind of name change being used as a way to avoid being on a watch list or being picked up by some other terrorist blockage system?I'm not sure who best to call on.
Mr. Heyman?
Mr. Healy?
You get my point: To what extent can an individual like this make it harder for him to be picked up, by changing his name, in this case, to an American or English sounding name?
HEALY: Chairman, it's difficult, because, first of all, I'm in a difficult position about commenting on a particular case.
LIEBERMAN: Yes, understood,.
HEALY: But it's -- I find my -- I find challenges in my particular position, because it's truly a balancing act. It's a balancing act between safeguarding civil liberties and protecting the American people.And the best we can do is just keep driving the intelligence and keep working the intelligence as much as we possibly can to try to get the information. I don't know how else you could do it.
LIEBERMAN: Anyone else have a response on that?
HEYMAN (?): I agree with -- with Tim Healy that this is a challenge. You know, those who are seeking to do harm are constantly hearing what we are doing, watching what we are doing and adapting to that.So changing names may be one thing. Changing secure documents or attempting to change documents, changing even biometrics, people do that.And so, we have to constantly be working to try to counter that through technology, through procedures, but also through additional layers, so that we're not just resting on one thing, one security solution.
LIEBERMAN: Yes. I think without making too much of a point of it, even though the Headley case presents challenges to the system or questions about it, the fact is that through quite remarkable work across law enforcement and intelligence (inaudible), he was identified, and was stopped.
And of course, we -- we do have -- though he traveled legally in and out of the country, we do have records, of course, of every time he traveled in and out, which are part of the case that's now been built against him.But with the indulgence of my colleagues, I want to ask you another question. This is a fact case. And I remember it was presented to us as a worry by one of your predecessors in the last administration at the Department of Homeland Security.
Which is the case, and this is something I know people worry about, where -- this is the dual passport issue -- someone with a Pakistani and U.K., United Kingdom, passport travels to Pakistan with his Pakistani documents and then comes to the U.S. with his British passport, and we don't have any record that he traveled to Pakistan.I don't know if that's a question without an answer, but I just give it to you because I remember that as a practical fear based on all the presence of all training camps and centers of world terrorism in the Pakistan/Afghanistan area, not particularly...
HEYMAN (?): Sir, that continues to be a concern. I was last in London in November. I had a two-hour dialogue with a variety of British officials on this particular issue. It is one in which we are looking to work out procedures.I can't tell you we've worked them out yet, but we're absolutely aware of this and -- and -- and looking at whether or not there are ways within our systems to be able to catch that.Because you're absolutely right. If the person left the U.K. under one passport...
LIEBERMAN: Right.
HEYMAN (?): ... and came back under another passport, being a dual citizen, that would be caught by the U.K. But to travel under a Pakistani passport isn't necessarily, under the current system, going to -- going to raise an alert. But they are looking at that system, and I think we all have to be cognizant of that.
LIEBERMAN: Well, I'm encouraged that you're raising the question. It's not easy to solve, but I appreciate that you're on it. Thank you
B.RAMAN
Please refer to my article of December 15,2009, titled “ Headley’s Case Figures in Senate Committee” available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers36/paper3549.html .
2. A reader in the US has drawn my attention to some other references to the Headley case in the transcript of the Committee hearing. I had missed these references in my earlier article. These are annexed.
3. While forwarding these references, the reader has also made the following observations. I am not in a position to comment on his observations:
a) There have been multiple classified hearings prior to recent public revelations wherein Headley was discussed. I base this on the highlighted comment made by Senator Lieberman and by looking at the committee's calendar. It would be reasonable to infer that at least some key government elements in the US were aware of Headley's actions for a while now
(b) Also based on the same discussion, it appears that the relevant US agencies were possibly downplaying Headley's actions as only a threat outside of the US as opposed to threats to the US directly.
(c) If a well informed person like Senator Lieberman can publicly raise questions on how long Headley was being allowed to operate from the US, then so should Indian authorities.
4.In my article of November 10,2009, titled “ FBI Affidavit Against Headley: References to India” available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers35/paper3496.html I had extracted references to India from the affidavits filed by the FBI in the Chicago court. The significant extracts are again re-produced below:
On July 3, 2009, Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A sent HEADLEY an email in which Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A said, "i need to see you for some new investment plans."
