Sunday, October 4, 2009

OCTOBER 1: DAY OF MOURNING IN XINJIANG & TIBET

B.RAMAN


According to reliable source reports from Tibet and Xinjiang, October 1, 2009, which marked the 60the anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, was observed as a day of mourning by the Uighurs and the Tibetans in Xinjiang and Tibet.


2. Despite the strong security measures taken by the Public Security Bureau of Urumqi, the capital of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, pamphlets purported to have been issued by the Munich-based World Uighur Congress (WUC) calling upon the Uighurs not to celebrate the day managed to circulate in the Uighur-majority areas of the city. The pamphlet said: "On October 1st, 1949 Mao proclaimed the People's
Republic of China and incorporated East Turkestan into its territory. Since the land had been conquered by the non-Chinese Manchu emperors of China in the later part of the 19th century and renamed 'Xinjiang' or 'New Dominion', the people of East Turkestan had tried more than three times to throw off the yoke of the foreign invaders. Replacing the rule of the Manchu emperor with Nationalist Chinese or
Communist Chinese did little to help the people of East Turkestan.On this 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China,the World Uyghur Congress does not celebrate the yoke of oppression or the 'dictatorship of the people.' This date conjures feelings of anguish and misery for the people who have endured the takeover and transformation of their homeland into another Chinese province."


3. The local authorities had made it a criminal offence to disseminate anything, which could weaken national unity and ethnic harmony.They were taken by surprise that despite the stepped-up vigilance some local sympathisers of the WUC managed to circulate these pamphlets. Some arrests have been made in this connection. SMS messages on mobile phone networks were ordered to be suspended during the whole of the week, apparently due to an apprehension that these messages could be used to organise a public demonstration on October 1 against Beijing's rule.


4. While the Chinese authorities denied any ban on the visits of foreign tourists to Urumqi and Lhasa, they had reportedly advised the travel agencies, which organise tours to these areas, to ensure that no foreign tourists would be present in Urumqi and Lhasa for a week from September 28.


5. As part of the security measures, kite-flying and sale of items which could be used by terrorists such as knives, syringe needles,fertilisers, certain women's cosmetics items etc were banned. A ban was also imposed on women carrying their cosmetic bags in public transport.


6. Worried over the non-participation of Uighurs and Tibetans in the celebration of the 60 th anniversary, the Public Security Bureau issued warnings that any Tibetan and Uighur public servant , who did not attend the celebrations, would be liable for disciplinary action.


7. A week before October 1, the Xinjiang's People's Congress Standing Committee passed a so-called "Information Promotion Bill" banning people in the region from using the Internet in any way that undermines national unity, incites ethnic separatism or harms social stability. (4-10-09)


( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

Saturday, October 3, 2009

A SONIA GANDHI TYPE ROLE FOR AUNG SAN SUU KYI?

B.RAMAN


With the administration of President Barrack Obama of the US expanding bilateral official contacts with the Myanmar military junta and embarking on a policy of probing engagement without lifting sanctions for the present, interesting steps are being taken in the US-Myanmar political minuet.


2.The US seems to have realised that total democracy in Myanmar is not for tomorrow and that the Army cannot be expected to totally renounce power in the near future. A short-term plan of free elections to pave the way for a genuine sharing of the power between the military leadership and the elected political leaders accompanied by a mutually acceptable time-table for reducing the Army's role in governance will be a better workable option.


3. The probing engagement has been not only between the US and the Junta, but also simultaneously between Aung San Suu Kyi and the Junta. Her rhetoric as well as that of her party---the National League For Democracy---show signs of softening and she has made significant overtures to the Junta by not opposing the lifting of sanctions if a satisfactory arrangement for doing so can be found and has offered to make suggestions to the Junta as to how to go about its task of getting the international sanctions lifted.


4.Her decision to appeal against her recent conviction by a court in a case relating to a trespass into her Government-guarded house by an American national, which led to an extension of her house arrest by another 18 months, was another significant move. Though her appeal has been rejected by a lower court, she reportedly intends appealing against the rejection to a higher court. She is a very proud person and it was not in her nature to appeal against her extended house arrest. Normally, she would have ignored the extension with the contempt it deserved.


5. The fact that she appealed against it in a lower court and is now appealing to a higher court against the rejection by the lower court is an indicator of delicately-orchestrated moves by the Obama Administration, the Junta and her party to move towards a situation where her house arrest will stand lifted without the Junta suffering any loss of face.


6. Another significant development has been her October 3 meeting with Aung Kyi, the Labour Minister, who was designated by the Junta as the interlocutor with her on behalf of the Junta after the Buddhist monks' agitation in September,2007. He was so nominated by the Junta under international pressure to hold a dialogue with her . Immediately after his nomination, there were six meetings with her in quick
succession, but these meetings dried up after January,2008. Aung Kyi's decision to meet her after 21 months---whatever be the subjects they discussed--- was a message meant to be conveyed to the US by the Junta of its seriousness in wanting to press ahead with its search for a workable accommodation with the US. One should not be surprised if he had, inter alia, discussed with her a modus vivendi for ending her house arrest. Such a modus vivendi could be in the form of the Junta lifting the house arrest in return for an informal commitment by her not to travel outside Yangon for the present.


7. The US has its own agenda in seeking to try out a policy of engagement with the Junta. The most important of its objectives would be to find out details of Myanmar's nuclear co-operation with Russia, Pakistan and North Korea and to persuade the Junta to reverse this co-operation and to renounce its nuclear aspirations in return for the lifting of the sanctions. Agreement on a time-bound plan for the
restoration of a democratic process would be an equally important objective. Without any progress on the second objective, the Obama Administration might find it difficult to justify to the Congress and the US public its decision to engage the Junta.


