B.RAMAN
US policy-makers had hoped that the taking-over of Gen. David Petraeus as the commander of the US Central Command, and Gen. Stanley McChrystal as the US Commander in Afghanistan working under Gen.Petraeus would bring about a more proactive strategy to weaken the Taliban and create a divide between it and the Afghan people. The two had earned a reputation in Iraq for reversing the fortunes of Al Qaeda and the former Baathist soldiers of Saddam Hussein, creating a divide between the two and enlisting the support of different tribal leaders and through them their followers for the US military operations. The improvement in the ground situation in Iraq----though not yet irreversible--- was largely due to their thinking, planning and execution.
2. Hopes in Washington that the two Generals would bring about similar results in Afghanistan have been belied so far.The Af-Pak troika of the administration of Barack Obama---- Richard Holbrooke, Obama's special representative for the Af-Pak region, who handles the political and diplomatic angles, and the two Generals--- has not been able to come to grips with the problem almost six months after the new Af-Pak policy of the Obama adminstration was launched in March last. The present ground situation favours the Pakistan-based Neo Taliban. Since the two Generals took over, the Neo Taliban has been able to increase and strengthen its presence in the north too. The situation is still one of a bleeding stalemate, but the prospects of the US-led forces breaking the stalemate and prevailing over the Neo Taliban are not any the brighter since the two Generals took over.
3. The dilemma posed by the worrisome ground situation is reflected in the growing impression that Obama's Af-Pak strategy has failed to take off and is unlikely to take off and that the time has come to think of a new strategy in which the key to success would be in Pakistan and not in Afghanistan.Vice-President Joe Biden seems to favour a change of focus from a Neo Taliban-centric strategy in Afghanistan to an Al Qaeda-centric one in Pakistan.
4.Presently, the political pressure is on Pakistan to act against the Taliban and Al Qaeda elements operating from sanctuaries in its territory and on the Hamid Karzai Government in Kabul to improve governance, reduce corruption and pay better attention to the problems of the people in the areas controlled by the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the US-led Western forces.
5. Neither of these pressures has worked. Nor have the never-ending incentives offered by the US to Pakistan---the latest of which is the expected passage by both Houses of the US Congress of the Kerry-Lugar Bill making a long term commitment of US$ 7.5 billion to Pakistan in the form of non-military aid over a period of five years. The military aid, which too continues to increase, will be in addition. Original expectations when Obama assumed office in January last that strict benchmarks would be laid down for the periodic disbursements of this aid in order to ensure that Pakistan does act sincerely and firmly against the terrorists have been belied.The more Pakistan is pampered, the less it acts against the terrorists. That has been the lesson since 9/11 and this lesson has not been learnt by the officials of the Obama administration.This is evident even from the grim Assessment dated August 30,2009, prepared by Gen.McChrystal, on the basis of which he is reported to be planning to ask for another surge of 21000 US troops--- a request over which Obama is reportedly not enthusiastic.
6. The pressures on Karzai to improve governance have not worked either. This is partly due to the difficult ground situation, which would pose a dilemma to any ruler---however democratic and however competent. Moreover, instead of strengthening the position of Karzai, US officials have done everything to weaken his credibility in the eyes of his own people as well as the international community through allegations---some true, many unwisely inspired--- regarding his inability or unwillingness to act against corruption and narcotics production and rigging in the Presidential elections. Even if he wins the elections in the first round itself----as he is expected to--- the importance of that victory has already been diluted by these allegations. US officials take a lot of care not to say or do anything, which might weaken the position of the Pakistani leadership, but they do not take similar care in respect of Karzai.
7.In the existing gloomy scenario, there are only two positive factors, which provide some cheer. Firstly, the improvement in the flow of human intelligence to the US intelligence community from sources in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, which has led to some significant sucesses in the form of eradication of some middle-level leaders of Al Qaeda and even senior leaders of the Pakistan Taliban known as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) by US drone strikes. After having eliminated Baitullah Mehsud, the Amir of the TTP, the Drone strikes are now focussed on eliminating the Haqqani network consisting of the old Soviet era mujahideen warrior Jalaluddin Haqqani and his sons. If the US succeeds in eliminating the Haqqani network--- I hope it will--- the pressure on the US forces in Afghan territory could lessen--- at least in the short term. As against this, the impact of the elimination of Baitullah on the ground situation in Afghanistan would be minimal. His elimination was more a boon to the Pakistani security forces grappling with terrorists of their own creation in their territory than to the US-led Western forces in Afghanistan.
8.The second positive factor is the role of India as a force for stability in Afghanistan. Any objective analyst has to concede that the various road construction, democracy-promotion and people-oriented programmes undertaken by India in the areas controlled by the Government of Afghanistan have benefitted not only the people of Afghanistan immensely, but also the long-term Western objective of a democratic, modern Afghanistan.
9. One would have expected the US policy-makers not only to recognise the importance of retaining the role of India as a force for stability, but also encouraging India to expand further its people-oriented role in Afghanistan. In his assessment, McChrystal recognises --- though somewhat grudgingly-- the beneficial role of India and the support for that role from the Karzai Government, but one is surprised to find that he shows understanding for the Pakistani concerns over India's role and hints that these concerns have to be taken into consideration while formulating any revised strategy. He himself says that no strategy will work unless it is people-oriented, but at the same time wants something to be done to address Pakistani concerns over India's people-oriented role.
10.The Afghan people---whether Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbecks or others--- distrust and hate the Pakistanis after seeing the role played by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in the creation and fattening of the Taliban since 1994. One saw the extent of the hatred for the Pakistanis when the American and Northern Alliance troops entered Kabul in 2001 under Operation Enduring Freedom. Pakistanis assisting the Taliban Government in Kabul were hunted, killed and their dead bodies thrown into the gutters of Kabul.
11. Gen.McChrystal's ideas, if implemented, would provide an environment for the re-assertion of the hated Pakistani role by paying attention to Pakistani concerns over India's positive role.This shows how short-sighted US policy-makers and military-officers can be.The General's assessment is disappointing because it fails to put its finger on the crux of the dilemma being faced by the US-led Western forces, similar to the dilemma which the Soviet troops faced in Afghanistan in the 1980s before they decided to quit in 1988.This dilemma arose in the case of the Soviet troops and has now arisen in the case of the US-led Western troops from the absence of a counter-sanctuaries component to the counter-insurgency strategy.
12.The reluctance of the Soviet troops to take their fighting to the sanctuaries of the Afghan Mujahideen in Pakistani territory led to a situation where the Soviet troops kept bleeding till battle fatigue and public disenchantment with the war set in. Similarly, the absence of an effective counter-sanctuaries component is leading to a situation where the US and other Western forces as well as the ANA are bleeding more and more. There are already the incipient signs of a battle fatigue as cound be seen even from the General's assessment and the beginning of a public disenchantment with the involvement in Afghanistan. This disenchantment is already pronounced in West Europe and Canada and one could see the beginning of it even in the US. Instead of allowing the Neo Taliban to infiltrate in increasing numbers from its sanctuaries and recruiting grounds in the FATA and the Pashtun majority areas of Balochistan and then fighting or countering their ambushes in Afghan territory, the US should take its counter-insurgency operations to the camps of the Neo Taliban in adjoining Pakistani territory----whether in the FATA or in Balochistan.
13. The US already has an air-mounted counter-sanctuaries strategy in the FATA with the help of the Drones, which provide a deniable way of hitting at the sanctuaries of Al Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban and the Neo Taliban. This strategy has had its successes, but, despite them, has proved inadequate. Initially, these strikes were concentrated on the sanctuaries of Al Qaeda and its allies in North Waziristan. Earlier this year, when there was a danger of the TTP expanding its presence to the non-tribal areas and posing a danger to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, the focus of the Drone strikes shifted to South Waziristan against the sanctuaries of the TTP.During the last six months or so, the objective of these strikes became not protecting the NATO forces and the ANA in Afghanistan from attacks mounted from the Pakistani territory, but assisting the Pakistan Army in reversing the advance of the TTP into the non-tribal areas. After killing Baitullah in the first week of August, the US has again changed the direction and is now focussing on the Haqqani network, whose threat is more in Afghan territory than in the FATA. The US has not been able to mount a full-scale operation against Al Qaeda sanctuaries in North Waziristan due to the dispersal of its resources to South Waziristan for use against the TTP.
14. Even this limited success has not been there against the staging grounds of the Neo Taliban in Balochistan.The US continues to depend on the Pakistan Army for action against the sanctuaries of the Neo Taliban. The ISI-sponsored Neo Taliban is the only asset left with the Pakistan Army for regaining its primacy in Afghanistan if and when the US and other Western troops leave Afghanistan. Pakistan wants to regain this primacy without the direct deployment of its own army as it did in the 1990s. If the US is waiting for the Pakistan Army to act against the Neo Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistani territory, this is not going to happen. The US has only two alternatives---either itself act against the sanctuaries in Balochistan and destroy the Neo Taliban leadership in order to restore the damaged image of the US forces in Afghanistan, thereby paving the way for an honourable exit or keep its operations confined to Afghan territory, thereby continuing to bleed and face the prospect of an exit forced on the US by the Neo Taliban under humiliating conditions.
15.The role of the Drones---even if extended to Balochistan-- may not be as effective as their role in the FATA. The places in the FATA where the sanctuaries of Al Qaeda,the TTP and the Haqqani network are located are far from inhabited areas. The dangers of civilian fatalities are not large. In the Quetta and adjoining areas of Balochistan, the sanctuaries of the Neo Taliban are located in inhabited areas. It would be very difficult---almost impossible---to avoid large civilian fatalities. Deniable ground operations would, therefore, be necessary to eliminate the sanctuaries of the Neo Taliban. The US has the capability for such ground operations, but does not have the political will to use it lest it add to the already high anti-US feelings in Pakistan and affect even the limited co-operration which it has presently been getting from Pakistan in the FATA.
16. This danger of adverse reaction in Pakistan has to be faced if the US wants to bring about better ground conditions, which would enable it to contemplate withdrawing from Afghanistan with honour and with some confidence that Afghanistan will not revert to its pre-9/11 position of being the rear base for Al Qaeda. Before contemplating withdrawal, the US has to destroy Al Qaeda sanctuaries, including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, in the FATA, the Haqqani network and the Neo Taliban sanctuaries in Balochistan. It has to come to terms with the hard reality that this is something which the US has to do without depending on Pakistan.Pakistan and Al Qaeda are biding their time hoping that after the US withdrawal, they can move into Afghanistan once again. This should not be allowed to happen.
17. Instead of discussing the various options available in this regard,McChrystal's report skirts the crux of the dilemma and discusses other issues having little relevance to a counter-sanctuaries strategy. His assessment reads more like one prepared by a senior officer attending a joint staff course than a recommendation for action prepared by an officer in charge of command and control. It is possible there is a classified part of the Assessment in which McChrystal discusses a counter-sanctuaries strategy. If not, his thinking doesn't bode well for the ultimate success of the US operations in the Af-Pak region.
18. This may please be read in continuation of my earlier paper of May 13,2009, titled "The Af-Pak Situation--An Update", at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers32/paper3186.html (27-9-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Sunday, September 27, 2009
Wednesday, September 23, 2009
PAKISTAN & THE US KARMA
In response to my latest article on Gilgit-Baltistan, I was in receipt of a mail from a highly-respected US analyst asking me whether what is going on in Balochistan and Swat is good for India. I am giving below my reply, which I have sent separately:
Many thanks for your kind message. Balochistan has nothing to do with India or vice versa.It is a question of the on-going freedom struggle in Balochistan being good or bad for Pakistan. It is definitely not good for Pakistan, which has already once suffered a traumatic split in 1971 due to the inability of its political and military leadership to understand the extent of the alienation of the Bengalis and the inability of US policy-makers to realise the implications of the alienation.Thirty-eight years later, one is facing a similar situation. Neither the political nor the military leadership of Pakistan has been able to understand the extent of the alienation of the Balochs and they are dealing with them in the same way Yahya Khan, Tikka Khan, Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto and others dealt with the Bengalis---through brute force. The failure of the US policy-makers to realise the serious implications of what is going on in Balochistan and their inability----as surprising as theirs in 1971-- is aggravating the situation both for Pakistan and the US. I have been studying Pakistan and the US from the sub-continental perspective for four decades. The US policy of solidarity with Pakistan right or wrong has repeatedly proved to be the kiss of disaster for Pakistan. Swat is a mosquito bite compared to what has been going on in Balochistan. Both Balochistan and Swat are the internal affairs of Pakistan and policy traps of the US. India, as a sub-continental power, watches the situation closely and as a genuine friend and well-wisher of the US feels concerned over the blindness of US policy-makers and think-tanks. Like the old Bourbon kings of France, US policy-makers dealing with the sub-continent have nothing to learn and nothing to forget. The US is unable to come out of its karma. Warm regards. B.Raman
Many thanks for your kind message. Balochistan has nothing to do with India or vice versa.It is a question of the on-going freedom struggle in Balochistan being good or bad for Pakistan. It is definitely not good for Pakistan, which has already once suffered a traumatic split in 1971 due to the inability of its political and military leadership to understand the extent of the alienation of the Bengalis and the inability of US policy-makers to realise the implications of the alienation.Thirty-eight years later, one is facing a similar situation. Neither the political nor the military leadership of Pakistan has been able to understand the extent of the alienation of the Balochs and they are dealing with them in the same way Yahya Khan, Tikka Khan, Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto and others dealt with the Bengalis---through brute force. The failure of the US policy-makers to realise the serious implications of what is going on in Balochistan and their inability----as surprising as theirs in 1971-- is aggravating the situation both for Pakistan and the US. I have been studying Pakistan and the US from the sub-continental perspective for four decades. The US policy of solidarity with Pakistan right or wrong has repeatedly proved to be the kiss of disaster for Pakistan. Swat is a mosquito bite compared to what has been going on in Balochistan. Both Balochistan and Swat are the internal affairs of Pakistan and policy traps of the US. India, as a sub-continental power, watches the situation closely and as a genuine friend and well-wisher of the US feels concerned over the blindness of US policy-makers and think-tanks. Like the old Bourbon kings of France, US policy-makers dealing with the sub-continent have nothing to learn and nothing to forget. The US is unable to come out of its karma. Warm regards. B.Raman
Monday, September 21, 2009
GILGIT-BALTISTAN: THE AQ KHAN PROLIFERATION HIGHWAY---PART VII
B.RAMAN
Before the Agra summit of July 14-16,2001, between Atal Behari Vajpayee, the then Indian Prime Minister, and Pervez Musharraf, the latter had held a series of consultations with political and religious leaders of Pakistan, including Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), on his negotiating strategy at Agra. Significantly, he did not invite any representative from the NA for these consultations.
