Tuesday, November 24, 2009
26/11:QUESTIONS THAT NEED TO BE POSED & ANSWERED
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO 581
B.RAMAN
The 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai left many important questions unanswered, if not unposed.
What kind of intelligence was available----from the Indian as well as foreign agencies?
How and by whom were the reports analysed, assessed and disseminated?
Were the gaps in the available intelligence identified and was action taken to fill those gaps?
What follow-up action was taken on the available intelligence----however inadequate it might have been?
What action was taken to strengthen physical security----- hotel and coastal security---- in Mumbai keeping in view the fact that the available intelligence---even if general and not specific--- spoke of likely sea-borne attacks on hotels, the Taj Mahal Hotel being one of them?
Who co-ordinated the physical security measures in the Governments of India and Maharashtra?
Some media reports immediately after the attack had quoted a senior executive in the Taj Mahal Hotel as saying that security was strengthened in the hotel for some days before the attack, but was subsequently down-graded. Who took the decision to down-grade physical security? On what basis?
Who co-ordinated the investigation after the terrorist attacks? What was the role of the Government of India in the co-ordination?
Were the foreigners, who escaped from the custody of the terrorists, debriefed thoroughly after they were rescued before they were allowed to go back to their countries? Who debriefed them? Were the debriefings recorded in writing? Where are those notes kept?If they were not debriefed, why? Was their being allowed to leave India without being debriefed due to negligence or was it the result of a conscious decision? If so, who took that decision?
Was a detailed reconstruction of the terrorist attacks made? Who made that reconstruction? What were the conclusions of that reconstruction?
On what basis did the police come to the conclusion that apart from the 10 Pakistani terrorists who came by sea from Pakistan, no other Pakistani accomplice was involved on the ground in Mumbai?
On what basis did the police come to the conclusion that apart from the two Indian Muslims arrested and prosecuted, there was no involvement of any other Indian Muslim?
On what basis did the police come to the conclusion that there was no evidence of any pre-9/11 reccee of the places attacked by the LET or its accomplices?
Did the police seize the guest registers of the hotels attacked, make out a list of persons of Pakistani origin who had stayed there in the months preceding the attacks and verify their background? If so, did the name of David Colemn Headley, who had reportedly stayed twice in the Taj Mahal Hotel, figure in that list? The fact that the Mumbai Police became aware of Headley's stay in the hotel only after they were tipped off by the FBI recently show that the registers were either not scrutinised or were scrutinised superficially.
Did the police seize the immigration records of the Mumbai airport to check the particulars of persons of Pakistani origin who had arrived in the days preceding the attacks and left in the hours following the attacks?
Were the investigators able to get any evidence beyond the confession of Kasab, the lone terrorist captured alive?
2. 26/11 in Mumbai was the most well-planned, well-organised and well-executed terrorist attack since 9/11 in the US. The National Commission appointed in the US made a detailed enquiry into the sins of commission and omission, which made 9/11 possible. Its report was debated in the US Congress and made available to the public. The relatives of US citizens killed by the 9/11 terrorist strikes mobilised themselves to ensure that there would be no cover-up, that the truth would be brought out and that follow-up action would be taken to identify and remove the deficiencies in the intelligence and physical security agencies.
3.The Government of India, by taking advantage of the apathy and confusion in the Bharatiya Janata Party, (BJP), has skilfully avoided any enquiry into the 26/11 terrorist attacks and diverted public attention away from its sins of commission and omission. The Government of Maharashtra did appoint an enquiry committee headed by S.D.Pradhan, former Home Secretary, but its report has been classified and not shared with the legislattive assembly and the public on the unconvincing ground that releasing it could affect the ongoing prosecution.
4.The relatives of the security forces officers and civilians, who were killed by the terrorists, should emulate the relatives of those killed on 9/11 in the US, mobilise themselves and campaign for the constitution of a national commission to enquire into the terrorist strikes.
5. Kavita Karkare, the widow of Hemant Karkare, the brave head of the anti-terrorism squad of the Maharashtra Police who was brutally killed by the terrorists, should take the lead in the matter.
6. I had known Hemant personally. I met him for the first time at a seminar in Bangalore in February last year. I subsequently met him again in Jaipur in May last year after the explosions caused by the Indian Mujahideen. We were in telephonic contact with each other off and on. He never failed to return my calls-----whether they were professional or personal. He was an extremely sincere officer who, like the other officers killed by the terrorists, sacrificed his life in the fight against terrorism. Their sacrifice and the sacrifice of the civilians who were killed should not be allowed to go in vain. (24-11-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
B.RAMAN
The 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai left many important questions unanswered, if not unposed.
What kind of intelligence was available----from the Indian as well as foreign agencies?
How and by whom were the reports analysed, assessed and disseminated?
Were the gaps in the available intelligence identified and was action taken to fill those gaps?
What follow-up action was taken on the available intelligence----however inadequate it might have been?
What action was taken to strengthen physical security----- hotel and coastal security---- in Mumbai keeping in view the fact that the available intelligence---even if general and not specific--- spoke of likely sea-borne attacks on hotels, the Taj Mahal Hotel being one of them?
Who co-ordinated the physical security measures in the Governments of India and Maharashtra?
Some media reports immediately after the attack had quoted a senior executive in the Taj Mahal Hotel as saying that security was strengthened in the hotel for some days before the attack, but was subsequently down-graded. Who took the decision to down-grade physical security? On what basis?
Who co-ordinated the investigation after the terrorist attacks? What was the role of the Government of India in the co-ordination?
Were the foreigners, who escaped from the custody of the terrorists, debriefed thoroughly after they were rescued before they were allowed to go back to their countries? Who debriefed them? Were the debriefings recorded in writing? Where are those notes kept?If they were not debriefed, why? Was their being allowed to leave India without being debriefed due to negligence or was it the result of a conscious decision? If so, who took that decision?
Was a detailed reconstruction of the terrorist attacks made? Who made that reconstruction? What were the conclusions of that reconstruction?