8. The US is at the same time anxious to prevent its initiatives being seen in Beijing and New Delhi as likely to be detrimental to their long-standing presence and interests in Myanmar.Announcing the new policy at Washington on September 29,2009, Kurt Campbell, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, said:"We will intensify our engagement with Association of South East Asian Nations,
China, and India to press the Burmese leadership to reform and to participate responsibly in the international community.The dialogue will include specific discussion of democracy and human rights inside Burma, cooperation on international security issues such as nonproliferation and compliance with UN resolutions 1874 and 1718, and areas that could be of mutual benefit such as counter-narcotics
and recovery of World War II era remains.Lifting sanctions now would send the wrong signal. We will tell the Burmese that we will discuss easing sanctions only if they take actions on our core concerns. We will reserve the option to apply additional targeted sanctions, if warranted, by events inside Burma.We will continue to push for the immediate and unconditional release of Aung San Suu Kyi and all political prisoners, an end to conflicts with ethnic minorities and gross human rights violations and initiation of a credible internal political dialogue with the democratic opposition and ethnic minority leaders on elements of reconciliation and reform.We will also press Burma to comply with its international obligations, including on nonproliferation, ending any prohibited military or proliferation-related cooperation with North Korea, and full compliance with United Nations 1874 and 1718.If Burma makes meaningful progress towards these goals, it will be possible to improve the relationship with the United States in a step-by-step process. We recognise that this will likely be a long and difficult process, and we are prepared to sustain our efforts on this front."


9. While the US has thus publicly articulated its view of the road ahead, the Junta-----apart from indicating a desire to improve relations with the US---is yet to do so. Any arrangement ultimately worked out between the Obama Administration and the Junta, to be effective, has to have the support of not only the US public and Congress, but also the Myanmar public and political class. Any agreement that does not provide for a honourable and meaningful political role for Aung San Suu Kyi is unlikely to be acceptable to large sections of public and political opinion in both countries. The Junta has already firmly ruled out any Governmental role for her by including in the Constitution a provision debarring a Myanmar citizen of foreign origin or a Myanmar citizen married to a foreigner from holding office as the head of State or Government.


10. There have been some indications that this bar against her because of her marriage to a foreigner need not apply to her role as the leader of her party and to any aspirations she may have of becoming a member of the new Parliament to be elected. The Junta is determined not to let her become the President or the Prime Minister. At the same time, it seems to be trying to keep the door open for her
playing a role similar to Mrs.Sonia Gandhi in India after the 2004 elections--- renouncing any Governmental status and power while continuing to retain her political status and power as the leader and guide of her party.

11. If the Junta offers this way out, will Aung San Suu Kyi accept it?Or will she herself make such an offer? (4-10-09)


( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

SUSPECTED DEATH OF YULDASHEV: GOOD NEWS FOR UZBEKISTAN,CHINA,GERMANY

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.560

B.RAMAN


In its relentless strikes with drones (pilotless planes) on suspected terrorist hide-outs in Pakistan's tribal belt, the US intelligence has been scoring two kinds of successes. The first is the kind of success where the US intelligence knows immediately after a strike whom it has targeted and killed. A good example was the drone strike on the house of the father-in-law of Baitullah Mehsud , the then Amir of the Pakistani Taliban known as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), in South Waziristan on August 5,2009. Immediately after the strike, the US intelligenvce knew and said with an 80 per cent certainty that it had killed Baitullah. The TTP initially denied the US claim, but subsequently had to admit his death.


2. The second is the kind of success of which the US intelligence becomes aware long after a strike. It attacks a place knowing it to be a terrorist hide-out without being aware of the identity of the inmates. After the strike, it realises through source information that one of the persons killed by it was someone important and becomes aware of his identity.


3. The reported death of Tohir Yuldashev, the Amir of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), would come in this category. On August 27,2009, there was a drone strike on a suspected terrorist hide-out at Kanigoram in South Waziristan. At that time, the US intelligence was not aware as to whom it had killed. Much later, on September 29,2009, a man claiming to be Yuldashev's bodyguard reportedly phoned
Radio Liberty in Prague to claim that Yuldashev was among those killed in this attack.This has subsequently been corroborated by tribal and Pakistani official sources cited in the Pakistani media, but not yet confirmed by the US intelligence. That is why I have called it a suspected death.


4. If ultimately confirmed, the death of Yuldashev would be the second instance in which drones have killed the Amirs (heads) of two dreaded terrorist organisations. US drones have killed many middle and even senior level leaders of Al Qaeda and other organisations, but not heads of organisations till their two successes in August----the confirmed death of Baitullah on August 5 and the reported, but not yet
confirmed death of Yuldashev on August 27.


5.The reported elimination of Yuldashev would be greeted with relief not only by the counter-terrorism agencies of Uzbekistan and China, but also by the agencies of the West European countries faced with threats arising from members of their Muslim diaspora trained by the IMU and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), another Uzbek organisation, in their training camps in North Waziristan. Germany, which was recently threatened repeatedly by Al Qaeda and some of its affiliates, would have particular reason to be happy since some of the Germans of Turkish or Moroccan origin , who pose a threat to German security, had been trained in the camps of the two Uzbek organisations in North Waziristan.


6.The first signs of Islamic fundamentalism appeared in Uzbekistan in December 1991, when some unemployed Muslim youth seized the Communist Party headquarters in the eastern city of Namangan, to protest against the refusal of the local Mayor to permit the construction of a mosque. The protest was organised by Tohir Abdouhalilovitch Yuldashev, a 24-year-old college drop-out, who had become a Mulla, and Jumaboi Ahmadzhanovitch Khojaev, a former Soviet paratrooper who had served in Afghanistan and returned from there totally converted to Wahabism.