On July 8, 2009, HEADLEY sent Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A an email which stated, in part: "What do you want me to do? Where are you interested in making investments?"
In another email on July 8, 2009, HEADLEY told Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A that "I think when we get a chance we should revisit our last location again and say hi to Rahul. "Following his arrest, HEADLEY acknowledged that, in this email, "Rahul" refers to a prominent Indian actor with the first name "Rahul."
Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A replied to the above email on July 8, 2009 and told HEADLEY in an email that "to see Rahul is a good idea coz have some work for you over there too. Matters are good enough to move forward...."
On July 9, 2009, HEADLEY responded: "When you say "move forward" do you mean in the North direction or towards Rahul? Also in the future if we need to meet to discuss anything, do I have to come all the way over there or can we meet somewhere in the middle like Africa or Middle East?"
The same day, Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A responded that "I mean towards Rahul."
On July 10, 2009, HEADLEY sent an email to Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A in which he stated: "I would like to know a few things if you can tell me:1) What is the status with the Northern project, is it still postponed indefinitely? 2) The visit to Rahul's place, is it for checking out real estate property like before, or something different and if so tell me what you can please. Also is it exactly in Rahul's city or different one? 3) How long do you think I will need to stay at Rahul's place to complete this task? 4) Will I have to stay there continuously for a while, or back and forth like before?"
Based on my (FBI agent's) review of this and other communications, I believe that HEADLEY had inquired of Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A whether the Denmark project was on hold, and whether the visit to India that Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A had asked him to undertake was for the purpose of surveilling targets for a new terrorist attack.
Later on July 10, 2009, Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A responded to HEADLEY's email, stating, in part, that: "There are some investment plans with me, not exactly at Rahul's city but near that. Rest we can decide when meet according to your ease".
In an email to Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A on July 16, 2009, HEADLEY stated, in part: "One very important thing I need to know please is that how long do you need me for, meaning how long should it take me to finish my work, in your opinion. And is it really urgent? Before it seemed that the Northern Project was really urgent."
After Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A responded on July 18, 2009, that "it may take somewhere between 2 to 4 weeks," HEADLEY replied on July 19, 2009, that "I think I can manage it," and that he would be available in October. He closed his email by asking "Is the Northern Investment definitely postponed for now?"
Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A and HEADLEY continued to exchange emails through late August 2009, when HEADLEY told Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A that he "will be there end of next month."
I (FBI agent) understand these emails to reflect that beginning in July 2009, Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A was placing a higher priority on using HEADLEY to assist in planning a new attack in India than on completing the planned attack in Denmark.
5. By studying these extracts submitted by the FBI along with other FBI documents submitted by the FBI to the court and US media reports about Headley’s links with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),one can make the following assessment:
(a). Headley was not a double agent, but a quadruple agent. He initially started working for the DEA around 1998. Even if one presumes that initially the FBI and the CIA were not aware of this, they should have become aware of this by 2004 when the National Counter-Terrorism Centre with a common charter and a common data-base was set up by the Bush Administration under the newly-created post of Director National Intelligence (DNI).
(b).He started working for the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) sometime in 2005. It is not clear whether he joined the LET at his own instance or at the instance of the FBI or the CIA or both in order to penetrate it. He was already visiting Pakistan at the instance of the DEA since 1998. Since 2006, he started visiting India too. The DEA and the FBI would have been aware of his visits since every time a conscious agent of an agency travels abroad his passport is scrutinized by the controlling agency on his return. This is a security precaution followed by all intelligence agencies.
( c). He started working for the 313 Brigade of Ilyas Kashmiri towards the end of 2008 and agreed to visit Copenhagen to collect operational information for a possible terrorist attack. This was probably not at the instance of the FBI, which came to know accidentally of Headley volunteering himself to undertake a task in Copenhagen while monitoring the chat room of the old students of the Army Cadet School at Hasan Abdal. Both Headley and Rana studied in the school. The FBI put Headley under electronic surveillance after obtaining orders of a relevant court.