On what basis did the police come to the conclusion that apart from the 10 Pakistani terrorists who came by sea from Pakistan, no other Pakistani accomplice was involved on the ground in Mumbai?
On what basis did the police come to the conclusion that apart from the two Indian Muslims arrested and prosecuted, there was no involvement of any other Indian Muslim?
On what basis did the police come to the conclusion that there was no evidence of any pre-9/11 reccee of the places attacked by the LET or its accomplices?
Did the police seize the guest registers of the hotels attacked, make out a list of persons of Pakistani origin who had stayed there in the months preceding the attacks and verify their background? If so, did the name of David Colemn Headley, who had reportedly stayed twice in the Taj Mahal Hotel, figure in that list? The fact that the Mumbai Police became aware of Headley's stay in the hotel only after they were tipped off by the FBI recently show that the registers were either not scrutinised or were scrutinised superficially.
Did the police seize the immigration records of the Mumbai airport to check the particulars of persons of Pakistani origin who had arrived in the days preceding the attacks and left in the hours following the attacks?
Were the investigators able to get any evidence beyond the confession of Kasab, the lone terrorist captured alive?
2. 26/11 in Mumbai was the most well-planned, well-organised and well-executed terrorist attack since 9/11 in the US. The National Commission appointed in the US made a detailed enquiry into the sins of commission and omission, which made 9/11 possible. Its report was debated in the US Congress and made available to the public. The relatives of US citizens killed by the 9/11 terrorist strikes mobilised themselves to ensure that there would be no cover-up, that the truth would be brought out and that follow-up action would be taken to identify and remove the deficiencies in the intelligence and physical security agencies.
3.The Government of India, by taking advantage of the apathy and confusion in the Bharatiya Janata Party, (BJP), has skilfully avoided any enquiry into the 26/11 terrorist attacks and diverted public attention away from its sins of commission and omission. The Government of Maharashtra did appoint an enquiry committee headed by S.D.Pradhan, former Home Secretary, but its report has been classified and not shared with the legislattive assembly and the public on the unconvincing ground that releasing it could affect the ongoing prosecution.
4.The relatives of the security forces officers and civilians, who were killed by the terrorists, should emulate the relatives of those killed on 9/11 in the US, mobilise themselves and campaign for the constitution of a national commission to enquire into the terrorist strikes.
5. Kavita Karkare, the widow of Hemant Karkare, the brave head of the anti-terrorism squad of the Maharashtra Police who was brutally killed by the terrorists, should take the lead in the matter.
6. I had known Hemant personally. I met him for the first time at a seminar in Bangalore in February last year. I subsequently met him again in Jaipur in May last year after the explosions caused by the Indian Mujahideen. We were in telephonic contact with each other off and on. He never failed to return my calls-----whether they were professional or personal. He was an extremely sincere officer who, like the other officers killed by the terrorists, sacrificed his life in the fight against terrorism. Their sacrifice and the sacrifice of the civilians who were killed should not be allowed to go in vain. (24-11-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
Monday, November 23, 2009
INDIA, A TRADITIONAL PARTNER OF AFGHANISTAN
B.RAMAN
( Written at the request of an Italian journal)
Historically, India has had close relations with the rulers of Afghanistan and its people as well as with the Pashtuns on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border. The Pashtuns of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan under the leadership of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, known as the Frontier Gandhi, fought hand in hand with the Indian National Congress led by Mahatma Gandhi against the British colonial rule for the independence of a united India. The Frontier Gandhi, a secularist Muslim, was opposed to the creation of Pakistan as demanded by the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) of Mohammad Ali Jinnah. In 1947, when India and Pakistan became independent, the Pashtun movement of Frontier Gandhi had to reconcile itself to the creation of Pakistan against its will, but started a movement for an independent Pashtunistan, which was ruthlessly crushed by the Pakistani authorities.
2. The Indian National Congress led by Mahatma Gandhi maintained cordial relations with the rulers and different ethnic groups of Afghanistan. These relations established long before India and Pakistan became independent, continued after India became independent. The ruthless suppression of the Pashtun nationalist movement, which enjoyed the support of the Pashtuns of Afghanistan, by the Pakistani rulers with the help of their Army, antagonized the people and the rulers of Afghanistan and made them look up to India for support and assistance. They looked upon Pakistan as an adversary of the Afghan people and India as their natural ally.
3. Because of poverty and lack of resources, education was ill-developed in Afghanistan. Those wanting higher education and in a position to afford it had to go to India, Pakistan or the Soviet Union. Those, who came to India, studied in its secular educational institutions and went back as enlightened members of the Afghan civil society. Hamid Karzai, who was recently re-elected as the President of Afghanistan, is a good example of the Indian contribution to the development of an enlightened component in the Afghan civil society. He is a product of the Indian educational system. He studied in Shimla.
4. Many of those, who went to Pakistan, studied in its madrasas and were influenced by the fundamentalist/Wahabi ideas taught there. If the Indian educational system produced the likes of Karzai, who sought to take Afghanistan forward into the modern age, the Pakistani madrasa system produced the likes of Mulla Mohammad Omar, the Amir of the Afghan Taliban, who sought to take Afghanistan back into the middle ages by imposing on it a Wahabised Islam alien to Afghan culture.
5. Those educated in the Soviet Union returned home hardened communists, who played a role in the governance of the country in the 1980s and facilitated the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The communists stand discredited after the Afghan Mujahideen defeated them and their Soviet supporters. They have been practically eliminated from the Afghan political and social scene.
6. Between 1992 and 2001, when the victorious Afghan Mujahideen (1992-96) and the Taliban (1996-2001) were in power in Kabul, attempts were made to eliminate, at the instance of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the enlightened elements, which were products of the Indian educational system, and looked up to India for inspiration. The madrasa-educated elements from Pakistan assumed the leadership of the Afghan civil society and sought to convert Afghanistan into a medieval society. These elements looked up for inspiration to the madrasa products of Pakistan such as the late Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai of the Binori madrasa of Karachi, Maulana Fazlur Rehman of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema Islam (JUI) Pakistan, Maulana Samiul Haq of a rival faction of the JUI and others of the same Wahabi kind.