2.Reliable source reports indicated that his decision not to invite anyone from the NA was due to the fact that Gilgit was in a serious state of unrest for a fortnight from the last week of June,2001, due to protests from Sunni organisations over the decision of the local administration to introduce different text-books in the schools for the Shias, who are in a majority in Gilgit, and the Sunnis. Embarrassed by the outbreak of the violence before the summit, the Pakistani authorities stopped all movements between Gilgit and the rest of Pakistan and imposed strict censorship on the publication of the details of the incidents in Gilgit.
3.The riots in Gilgit started on June 23,2001, when there were clashes between the workers of the extremist Sunni organisation Sipah Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and law enforcing agencies following the arrests of some SSP leaders, who demanded that Shia students should study the same books as were prescribed for Sunni students by the Sunni Ulema and not separate books approved by the Shia clergy.
4.The Sunni traders started a shutter down strike in protest against the arrests of the central Khateeb and Ameer Tanzeem-e-Ahle-Sunnah-al-Jamat, Maulana Nisar Ahmed, and the President of the Gilgit branch of the SSP,Himayat-ullah, along with other religious scholars on the night of June 22.
5.To disperse rioting SSP members, the police first baton charged and when the SSP cadres retaliated by pelting stones, they fired tear-gas shells intermittently for nearly two hours, which resulted in a large number of casualties. A curfew was imposed and para-military forces were deployed to enforce it.
6.Thousands of protesting activists of the Ahle Sunnah blocked the roads in Gilgit City and Kohistan to prevent the movement of reinforcements, which were then rushed to the affected areas by helicopters. The Army then forcibly removed the demonstrators from the roads and used bulldozers to remove the barricades erected by them.
7.Subsequently, about 500 activists of the SSP surrounded the Gilgit City Police Station, demanded the release of the arrested Sunni leaders and defied an one-hour ultimatum to disperse issued by the Army.Brig.Zahid Mubashir, the Station Commander at Gilgit, then rushed to the Police Station and tried unsuccessfully to persuade the demonstrators to disperse. Later, he withdrew the Army to the barracks and let the local Police handle the inflamed situattion.
8.Meanwhile,another crowd of demonstrators led by Maulana Luqman Hakim, leader of the local unit of the Jamaat-ul-Ulema Islam (JUI), and two members of the Northern Areas Council Sumbal Shah and Saif ur Rehman Khan surrounded the local airfield and refused to allow any aircraft to land or take off. They demanded the transfer of Muhammad Ali Shahzad, a Shia, who was the Deputy Commissioner of Gilgit, for
allegedly permitting the Shias to have their own text-books.
9.The Army cut off all telephone communications inside the NA as well as between the NA and the rest of Pakistan. Despite this, the news of the demonstrations spread to the rest of the NA resulting in demonstrations in other areas too and also in the Kohistan District of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). The demonstrating mobs blocked the Karakoram Highway at many points.
10.Musharraf thereupon rushed Abbas Sarfaraz Khan, his Minister in charge of the POK and NA Affairs, to Gilgit to take control of the situation. Normalcy could be restored only by the first week of July.
11.The unrest was mainly directed against the Shia officers of the local Administration.There were no attacks by the Sunnis on the Shia civilian population. Long before the unrest, the "Dawn" of Karachi had reported as follows:
"Though outwardly calm, the Northern Areas of Pakistan are simmering with a crisis that has all the ingredients of boiling over the rim: the over 2 million people of the Northern Areas spread over an area of 72,500 sq km are politically unrepresented in Pakistan and thus facing obvious neglect as all the governments have linked their fate to the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. This discontent and anger, if not
appeased, can erupt into a national crisis with far reaching consequences.
"The region classified as 'Northern Areas' comprises five districts: Gilgit, Diamir, Baltistan, Ghizer and Ghanche. It had voluntarily acceded to Pakistan on Nov 1, 1948, liberating itself from the Dogra Raj. Yet, Islamabad considers it to be a disputed territory and links its future to that of Kashmir. The people of this area have neither been granted any civil, human and constitutional rights, nor do they have due representation in the legislature.
"The area has always been governed directly from Islamabad through an appointed Chief Secretary, armed with the Frontier Crime Regulation (FCR) laws. Although there is an elected Northern Areas Council to regulate its local affairs, the locals believe it to be just a 'rubber stamp'. Besides the Chief Secretary and a Minister for Northern Areas and Kashmir Affairs and his six officers, who sit in Islamabad,
the area has no other legal representation. All these people are non-locals, including the Judicial Commissioner against whose judgements there is no right to appeal.
"Fifty-three years down the line and exposed to an era of digital communication, the people of the Northern Areas are getting restless. Though committed to the denominators of Pakistan's security and integrity, they have started questioning Islamabad's policy of keeping them unrepresented and backward till Kashmir's fate has been determined. Their demand makes sense as even the internationally
accepted disputed territory of Kashmir has an assembly and an independent legal status.
"The feeling of alienation among the inhabitants of these areas is growing as Islamabad continues to turn a blind eye to their misery; they feel the government is trying to solve the Kashmir issue at their expense. The frequent protest demonstrations and various efforts by the locals in an attempt to attract the attention of Islamabad are too obvious a distress signal to ignore. Rallies marking 'day of deprivation' are held in many pockets across Gilgit and Baltistan.
"In May 1999, the Supreme Court of Pakistan in a landmark judgment ruled: "The NA are a disputed territory and the Government of Pakistan has no claim over it." In the same breath, the apex court asked the Federal Government to grant the region its due status within the next "six months". Nothing has come of it so far. The rift is taking its toll on the region in the form of grave national and international
consequences.
"The unrepresented status of the NA has resulted in its alienation from the national mainstream, causing deprivation and socio-economic backwardness. Strategically located, this serene and beautiful region is among the most poverty-ridden parts of the country. Lacking a strong socio-economic infrastructure, the region is not developed. Despite strong nationalistic feelings among the people of the NA, they
would like to enter into a legal and constitutional arrangement with Pakistan. The Northern Areas are as important to us as Kashmir; and this fact should be recognized by the authorities.
"On the international front, the indecisive status of the NA is a source of embarrassment. It hinders the development work. The pending Basha Dam, the gold mining project of the Australians and other such projects are examples of how the donors shy away from the region owing to its lack of constitutional and legal status.
"Similarly, tourism has failed to get a boost for which even the essential infrastructure is missing. "It is ironic that the world is more worried about the falling trees; they are sad that our white leopard are vanishing day by day; the dead bodies of our Markhor frightens them; they are going all out to preserve our ecosystem. But nobody ever thinks of the people of this land," says Raja Hussain Khan Maqpoon, Editor of Gilgit-Baltistan's weekly newspaper K2.
"While it is true that this area has some of the finest wildlife in the world which is in urgent need of protection, the fact that the people living here are facing abject poverty cannot be ignored for long. Much as they would like to preserve their heritage, it is becoming very difficult for them to cooperate with the concerned agencies in the face of non-existent basic facilities such as electricity, drinking water and elementary health care. Remoteness has added to their misery.
"Gilgit and Baltistan, which lie to the north of India, were part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) before 1947. In order to distinguish them from the valley proper, Jammu and Ladakh regions, they used to be called the Northern Areas of Jammu and Kashmir. After the 1948 war over Kashmir, the Government of Pakistan issued a proclamation on April 28, 1949, separating the Northern Areas of J&K from Azad
Kashmir and placing them under the administration of the Federal Government under the name of Northern Areas of Pakistan.
"Since then time has stood still for the locals owing to total neglect by successive regimes in Islamabad. For almost five decades, the area has been under virtual Martial Law. Under the Frontier Crime Regulations, framed by the British during the colonial days, every resident of the area has to report to the local police station once a month and all movements from one village to another have to be reported to the
police station.
"Frustration arising out of unemployment is forcing the youth to come out on the streets. As they have no access to courts they never receive any redress. Lack of educational institutions has practically closed all avenues of government jobs, thus negating their chances for upliftment. Money earmarked for development projects often end up in wrong places, so the economy is mainly dependent on agriculture.
But like feudalism everywhere, most of the land is owned by a privileged few with no respite to the common man.
"Hunza is a comparative exception. A high level of missionary movement and the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme has brought about a unique mix of modern education in the most primitive of places. Then, the border town of Sost, just below the Khunjerab Pass, also does well by the trade of electronic goods with China.
"However, it is time Islamabad played its cards with prudence and foresight. Cruising along the international front with Kashmir is fine, but it should not be done at the cost of the Northern Areas. They should be granted their due status and rights, to which they were entitled at the time they acceded to Pakistan."
Shaheen Sardar Ali, a prominent lawyer of the Peshawar bar, has co-authored a book titled "Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic Minorities of Pakistan" (Curzon Press) on the mess created by the ideological principle that only religion was the basis of nationhood. She attributes the ethnic and linguistic troubles of Pakistan to the blindly monistic claim that if one is a Muslim one can't be a Sindhi, Balochi, or Kashmiri etc and draws attention to the following facts:
"It is Article 21 of the 1974 Interim Constitution Act passed by the 48-member Azad Jammu and Kashmir unicameral assembly in 1974 which tells us how 'azad' is Azad Kashmir although the leader of the majority in the House is called Prime Minister unlike his counterpart in Held Kashmir. The article explained the role played by the Government of Pakistan in the affairs of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. It is in fact the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council based in Islamabad which runs Azad Kashmir. The Prime Minister of Pakistan is its Chairman and a Secretary of the Ministry for Kashmir Affairs actually runs the territory on a daily basis. The Council has Azad Kashmiri members, including the President and Prime Minister, but it is the Prime Minister (of Pakistan) who orders everyone around. His power derives from the fact that he gives Azad Kashmir its annual budget and can actually dismiss the government of the state if the fancy takes him.
"Azad Kashmir has a High Court, but all appeals against its decisions lie in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which makes sure that nothing is adjudicated in the state contrary to the policy of the Federal Government. One example of this came in the shape of cases in 1993 and 1995 ( Malik Muhammad Miskeen and Others vs. Government of Pakistan, through Secretary Kashmir Affairs and Northern Affairs Division,
Islamabad and Others [PLD AJ&K] and Federation of Pakistan vs. Malik Muhammad Miskeen and Eight Others [PLD SC]). In 1949, Pakistan decided to take over the administration of the Gilgit-Baltistan territory which is legally a part of Azad Kashmir. It concluded an agreement with the Government in Muzaffarabad and simply delinked it from Azad Kashmir to call it the Northern Areas. Later on, when it (Islamabad) sorted out its frontier with China, some of this territory was ceded to China with the proviso that the settlement was subject to the final solution of the Kashmir dispute. The cases at the Azad Kashmir High Court challenged the authority of the Federal Government to take away the Northern Areas and wanted the territory returned to the administration of Muzaffarabad.
"It is understandable that the High Court found for the petitioner. The Azad Kashmir Government was hardly sovereign to sign an equal treaty with Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan admitted that the Northern Areas were a part of the state. The Court ordered that Gilgit-Baltistan be returned to Azad Kashmir, whereafter Islamabad went to the Supreme Court in Islamabad in appeal. Here the case was
decided on political grounds, the Federal Government strangely taking the position that the case was not based on legality but politics."
The book concludes:"The judgement became the cause of serious concern for the Governments of Pakistan and Azad Jammu & Kashmir and they appealed to the Supreme Court. The contention that the Northern Areas formed historically part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir was not - indeed could not - be denied by either Government. That the Northern Areas were being looked after by the Pakistan government administratively by virtue of the 1949 agreement between the two governments was not disputed either. The arguments at the Supreme Court were mainly confined to technicalities of the petition. The Government of Pakistan contended that the issues raised were basically political in nature and hence not amenable to discussion and judgement before a court of law. It was further argued that the High
Court of Azad Jammu & Kashmir lacked jurisdiction in this matter as it could not issue a writ to the Government of Pakistan. In short the Supreme Court overturned the judgement handed down by the High Court of the state without going into the substantive details of the case."