(d). While doing the electronic surveillance to monitor his involvement in the Northern or Copenhagen or Micky Mouse project for the 313 Brigade, the FBI came across a series of E-mail intercepts in July and August,2009, which showed that Headley had helped the LET in preparing itself for the 26/11 terrorist strikes and had agreed to help the LET in carrying out another terrorist strike in India for which he was to visit India. The FBI started monitoring the meetings and conversations of Headley and Rana and recorded their conversation of September 7,2009, in a car which clearly indicated their involvement in the 26/11 terrorist strike.
(e). The communications between Headley and his LET handler intercepted by the FBI in July and August also indicated that he was planning to visit India in October to prepare the ground for another terrorist strike. The FBI had two options---either allow him to go to India, alert the Indian intelligence and keep him under surveillance or arrest him before he left for Pakistan and India. If he had been allowed to go to India, watched there and arrested by the Indian intelligence, his past contacts with the US agencies and his role in 26/11 would have come to the notice of the Indian authorities. There is no evidence so far to show that till July 2009 the FBI was aware of his active role in 26/11. They were probably only aware of his frequent visits to Pakistan and India on behalf of the DEA operations. The FBI arrested him when he was about to leave for Pakistan and India on October 3.
(f). He was also in touch with serving and retired officers of the Pakistan Army.
6. Headley’s case reflects poorly not only on the US agencies, but also on the Indian agencies. The ease with which he and Rana allegedly obtained multiple-entry business visas from Indian consular authorities despite their Pakistani origin and with which they repeatedly visited India without any alarm bell ringing in our airport immigration control shows shockingly lax immigration controls. Rana was a Canadian citizen living and working in Chicago. Was the clearance of the Indian High Commission in Ottawa obtained before issuing him a visa? Did Headley obtain the clearance of the Governments of Maharashtra and India before opening an immigration consultancy office in Mumbai? Did he inform the Income-Tax authorities? Did he obtain an income-tax clearance certificate before leaving India after each stay? (16-12-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE ( From the transcript of the hearing of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security )
LIEBERMAN: Let me ask you two questions that come off of the Headley case for me.One is it has been reported that Headley changed his name. He was a child of -- one parent was a Pakistani, one parent was American. He changed his name. His original name was Daood Gilani. And he changed it to David Headley, allegedly to reduce scrutiny by immigration and customs officials while traveling.And I wonder, just as this is a test case, what -- what can be done to try to avoid, to block this kind of name change being used as a way to avoid being on a watch list or being picked up by some other terrorist blockage system?I'm not sure who best to call on.
Mr. Heyman?
Mr. Healy?
You get my point: To what extent can an individual like this make it harder for him to be picked up, by changing his name, in this case, to an American or English sounding name?
HEALY: Chairman, it's difficult, because, first of all, I'm in a difficult position about commenting on a particular case.
LIEBERMAN: Yes, understood,.
HEALY: But it's -- I find my -- I find challenges in my particular position, because it's truly a balancing act. It's a balancing act between safeguarding civil liberties and protecting the American people.And the best we can do is just keep driving the intelligence and keep working the intelligence as much as we possibly can to try to get the information. I don't know how else you could do it.
LIEBERMAN: Anyone else have a response on that?
HEYMAN (?): I agree with -- with Tim Healy that this is a challenge. You know, those who are seeking to do harm are constantly hearing what we are doing, watching what we are doing and adapting to that.So changing names may be one thing. Changing secure documents or attempting to change documents, changing even biometrics, people do that.And so, we have to constantly be working to try to counter that through technology, through procedures, but also through additional layers, so that we're not just resting on one thing, one security solution.
LIEBERMAN: Yes. I think without making too much of a point of it, even though the Headley case presents challenges to the system or questions about it, the fact is that through quite remarkable work across law enforcement and intelligence (inaudible), he was identified, and was stopped.
And of course, we -- we do have -- though he traveled legally in and out of the country, we do have records, of course, of every time he traveled in and out, which are part of the case that's now been built against him.But with the indulgence of my colleagues, I want to ask you another question. This is a fact case. And I remember it was presented to us as a worry by one of your predecessors in the last administration at the Department of Homeland Security.