7. These elements provided hospitality to Al Qaeda and its leaders and encouraged the mushrooming of a myriad jihadi terrorist organizations, which called for a jihad against modern values and the West. The Western Governments, which had trained the Afghan Mujahideen through the ISI in the madrasas and the training camps of Pakistan in the 1980s to use them against the Soviet Union and its troops in Afghanistan, looked on without the least concern as these Wahabised elements took over the leadership of Afghanistan. The Taliban was created by the ISI in 1994 with the blessings of the US which was hoping that a Taliban-led Government would give the Unocal, the US oil company, the right to construct oil and gas pipelines from Turkmenistan to Pakistan via Afghan territory.
8. The short-sighted policy of the US set in motion the train of events which led to the emergence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda as Frankenstein’s monsters and the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US homeland. The only Afghan force, which confronted the Taliban between 1996 and 2001, was the Northern Alliance led by the late Ahmed Shah Masood. It represented the enlightened component of the Afghan society, but was shunned by the US and other Western countries, who found greater strategic value in the Wahabised Taliban.
9. It goes to the credit of the political leadership of India and Russia that they realized the importance of helping the Northern Alliance in its efforts to counter the Taliban in order to preserve and encourage the enlightened component of the Afghan society. India and Russia----separately and jointly—provided training and other assistance to the Northern Alliance. It was this Alliance, that made possible the success of the US-led forces in having the Taliban Government defeated under Operation Enduring Freedom post-October 2001.
10.The goodwill traditionally enjoyed by India in the enlightened sections of the Afghan society made them and the new Government headed by Hamid Karzai look up to India once again for assistance in the creation of a new, pluralistic, democratic and enlightened Afghanistan. India has willingly come forward to assist them.
11. Since 2002, India has extended to Afghanistan assistance worth more than US $ 1.2 billion. This assistance has gone into projects such as the following:
(a).The construction of a 218 km road from Zaranj to Delaram in the Nimroz province in Southern Afghanistan.
(b). The construction of a 220 KV Transmission Line from Pul-e-Khumri to Kabul together with a sub-station in Chimtala.
( c ). The construction of Afghanistan's new Parliament building.
(d). A Graduate Programme under which about 650 young Afghan men and women are provided scholarships annually for studying in Indian universities.
(e). The upgrading of the skills of Afghan civil servants and technical people by training 650 of them annually in Indian institutions in subjects such as auditing, accountancy, agriculture extension, rural development, power sector management etc.
(f). Financial assistance for Indian NGOs working in Afghanistan. An Indian women’s organization called SEWA, the Self Employment Women’s Association – works with the Afghan Ministry of Women’s Affairs on providing war widows, orphans and other destitute women with skills they can use to generate an income depending entirely on their own household resources. The Confederation of Indian Industry has a skills development programme – in areas such as plumbing, automobile repairs, carpentry, masonry etc. for school dropouts. Another NGO called Hand in Hand has been providing skills to the rural poor and organizing them in self-help groups for saving, entrepreneurship and job creation.
12. About 4000 Indians are working in Afghanistan in the various projects. In July,2009, the two countries decided to establish an India-Afghanistan Partnership Council, that will be composed of separate groups on political consultation, capacity development and education, power and water, culture, trade and industry, health, and agriculture.
13. These are projects and initiatives undertaken for the welfare of the Afghan people, for their economic development and for strengthening democracy in Afghanistan. The benefits of these projects have been welcomed by the Afghan Government and people. India’s role in Afghanistan since 2002 has been in the fields of democracy-promotion, economic development and upgradation of the quality of education and technical skills. The funds allotted for the upgradation of educational qualifications has been increased by 35 per cent this year.
14. Pakistan has been concerned over the popularity of the Indian programmes. It is worried that the strengthening of the role and influence of the enlightened sections of the Afghan society as a result of the Indian-aided programmes might make it difficult for the Taliban, its creation, to stage a come-back in Afghanistan. It continues to look upon the Taliban as its only strategic asset in Afghanistan and is hoping that the exit of the US-led NATO forces from Afghanistan due to a war fatigue might enable it to stage a come-back in Afghanistan behind the Taliban.
15. It has, therefore, embarked on a three-pronged strategy consisting of the following:
(a). Giving the Taliban leadership sanctuary in Pakistani territory from where they can organize their operations against the NATO forces. The command and control of the Afghan Taliban is located in Pakistani territory. The “Washington Times” recently reported that American intelligence experts believe that this command and control, which was till recently located in the Quetta area of Balochistan, has been shifted to Karachi to escape attacks by American pilotless planes (Drones).
(b).Making allegations of Indian attempts to destabilize Pakistan from Afghan territory and exercising pressure on the US to make India reduce its activities in Afghanistan as a quid pro quo for Pakistani co-operation against Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
( c ). Attempts to intimidate India and the Indian personnel in Afghanistan by sponsoring terrorist attacks on the Indian Embassy in Kabul by the Taliban and the Jalalludin Haqqani group, which operates from North Waziristan.
16. Despite two terrorist attacks on the Indian Embassy, India and Indian personnel have refused to be intimidated by Pakistan. Unfortunately, some American experts have wittingly or unwillingly given legitimacy to the baseless allegations of Pakistan without realizing the machinations of Pakistan to pave the way for the return of the Taliban to power either on its own through a military victory over the US-led NATO forces or as part of a coalition with Western-backed elements. If Pakistan succeeds in its machinations, it will take the world back to the pre-9/11 period and nullify whatever gains that have been made by the US in its fight against Al Qaeda, the Taliban and other jihadi terrorist organizations allied to them.
17. India wishes well to the US in its campaign against the jihadi terrorists inspired and led by Al Qaeda operating from sanctuaries in the Af-Pak region. The success of the US campaign will benefit India too, which has been the victim of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism of various hues for three decades. It will also prevent the possibility of the terrorists getting hold of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and using it elsewhere.
