B.RAMAN
( To be read in continuation of my earlier article of August 18,2009, titled "Maritime Security Concerns of Japan & Prospects of India-Japan
Co-Operation" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers34/paper3361.html )
Media reports from Japan indicate that as widely forecast by opinion polls, the Democratic Party of Japan ( DPJ) has won the elections to the House of Representatives, the lower House of the Japanese Diet (Parliament), held on August 30,2009,dislodging from power the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)-led coalition, which had ruled the country almost continuously for over 50 years except for 11 months in 1997 when a non-LDP coalition ruled the country. The 62-year-old Yukio Hatoyama, a founding father of the DPJ in 1996 and its President since May,2009, who used to act as the media spokesperson of the non-LDP coalition in 1997, is expected to take over as the new Japanese Prime Minister.
2.The DPJ, which came into existence in 1996, was expanded on April 27, 1998, by merging into it the Party of Japan, the Good Governance Party, the New Fraternity Party and the Democratic Reform Party. The newly-expanded party had a liberal or social-democratic agenda. In 1998, as a result of these mergers, the newly-expanded DPJ had 93 members in the House of Representatives and 38 in the upper House called the House of Councilors. Naoto Kan, former Health and Welfare Minister, was appointed as the President of the party and Tsutomu Hata, former Prime Minister, as Secretary-General.
3.On September 24, 2003, the party was further expanded by merging into it the small, centre-right Liberal Party led by Ichir Ozawa, which had eight seats in the House of Councillors, but none in the lower House.
4.In the 2003 elections to the House of Representatives, the DPJ won 178 seats, increasing its tally by 85 seats, but still short of a majority. Following a pension scandal, Naoto Kan resigned and was replaced as President of the party by Katsuya Okada, a liberal. In the 2004 elections to the House of Councillors, the DPJ won one seat more than the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).
5.In 2005, Junichiro Koizumi, the then Prime Minister, dissolved the House of Representatives before it had completed its tenure following the rejection by it of a Bill moved by his Government for the privatisation of the postal banking services and called for fresh elections. The DPJ did badly in the elections and lost 62 seats to the LDP. Following this electoral set-back, Okada resigned as the President of the Party and was replaced by Seiji Maehara in September 2005. He had to resign on March 31,2006, following allegations that he used a fake E-mail to make allegations of wrong-doing against the Koizumi Government. He was replaced on April 7,2006, by Ichir Ozawa as the party President.
6.The real credit for building up the DPJ, which started as a hotch-potch party of various liberal or social democratic factions, into a viable political formation capable of beating the LDP should go to Ozawa, who started his political career as a member of the LDP in the Diet in 1969 succeeding his father and as a political aide to Kakuei Tanaka, the legendary LDP leader.Dissatisfied with the policies of the LDP leadership, he and some of his followers quit the LDP in 1993. After his resignation from the LDP, he gravitated to the small New Frontier Party and then to the Liberal Party, which subsequently merged with the DPJ.Even before he moved to the DPJ, he had published a document titled a Blueprint for a New Japan, which called for electoral reforms and more assertive foreign-affairs and defense policies. As the President of the DPJ, he worked for gaining public support to some of these ideas incorporated in the Blueprint. He had to resign abruptly as the Party President in May,2009 after his secretary Takanori Okubo was accused of accepting political donations from a company involved in scandals.Ozawa, who had pledged to cleanse Japanese politics of corruption and wrong-doing, was embarrassed when his own secretary was allegedly found involved in political corruption.
7.But for this, Ozawa would have led the DPJ to victory in the elections and might have become the new Prime Minister. Ultimately, after the resignation of Ozawa, Yukio Hatoyama, who has been in the DPJ right from its inception in 1996, took over as the President of the Party and led it to a spectacular electoral victory, which would make him the Prime Minister.While Ozawa was embarrassed by the scandal involving his secretary, he has not been politically weakened. He still has many supporters and admirers in the Party and is expected to play an important role in policy-formulation either as a member of the Cabinet under Hatoyama or as a senior functionary of the party.
8.Hatoyama, who belonged to a blue-blooded LDP family, studied engineering at the prestigious University of Tokyo and earned his Ph.D. from the Stanford University of the US. His grand-father was the Prime Minister of Japan from 1954 to 56. His father served as the Foreign Minister of Japan for some years. Hatoyama, who started his career as a teacher, entered politics in 1983 as the personal secretary to his father.
9.In a personality profile on Hatoyama disseminated on August 27,2009, Mari Yamaguchi of the Associated Press wrote as follows: "Stiff and professor-like, Hatoyama is an unlikely figure to bring about major political change. He is not seen as charismatic and has a tendency to be verbose and dismissive. His shock of curly hair is often piled up on his head as though he just awoke from a troubled sleep. He has even garnered the nickname "alien" because he can come across as eccentric or aloof. During the campaign, Hatoyama appealed to voters with promises that he will cut wasteful government spending, rein in the power of the bureaucracy and put more money in consumers' pockets by holding off on tax hikes that the ruling party has said are in the works.One of his biggest departures from the LDP's positions is Japan's relationship with the United States, its biggest trading partner and military ally. He wants Japan to be more independent from Washington and closer to Asia. "We must not forget our identity as a nation located in Asia," he has said. But Hatoyama has also stressed he does not intend to change Japan's course overnight. In an opinion piece published Thursday in The New York Times, Hatoyama said the U.S.-Japan alliance would "continue to be the cornerstone of Japanese diplomatic policy." Polls indicate that voters want change — but not too much.
And Hatoyama's relatively conservative pedigree suggests that he's not going to seek any radical departures from what most Japanese feel comfortable with."
10.Some Japanese analysts view the victory of the DPJ under Hatoyama as more due to the disgust of large sections of the voters with the long period of corruption and cronyism ridden LDP rule than to any fascination for the DPJ and Hatoyama. Hatoyama has promised wide-ranging changes in the political,economic and social spheres. They are doubtful of his ability to deliver.Three of his promised flagship
changes are:
Regional sovereignty. He has promised to reverse the process of the over-centralisation of the Japanese Government under the LDP by transfering more powers and funds to regional authorities.
Breaking the nexus between the bureaucracy and the political rulers which, according to him, became the hallmark of the LDP rule. He has promised that he will ensure that politicians are responsible for policy formulation and the bureaucrats are responsible for implementation.
A shift away from the urban-centric policies of the LDP towards greater attention and importance to the problems of the rural areas.
11. He has also promised many lollipops to various segments of the population such as pensioners, farmers etc. Skeptics are doubtful whether he would be able to implement them and, even if he wants to, whether he will be able to find the required funds if he sticks to his promise not to raise taxes.
12.In the manifesto issued by the DPJ when Okada was the President before the 2005 elections to the House of Representatives,the references to India were positive.It said:
"India is expected to be a nucleus of Asian economic development in the 21st century along with Japan, China, South Korea, and ASEAN. It projects a unique charisma not only as an economic, demographic, and cultural/ philosophical giant but also as a huge democracy. Establishing and maintaining a close relationship, including strategic, with this India will be in the national interests of Japan and will expand Japan's diplomatic options."
"The East Asian Community should never become an exclusive institution. India, Australia, and New Zealand will be important partners when building a full-scale East Asian Community."
"Japan can also promote a joint sea lane patrol program against terrorists and pirates in collaboration with ASEAN, China, India, and the United States, naturally paying due respect to the sovereignty of coastal states."
13.At the same time, it contained a worrisome reference linking Pakistan's nuclear proliferation to the Kashmir issue. It said: "In the overall context of Asian security, WMD proliferation and terrorism are extremely important challenges. The new Japanese government will further promote the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and actively engage itself with the peaceful solution of the Kashmir conflict, which has led to the nuclear armament of India and Pakistan."
14.All these references to India have disappeared from the election manifesto for the August 30,2009, elections drafted under the Presidentship of Hatoyama. The only reference to India in the manifesto is the following sentence: "Play a leadership role in environmental diplomacy and encourage the participation of major emitter nations, including the United States, China,and India, in the "post-Kyoto"
international framework for greenhouse gas emissions reduction."
15.What are the views of Hatoyama on India? Does he attach importance to the strategic relationship between India and Japan? The answers to these questions are not yet available. If one were to go by the latest manifesto, Hatoyama's world consists essentially of Japan, the US, China, South Korea, North Korea (all mentioned by name) and "other countries". India has been relegated to the position of one of the "other countries".
16.Is this interpretation correct? One has to wait and see.
17. The text of the foreign policy chapter in the latest manifesto of the DPJ is annexed.(31-8-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
( From the DPJ's manifesto for the August 30,2009, elections)
VII. Foreign Relations. Build a close and equal Japan-U.S. relationship
Build a close and equal Japan-U.S. alliance to serve as the foundation of Japan's foreign policy. For this purpose, having developed an autonomous foreign policy strategy for Japan, determine the assignment of functions and roles between Japan and the United States, and work positively to fulfil Japan's responsibilities in this regard.Promote liberalization of trade and investment through the conclusion of a free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States. The measures will not include any which are detrimental to the safety and stable supply of food,increasing Japan's food self-sufficiency ratio, and the development of Japan's agricultural industry and its farming villages.Propose the revision of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement. Move in the direction of re-examining the realignment of the U.S. military forces in Japan and the role of U.S. military bases in Japan.
Strengthen Japan's foreign relations in Asia with the aim of building an East Asian Community.
