INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.555
B.RAMAN
Despite attrition in its ranks and lower and middle-level leadership, Al Qaeda remains as elusive, as innovative and as homing-pigeon like as ever. That is the assessment that one could draw 11 years after its terrorist strikes in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam and eight years after its 9/11 strikes in the US Homeland.
2.Despite the most sophisticated search for eight years with the help of modern gadgetry and some of the sharpest minds in the US counter-terrorism community, the US has not been able to pin-point the location of Osama bin Laden and his No.2 Ayman-al Zawahiri.The supposition ---this is strongly denied by Pakistan---is that they are somewhere in the North Waziristan or Chitral area of the Pashtun tribal belt of Pakistan.There has been no confirmation of this supposition. Neither human nor technical intelligence regarding their exact whereabouts has been forthcoming.
3. The flow of human and technical intelligence regarding the Pakistani Taliban has improved considerably resulting in some very successful operations by the US. The most spectacular in recent months was the elimination of Baitullah Mehsud, the Amir of the Pakistani Taliban, through a Predator strike on the house of his father-in-law in South Waziristan, where he was resting, on August 5,2009.
4. There have been no similar operations against OBL and Zawahiri since January 2006 when the US narrowly missed killing Zawahiri in the Bajaur Agency through a Predator strike on the house of one of his friends with whom he was reportedly planning to eat. He did not turn up at the last minute. The US strike killed a large number of civilians, but not Zawahiri.
5.Offers of millions of dollars in reward for information leading to OBL and Zawahiri have not helped. There are Pashtuns who are prepared to betray the leaders of the Pakistani Taliban, but not OBL or Zawahiri.Is the absence of even scanty information regarding their whereabouts due to the devotion and loyalty of the Pashtuns to OBL and Zawahiri, whom they regard as their honoured guests or is it due to the fact that neither of them is in the Pashtun belt, where the US has been looking for them?
6.Some middle-level leaders of Al Qaeda, who had taken shelter in the Pashtun belt, were killed by Predator strikes. Abu Faraj al-Libi, another middle-level leader, was arrested in the Pashtun belt in May, 2005 and flown to the Guantanamo Bay detention centre in Cuba . All other Al Qaeda leaders caught in Pakistan since 9/11 were found in non-tribal areas and arrested in places such as Faislabad, Karachi,
Rawalpindi etc. Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (KSM), the most important Al Qaeda leader arrested in Pakistan, was reportedly found in the house of a women's wing leader of the Jamaat-e-Islami in Rawalpindi. Is it necessary for the US to revisit its supposition that OBL andZawahiri must be in the tribal belt----most probably in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)? Which are the other areas where they
could hide as effectively as in the Pashtun belt? These questions must be already engaging the attention of the US intelligence.
7.OBL and Zawahiri have not been seen by anyone outside Al Qaeda since 2002, but they are heard from time to time through their messages disseminated by As-Sahab, the propaganda wing of Al Qaeda. The US has not even been able to track their message trail back to their hide-outs. It seems to be clueless as to how and where these messages are being recorded and how they are disseminated.
8. The relentless US hunt for OBL and Zawahiri and the constant fear of their being killed or captured have not come in the way of Al Qaeda continuing to organise, guide or inspire terrorist strikes in different parts of the world. It may not have succeeded in carrying out another 9/11 in the US homeland, but its record in terms of terrorist strikes right across the world organised ,guided or inspired by it has been impressive. Bali (2002 and 2005), Mombasa ( 2002), Madrid ( 2004), Jakarta (2003,2004 and 2009),London (2005), Mumbai (2006 by the Lashkar-e-Toiba), Islamabad (Marriott Hotel explosion in September 2008), Mumbai ( November,2008 again by the LET) and Jeddah (August 2009) are the notable examples. There are many other examples from Algeria, Somalia, Iraq, Egypt,Morocco, Turkey and Yemen.
9. Al Qaeda's leaders are widely scattered. They do not live and operate from the same place. That is why whenever an Al Qaeda leader was killed or captured he was found alone. No other leader was found with him. They maintain communication and restrictive security effectively. That is why whenever an Al Qaeda leader was captured, his interrogation did not lead to the hide-outs of OBL, Zawahiri or others. From this it should be evident that the Shura of Al Qaeda is no longer able to operate as a shura with all members meeting at one place and taking joint decisions. Despite this, new ideas have been flowing back and forth and innovative modus operandi ----new ones or old ones with new gadgetry to increase their destruction-multiplier effect---are being tried by Al Qaeda and its associates such as the LET.
10.Among the innovative MOs seen since 9/11 of 2008, one could mention the commando-style attacks with hand-held weapons on multiple targets mounted from the sea in Mumbai in November,2008 by the LET, terrorists checking into hotels as normal guests and the explosive material being reached to them separately for mounting a suicide attack as was seen in Jakarta in July,2009, and a terrorist posing as a deserter from Al Qaeda and wanting to surrender in order to gain access to an important, well-protected leader as was seen during the failed attempt to kill the Saudi Deputy Minister of the Interior, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, at Jeddah on August 27,2009. According to unconfirmed reports, the suicide terrorist, who was accidentally blown up before he could come close to the VIP, was wearing a suicide under-wear and not a vest as used to be normally done.
11. There has been no degradation of Al Qaeda's ability to think and innovate and to take the intelligence and security agencies by surprise. Al Qaeda derives its ability to surprise from the fact that it continues to be the least penetrated of the jihadi terrorist organisations of the world. Neither the strengthening of national intelligence capabilities nor the development of international intelligence co-operation has succeeded in penetrating it. There have been tactical successes scored by the intelligence agencies of the US, the UK, Canada, Saudi Arabia and India in thwarting terrorist operations by identifying and neutralising the cells constituted by Al Qaeda and its associates for carrying out terrorist strikes, but the neutralisation of such cells has not yet led to a withering away of the organisation. Al Qaeda continues to think globally and operate globally.
12.Al Qaeda's principal adversaries remain the same---the US and Israel. Its subsidiary national targets keep changing depending on the policies of different States towards the US and Israel. Spain and Italy, which were among its important national targets immediately after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, no longer seem to receive the same attention in its planning. Among its new targets post-2003 are Pakistan and India---- Pakistan because of its alleged co-operation with the US in its anti-Al Qaeda and anti-Taliban operations and India because of its developing strategic relationships with the US and Israel.In Europe it pays more attention to the UK and Germany as possible targets because of their active role in helping the US in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia's importance in the eyes of Al Qaeda remains undiminished----not only because the holy places of Islam are located there, but also because its oil wealth could be used to economically damage the West. Its
presence in South-East Asia and Central Asia is important for it to project itself as a global force defending the interests and honour of Islam.