18. If another 9/11, or Madrid or London or Mumbai or Bali is to be prevented, the US-led NATO forces have to succeed in the Af-Pak region. What stands in the way of their success is Pakistan’s complicity with the Taliban and other terrorist groups and inaction against Al Qaeda. India’s contribution to the fight against jihadi terrorism in the Af-Pak region is not through participation in the fighting on the ground but through imaginative initiatives in the schools, colleges, work places and among the people of Afghanistan in order to preserve the gains being made by the enlightened sections of the Afghan society.
19. The Indian initiatives in Afghanistan are making an important contribution to the ideological fight against the medieval forces. Their success is as important, if not more important, as the success of the NATO’s military actions. Pakistan should not be allowed to undermine the Indian initiatives.
20.The dilemma posed by the worrisome ground situation in Afghanistan is reflected in the growing impression that President Barack Obama's Af-Pak strategy has failed to take off and is unlikely to take off and that the time has come to think of a new strategy. Presently, the political pressure is on Pakistan to act against the Taliban and Al Qaeda elements operating from sanctuaries in its territory and on the Hamid Karzai Government in Kabul to improve governance, reduce corruption and pay better attention to the problems of the people in the areas controlled by the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the US-led Western forces. Neither of these pressures has worked. Nor have the never-ending incentives offered by the US to Pakistan in the form of increased civil and military assistance.
21.The pressures on Karzai to improve governance have not worked either. This is partly due to the difficult ground situation, which would pose a dilemma to any ruler---however democratic and however competent. Moreover, instead of strengthening the position of Karzai, US officials have done everything to weaken his credibility in the eyes of his own people as well as the international community through allegations---some true, many unwisely inspired--- regarding his inability or unwillingness to act against corruption and narcotics production and rigging in the recent Presidential elections. The importance of Karzai’s victory in the elections has been diluted by these allegations. US officials take a lot of care not to say or do anything, which might weaken the position of the Pakistani leadership, but they do not take similar care in respect of Karzai.
22.The crux of the dilemma being faced by the US-led Western forces is similar to the dilemma which the Soviet troops faced in Afghanistan in the 1980s before they decided to quit in 1988.This dilemma arose in the case of the Soviet troops and has now arisen in the case of the US-led Western troops from the absence of a counter-sanctuaries component to the counter-insurgency strategy.
23.The reluctance of the Soviet troops to take their fighting to the sanctuaries of the Afghan Mujahideen in Pakistani territory led to a situation where the Soviet troops kept bleeding till battle fatigue and public disenchantment with the war set in. Similarly, the absence of an effective counter-sanctuaries component is leading to a situation where the US and other Western forces as well as the ANA are bleeding more and more. There are already the incipient signs of a battle fatigue. One could see the beginning of a public disenchantment with the involvement in Afghanistan. This disenchantment is already pronounced in West Europe and Canada and one could see the beginning of it even in the US. Instead of allowing the Taliban to infiltrate in increasing numbers from its sanctuaries and recruiting grounds in the FATA and the Pashtun majority areas of Balochistan and then fighting or countering their ambushes in Afghan territory, the US should take its counter-insurgency operations to the camps of the Afghan Taliban in adjoining Pakistani territory----whether in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) or in Balochistan. If the reports that the ISI has shifted the Taliban leadership to Karachi prove correct, the US should discontinue its military aid to Pakistan.
24.Any new Af-Pak strategy has to focus on the following questions: How to strengthen the governance of Karzai and the capacity of the Afghan National Army to counter the Taliban on its own? How to stop the Pakistani collusion with the Taliban while seeming to co-operate with the West? How to eliminate the sanctuaries of Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistani territory? Unless satisfactory answers to these questions are found and implemented, the situation in Afghanistan is unlikely to improve. (23-11-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies. He is the author of five books---- “Intelligence---Past,Present & Future”, “ A Terrorist State As a Frontline Ally”, “The Kaoboys of R&AW ---Down Memory Lane”, “Terrorism---Yesterday, Today & Tomorrow” and “Mumbai—26/11: A Day of Infamy”. All of them have been published by the Lancer Publishers of New Delhi. He was a member of the National Security Advisory Board of the Government of India from 2000 to 2002 and of the Special Task Force set up by the Government of India in 2000 to revamp the Indian intelligence agencies . E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
( Written at the request of an Italian journal)
Historically, India has had close relations with the rulers of Afghanistan and its people as well as with the Pashtuns on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border. The Pashtuns of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan under the leadership of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, known as the Frontier Gandhi, fought hand in hand with the Indian National Congress led by Mahatma Gandhi against the British colonial rule for the independence of a united India. The Frontier Gandhi, a secularist Muslim, was opposed to the creation of Pakistan as demanded by the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) of Mohammad Ali Jinnah. In 1947, when India and Pakistan became independent, the Pashtun movement of Frontier Gandhi had to reconcile itself to the creation of Pakistan against its will, but started a movement for an independent Pashtunistan, which was ruthlessly crushed by the Pakistani authorities.
2. The Indian National Congress led by Mahatma Gandhi maintained cordial relations with the rulers and different ethnic groups of Afghanistan. These relations established long before India and Pakistan became independent, continued after India became independent. The ruthless suppression of the Pashtun nationalist movement, which enjoyed the support of the Pashtuns of Afghanistan, by the Pakistani rulers with the help of their Army, antagonized the people and the rulers of Afghanistan and made them look up to India for support and assistance. They looked upon Pakistan as an adversary of the Afghan people and India as their natural ally.
3. Because of poverty and lack of resources, education was ill-developed in Afghanistan. Those wanting higher education and in a position to afford it had to go to India, Pakistan or the Soviet Union. Those, who came to India, studied in its secular educational institutions and went back as enlightened members of the Afghan civil society. Hamid Karzai, who was recently re-elected as the President of Afghanistan, is a good example of the Indian contribution to the development of an enlightened component in the Afghan civil society. He is a product of the Indian educational system. He studied in Shimla.