Make the greatest possible effort to develop relations of mutual trust with China, South Korea, and other Asian countries.Establish intra-regional cooperative mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific region,particularly in such areas as trade, finance, energy, the environment,disaster relief, and measures to control infectious diseases.Take positive measures to promote the conclusion of economic partnership agreements (EPAs) and free trade agreements (FTAs) with countries of the Asia-Pacific region, as well as countries throughout the world, covering a broad range of fields including investment, labour and intellectual property.The measures will not include any which are detrimental to the safety and stable supply of food, increasing Japan's food self-sufficiency ratio, and the development of Japan's
agricultural industry and its farming villages.
North Korea must not be permitted to possess nuclear weapons. North Korea's repeated nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches constitute a clear threat to the peace and stability of Japan and the international community, and they certainly cannot be permitted.In cooperation with the international community, especially the United States, South Korea, China, and Russia, we will take firm measures,including cargo inspections, to induce North Korea to abandon the development, possession, and deployment of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missiles.The abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea is a violation of Japan's sovereignty and
a serious violation of human rights, and we will make every effort to resolve this issue as a responsibility of the Japanese government.
Realise world peace and prosperity. Aim to build world peace that emphasise the importance of the United Nations, and play a significant role by taking the lead on UN reforms and other areas.Play a role in building peace by participating in UN peacekeeping operations and related efforts. However, such participation must be based on Japan's own judgment and must be placed under democratic control and
governance.Carry out anti-piracy operations according to proper procedures in order to provide security for maritime transport and make an international contribution.Promote liberalisation of trade and investment, in particular by exercising leadership toward the successful conclusion of World Trade Organisation(WTO) negotiations through such means as improvement of the dispute settlement system and a fundamental review of agricultural and other policies.
Take the lead in working for the elimination of nuclear weapons, and remove the threat of terrorism. Work toward a nuclear-free Northeast Asia.Make efforts to facilitate the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the early realisation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.Play a leadership role in the 2010 review conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).To eradicate terrorism and its breeding grounds, study the implementation of economic assistance, strengthening of government institutions, and humanitarian and reconstruction activities, in conjunction with NGOs, and contribute to the eradication of poverty and to national reconstruction.
Sunday, August 30, 2009
Friday, August 28, 2009
PAKISTAN: QUO VADIS?
B.RAMAN
One used to talk of Pakistan as a State drawn by a troika----the President, the Prime Minister and the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), with the COAS often acting as the arbiter between the President and the Prime Minister when a democratically elected Government was in power.
2.This image did not hold good only between 1996 and 1999 when Nawaz Sharif was the Prime Minister enjoying a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. He used that majority to amend the Constitution and deprive the President of the power to dismiss the Prime Minister and imposed on the State a powerless President (Mohammad Rafique Tarar), who would do his bidding.Pakistan came under a duality of leadership----the elected and on-paper powerful Prime Minister and the COAS, powerful on paper as well as in reality. When there was a clash of will and egos between the two, Gen.Pervez Musharraf, as the COAS, overthrew the Prime Minister and assumed the leadership.
3.If one keeps aside this brief period, the post-1971 history of Pakistan has seen repeated instances of an assertive Prime Minister being either overthrown by the Army or being dismissed or forced to quit by the President either at the instigation of the COAS as it happened to Benazir Bhutto in 1990 or with his tacit consent as it happened to Nawaz in 1993 and Benazir in 1996. The post-facto backing of the judiciary under the so-called doctrine of necessity enabled the President and the COAS to rid themselves of an inconvenient or assertive Prime Minister.
4. For the first time since 1971, the State of Pakistan is being drawn not by a troika, but by four horses----- the President, the Prime Minister,the COAS and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Since re-assumuing charge as the Chief Justice, a post from which he was unceremoniously thrown out by Musharraf, Mohammad Iftikhar Chaudhury has shown how powerful and popular a genuinely independent judiciary can become.So long as he heads the judiciary, neither the President nor the Prime Minister nor the COAS can count on the automatic support of the judiciary if they indulge in political wrong-doing.
5. Thus, one finds in Pakistan a President (Asif Ali Zardari), a Prime Minister (Yousef Raza Gilani ) and a COAS (Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani),each equally powerful on paper, but relatively powerless in reality. Despite the action of the Chief Justice in declaring post-facto the proclamation of the State of Emergency in November,2007, by Musharraf as illegal and in setting aside the illegal orders of Musharraf
relating to the judiciary, Zardari continues to be powerful on paper and retains many of the powers assumed by Musharraf, including the most important power to dismiss the Prime Minister , which was re-introduced into the Constitution by Musharrf. But with a powerful and independent Chief Justice in position now, he cannot be certain that his exercise of this power of dismissal will be automatically validated by the judiciary. As a result, he has no other alternative but to grin and bear an increasingly assertive Gilani unless he is able to organise a revolt in the party against Gilani.
6. The power of Gilani derives from the fact that Zardari would find it difficult to dismiss him, but his powerlessness can be attributed to the fact that he has very little popular backing in the country or political backing in his Pakistan People's Party (PPP)----like Benazir and Nawaz had in the country and in their respective parties. Gilani, a Seraiki from Multan, was Zardari's choice as the Prime Minister to keep Makhdoom Amin Fahim, a Sindhi feudal personality and a close political confidante of Benazir, out of power.The party by itself would never have chosen Gilani as the Prime Minister but for Zardari's support. Gilani entered office as a weak leader, who would depend on Zardari for his survival as the Prime Minister, but has grown in office as an assertive and politically influential Prime Minister against whom the President dare not act so long as he enjoys the support of the Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and so long as Mohammad Iftikhar Chaudhury continues as the Chief Justice. But there is a limitation to his power imposed by his weak political base in the Party. The fear that in a confrontation, the party may back Zardari and not him acts as a check on Gilani. He is trying to neutralise this check by cultivating Nawaz Sharif, the leader of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML).
7.Nawaz has been playing his cards more shewdly than he had ever done in the past.His humiliation at the hands of Musharraf between 1999 anbd 2008 has rendered him more mature and less impetuous. The man, who humiliated the judiciary when he was the Prime Minister between 1996 and 1999, has emerged as the upholder of the independence of the judiciary. The man, who in the past was prepared to side
with the Army against the PPP, has emerged as the well-wisher of the PPP. The man, who sought to concentrate all the powers in his hands between 1996 and 1999, has emerged as a seeming statesman for whom national and people's interests are paramount and not partisan political interests. He has retained his political manoeuvrability. He has neither assumed the mantle of the leader of the opposition nor accepted the role of a partner of the ruling coalition. The fear that in the event of a confrontation, the Punjabi and Seraiki MPs of the PPP might join hands with Nawaz acts as a check on Zardari.
8.Gen.Kayani, as the COAS, is powerful on paper, but not as powereful as his predecessors. The Army can no longer take the support of the judiciary for granted if he interferes in politics. The humiliation of Musharraf has had an impact on the minds of senior army officers. For the first time in the history of Pakistan, a former COAS had to run away from the country and seek to live in political exile in order to escape arrest, prosecution and conviction.In the past, powerful political leaders used to go into exile to escape the jail, but now a former COAS had
to seek exile to escape the jail. So long as the image of a humiliated Musharraf remains fresh in their mind, Gen.Kayani and his successors will hopefully think many times before indulging in political adventurism.
9. The powerful yet powerless syndrome has till now had a checks-and-balances effect on the running of the Pakistani State----the like of which it has never had since it became independent in 1947. Important decisions are being taken on the basis of a consensus reached by the President, the Prime Minister and the COAS----- whether it be in relation to the operations against the Pakistani Taliban or relations with
the US or tacit co-operation with the US in its operations against the Taliban or Al Qaeda. There seems to be no differences on these three issues. All the three have taken in their stride the increasingly active role being played by Richard Holbrooke, President Barack Obama's special representative for the Af-Pak region, who goes around as if he is the viceroy of Pakistan.
10. But there are differences with regard to India. Zardari seems better disposed towards India than Gilani and Kayani. According to well-informed PPP sources, whenever Zardari made some friendly overtures to India, Gilani and Kayani jointly sought to have them neutralised.According to them, whatever little co-operation Pakistan has extended to India in the investigation and prosecution of the
Pakistanis involved in the Mumbai terrorist attack of November,2008, was due to the initiative of Zardari and his confidante Rehman Malik, who is the Interior Minister. They say that it is Gilani and Kayani, who have been acting as speed-breakers on this co-operation.They are surprised that Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh showed what they consider as unwarranted gestures to Gilani, who is not a well-wisher of
India, at Sharm-el-Sheikh and snubbed Zardari, who, according to them is a well-wisher of India, at Yekaterinburg in Russia.
11.Zardari's political role till now has been uncharacteristically low profile. Gilani has taken advantage of the relative inability of Zardari to act against him to inflict one affront upon another on him such as his disapproving the posting of a non-Foreign Service officer close to Zardari as the Ambassador to France or his sacking on charges of corruption the head of Pakistan Steel, who is also reputed to be close to Zardari.
12. Zardari has quietly put up with these affronts. His low-profile role and his seeming reluctance to call Gilani to order have resulted in conflicting images of Zardari circulating in the political circles of Islamabad---- Zardari, the isolated President, Zardari, the disinterested President, Zardari, who has been playing his cards intelligently, but silently and Zardari, who is biding his time before getting rid of Gilani.
13. Which image is correct---it is difficult to say. The equalibrium in the State of Pakistan has thus far remained stable. If it turns unstable leading to a confrontation with unpredictable consequences, Gilani would most probably be the trigger for it. Till now, he has been assertive, but not over-confident. If he turns over-confident, Pakistan could be in for another spell of political instability. (29-8-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, the Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
One used to talk of Pakistan as a State drawn by a troika----the President, the Prime Minister and the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), with the COAS often acting as the arbiter between the President and the Prime Minister when a democratically elected Government was in power.