Other points to emerge from the book and other comments in Pakistan were: "And how has the Government of Pakistan acquitted itself of the responsibility of administering the Northern Areas or the region of Gilgit-Baltistan? Here too the Northern Areas Council has no independence and is run by the same Ministry that runs Azad Kashmir. What a politically unsteady Islamabad has done to the Northern
Areas is clear, if you study the developments in the region since 1988 when the first big sectarian killings occurred there. The book modestly states that the ulema began to be given more importance than the people, which caused the Islamised administration of Islamabad to retreat before the rising Sunni storm against the two communities (Shias and Ismailis) that formed the majority in Gilgit-Baltistan. Gilgit joined the other centres of Shia concentration in Pakistan, like Jhang and Parachinar, when its population were brutalised by the Deobandi assault, carrying a clear stamp of anti-Shia Afghanistan. The Aga Khan Foundation projects in Gilgit were attacked and bombed while Shia-Sunni marriages were stopped by force by the warrior priests. "
12.While the Government of Pakistan has, since 1975, allowed at least a façade of democracy and autonomy to Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), it has kept the NA under tight federal control, imposing an iron curtain in the area. The reasons are its strategic location adjoining China and the clandestine use of the Karakoram Highway for the movement of Chinese nuclear material and missiles.
13.The "Washington Times" carried two reports on August 6 and 7,2001, stating as follows:
* The China National Machinery & Equipment Import & Export Corporation sent a dozen shipments of missile components to Pakistan since November,2000, and a US spy satellite detected the latest shipment as it arrived by truck at the mountainous Chinese-Pakistani border May 1,2001. The company supplied components for Pakistan's Shaheen-1 and Shaheen-2 missile programmes. The consignments were sent by ship and truck.
* The missile components were being used for the production of the Shaheen-1, which has an estimated range of 465 miles, and the development of the Shaheen-2, which US intelligence agencies think would have a range of up to 1,240 miles.
14.In a statement issued at Beijing on August 8,2001,the China National Machinery and Equipment Import and Export Corporation (CMEC) claimed that it had never exported or provided missile components to Pakistan. It contended that the CMEC's business scope was mainly confined to the contracting of international engineering projects, and export of machinery and electrical products and complete plants.
Since its founding, the CMEC had always operated strictly within the bounds of law and the business scope approved by the state and had never exported or provided any military equipment, arms or related components to Pakistan or any other country, it claimed further. It added that the CMEC had never used trucks as a means of transportation for cross-border exports.
15.Refuting the "Washington Times" report on August 9,2001, a spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Office claimed that China had all along been implementing its non-proliferation policy in a serious, earnest and responsible approach and accused some newspapers in the US of frequently spreading "irresponsible and totally unfounded rumours" and slanders of China engaging in proliferation, which was entirely
driven by "ulterior motives."
16.She added that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles had an impact on international peace and security, and all countries had the obligation to strictly observe the relevant international legal instruments. "If any country adopts a selective approach to these legal instruments, it will only undermine the international non-proliferation efforts. It is even more inadvisable to spread irresponsible remarks based on so-called `intelligence' that is fabricated out of thin air in an attempt to exert pressure on other countries."
17.In the past, Pakistan had been receiving its clandestine missile consignments from North Korea by sea. Since the appointment of Richard Armitage as Deputy Secretary of State in the Bush Administration, Pakistan and North Korea were worried because in a paper on US policy options towards North Korea submitted to the US House of Representatives on March 4,1999, Armitage had, inter alia,
recommended as follows: "Should diplomacy fail, the United States would have to consider two alternative courses, neither of which is attractive. One is to live with and deter a nuclear North Korea armed with delivery systems, with all its implications for the region. The other is preemption, with the attendant uncertainties. Strengthened deterrence and containment. This would involve a more ready and robust posture, including a willingness to interdict North Korean missile exports on the high seas. Our posture in the wake of a failure of diplomacy would position the United States and its allies to enforce 'red lines.' Preemption. We recognize the dangers and difficulties associated with this option. To be considered, any such initiative must be based on precise knowledge of facilities, assessment of probable success, and clear understanding with our allies of the risks."
18.During the visit of the then Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji to Pakistan in May,2001, Islamabad had taken up with China the question of allowing future missile consignments from North Korea to come to Pakistan by road via China and the NA and, according to reliable sources in the NA, this started happening thereafter.
19. After his return from the Agra summit, Musharraf visited the NA in August,2001. His visit came in the wake of the reports carried by the "Washington Times" about the detection by the US intelligence of a convoy of trucks carrying Chinese missile components by the Karakoram Highway. The Pakistani military junta had taken considerable precautions to prevent detection of the truck movements by not
associating any of the officials of the NA Administration, particularly the Shias, with the arrangements for the movement. In view of this,both Islamabad and Beijing were surprised and embarrassed by the US media reports that US intelligence had detected the truck movements. Pakistani officials claimed that even if US satellites had detected the trucks, they could not have known that the
consignments contained missile components. They, therefore, reportedly felt that there must have been leakage to the CIA from one of the Pakistani officials associated with the movement. Moreover, following past US detection of the storage of the earlier missiles/components in Sargoda, the military junta had drawn up alternate plans for storage in Gilgit in the hope that there would be less possibility of detection there by the CIA. Before Musharraf's arrival in the NA, Lt.Gen. Jamshed Gulzar, then Corps Commander, 10 Corps based in Rawalpindi, had
visited the NA to enquire into the leakage jointly with the Force Commander, NA, Lt-Gen Muhammad Safdar. Measures for tightening up security in the NA was one of the subjects which figured during the discussions of Musharraf in Gilgit in which apart from senior military officers, Abbas Sarfaraz, Musharraf's Minister for Kashmir and NA Affairs, who was also the Chief Executive of the NA, also participated.
20.In the NA, Musharraf had discussions with the officials of the NA Administration on the law and order situation in the wake of the riots by the Sunnis in June, 2001. He also addressed the NA Council, which had only powers of a local body and was not a full-fledged Assembly with legislative powers. He promised to consider suggestions for upgrading it as a full-fledged Legislative Assembly. At the same time, he made it clear that in view of the strategic importance of the area, the NA could not have a President and a Prime Minister as in POK, but would continue to be directly administered from Islamabad by the Ministry of Kashmir and NA Affairs, with the Minister in charge acting as the Chief Executive of the NA.
21.Musharraf declined to receive representatives of local Shia organisations, who wanted to present a memorandum reiterating their demand for the conversion of the NA into a separate Karakoram province, with the new province having the same powers as the other provinces of Pakistan. The Shias' demand for a sepate province is strongly opposed by the Sunnis of the POK, the Sunni component of the NA population and by the Sunni organisations of Pakistan.
22.The NA does not have a separate budget of its own. Its budget is incorporated in the budget of the Federal Government. After the Kargil conflict of 1999, the Federal Government, on the advice of the Army, embarked upon a plan for the improvement of road communications in the NA. The Federal Government allocated Rs 600 million for the construction of roads in the area.
23.There is no truckable road between Gilgit and Chitral, which is mainly accessible from Afghanistan along the Kunar River. A jeepable track was developed after 1950 between Dir and Darosh passing over the 3118 meter high Lowari Pass. However, it is open for only six months during the summer. The Lowari Pass remains blocked by snow during the rest of the year. During this period, the only way of
reaching Chitral is either by the Pakistan International Airways (PIA)'s Fokkar flights or through Afghan territory via the Bajaur Agency.
24.In 1975, an attempt to connect Chitral with the rest of Pakistan was made when work on an 8 km long tunnel under the Lowari Pass was started by the Lowari Tunnel Organisation, an army engineers' organisation, but they could not succeed in constructing the tunnel and the work was abandoned in 1977.
25.The Musharraf Government drew up in 2001 plans for the construction of a 24 -feet wide truckable road between Gilgit and Chitral as follows:
* Chitral to Mastuj (100 km):Already metalled for about 80 kms up to Buni. The remaining portion was to be metalled.
* Mastuj-Shandur: (42 km ): There was a jeepable track over the 3734m high Shandur top, which is the boundary between the NWFP and the NA. The elevation varies from 2280m in Mastuj to 3734 m at Shandur, which would be the highest point on this proposed road.
* Shandur- Pingal( 62 km):There was a jeepable track along the Ghizar river in Ghizar District. The jeep track descends from a height of 3734m to 2185 m at Pingal.
* Pingal-Gahkuch (40 km): There was a jeepable track along the Ghizar river. Gahkuch is the headquarters of Ghizar District. It descends from a height of 2185 m to 1870 m at Gahkuch.
* Gahkuch-Gilgit (77 km): A road already existed, which was to be metalled. The elevation at Gilgit is 1454m.
26.The Astore Valley and the Deosai plains used to provide the oldest route connecting Gilgit with Srinagar via the Burzil Pass and Skardu through Chotta Deosai and Sadpara. In 2001 a project was undertaken to connect Thelichi with Skardu via Chilum and Deosai to provide a shorter route between Astore and Skardu. The project was to be implemented as follows:
* Thelechi-Chilum (94 kms): It was to be 24 ft wide with 12 ft metalled. The elevation of the road rises from about 1250 m at Thelechi to 3400m at Chilum.
* Chilum to Deosai Plains ( 53 km): This section spans the Deosai. An existing track was to be widened. Its elevation is around 4500 m and it remains under snow for about four to five months in a year.
* Deosai Plains to Sadpara(29 km):Will be 24 feet wide. The elevation descends from the Deosai Plains (4500m) to 2600 m at Sadpara.
* Sadpara to Skardu (10km): This section will be 24 ft wide with 12 ft metalled. The elevation is around 2500 m. The area is snow bound for about two to three months in a year.
26.During his visit to the NA ---- his third since he assumed power in October,1999--- Musharraf inaugurated work on these projects. There were unconfirmed reports that the Pakistani Army had sought the assistance of North Korean army engineers for the construction of the Lowari tunnel. (21-9-09)
To be continued.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventy-one2@gmail.com )
Before the Agra summit of July 14-16,2001, between Atal Behari Vajpayee, the then Indian Prime Minister, and Pervez Musharraf, the latter had held a series of consultations with political and religious leaders of Pakistan, including Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), on his negotiating strategy at Agra. Significantly, he did not invite any representative from the NA for these consultations.
2.Reliable source reports indicated that his decision not to invite anyone from the NA was due to the fact that Gilgit was in a serious state of unrest for a fortnight from the last week of June,2001, due to protests from Sunni organisations over the decision of the local administration to introduce different text-books in the schools for the Shias, who are in a majority in Gilgit, and the Sunnis. Embarrassed by the outbreak of the violence before the summit, the Pakistani authorities stopped all movements between Gilgit and the rest of Pakistan and imposed strict censorship on the publication of the details of the incidents in Gilgit.
3.The riots in Gilgit started on June 23,2001, when there were clashes between the workers of the extremist Sunni organisation Sipah Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and law enforcing agencies following the arrests of some SSP leaders, who demanded that Shia students should study the same books as were prescribed for Sunni students by the Sunni Ulema and not separate books approved by the Shia clergy.
4.The Sunni traders started a shutter down strike in protest against the arrests of the central Khateeb and Ameer Tanzeem-e-Ahle-Sunnah-al-Jamat, Maulana Nisar Ahmed, and the President of the Gilgit branch of the SSP,Himayat-ullah, along with other religious scholars on the night of June 22.
5.To disperse rioting SSP members, the police first baton charged and when the SSP cadres retaliated by pelting stones, they fired tear-gas shells intermittently for nearly two hours, which resulted in a large number of casualties. A curfew was imposed and para-military forces were deployed to enforce it.
6.Thousands of protesting activists of the Ahle Sunnah blocked the roads in Gilgit City and Kohistan to prevent the movement of reinforcements, which were then rushed to the affected areas by helicopters. The Army then forcibly removed the demonstrators from the roads and used bulldozers to remove the barricades erected by them.
7.Subsequently, about 500 activists of the SSP surrounded the Gilgit City Police Station, demanded the release of the arrested Sunni leaders and defied an one-hour ultimatum to disperse issued by the Army.Brig.Zahid Mubashir, the Station Commander at Gilgit, then rushed to the Police Station and tried unsuccessfully to persuade the demonstrators to disperse. Later, he withdrew the Army to the barracks and let the local Police handle the inflamed situattion.
8.Meanwhile,another crowd of demonstrators led by Maulana Luqman Hakim, leader of the local unit of the Jamaat-ul-Ulema Islam (JUI), and two members of the Northern Areas Council Sumbal Shah and Saif ur Rehman Khan surrounded the local airfield and refused to allow any aircraft to land or take off. They demanded the transfer of Muhammad Ali Shahzad, a Shia, who was the Deputy Commissioner of Gilgit, for
allegedly permitting the Shias to have their own text-books.
9.The Army cut off all telephone communications inside the NA as well as between the NA and the rest of Pakistan. Despite this, the news of the demonstrations spread to the rest of the NA resulting in demonstrations in other areas too and also in the Kohistan District of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). The demonstrating mobs blocked the Karakoram Highway at many points.
10.Musharraf thereupon rushed Abbas Sarfaraz Khan, his Minister in charge of the POK and NA Affairs, to Gilgit to take control of the situation. Normalcy could be restored only by the first week of July.
11.The unrest was mainly directed against the Shia officers of the local Administration.There were no attacks by the Sunnis on the Shia civilian population. Long before the unrest, the "Dawn" of Karachi had reported as follows:
"Though outwardly calm, the Northern Areas of Pakistan are simmering with a crisis that has all the ingredients of boiling over the rim: the over 2 million people of the Northern Areas spread over an area of 72,500 sq km are politically unrepresented in Pakistan and thus facing obvious neglect as all the governments have linked their fate to the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. This discontent and anger, if not
appeased, can erupt into a national crisis with far reaching consequences.