4. Many of those, who went to Pakistan, studied in its madrasas and were influenced by the fundamentalist/Wahabi ideas taught there. If the Indian educational system produced the likes of Karzai, who sought to take Afghanistan forward into the modern age, the Pakistani madrasa system produced the likes of Mulla Mohammad Omar, the Amir of the Afghan Taliban, who sought to take Afghanistan back into the middle ages by imposing on it a Wahabised Islam alien to Afghan culture.
5. Those educated in the Soviet Union returned home hardened communists, who played a role in the governance of the country in the 1980s and facilitated the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The communists stand discredited after the Afghan Mujahideen defeated them and their Soviet supporters. They have been practically eliminated from the Afghan political and social scene.
6. Between 1992 and 2001, when the victorious Afghan Mujahideen (1992-96) and the Taliban (1996-2001) were in power in Kabul, attempts were made to eliminate, at the instance of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the enlightened elements, which were products of the Indian educational system, and looked up to India for inspiration. The madrasa-educated elements from Pakistan assumed the leadership of the Afghan civil society and sought to convert Afghanistan into a medieval society. These elements looked up for inspiration to the madrasa products of Pakistan such as the late Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai of the Binori madrasa of Karachi, Maulana Fazlur Rehman of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema Islam (JUI) Pakistan, Maulana Samiul Haq of a rival faction of the JUI and others of the same Wahabi kind.
7. These elements provided hospitality to Al Qaeda and its leaders and encouraged the mushrooming of a myriad jihadi terrorist organizations, which called for a jihad against modern values and the West. The Western Governments, which had trained the Afghan Mujahideen through the ISI in the madrasas and the training camps of Pakistan in the 1980s to use them against the Soviet Union and its troops in Afghanistan, looked on without the least concern as these Wahabised elements took over the leadership of Afghanistan. The Taliban was created by the ISI in 1994 with the blessings of the US which was hoping that a Taliban-led Government would give the Unocal, the US oil company, the right to construct oil and gas pipelines from Turkmenistan to Pakistan via Afghan territory.
8. The short-sighted policy of the US set in motion the train of events which led to the emergence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda as Frankenstein’s monsters and the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US homeland. The only Afghan force, which confronted the Taliban between 1996 and 2001, was the Northern Alliance led by the late Ahmed Shah Masood. It represented the enlightened component of the Afghan society, but was shunned by the US and other Western countries, who found greater strategic value in the Wahabised Taliban.
9. It goes to the credit of the political leadership of India and Russia that they realized the importance of helping the Northern Alliance in its efforts to counter the Taliban in order to preserve and encourage the enlightened component of the Afghan society. India and Russia----separately and jointly—provided training and other assistance to the Northern Alliance. It was this Alliance, that made possible the success of the US-led forces in having the Taliban Government defeated under Operation Enduring Freedom post-October 2001.
10.The goodwill traditionally enjoyed by India in the enlightened sections of the Afghan society made them and the new Government headed by Hamid Karzai look up to India once again for assistance in the creation of a new, pluralistic, democratic and enlightened Afghanistan. India has willingly come forward to assist them.
11. Since 2002, India has extended to Afghanistan assistance worth more than US $ 1.2 billion. This assistance has gone into projects such as the following:
(a).The construction of a 218 km road from Zaranj to Delaram in the Nimroz province in Southern Afghanistan.
(b). The construction of a 220 KV Transmission Line from Pul-e-Khumri to Kabul together with a sub-station in Chimtala.
( c ). The construction of Afghanistan's new Parliament building.
(d). A Graduate Programme under which about 650 young Afghan men and women are provided scholarships annually for studying in Indian universities.
(e). The upgrading of the skills of Afghan civil servants and technical people by training 650 of them annually in Indian institutions in subjects such as auditing, accountancy, agriculture extension, rural development, power sector management etc.
(f). Financial assistance for Indian NGOs working in Afghanistan. An Indian women’s organization called SEWA, the Self Employment Women’s Association – works with the Afghan Ministry of Women’s Affairs on providing war widows, orphans and other destitute women with skills they can use to generate an income depending entirely on their own household resources. The Confederation of Indian Industry has a skills development programme – in areas such as plumbing, automobile repairs, carpentry, masonry etc. for school dropouts. Another NGO called Hand in Hand has been providing skills to the rural poor and organizing them in self-help groups for saving, entrepreneurship and job creation.
12. About 4000 Indians are working in Afghanistan in the various projects. In July,2009, the two countries decided to establish an India-Afghanistan Partnership Council, that will be composed of separate groups on political consultation, capacity development and education, power and water, culture, trade and industry, health, and agriculture.
13. These are projects and initiatives undertaken for the welfare of the Afghan people, for their economic development and for strengthening democracy in Afghanistan. The benefits of these projects have been welcomed by the Afghan Government and people. India’s role in Afghanistan since 2002 has been in the fields of democracy-promotion, economic development and upgradation of the quality of education and technical skills. The funds allotted for the upgradation of educational qualifications has been increased by 35 per cent this year.
14. Pakistan has been concerned over the popularity of the Indian programmes. It is worried that the strengthening of the role and influence of the enlightened sections of the Afghan society as a result of the Indian-aided programmes might make it difficult for the Taliban, its creation, to stage a come-back in Afghanistan. It continues to look upon the Taliban as its only strategic asset in Afghanistan and is hoping that the exit of the US-led NATO forces from Afghanistan due to a war fatigue might enable it to stage a come-back in Afghanistan behind the Taliban.
15. It has, therefore, embarked on a three-pronged strategy consisting of the following:
(a). Giving the Taliban leadership sanctuary in Pakistani territory from where they can organize their operations against the NATO forces. The command and control of the Afghan Taliban is located in Pakistani territory. The “Washington Times” recently reported that American intelligence experts believe that this command and control, which was till recently located in the Quetta area of Balochistan, has been shifted to Karachi to escape attacks by American pilotless planes (Drones).