Which is the case, and this is something I know people worry about, where -- this is the dual passport issue -- someone with a Pakistani and U.K., United Kingdom, passport travels to Pakistan with his Pakistani documents and then comes to the U.S. with his British passport, and we don't have any record that he traveled to Pakistan.I don't know if that's a question without an answer, but I just give it to you because I remember that as a practical fear based on all the presence of all training camps and centers of world terrorism in the Pakistan/Afghanistan area, not particularly...
HEYMAN (?): Sir, that continues to be a concern. I was last in London in November. I had a two-hour dialogue with a variety of British officials on this particular issue. It is one in which we are looking to work out procedures.I can't tell you we've worked them out yet, but we're absolutely aware of this and -- and -- and looking at whether or not there are ways within our systems to be able to catch that.Because you're absolutely right. If the person left the U.K. under one passport...
LIEBERMAN: Right.
HEYMAN (?): ... and came back under another passport, being a dual citizen, that would be caught by the U.K. But to travel under a Pakistani passport isn't necessarily, under the current system, going to -- going to raise an alert. But they are looking at that system, and I think we all have to be cognizant of that.
LIEBERMAN: Well, I'm encouraged that you're raising the question. It's not easy to solve, but I appreciate that you're on it. Thank you
Monday, December 14, 2009
THE HEADLEY--RANA CASE: MORE Q & A
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR—PAPER NO.591
B.RAMAN
Q: There is a growing demand in India that the Indian investigators should be allowed independent access to David Coleman Headley, the Chicago-based American member of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), who had visited India five times before 26/11 to collect pre-attack operational information for the LET. Will the FBI continue to resist this demand?
A: Any professional intelligence or investigation agency will, if it is worth its salt. Deniability is an important operational principle followed by all intelligence agencies. Once an intelligence agency grants free access to another agency to one of its sensitive sources, deniability is gone. The Intelligence Bureau will not grant the Research & Analysis Wing free access to any of its sensitive sources and vice versa. It is unrealistic to expect that any US agency---whether the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the FBI --- will grant to their Indian counterparts free access to Headley, since it has clearly come out that he was a conscious agent of the DEA at least since 1998.
Q: How about Tahawwur Hussain Rana, the other member of the LET’s Chicago cell?
A: His case seems to be qualitatively different. Firstly, whereas Rana’s lawyers have been fighting for a bail for him, Headley’s lawyers have not sought bail for him. Headley and his lawyers seem to have reconciled themselves to his being in custody till January 12 when a decision on the “status of his trial” is expected to be taken by the court. Secondly, the latest report on the various charges against Headley filed by the FBI before the court on December 7 is called the Criminal Information Report. In that report, there is no reference to any pending or proposed trial against him. As against this, the latest report filed before the court by the FBI on December 14 opposing the grant of bail to Rana says “ further support of the motion to detain defendant Rana pending trial.” From this, it is evident that while a decision has been taken to have a formal trial against Rana, no such decision has yet been taken against Headley.
Q: What does this indicate?
A: While the FBI has been handling Headley’s case cautiously since he was an agent of the DEA, it does not feel the need for such caution in the case of Rana. This is probably because Rana was not an agent of any US agency. It is also interesting to note that while the FBI had details of Headley’s pre-26/11 visits to India, it has not so far given any indication in the documents produced before the court that it was aware of Rana’s visits to India. Whatever details have appeared in the Indian media about Rana’s visits to India, have come from Indian and not US sources. This would indicate that since Headley was a source of the DEA, the FBI, through the DEA, was aware of his visits to India. Since Rana was probably not a source of any agency, no US agency was aware of his travels to India.
Q: Since Rana does not appear to have been an agent of any US agency, will the FBI allow Indian interrogators to question him?
A: Possibly, provided he is questioned in the presence of FBI officers and the questions are vetted by them and the court allows it.
Q: Is a similar procedure possible in the case of Headley?
A: Seems difficult.
Q: The US intelligence was reported to have alerted the Indian intelligence in September,2008, about the likelihood of a sea-borne terrorist attack by the LET on the hotels. Could this information have come from Headley?