7. Yuldashev and Khojaev, who later adopted the alias Juma Namangani, after his hometown, became members of the Uzbekistan branch of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP). Following the IRP's refusal to support their demand for the establishment of an Islamic State in Uzbekistan, they formed their own party called the Adolat (Justice) Party, which was banned by President Islam Karimov. They then fled to
Tajikistan. While Namangani fought in the local civil war, Yuldashev went to Chechnya to participate in the jihad there. In 1995, he went to Pakistan, where the jihadi organisations gave him shelter in Peshawar. From there, he re-named the Adolat Party as the IMU and was allegedly in receipt of funds from the intelligence agencies of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. After Osama bin Laden shifted to Jalalabad from Khartoum in Sudan in 1996, Yuldashev crossed over into Afghanistan.


8. After the end of the civil war in Tajikistan, Namangani settled down for a while as a road transport operator. He was also allegedly involved in heroin smuggling from Afghanistan. Subsequently, he too crossed over into Afghanistan and joined the IMU and became its leader. The IMU allegedly earns a major part of its revenue from heroin smuggling.


9. After the Taliban captured Kabul in September, 1996, Namangani and Yuldashev held a press conference at Kabul at which they announced the formation of the IMU with Namangani as the Amir and Yuldashev as its military commander. In 1998, the IMU joined the International Islamic Front (IIF) of Al Qaeda. bin Laden was reportedly greatly interested in the IMU because he was hoping to use it for getting nuclear material and know-how from Russia and other constituent States of the erstwhile USSR.


10. The IMU's initial goal was described as the overthrow of Uzbek President Islam Karimov and the establishment of an Islamic State in Uzbekistan. It changed its name to the Islamic Party of Turkestan (IPT) in June 2001, and called for the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate in Central Asia consisting of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and China's Xinjiang province. It has been recruiting members from all these areas, including Uighurs from Xinjiang. Initially, its recruits were trained by the Arab instructors of Al Qaeda in the training camps in Afghan territory and after 9/11 by Chechen and Pashtun instructors of the Taliban in the South Waziristan area of Pakistan. Despite its 2001 change of name as IPT, it continues to be known in Uzbekistan as the IMU. The name IPT is not widely known.


11. After the reported death of Namangani in a US air strike in Afghanistan post-9/11 Yuldashev took over the leadership of the IMU as its Amir and crossed over with the surviving members of the IMU into South Waziristan in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, where he and his Uzbek/Chechen instructors set up a training camp for training jihadi terrorists. In an operation launched by the
Pakistani security forces in South Waziristan in March-April, 2004, to smoke out the remnants of Al Qaeda, Yuldashev was reported to have been injured, but he managed to escape.


12.Till March, 2007, Mir Ali in North Waziristan used to be the headquarters of the Islamic Jihad Group, also known as the Islamic Jihad Union. It ran a number of training camps there where jihadis from many Western countries, including Germany, China's Xinjiang, and Pakistan itself were trained by Uzbek and Chechen instructors. The IMU's headquarters used to be in the Azam Warsak area of South Waziristan. This area became the scene of violent attacks by sections of the local tribals on the Uzbeks living in the area following the alleged murder of a local tribal personality by an Uzbek resident of the area in the third week of March, 2007. In the ensuing clashes, nearly 100 persons were killed----about 70 Uzbeks and the remaining locals mainly belonging to the Darikhel and the Tojikhel sub-tribes of the Pashtuns. The Yargulkhel sub-tribe led by Noor Islam and his brother Haji Omar, two important pro-Taliban military commanders who had once fought in Afghanistan, supported the Uzbeks in their fight against the Darikhels and the Tojkhels. Some Yargulkhels were also killed. Ultimately, the IMU was forced to evacuate South Waziristan and shift to Mir Ali.


13.Following this, I had reported as follows in my article titled "Mir Ali In North Waziristan- : Under Uzbek Control ", which is available at
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers24/paper2317.html : Quote According to well-informed sources in the Police of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), the Mir Ali area of North Waziristan in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan is under the effective control of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) headed by Qari Tohir Yuldashev. Small groups of Chechens and Uighurs are also present in the area. They work under the over-all command of Qari Tohir. They were being helped by Maulana Sadiq Noor, a local tribal leader close to the Neo Taliban. The IMU, with the help of Chechen instructors, has set up training camps in the area for training the recruits of the Neo Taliban, the jihadi terrorist organisations of Pakistan and individual jihadis from abroad-particularly from the Pakistani
diaspora abroad."


14.After the Pakistani commando raid in the Lal Masjid of Islamabad between July 10 and `13, 2007, the Mehsuds of Baitullah joined hands with the IMU and the Islamic Jihad Group and they started instigating suicide terrorist attacks not only in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), but also outside the tribal belt---even in places like Islamabad and Rawalpindi.Coinciding with the commando raid, the Government of Pervez Musharraf sent reinforcements of security forces to North Waziristan. This was interpreted by sections of the local tribals as a violation of the peace agreement signed with them by the Pakistan Army in September,2006, and as a prelude to attacks on the headquarters of the IMU and the Islamic Jihad Group. They kidnapped nearly 300 members of the para-military forces and threatened to kill them at the rate of three a day if their followers in Government custody were not released and the reinforcements were not withdrawn.


15. Following the arrest in Germany in September,2007, of three German Muslims trained in the camps of the Islamic Jihad Group in the Mir Ali area, who were allegedly planning to attack a US military base in Germany, the Musharraf Government came under increased pressure from the US to act against pro-Al Qaeda jihadis in the Mir Ali area. There was similar pressure from the Chinese, who were concerned over the attacks on Chinese nationals working in Pakistan after the Lal Masjid raid. Even apart from these pressures, the worsening security situation in the tribal belt forced the Pakistani Security Forces to act against the Uzbeks, Chechens and Uighurs and their local tribal supporters. Reports from the NATO forces in Afghanistan of the presence of increasing numbers of Uzbeks, Chechens and Uighurs with the
Neo Taliban forces operating in Afghan territory added to the pressure for action. Responding to these pressures, the Pakistani Government started sending further reinforcements to the area. It was a jihadi attack on one of the convoys carrying these reinforcements which triggered off a new round of deadly clashes.