"The region classified as 'Northern Areas' comprises five districts: Gilgit, Diamir, Baltistan, Ghizer and Ghanche. It had voluntarily acceded to Pakistan on Nov 1, 1948, liberating itself from the Dogra Raj. Yet, Islamabad considers it to be a disputed territory and links its future to that of Kashmir. The people of this area have neither been granted any civil, human and constitutional rights, nor do they have due representation in the legislature.
"The area has always been governed directly from Islamabad through an appointed Chief Secretary, armed with the Frontier Crime Regulation (FCR) laws. Although there is an elected Northern Areas Council to regulate its local affairs, the locals believe it to be just a 'rubber stamp'. Besides the Chief Secretary and a Minister for Northern Areas and Kashmir Affairs and his six officers, who sit in Islamabad,
the area has no other legal representation. All these people are non-locals, including the Judicial Commissioner against whose judgements there is no right to appeal.
"Fifty-three years down the line and exposed to an era of digital communication, the people of the Northern Areas are getting restless. Though committed to the denominators of Pakistan's security and integrity, they have started questioning Islamabad's policy of keeping them unrepresented and backward till Kashmir's fate has been determined. Their demand makes sense as even the internationally
accepted disputed territory of Kashmir has an assembly and an independent legal status.
"The feeling of alienation among the inhabitants of these areas is growing as Islamabad continues to turn a blind eye to their misery; they feel the government is trying to solve the Kashmir issue at their expense. The frequent protest demonstrations and various efforts by the locals in an attempt to attract the attention of Islamabad are too obvious a distress signal to ignore. Rallies marking 'day of deprivation' are held in many pockets across Gilgit and Baltistan.
"In May 1999, the Supreme Court of Pakistan in a landmark judgment ruled: "The NA are a disputed territory and the Government of Pakistan has no claim over it." In the same breath, the apex court asked the Federal Government to grant the region its due status within the next "six months". Nothing has come of it so far. The rift is taking its toll on the region in the form of grave national and international
consequences.
"The unrepresented status of the NA has resulted in its alienation from the national mainstream, causing deprivation and socio-economic backwardness. Strategically located, this serene and beautiful region is among the most poverty-ridden parts of the country. Lacking a strong socio-economic infrastructure, the region is not developed. Despite strong nationalistic feelings among the people of the NA, they
would like to enter into a legal and constitutional arrangement with Pakistan. The Northern Areas are as important to us as Kashmir; and this fact should be recognized by the authorities.
"On the international front, the indecisive status of the NA is a source of embarrassment. It hinders the development work. The pending Basha Dam, the gold mining project of the Australians and other such projects are examples of how the donors shy away from the region owing to its lack of constitutional and legal status.
"Similarly, tourism has failed to get a boost for which even the essential infrastructure is missing. "It is ironic that the world is more worried about the falling trees; they are sad that our white leopard are vanishing day by day; the dead bodies of our Markhor frightens them; they are going all out to preserve our ecosystem. But nobody ever thinks of the people of this land," says Raja Hussain Khan Maqpoon, Editor of Gilgit-Baltistan's weekly newspaper K2.
"While it is true that this area has some of the finest wildlife in the world which is in urgent need of protection, the fact that the people living here are facing abject poverty cannot be ignored for long. Much as they would like to preserve their heritage, it is becoming very difficult for them to cooperate with the concerned agencies in the face of non-existent basic facilities such as electricity, drinking water and elementary health care. Remoteness has added to their misery.
"Gilgit and Baltistan, which lie to the north of India, were part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) before 1947. In order to distinguish them from the valley proper, Jammu and Ladakh regions, they used to be called the Northern Areas of Jammu and Kashmir. After the 1948 war over Kashmir, the Government of Pakistan issued a proclamation on April 28, 1949, separating the Northern Areas of J&K from Azad
Kashmir and placing them under the administration of the Federal Government under the name of Northern Areas of Pakistan.
"Since then time has stood still for the locals owing to total neglect by successive regimes in Islamabad. For almost five decades, the area has been under virtual Martial Law. Under the Frontier Crime Regulations, framed by the British during the colonial days, every resident of the area has to report to the local police station once a month and all movements from one village to another have to be reported to the
police station.
"Frustration arising out of unemployment is forcing the youth to come out on the streets. As they have no access to courts they never receive any redress. Lack of educational institutions has practically closed all avenues of government jobs, thus negating their chances for upliftment. Money earmarked for development projects often end up in wrong places, so the economy is mainly dependent on agriculture.
But like feudalism everywhere, most of the land is owned by a privileged few with no respite to the common man.
"Hunza is a comparative exception. A high level of missionary movement and the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme has brought about a unique mix of modern education in the most primitive of places. Then, the border town of Sost, just below the Khunjerab Pass, also does well by the trade of electronic goods with China.
"However, it is time Islamabad played its cards with prudence and foresight. Cruising along the international front with Kashmir is fine, but it should not be done at the cost of the Northern Areas. They should be granted their due status and rights, to which they were entitled at the time they acceded to Pakistan."
Shaheen Sardar Ali, a prominent lawyer of the Peshawar bar, has co-authored a book titled "Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic Minorities of Pakistan" (Curzon Press) on the mess created by the ideological principle that only religion was the basis of nationhood. She attributes the ethnic and linguistic troubles of Pakistan to the blindly monistic claim that if one is a Muslim one can't be a Sindhi, Balochi, or Kashmiri etc and draws attention to the following facts:
"It is Article 21 of the 1974 Interim Constitution Act passed by the 48-member Azad Jammu and Kashmir unicameral assembly in 1974 which tells us how 'azad' is Azad Kashmir although the leader of the majority in the House is called Prime Minister unlike his counterpart in Held Kashmir. The article explained the role played by the Government of Pakistan in the affairs of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. It is in fact the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council based in Islamabad which runs Azad Kashmir. The Prime Minister of Pakistan is its Chairman and a Secretary of the Ministry for Kashmir Affairs actually runs the territory on a daily basis. The Council has Azad Kashmiri members, including the President and Prime Minister, but it is the Prime Minister (of Pakistan) who orders everyone around. His power derives from the fact that he gives Azad Kashmir its annual budget and can actually dismiss the government of the state if the fancy takes him.
"Azad Kashmir has a High Court, but all appeals against its decisions lie in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which makes sure that nothing is adjudicated in the state contrary to the policy of the Federal Government. One example of this came in the shape of cases in 1993 and 1995 ( Malik Muhammad Miskeen and Others vs. Government of Pakistan, through Secretary Kashmir Affairs and Northern Affairs Division,
Islamabad and Others [PLD AJ&K] and Federation of Pakistan vs. Malik Muhammad Miskeen and Eight Others [PLD SC]). In 1949, Pakistan decided to take over the administration of the Gilgit-Baltistan territory which is legally a part of Azad Kashmir. It concluded an agreement with the Government in Muzaffarabad and simply delinked it from Azad Kashmir to call it the Northern Areas. Later on, when it (Islamabad) sorted out its frontier with China, some of this territory was ceded to China with the proviso that the settlement was subject to the final solution of the Kashmir dispute. The cases at the Azad Kashmir High Court challenged the authority of the Federal Government to take away the Northern Areas and wanted the territory returned to the administration of Muzaffarabad.
"It is understandable that the High Court found for the petitioner. The Azad Kashmir Government was hardly sovereign to sign an equal treaty with Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan admitted that the Northern Areas were a part of the state. The Court ordered that Gilgit-Baltistan be returned to Azad Kashmir, whereafter Islamabad went to the Supreme Court in Islamabad in appeal. Here the case was
decided on political grounds, the Federal Government strangely taking the position that the case was not based on legality but politics."
The book concludes:"The judgement became the cause of serious concern for the Governments of Pakistan and Azad Jammu & Kashmir and they appealed to the Supreme Court. The contention that the Northern Areas formed historically part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir was not - indeed could not - be denied by either Government. That the Northern Areas were being looked after by the Pakistan government administratively by virtue of the 1949 agreement between the two governments was not disputed either. The arguments at the Supreme Court were mainly confined to technicalities of the petition. The Government of Pakistan contended that the issues raised were basically political in nature and hence not amenable to discussion and judgement before a court of law. It was further argued that the High
Court of Azad Jammu & Kashmir lacked jurisdiction in this matter as it could not issue a writ to the Government of Pakistan. In short the Supreme Court overturned the judgement handed down by the High Court of the state without going into the substantive details of the case."
Other points to emerge from the book and other comments in Pakistan were: "And how has the Government of Pakistan acquitted itself of the responsibility of administering the Northern Areas or the region of Gilgit-Baltistan? Here too the Northern Areas Council has no independence and is run by the same Ministry that runs Azad Kashmir. What a politically unsteady Islamabad has done to the Northern
Areas is clear, if you study the developments in the region since 1988 when the first big sectarian killings occurred there. The book modestly states that the ulema began to be given more importance than the people, which caused the Islamised administration of Islamabad to retreat before the rising Sunni storm against the two communities (Shias and Ismailis) that formed the majority in Gilgit-Baltistan. Gilgit joined the other centres of Shia concentration in Pakistan, like Jhang and Parachinar, when its population were brutalised by the Deobandi assault, carrying a clear stamp of anti-Shia Afghanistan. The Aga Khan Foundation projects in Gilgit were attacked and bombed while Shia-Sunni marriages were stopped by force by the warrior priests. "
12.While the Government of Pakistan has, since 1975, allowed at least a façade of democracy and autonomy to Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), it has kept the NA under tight federal control, imposing an iron curtain in the area. The reasons are its strategic location adjoining China and the clandestine use of the Karakoram Highway for the movement of Chinese nuclear material and missiles.
13.The "Washington Times" carried two reports on August 6 and 7,2001, stating as follows:
* The China National Machinery & Equipment Import & Export Corporation sent a dozen shipments of missile components to Pakistan since November,2000, and a US spy satellite detected the latest shipment as it arrived by truck at the mountainous Chinese-Pakistani border May 1,2001. The company supplied components for Pakistan's Shaheen-1 and Shaheen-2 missile programmes. The consignments were sent by ship and truck.
* The missile components were being used for the production of the Shaheen-1, which has an estimated range of 465 miles, and the development of the Shaheen-2, which US intelligence agencies think would have a range of up to 1,240 miles.
14.In a statement issued at Beijing on August 8,2001,the China National Machinery and Equipment Import and Export Corporation (CMEC) claimed that it had never exported or provided missile components to Pakistan. It contended that the CMEC's business scope was mainly confined to the contracting of international engineering projects, and export of machinery and electrical products and complete plants.
Since its founding, the CMEC had always operated strictly within the bounds of law and the business scope approved by the state and had never exported or provided any military equipment, arms or related components to Pakistan or any other country, it claimed further. It added that the CMEC had never used trucks as a means of transportation for cross-border exports.
15.Refuting the "Washington Times" report on August 9,2001, a spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Office claimed that China had all along been implementing its non-proliferation policy in a serious, earnest and responsible approach and accused some newspapers in the US of frequently spreading "irresponsible and totally unfounded rumours" and slanders of China engaging in proliferation, which was entirely
driven by "ulterior motives."
16.She added that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles had an impact on international peace and security, and all countries had the obligation to strictly observe the relevant international legal instruments. "If any country adopts a selective approach to these legal instruments, it will only undermine the international non-proliferation efforts. It is even more inadvisable to spread irresponsible remarks based on so-called `intelligence' that is fabricated out of thin air in an attempt to exert pressure on other countries."
17.In the past, Pakistan had been receiving its clandestine missile consignments from North Korea by sea. Since the appointment of Richard Armitage as Deputy Secretary of State in the Bush Administration, Pakistan and North Korea were worried because in a paper on US policy options towards North Korea submitted to the US House of Representatives on March 4,1999, Armitage had, inter alia,
recommended as follows: "Should diplomacy fail, the United States would have to consider two alternative courses, neither of which is attractive. One is to live with and deter a nuclear North Korea armed with delivery systems, with all its implications for the region. The other is preemption, with the attendant uncertainties. Strengthened deterrence and containment. This would involve a more ready and robust posture, including a willingness to interdict North Korean missile exports on the high seas. Our posture in the wake of a failure of diplomacy would position the United States and its allies to enforce 'red lines.' Preemption. We recognize the dangers and difficulties associated with this option. To be considered, any such initiative must be based on precise knowledge of facilities, assessment of probable success, and clear understanding with our allies of the risks."
18.During the visit of the then Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji to Pakistan in May,2001, Islamabad had taken up with China the question of allowing future missile consignments from North Korea to come to Pakistan by road via China and the NA and, according to reliable sources in the NA, this started happening thereafter.
19. After his return from the Agra summit, Musharraf visited the NA in August,2001. His visit came in the wake of the reports carried by the "Washington Times" about the detection by the US intelligence of a convoy of trucks carrying Chinese missile components by the Karakoram Highway. The Pakistani military junta had taken considerable precautions to prevent detection of the truck movements by not
associating any of the officials of the NA Administration, particularly the Shias, with the arrangements for the movement. In view of this,both Islamabad and Beijing were surprised and embarrassed by the US media reports that US intelligence had detected the truck movements. Pakistani officials claimed that even if US satellites had detected the trucks, they could not have known that the
consignments contained missile components. They, therefore, reportedly felt that there must have been leakage to the CIA from one of the Pakistani officials associated with the movement. Moreover, following past US detection of the storage of the earlier missiles/components in Sargoda, the military junta had drawn up alternate plans for storage in Gilgit in the hope that there would be less possibility of detection there by the CIA. Before Musharraf's arrival in the NA, Lt.Gen. Jamshed Gulzar, then Corps Commander, 10 Corps based in Rawalpindi, had
visited the NA to enquire into the leakage jointly with the Force Commander, NA, Lt-Gen Muhammad Safdar. Measures for tightening up security in the NA was one of the subjects which figured during the discussions of Musharraf in Gilgit in which apart from senior military officers, Abbas Sarfaraz, Musharraf's Minister for Kashmir and NA Affairs, who was also the Chief Executive of the NA, also participated.