13. Al Qaeda continues to view its battle against the US as being fought on many fronts----Algeria, Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan. In its view,the ultimate defeat or victory will come in the battlefields of the Af-Pak region. Afghanisation of Pakistan is one of its important objectives----that is, making Pakistan as unstable and as ungovernable as Afghanistan and as receptive to the jihadis of the world. It
originally thought it would engage the US in a two-front war in Iraq and Afghanistan, but in Iraq things have not developed the way it hoped they would. Iraq has not been a success story for Al Qaeda.
14. What it failed to achieve in Iraq----the defeat and humiliating withdrawal of the US---- it hopes to achieve in the Af-Pak region. It is encouraged by what it perceives as the first signs of public fatigue in the US with its involvement in Afghanistan.Till some months ago,public support for the US operations in Afghanistan was high. The US public---like its political leadership---viewed continued US military operations in the Af-Pak region as important to prevent another 9/11 in the US homeland. But memories of 9/11 are fading. Fears of a catastrophic act of terrorism by Al Qaeda or its associates involving the use of weapons of mass destruction material no longer strengthen public support to the same extent as they did. The present visuals before the US public are of the Americans being killed in increasing numbers in Afghanistan and not of the hundreds of civilians killed on 9/11
15. There has been no spectacular battle-field success of the US and other NATO troops against the Afghan Taliban or Al Qaeda. The US successes against the Pakistani Taliban are not exciting the American public. What it wants is signs of success against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban.
16. What stands in the way of the US ability to turn the tide of the campaign in the Af-Pak region in its favour decisively is its failure to realise that its continued pampering of Pakistan is the root cause of its difficulties in Afghanistan and of the lack of success against Al Qaeda. Without a more robust policy to make Pakistan act really and not seemingly against Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban and the Punjabi
jihadi organisations, American difficulties will not end.
17. It is in the common interest of the international community to work in a co-ordinated and determined manner for making Al Qaeda and its
associates wither way.They will not wither away so long as they find a fertile, well-irrigated soil in Pakistan. ( 6-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Sunday, September 6, 2009
Saturday, September 5, 2009
TWO HEADS ROLL IN XINJIANG
B.RAMAN
The demonstrations by a large number of Han residents of Urumqi, the capital of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region of China, from September 2 to 4,2009, to protest against the failure of the local authorities to stop the wave of mysterious attacks by hypodermic syringe needles since August 17,2009, have claimed their first victims--- one at the level of the Urumqi city and the other at the provincial level..
2. The officially-controlled Xinhua news agency announced on September 5,2009, that the regional committee of the Communist Party of China for the Xinjiang Autonomous Region has replaced Li Zhi, who was the Secretary of the Urumqi Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China, by Zhu Hailun, who was the Secretary of the Regional Political and Legislative Affaitrs Committee of the entire province.
3. At the provincial level, Xinhua reported that the Standing Committee of the People's Congress of the province, which is the provincial legislature, has replaced Liu Yaohua, who was the Director of the Public Security Department of the province, by Zhu Changjie, who was the party chief in the Aksu Prefecture of the province. The Public Security Department of the province, which works under the Ministry of Public
Security of the central Government in Beijing, is responsible for internal intelligence and internal security. The police also comes under its supervision. In China, the head of the Public Security Department of a province is generally referred to as the police chief of the province and the Minister for Public Security at Beijing is referred to as the police chief of China. All police chiefs are appointed by the respective legislatures on the recommendation of the party--- the provincial police chiefs by the provincial legislature and the Minister for Public
Security by the National People's Congress or by its Standing Committee, if it is not in session.
4.Some interesting points about these two changes need to be underlined. Firstly, the two decisions have been projected as taken at the provincial level, but the instructions for the changes must have come from Beijing. Secondly, while the change at the party level has been restricted to the municipality of Urumqi, the change at the governmental level has affected the head of the Public Security Department for
the entire province. There has been no announcement regarding the head of the Public Security Department in the Urumqi municipality. Any decision regarding him has apparently been left to the new provincial chief.
5. It is also interesting to note that Wang Lequan, the head of the Communist Party of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, has not so far been affected. He is the provincial head of the party continuously since 1994 and is considered very close to President Hu Jintao. During the demonstrations, most of the slogans were against him. Large sections of the Hans of Urumqi blame him for the failure of the police to
protect them, but he can be removed only by the central party Politburo or its Standing Committee in Beijing. It would be interesting to see whether he too is removed by the Politburo or whether he is protected from any humiliation by President Hu Jintao.
6. If he is removed, that could be an indication that Hu's position in the party has been weakened by the developments in Xinjiang. If he manages to stay on despite his alleged mishandling of the situation, that could be an indication that Hu's position remains strong.
7. The other person whose future requires watching is China's Public Security Minister Meng Jianzhu, who rushed to Urumqi from Beijing on September 4. He is responsible for supervising the work of the Public Security Department of the province. If the provincial chief is removed because of the situation, can Meng in Beijing escape responsibility for failing to supervise his work effectively. Meng can be removed only by the National People's Congress or its Standing Committee on the recommendation of the party.
8. One possibility is that Wang and Meng may be allowed to continue till the celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the People's Republic of China next month are over and may be eased out thereafter. Will the Han residents of Urumqi remain quiet till then or will they resume their demand for sacking Wang immediately. If the Hans resume their demand for removing Wang and if Hu doesn't do so, there is a danger of the public anger turning against him.
9. In the meanwhile, there was relative calm in Urumqi on September 5. There was one attempt by a group of about 1000 young Hans to gather at the central square, but this was thwarted by the police without using force. The authorities allowed the local mosques to hold their Ramadan prayers. Many shops were open. However, there was a heavy presence of the People's Armed Police all over the city. Despite
this, more incidents of needle-stabbings were reported. There have been no fatalities due to the stabbings, but for the last three days rumours have been circulating in the city that the Uighurs have been trying to infect the Hans with the HIV virus. This has added to the panic. A team of Army doctors has been rushed to Urumqi from the PLA headquarters in Beijing to examine the persons injured by the
needle-stabbings and to dispel these rumours.