16.About 200 members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) , the Islamic Jihad Group and the Pashtun tribal group led by Baitullah Mehsud and about a hundred members of the Pakistani Security Forces---mostly para-military personnel--- were killed in violent clashes between pro-Al Qaeda jihadis and the security forces in and around the Mir Ali area from October 6, 2007. The clashes started after the
terrorists ambushed a convoy of the security forces in North Waziristan, inflicting an undisclosed number of fatalities and capturing some Pakistani personnel of the security forces.


17. The dead bodies of the some of the security forces personnel were later found abandoned with their throats slit. A Jirga of leading North Waziristan clerics led by former Member of the National Assembly from North Waziristan, Maulana Nek Zaman Haqqani, after daylong negotiations, received 30 bodies of the slain soldiers from the jihadis in Khaisur and handed them over to military officials in Mir Ali. The
"News", a well-informed daily newspaper, quoted an unidentified jirga member as claiming on October 8, 2007, that the jirga members had recovered 73 bodies of soldiers, majority of which were burnt or badly mutilated, from the Mir Ali villages that they had visited. Malik Sher Khan, a local tribal elder, said 45 bodies of soldiers had been handed over to military officials in Mir Ali. Quoting a local Government official,the "News" reported as follows: “Very few of the over 200 soldiers besieged by militants on Sunday (October 7) seem to have survived after
the deadliest ever attack on them.” Following the discovery of over a dozen mutilated dead bodies, either beheaded or with their throats slit,of para-military personnel captured earlier by the men of Baitullah Mehsud, the para-military forces ran amok. Some surrendered to the terrorists, others discarded their uniforms and took shelter in the homes of the residents of the area and some others went on a killing spree, indiscriminately killing the local villagers and the Uzbeks, Chechens and Uighurs..


18.The Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) or the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG), came into being in Pakistani territory post 9/11 as a result of a split in the IMU following the US military strikes in Afghanistan against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. It describes Osama bin Laden, Mulla Mohammad Omar, the Amir of the Neo Taliban, and Maulana Samiul Haq, the Amir of a faction of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema Islam Pakistan, as its mentors. It
focusses on training volunteers from the Western countries as well as from Uzbekistan.


19. It came to notice for the first time in April 2004 when it claimed the responsibility for a series of suicide bombings around Tashkent and Bukharo in Uzbekistan which killed 47 people. The attacks targeted local government offices, as well as a crowded market. On July 30,2004, it carried out simultaneous bombing attacks on the US Embassy, the Israeli Embassy, and the office of the Uzbek Prosecutor General,killing at least two people and wounding many others.


20. A statement purported to have been disseminated by it said: “A group of young Muslims executed martyrdom operations that put fear in the apostate government and its infidel allies, the Americans and Jews. The mujahidin belonging to Islamic Jihad Group attacked both the American and Israeli embassies as well as the court building where the trials of a large number of the brothers from the Group had begun.
These martyrdom operations that the group is executing will not stop, God willing. It is for the purpose of repelling the injustice of the apostate government and supporting the jihad of our Muslim brothers in Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, the Hijaz, and in other Muslim countries ruled by infidels and apostates.”


21. On May 26, 2005, the US State Department issued the following statement: "The Department of State on May 25 announced the designation of the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Organisation under Executive Order 13224. This designation blocks all property, and interests in property, of the organization that are in the United States, or come within the United States,
or the control of U. S. persons. The Secretary of State took this action in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Department of Homeland Security. The Islamic Jihad Group, active in Central Asia, broke away from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a Specially Designated Global Terrorist organization that is listed by the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee. On
July 30, 2004, the Islamic Jihad Group conducted coordinated bombing attacks in Tashkent against the U.S. and Israeli Embassies, and the office of the Uzbek Prosecutor General, killing at least two people and wounding nine. The Islamic Jihad Group claimed responsibility for these attacks and indicated that future attacks are planned. The Islamic Jihad Group continues to target Americans and U.S. facilities
overseas and is a dangerous threat to U.S. interests. After an explosion at a safehouse in Bukharo, Uzbekistan, IJG suicide bombers attacked a popular bazaar and other locations in Tashkent in March and April 2004, resulting in the deaths of more than a dozen police officers and innocent bystanders and dozens of injuries. The attackers in the March and April 2004 attacks, some of whom were female suicide bombers, targeted the local government offices of the Uzbekistani and Bukharo police, killing approximately 47 people, including 33 terrorists. These attacks marked the first use of female suicide bombers in Central Asia. Those arrested in connection with the attacks in Bukharo have testified to the close ties between the IJG leaders and Usama bin Laden and Mullah Omar. Kazakhstani authorities have
declared that IJG members were taught by al-Qaida instructors to handle explosives and to organize intelligence work and subversive activities. Kazakhstan has arrested several IJG members and put them on trial."


22 In October, 2005, the British Government declared it as a terrorist organisation despite strong opposition from human rights groups,which alleged that the Uzbek Government was projecting political dissidents opposed to it as pro-Al Qaeda terrorists.


23.The IJG, which was formed in 2002 to oppose the co-operation extended by the Government of Islam Karimov to the US in its operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, projects the US and Israel as the main enemies of Islam and all Muslim countries co-operating with the US as apostates, which need to be opposed. The IJG, which also has the over-all objective of a global Islamic Caliphate, projects itself as a global jihadi organisation and not a basically Uzbek organisation. It says that since Islam does not recognise nationalities or ethnicities, any Muslim can become its member irrespective of where he or she lives. Since it describes the US and Israel as its principal enemies, it welcomes volunteers from countries where the US and Israel have a large presence.


24. In an interview on May 31, 2007, Ebu Yahya Muhammed Fatih, who describes himself as the Commander of the Islamic Jihad Union,stated as follows:



"After the fall of the Afganistan Islamic Administration,we who shared the same opinions came together and decided to organize groups which will conduct jihad operations against the infidel constitution of cruel Karimov in Uzbekistan. The sole aim of all the emigrant-mujahedeen brothers was to find war-like solutions against the infidel constitution of cruel Karimov. For this aim our Union was established in 2002.