20.In the NA, Musharraf had discussions with the officials of the NA Administration on the law and order situation in the wake of the riots by the Sunnis in June, 2001. He also addressed the NA Council, which had only powers of a local body and was not a full-fledged Assembly with legislative powers. He promised to consider suggestions for upgrading it as a full-fledged Legislative Assembly. At the same time, he made it clear that in view of the strategic importance of the area, the NA could not have a President and a Prime Minister as in POK, but would continue to be directly administered from Islamabad by the Ministry of Kashmir and NA Affairs, with the Minister in charge acting as the Chief Executive of the NA.
21.Musharraf declined to receive representatives of local Shia organisations, who wanted to present a memorandum reiterating their demand for the conversion of the NA into a separate Karakoram province, with the new province having the same powers as the other provinces of Pakistan. The Shias' demand for a sepate province is strongly opposed by the Sunnis of the POK, the Sunni component of the NA population and by the Sunni organisations of Pakistan.
22.The NA does not have a separate budget of its own. Its budget is incorporated in the budget of the Federal Government. After the Kargil conflict of 1999, the Federal Government, on the advice of the Army, embarked upon a plan for the improvement of road communications in the NA. The Federal Government allocated Rs 600 million for the construction of roads in the area.
23.There is no truckable road between Gilgit and Chitral, which is mainly accessible from Afghanistan along the Kunar River. A jeepable track was developed after 1950 between Dir and Darosh passing over the 3118 meter high Lowari Pass. However, it is open for only six months during the summer. The Lowari Pass remains blocked by snow during the rest of the year. During this period, the only way of
reaching Chitral is either by the Pakistan International Airways (PIA)'s Fokkar flights or through Afghan territory via the Bajaur Agency.
24.In 1975, an attempt to connect Chitral with the rest of Pakistan was made when work on an 8 km long tunnel under the Lowari Pass was started by the Lowari Tunnel Organisation, an army engineers' organisation, but they could not succeed in constructing the tunnel and the work was abandoned in 1977.
25.The Musharraf Government drew up in 2001 plans for the construction of a 24 -feet wide truckable road between Gilgit and Chitral as follows:
* Chitral to Mastuj (100 km):Already metalled for about 80 kms up to Buni. The remaining portion was to be metalled.
* Mastuj-Shandur: (42 km ): There was a jeepable track over the 3734m high Shandur top, which is the boundary between the NWFP and the NA. The elevation varies from 2280m in Mastuj to 3734 m at Shandur, which would be the highest point on this proposed road.
* Shandur- Pingal( 62 km):There was a jeepable track along the Ghizar river in Ghizar District. The jeep track descends from a height of 3734m to 2185 m at Pingal.
* Pingal-Gahkuch (40 km): There was a jeepable track along the Ghizar river. Gahkuch is the headquarters of Ghizar District. It descends from a height of 2185 m to 1870 m at Gahkuch.
* Gahkuch-Gilgit (77 km): A road already existed, which was to be metalled. The elevation at Gilgit is 1454m.
26.The Astore Valley and the Deosai plains used to provide the oldest route connecting Gilgit with Srinagar via the Burzil Pass and Skardu through Chotta Deosai and Sadpara. In 2001 a project was undertaken to connect Thelichi with Skardu via Chilum and Deosai to provide a shorter route between Astore and Skardu. The project was to be implemented as follows:
* Thelechi-Chilum (94 kms): It was to be 24 ft wide with 12 ft metalled. The elevation of the road rises from about 1250 m at Thelechi to 3400m at Chilum.
* Chilum to Deosai Plains ( 53 km): This section spans the Deosai. An existing track was to be widened. Its elevation is around 4500 m and it remains under snow for about four to five months in a year.
* Deosai Plains to Sadpara(29 km):Will be 24 feet wide. The elevation descends from the Deosai Plains (4500m) to 2600 m at Sadpara.
* Sadpara to Skardu (10km): This section will be 24 ft wide with 12 ft metalled. The elevation is around 2500 m. The area is snow bound for about two to three months in a year.
26.During his visit to the NA ---- his third since he assumed power in October,1999--- Musharraf inaugurated work on these projects. There were unconfirmed reports that the Pakistani Army had sought the assistance of North Korean army engineers for the construction of the Lowari tunnel. (21-9-09)
To be continued.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventy-one2@gmail.com )
Sunday, September 20, 2009
CHINA AS NUCLEAR PROLIFERATOR
B.RAMAN
It was known in 2004 that A.Q.Khan, Pakistan's nuclear scientist, who is wanted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna, for interrogation in connection with his nuclear proliferation to North Korea, Iran and Libya, had left a letter with his wife Henny of Dutch origin and their daughter giving some details of his proliferation activities with the knowledge, if not prior approval, of the political and military leadership. The reported purpose of the letter was to tell his people that whatever he did, he did at the instance of the political and
military leadership of the country and that he was not acting as a rogue proliferator as was sought to be made out by the leadership of the country.
2. He reportedly wanted his wife to release the letter to the public if any harm came to him. People close to him had also leaked to sections of the Pakistani media information about the letter written by him to his wife and daughter to be released if he was harmed. He feared that he might be prosecuted and jailed on the basis of confessions extracted under duress or handed over to the IAEA for interrogation and
prosecution under US pressure.
3. Neither of these contingencies happened. The Pervez Musharraf Government pressured him to admit those proliferation activities, which had already come to the notice of the US and the IAEA and project them as carried out by him on his own independent initiative without the knowledge of the political and military leadership. In return, he was promised that he would be merely kept under house arrest to satisfy the US and not prosecuted or handed over to the IAEA for interrogation. He agreed to this deal.
4. After the Pakistan People's Party (PPP)-led Govrernment headed by Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani came to power in March last year, it removed some of the restrictions on his meeting others in his house. He took advantage of this to tell some Japanese correspondents that his contacts with North Korea were within the knowledge of Musharraf. The Government of Gilani denied his allegations and reimposed the restrictions on his interactions with journalists and other members of the public. On an appeal filed on his behalf, he was released from house arrest by a court, but was told by the court that he could not travel inside the country without the prior permission of the Government. The restrictions on his meeting journalists remained.
5. He again took up the matter before the Lahore High Court, which ordered the removal of all restrictions on his movements inside the country. These restrictions have been re-imposed by the Government by a fresh order.
6. Apparently angered by the continuing restrictions on him, his wife or daughter seems to have released the letter written by him to them in December,2003, giving some details of his proliferation activities undertaken, according to him, at the instance of the Benazir Bhutto Government in the case of Iran and an unnamed Army General in the case of North Korea. It also gives details of the assistance received by Pakistan from China for the development of an atom bomb. The letter has reached the hands of a journalist by name Siman Henderson, who has published a story based on it in the "Sunday Times" of London of September 20,2009. The journalist, in his story, has sought to give the impression that he had got hold of the letter independently through his contacts unconnected to the Khan family and that it has been in his possession since 2007, though he decided to make it public only now. It has to be noted that even now he has not published the entire letter which, according to him, ran to two pages. He has published only three or four paras. He has given some details of what the letter contained about China, North Korea and Iran. He says that the letter also refers to Libya, without specifying what.Is there an attempt by him to potect Libya? If so, why?
7. The "Times" article gives only details of his proliferation activities undertaken with the knowledge, if not at the instance, of the political and/or military leadership of Pakistan. It is silent on the proliferation activities undertaken by him at his own instance such as the supply of nuclear equipment to Libya and the setting up of facilities in Malaysia with the help of a Muslim of Indian/Sri Lankan origin for the manufacture of enrichment centrifuges for supply to Iran and Libya. It is also silent on his missile proliferation activities. The details given by Khan are meant to implicate his political and military leadership without enabling the IAEA and the US to have a full idea of the nuclear capabilities of Iran and North Korea. Khan has taken care to see that scanty details given by him could not be used by the US and the IAEA against Iran and North Korea.
8. Puzzlingfly, the maximum details given by him in his letter are regarding the assistance received by Pakistan from China for the development of a military nuclear capability. According to his letter, "we put up a centrifuge plant at Hanzhong (250km southwest of Xian).The Chinese gave us drawings of the nuclear weapon, gave us 50kg of enriched uranium, gave us 10 tons of UF6 (natural) and 5 tons of UF6 (3%)." The role of China in helping Pakistan develop a military nuclear capability,including the supply of the drawings of the first Chinese
atomic bomb, were known earlier through human and technical intelligence reports, but this is the first time such authentic details have come from the scientist who developed Pakistan's military nuclear programme. The details from the letter as revealed in the "Times" article do greater damage to China than to Iran and North Korea.
9. While there has been considerable international focus on Pakistan's nuclear proliferation activities through AQ Khan, a similar focus on China's role in nuclear proliferation has not been there so far. There have been many congressional enquiries in the US on China's missile proliferation activities, but not on its nuclear proliferation activities. It is the copies of the A-bomb drawings passed on by China to Pakistan which were subsequently passed on by AQ Khan to Iran and Libya. India and Israel have been the worst sufferers of the Chinese nuclear
proliferation in favour of Pakistan----India directly and Israel indirectly.
10. Apart from reviving the demand for the interrogation of AQ Khan outside Pakistan by an independent IAEA team of experts, the IAEA should also ask for a full disclosure by China of its nuclear proliferation to Pakistan. An enquiry into this should also be taken up by the relevant US Congressional committees.
11. At a time when efforts are being made by the Government of India to discourage the anti-Chinese hysteria in our media over the reports of Chinese troop intrusions into Indian territory, the disclosures in AQ Khan's letter of details of the Chinese assistance in developing an atomic bomb for possible use against India would add to the suspicions and fears in the Indian civil society over what they see as China's
malevolent attitude towards India. If China really values improved relations with India, it should volunteer a full disclosure of its nuclear supply relationship with Pakistan and give credible assurances to the Indian people that such instances will not recur in future. Unless and until this is done the trust deficit between the two countries will continue to remain wide. (20-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
It was known in 2004 that A.Q.Khan, Pakistan's nuclear scientist, who is wanted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna, for interrogation in connection with his nuclear proliferation to North Korea, Iran and Libya, had left a letter with his wife Henny of Dutch origin and their daughter giving some details of his proliferation activities with the knowledge, if not prior approval, of the political and military leadership. The reported purpose of the letter was to tell his people that whatever he did, he did at the instance of the political and
military leadership of the country and that he was not acting as a rogue proliferator as was sought to be made out by the leadership of the country.
2. He reportedly wanted his wife to release the letter to the public if any harm came to him. People close to him had also leaked to sections of the Pakistani media information about the letter written by him to his wife and daughter to be released if he was harmed. He feared that he might be prosecuted and jailed on the basis of confessions extracted under duress or handed over to the IAEA for interrogation and
prosecution under US pressure.
3. Neither of these contingencies happened. The Pervez Musharraf Government pressured him to admit those proliferation activities, which had already come to the notice of the US and the IAEA and project them as carried out by him on his own independent initiative without the knowledge of the political and military leadership. In return, he was promised that he would be merely kept under house arrest to satisfy the US and not prosecuted or handed over to the IAEA for interrogation. He agreed to this deal.
4. After the Pakistan People's Party (PPP)-led Govrernment headed by Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani came to power in March last year, it removed some of the restrictions on his meeting others in his house. He took advantage of this to tell some Japanese correspondents that his contacts with North Korea were within the knowledge of Musharraf. The Government of Gilani denied his allegations and reimposed the restrictions on his interactions with journalists and other members of the public. On an appeal filed on his behalf, he was released from house arrest by a court, but was told by the court that he could not travel inside the country without the prior permission of the Government. The restrictions on his meeting journalists remained.
5. He again took up the matter before the Lahore High Court, which ordered the removal of all restrictions on his movements inside the country. These restrictions have been re-imposed by the Government by a fresh order.
6. Apparently angered by the continuing restrictions on him, his wife or daughter seems to have released the letter written by him to them in December,2003, giving some details of his proliferation activities undertaken, according to him, at the instance of the Benazir Bhutto Government in the case of Iran and an unnamed Army General in the case of North Korea. It also gives details of the assistance received by Pakistan from China for the development of an atom bomb. The letter has reached the hands of a journalist by name Siman Henderson, who has published a story based on it in the "Sunday Times" of London of September 20,2009. The journalist, in his story, has sought to give the impression that he had got hold of the letter independently through his contacts unconnected to the Khan family and that it has been in his possession since 2007, though he decided to make it public only now. It has to be noted that even now he has not published the entire letter which, according to him, ran to two pages. He has published only three or four paras. He has given some details of what the letter contained about China, North Korea and Iran. He says that the letter also refers to Libya, without specifying what.Is there an attempt by him to potect Libya? If so, why?
7. The "Times" article gives only details of his proliferation activities undertaken with the knowledge, if not at the instance, of the political and/or military leadership of Pakistan. It is silent on the proliferation activities undertaken by him at his own instance such as the supply of nuclear equipment to Libya and the setting up of facilities in Malaysia with the help of a Muslim of Indian/Sri Lankan origin for the manufacture of enrichment centrifuges for supply to Iran and Libya. It is also silent on his missile proliferation activities. The details given by Khan are meant to implicate his political and military leadership without enabling the IAEA and the US to have a full idea of the nuclear capabilities of Iran and North Korea. Khan has taken care to see that scanty details given by him could not be used by the US and the IAEA against Iran and North Korea.