10.The local security agencies are totally non-plussed and do not know how to deal with the new modus operandi of the Uighurs, which amounts to the use of soft terror, that is, criminal intimidation, causing polarisation between Muslims and non-Muslims and discrediting the security agencies in the eyes of the public through means, which do not cause mass fatalities. Or are some local irrational elements, having
nothing to do with terrorism or extremism, causing a scare in the population similar to the anthrax scare in the US after 9/11? (5-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
The demonstrations by a large number of Han residents of Urumqi, the capital of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region of China, from September 2 to 4,2009, to protest against the failure of the local authorities to stop the wave of mysterious attacks by hypodermic syringe needles since August 17,2009, have claimed their first victims--- one at the level of the Urumqi city and the other at the provincial level..
2. The officially-controlled Xinhua news agency announced on September 5,2009, that the regional committee of the Communist Party of China for the Xinjiang Autonomous Region has replaced Li Zhi, who was the Secretary of the Urumqi Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China, by Zhu Hailun, who was the Secretary of the Regional Political and Legislative Affaitrs Committee of the entire province.
3. At the provincial level, Xinhua reported that the Standing Committee of the People's Congress of the province, which is the provincial legislature, has replaced Liu Yaohua, who was the Director of the Public Security Department of the province, by Zhu Changjie, who was the party chief in the Aksu Prefecture of the province. The Public Security Department of the province, which works under the Ministry of Public
Security of the central Government in Beijing, is responsible for internal intelligence and internal security. The police also comes under its supervision. In China, the head of the Public Security Department of a province is generally referred to as the police chief of the province and the Minister for Public Security at Beijing is referred to as the police chief of China. All police chiefs are appointed by the respective legislatures on the recommendation of the party--- the provincial police chiefs by the provincial legislature and the Minister for Public
Security by the National People's Congress or by its Standing Committee, if it is not in session.
4.Some interesting points about these two changes need to be underlined. Firstly, the two decisions have been projected as taken at the provincial level, but the instructions for the changes must have come from Beijing. Secondly, while the change at the party level has been restricted to the municipality of Urumqi, the change at the governmental level has affected the head of the Public Security Department for
the entire province. There has been no announcement regarding the head of the Public Security Department in the Urumqi municipality. Any decision regarding him has apparently been left to the new provincial chief.
5. It is also interesting to note that Wang Lequan, the head of the Communist Party of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, has not so far been affected. He is the provincial head of the party continuously since 1994 and is considered very close to President Hu Jintao. During the demonstrations, most of the slogans were against him. Large sections of the Hans of Urumqi blame him for the failure of the police to
protect them, but he can be removed only by the central party Politburo or its Standing Committee in Beijing. It would be interesting to see whether he too is removed by the Politburo or whether he is protected from any humiliation by President Hu Jintao.
6. If he is removed, that could be an indication that Hu's position in the party has been weakened by the developments in Xinjiang. If he manages to stay on despite his alleged mishandling of the situation, that could be an indication that Hu's position remains strong.
7. The other person whose future requires watching is China's Public Security Minister Meng Jianzhu, who rushed to Urumqi from Beijing on September 4. He is responsible for supervising the work of the Public Security Department of the province. If the provincial chief is removed because of the situation, can Meng in Beijing escape responsibility for failing to supervise his work effectively. Meng can be removed only by the National People's Congress or its Standing Committee on the recommendation of the party.
8. One possibility is that Wang and Meng may be allowed to continue till the celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the People's Republic of China next month are over and may be eased out thereafter. Will the Han residents of Urumqi remain quiet till then or will they resume their demand for sacking Wang immediately. If the Hans resume their demand for removing Wang and if Hu doesn't do so, there is a danger of the public anger turning against him.
9. In the meanwhile, there was relative calm in Urumqi on September 5. There was one attempt by a group of about 1000 young Hans to gather at the central square, but this was thwarted by the police without using force. The authorities allowed the local mosques to hold their Ramadan prayers. Many shops were open. However, there was a heavy presence of the People's Armed Police all over the city. Despite
this, more incidents of needle-stabbings were reported. There have been no fatalities due to the stabbings, but for the last three days rumours have been circulating in the city that the Uighurs have been trying to infect the Hans with the HIV virus. This has added to the panic. A team of Army doctors has been rushed to Urumqi from the PLA headquarters in Beijing to examine the persons injured by the
needle-stabbings and to dispel these rumours.
10.The local security agencies are totally non-plussed and do not know how to deal with the new modus operandi of the Uighurs, which amounts to the use of soft terror, that is, criminal intimidation, causing polarisation between Muslims and non-Muslims and discrediting the security agencies in the eyes of the public through means, which do not cause mass fatalities. Or are some local irrational elements, having
nothing to do with terrorism or extremism, causing a scare in the population similar to the anthrax scare in the US after 9/11? (5-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
TO STRIKE OR NOT TO STRIKE? A COUNTER-INSURGENCY DILEMMA
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO. 554
B.RAMAN
A NATO air strike of September 4,2009, in the Kunduz province in Northern Afghanistan on two fuel tankers hijacked by the Taliban in order to prevent the Taliban from making use of the fuel has caused a tremendous controversy over the collateral damage caused by the air strike.
2. These tankers were reportedly bringing fuel for NATO use via Tajikistan. In view of the repeated disruptions of logistic supplies to the NATO troops via Pakistani territory due to attacks by the Pakistani Taliban called the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the NATO troops have developed an alternate route for logistic supplies via Russia and the Central Asian Republics (CAR). There have been indications that the Afghan Taliban and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan ( IMU) were planning to disrupt this alternative route too by stepping up their activities in Northern Afghanistan and the CARs. There have already been indications of a revival of acts of terrorism by pro-Al Qaeda organisations in the CARs.
3. Two of these fuel tankers coming from or via Tajikistan were reportedly hijacked by the Neo Taliban of Afghanistan. It is not clear from available reports whether the hijacking was done in Tajik or Afghan territory. The reports say that after hijacking the tankers, the Neo Taliban group responsible for the hijacking beheaded the drivers and started driving them to the area controlled by it. On the way one of the tankers developed some technical trouble and stalled. Some members of the local community gathered round it, reportedly to help themselves to some of the fuel.After assessing the situation and satisfying itself that any collateral damage to civilians will be minimal, a NATO air strike was ordered on the tankers. There are conflicting reports of the fatalities caused by the exploding fuel tankers as a result of the air strike---- varying between 60 and 90.