A: Difficult to say. If Headley had conveyed this information to the US intelligence, he should have also told them that the LET had also targeted the Nariman House. Neither the Indian intelligence nor the Israeli agencies would appear to have been warned by the US intelligence about a likely attack on the Nariman House. At that time, George Bush was still in office. His administration had close relations with Israel. Israel would have been immediately alerted. It was apparently not. How would one explain the fact that the US intelligence was aware of the intended attack on the hotels but not of the planned attack on the Nariman House? My own suspicion is that the US warning of September 2008, came from technical intercepts or other sources in Pakistan and not from Headley.
Q: What is the most interesting part of the report filed by the FBI in the court on December 14 opposing bail to Rana?
A: Even in the earlier affidavit filed by the FBI against Rana, it was somewhat evident that the first incriminating conversation between Headley and Rana regarding future operations of the LET in India took place during a joint car drive by the two on September 7,2009. The latest report confirms it. It says: “On September 7, 2009, Headley and Rana took a long car ride and discussed several topics. This conversation was recorded. During their conversation, Headley and Rana discussed the attacks that occurred in November 2008 in Mumbai, India, in which approximately 170 people were killed. It is clear from the conversation and extrinsic corroboration that Rana was told just days before the Mumbai attacks that the attacks were about to happen.” This conversation while moving in a car could not have been recorded through telephonic or E-mail intercepts. This could have been recorded only by planting a secret recording device in the car without the knowledge of either Headley or Rana or by the FBI using Headley to pose leading questions to Rana and recording his replies without Rana’s knowledge. Neither in the affidavit filed against Headley nor in that filed against Rana after their arrest in October, was their any reference to their role in respect of 26/11. The only reference was to their agreed role in a future strike. The FBI knew about their role in 26/11 at least since September 7,2009, if not earlier. Why this was kept out of the affidavits filed initially? ( 15-12-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
Q: There is a growing demand in India that the Indian investigators should be allowed independent access to David Coleman Headley, the Chicago-based American member of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), who had visited India five times before 26/11 to collect pre-attack operational information for the LET. Will the FBI continue to resist this demand?
A: Any professional intelligence or investigation agency will, if it is worth its salt. Deniability is an important operational principle followed by all intelligence agencies. Once an intelligence agency grants free access to another agency to one of its sensitive sources, deniability is gone. The Intelligence Bureau will not grant the Research & Analysis Wing free access to any of its sensitive sources and vice versa. It is unrealistic to expect that any US agency---whether the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the FBI --- will grant to their Indian counterparts free access to Headley, since it has clearly come out that he was a conscious agent of the DEA at least since 1998.
Q: How about Tahawwur Hussain Rana, the other member of the LET’s Chicago cell?
A: His case seems to be qualitatively different. Firstly, whereas Rana’s lawyers have been fighting for a bail for him, Headley’s lawyers have not sought bail for him. Headley and his lawyers seem to have reconciled themselves to his being in custody till January 12 when a decision on the “status of his trial” is expected to be taken by the court. Secondly, the latest report on the various charges against Headley filed by the FBI before the court on December 7 is called the Criminal Information Report. In that report, there is no reference to any pending or proposed trial against him. As against this, the latest report filed before the court by the FBI on December 14 opposing the grant of bail to Rana says “ further support of the motion to detain defendant Rana pending trial.” From this, it is evident that while a decision has been taken to have a formal trial against Rana, no such decision has yet been taken against Headley.
Q: What does this indicate?
A: While the FBI has been handling Headley’s case cautiously since he was an agent of the DEA, it does not feel the need for such caution in the case of Rana. This is probably because Rana was not an agent of any US agency. It is also interesting to note that while the FBI had details of Headley’s pre-26/11 visits to India, it has not so far given any indication in the documents produced before the court that it was aware of Rana’s visits to India. Whatever details have appeared in the Indian media about Rana’s visits to India, have come from Indian and not US sources. This would indicate that since Headley was a source of the DEA, the FBI, through the DEA, was aware of his visits to India. Since Rana was probably not a source of any agency, no US agency was aware of his travels to India.
Q: Since Rana does not appear to have been an agent of any US agency, will the FBI allow Indian interrogators to question him?
A: Possibly, provided he is questioned in the presence of FBI officers and the questions are vetted by them and the court allows it.
Q: Is a similar procedure possible in the case of Headley?