8. Puzzlingfly, the maximum details given by him in his letter are regarding the assistance received by Pakistan from China for the development of a military nuclear capability. According to his letter, "we put up a centrifuge plant at Hanzhong (250km southwest of Xian).The Chinese gave us drawings of the nuclear weapon, gave us 50kg of enriched uranium, gave us 10 tons of UF6 (natural) and 5 tons of UF6 (3%)." The role of China in helping Pakistan develop a military nuclear capability,including the supply of the drawings of the first Chinese
atomic bomb, were known earlier through human and technical intelligence reports, but this is the first time such authentic details have come from the scientist who developed Pakistan's military nuclear programme. The details from the letter as revealed in the "Times" article do greater damage to China than to Iran and North Korea.
9. While there has been considerable international focus on Pakistan's nuclear proliferation activities through AQ Khan, a similar focus on China's role in nuclear proliferation has not been there so far. There have been many congressional enquiries in the US on China's missile proliferation activities, but not on its nuclear proliferation activities. It is the copies of the A-bomb drawings passed on by China to Pakistan which were subsequently passed on by AQ Khan to Iran and Libya. India and Israel have been the worst sufferers of the Chinese nuclear
proliferation in favour of Pakistan----India directly and Israel indirectly.
10. Apart from reviving the demand for the interrogation of AQ Khan outside Pakistan by an independent IAEA team of experts, the IAEA should also ask for a full disclosure by China of its nuclear proliferation to Pakistan. An enquiry into this should also be taken up by the relevant US Congressional committees.
11. At a time when efforts are being made by the Government of India to discourage the anti-Chinese hysteria in our media over the reports of Chinese troop intrusions into Indian territory, the disclosures in AQ Khan's letter of details of the Chinese assistance in developing an atomic bomb for possible use against India would add to the suspicions and fears in the Indian civil society over what they see as China's
malevolent attitude towards India. If China really values improved relations with India, it should volunteer a full disclosure of its nuclear supply relationship with Pakistan and give credible assurances to the Indian people that such instances will not recur in future. Unless and until this is done the trust deficit between the two countries will continue to remain wide. (20-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
AL QAEDA WARNS GERMANS, CITES MUMBAI
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO. 558
B.RAMAN
Al Qaeda has reportedly warned of a terrorist strike in Germany, similar to the past strikes by pro-Al Qaeda elements in Madrid (March 2004),London (July 2005) and Mumbai, if the German voters do not vote against the present Government of Germany in the elections being held on September 27,2009.
2. The video message, the warning contained in it and the reference to Madrid are meant to influence the voting through intimidation and bring about a reversal of the German policy of participating in the NATO operations in Afghanistan. While the references to the Madrid and London attacks are clear, it is not clear from the message whether the reference to Mumbai seeks to recall the multiple explosions in
suburban trains in July,2006, or the commando-style attacks with hand-held weapons and explosives by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) on multiple-targets in November,2008, or both.The responsibility for the July-2006 attacks has not been conclusively established so far.
3. The message seeks to give the impression of Al Qaeda being confident of carrying out its threat in reality if its warning is not heeded. A detailed analysis of the message by Nick Grace, an American counter-terrorism analyst, is available at the web site of the "Long War Journal" of the US, which monitors systematically all developments bearing on international terrorism. It may be seen at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/09/al_qaeda_warns_germa.php . The "Long War Journal" and its analyses enjoy a very high level of credibility in international counter-terrorism circles.
4. According to the analysis by Nick Grace, the warning message has been issued by Bekkay Harrach, alias Al Hafidh Abu Talha al Almani, a person of Moroccan origin, who grew up in Germany and then gravitated to Al Qaeda. He is presently believed to be somewhere in the Af-Pak region. Nick Grace points out in his analysis that this is the third warning issued by Harrach this year. Nick Grace says: "His previous
warning to Germany, on Jan. 17, 2009, coincided with a massive car bomb attack on the heavily guarded German embassy in Kabul that was orchestrated by the notorious Haqqani Network. Four Afghan civilians and an American soldier died in the attack." His mention of the Haqqani network refers to Jalalludin Haqqani and his son Serajuddin Haqqani, who are reported to be operating from the North Waziristan area of Pakistan. While some sources attributed the huge explosion outside the Indian Embassy in Kabul in July last year to the LET, other sources suspected the Haqqani network to have been responsible. The Haqqani network is as close to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence as the LET.
5. To quote again from Nick Grace's analysis:Harrach has "warned that if Chancellor Angela Merkel is reelected on Sept. 27, Germany will be directly attacked." Nick Grace adds: "The latest video by Harrach is most striking because its themes and packaging are targeted almost exclusively for a Western audience. Speaking softly in fluent German, without the usual militant or religious props featured in past al Qaeda messages, he stares directly into the camera and only occasionally looks down to turn over the pages of his speech. He never wags his finger or raises his voice. The video carries no subtitling in Arabic. "
6. The picture of Harrach as he appears in the video message has been reproduced by the "Long War Journal" along with the analysis. He is clad in typical Western attire with a suit and a tie. His attire reminds one of the attire worn by the volunteers of the Hizbut Tehrir, which advises its followers to avoid dressing themselves in a manner typical of Muslims. It is likely that if Al Qaeda already has its volunteers in Germany to carry out the threat they may not be attired like Muslims and they may avoid going to mosques and other places frequented by Muslims in order not to draw suspicion upon themselves.
7. If Al Qaeda carries out the threat, will it be an attack with timed explosives as in Madrid and Mumbai--July 2006 or a suicide attack as in London or a commando-style attack with hand-held weapons as in Mumbai--26/11? Will it be an attack confined to public transportation systems as in Madrid, London and Mumbai-July 2006 or will it be in public places as in Mumbai--26/11? These are important questions, which
would certainly be factored into by the German counter-terrorism authorities while planning their strategy to frustrate the plans of Al Qaeda.
8. The message, as analysed by Nick Grace, carries an implied assurance that the town of Kiel might not be attacked. This assurance is puzzling because on August 20,2006, the German police had arrested a Muslim from the Lebanon studying in the Kiel University on a charge of placing a timed explosive device (a suitcase bomb) on a commuter train in Dortmund on July 31,2006. It failed to explode. They managed
to identify him through a closed circuit TV footage, which showed him placing the suitcase in a train. Another suitcase bomb,timed to explode at the same time, had been placed in a train at Koblenz. That too failed to explode. It is not known whether the police were able to identify and arrest the person who placed the second suit case bomb. The German media had reported that the identification of the first
man was made possible by a tip-off from an unnamed foreign intelligence agency. These two incidents had indicated as early as 2006 that pro-Al Qaeda elements were wanting to target the public transportation system in Germany.
9. This is the second instance when there has been a reference to Mumbai in messages attributed to Al Qaeda.In a telephonic message to the British Broadcasting Corporation in the second week of February,2009,Mustafa Abu-al Yazid, who has been projected since 2007 as in charge of Al Qaeda operations in Afghanistan in liaison with the Neo Taliban of Mulla Mohammad Omar, warned India in the following words: “We send a short and succinct message to the Indian Government. The Mujahideen will never allow you to invade the Muslims and their lands in Pakistan. If you beguile yourselves into doing this, know well that you will pay a very heavy price, which you will regret much. We will call upon our whole Muslim nation, its Mujahideen and its martyrdom squads against you. We will strike your interests and your economic lifelines wherever they may be until you are demolished and bankrupt as America is being demolished and going bankrupt today. The Islamic nation which produced the audacious and heroic martyrs of Bombay, who struck you in the midst of your homes and humiliated you, is able to produce thousands more like them. You cannot be more powerful or have more ability than the Soviet Union which was
destroyed on the rocks of the Afghanistan mountains nor Americans whose nose we rubbed in the dirt of Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia.” The authenticity of the message could not be established. ( 20-9-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
Al Qaeda has reportedly warned of a terrorist strike in Germany, similar to the past strikes by pro-Al Qaeda elements in Madrid (March 2004),London (July 2005) and Mumbai, if the German voters do not vote against the present Government of Germany in the elections being held on September 27,2009.
2. The video message, the warning contained in it and the reference to Madrid are meant to influence the voting through intimidation and bring about a reversal of the German policy of participating in the NATO operations in Afghanistan. While the references to the Madrid and London attacks are clear, it is not clear from the message whether the reference to Mumbai seeks to recall the multiple explosions in
suburban trains in July,2006, or the commando-style attacks with hand-held weapons and explosives by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) on multiple-targets in November,2008, or both.The responsibility for the July-2006 attacks has not been conclusively established so far.
3. The message seeks to give the impression of Al Qaeda being confident of carrying out its threat in reality if its warning is not heeded. A detailed analysis of the message by Nick Grace, an American counter-terrorism analyst, is available at the web site of the "Long War Journal" of the US, which monitors systematically all developments bearing on international terrorism. It may be seen at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/09/al_qaeda_warns_germa.php . The "Long War Journal" and its analyses enjoy a very high level of credibility in international counter-terrorism circles.
4. According to the analysis by Nick Grace, the warning message has been issued by Bekkay Harrach, alias Al Hafidh Abu Talha al Almani, a person of Moroccan origin, who grew up in Germany and then gravitated to Al Qaeda. He is presently believed to be somewhere in the Af-Pak region. Nick Grace points out in his analysis that this is the third warning issued by Harrach this year. Nick Grace says: "His previous
warning to Germany, on Jan. 17, 2009, coincided with a massive car bomb attack on the heavily guarded German embassy in Kabul that was orchestrated by the notorious Haqqani Network. Four Afghan civilians and an American soldier died in the attack." His mention of the Haqqani network refers to Jalalludin Haqqani and his son Serajuddin Haqqani, who are reported to be operating from the North Waziristan area of Pakistan. While some sources attributed the huge explosion outside the Indian Embassy in Kabul in July last year to the LET, other sources suspected the Haqqani network to have been responsible. The Haqqani network is as close to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence as the LET.
5. To quote again from Nick Grace's analysis:Harrach has "warned that if Chancellor Angela Merkel is reelected on Sept. 27, Germany will be directly attacked." Nick Grace adds: "The latest video by Harrach is most striking because its themes and packaging are targeted almost exclusively for a Western audience. Speaking softly in fluent German, without the usual militant or religious props featured in past al Qaeda messages, he stares directly into the camera and only occasionally looks down to turn over the pages of his speech. He never wags his finger or raises his voice. The video carries no subtitling in Arabic. "
6. The picture of Harrach as he appears in the video message has been reproduced by the "Long War Journal" along with the analysis. He is clad in typical Western attire with a suit and a tie. His attire reminds one of the attire worn by the volunteers of the Hizbut Tehrir, which advises its followers to avoid dressing themselves in a manner typical of Muslims. It is likely that if Al Qaeda already has its volunteers in Germany to carry out the threat they may not be attired like Muslims and they may avoid going to mosques and other places frequented by Muslims in order not to draw suspicion upon themselves.
7. If Al Qaeda carries out the threat, will it be an attack with timed explosives as in Madrid and Mumbai--July 2006 or a suicide attack as in London or a commando-style attack with hand-held weapons as in Mumbai--26/11? Will it be an attack confined to public transportation systems as in Madrid, London and Mumbai-July 2006 or will it be in public places as in Mumbai--26/11? These are important questions, which
would certainly be factored into by the German counter-terrorism authorities while planning their strategy to frustrate the plans of Al Qaeda.
8. The message, as analysed by Nick Grace, carries an implied assurance that the town of Kiel might not be attacked. This assurance is puzzling because on August 20,2006, the German police had arrested a Muslim from the Lebanon studying in the Kiel University on a charge of placing a timed explosive device (a suitcase bomb) on a commuter train in Dortmund on July 31,2006. It failed to explode. They managed
to identify him through a closed circuit TV footage, which showed him placing the suitcase in a train. Another suitcase bomb,timed to explode at the same time, had been placed in a train at Koblenz. That too failed to explode. It is not known whether the police were able to identify and arrest the person who placed the second suit case bomb. The German media had reported that the identification of the first
man was made possible by a tip-off from an unnamed foreign intelligence agency. These two incidents had indicated as early as 2006 that pro-Al Qaeda elements were wanting to target the public transportation system in Germany.
9. This is the second instance when there has been a reference to Mumbai in messages attributed to Al Qaeda.In a telephonic message to the British Broadcasting Corporation in the second week of February,2009,Mustafa Abu-al Yazid, who has been projected since 2007 as in charge of Al Qaeda operations in Afghanistan in liaison with the Neo Taliban of Mulla Mohammad Omar, warned India in the following words: “We send a short and succinct message to the Indian Government. The Mujahideen will never allow you to invade the Muslims and their lands in Pakistan. If you beguile yourselves into doing this, know well that you will pay a very heavy price, which you will regret much. We will call upon our whole Muslim nation, its Mujahideen and its martyrdom squads against you. We will strike your interests and your economic lifelines wherever they may be until you are demolished and bankrupt as America is being demolished and going bankrupt today. The Islamic nation which produced the audacious and heroic martyrs of Bombay, who struck you in the midst of your homes and humiliated you, is able to produce thousands more like them. You cannot be more powerful or have more ability than the Soviet Union which was
destroyed on the rocks of the Afghanistan mountains nor Americans whose nose we rubbed in the dirt of Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia.” The authenticity of the message could not be established. ( 20-9-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Saturday, September 19, 2009
GILGIT-BALTISTAN: THE AQ KHAN PROLIFERATION HIGHWAY---PART VI
B.RAMAN
The Aga Khan Foundation has over the years undertaken many rural development projects in the NA. Whatever little development has been there is mainly due to the Aga Khan Foundation. Even though the Islamic fundamentalist parties from time to time mounted a campaign against successive Aga Khans and their workers in the NA by projecting them as Western agents and anti-Islam, the Government of Pakistan saw to it that there was no interference with the Foundation's work because of its excellent international image.