4. In an operation of this kind, there are bound to have been civilian casualties. It would be difficult to quantify how many of those killed were from the Neo Taliban and how many were civilians.Even though an enquiry has been ordered by the NATO officials, they would find it difficult to arrive at an acceptable figure of civilian fatalities.It would be impossible to prove or disprove the contention of either side. The NATO's contention is that even if there were civilian fatalities, their number would be small and that the majority of those killed were from
the Neo Taliban. The contention of the Neo Taliban is that most of those killed were innocent civilians. In a situation such as this, the general population will always believe the insurgents and not the security forces. This is one of the inherent hazards in a counter-insurgency operation. The security forces have to live with it.
5. One could understand the factors which must have prompted the air strike. First, to prevent the Neo Taliban from using the fuel for adding to its capabilities. Second, to deter future attempts to disrupt supplies from or through the CARs. At the same time, air strikes on a fuel tanker----particularly if it is stationery--- carry with them the risk of unacceptable collateral damage, which would be exploited by the insurgents to the detriment of the security forces and their counter-insurgency operations.
6. One of the lessons from this incident could be to avoid air strikes on stationery fuel tankers. Air strikes on fuel tankers moving on country roads in an isolated or thinly-inhabited area normally will carry less danger of civilian fatalities. There are situations where the security forces should resist the urge to act. What happened on September 4 was one such situation. (5-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
A NATO air strike of September 4,2009, in the Kunduz province in Northern Afghanistan on two fuel tankers hijacked by the Taliban in order to prevent the Taliban from making use of the fuel has caused a tremendous controversy over the collateral damage caused by the air strike.
2. These tankers were reportedly bringing fuel for NATO use via Tajikistan. In view of the repeated disruptions of logistic supplies to the NATO troops via Pakistani territory due to attacks by the Pakistani Taliban called the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the NATO troops have developed an alternate route for logistic supplies via Russia and the Central Asian Republics (CAR). There have been indications that the Afghan Taliban and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan ( IMU) were planning to disrupt this alternative route too by stepping up their activities in Northern Afghanistan and the CARs. There have already been indications of a revival of acts of terrorism by pro-Al Qaeda organisations in the CARs.
3. Two of these fuel tankers coming from or via Tajikistan were reportedly hijacked by the Neo Taliban of Afghanistan. It is not clear from available reports whether the hijacking was done in Tajik or Afghan territory. The reports say that after hijacking the tankers, the Neo Taliban group responsible for the hijacking beheaded the drivers and started driving them to the area controlled by it. On the way one of the tankers developed some technical trouble and stalled. Some members of the local community gathered round it, reportedly to help themselves to some of the fuel.After assessing the situation and satisfying itself that any collateral damage to civilians will be minimal, a NATO air strike was ordered on the tankers. There are conflicting reports of the fatalities caused by the exploding fuel tankers as a result of the air strike---- varying between 60 and 90.
4. In an operation of this kind, there are bound to have been civilian casualties. It would be difficult to quantify how many of those killed were from the Neo Taliban and how many were civilians.Even though an enquiry has been ordered by the NATO officials, they would find it difficult to arrive at an acceptable figure of civilian fatalities.It would be impossible to prove or disprove the contention of either side. The NATO's contention is that even if there were civilian fatalities, their number would be small and that the majority of those killed were from
the Neo Taliban. The contention of the Neo Taliban is that most of those killed were innocent civilians. In a situation such as this, the general population will always believe the insurgents and not the security forces. This is one of the inherent hazards in a counter-insurgency operation. The security forces have to live with it.
5. One could understand the factors which must have prompted the air strike. First, to prevent the Neo Taliban from using the fuel for adding to its capabilities. Second, to deter future attempts to disrupt supplies from or through the CARs. At the same time, air strikes on a fuel tanker----particularly if it is stationery--- carry with them the risk of unacceptable collateral damage, which would be exploited by the insurgents to the detriment of the security forces and their counter-insurgency operations.
6. One of the lessons from this incident could be to avoid air strikes on stationery fuel tankers. Air strikes on fuel tankers moving on country roads in an isolated or thinly-inhabited area normally will carry less danger of civilian fatalities. There are situations where the security forces should resist the urge to act. What happened on September 4 was one such situation. (5-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, September 4, 2009
DEMONSTRATIONS BANNED IN URUMQI--AUTHORITIES ALLEGE USE OF "SOFT VIOLENCE" BY EXTREMISTS
B.RAMAN
The authorities of China's Xinjiang Autonomous Region have issued a notification banning all public demonstrations with immediate effect.Anyone, who holds or organises a public demonstration without the prior permission of the authorities or
participates in such a demonstration will be liable to be arrested and prosecuted. The notification says: "In case of violations,the public security department will disperse those gathered, and detain those who disobey the order."
2. Zhang Hong, the Deputy Mayor of Urumqi, held a press conference on September 4,2009, to give details of the situation. From the details given by him, it appeared that the five persons, whose deaths were reported earlier, had died during the demonstrations on September 3 and not due to the syringe attacks. He did not clarify whether the deaths occurred due to the People's Armed Police opening fire on the
demonstrators. However, he said that of the five who died, two were found to be innocent. There have been unconfirmed reports that some Uighurs, whom Han mobs suspected to be needle-stabbers, had died due to lynching.
3. The following are some of the details given at the press conference
On September 4, the situation was basically under control in the city.Small crowds gathered "in a few locations" , but soon dispersed and nobody was killed.
Syringe attacks have resulted in panic and resentment from the public.Suspects were caught on September 2 when attacking members of the public. They were beaten by an angry crowd and one was seriously injured.
Five people have been confirmed dead and 14 others injured and hospitalized following the protests of September 3.Of the five dead,two had been confirmed as innocent civilians, while police are trying to identify the remaining three.
Investigations showed those carrying out the syringe attacks were from the Uighur ethnic group while the attacked included Han Chinese and other ethnic groups.By September 3, local hospitals had dealt with 531 victims of hypodermic syringe stabbings, 106 of whom showed obvious signs of needle attacks.The attacks were premeditated and organized to create terror in society.
"The 'three forces' (separatism, terrorism and extremism) at home and abroad are not willing to see ethnic unity and their failure when he July 5 violence died down quickly.So they are using 'soft violence' to disrupt social order and instigate ethnic hatred."
4. The Government-controlled Xinhua news agency disseminated the following report at 10 PM Beijing time on September 4: "According to the directive of superiors, a quarantine experts team from the PLA Military Academy of Medical Sciences arrived at Urumqi by air on the evening of September 3, to join local authorities in the examination and identification of the injuries by syringe attacks on some of the local people." ( 5-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The authorities of China's Xinjiang Autonomous Region have issued a notification banning all public demonstrations with immediate effect.Anyone, who holds or organises a public demonstration without the prior permission of the authorities or
participates in such a demonstration will be liable to be arrested and prosecuted. The notification says: "In case of violations,the public security department will disperse those gathered, and detain those who disobey the order."