A: Seems difficult.
Q: The US intelligence was reported to have alerted the Indian intelligence in September,2008, about the likelihood of a sea-borne terrorist attack by the LET on the hotels. Could this information have come from Headley?
A: Difficult to say. If Headley had conveyed this information to the US intelligence, he should have also told them that the LET had also targeted the Nariman House. Neither the Indian intelligence nor the Israeli agencies would appear to have been warned by the US intelligence about a likely attack on the Nariman House. At that time, George Bush was still in office. His administration had close relations with Israel. Israel would have been immediately alerted. It was apparently not. How would one explain the fact that the US intelligence was aware of the intended attack on the hotels but not of the planned attack on the Nariman House? My own suspicion is that the US warning of September 2008, came from technical intercepts or other sources in Pakistan and not from Headley.
Q: What is the most interesting part of the report filed by the FBI in the court on December 14 opposing bail to Rana?
A: Even in the earlier affidavit filed by the FBI against Rana, it was somewhat evident that the first incriminating conversation between Headley and Rana regarding future operations of the LET in India took place during a joint car drive by the two on September 7,2009. The latest report confirms it. It says: “On September 7, 2009, Headley and Rana took a long car ride and discussed several topics. This conversation was recorded. During their conversation, Headley and Rana discussed the attacks that occurred in November 2008 in Mumbai, India, in which approximately 170 people were killed. It is clear from the conversation and extrinsic corroboration that Rana was told just days before the Mumbai attacks that the attacks were about to happen.” This conversation while moving in a car could not have been recorded through telephonic or E-mail intercepts. This could have been recorded only by planting a secret recording device in the car without the knowledge of either Headley or Rana or by the FBI using Headley to pose leading questions to Rana and recording his replies without Rana’s knowledge. Neither in the affidavit filed against Headley nor in that filed against Rana after their arrest in October, was their any reference to their role in respect of 26/11. The only reference was to their agreed role in a future strike. The FBI knew about their role in 26/11 at least since September 7,2009, if not earlier. Why this was kept out of the affidavits filed initially? ( 15-12-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
HEADLEY'S CASE FIGURES IN SENATE COMMITTEE
B.RAMAN
On December 9,2009, the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee of the US Senate held a hearing on the subject "Five Years After the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA): Stopping Terrorist Travel". Though the hearing was not specifically related to the frequent travels of David Coleman Headley of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) to India before the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai and his role in allegedly collecting operational information about the various targets which the LET intended attacking, there was a reference in passing to his travels to India before 26/11 and his role.
2. In his prepared introductory remarks, Joseph Lieberman, the co-Chairman of the Committee, said: "In the months leading up to 9/11, we know that the system was “blinking red,” as then CIA Director George Tenet famously put it. The system, however, was not set up to share that information among the different federal agencies involved in a timely manner. We now have the ability to leverage the terrorist watchlist and its integrated connections with other government databases to block the accidental entry into the country of anybody suspected of participating in terrorism. We must also share information on terrorists and other criminals with our partners overseas. This is why I insisted that information-sharing agreements be mandatory for participation in the Visa Waiver Program. I am told that 13 of the 35 visa waiver nations have entered into agreements to share biometric law enforcement and terrorist watch list data with us – and the United States will be sharing the same types of information on a reciprocal basis to these nations. As a stark reminder of the urgency of these international agreements, this week an American citizen, David Headley, was charged in federal court with six counts of conspiracy to bomb public places in India, to murder and maim persons in India and Denmark, to provide material support to foreign terrorist plots, and to provide material support to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and six counts of aiding and abetting the murder of U.S. citizens in India. Headley is alleged to have made five trips to Mumbai from 2006 to 2008 to conduct pre-attack planning and surveillance for LeT of many of the targets that were struck in the November 2008 Mumbai attacks. Because Headley was an U.S. citizen, his travel likely did not raise suspicions, and he was able to use the United States as a base of operations while helping to plan one of the most significant terrorist attacks in Indian history. Although it is not clear at this point whether Mr. Headley’s travel raised flags within the U.S. government, this case underscores the need to implement these international agreements as quickly as possible and make sure that all 35 visa waiver nations and other nations with a common interest in preventing acts of terrorism eventually participate in similar agreements."