2.This image did not hold good only between 1996 and 1999 when Nawaz Sharif was the Prime Minister enjoying a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. He used that majority to amend the Constitution and deprive the President of the power to dismiss the Prime Minister and imposed on the State a powerless President (Mohammad Rafique Tarar), who would do his bidding.Pakistan came under a duality of leadership----the elected and on-paper powerful Prime Minister and the COAS, powerful on paper as well as in reality. When there was a clash of will and egos between the two, Gen.Pervez Musharraf, as the COAS, overthrew the Prime Minister and assumed the leadership.
3.If one keeps aside this brief period, the post-1971 history of Pakistan has seen repeated instances of an assertive Prime Minister being either overthrown by the Army or being dismissed or forced to quit by the President either at the instigation of the COAS as it happened to Benazir Bhutto in 1990 or with his tacit consent as it happened to Nawaz in 1993 and Benazir in 1996. The post-facto backing of the judiciary under the so-called doctrine of necessity enabled the President and the COAS to rid themselves of an inconvenient or assertive Prime Minister.
4. For the first time since 1971, the State of Pakistan is being drawn not by a troika, but by four horses----- the President, the Prime Minister,the COAS and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Since re-assumuing charge as the Chief Justice, a post from which he was unceremoniously thrown out by Musharraf, Mohammad Iftikhar Chaudhury has shown how powerful and popular a genuinely independent judiciary can become.So long as he heads the judiciary, neither the President nor the Prime Minister nor the COAS can count on the automatic support of the judiciary if they indulge in political wrong-doing.
5. Thus, one finds in Pakistan a President (Asif Ali Zardari), a Prime Minister (Yousef Raza Gilani ) and a COAS (Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani),each equally powerful on paper, but relatively powerless in reality. Despite the action of the Chief Justice in declaring post-facto the proclamation of the State of Emergency in November,2007, by Musharraf as illegal and in setting aside the illegal orders of Musharraf
relating to the judiciary, Zardari continues to be powerful on paper and retains many of the powers assumed by Musharraf, including the most important power to dismiss the Prime Minister , which was re-introduced into the Constitution by Musharrf. But with a powerful and independent Chief Justice in position now, he cannot be certain that his exercise of this power of dismissal will be automatically validated by the judiciary. As a result, he has no other alternative but to grin and bear an increasingly assertive Gilani unless he is able to organise a revolt in the party against Gilani.
6. The power of Gilani derives from the fact that Zardari would find it difficult to dismiss him, but his powerlessness can be attributed to the fact that he has very little popular backing in the country or political backing in his Pakistan People's Party (PPP)----like Benazir and Nawaz had in the country and in their respective parties. Gilani, a Seraiki from Multan, was Zardari's choice as the Prime Minister to keep Makhdoom Amin Fahim, a Sindhi feudal personality and a close political confidante of Benazir, out of power.The party by itself would never have chosen Gilani as the Prime Minister but for Zardari's support. Gilani entered office as a weak leader, who would depend on Zardari for his survival as the Prime Minister, but has grown in office as an assertive and politically influential Prime Minister against whom the President dare not act so long as he enjoys the support of the Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and so long as Mohammad Iftikhar Chaudhury continues as the Chief Justice. But there is a limitation to his power imposed by his weak political base in the Party. The fear that in a confrontation, the party may back Zardari and not him acts as a check on Gilani. He is trying to neutralise this check by cultivating Nawaz Sharif, the leader of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML).
7.Nawaz has been playing his cards more shewdly than he had ever done in the past.His humiliation at the hands of Musharraf between 1999 anbd 2008 has rendered him more mature and less impetuous. The man, who humiliated the judiciary when he was the Prime Minister between 1996 and 1999, has emerged as the upholder of the independence of the judiciary. The man, who in the past was prepared to side
with the Army against the PPP, has emerged as the well-wisher of the PPP. The man, who sought to concentrate all the powers in his hands between 1996 and 1999, has emerged as a seeming statesman for whom national and people's interests are paramount and not partisan political interests. He has retained his political manoeuvrability. He has neither assumed the mantle of the leader of the opposition nor accepted the role of a partner of the ruling coalition. The fear that in the event of a confrontation, the Punjabi and Seraiki MPs of the PPP might join hands with Nawaz acts as a check on Zardari.
8.Gen.Kayani, as the COAS, is powerful on paper, but not as powereful as his predecessors. The Army can no longer take the support of the judiciary for granted if he interferes in politics. The humiliation of Musharraf has had an impact on the minds of senior army officers. For the first time in the history of Pakistan, a former COAS had to run away from the country and seek to live in political exile in order to escape arrest, prosecution and conviction.In the past, powerful political leaders used to go into exile to escape the jail, but now a former COAS had
to seek exile to escape the jail. So long as the image of a humiliated Musharraf remains fresh in their mind, Gen.Kayani and his successors will hopefully think many times before indulging in political adventurism.
9. The powerful yet powerless syndrome has till now had a checks-and-balances effect on the running of the Pakistani State----the like of which it has never had since it became independent in 1947. Important decisions are being taken on the basis of a consensus reached by the President, the Prime Minister and the COAS----- whether it be in relation to the operations against the Pakistani Taliban or relations with
the US or tacit co-operation with the US in its operations against the Taliban or Al Qaeda. There seems to be no differences on these three issues. All the three have taken in their stride the increasingly active role being played by Richard Holbrooke, President Barack Obama's special representative for the Af-Pak region, who goes around as if he is the viceroy of Pakistan.
10. But there are differences with regard to India. Zardari seems better disposed towards India than Gilani and Kayani. According to well-informed PPP sources, whenever Zardari made some friendly overtures to India, Gilani and Kayani jointly sought to have them neutralised.According to them, whatever little co-operation Pakistan has extended to India in the investigation and prosecution of the
Pakistanis involved in the Mumbai terrorist attack of November,2008, was due to the initiative of Zardari and his confidante Rehman Malik, who is the Interior Minister. They say that it is Gilani and Kayani, who have been acting as speed-breakers on this co-operation.They are surprised that Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh showed what they consider as unwarranted gestures to Gilani, who is not a well-wisher of
India, at Sharm-el-Sheikh and snubbed Zardari, who, according to them is a well-wisher of India, at Yekaterinburg in Russia.
11.Zardari's political role till now has been uncharacteristically low profile. Gilani has taken advantage of the relative inability of Zardari to act against him to inflict one affront upon another on him such as his disapproving the posting of a non-Foreign Service officer close to Zardari as the Ambassador to France or his sacking on charges of corruption the head of Pakistan Steel, who is also reputed to be close to Zardari.
12. Zardari has quietly put up with these affronts. His low-profile role and his seeming reluctance to call Gilani to order have resulted in conflicting images of Zardari circulating in the political circles of Islamabad---- Zardari, the isolated President, Zardari, the disinterested President, Zardari, who has been playing his cards intelligently, but silently and Zardari, who is biding his time before getting rid of Gilani.
13. Which image is correct---it is difficult to say. The equalibrium in the State of Pakistan has thus far remained stable. If it turns unstable leading to a confrontation with unpredictable consequences, Gilani would most probably be the trigger for it. Till now, he has been assertive, but not over-confident. If he turns over-confident, Pakistan could be in for another spell of political instability. (29-8-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, the Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Thursday, August 27, 2009
CHINA IN PAKISTAN-OCCUPIED KASHMIR
B.RAMAN
Among the major development projects in Pakistan in which the Chinese have been involved till now are the construction of an international commercial port cum naval base in Gwadar on the Makran coast in Balochistan, the development of the Saindak copper-cum-gold mines in Balochistan, the upgradation of the Karakoram Highway connecting the Xinjiang province of China with Pakistan via the Northern Areas
(Gilgit and Baltistan), the construction of a small-scale hydel project in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the development of a mobile telephone network in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP).
2. The commercial port in Gwadar has already been completed and commissioned, but it has not been attracting many foreign sea-going vessels due to the poor security situation in Balochistan because of the increasing activities of Baloch nationalists demanding an independent Balochistan. The construction of a naval base in Gwadar, which could also be used by Chinese naval ships visiting the Gulf, has also slowed down due to the poor security situation in the area.
3. The Pakistanis, since the days of Gen.Pervez Musharraf, have repeatedly sought Chinese assistance for the construction of a petro-chemical complex at Gwadar and oil and gas pipelines and a railway line connecting Gwadar with the Xinjiang province. The Chinese have till now not shown much enthusiasm for additional involvement in Balochistan because of the security situation. Since 2002, there
have been at least three attacks on Chinese engineers working in Balochistan. In two of these, Uighurs were suspected and in one in 2007,which took place after the Pakistani Army raid in the Lal Masjid of Islamabad in July,2007, the Pakistani Taliban was suspected. While there were Chinese fatalities in the first two attacks, there were no Chinese fatalities in the third attack of 2007, in which many passers-by were killed. All these incidents involved the use of improvised explosive devices (IED).
4.The authorities of Pakistan and Iran have been claiming that the Chinese have been showing interest in the extension of the proposed Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline to Xinjiang. Presently, the proposal for the pipeline envisages the involvement of Iran, Pakistan and India----with India participating only as the purchaser of the gas and not as a contributor of funds for the construction of the pipeline. Since 2005, Indian enthusiasm for the project has declined due to the security situatiion in Balochistan through which the pipeline has to pass and the US opposition to it.Pakistani and Iranian authorities have been repeatedly hinting since last year that if India withdrew, China might be prepared to step in as a purchaser of the gas as well as a contributor of funds for the construction. There has been no indication from the Chinese side on their reported interest in the project.