2. Zhang Hong, the Deputy Mayor of Urumqi, held a press conference on September 4,2009, to give details of the situation. From the details given by him, it appeared that the five persons, whose deaths were reported earlier, had died during the demonstrations on September 3 and not due to the syringe attacks. He did not clarify whether the deaths occurred due to the People's Armed Police opening fire on the
demonstrators. However, he said that of the five who died, two were found to be innocent. There have been unconfirmed reports that some Uighurs, whom Han mobs suspected to be needle-stabbers, had died due to lynching.
3. The following are some of the details given at the press conference
On September 4, the situation was basically under control in the city.Small crowds gathered "in a few locations" , but soon dispersed and nobody was killed.
Syringe attacks have resulted in panic and resentment from the public.Suspects were caught on September 2 when attacking members of the public. They were beaten by an angry crowd and one was seriously injured.
Five people have been confirmed dead and 14 others injured and hospitalized following the protests of September 3.Of the five dead,two had been confirmed as innocent civilians, while police are trying to identify the remaining three.
Investigations showed those carrying out the syringe attacks were from the Uighur ethnic group while the attacked included Han Chinese and other ethnic groups.By September 3, local hospitals had dealt with 531 victims of hypodermic syringe stabbings, 106 of whom showed obvious signs of needle attacks.The attacks were premeditated and organized to create terror in society.
"The 'three forces' (separatism, terrorism and extremism) at home and abroad are not willing to see ethnic unity and their failure when he July 5 violence died down quickly.So they are using 'soft violence' to disrupt social order and instigate ethnic hatred."
4. The Government-controlled Xinhua news agency disseminated the following report at 10 PM Beijing time on September 4: "According to the directive of superiors, a quarantine experts team from the PLA Military Academy of Medical Sciences arrived at Urumqi by air on the evening of September 3, to join local authorities in the examination and identification of the injuries by syringe attacks on some of the local people." ( 5-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
SITUATION WORSENS: INTERNAL SECURITY CHIEF RUSHES TO URUMQI
B.RAMAN
The situation has deteriorated in Urumqi, the capital of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region of China. The Chinese authorities admitted on the evening of September 4,2009 that there have been five deaths without specifying when the deaths occurred
and whether they were due to the incidents of needle stabbings or due to the clashes between the Han protesters and the People's Armed Police.
2. Either way, it is a serious development.If the deaths were due to needle stabbings, this would indicate that the needles were poison-tipped. If the deaths were due to clashes, it shows the increasingly defiant mood of the Han protesters.
3. Reflecting the seriousness of the situation, China's Public Security Minister Meng Jianzhu, who is responsible for internal intelligence and internal security, rushed to Urumqi on September 4,2009, for discussions on the situation with the local authorities and to appeal to the Han community to maintain calm.
4. Annexed is a report on his arrival at Urumqi disseminated by the State-controlled Xinhua news agency on the night of September 4,2009. (4-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail:
seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
( Text of Xinhua despatch of September 4,2009, disseminated at 8 PM Beijing time)
China's Public Security Minister Meng Jianzhu arrived in Urumqi, capital of northwest China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, Friday to direct work to defuse ongoing unrest in the city.
Meng, also a State Councillor, urged local governments and Communist Party of China (CPC) committees at all levels in Xinjiang "to restore social order as soon as possible."
"Maintaining stability is the central task of overriding importance in Xinjiang at the present time," he said in a meeting with local officials.
Meng said the recent syringe attacks, which were premeditated, masterminded and conducted by law-breakers and instigated by ethnic separatist forces, were a continuation of the July 5 incident in the city. He said their purpose was to
undermine ethnic unity.
"Fellow citizens of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang should sharpen vigilance and not be fooled by law-breakers," he said.
The police chief said legal proceedings against suspects arrested in the July 5 violence should be accelerated. Those who were responsible should be discovered and murderers should be punished according to the law.
Meng held discussions with Urumqi residents during which he said traffic controls imposed in the city on Thursday aimed to ensure normal social order and asked for their understanding, support and cooperation.
He also warned "those involved in violence, assaults, vandalism, looting and burning, and those who disrupt social order by different means or undermine ethnic unity, shall be punished according to the law without exception, whatever their ethnicity is."
The situation has deteriorated in Urumqi, the capital of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region of China. The Chinese authorities admitted on the evening of September 4,2009 that there have been five deaths without specifying when the deaths occurred
and whether they were due to the incidents of needle stabbings or due to the clashes between the Han protesters and the People's Armed Police.
2. Either way, it is a serious development.If the deaths were due to needle stabbings, this would indicate that the needles were poison-tipped. If the deaths were due to clashes, it shows the increasingly defiant mood of the Han protesters.
3. Reflecting the seriousness of the situation, China's Public Security Minister Meng Jianzhu, who is responsible for internal intelligence and internal security, rushed to Urumqi on September 4,2009, for discussions on the situation with the local authorities and to appeal to the Han community to maintain calm.
4. Annexed is a report on his arrival at Urumqi disseminated by the State-controlled Xinhua news agency on the night of September 4,2009. (4-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail:
seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
( Text of Xinhua despatch of September 4,2009, disseminated at 8 PM Beijing time)
China's Public Security Minister Meng Jianzhu arrived in Urumqi, capital of northwest China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, Friday to direct work to defuse ongoing unrest in the city.
Meng, also a State Councillor, urged local governments and Communist Party of China (CPC) committees at all levels in Xinjiang "to restore social order as soon as possible."
"Maintaining stability is the central task of overriding importance in Xinjiang at the present time," he said in a meeting with local officials.
Meng said the recent syringe attacks, which were premeditated, masterminded and conducted by law-breakers and instigated by ethnic separatist forces, were a continuation of the July 5 incident in the city. He said their purpose was to
undermine ethnic unity.
"Fellow citizens of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang should sharpen vigilance and not be fooled by law-breakers," he said.
The police chief said legal proceedings against suspects arrested in the July 5 violence should be accelerated. Those who were responsible should be discovered and murderers should be punished according to the law.
Meng held discussions with Urumqi residents during which he said traffic controls imposed in the city on Thursday aimed to ensure normal social order and asked for their understanding, support and cooperation.