(b).Making allegations of Indian attempts to destabilize Pakistan from Afghan territory and exercising pressure on the US to make India reduce its activities in Afghanistan as a quid pro quo for Pakistani co-operation against Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
( c ). Attempts to intimidate India and the Indian personnel in Afghanistan by sponsoring terrorist attacks on the Indian Embassy in Kabul by the Taliban and the Jalalludin Haqqani group, which operates from North Waziristan.
16. Despite two terrorist attacks on the Indian Embassy, India and Indian personnel have refused to be intimidated by Pakistan. Unfortunately, some American experts have wittingly or unwillingly given legitimacy to the baseless allegations of Pakistan without realizing the machinations of Pakistan to pave the way for the return of the Taliban to power either on its own through a military victory over the US-led NATO forces or as part of a coalition with Western-backed elements. If Pakistan succeeds in its machinations, it will take the world back to the pre-9/11 period and nullify whatever gains that have been made by the US in its fight against Al Qaeda, the Taliban and other jihadi terrorist organizations allied to them.
17. India wishes well to the US in its campaign against the jihadi terrorists inspired and led by Al Qaeda operating from sanctuaries in the Af-Pak region. The success of the US campaign will benefit India too, which has been the victim of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism of various hues for three decades. It will also prevent the possibility of the terrorists getting hold of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and using it elsewhere.
18. If another 9/11, or Madrid or London or Mumbai or Bali is to be prevented, the US-led NATO forces have to succeed in the Af-Pak region. What stands in the way of their success is Pakistan’s complicity with the Taliban and other terrorist groups and inaction against Al Qaeda. India’s contribution to the fight against jihadi terrorism in the Af-Pak region is not through participation in the fighting on the ground but through imaginative initiatives in the schools, colleges, work places and among the people of Afghanistan in order to preserve the gains being made by the enlightened sections of the Afghan society.
19. The Indian initiatives in Afghanistan are making an important contribution to the ideological fight against the medieval forces. Their success is as important, if not more important, as the success of the NATO’s military actions. Pakistan should not be allowed to undermine the Indian initiatives.
20.The dilemma posed by the worrisome ground situation in Afghanistan is reflected in the growing impression that President Barack Obama's Af-Pak strategy has failed to take off and is unlikely to take off and that the time has come to think of a new strategy. Presently, the political pressure is on Pakistan to act against the Taliban and Al Qaeda elements operating from sanctuaries in its territory and on the Hamid Karzai Government in Kabul to improve governance, reduce corruption and pay better attention to the problems of the people in the areas controlled by the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the US-led Western forces. Neither of these pressures has worked. Nor have the never-ending incentives offered by the US to Pakistan in the form of increased civil and military assistance.
21.The pressures on Karzai to improve governance have not worked either. This is partly due to the difficult ground situation, which would pose a dilemma to any ruler---however democratic and however competent. Moreover, instead of strengthening the position of Karzai, US officials have done everything to weaken his credibility in the eyes of his own people as well as the international community through allegations---some true, many unwisely inspired--- regarding his inability or unwillingness to act against corruption and narcotics production and rigging in the recent Presidential elections. The importance of Karzai’s victory in the elections has been diluted by these allegations. US officials take a lot of care not to say or do anything, which might weaken the position of the Pakistani leadership, but they do not take similar care in respect of Karzai.
22.The crux of the dilemma being faced by the US-led Western forces is similar to the dilemma which the Soviet troops faced in Afghanistan in the 1980s before they decided to quit in 1988.This dilemma arose in the case of the Soviet troops and has now arisen in the case of the US-led Western troops from the absence of a counter-sanctuaries component to the counter-insurgency strategy.
23.The reluctance of the Soviet troops to take their fighting to the sanctuaries of the Afghan Mujahideen in Pakistani territory led to a situation where the Soviet troops kept bleeding till battle fatigue and public disenchantment with the war set in. Similarly, the absence of an effective counter-sanctuaries component is leading to a situation where the US and other Western forces as well as the ANA are bleeding more and more. There are already the incipient signs of a battle fatigue. One could see the beginning of a public disenchantment with the involvement in Afghanistan. This disenchantment is already pronounced in West Europe and Canada and one could see the beginning of it even in the US. Instead of allowing the Taliban to infiltrate in increasing numbers from its sanctuaries and recruiting grounds in the FATA and the Pashtun majority areas of Balochistan and then fighting or countering their ambushes in Afghan territory, the US should take its counter-insurgency operations to the camps of the Afghan Taliban in adjoining Pakistani territory----whether in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) or in Balochistan. If the reports that the ISI has shifted the Taliban leadership to Karachi prove correct, the US should discontinue its military aid to Pakistan.
24.Any new Af-Pak strategy has to focus on the following questions: How to strengthen the governance of Karzai and the capacity of the Afghan National Army to counter the Taliban on its own? How to stop the Pakistani collusion with the Taliban while seeming to co-operate with the West? How to eliminate the sanctuaries of Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistani territory? Unless satisfactory answers to these questions are found and implemented, the situation in Afghanistan is unlikely to improve. (23-11-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies. He is the author of five books---- “Intelligence---Past,Present & Future”, “ A Terrorist State As a Frontline Ally”, “The Kaoboys of R&AW ---Down Memory Lane”, “Terrorism---Yesterday, Today & Tomorrow” and “Mumbai—26/11: A Day of Infamy”. All of them have been published by the Lancer Publishers of New Delhi. He was a member of the National Security Advisory Board of the Government of India from 2000 to 2002 and of the Special Task Force set up by the Government of India in 2000 to revamp the Indian intelligence agencies . E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
Sunday, November 22, 2009
MADINA TRADING COMPANY,PART OF A BIGGER CONSPIRACY
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO. 580
B.RAMAN
On June 12,2009, US and Italian investigators arrested some persons on a charge of stealing phone services from phone companies around the world and using the illegal profits thus earned for funding terrorism.