5.Chinese interest in participation in projects in the Pashtun belt has also declined following two incidents of kidnapping by the Pakistani Taliban of Chinese engineers working in South Waziristan for the China National Water Resources and Hydropower Engineering Group Corporation in October,2004, and in the mobile telephone network in the Dir District of the NWFP in August 2008. There was also an attack by the Pakistani Taliban on some Chinese meat importers in Peshawar after the Lal Masjid raid, resulting in fatalities.
6. As a result, the Chinese interest in participating in development projects in Pakistan is presently confined to Pakistani Punjab,Sindh and
Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir, including the Northern Areas. In Punjab, they have been participating in projects like the development of a special economic zone, construction of shopping malls etc. In Sindh, talks have been going on for their participation in the development of the Thar coal mines and the construction of thermal and fertiliser plants.
7. The Karakoram Highway was originally constructed with Chinese assistance with the participation of Chinese engineers. For the last 10 years it has been in a bad state of repairs due to poor maintenance by Pakistani engineers.During the second tenure of Benazir Bhutto as the Prime Minister ( 1993 to 1996) she sought Chinese assistance for the repair and upgradation of the Highway. The Chinese agreed to it.
The proposal was that the Chinese would upgrade it on their side and the Pakistanis on their side with Chinese technical assistance. The upgradation work has been going on. It has been reported that while the work on the Chinese side has been completed ahead of schedue, it has been much behind schedule on the Pakistani side. It is not known whether Chinese engineers are participating on the Pakistani side and, if so, how many of them.
8.During his visit to Hang Zhou in the Zhejiang province and Guangzhou in the Guangdong province from August 21 to 24,2009, President Asif Ali Zardari, who met the local authorities and investors, sought Chinese participation in the development of hydel, thermal and solar energy projects, irrigation and fisheries and mobile telephone networks and in creating facilities for higher technical education, including the setting-up of a telecommunications university and research complex.Among the concrete results from his visit were:
The signing of a a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to promote cooperation in river fisheries and related technologies by representatives of the Indus River Fresh Water Fisheries Research Institute and the Pearl River Fishery Research Institute of
Guangzhou.
The signing of an MOU for the construction of a dam at Bunji in the Astore district of the Northern Areas by officials of Pakistan’s Ministry of Water and Power and China’s Three Gorges Project Corporation. The Chairman Board of Investment Saleem Mandviwala and Li Yang’an of the Chinese corporation signed the MoU.The dam, one of the eight hydel projects short-listed for construction by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), will have a capacity of generating 7,000 megawatts of electricity.
9.Zardari attended a presentation on small and medium sized dams, water conservation and irrigation by the Zhejiang Design Institute of Water Conservancy and Hydroelectric Power.Li Yueming, the President of the institute, said they had carried out feasibility studies of a couple of medium-sized dams in the POK.Shakeel Durrani,Chairman of the WAPDA, who was present on the occasion, said that Chinese
companies were already working on a number of hydel projects in Pakistan, including Neelum-Jhelum and Gomal Zam and the raising of the height of the Mangla dam in the POK. He said the institute would be invited to bid for the construction of 12 small dams.
10.Meanwhile, in a report carried by the "News" of August 18, 2009, before Zardari's visit to China, Kamran Khan, its journalist, alleged that without inviting open bidding from interested companies and investors, the Pakistan Steel has signed a non-transparent secret MoU with the Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC) for a $2.2 billion expansion programme to raise its current production capacity of 1.1 million
tons to five million tons. According to him, contrary to relevant government rules and regulations as well as basic norms of transparency, the Pakistan Steel didn’t place any advertisement in the local and international press to seek the best international offers before entering into secret negotiations with the Chinese company, which was long seeking to clinch this deal. He said: "The most shocking element of this MoU, available with this correspondent, which will bind Pakistan with an additional foreign loan of $2.2 billion, is a clause that requires
complete secrecy of this understanding. Clause 6.1 of this MoU states: “This MoU and any discussions related to it shall remain strictly confidential between the parties and no public announcement shall be made without written consent of both parties.”
11. Kamran Khan quoted a Pakistani official as saying: “This was not our requirement but the Chinese company asked for this secrecy clause and we agreed.”
12. There have been allegations that a businessman close to Zardari would be a major beneficiary of this expansion project. The Pakistan Steel has become one of the bones of contention between Zardari and Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani. A day after the publication of the "News" report Gilani announced in the National Assembly that the Chairman of the Pakistan Steel Mills,Moin Aftab Shaikh had been sacked on corruption charges. “I had directed the Interior Ministry to investigate the affairs of the Pakistan Steel Mills and submit a report,” he said.Some Pakistani columnists interpreted Gilani's action as an affront to Zardari.
13. Since taking over as the President a year ago, Zardari has been periodically visiting Chinese provinces to study their economic development. During these visits, he does not go to Beijing. Most of his meetings are confined to Chinese businessmen and local Party and Government officials. A member of the Chinese Cabinet---generally the Foreign Minister--- goes to the province being visited by Zardari and
makes a courtesy call on him. Befor going back to Pakistan, he speaks over phone to President Hu Jintao. He has so far made four such visits to China in the last one year, including the latest one. These frequent visits to meet Chinese investors and businessmen have given rise to allegations that he was going there to promote the business interests of his friends in Pakistan. (28-8-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Among the major development projects in Pakistan in which the Chinese have been involved till now are the construction of an international commercial port cum naval base in Gwadar on the Makran coast in Balochistan, the development of the Saindak copper-cum-gold mines in Balochistan, the upgradation of the Karakoram Highway connecting the Xinjiang province of China with Pakistan via the Northern Areas
(Gilgit and Baltistan), the construction of a small-scale hydel project in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the development of a mobile telephone network in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP).
2. The commercial port in Gwadar has already been completed and commissioned, but it has not been attracting many foreign sea-going vessels due to the poor security situation in Balochistan because of the increasing activities of Baloch nationalists demanding an independent Balochistan. The construction of a naval base in Gwadar, which could also be used by Chinese naval ships visiting the Gulf, has also slowed down due to the poor security situation in the area.
3. The Pakistanis, since the days of Gen.Pervez Musharraf, have repeatedly sought Chinese assistance for the construction of a petro-chemical complex at Gwadar and oil and gas pipelines and a railway line connecting Gwadar with the Xinjiang province. The Chinese have till now not shown much enthusiasm for additional involvement in Balochistan because of the security situation. Since 2002, there
have been at least three attacks on Chinese engineers working in Balochistan. In two of these, Uighurs were suspected and in one in 2007,which took place after the Pakistani Army raid in the Lal Masjid of Islamabad in July,2007, the Pakistani Taliban was suspected. While there were Chinese fatalities in the first two attacks, there were no Chinese fatalities in the third attack of 2007, in which many passers-by were killed. All these incidents involved the use of improvised explosive devices (IED).
4.The authorities of Pakistan and Iran have been claiming that the Chinese have been showing interest in the extension of the proposed Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline to Xinjiang. Presently, the proposal for the pipeline envisages the involvement of Iran, Pakistan and India----with India participating only as the purchaser of the gas and not as a contributor of funds for the construction of the pipeline. Since 2005, Indian enthusiasm for the project has declined due to the security situatiion in Balochistan through which the pipeline has to pass and the US opposition to it.Pakistani and Iranian authorities have been repeatedly hinting since last year that if India withdrew, China might be prepared to step in as a purchaser of the gas as well as a contributor of funds for the construction. There has been no indication from the Chinese side on their reported interest in the project.
5.Chinese interest in participation in projects in the Pashtun belt has also declined following two incidents of kidnapping by the Pakistani Taliban of Chinese engineers working in South Waziristan for the China National Water Resources and Hydropower Engineering Group Corporation in October,2004, and in the mobile telephone network in the Dir District of the NWFP in August 2008. There was also an attack by the Pakistani Taliban on some Chinese meat importers in Peshawar after the Lal Masjid raid, resulting in fatalities.
6. As a result, the Chinese interest in participating in development projects in Pakistan is presently confined to Pakistani Punjab,Sindh and
Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir, including the Northern Areas. In Punjab, they have been participating in projects like the development of a special economic zone, construction of shopping malls etc. In Sindh, talks have been going on for their participation in the development of the Thar coal mines and the construction of thermal and fertiliser plants.
7. The Karakoram Highway was originally constructed with Chinese assistance with the participation of Chinese engineers. For the last 10 years it has been in a bad state of repairs due to poor maintenance by Pakistani engineers.During the second tenure of Benazir Bhutto as the Prime Minister ( 1993 to 1996) she sought Chinese assistance for the repair and upgradation of the Highway. The Chinese agreed to it.
The proposal was that the Chinese would upgrade it on their side and the Pakistanis on their side with Chinese technical assistance. The upgradation work has been going on. It has been reported that while the work on the Chinese side has been completed ahead of schedue, it has been much behind schedule on the Pakistani side. It is not known whether Chinese engineers are participating on the Pakistani side and, if so, how many of them.
8.During his visit to Hang Zhou in the Zhejiang province and Guangzhou in the Guangdong province from August 21 to 24,2009, President Asif Ali Zardari, who met the local authorities and investors, sought Chinese participation in the development of hydel, thermal and solar energy projects, irrigation and fisheries and mobile telephone networks and in creating facilities for higher technical education, including the setting-up of a telecommunications university and research complex.Among the concrete results from his visit were:
The signing of a a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to promote cooperation in river fisheries and related technologies by representatives of the Indus River Fresh Water Fisheries Research Institute and the Pearl River Fishery Research Institute of
Guangzhou.