He also warned "those involved in violence, assaults, vandalism, looting and burning, and those who disrupt social order by different means or undermine ethnic unity, shall be punished according to the law without exception, whatever their ethnicity is."
XINJIANG: A CHALLENGE TO HU JINTAO
B.RAMAN
Less than a month before the 60th anniversary of the People's Republic of China, President Hu Jintao and the Chinese Communist Party face a serious challenge to their authority from the Uighurs as well as the Hans of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region.
2. The repressive measures taken by the local authorities of the province against the Uighurs following the disturbances of July 5/6,2009, at Urumqi in which 197 persons---the majority of them Han Chinese---were killed, have not brought the situation totally under control. After a lull of about six weeks, large numbers of Uighurs---including some women--- reportedly motivated by the pro-Al Qaeda Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan (IMET) have again succeeded in creating a growing feeling of insecurity among the Hans by organising a large number of stabbing incidents with hypodermic syringe needles on Hans ---including children--- in public places. These attacks started on August 17,2009, and are continuing during the present holy fasting period of Ramadan.
3.There have been over 470 reports of such attacks, but only about 80 of them have reportedly been confirmed by doctors who did a physical examination of the complainants. The large number of confirmed attacks indicates that a number of Uighurs have been operating autonomously of each other, but their actions are being co-ordinated by a common command and control. The much larger number of
unconfirmed cases speak of the panic prevailing in the Han population. This panic is making many believe that they have been stabbed by a passer-by with a syringe needle. Despite the arrests of a number of suspects---including one or two allegedly caught red-handed while stabbing Hans with needles---- the local police have not been able to establish who is behind this wave of strikes and identify and arrrest their ring leaders.
4. The ineffectiveness of the police in dealing with the situation has led to a recrudescence of the anger of the Han residents of Urumqi. This is similar to the anger witnessed after the violent disturbances of July when thousands of Hans protested in the streets against the inefficiency of the police. Unnerved by this anger, President Hu Jintao, who was then in Italy to attend the G-8 summit, cancelled his participation in the summit and flew back to Beijing to order the despatch of Army and People's Armed Police reinforcements to Xinjiang in
his capacity as the Chairman of the Central Military Commission. This led to the Han anger subsiding.
5. The expectations of the Hans that an enquiry will be held to establish responsibility for the acts of negligence which led to the July disturbances and take action against those found negligent have been belied. On the contrary, during his visit to Xinjiang last month President Hu Jintao extended his backing to the local Government and party leaders for the way they had handled the situation.
6.The wave of needle stabbings and the failure of the local police to stop this and identify and arrest those responsible have led to a fresh eruption of anger among the Hans. They have been demonstrating in the streets of Urumqi since September 2. The demonstrations started on a small scale on September 2. Thousands joined the demonstrations the next day, but they obeyed the instructions of the local officials
and dispersed peacefully without creating any incident.
7. On the night of September 3, the authorities imposed an undeclared curfew by banning vehicular movements and gatherings of people on the main roads under the guise of regulating traffic.They also inducted a large number of People's Armed Police units from outside Urumqi who took up positions at sensitive points of the city and outside main government and party offices. They ordered the closure of all
educational institutions on September 4 and the local mosques to cancel their Ramadan Friday prayers. Police vans fittled with public address systems moved around the city appealing to the people to stay in their houses.
8. Despite this, hundreds of Han residents of the city started coming into the streets around mid-day in different parts of the city to demonstrate against the failure of the authorities to protect the lives and property of the Hans. Apparently afraid of a 1989 Tianenmen Square type of incident, the authorities have banned the people from gathering in the main square of the city. When a crowd of about 1000 young Hans tried to defy this ban, the People's Armed Police units dispersed them ny using tear-smoke.
9. According to reports from reliable sources, for the first time since the protests began on September 2 slogans are being shouted demanding the sacking of Wang Lequan, the head of the Communist Party of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, who is considered a protege of President Hu. There were no slogans against Hu, but if Beijing continues to back Wang there is a danger of the Han anger turning against
Hu himself and the Central Government and party leaders.
10. The situation in Urumqi is increasingly delicate for the Central Government and party. ( 4-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Less than a month before the 60th anniversary of the People's Republic of China, President Hu Jintao and the Chinese Communist Party face a serious challenge to their authority from the Uighurs as well as the Hans of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region.
2. The repressive measures taken by the local authorities of the province against the Uighurs following the disturbances of July 5/6,2009, at Urumqi in which 197 persons---the majority of them Han Chinese---were killed, have not brought the situation totally under control. After a lull of about six weeks, large numbers of Uighurs---including some women--- reportedly motivated by the pro-Al Qaeda Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan (IMET) have again succeeded in creating a growing feeling of insecurity among the Hans by organising a large number of stabbing incidents with hypodermic syringe needles on Hans ---including children--- in public places. These attacks started on August 17,2009, and are continuing during the present holy fasting period of Ramadan.
3.There have been over 470 reports of such attacks, but only about 80 of them have reportedly been confirmed by doctors who did a physical examination of the complainants. The large number of confirmed attacks indicates that a number of Uighurs have been operating autonomously of each other, but their actions are being co-ordinated by a common command and control. The much larger number of
unconfirmed cases speak of the panic prevailing in the Han population. This panic is making many believe that they have been stabbed by a passer-by with a syringe needle. Despite the arrests of a number of suspects---including one or two allegedly caught red-handed while stabbing Hans with needles---- the local police have not been able to establish who is behind this wave of strikes and identify and arrrest their ring leaders.
4. The ineffectiveness of the police in dealing with the situation has led to a recrudescence of the anger of the Han residents of Urumqi. This is similar to the anger witnessed after the violent disturbances of July when thousands of Hans protested in the streets against the inefficiency of the police. Unnerved by this anger, President Hu Jintao, who was then in Italy to attend the G-8 summit, cancelled his participation in the summit and flew back to Beijing to order the despatch of Army and People's Armed Police reinforcements to Xinjiang in
his capacity as the Chairman of the Central Military Commission. This led to the Han anger subsiding.
5. The expectations of the Hans that an enquiry will be held to establish responsibility for the acts of negligence which led to the July disturbances and take action against those found negligent have been belied. On the contrary, during his visit to Xinjiang last month President Hu Jintao extended his backing to the local Government and party leaders for the way they had handled the situation.
6.The wave of needle stabbings and the failure of the local police to stop this and identify and arrest those responsible have led to a fresh eruption of anger among the Hans. They have been demonstrating in the streets of Urumqi since September 2. The demonstrations started on a small scale on September 2. Thousands joined the demonstrations the next day, but they obeyed the instructions of the local officials
and dispersed peacefully without creating any incident.