"Our Union's aim is, under the flag of justice and Islam Dominancy, to save our Müslim brothers who have been suffering from the cruelty of pre-Soviet period and Uzbekistan, and to take them out of the swamp of cruelty and infidelity, as well as to help other Müslim brothers all around the world as per God and his Prophet's orders.


"Members of our Union are not members of a specific tribe or a nation. As there is no nationalism and tribalism in Islam, our Union is formed of the believers from all over the world and multi-national emigrants travelling to praise the religion.


"Today we proceed according to our targeted goals with all our means. Muslim youth in the republics of former Soviet Union who found the path of Allah and are ready to fight for their religion have been trained in various fields in the training facilities of the Union. One of the armed forces of the Union is active in Afghanistan. Besides, we have been in contact and also been working on our common targets together with Caucasian mujahedeens. We have also been working together on plans and aims against the infidel regime of Uzbekistan which is one of our major targets."


25. In April, 2007, the US Embassy in Berlin announced that it was strengthening security at US facilities in Germany in response to what it described as an increased threat of terrorism. Mr. August Hanning, a former head of Germany’s foreign intelligence agency known as the Bundes Nachrichten Dienst (BND), who was the then Deputy Interior Minister, said in an interview that 14 German Islamists had gone to Pakistan for training. He also said that in recent months the Pakistani authorities had detained at least seven German Islamists “who could have been involved in planning attacks”.


26. On September 5, 2007, German Federal Prosecutor Monika Harms announced the arrest of three persons and the recovery from them of 700 kilos of chemicals capable of being converted into explosives. German media reports said that they were planning attacks against a US military base in Ramstein and the Frankfurt airport. Two of the arrested persons were described as white converts to Islam, both German
nationals, and the third as of Turkish origin. The Federal Prosecutor named the three persons aged 22,28 and 29 as belonging to the German cell of the Islamic Jihad Union. It was reported that seven more members of the cell were still at large.


27.There is another Yuldashev in the jihadi world of Uzbekistan ---- by the first name Akram.In 1992, Akram Yuldashev,then a 29-year-old maths teacher of Andijan, published a pamphlet titled "Yimonga Yul" (Path to faith) on what he projected as the superiority of Islamic moral values. This brought him many supporters and his pamphlet was widely read. In 1998, the authorities arrested him on a charge of
possessing narcotics and he was jailed for 30 months. However, he was prematurely released in December 1998.At the time of his arrest, he was working in a furniture company. He was again arrested in February 1999 following explosions in Tashkent, accused of participating in acts of terrorism and sentenced to 17 years in jail. The charge-sheet filed against him described him as the head of a jihadi organisation
called Akramia, named after him, whose objective, it was alleged, was to convert Uzbekistan into an Islamic State ruled according to the Sharia.

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retired), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)

Thursday, October 1, 2009

INDIA SHOULD SUSPEND WORK VISAS FOR CHINESE

B.RAMAN


"The Hindu" has reported on October 1,2009, that the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi has been issuing visas on a separate sheet of paper to Indian citizens born and resident in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). A Chinese Embassy spokesman has been quoted as claiming that this is not a new practice and has been done even in the past.


2.From a perusal of the two reports from its New Delhi-based correspondent carried by the paper, it would seem that one or two Kashmiris,who are citizens of India, with plain paper visas issued by the Chinese Embassy, were not allowed to leave the country by the Indian immigration and they complained to this correspondent.


3. While the Chinese Embassy has tried to make out that this practice is nothing new, it must have been of recent origin. Otherwise, the Indian immigration would have noticed it and drawn the attention of the Ministry of External Affairs. The veracity of the Chinese claim can be easily established by the Indian Embassy in Beijing requesting Kashmiris ftrom India studying in China to produce their Indian passports in order to see whether they had travelled with plain paper visas. If so, there was definitely negligence on the part of the Indian immigration in not noticing this earlier.


4. The Chinese action in issuing such plain-paper visas to Indian citizens born and resident in J&K is a political statement meant to indicate that China does not recognise J&K as an integral part of India and that it agrees with the Pakistani contention that J&K is a disputed territory.


5.Chinese policy on J&K has passed through three stages. In the first stage till 1996 China automatically supported the Pakistani contention that J&K is a disputed territory and that the violence in J&K did not amount to terrorism.Following the visit of the then Chinese President Jiang Zemin to India and Pakistan in 1996, there was a nuanced change in the Chinese policy. They did not recognise J&K as an
integral part of India, but started avoiding words, actions or gestures which could be interpreted as their support to the Pakistani stand.During the Kargil conflict of 1999, the Chinese reportedly supported the US position that Pakistan should withdraw its troops from the Indian territory in the Kargil Heights and that the Line of Control should be respected. It was the Chinese reluctance to support Pakistan at the
time of the Kargil conflict during the visit to Beijing by Nawaz Sharif, the then Pakistani Prime Minister, which made him dash to Washington after returning to Islamabad and seek a US-backed face-saving before ordering the withdrawal of the Pakistani troops ftrom Indian territory.


6.The Chinese position had stood there since then. Their position till recently can be summed up as follows:Avoiding any action or words or gestures which could be interpreted as their support to either the Pakistani stand that J&K is a disputed territory or the Iindian stand that J&K is an integral part of India. At the same time, they have consistently maintained their past policy of refusing to categorise the violence in J&K as terrorism.


7.Their practice of issuing plain paper visas to Indian citizens born and resident in J&K, whenever it started, indicates their sliding back to their pre-1999 position of support to the Pakistani stand that J&K is a disputed territory and rejection of the Indian stand that J&K is an integral part of India.