The signing of an MOU for the construction of a dam at Bunji in the Astore district of the Northern Areas by officials of Pakistan’s Ministry of Water and Power and China’s Three Gorges Project Corporation. The Chairman Board of Investment Saleem Mandviwala and Li Yang’an of the Chinese corporation signed the MoU.The dam, one of the eight hydel projects short-listed for construction by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), will have a capacity of generating 7,000 megawatts of electricity.
9.Zardari attended a presentation on small and medium sized dams, water conservation and irrigation by the Zhejiang Design Institute of Water Conservancy and Hydroelectric Power.Li Yueming, the President of the institute, said they had carried out feasibility studies of a couple of medium-sized dams in the POK.Shakeel Durrani,Chairman of the WAPDA, who was present on the occasion, said that Chinese
companies were already working on a number of hydel projects in Pakistan, including Neelum-Jhelum and Gomal Zam and the raising of the height of the Mangla dam in the POK. He said the institute would be invited to bid for the construction of 12 small dams.
10.Meanwhile, in a report carried by the "News" of August 18, 2009, before Zardari's visit to China, Kamran Khan, its journalist, alleged that without inviting open bidding from interested companies and investors, the Pakistan Steel has signed a non-transparent secret MoU with the Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC) for a $2.2 billion expansion programme to raise its current production capacity of 1.1 million
tons to five million tons. According to him, contrary to relevant government rules and regulations as well as basic norms of transparency, the Pakistan Steel didn’t place any advertisement in the local and international press to seek the best international offers before entering into secret negotiations with the Chinese company, which was long seeking to clinch this deal. He said: "The most shocking element of this MoU, available with this correspondent, which will bind Pakistan with an additional foreign loan of $2.2 billion, is a clause that requires
complete secrecy of this understanding. Clause 6.1 of this MoU states: “This MoU and any discussions related to it shall remain strictly confidential between the parties and no public announcement shall be made without written consent of both parties.”
11. Kamran Khan quoted a Pakistani official as saying: “This was not our requirement but the Chinese company asked for this secrecy clause and we agreed.”
12. There have been allegations that a businessman close to Zardari would be a major beneficiary of this expansion project. The Pakistan Steel has become one of the bones of contention between Zardari and Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani. A day after the publication of the "News" report Gilani announced in the National Assembly that the Chairman of the Pakistan Steel Mills,Moin Aftab Shaikh had been sacked on corruption charges. “I had directed the Interior Ministry to investigate the affairs of the Pakistan Steel Mills and submit a report,” he said.Some Pakistani columnists interpreted Gilani's action as an affront to Zardari.
13. Since taking over as the President a year ago, Zardari has been periodically visiting Chinese provinces to study their economic development. During these visits, he does not go to Beijing. Most of his meetings are confined to Chinese businessmen and local Party and Government officials. A member of the Chinese Cabinet---generally the Foreign Minister--- goes to the province being visited by Zardari and
makes a courtesy call on him. Befor going back to Pakistan, he speaks over phone to President Hu Jintao. He has so far made four such visits to China in the last one year, including the latest one. These frequent visits to meet Chinese investors and businessmen have given rise to allegations that he was going there to promote the business interests of his friends in Pakistan. (28-8-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, August 25, 2009
PAK TALIBAN UNDER HAKIMULLAH MEHSUD
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO 552
B.RAMAN
Baitullah Mehsud , the dreaded chief of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), is no more. On August 23,2009,he succumbed to injuries sustained by him in the US Drone strike on the house of his father-in-law Ikramullah in South Waziristan on August 5,2009. Hakimullah Mehsud, who was till now one of the deputy chiefs---- the other being Waliur Rehman Mehsud---- and in charge of operations in the Orakzai,Kurram and Khyber Agencies, is the new Amir as decided unanimously by the TTP Shura at a meeting in the Orakzai Agency last week.
2. This was reportedly stated on August 24,2009, by Hakimullah and Waliur Rehman in calls made to some sections of the media independently of each other. They have thus sought to put an end to rumours floated by Rehman Malik, Pakistan's Interior Minister, about a fierce succession struggle in which, according to him, Hakimullah was killed and Waliur was injured.
3. If the earlier US and Pakistani claims that Baitullah was killed instanteneously on August 5 after the Drone strike is correct----there is no reason to believe otherwise---- it is intriguing that the TTP took 19 days to admit his death at the hands of the US and even then attributed his death to injuries and projected it as not instantaneous. These 19 days were probably taken to decide on the successor and to identify those who had allegedly betrayed Baitullah to the Americans---either directly or through Pakistan. This long time shows that the Shura,which met in Orakzai and not in South Waziristan as claimed by Rehman Malik, needed time to sort out differences.
4. Waliur Rehman is a Mehsud of the soil. He had spent his years as a jihadi in South Waziristan, where the native place of the Mehsuds is located, and became a trusted confidante of Baitullah, his cousin. He was the man who controlled the coffers of Baitullah, who trusted him with money and wanted him to succeed him so that he would continue to have the control over the money.
5. Though Hakimullah was born in South Waziristan, grew up and had been known for his legendary exploits against the Pakistan Army there, he did not enjoy the confidence of Baitullah to the same extent as Waliur Rehman. Baitullah did not trust him with money and sent him away to Orakzai to co-ordinate operations in that Agency as well as in the Khyber and Kurram Agencies. Of the many tasks which
Hakimullah performed, three need special mention: first, disruption of logistic supplies to the NATO troops in Afghanistan from the Karachi port; second, the organisation of suicide strikes in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the non-tribal areas of Pakistan with the help of suicide volunteers trained by his cousin Qari Hussain Mehsud; and third, operations against the Shia extremist Sipah Mohammad members headed by Hussain Ali Shah in the Kurram Agency.
6. Many successful attacks on NATO convoys in the Khyber Agency gave Hakimullah large quantities of arms and ammunition and other equipment. He shared some of these with Baitullah for use in South Waziristan, but kept a large quantity for his own use. He also captured large quantities of arms and ammunition during attacks on posts and convoys of the Frontier Constabulary and other Pakistani para-military
units. Thus, after Baitullah, while Waliur Rehman will control the coffers of the TTP, Hakimullah will control its weapon holdings and its reserve of trained suicide volunteers. In terms of men, the "Daily Times" of Lahore ( August 24,2009) had estimated the total number of trained and armed followers under the command of Hakimullah in the Orakzai-Khyber-Khurram areas as 8000 as against 30,000 under the
command of Baitullah in South Waziristan at the time of Baitullah's death. These 30,000 armed men in South Waziristan are now expected to be loyal to Waliur Rehman.
7. Thus the Mehsud component of the TTP, which has been the most dominant till now and which has been in the forefront of the operations against the Pakistani security forces, will now have about 30,000 trained and armed men owing primary loyalty to Waliur Rehman and another 8,000 armed men plus an unquantifiable number of suicide volunteers owing primary loyalty to Hakimullah. Waliur Rehman will have to depend on Hakimullah for weapon replenishments and suicide volunteers and Hakimullah will have to depend on Waliur Rehman for funds replenishments.
8. For the present, the two have chosen to project a picture of unity and solidarity to all the units of the TTP---Mehsuds as well as non-Mehsuds. Whether this will last remains to be seen. Ever since the TTP made its appearance in 2007 after the Lal Masjid raid in Islamabad in July of that year, the Mehsuds under Baitullah have been its driving force. This will continue at least in the short term. An interesting feature of the post-9/11 scene in the Af-Pak area has been that whereas there were splits in the Pakistani Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) with one group under Maulana Masood Azhar forming the Jaish-e-Mohammad in 2000, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD), with a group owing loyalty to Zafar Iqbal and Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi forming a separate organisation in 2004 which called itself the Kairun Naas (Welfare of the Masses) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) with some elements coming out of it and forming the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), Al Qaeda, the Afghan Neo Taliban under Mulla Mohammad Omar, the TTP, the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI),the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) and the Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan (IMET) have maintained their unity in the face of pressure from the US. One should not, therefore, be surprised if the TTP maintains its unity even after the death of Baitullah.
9. While organisationally remaining intact, the Mehsud component of the TTP has been suffering attrition in the form of individual elements letting themselves be tempted by American offers of huge rewards for betraying their leaders. It is such individual elements which have been behind the impressive success rate of the US Drones in South Waziristan. Gnawing suspicions over US moles in their midst will impose an increasing strain on this unity. There are already reports of the TTP detaining Ikramullah, the father-in-law of Baitullah, and some membes of the family, who allegedly absented themselves from the house when it was attacked by the Drones on August 5.
10.Of the Punjabi terrorist organisations, three have been closely collaborating with the TTP components---- the JEM has been collaborating with the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) headed by Fazlullah in the Swat Valley of the NWFP, the HUJI headed by Qari Saifullah Akhtar was collaborating with Baitullah's men in South Waziristan and the anti-Shia LEJ with Hakimullah in Kurram, Khyber and Orakzai. While the collaboration of the JEM and the LEJ remains intact, there is a question mark over the HUJI. According to reliable police sources, the TTP now suspects that he was another mole of either the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) or the CIA or both and it was to protect him that the Pakistani authorities have again taken him into custody.