7. On the night of September 3, the authorities imposed an undeclared curfew by banning vehicular movements and gatherings of people on the main roads under the guise of regulating traffic.They also inducted a large number of People's Armed Police units from outside Urumqi who took up positions at sensitive points of the city and outside main government and party offices. They ordered the closure of all
educational institutions on September 4 and the local mosques to cancel their Ramadan Friday prayers. Police vans fittled with public address systems moved around the city appealing to the people to stay in their houses.
8. Despite this, hundreds of Han residents of the city started coming into the streets around mid-day in different parts of the city to demonstrate against the failure of the authorities to protect the lives and property of the Hans. Apparently afraid of a 1989 Tianenmen Square type of incident, the authorities have banned the people from gathering in the main square of the city. When a crowd of about 1000 young Hans tried to defy this ban, the People's Armed Police units dispersed them ny using tear-smoke.
9. According to reports from reliable sources, for the first time since the protests began on September 2 slogans are being shouted demanding the sacking of Wang Lequan, the head of the Communist Party of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, who is considered a protege of President Hu. There were no slogans against Hu, but if Beijing continues to back Wang there is a danger of the Han anger turning against
Hu himself and the Central Government and party leaders.
10. The situation in Urumqi is increasingly delicate for the Central Government and party. ( 4-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Thursday, September 3, 2009
MYANMAR: ANOTHER GESTURE BY JUNTA TO US?
B.RAMAN
The Kokang and Wa regions of the Shan State of Myanmar predominantly consist of non-Han tribals of Yunnanese origin, who are to be found on both sides of the Sino-Myanmar border like the Lishus and the Kachins in the Kachin State of Myanmar. This is also the area into which a large number of KMT troops----consisting of Han Chinese as well as non-Han ethnic recruits from Yunnan--- had crossed over after
the communists captured power in China. While a large number of them were evacuated to Taiwan in the 1970s, many settled down in the Kokang and Wa areas, married locally and raised families.
2. The inhabitants of the Kokang and Wa areas were largely Christians like the non-Han tribals of the Yunnan province of China unlike the Shans of Myanmar who were largely Buddhists. Before 1949, many American Baptist missionaries used to work among the non-Han ethnic groups in Yunnan----like the family of Rev.Joseph Morse. After the Communists captured power, these missionaries and their Lishu and other
supporters crossed over into the Kachin State, while the KMT remnants crossed over into the Kokang and Wa areas of the Shan State.
3. Before they were evacuated to Taiwan, the KMT stragglers, as they were called, actively collaborated with the US intelligence in destabilisation activities in Yunnan. The US intelligence also used the native inhabitants of the Kokang and Wa regions for its destabilisation operations in Yunnan. Many recruits from these areas trained and armed by the KMT stragglers used to indulge in hit and run
raids on Chinese border posts in the Yunnan province.
4. Their harassing attacks were countered by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) by raising a force called the North-East Command headed by Capt.Naw Sang, a Kachin ex-serviceman of the Myanmar Army, who had deserted and took political asylum in Yunnan. This force,which had not only non-Han ethnic recruits from Yunnan, but also Han ex-servicemen from the PLA, infiltrated into the Kokang area and
occupied it in 1968-69. A large number of PLA troops entered the Kokang area after the so-called North-east Command had occupied it and started confronting the KMT stragglers in the Kokang and Wa regions.
5. There were also many clashes between the PLA and the Myanmar Army when the latter tried to eject the North-east Command from the areas occupied by it. After the US established relations with China in the wake of Henry Kissinger's famous visit to Beijing when Richard Nixon was the President, the US agencies discontinued their destabilisation operations in Yunnan and pressured the KMT stragglers, who were no longer of use to the US agencies, to opt for resettlement in Taiwan. Once the majority of the KMT stragglers chose to be repatriated to Taiwan, China discontinued its support to the North-East Command of Naw Sang and the PLA troops which had entered the Kokang and Wa regions withdrew into Yunnan.
6. Some KMT stragglers, who had refused to shift to Taiwan and settled down in the Shan State, became the hard-core of the narcotics and jade smugglimg groups operating from the Golden Triangle area. Opium used to be grown in the Kokang and Wa areas, converted into heroin and smuggled to other countries via Thailand. The withdrawal of the PLA troops and the members of the North-East Command did not lead
to the re-establishment of the writ of the Myanmar Army in these areas, which became almost semi-independent under the control of heroin and jade smugglimg mafia groups. In recent years, these groups have also become producers and smugglers of synthetic drugs, which are causing havoc on public health in many countries of the world, including in the Manipur State in India's North-East.
7.The US has been greatly concerned since the 1980s over the extent of the drug production and smuggling from these areas. A lot of these drugs manages to find its way into the US streets.Even though the US continues to maintain a diplomatic presence in Myanmar, bilateral interactions are practically non-existent for nearly 20 years because of the various sanctions imposed by the West against the military junta in a futile attempt to make it stop the suppression of political dissidents and release Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest.
8. Despite this, the US authorities in charge of action against narcotics production and smuggling continue to maintain a discreet, but vigorous interaction with their Myanmar counterparts. US funding is also available----despite the economic sanctions---- for the eradication of narcotics production and smuggling from the Kokang and Wa areas. Though some action was taken by the Junta in this regard, Washington
has not been totally satisfied. The US suspects that many Myanmar Army officers have been in receipt of money from the narcotics lords of the Kokang and Wa regions and, in return, have been closing their eyes to narcotics production and smuggling.
9. In recent weeks, the junta, which is keen to take advantage of the opening provided by reported re-thinking in the Barack Obama Administration about the wisdom of continuing to keep the junta in the dog house, has been paying greater attention to the US concerns over narcotics production and smuggling from the Kokang and Wa areas. It is reported by sources in this region that it is this which led to
military action by the Myanmar Army against narcotics production in the Kokang area in the last week of August,2009, which led to the exodus of nearly 40,000 tribals and Han Chinese from this region into Yunnan. The fighting between the Myanmar Army and Kokang militia units, which reportedly lasted about three days, has since stopped and the refugees have started coming back into the area from the camps
in Yunnan, where they had been accommodated by the Yunnanese authorities.