3.David Heyman, Assistant Secretary For Homeland Security, who testified before the committee on various measures taken by his Department to monitor travels by terrorist suspects, said the circumstances surrounding the Headley investigation were changing the way authorities were looking at potential suspects. He added: "We can no longer assume that Americans are not involved in terrorism.As indicated by the recent indictments, we also see the nexus of travel in those who may get further indoctrinated abroad. This is a challenge.Those who are seeking to do harm are constantly hearing what we are doing, watching what we are doing, and adapting to that. So changing names may be one thing. Changing secure documents. Changing even biometrics."
4. Beyond these cursory remarks, there was no detailed discussion on the ease with which Headley was travelling to Pakistan and India and whether any of the US agencies had noticed this and raised an alarm over it. There was also no reference to reports carried by sections of the US media alleging that Headley was working as an informant of the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) since at least 1998.
5. There were also no questions during the hearing as to whether there were any arrangements between the Governments of India and the US for the exchange of information regarding travels of terrorist suspects between the two countries. (14-12-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
On December 9,2009, the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee of the US Senate held a hearing on the subject "Five Years After the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA): Stopping Terrorist Travel". Though the hearing was not specifically related to the frequent travels of David Coleman Headley of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) to India before the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai and his role in allegedly collecting operational information about the various targets which the LET intended attacking, there was a reference in passing to his travels to India before 26/11 and his role.
2. In his prepared introductory remarks, Joseph Lieberman, the co-Chairman of the Committee, said: "In the months leading up to 9/11, we know that the system was “blinking red,” as then CIA Director George Tenet famously put it. The system, however, was not set up to share that information among the different federal agencies involved in a timely manner. We now have the ability to leverage the terrorist watchlist and its integrated connections with other government databases to block the accidental entry into the country of anybody suspected of participating in terrorism. We must also share information on terrorists and other criminals with our partners overseas. This is why I insisted that information-sharing agreements be mandatory for participation in the Visa Waiver Program. I am told that 13 of the 35 visa waiver nations have entered into agreements to share biometric law enforcement and terrorist watch list data with us – and the United States will be sharing the same types of information on a reciprocal basis to these nations. As a stark reminder of the urgency of these international agreements, this week an American citizen, David Headley, was charged in federal court with six counts of conspiracy to bomb public places in India, to murder and maim persons in India and Denmark, to provide material support to foreign terrorist plots, and to provide material support to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and six counts of aiding and abetting the murder of U.S. citizens in India. Headley is alleged to have made five trips to Mumbai from 2006 to 2008 to conduct pre-attack planning and surveillance for LeT of many of the targets that were struck in the November 2008 Mumbai attacks. Because Headley was an U.S. citizen, his travel likely did not raise suspicions, and he was able to use the United States as a base of operations while helping to plan one of the most significant terrorist attacks in Indian history. Although it is not clear at this point whether Mr. Headley’s travel raised flags within the U.S. government, this case underscores the need to implement these international agreements as quickly as possible and make sure that all 35 visa waiver nations and other nations with a common interest in preventing acts of terrorism eventually participate in similar agreements."
3.David Heyman, Assistant Secretary For Homeland Security, who testified before the committee on various measures taken by his Department to monitor travels by terrorist suspects, said the circumstances surrounding the Headley investigation were changing the way authorities were looking at potential suspects. He added: "We can no longer assume that Americans are not involved in terrorism.As indicated by the recent indictments, we also see the nexus of travel in those who may get further indoctrinated abroad. This is a challenge.Those who are seeking to do harm are constantly hearing what we are doing, watching what we are doing, and adapting to that. So changing names may be one thing. Changing secure documents. Changing even biometrics."
4. Beyond these cursory remarks, there was no detailed discussion on the ease with which Headley was travelling to Pakistan and India and whether any of the US agencies had noticed this and raised an alarm over it. There was also no reference to reports carried by sections of the US media alleging that Headley was working as an informant of the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) since at least 1998.
5. There were also no questions during the hearing as to whether there were any arrangements between the Governments of India and the US for the exchange of information regarding travels of terrorist suspects between the two countries. (14-12-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
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