11. After the success of their hunt for Baitullah in co-ordination with the ISI and the Pakistan Army, the Americans have started a similar hunt for Serajuddin Haqqani, the son of Jalaluddin Haqqani. The Drones have started going after places, which were in the past known to be among his hide-outs. Surprisngly, almost the entire focus of the US covert operations, of which the Drone strikes are an important
component, were initially against the TTP and now against the Afghan Taliban.When the Drone strikes initially started under former President George Bush the focus of their hunt was on Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and other Al Qaeda leaders. After a number of unsuccessful strikes against suspected Al Qaeda hide-outs due to incorrect human intelligence, the focus has now shifted to the two Talibans. While the flow of correct human intelligence has been good in respect of the TTP, it is still poor in respect of the Afghan Taliban.
12. It remains to be seen whether Hakimullah as the new Amir will choose to co-ordinate the operations of the TTP from Orakzai or will shift to South Waziristan.Most probably, he will remain in Orakzai because of the suspected CIA penetratiion of the Mehsuds in South Waziristan.He will focus on identifying all the moles and getting them eliminated, continuing to disrupt NATO convoys, stepping up attacks on Shias in co-ordination with the LEJ and targeting the leaders of the Awami National Party (ANP) in the NWFP. The ANP is his sworn enemy.
13. Will there be an act of retaliation to avenge the death of Baitullah? If so, will it be directed against the Americans or the Pakistani Army and the ISI? If against the Americans, will it be in Pakistan itself or outside? These are important questions, but it is difficult to answer them now. ( 26-8-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical
Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
Baitullah Mehsud , the dreaded chief of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), is no more. On August 23,2009,he succumbed to injuries sustained by him in the US Drone strike on the house of his father-in-law Ikramullah in South Waziristan on August 5,2009. Hakimullah Mehsud, who was till now one of the deputy chiefs---- the other being Waliur Rehman Mehsud---- and in charge of operations in the Orakzai,Kurram and Khyber Agencies, is the new Amir as decided unanimously by the TTP Shura at a meeting in the Orakzai Agency last week.
2. This was reportedly stated on August 24,2009, by Hakimullah and Waliur Rehman in calls made to some sections of the media independently of each other. They have thus sought to put an end to rumours floated by Rehman Malik, Pakistan's Interior Minister, about a fierce succession struggle in which, according to him, Hakimullah was killed and Waliur was injured.
3. If the earlier US and Pakistani claims that Baitullah was killed instanteneously on August 5 after the Drone strike is correct----there is no reason to believe otherwise---- it is intriguing that the TTP took 19 days to admit his death at the hands of the US and even then attributed his death to injuries and projected it as not instantaneous. These 19 days were probably taken to decide on the successor and to identify those who had allegedly betrayed Baitullah to the Americans---either directly or through Pakistan. This long time shows that the Shura,which met in Orakzai and not in South Waziristan as claimed by Rehman Malik, needed time to sort out differences.
4. Waliur Rehman is a Mehsud of the soil. He had spent his years as a jihadi in South Waziristan, where the native place of the Mehsuds is located, and became a trusted confidante of Baitullah, his cousin. He was the man who controlled the coffers of Baitullah, who trusted him with money and wanted him to succeed him so that he would continue to have the control over the money.
5. Though Hakimullah was born in South Waziristan, grew up and had been known for his legendary exploits against the Pakistan Army there, he did not enjoy the confidence of Baitullah to the same extent as Waliur Rehman. Baitullah did not trust him with money and sent him away to Orakzai to co-ordinate operations in that Agency as well as in the Khyber and Kurram Agencies. Of the many tasks which
Hakimullah performed, three need special mention: first, disruption of logistic supplies to the NATO troops in Afghanistan from the Karachi port; second, the organisation of suicide strikes in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the non-tribal areas of Pakistan with the help of suicide volunteers trained by his cousin Qari Hussain Mehsud; and third, operations against the Shia extremist Sipah Mohammad members headed by Hussain Ali Shah in the Kurram Agency.
6. Many successful attacks on NATO convoys in the Khyber Agency gave Hakimullah large quantities of arms and ammunition and other equipment. He shared some of these with Baitullah for use in South Waziristan, but kept a large quantity for his own use. He also captured large quantities of arms and ammunition during attacks on posts and convoys of the Frontier Constabulary and other Pakistani para-military
units. Thus, after Baitullah, while Waliur Rehman will control the coffers of the TTP, Hakimullah will control its weapon holdings and its reserve of trained suicide volunteers. In terms of men, the "Daily Times" of Lahore ( August 24,2009) had estimated the total number of trained and armed followers under the command of Hakimullah in the Orakzai-Khyber-Khurram areas as 8000 as against 30,000 under the
command of Baitullah in South Waziristan at the time of Baitullah's death. These 30,000 armed men in South Waziristan are now expected to be loyal to Waliur Rehman.
7. Thus the Mehsud component of the TTP, which has been the most dominant till now and which has been in the forefront of the operations against the Pakistani security forces, will now have about 30,000 trained and armed men owing primary loyalty to Waliur Rehman and another 8,000 armed men plus an unquantifiable number of suicide volunteers owing primary loyalty to Hakimullah. Waliur Rehman will have to depend on Hakimullah for weapon replenishments and suicide volunteers and Hakimullah will have to depend on Waliur Rehman for funds replenishments.
8. For the present, the two have chosen to project a picture of unity and solidarity to all the units of the TTP---Mehsuds as well as non-Mehsuds. Whether this will last remains to be seen. Ever since the TTP made its appearance in 2007 after the Lal Masjid raid in Islamabad in July of that year, the Mehsuds under Baitullah have been its driving force. This will continue at least in the short term. An interesting feature of the post-9/11 scene in the Af-Pak area has been that whereas there were splits in the Pakistani Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) with one group under Maulana Masood Azhar forming the Jaish-e-Mohammad in 2000, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD), with a group owing loyalty to Zafar Iqbal and Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi forming a separate organisation in 2004 which called itself the Kairun Naas (Welfare of the Masses) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) with some elements coming out of it and forming the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), Al Qaeda, the Afghan Neo Taliban under Mulla Mohammad Omar, the TTP, the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI),the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) and the Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan (IMET) have maintained their unity in the face of pressure from the US. One should not, therefore, be surprised if the TTP maintains its unity even after the death of Baitullah.
9. While organisationally remaining intact, the Mehsud component of the TTP has been suffering attrition in the form of individual elements letting themselves be tempted by American offers of huge rewards for betraying their leaders. It is such individual elements which have been behind the impressive success rate of the US Drones in South Waziristan. Gnawing suspicions over US moles in their midst will impose an increasing strain on this unity. There are already reports of the TTP detaining Ikramullah, the father-in-law of Baitullah, and some membes of the family, who allegedly absented themselves from the house when it was attacked by the Drones on August 5.
10.Of the Punjabi terrorist organisations, three have been closely collaborating with the TTP components---- the JEM has been collaborating with the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) headed by Fazlullah in the Swat Valley of the NWFP, the HUJI headed by Qari Saifullah Akhtar was collaborating with Baitullah's men in South Waziristan and the anti-Shia LEJ with Hakimullah in Kurram, Khyber and Orakzai. While the collaboration of the JEM and the LEJ remains intact, there is a question mark over the HUJI. According to reliable police sources, the TTP now suspects that he was another mole of either the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) or the CIA or both and it was to protect him that the Pakistani authorities have again taken him into custody.
11. After the success of their hunt for Baitullah in co-ordination with the ISI and the Pakistan Army, the Americans have started a similar hunt for Serajuddin Haqqani, the son of Jalaluddin Haqqani. The Drones have started going after places, which were in the past known to be among his hide-outs. Surprisngly, almost the entire focus of the US covert operations, of which the Drone strikes are an important
component, were initially against the TTP and now against the Afghan Taliban.When the Drone strikes initially started under former President George Bush the focus of their hunt was on Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and other Al Qaeda leaders. After a number of unsuccessful strikes against suspected Al Qaeda hide-outs due to incorrect human intelligence, the focus has now shifted to the two Talibans. While the flow of correct human intelligence has been good in respect of the TTP, it is still poor in respect of the Afghan Taliban.
12. It remains to be seen whether Hakimullah as the new Amir will choose to co-ordinate the operations of the TTP from Orakzai or will shift to South Waziristan.Most probably, he will remain in Orakzai because of the suspected CIA penetratiion of the Mehsuds in South Waziristan.He will focus on identifying all the moles and getting them eliminated, continuing to disrupt NATO convoys, stepping up attacks on Shias in co-ordination with the LEJ and targeting the leaders of the Awami National Party (ANP) in the NWFP. The ANP is his sworn enemy.
13. Will there be an act of retaliation to avenge the death of Baitullah? If so, will it be directed against the Americans or the Pakistani Army and the ISI? If against the Americans, will it be in Pakistan itself or outside? These are important questions, but it is difficult to answer them now. ( 26-8-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical
Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Sunday, August 23, 2009
OCTOBER 1,2009: BEIJING KEEPS ITS FINGERS CROSSED
B.RAMAN
With the high-profile celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the People's Republic of China just five weeks away, the Chinese authorities have stepped up physical security measures right across the country in general and in Beijing,Tibet and Xingiang in particular. Other sensitive areas receiving special attention are the provinces of Sichuan and Yunnan and Shanghai. Special security measures have been
taken in towns having a large Uighur migrant population.
2. More than the Tibetans, the Chinese have been particularly worried about the Uighurs and the suspected links of the Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan (IMET) with Al Qaeda. Reliable reports from Police sources in Pakistan say that Rehman Malik, the Pakistani Interior Minister, has been requested by the Chinese Ambassador in Islamabad to step up vigilance on the Uighur elements in Pakistan and
particularly on the activities of the IMET based in North Waziristan.