2. They were accused of hacking phone lines and selling the phone services thus illegally obtained through call centers and via phone cards. It was stated by the invesigators that many of the phone calls were made over lines owned by the AT&T Corp. While the AT&T was not hacked, 12 million minutes of its phone services valued at $55 million were allegedly stolen by the arrested persons.
3.The three hackers, who were indicted by a grand jury of New Jersey in the US on June 12,2009, were residents of the Philippines. They were accused by the invesigators of helping the Madina Trading Company of Brescia, Italy, in obtaining stolen phone lines for providing stolen phone services to the customers of the company in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The "Wall Street Journal" reported on June 13,2009, that the Madina Trading Company, which paid the three hackers, also 'financed the communications of the terrorists" in the Mumbai 26/11 attacks.
4. According to the U.S. indictment, Mahmoud Nusier, 40, Paul Michael Kwan, 27, and Nancy Gomez, 24, residing in the Philippines, conspired to break into the phone systems of 2,500 entities in the U.S., Canada, Australia and Europe. The three hackers were arrested by the Philippines Police last year, but were released on bail. On getting information of their hacking into the phone systems of American companies, US authorities took up the investigation and have sought their extradition from the Filippino authorities. It is not known what action has been taken by the Filippino authorities on the extradition request from their US counterparts. The "Wall Street Journal" reported that the Filippino authorities alleged that Nusier, a Jordanian national, had links with Al Qaeda.
5. The Italian Police arrested on June 12,2009,five Pakistani nationals during raids on 10 call centers suspected of involvement in the alleged conspiracy. Among those arrested were a husband-and-wife team who managed call centers in Brescia, Italy -- Mohammad Zamir, 40 years old, and Shabina Kanwal, 38. The indictment filed in the New Jersey court alleged that the Madina Trading Company is owned by one of the call-center operators involved in the alleged conspiracy. However,the owner of the company was not named.
6. Two employees of the same Madina Trading Company in Brescia ---- 60-year-old Mohammad Yaqub Janijua and his son 31-year-old Aamer Yaqub Janijua----- who were managing the company were arrested by the Italian authorities on November 21,2009, on a charge of aiding and abetting international terrorism as well as illegal financial activity.
7. According to Stefano Fonzi, the head of the anti-terrorism police of Brescia, on November 25,2008, they sent money using a stolen identity to a U.S. company to activate an Internet phone account used by the terrorists involved in the 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai.The funds were transferred under the identity of another Pakistani who had never been to Italy and was not involved in the attacks, Fonzi said. His identity was probably stolen when he used another money transfer agency in Pakistan.The order to open the account that allowed the attackers to communicate during the attack came from two men in Pakistan. The Italian Police said the identities of these Pakistanis had been intimated to the Pakistani authorities.
8.The transfer of the money by the Mumbai conspirators through the Madina Trading Company had come to the notice of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Indian authorities shortly after the 26/11 attacks, but the manager of the company and his son could not be arrested immediately by the Italian authorities as they had fled Italy----reportedly to Pakistan. They were arrested when they returned to Italy. If it is correct that they had fled to Pakistan, it is not clear why they were not arrested by the Pakistani authorities.
9.The investigation into the activities of the Madina Trading Company bring out the involvement of members of the Pakistani diaspora in the West in the sale of stolen phone services and the use of such companies by terrorist organisations based in Pakistan such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET). These organisations seem to have an up-to-date database of Pakistani-owned or run companies which could be used for facilitating terrorist attacks. (22-11-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
On June 12,2009, US and Italian investigators arrested some persons on a charge of stealing phone services from phone companies around the world and using the illegal profits thus earned for funding terrorism.
2. They were accused of hacking phone lines and selling the phone services thus illegally obtained through call centers and via phone cards. It was stated by the invesigators that many of the phone calls were made over lines owned by the AT&T Corp. While the AT&T was not hacked, 12 million minutes of its phone services valued at $55 million were allegedly stolen by the arrested persons.
3.The three hackers, who were indicted by a grand jury of New Jersey in the US on June 12,2009, were residents of the Philippines. They were accused by the invesigators of helping the Madina Trading Company of Brescia, Italy, in obtaining stolen phone lines for providing stolen phone services to the customers of the company in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The "Wall Street Journal" reported on June 13,2009, that the Madina Trading Company, which paid the three hackers, also 'financed the communications of the terrorists" in the Mumbai 26/11 attacks.
4. According to the U.S. indictment, Mahmoud Nusier, 40, Paul Michael Kwan, 27, and Nancy Gomez, 24, residing in the Philippines, conspired to break into the phone systems of 2,500 entities in the U.S., Canada, Australia and Europe. The three hackers were arrested by the Philippines Police last year, but were released on bail. On getting information of their hacking into the phone systems of American companies, US authorities took up the investigation and have sought their extradition from the Filippino authorities. It is not known what action has been taken by the Filippino authorities on the extradition request from their US counterparts. The "Wall Street Journal" reported that the Filippino authorities alleged that Nusier, a Jordanian national, had links with Al Qaeda.
5. The Italian Police arrested on June 12,2009,five Pakistani nationals during raids on 10 call centers suspected of involvement in the alleged conspiracy. Among those arrested were a husband-and-wife team who managed call centers in Brescia, Italy -- Mohammad Zamir, 40 years old, and Shabina Kanwal, 38. The indictment filed in the New Jersey court alleged that the Madina Trading Company is owned by one of the call-center operators involved in the alleged conspiracy. However,the owner of the company was not named.
6. Two employees of the same Madina Trading Company in Brescia ---- 60-year-old Mohammad Yaqub Janijua and his son 31-year-old Aamer Yaqub Janijua----- who were managing the company were arrested by the Italian authorities on November 21,2009, on a charge of aiding and abetting international terrorism as well as illegal financial activity.
7. According to Stefano Fonzi, the head of the anti-terrorism police of Brescia, on November 25,2008, they sent money using a stolen identity to a U.S. company to activate an Internet phone account used by the terrorists involved in the 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai.The funds were transferred under the identity of another Pakistani who had never been to Italy and was not involved in the attacks, Fonzi said. His identity was probably stolen when he used another money transfer agency in Pakistan.The order to open the account that allowed the attackers to communicate during the attack came from two men in Pakistan. The Italian Police said the identities of these Pakistanis had been intimated to the Pakistani authorities.