8.India should not remain content with merely taking up this issue at the diplomatic level with China. There is a need for concrete action to express our displeasure over the insidious Chinese practice. The Indian diplomatic and consular missions in China should be asked not to issue any more work visas to Chinese selected by their companies to work in their projects in India. The visas of the Chinese already
working in India should not be extended when they expire. It should be made clear to the Chinese that the issue of work visas to Chinese nationals will be resumed only when their practice of issue of plain paper visas is discontinued. ( 2-10-09)


( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

INDIA SHOULD SUSPEND WORK VISAS FOR CHINESE

B.RAMAN


"The Hindu" has reported on October 1,2009, that the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi has been issuing visas on a separate sheet of paper to Indian citizens born and resident in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). A Chinese Embassy spokesman has been quoted as claiming that this is not a new practice and has been done even in the past.


2.From a perusal of the two reports from its New Delhi-based correspondent carried by the paper, it would seem that one or two Kashmiris, who are citizens of India, with plain paper visas issued by the Chinese Embassy, were not allowed to leave the country by the Indian immigration and they complained to this correspondent.


3. While the Chinese Embassy has tried to make out that this practice is nothing new, it must have been of recent origin. Otherwise, the Indian immigration would have noticed it and drawn the attention of the Ministry of External Affairs. The veracity of the Chinese claim can be easily established by the Indian Embassy in Beijing requesting Kashmiris ftrom India studying in China to produce their Indian passports in order to see whether they had travelled with plain paper visas. If so, there was definitely negligence on the part of the Indian immigration in not noticing this earlier.


4. The Chinese action in issuing such plain-paper visas to Indian citizens born and resident in J&K is a political statement meant to indicate that China does not recognise J&K as an integral part of India and that it agrees with the Pakistani contention that J&K is a disputed territory.


5.Chinese policy on J&K has passed through three stages. In the first stage till 1996 China automatically supported the Pakistani contention that J&K is a disputed territory and that the violence in J&K did not amount to terrorism.Following the visit of the then Chinese President Jiang Zemin to India and Pakistan in 1996, there was a nuanced change in the Chinese policy. They did not recognise J&K as an
integral part of India, but started avoiding words, actions or gestures which could be interpreted as their support to the Pakistani stand. During the Kargil conflict of 1999, the Chinese reportedly supported the US position that Pakistan should withdraw its troops from the Indian territory in the Kargil Heights and that the Line of Control should be respected. It was the Chinese reluctance to support Pakistan at the time of the Kargil conflict during the visit to Beijing by Nawaz Sharif, the then Pakistani Prime Minister, which made him dash to Washington
after returning to Islamabad and seek a US-backed face-saving before ordering the withdrawal of the Pakistani troops ftrom Indian territory.


6.The Chinese position had stood there since then. Their position till recently can be summed up as follows:Avoiding any action or words or gestures which could be interpreted as their support to either the Pakistani stand that J&K is a disputed territory or the Iindian stand that J&K is an integral part of India. At the same time, they have consistently maintained their past policy of refusing to categorise the violence in J&K as terrorism.


7.Their practice of issuing plain paper visas to Indian citizens born and resident in J&K, whenever it started, indicates their sliding back to their pre-1999 position of support to the Pakistani stand that J&K is a disputed territory and rejection of the Indian stand that J&K is an integral part of India.


8.India should not remain content with merely taking up this issue at the diplomatic level with China. There is a need for concrete action to express our displeasure over the insidious Chinese practice. The Indian diplomatic and consular missions in China should be asked not to issue any more work visas to Chinese selected by their companies to work in their projects in India. The visas of the Chinese already
working in India should not be extended when they expire. It should be made clear to the Chinese that the issue of work visas to Chinese nationals will be resumed only when their practice of issue of plain paper visas is discontinued. ( 2-10-09)


( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

Tuesday, September 29, 2009

CONTINUING THREAT FROM INDIAN MUJAHIDEEN

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.559

B.RAMAN


It is one year since the last reported terrorist attack (in New Delhi in September last year) by the Indian Mujahideen (IM) and its mentor the Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). Not only has there been no jihadi terrorist attack in Indian territory outside Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) attributable to the IM for a year now, there has been no propaganda offensive by the IM either during this period. There was no evidence of IM involvement in the spectacular terrorist attack launched by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) of Pakistan in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008. A message purporting to be from one Deccan Mujahideen claiming responsibility for the Mumbai attack had originated from Pakistan at the time of the attack, but it was believed to have been sent at the instance of the LET set-up in Pakistan to confuse the Indian security agencies.


2. The period between November 2007 and September,2008, saw repeated terrorist strikes with timed improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by a group of jihadis originally belonging to the SIMI, who claimed to be operating as the Indian Mujahideen. These explosions, with many human fatalities, took place in three cities of Uttar Pradesh on the same day in November,2007, in Jaipur in May,2008, in Bangalore and Ahmedabad in July,2008 and in New Delhi in September,2008. Messages purporting to be from the IM received by some media outfits claimed responsibility not only for these explosions, but also for some others which had taken place before November,2007, such as the explosions targeting suburban train passengers in Mumbai in July,2006.


3.The attacks between November,2007, and September,2008, were well-planned, well-orchestrated and well-executed and indicated the involvement in their planning and execution by some well-educated members of the Indian Muslim community, some of whom had attended so-called secular educational institutions. Some of the educated Muslims involved and arrested by the Mumbai police were adept in the use of information technology (IT). One of them was reportedly working for a reputed IT company.


4.The Indian intelligence agencies and the police of the affected States, which were taken by surprise by these attacks, mobilised their resources and succeeded in arresting many of those involved. The investrigation brought out that long before launching these attacks, the SIMI had been planning for them and holding training camps for those to be used for these attacks in different parts of Indian territory,
including in Kerala and Gujarat. The investigation also brought out that prompt follow-up action by the police of different States on the revelations about these training activities contained in the reports of the Madhya Pradesh police on the interrogation of some SIMI cadress arrested by them in the beginning of 2008 might have prevented at least some of these attacks.Unfortunately, the interrogation reports were allegedly not widely disseminated and no alert was sounded. The details of the planning and training came to be known only after the Ahmedabad explosions.