10. The Chinese, who continue to be as active as before in Myanmar and are busy constructing oil and gas pipelines from the Arakan area of Myanmar to Yunnan and reportedly also a port to which Chinese oil and gas tankers could come, will have reasons to be concerned over reports of a likely thaw in the relations between the US and the junta. A resumption of US assistance to Myanmar and a consequent
increase in the US presence in Myanmar---- particularly in the areas bordering Yunnan--- will worry the Chinese authorities. The Chinese, who make no secret of their concerns over what they perceive as increasing Indo-US naval cooperation in the Indian Ocean region, will be monitoring closely the developments in the US relations with Myanmar. An additional fear for them will be that if there is a normalisation of the US-Junta relations, that could contribute to a convergence of Indo-US strategic objectives in Myanmar.
11. This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article of August 15,2009, titled MYANMAR: ANOTHER INSTANCE OF OBAMA'S REALPOLITIK at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers34/paper3359.html ( 4-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The Kokang and Wa regions of the Shan State of Myanmar predominantly consist of non-Han tribals of Yunnanese origin, who are to be found on both sides of the Sino-Myanmar border like the Lishus and the Kachins in the Kachin State of Myanmar. This is also the area into which a large number of KMT troops----consisting of Han Chinese as well as non-Han ethnic recruits from Yunnan--- had crossed over after
the communists captured power in China. While a large number of them were evacuated to Taiwan in the 1970s, many settled down in the Kokang and Wa areas, married locally and raised families.
2. The inhabitants of the Kokang and Wa areas were largely Christians like the non-Han tribals of the Yunnan province of China unlike the Shans of Myanmar who were largely Buddhists. Before 1949, many American Baptist missionaries used to work among the non-Han ethnic groups in Yunnan----like the family of Rev.Joseph Morse. After the Communists captured power, these missionaries and their Lishu and other
supporters crossed over into the Kachin State, while the KMT remnants crossed over into the Kokang and Wa areas of the Shan State.
3. Before they were evacuated to Taiwan, the KMT stragglers, as they were called, actively collaborated with the US intelligence in destabilisation activities in Yunnan. The US intelligence also used the native inhabitants of the Kokang and Wa regions for its destabilisation operations in Yunnan. Many recruits from these areas trained and armed by the KMT stragglers used to indulge in hit and run
raids on Chinese border posts in the Yunnan province.
4. Their harassing attacks were countered by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) by raising a force called the North-East Command headed by Capt.Naw Sang, a Kachin ex-serviceman of the Myanmar Army, who had deserted and took political asylum in Yunnan. This force,which had not only non-Han ethnic recruits from Yunnan, but also Han ex-servicemen from the PLA, infiltrated into the Kokang area and
occupied it in 1968-69. A large number of PLA troops entered the Kokang area after the so-called North-east Command had occupied it and started confronting the KMT stragglers in the Kokang and Wa regions.
5. There were also many clashes between the PLA and the Myanmar Army when the latter tried to eject the North-east Command from the areas occupied by it. After the US established relations with China in the wake of Henry Kissinger's famous visit to Beijing when Richard Nixon was the President, the US agencies discontinued their destabilisation operations in Yunnan and pressured the KMT stragglers, who were no longer of use to the US agencies, to opt for resettlement in Taiwan. Once the majority of the KMT stragglers chose to be repatriated to Taiwan, China discontinued its support to the North-East Command of Naw Sang and the PLA troops which had entered the Kokang and Wa regions withdrew into Yunnan.
6. Some KMT stragglers, who had refused to shift to Taiwan and settled down in the Shan State, became the hard-core of the narcotics and jade smugglimg groups operating from the Golden Triangle area. Opium used to be grown in the Kokang and Wa areas, converted into heroin and smuggled to other countries via Thailand. The withdrawal of the PLA troops and the members of the North-East Command did not lead
to the re-establishment of the writ of the Myanmar Army in these areas, which became almost semi-independent under the control of heroin and jade smugglimg mafia groups. In recent years, these groups have also become producers and smugglers of synthetic drugs, which are causing havoc on public health in many countries of the world, including in the Manipur State in India's North-East.
7.The US has been greatly concerned since the 1980s over the extent of the drug production and smuggling from these areas. A lot of these drugs manages to find its way into the US streets.Even though the US continues to maintain a diplomatic presence in Myanmar, bilateral interactions are practically non-existent for nearly 20 years because of the various sanctions imposed by the West against the military junta in a futile attempt to make it stop the suppression of political dissidents and release Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest.
8. Despite this, the US authorities in charge of action against narcotics production and smuggling continue to maintain a discreet, but vigorous interaction with their Myanmar counterparts. US funding is also available----despite the economic sanctions---- for the eradication of narcotics production and smuggling from the Kokang and Wa areas. Though some action was taken by the Junta in this regard, Washington
has not been totally satisfied. The US suspects that many Myanmar Army officers have been in receipt of money from the narcotics lords of the Kokang and Wa regions and, in return, have been closing their eyes to narcotics production and smuggling.
9. In recent weeks, the junta, which is keen to take advantage of the opening provided by reported re-thinking in the Barack Obama Administration about the wisdom of continuing to keep the junta in the dog house, has been paying greater attention to the US concerns over narcotics production and smuggling from the Kokang and Wa areas. It is reported by sources in this region that it is this which led to
military action by the Myanmar Army against narcotics production in the Kokang area in the last week of August,2009, which led to the exodus of nearly 40,000 tribals and Han Chinese from this region into Yunnan. The fighting between the Myanmar Army and Kokang militia units, which reportedly lasted about three days, has since stopped and the refugees have started coming back into the area from the camps
in Yunnan, where they had been accommodated by the Yunnanese authorities.
10. The Chinese, who continue to be as active as before in Myanmar and are busy constructing oil and gas pipelines from the Arakan area of Myanmar to Yunnan and reportedly also a port to which Chinese oil and gas tankers could come, will have reasons to be concerned over reports of a likely thaw in the relations between the US and the junta. A resumption of US assistance to Myanmar and a consequent
increase in the US presence in Myanmar---- particularly in the areas bordering Yunnan--- will worry the Chinese authorities. The Chinese, who make no secret of their concerns over what they perceive as increasing Indo-US naval cooperation in the Indian Ocean region, will be monitoring closely the developments in the US relations with Myanmar. An additional fear for them will be that if there is a normalisation of the US-Junta relations, that could contribute to a convergence of Indo-US strategic objectives in Myanmar.
11. This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article of August 15,2009, titled MYANMAR: ANOTHER INSTANCE OF OBAMA'S REALPOLITIK at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers34/paper3359.html ( 4-9-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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