8.The transfer of the money by the Mumbai conspirators through the Madina Trading Company had come to the notice of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Indian authorities shortly after the 26/11 attacks, but the manager of the company and his son could not be arrested immediately by the Italian authorities as they had fled Italy----reportedly to Pakistan. They were arrested when they returned to Italy. If it is correct that they had fled to Pakistan, it is not clear why they were not arrested by the Pakistani authorities.
9.The investigation into the activities of the Madina Trading Company bring out the involvement of members of the Pakistani diaspora in the West in the sale of stolen phone services and the use of such companies by terrorist organisations based in Pakistan such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET). These organisations seem to have an up-to-date database of Pakistani-owned or run companies which could be used for facilitating terrorist attacks. (22-11-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, November 20, 2009
HEADLEY--RANA CASE : NEED FOR CAUTION
B.RAMAN
The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) of the Government of India is reported to have entrusted the newly-created National Intelligence Agency (NIA) with the task of follow-up investigation into the presence, travels and activities of David Coleman Headley, an American national of Chicago, and Tawahuur Hussain Rana, a Canadian national resident in Chicago, in India since 2006 and after the terrorist attack of 26/11 in Mumbai by 10 Pakistani members of the Lashksar-e-Toiba (LET).
2. Preliminary investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation between October,2008, and October 2,2009, brought out their suspected links with the LET. It also brought out that they were part of a conspiracy sought to be orchestrated from Pakistan to carry out a terrorist attack against a Danish journal, which had published cartoons of the Prophet in 2005, and a new terrorist strike in India by the LET. Both of them are of Pakistani origin.
3. Acting on preliminary evidence, which consisted largely of technical intercepts of the telephone and E-mail communications of the two, the FBI had arrested Headley on October 3,2009 and Rana on October 16,2009. According to the affidavits filed by the FBI in a Chicago court, Headley has waived his right against self-incrimination and has been talking voluntarily to the FBI interrogators.
4. The affidavits, which are available to the public, contain only that evidence which justified the decision to arrest and interrogate them. Evidence obtained during the still on-going interrogation, which would be necessary to prosecute them, has not been disclosed to the public. As and when one phase of the interrogation is over, evidence obtained during that phase is being put in a sealed cover and deposited with the court to enable the court to decide on the FBI's applications for further detention of the two suspects.
5. The FBI will be interrogating them from two angles---- their plans for future terrorist strikes and their activities in India before and after 26/11 in order to see whether they had any role in the terrorist attacks of 26/11 in which US nationals were among the foreigners killed.
6. While the US law and courts may not come in the way of the FBI sharing with India and Denmark information obtained during the interrogation which would enable the Indian and Danish Police to prevent future attacks, the FBI may not have a free hand at present in sharing with India any evidence pertaining to their role, if any, in the 26/11 terrorist attacks.
7.Any information obtained by the FBI relating to 26/11 from the two suspects has to be got verified by the FBI though the Indian NIA. For that purpose, the FBI will have to share even this information with the NIA. From its side, the FBI has taken care to see that none of the information being disclosed by the suspects during the interrogation leaks to the media and the public. The US media, which is more responsible than the Indian media, has refrained from publishing speculative stories relating to their interrogation so that the suspects continue to speak voluntarily to their interrogators.
8. Many sections of the Indian media have not been observing such restraint. There has been frenzied speculation and some journalists----in their attempts to sound more credible than others---- are even claiming to have obtained their information from "FBI sources", which one finds it difficult to believe.
9. If this kind of ill-advised speculation continues, it may come in the way of the FBI being able to share with India all the information that comes to its notice about the past and the future. The Government should caution its officials against talking to the media about the progress of the investigation and also issue an advisory to the media against frenzied speculation, which could be exploited by the lawyers of the two suspects to argue that the sharing of the information by the FBI with the Indian agencies might affect the legal rights of their clients. (21-11-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
EXPECTATIONS FROM MANMOHAN SINGH'S VISIT TO THE US
B.RAMAN
The following are the comments sent by me on the subject mentioned above in response to a query from a US think-tank:
How to address a complex mix of interests, concerns and policy preoccupations in a manner that will retain the US influence in the Af-Pak region without jeopardising the beginnings of its strategic presence and influence in India? That is the question that will be before Obama and his advisers during their talks with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. They have not found an answer to this dilemma and hence the spotlight more on style than on substance.
Efforts will be made to make India amenable to a resumption of the composite dialogue with Pakistan and to be more responsive to Pakistani concerns relating to Afghanistan.Will Obama use a promise of US support for India's permanent membership of the UN Security Council as a lollipop in return for Indian gestures to Pakistan?
The limitations on the US ability and willingness to make Pakistan address India's concerns on terrorism have been amply demonstrated time and again. To expect that Manmohan Singh will respond to US entreaties in the absence of a demonstrated US ability to make Pakistan act may be unrealistic.
Common concerns over China brought India and the US together under the Bush Administration. With Obama projecting China as a benign power and not as a power to be concerned about, China will no longer be a uniting factor between the two countries.
There is considerable confusion about Obama in India. He has clearly accorded a pre-eminent role to China not only in the rest of Asia, but even in South Asia. He is reluctant to act against Pakistan as vigorously as India would like him to.India is still keeping its fingers crossed as to whether he would keep up his promise to adhere to the commitments made by the Bush Administration on civil nuclear co-operation and transfer of dual-use technology.
During Manmohan Singh's visit to the US in July,2005, Bush managed to establish an excellent personal chemistry with him, which has served well the Indo-US relations.Obama's interactions with his foreign interlocutors have clearly brought out his inability to establish such personal chemistry. Indian policy-makers and analysts have, therefore been cautious in their expectations from the visit.( 20-11-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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