3. The Chinese nervousness has been increased by the outbreak of violence in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, on July 5,2009, and the failure of their Ministry of Public Security, which is responsible for internal intelligence and security, to detect the preparations for the violence by the Uighurs. The Ministry of Public Security was as badly caught napping in Xinjiang in July as it was in Tibet in March last year.
4. The Lhasa riots of March,2008, and the Urumqi riots of July,2009, have underlined the weak intelligence capabilities in the peripheral regions. The security authorities did well in preventing any undue incident anywhere in China during the Beijing Olympics of August last year, but their subsequent performance in Xinjiang was unsatisfactory.
5. The Chinese nervousness over possible threats from pro-Al Qaeda elements has been increased by the fact that the Muslim fasting period of Ramadan, which started on August 23,2009, coincides with the weeks preceding the October celebrations, which start on October 1, and will end when the celebrations start in October.Restrictions on the movements and gatherings of Muslims become very difficult during this
period and often prove provocative.
6. The security authorities of Beijing staged a simulation exercise on August 11,2009, to test the reflexes of the local authorites to a terrorist raid into the capital. Scanty details of the exercise available so far indicate that one of the scenarios apprehended by the Chinese security is a complex, multi-target, multi-modus operandi terrorist attack of the kind witnessed by Mumbai between November 26 and 29,2008. Similar complex attacks have subsequently been seen in Kabul, Khost, Kandahar and Peshawar, but not on the same scale as in Mumbai. The security agencies in all these places were caught napping.
7. While widespread disturbances of the kind seen in Lhasa and Urumqi would require dozens of law-breakers, a terrorist attack of the kind witnessed in Mumbai required less than a dozen well-motivated and well-trained terrorists. The IMET has such well-motivated and well-trained members in its ranks and could create havoc if they manage infiltrate into Beijing.
8. The security precautions all over China are being planned on the same scale as were taken during the Beijing Olympics. The "China Daily" of August 24,2009, has given details of some of these security measures. Relevant extracts from its report are annexed. (24-8-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
Extracts from the report carried by the "China Daily" on August 24,2009
Over the weekend, police activated hundreds of checkpoints developed for last year's Olympic Games to beef up checks on people and vehicles entering the city.
Xu Ke, a driver who constantly travels between Handan in Hebei province and Beijing, said Sunday the toll station at the Beijing end of the Hebei-Beijing expressway has been fitted with new security-scanning machines.
Thousands of militia soldiers have also been deployed to watch key infrastructure such as bridges, overpasses, railways and highway tunnels, according to the police bureau.
Security measures have also been tightened in the city's subway system and key areas such as Tian'anmen Square.
All bags carried by subway passengers are subject to security checks, and armed police officers and plainclothes officers will patrol more often in Tian'anmen Square.
Bags taken into the square are being checked, China Daily noted over the weekend.
Taxi drivers have also been told to report any suspicious customers to police, especially along Chang'an Avenue, a major thoroughfare that runs along Tian'anmen Square, the latest issue of Southern Weekly reported.
The report also said the Beijing Radio Administration Bureau is screening radio devices in the city, especially near Tian'anmen Square, Chang'an Avenue and three "parade villages" where civilians and troops participating in the parade are exercising.
Meanwhile, gas stations have been asked to be wary of customers buying gasoline with containers. Stations are required to question the purpose of the purchase, and keep a copy of the buyer's ID card and contact information.
The administration also asks gas stations make contingency plans in case of emergencies, including terrorist attacks, administration director Zhang Jiaming was quoted by the local media as saying.
In June, a 62-year-old man ignited a bucket of gas he bought at a local station on a bus in Chengdu, killing 27 people, including himself.
Local communities have also been mobilized as an important supplement to police. The city's police bureau said ideally about 800,000 people would be involved, including college students, retired and self-employed residents. They will wear red armbands and watch for suspicious strangers around their communities.
Wang Taiyuan, a professor with the Chinese People's Public Security University, said these measures are a comprehensive system to improve security ahead of National Day.
He said unlike last year's Olympic Games, threats for National Day are more likely to come from inside the country than from abroad.
"However, the security work for the coming event is by no means easier. Some of the threats, such as Tibetan and Xinjiang Uygur separatists, may not give up the opportunity (to disrupt the celebration)," Wang said.
Li Wei, director of the center for counter-terrorism studies with the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, also said the risk of violence and terrorism rose after the July 5 riot in Urumqi in Xinjiang.
With the high-profile celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the People's Republic of China just five weeks away, the Chinese authorities have stepped up physical security measures right across the country in general and in Beijing,Tibet and Xingiang in particular. Other sensitive areas receiving special attention are the provinces of Sichuan and Yunnan and Shanghai. Special security measures have been
taken in towns having a large Uighur migrant population.
2. More than the Tibetans, the Chinese have been particularly worried about the Uighurs and the suspected links of the Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan (IMET) with Al Qaeda. Reliable reports from Police sources in Pakistan say that Rehman Malik, the Pakistani Interior Minister, has been requested by the Chinese Ambassador in Islamabad to step up vigilance on the Uighur elements in Pakistan and
particularly on the activities of the IMET based in North Waziristan.
3. The Chinese nervousness has been increased by the outbreak of violence in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, on July 5,2009, and the failure of their Ministry of Public Security, which is responsible for internal intelligence and security, to detect the preparations for the violence by the Uighurs. The Ministry of Public Security was as badly caught napping in Xinjiang in July as it was in Tibet in March last year.
4. The Lhasa riots of March,2008, and the Urumqi riots of July,2009, have underlined the weak intelligence capabilities in the peripheral regions. The security authorities did well in preventing any undue incident anywhere in China during the Beijing Olympics of August last year, but their subsequent performance in Xinjiang was unsatisfactory.
5. The Chinese nervousness over possible threats from pro-Al Qaeda elements has been increased by the fact that the Muslim fasting period of Ramadan, which started on August 23,2009, coincides with the weeks preceding the October celebrations, which start on October 1, and will end when the celebrations start in October.Restrictions on the movements and gatherings of Muslims become very difficult during this
period and often prove provocative.
6. The security authorities of Beijing staged a simulation exercise on August 11,2009, to test the reflexes of the local authorites to a terrorist raid into the capital. Scanty details of the exercise available so far indicate that one of the scenarios apprehended by the Chinese security is a complex, multi-target, multi-modus operandi terrorist attack of the kind witnessed by Mumbai between November 26 and 29,2008. Similar complex attacks have subsequently been seen in Kabul, Khost, Kandahar and Peshawar, but not on the same scale as in Mumbai. The security agencies in all these places were caught napping.
7. While widespread disturbances of the kind seen in Lhasa and Urumqi would require dozens of law-breakers, a terrorist attack of the kind witnessed in Mumbai required less than a dozen well-motivated and well-trained terrorists. The IMET has such well-motivated and well-trained members in its ranks and could create havoc if they manage infiltrate into Beijing.
8. The security precautions all over China are being planned on the same scale as were taken during the Beijing Olympics. The "China Daily" of August 24,2009, has given details of some of these security measures. Relevant extracts from its report are annexed. (24-8-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
Extracts from the report carried by the "China Daily" on August 24,2009
Over the weekend, police activated hundreds of checkpoints developed for last year's Olympic Games to beef up checks on people and vehicles entering the city.
Xu Ke, a driver who constantly travels between Handan in Hebei province and Beijing, said Sunday the toll station at the Beijing end of the Hebei-Beijing expressway has been fitted with new security-scanning machines.
Thousands of militia soldiers have also been deployed to watch key infrastructure such as bridges, overpasses, railways and highway tunnels, according to the police bureau.
Security measures have also been tightened in the city's subway system and key areas such as Tian'anmen Square.
All bags carried by subway passengers are subject to security checks, and armed police officers and plainclothes officers will patrol more often in Tian'anmen Square.
Bags taken into the square are being checked, China Daily noted over the weekend.
Taxi drivers have also been told to report any suspicious customers to police, especially along Chang'an Avenue, a major thoroughfare that runs along Tian'anmen Square, the latest issue of Southern Weekly reported.
The report also said the Beijing Radio Administration Bureau is screening radio devices in the city, especially near Tian'anmen Square, Chang'an Avenue and three "parade villages" where civilians and troops participating in the parade are exercising.
Meanwhile, gas stations have been asked to be wary of customers buying gasoline with containers. Stations are required to question the purpose of the purchase, and keep a copy of the buyer's ID card and contact information.
The administration also asks gas stations make contingency plans in case of emergencies, including terrorist attacks, administration director Zhang Jiaming was quoted by the local media as saying.
In June, a 62-year-old man ignited a bucket of gas he bought at a local station on a bus in Chengdu, killing 27 people, including himself.
Local communities have also been mobilized as an important supplement to police. The city's police bureau said ideally about 800,000 people would be involved, including college students, retired and self-employed residents. They will wear red armbands and watch for suspicious strangers around their communities.
Wang Taiyuan, a professor with the Chinese People's Public Security University, said these measures are a comprehensive system to improve security ahead of National Day.
He said unlike last year's Olympic Games, threats for National Day are more likely to come from inside the country than from abroad.
"However, the security work for the coming event is by no means easier. Some of the threats, such as Tibetan and Xinjiang Uygur separatists, may not give up the opportunity (to disrupt the celebration)," Wang said.
Li Wei, director of the center for counter-terrorism studies with the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, also said the risk of violence and terrorism rose after the July 5 riot in Urumqi in Xinjiang.