5. The credit for the one-year lull since September,2008, should go to the Indian intelligence agencies and the police of all the states. They have not allowed their preoccupation with detecting and neutralising the cells of the LET, the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) and other Pakistani organisations come in the way of their hunt for the remnants of the IM and the SIMI, which have escaped attention and arrest so far. Many suspected cells of the SIMI and the IM in Kerala, and other places have been detected and neutralised by them during the last one year.


6. The details out of these detections and arrests as reported by the media periodically indicate that the SIMI and the IM have been re-strategising their operations for the future and biding their time before striking again. The one-year lull in the terrorist strikes of the IM and the SIMI should not be interpreted as indicating any set-back suffered by them. The arrests made during this period of lull indicate continued planning and training for more attacks.


7. The IM and the SIMI continue to be as serious a threat to our internal security as they were in 2008. (30-9-09)


( The writer is Additional Secretary (retired), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

CHINDIA: CHINA ALL OVER INDIA

B.RAMAN

It is well known that the bilateral trade between India and China is galloping towards the targeted figure of US $ 60 billion and that China has already emerged as India's largest trading partner.

2. What is not that well known even in India is the inroads which Chinese business companies have been making into key sectors of the Indian economy for the last four years----and particularly since the visit of President Hu Jintao to India in November 2007.Not only Hu, but also some leaders of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) were reported to have taken with the Government of India the inordinate delay in the issue of work visas to Chinese employees of Chinese construction companies which had won contracts in India. The Marxists were particularly upset over the delay in the issue of visas to a large number of Chinese employees of a company, which had won a contract for the construction of a gas pipeline.

3.Between 2004 and 2008, the Government of Dr.Manmohan Singh was dependent on the Marxists for its survival in office. The Chinese and the Marxists took full advantage of this to sort out the difficulties faced by Chinese companies. This was the time when the Chinese inroads into the Indian economy started in a big way and it has continued even after the Marxists stopped supporting the ruling coalition in the second half of last year. Now, there is not much love lost between the Congress (I) and the Marxists. The Government is no longer dependent on the Marxists for its survival.


4. Despite this, there has been no slowing-down of the Chinese inroads into the Indian economy. This is because many Indian corporate houses find it easier and more profitable to do business with Chinese companies than with companies from other countries, including Japan. They manage to persuade or pressure the Government to approve their decision to award construction and equipment-supply contracts to the Chinese.


5. Contracts with the Chinese are more profitable because Chinese construction companies bring their own engineers and labourers, who are allegedly prepared to work for less emoluments than their Indian counterparts and do not resort to strikes. The Chinese too insist on bringing their own work force in large numbers from China because this solves their problems arising from the poor command of the English language of the senior Chinese executives. The Chinese companies also claim that if they bring their own work force they could ensure timely completion of the projects and the quality of the construction. Nobody had challenged their arguments till now.


6. This has been creating resentment among unemployed Indian engineers and other skilled personnel who complain that at a time when there is growing unemployment in India due to the economic melt-down the Chinese companies should be bringing in thousands of their workers. Uncorroborated allegations have been made by those critical of the Chinese inroads that in order to get over difficulties in getting
work visas some Chinese companies bring their employees on three-months tourist visas. It is alleged that after three months they are replaced by a fresh lot of Chinese workers with tourist visas.


7. For the first time, an indirect reference was made to the resentment over Chinese companies bringing their own nationals to work in India by S. Jaishankar, India’s new Ambassador to China, during a seminar organized by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry and the China Council for Promotion of International Trade in the third week of September. The "Times of India" quoted him as saying as follows: : “An India-specific approach will have to be thought through by Chinese companies.I have personal experience in working with many of India’s other major economic partners. I cannot recall their investments and projects requiring such large manpower support from home.It is possible that business models of non-Chinese investors are based more heavily on collaborating with local Indian
capabilities.” He was replying to complaints from Chinese businessmen about difficulties in getting work visas from the Indian diplomatic and consular missions in China.


8. Apart from the resentment from unemployed Indian engineers and other skilled personnel, there is also some resentment among Indian construction companies, which had lost out to Chinese companies while bidding for contracts for the construction of power stations.On July 27,2009, the "Times Now" TV channel reported that in a letter written to the Finance Minister in June before the Union Budget, Larsen &
Toubro's Chairman and Managing Director A M Naik had expressed concerns over the import of Chinese power equipment to India that totalled nearly $8.3 billion, while Chinese taxation model struck down any hopes of Indian exports to China. The TV channel quoted his letter as complaining that India is following the 'buy Chinese' policy in which international tenders are not floated to give China advantage.
It also said that "Indian power companies changed specifications to suit Chinese manufacturers and that the Indian manufacturers are being overlooked and Chinese exporters incentivised."


9. There have also been complaints about the inadequate quality of construction by the Chinese companies. Such allegations of poor construction quality were being denied vehemently by the Chinese companies. But, they have been embarrassed by the collapse of a chimney in a power plant under construction in Central Chattisgarh by China's Shandong Electric Power Construction Company. Forty-one people were reported to have been killed in the accident on September 26. The Chinese company, which was engaged in the project with some other non-Chinese companies, has reportedly brought in 80 Chinese workers to work at the site. A news agency has reported that the Chattisgarh Police has told the owners of the project that the Chinese personnel should not be allowed to go back to China till the enquiry into the accident was completed and the responsibility for the accident fixed.


10. Apart from the power sector, Chinese companies have also come in a big way in the telecommunications sector as suppliers of equipment and hand sets and for laying networks. It is said that for security reasons the Government has allowed the Chinese companies to participate in telecom projects mostly in South India away from the border areas. While this is in respect of construction, there are no geographical restrictions on their selling their equipment and hand sets anywhere.