2. The only major development project taken up by the Government was the construction of the Karakoram Highway with Chinese assistance to facilitate the overland movement to China of the exports from Punjab. The benefit of these exports largely went to the peopleof Punjab. It was completed in 1978.
3. The Karakoram Highway was also used for the movement to Pakistan of Chinese nuclear and military equipment such as the M-9 and M-11 missiles, equipment for the Chashma nuclear power station constructed by the Chinese etc. The two countries avoided transporting such sensitive equipment by sea to avoid detection by the US. Some of the missiles supplied by North Korea to Pakistan after Benazir Bhutto's secret visit to Pyongyang in 1993 also came by the overland route via China and then the Karakoram Highway. Some of the missiles for Iran from China and North Korea were also transported by the same route.
4. On March 9,1995, Pakistan, China, Kazakhstan and Kyrghystan signed at Islamabad a Transit Trade Agreement to facilitate trade between Pakistan and the Central Asian republics (CARs) via China. Under a separate agreement between Pakistan and China, it was decided to upgrade the Karakoram Highway to facilitate this trade with the CARs, with Pakistan meeting the expenditure on its side and China on its side. While work on the Pakistan side involving an investment of US $ 85 million started after the signing of the agreement, China dragged its feet on upgrading the Highway in its territory because of its concerns over the increasing use of the Highway by the
Uighur extremist elements for getting arms, ammunition and explosives from Pakistan and by Pakistani narcotics smugglers for smuggling heroin to China.
5.Writing in the "Herald" (December,1995), the monthly journal of the "Dawn" group of publications, Ahmed Rashid, the well-known Pakistani expert on Afghanistan and the CARs, said: " Beijing's reluctance stems from the fact that the proposed road would run across Xinjiang and the Chinese fear that the route would increase the traffic in fundamentalism. After an abortive Islamist uprising in the town of Baren in 1992 in which 22 people were killed, China closed its road links with Pakistan for several months. In the second week of November,1995, Ibrahim Rouzi, Director of Xinjiang's Religious Affairs Bureau, ordered a Government probe into the mushrooming of unauthorised mosques and Quranic schools in the region, which, he said, were often opened from funds from abroad. "We must firmly oppose religious activities which run counter to the Socialist system, divide the motherland and incite fanaticism by disseminating speeches in mosques about a religious war," he added."
6.Ahmed Rashid further reported in the same article that six Islamic militants (Uighurs) from Xinjiang, who were undergoing training at the Islamabad Islamic University, attended a convention of the Jamaat-e-Islami at Lahore.
7. The "International Herald Tribune" reported on May 28,1996, that following a resurgence of pro-independence terrorist activity in Xinjiang, the local authorities had tightened border security and issued the following instructions: " We must greatly increase control on frontier crossings, put more soldiers on duty, strengthen inspection of goods crossing the border and seriously stop weapons, splittists and reactionary phamplhlets entering China."
8.The "Far Eastern Economic Review" of Hong Kong reported as follows in its issue of June 13,1996: " Beijing has ordered the re-deployment of several army units in the troubled Muslim region of Xinjiang as a result of increased separatist activities in the border areas. A Chinese scholar told a seminar in Hong Kong that he had been delayed for six hours while travelling in the region in May because of a massive shift of troops in the Aksu District. The official media have confirmed the assassination by separatists of one Muslim cleric and several polcemen in the regional capital Urumqi in late February. The movement of troops from military sub-districts in the region is believed to be the largest since a separatist insurrection took place in the Western border county of Akto in April,1990"
9.Another reason for China's concerns over the threats to its internal security from the Karakoram Highway was the increasing use of the Highway by narcotics smugglers for smuggling heroin from Afghanistan into China via Pakistan. As in the FATA, in the NA too, large sections of the local people, because of the extreme poverty, started taking to narcotics smuggling as a means of livelihood.
10. Quoting a Chinese diplomat in Islamabad, the Urdu language daily "Nawai Waqt" of Pakistan reported as follows on June 4,1996: " China has deported hundreds of Pakistanis, who had illegally entered Xinjiang for hunting eagles. These Pakistanis did not possess any valid documents to enter the Chinese territory. He also disclosed that dozens of people, allegedly involved in the smuggling of drugs, were
arrested by Chinese guards and one of them has been sentenced to death in Beijing. Several Pakistani drug smugglers are still languishing in Chinese jails."
11. It added: " The diplomat termed as incorrect a report about denial of visas to Pakistani tourists wishing to visit China. He said that following the arrest of about 450 Pakistanis in October,1995, in Xinjiang for illegal activities, Beijing has decided not to issue visas to any individual tourist. However, tourist groups are not being denied visas if they are sponsored by Pakistani or Chinese tourism institutions.Moreover, no trader or industrialist of Pakistan will be refused a visa. Asked whether the arrested Pakistanis were indulging in unhealthy political activities in Xinjiang, he declined to comment."
12. After seizing power in October 1999, Pervez Musharraf took up with the Chinese authorities the importance of the early implementation of the project for the upgradation of the Karakoram Highway. The Chinese took up the work on their side according to a mutually agreed revised schedule and have reportedly completed it ahead of schedule. The upgradation work on the Pakistan side has been much behind
schedule.
13. In the winter of 1998-99, Musharraf used the NA as the launching pad for the infiltration of the Pakistani Army into the Kargil area of India's J&K. Pakistani troops, assisted by Mehsuds and Wazirs from Waziristan trained by Al Qaeda, occupied the Kargil heights during the height of winter with the objective of disrupting traffic between Srinagar and Kargil and starving the Indian troops deployed in the Siachen sector of J&K. After the explosions outside the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam by Al Qaeda in August 1998, the Nawaz Sharif Government came under considerable pressure from the US either to act against Al Qaeda sanctuaries in Afghan territory or to let the US do it. Musharraf sold to Nawaz the idea that some of the inmates of Al Qaeda camps in the Afghan territory could be shifted to the NA for helping the Pakistan Army in its operations in J&K.
14. Nawaz agreed to it under the impression that the operations planned by Musharraf on the Kargil heights would only involve the tribals trained by Al Qaeda and not the Pakistan Army. In May,1999, a military conflict broke out between the Indian and Pakistani armies when the Indian Army took action to eject the Pakistani Army invaders from the Indian territory on the Kargil heights. The Indian Army killed or
captured regular soldiers of the Pakistan Army, many of them belonging to its Light Infantry Regiments raised in the NA. Through a back channel mechamism, the Government of India confronted Nawaz with conclusive evidence of the involvement of the Pakistani Army in the illegal occupation of the Indian territory, which triggered off the conflict.
15. Nawaz was taken by surprise because the clearance given by him to Musharraf was for shifting some of the inmates of Al Qaeda camps in Afghan territory to the NA for use against India and not for using the Pakistan Army for occupying Indian territory. The anger of Nawaz with Musharraf for using the Pakistan Army for occupying Indian territory set in motion the train of events which ultimately led to his overthrow and arrest by Musharraf in October,1999.
16. During the height of the Kargil fighting, the British High Commission in New Delhi used to organise daily briefings on the fighting for the benefit of some of the British journalists, who had assembled in New Delhi to cover the conflict. One of the British journalists who was covering the conflict from New Delhi was Julian West. In a despatch from New Delhi, which was carried by the "Electronic Telegraph" (May 30,1999) Julian West reported as follows:
(a). "A group of British Islamic fundamentalists are reported to be among the insurgents …According to Western intelligence sources, six Britons are reported to have recently received training in mountain techniques and high-altitude warfare."
(b)."The British Muslims are among a number of Islamic guerillas being trained in remote valleys near Skardu, in Pakistani Kashmir, just north of the LOC from Kargil…. Their instructor reportedly claimed that he was being paid Pound Sterling 30 a day---probably by Pakistan's military intelligence agency ISI."
( c ).The preparation of a mixed force of Afghan, Kashmiri, Pakistani and even British Muslim guerillas, trained to fight at high altitudes,reinforces India's contention that the current conflict was well planned. It also further confirms long-standing reports that Pakistan employs a loose network of international terrorists as well as Pakistani army regulars and Kashmiri militants-- not only for operations in Afghanistan,but also for intrusions into Indian Kashmir.
(d). "Western intelligence has long believed that various Muslim dissident groups in Britain are front organisations for Islamic extremism,funded by an international network of wealthy Muslims and often sponsored by Pakistani and Arab intelligence agencies."
(e)."Although the Indian army claims that these are Pakistani army regulars in disguise, Western intelligence believes that many are Afghan,Pakistani and even international Muslim militants backed by Pakistan's ISI.. Principal amongst these is Al Badr, a terrorist group linked to
Osama bin Laden…."
(f). An intelligence source, who believes about 3,000 to 5,000 militants are currently being trained in various camps run by Pakistani intelligence in Pakistan and possibly in Afghanistan, said: "This current operation (in Kargil) has all the hallmarks of the ISI."
(g). "The operation almost certainly has the backing of the ISI and could not have been launched without the knowledge of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif."
17.Apart from Al Badr of bin Laden mentioned by Western intelligence sources, other organisations which have claimed responsibility for the occupation of the ridges in the Kargil-Dras sector were:
(a). The Lashkar-e-Toiba. "The Times" of UK correspondent in Islamabad (May 31, 1999) quoted Abdullah Muntazir of the Lashkar as saying as follows: " We have Muslim volunteers from all over the world coming to join the jihad….A large number of our fighters have come from the Afghan province of Nuristan. " The correspondent also reported that at least four other Pakistan-backed militant groups were recruiting people to fight in Kashmir.
(b). The United Jihad Council of Muzzafarabad , which claimed to be a united front of 14 unnamed organisations. It is headed by Syed Salahuddin belonging to one faction of the Hizbul Mujahideen. The Hizbul Mujahideen works in close concert with the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Jammat-e-Islami of Pakistan and the Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Heckmatyar of Afghanistan.Since the US declared the HUM as an
international terrorist organisation in October, 1997, its volunteers operating in Kashmir use the cover of the Hizbul Mujahideen. (20-9-09)
To be continued
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The Aga Khan Foundation has over the years undertaken many rural development projects in the NA. Whatever little development has been there is mainly due to the Aga Khan Foundation. Even though the Islamic fundamentalist parties from time to time mounted a campaign against successive Aga Khans and their workers in the NA by projecting them as Western agents and anti-Islam, the Government of Pakistan saw to it that there was no interference with the Foundation's work because of its excellent international image.
2. The only major development project taken up by the Government was the construction of the Karakoram Highway with Chinese assistance to facilitate the overland movement to China of the exports from Punjab. The benefit of these exports largely went to the peopleof Punjab. It was completed in 1978.
3. The Karakoram Highway was also used for the movement to Pakistan of Chinese nuclear and military equipment such as the M-9 and M-11 missiles, equipment for the Chashma nuclear power station constructed by the Chinese etc. The two countries avoided transporting such sensitive equipment by sea to avoid detection by the US. Some of the missiles supplied by North Korea to Pakistan after Benazir Bhutto's secret visit to Pyongyang in 1993 also came by the overland route via China and then the Karakoram Highway. Some of the missiles for Iran from China and North Korea were also transported by the same route.
4. On March 9,1995, Pakistan, China, Kazakhstan and Kyrghystan signed at Islamabad a Transit Trade Agreement to facilitate trade between Pakistan and the Central Asian republics (CARs) via China. Under a separate agreement between Pakistan and China, it was decided to upgrade the Karakoram Highway to facilitate this trade with the CARs, with Pakistan meeting the expenditure on its side and China on its side. While work on the Pakistan side involving an investment of US $ 85 million started after the signing of the agreement, China dragged its feet on upgrading the Highway in its territory because of its concerns over the increasing use of the Highway by the
Uighur extremist elements for getting arms, ammunition and explosives from Pakistan and by Pakistani narcotics smugglers for smuggling heroin to China.
5.Writing in the "Herald" (December,1995), the monthly journal of the "Dawn" group of publications, Ahmed Rashid, the well-known Pakistani expert on Afghanistan and the CARs, said: " Beijing's reluctance stems from the fact that the proposed road would run across Xinjiang and the Chinese fear that the route would increase the traffic in fundamentalism. After an abortive Islamist uprising in the town of Baren in 1992 in which 22 people were killed, China closed its road links with Pakistan for several months. In the second week of November,1995, Ibrahim Rouzi, Director of Xinjiang's Religious Affairs Bureau, ordered a Government probe into the mushrooming of unauthorised mosques and Quranic schools in the region, which, he said, were often opened from funds from abroad. "We must firmly oppose religious activities which run counter to the Socialist system, divide the motherland and incite fanaticism by disseminating speeches in mosques about a religious war," he added."
6.Ahmed Rashid further reported in the same article that six Islamic militants (Uighurs) from Xinjiang, who were undergoing training at the Islamabad Islamic University, attended a convention of the Jamaat-e-Islami at Lahore.