11. In a New Delhi datelined report of September 14,2009, the Reuters news agency reported as follows: " China's ZTE Corp said on Monday (September 14) it has started selling mobile handsets free of usage contracts in India, having previously sold them only through tie-ups with local mobile operators. ZTE, China's second-largest telecoms equipment maker, said it wanted to raise its Indian sales to 20 per cent of its global handset sales from 16 per cent currently.Nokia , the world's top cell phone maker, dominates the Indian market with an about 60 per cent market share.About 120 million mobile phones are sold every year in India and this is expected to rise to 160 million a year by 2013. "


12. There have been reports that the Indian intelligence agencies have been concerned over the security implications of the growing Chinese inroads into the telecom sector. They do not accept the explanation that since the Chinese telecom companies operate mostly in South India, the security implications will not be serious. They reportedly want stricter security-related guidelines to be laid down in respect of the Chinese companies.


13. Concerns such as these were there even earlier, but they have grown since last year because of the allegedly aggressive manner in which Chinese companies have started winning contracts in India.Participating in an interactive session on ‘India and China to drive global economic growth’ at Kolkata in April last,the Consul General of China in Kolkata, Mao Siwei, said, as reported by "the Hindu" of April
12,2009, that while China had now become India’s largest trading partner, for the first time, (with bilateral trade of $51.8 billion in 2008),India had become the largest overseas market for Chinese companies undertaking contract projects. According to him, in 2008, Chinese companies were awarded contracts worth $12.9 billion for various construction projects in India.


14. Critics of China allege that the Chinese companies are treating India like they treat African countries, where they have a free run importing their own work force and bringing Chinese construction equipment when ample skilled Indian personnel and good quality equipment are locally available in India.


15. The Chinese authorities and the Government-controlled media in China have started noting with concern the growing resentment in India over the inroads made by Chinese companies, particularly in the telecom sector. Chinese critics of the campaign in India have been deploring the allegedly imaginary fears being created in the minds of the Indian public about the dangers of a Chinese mole in every
computer and mobile handset bought from China.


16. Xinhua, the Government-controlled news agency, came out with a detailed despatch from New Delhi on this subject on September 9,2009. A copy of it is annexed. (29-9-09)


( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )


ANNEXURE

The Xinhua-circulated despatch of September 9,2009


Restrictions on Chinese telecom equipment good for India?


www.chinaview.cn

by Mao Xiaoxiao

NEW DELHI, Sept. 9 (Xinhua) -- Telecom and electric power equipment are two fields where Chinese companies have made the most breakthroughs in Indian market over the past several years.

However, some voices about "Chinese products threat" have been rising recently from some government bodies and business groups here in the name of safeguarding national security and interests of Indian industry.

Restrictions imposed upon Chinese products equipment will no doubt increase the risk and costs of Chinese companies operating in India. But by doing so, will India gain in the fields of security, commerce and economic development?

ESCALATING TONE OF "CHINESE PRODUCTS THREAT"

On Aug. 28, the Department of Telecommunication (DoT) of India held a meeting with top executives of local telecom companies. DoT officials reportedly asked Indian telecom companies to stop using China-made telecom equipment in sensitive border areas, as the Home Ministry and intelligence agencies are concerned that these equipment could have spyware or malware built into them capable of tracking
voice and data traffic from a location outside the country.

At the end of July, India's leading industry body Association of Chamber of Commerce and Industry of India (Assocham) asked the government to levy import duty on Chinese power equipment. It said the domestic industry is being hampered by the products from China.

Assocham also accused Chinese power equipment producers of offering very low prices under the government subsidies. It said that India imported 8.3 billion U.S. dollars worth of Chinese power equipment in 2008, and therefore asked the government to restrict such imports.

Xinhua has learned from local sources that recently, there has been a trend that some Indian government bodies have been raising the tone of "security threat" from Chinese products.

While expanding its regulation list from state-run telecom companies like the BSNL to private telecom companies, the Indian government on Aug. 28 organized the meeting of telecom companies, making the issue clear and public.

MARKET COMPETITION BEHIND THREAT TONE

An expert on telecom security told Xinhua that Chinese equipment producers are committed to meeting domestic and international standards of security and post-sale security issues are actually taken care of by the local vendors. If there exists a potential security threat,the vendors will have all responsibility.

He said as most media people lack real knowledge of technological issues in telecom production, they have become unconsciously a collaborator in producing the fiction of "software spy".

The Chinese telecom companies are now worried that restrictions on the using of their products could suffocate their development in the Indian market.

Like the telecom industry, Chinese power industry has been known with a similar story of high growth and is facing direct competition from domestic industry, such as India's heavy electricity machinery Producer BHEL.

BHEL previously protected by government granted monopoly, has lost all leverage against outside competitors due to lack of competitive capability, and its production has been on the decline.

Some local analysts believe, the flawed government policy and poor productive forces are main reasons behind India's failure to realize half its goal to increase electric power in the past five-year-plan.

RESTRICTIONS GOOD FOR INDIA?

According to local media reports, many Indian private telecom vendors have openly expressed opposition to government plan to ban Chinese equipment.

They warned government officials that such measures could only hurt Indian telecom industry itself, because most of them have signed contracts with such Chinese producers as Huawei Technologies and the ZTE.

They said the price of Chinese telecom equipment is lower than those of Ericsson, Nokia and Siemens. Most Indian telecom companies newly entering the local market signed buying contracts with Chinese companies because of the high competitiveness in price, while some established old brand companies are using Chinese price as a bargain in talks with European producers.

Local news reports said some DoT officials have already hinted that the government might soften "compulsory measures" against Chinese products into "security guidelines", and might also minimize the number of states to be designated as "sensitive border area" banned from Chinese products.


Editor: Xiong Tong