7. The "International Herald Tribune" reported on May 28,1996, that following a resurgence of pro-independence terrorist activity in Xinjiang, the local authorities had tightened border security and issued the following instructions: " We must greatly increase control on frontier crossings, put more soldiers on duty, strengthen inspection of goods crossing the border and seriously stop weapons, splittists and reactionary phamplhlets entering China."
8.The "Far Eastern Economic Review" of Hong Kong reported as follows in its issue of June 13,1996: " Beijing has ordered the re-deployment of several army units in the troubled Muslim region of Xinjiang as a result of increased separatist activities in the border areas. A Chinese scholar told a seminar in Hong Kong that he had been delayed for six hours while travelling in the region in May because of a massive shift of troops in the Aksu District. The official media have confirmed the assassination by separatists of one Muslim cleric and several polcemen in the regional capital Urumqi in late February. The movement of troops from military sub-districts in the region is believed to be the largest since a separatist insurrection took place in the Western border county of Akto in April,1990"
9.Another reason for China's concerns over the threats to its internal security from the Karakoram Highway was the increasing use of the Highway by narcotics smugglers for smuggling heroin from Afghanistan into China via Pakistan. As in the FATA, in the NA too, large sections of the local people, because of the extreme poverty, started taking to narcotics smuggling as a means of livelihood.
10. Quoting a Chinese diplomat in Islamabad, the Urdu language daily "Nawai Waqt" of Pakistan reported as follows on June 4,1996: " China has deported hundreds of Pakistanis, who had illegally entered Xinjiang for hunting eagles. These Pakistanis did not possess any valid documents to enter the Chinese territory. He also disclosed that dozens of people, allegedly involved in the smuggling of drugs, were
arrested by Chinese guards and one of them has been sentenced to death in Beijing. Several Pakistani drug smugglers are still languishing in Chinese jails."
11. It added: " The diplomat termed as incorrect a report about denial of visas to Pakistani tourists wishing to visit China. He said that following the arrest of about 450 Pakistanis in October,1995, in Xinjiang for illegal activities, Beijing has decided not to issue visas to any individual tourist. However, tourist groups are not being denied visas if they are sponsored by Pakistani or Chinese tourism institutions.Moreover, no trader or industrialist of Pakistan will be refused a visa. Asked whether the arrested Pakistanis were indulging in unhealthy political activities in Xinjiang, he declined to comment."
12. After seizing power in October 1999, Pervez Musharraf took up with the Chinese authorities the importance of the early implementation of the project for the upgradation of the Karakoram Highway. The Chinese took up the work on their side according to a mutually agreed revised schedule and have reportedly completed it ahead of schedule. The upgradation work on the Pakistan side has been much behind
schedule.
13. In the winter of 1998-99, Musharraf used the NA as the launching pad for the infiltration of the Pakistani Army into the Kargil area of India's J&K. Pakistani troops, assisted by Mehsuds and Wazirs from Waziristan trained by Al Qaeda, occupied the Kargil heights during the height of winter with the objective of disrupting traffic between Srinagar and Kargil and starving the Indian troops deployed in the Siachen sector of J&K. After the explosions outside the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam by Al Qaeda in August 1998, the Nawaz Sharif Government came under considerable pressure from the US either to act against Al Qaeda sanctuaries in Afghan territory or to let the US do it. Musharraf sold to Nawaz the idea that some of the inmates of Al Qaeda camps in the Afghan territory could be shifted to the NA for helping the Pakistan Army in its operations in J&K.
14. Nawaz agreed to it under the impression that the operations planned by Musharraf on the Kargil heights would only involve the tribals trained by Al Qaeda and not the Pakistan Army. In May,1999, a military conflict broke out between the Indian and Pakistani armies when the Indian Army took action to eject the Pakistani Army invaders from the Indian territory on the Kargil heights. The Indian Army killed or
captured regular soldiers of the Pakistan Army, many of them belonging to its Light Infantry Regiments raised in the NA. Through a back channel mechamism, the Government of India confronted Nawaz with conclusive evidence of the involvement of the Pakistani Army in the illegal occupation of the Indian territory, which triggered off the conflict.
15. Nawaz was taken by surprise because the clearance given by him to Musharraf was for shifting some of the inmates of Al Qaeda camps in Afghan territory to the NA for use against India and not for using the Pakistan Army for occupying Indian territory. The anger of Nawaz with Musharraf for using the Pakistan Army for occupying Indian territory set in motion the train of events which ultimately led to his overthrow and arrest by Musharraf in October,1999.
16. During the height of the Kargil fighting, the British High Commission in New Delhi used to organise daily briefings on the fighting for the benefit of some of the British journalists, who had assembled in New Delhi to cover the conflict. One of the British journalists who was covering the conflict from New Delhi was Julian West. In a despatch from New Delhi, which was carried by the "Electronic Telegraph" (May 30,1999) Julian West reported as follows:
(a). "A group of British Islamic fundamentalists are reported to be among the insurgents …According to Western intelligence sources, six Britons are reported to have recently received training in mountain techniques and high-altitude warfare."
(b)."The British Muslims are among a number of Islamic guerillas being trained in remote valleys near Skardu, in Pakistani Kashmir, just north of the LOC from Kargil…. Their instructor reportedly claimed that he was being paid Pound Sterling 30 a day---probably by Pakistan's military intelligence agency ISI."
( c ).The preparation of a mixed force of Afghan, Kashmiri, Pakistani and even British Muslim guerillas, trained to fight at high altitudes,reinforces India's contention that the current conflict was well planned. It also further confirms long-standing reports that Pakistan employs a loose network of international terrorists as well as Pakistani army regulars and Kashmiri militants-- not only for operations in Afghanistan,but also for intrusions into Indian Kashmir.
(d). "Western intelligence has long believed that various Muslim dissident groups in Britain are front organisations for Islamic extremism,funded by an international network of wealthy Muslims and often sponsored by Pakistani and Arab intelligence agencies."
(e)."Although the Indian army claims that these are Pakistani army regulars in disguise, Western intelligence believes that many are Afghan,Pakistani and even international Muslim militants backed by Pakistan's ISI.. Principal amongst these is Al Badr, a terrorist group linked to
Osama bin Laden…."
(f). An intelligence source, who believes about 3,000 to 5,000 militants are currently being trained in various camps run by Pakistani intelligence in Pakistan and possibly in Afghanistan, said: "This current operation (in Kargil) has all the hallmarks of the ISI."
(g). "The operation almost certainly has the backing of the ISI and could not have been launched without the knowledge of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif."
17.Apart from Al Badr of bin Laden mentioned by Western intelligence sources, other organisations which have claimed responsibility for the occupation of the ridges in the Kargil-Dras sector were:
(a). The Lashkar-e-Toiba. "The Times" of UK correspondent in Islamabad (May 31, 1999) quoted Abdullah Muntazir of the Lashkar as saying as follows: " We have Muslim volunteers from all over the world coming to join the jihad….A large number of our fighters have come from the Afghan province of Nuristan. " The correspondent also reported that at least four other Pakistan-backed militant groups were recruiting people to fight in Kashmir.
(b). The United Jihad Council of Muzzafarabad , which claimed to be a united front of 14 unnamed organisations. It is headed by Syed Salahuddin belonging to one faction of the Hizbul Mujahideen. The Hizbul Mujahideen works in close concert with the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Jammat-e-Islami of Pakistan and the Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Heckmatyar of Afghanistan.Since the US declared the HUM as an
international terrorist organisation in October, 1997, its volunteers operating in Kashmir use the cover of the Hizbul Mujahideen. (20-9-09)
To be continued
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
NO HEROES IN THE NUCLEAR FIZZLE DEBATE--ANOTHER INTERESTING FEED-BACK FROM A READER OF MY ARTICLE ON K.SANTHANAM'S ALLEGATION OF A NUCLEAR FIZZLE
There are a number of issues that need to be taken note of and that seem to be lost in what is increasingly a war of personalities between scientists:
(1) Dr. Santhanam has claimed that the TN test achieved a yield of between 23-27 kilotons.
(2) If that statement is taken to be accurate - and let us assume that it is - that yield is substantially higher than that claimed by analysts in the West who using data and assumptions that were at times questionable suggested a much lower yield.
(3) Dr Santhanam in his op-ed piece claimed the deployment of 25 kiloton warheads on a wide scale.
(4) Subsequently he has said that India's deterrent consists only of 15 kiloton weapons - some consistency would be appreciated in this regard.
(5) What nobody has explained is why India has built missiles - with Santhanam himself in DRDO - with payloads of between 700 and 1500kg ?
(6) The other issue that has not been tackled is that of the primary stage of the TN device which has not been disputed as being a boosted-fission device and which, if Santhanam's figures are correct would have had to have a yield and produced a yield of between 15 and 17 kilotons.
(7) Taking Dr. Santhanam's words as being accurate some conclusions can immediately be drawn:
(a) India's weapons teams were not convinced of the TN test and did not weaponize any thermonuclear weapons
(b) India's deployed nuclear weapons weigh between 700kg and 1500kg - based on the Agni payloads
(c) Both fission and boosted-fission types that were tested worked.
(8) Admiral Suresh Mehta's words were very guarded:
"As far as we are concerned, scientists have given us a certain capability which is enough to provide requisite deterrence...the deterrent is tried and tested"
(9) No 15 kiloton or 25 kiloton fission or boosted fission device weighs 700-1500kg. At most the figures for those types will range between 170kg and 300kg with Indian design technology.
(10) Nobody - either critics or supporters - have considered the possibility of the scalability of either the fission or boosted-fission weapons/devices tested. This aspect of Indian weapons research in the last decade is what needs to be examined if one is to assess the Indian nuclear deterrent.
(11) The French MR31 120kiloton warhead used on their SSBS-S2 IRBM was a pure fission warhead weighed 700kg using about 25kg of weapons-grade plutonium (which is a considerable amount). The successor warhead, the MR41 was a boosted-fission warhead for the MSBS M1 and M2 SLBMs and had a yield of 500 kilotons and weighed 700kg.
To what yield are India's fission and/or boosted-fission designs scalable ?
Do the large payloads of the Agni series lead to the inexorable conclusion that large fission or boosted-fission weapons are the ones deployed ?
Without an analysis of this question, everybody who is attempting to tell the world they know what India's deterrent consists of is merely whistling in the wind - adding nothing but noise to a debate that has seen Dr. Santhanam being described as a nuclear scientist (when he is not) and Dr. Kalam being told to shut up because he is not a nuclear scientist and which has seen the POK-1 1974 test team turn on the 1998 team without remembering that the yield of their test in 1974 was also hotly disputed.
There are no heroes in this drama. What India needs to do is ignore the rhetoric and analyse whether its fission and boosted-fission capability can reliably deliver warheads in the 50-100 kiloton class to the armed forces with confidence.
(1) Dr. Santhanam has claimed that the TN test achieved a yield of between 23-27 kilotons.
(2) If that statement is taken to be accurate - and let us assume that it is - that yield is substantially higher than that claimed by analysts in the West who using data and assumptions that were at times questionable suggested a much lower yield.
(3) Dr Santhanam in his op-ed piece claimed the deployment of 25 kiloton warheads on a wide scale.
(4) Subsequently he has said that India's deterrent consists only of 15 kiloton weapons - some consistency would be appreciated in this regard.
(5) What nobody has explained is why India has built missiles - with Santhanam himself in DRDO - with payloads of between 700 and 1500kg ?
(6) The other issue that has not been tackled is that of the primary stage of the TN device which has not been disputed as being a boosted-fission device and which, if Santhanam's figures are correct would have had to have a yield and produced a yield of between 15 and 17 kilotons.
(7) Taking Dr. Santhanam's words as being accurate some conclusions can immediately be drawn:
(a) India's weapons teams were not convinced of the TN test and did not weaponize any thermonuclear weapons
(b) India's deployed nuclear weapons weigh between 700kg and 1500kg - based on the Agni payloads
(c) Both fission and boosted-fission types that were tested worked.
(8) Admiral Suresh Mehta's words were very guarded:
"As far as we are concerned, scientists have given us a certain capability which is enough to provide requisite deterrence...the deterrent is tried and tested"
(9) No 15 kiloton or 25 kiloton fission or boosted fission device weighs 700-1500kg. At most the figures for those types will range between 170kg and 300kg with Indian design technology.
(10) Nobody - either critics or supporters - have considered the possibility of the scalability of either the fission or boosted-fission weapons/devices tested. This aspect of Indian weapons research in the last decade is what needs to be examined if one is to assess the Indian nuclear deterrent.
(11) The French MR31 120kiloton warhead used on their SSBS-S2 IRBM was a pure fission warhead weighed 700kg using about 25kg of weapons-grade plutonium (which is a considerable amount). The successor warhead, the MR41 was a boosted-fission warhead for the MSBS M1 and M2 SLBMs and had a yield of 500 kilotons and weighed 700kg.
To what yield are India's fission and/or boosted-fission designs scalable ?
Do the large payloads of the Agni series lead to the inexorable conclusion that large fission or boosted-fission weapons are the ones deployed ?
Without an analysis of this question, everybody who is attempting to tell the world they know what India's deterrent consists of is merely whistling in the wind - adding nothing but noise to a debate that has seen Dr. Santhanam being described as a nuclear scientist (when he is not) and Dr. Kalam being told to shut up because he is not a nuclear scientist and which has seen the POK-1 1974 test team turn on the 1998 team without remembering that the yield of their test in 1974 was also hotly disputed.
There are no heroes in this drama. What India needs to do is ignore the rhetoric and analyse whether its fission and boosted-fission capability can reliably deliver warheads in the 50-100 kiloton class to the armed forces with confidence.
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