THE MOBILE JIHADI & THE DOUBLE JIHADI
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO. 551
B.RAMAN
In a broadcast over his FM radio station on August 22,2009, Maulvi Faqir Mohammad, the Amir of the Taliban unit in the Bajaur Agency of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and deputy Amir of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), stated as follows: " The shura has appointed Hakimullah as successor to Baitullah Mehsud. The shura earlier had nominated me as the acting chief, but now I will be again
deputy chief.I shall continue to be the Amir of the TTP in Bajaur."
2.He was reported to have told the Agence France Press as follows: "A Taliban shura has unanimously appointed Hakimullah Mehsud as successor to Baitullah Mehsud.The shura meeting continued for two days and was attended by 22 members."
3. Media reports originating from Bajaur had also quoted Faqir Mohammad as saying: " ‘Baitullah is alive but he is seriously sick.God forbid if Baitullah is dead, Hakimullah will be his successor." It is not clear when this statement was made. Probably before the official selection of Hakimullah as the Amir of the TTP by the Shura.
4.The claims of the US and Pakistan that Baitullah Mehsud was killed in a US Drone attack on the house of the father of his second wife in South Waziristan on August 5,2009, had been strongly refuted by the members of the TTP. If Baitullah had really been killed by a US Drone, it is difficult to understand why this was denied by the TTP because achieving martyrdom while fighting the Americans ---- any foreigner for that matter---is considered a divinely-bestowed honour for a Pashtun.
5.The TTP had also vehemently denied the claims made by Rehman Malik, the Pakistani Interior Minister, after the Drone attack that factional fighting broke out at a Shura meeting in South Waziristan to choose his successor in which Hakimullah was killed.At that time, I had pointed out that it was surprising that the Shura meeting should have been held so soon after the attack and that too in South
Waziristan where the Shura members would be vulnerable to Drone attacks by the US. It is now reported by tribal sources that the Shura meeting was actually held in the Orakzai Agency, where Hakimullah normally lives, on August 20 and 21.
6. In his broadcast, Faqir Mohammad did not announce the death of Baitullah. He merely announced the selection of Hakimullah as the new Amir.It would be interesting to see whether the TTP now announces the death of Baitullah and if so, what it attributes the death to---the Drone attack or his illness. Admiting his death as a result of the Drone attack would give him a place of honour as a martyr in the hearts of fellow-Pashtuns, but would at the same time indicate that he was probably betrayed by some fellow Pashtuns. Attributing his death to illness would deprive him of martyrdom while fighting the 'infidel' Americans and the 'apostate' Pakistani Army.
7. Hakimullah is known as the mobile jihadi because of his habit of constantly traveling. He is believed to be the cousin of Qari Hussain Mehsud, who is in charge of training suicide bombers. Both of them are natives of South Waziristan. While Qari Hussain operates from South Waziristan, Hakimullah operates from the Orakzai Agency. Till his appointment as the chief, he was in charge of the TTP's operations in the Orakzai, Khyber and Kurram Agencies. He was, inter alia, in charge of disrupting the NATO's logistic supplies to Afghanistan via the Pakistani tribal areas. He is believed to be in his late 20s and often moves around in a Humvee vehicle captured by his men from a NATO logistics convoy. He reportedly has a large weapons holding of NATO origin. He is healthier than Baitullah and more ruthless.
8.On April 1,2009, a Drone attacked with a missile the house of Hakimullah Mehsud in the Khadezai area of the Orakzai Agency. Twelve persons were killed ----- six of them followers of Hakimullah, two women and four other unidentified persons. Hakimullah himself, who was apparently one of the targets, escaped unhurt and warned of a retaliatory strike by the Taliban in Islamabad. The retaliation through a
suicide bomber came within three days. Late on the evening of April 4,2009, a suicide bomber blew himself up in front of the barracks of a company of the Frontier Constabulary (FC) from the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), which is deployed in Islamabad on VIP security duties. At least eight members of the FC were killed by the explosion.
9. In the last week of November,2008, Hakimullah had invited a group of about 20 Pakistani journalists to his hide-out in the Orakzai Agency. In a report in "The News" of November 30,2008, Rahimullah Yusufzai, the Pakistani journalist, stated as follows: "Hakimullah, who could aspire to succeed Baitullah Mehsud one day, made some strong-worded statements in his maiden encounter with the journalists. He
threatened attacks against the PPP and ANP( Awami National Party) leadership for having ordered military operations against the Taliban.He made no effort to hide his group’s plans to disrupt the supplies for Nato forces passing through Pakistan and warned of a tit-for-tat response for the US drone attacks in the tribal areas. He claimed the Taliban could attempt to take Peshawar and other towns and cities “if
the rulers failed to change their pro-US policies”. The young Taliban commander remarked that he found no difference between Bush and Obama. He also felt former president General Pervez Musharraf’s policies were still being followed in Pakistan. Other claims made by Hakimullah were that Baitullah Mehsud was hale and hearty, that their differences with Pakistani Taliban commander for North Waziristan, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, had been resolved and that there were no Taliban in Karachi. He alleged that MQM leader Altaf Hussain was raising the bogey of Talibanisation in Karachi to hide his own reign of terror. He also denied Taliban involvement in the recent bomb explosions in Lahore.Obviously, there was no way to verify his claims. About the rise in missile strikes by US drones in the two Waziristans, Hakimullah
claimed the Taliban had apprehended and beheaded about 12 men spying for the Americans and guiding them to targets."
10. In the meanwhile, the TTP has undertaken an enquiry to find out how the US intelligence knew about the visit of Baitullah to his father-in-law's house. Ikramullah, the father-in-law, who was reportedly not in the house at the time of the attack and some other members of his family, who were also not in the house during the attack, have reportedly been detained for questioning.
11. According to local Police sources, the TTP leadership also suspects Qari Saifullah Akhtar, the Amir of the Pakistan branch of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), who had reportedly ingratiated himself with Baitullah and was collaborating with him.Last week, the Islamabad Police reported that he was found to be undergoing treatment in an Islamabad hospital for an injury suspected to have been sustained in a Drone attack and has been taken into custody. This is the fifth or sixth time Qari Saifullah has been taken into custody for questioning. Previously, he was detained for questioning in connection with a coup plot against Benazir Bhutto in 1995, the two attempts to murder Pervez Musharraf in December,2003, the attack on Benazir Bhutto in Karachi in October,2007, and the murder of the Surgeon
General of the Pakistan Army early last year. Every time he managed to come out unscathed.
12.The HUJI was not banned by Musharraf as a terrorist organisation either in his notification of January 2002 or in his notification of November,2003. No action has been taken against it by the present Government either. While the US has declared the Bangladesh branch of the HUJI as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation, it has not made a similar declaration against the HUJI of Pakistan. It has not declared
Saifullah as a terrorist, No action has been taken by the US to move for the declaration of the HUJI of Pakistan as a terrorist organisation by the anti-terrorism committee of the UN Security Council. All actions taken so far either by the US or the committee of the UNSC, which generally acts at the US initiative, have been against the Bangladesh branch. It is suspected that the US and Pakistani intelligence agencies have been going out of their way to protect the HUJI of Pakistan and Saifullah.Is he a double agent working for the ISI against the
TTP and for the TTP against the Pakistan Army? That is the question which is reported to be troubling the new leadership of the TTP.
13. This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article of August 8,2009, titled "The Mole In Their Midst: The Top Guns of the Taliban Suspect Each Other" available at http://ramanstrategicanalysis.blogspot.com/2009_08_08_archive.html
23-8-09
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical
Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
In a broadcast over his FM radio station on August 22,2009, Maulvi Faqir Mohammad, the Amir of the Taliban unit in the Bajaur Agency of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and deputy Amir of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), stated as follows: " The shura has appointed Hakimullah as successor to Baitullah Mehsud. The shura earlier had nominated me as the acting chief, but now I will be again
deputy chief.I shall continue to be the Amir of the TTP in Bajaur."
2.He was reported to have told the Agence France Press as follows: "A Taliban shura has unanimously appointed Hakimullah Mehsud as successor to Baitullah Mehsud.The shura meeting continued for two days and was attended by 22 members."
3. Media reports originating from Bajaur had also quoted Faqir Mohammad as saying: " ‘Baitullah is alive but he is seriously sick.God forbid if Baitullah is dead, Hakimullah will be his successor." It is not clear when this statement was made. Probably before the official selection of Hakimullah as the Amir of the TTP by the Shura.
4.The claims of the US and Pakistan that Baitullah Mehsud was killed in a US Drone attack on the house of the father of his second wife in South Waziristan on August 5,2009, had been strongly refuted by the members of the TTP. If Baitullah had really been killed by a US Drone, it is difficult to understand why this was denied by the TTP because achieving martyrdom while fighting the Americans ---- any foreigner for that matter---is considered a divinely-bestowed honour for a Pashtun.
5.The TTP had also vehemently denied the claims made by Rehman Malik, the Pakistani Interior Minister, after the Drone attack that factional fighting broke out at a Shura meeting in South Waziristan to choose his successor in which Hakimullah was killed.At that time, I had pointed out that it was surprising that the Shura meeting should have been held so soon after the attack and that too in South
Waziristan where the Shura members would be vulnerable to Drone attacks by the US. It is now reported by tribal sources that the Shura meeting was actually held in the Orakzai Agency, where Hakimullah normally lives, on August 20 and 21.
6. In his broadcast, Faqir Mohammad did not announce the death of Baitullah. He merely announced the selection of Hakimullah as the new Amir.It would be interesting to see whether the TTP now announces the death of Baitullah and if so, what it attributes the death to---the Drone attack or his illness. Admiting his death as a result of the Drone attack would give him a place of honour as a martyr in the hearts of fellow-Pashtuns, but would at the same time indicate that he was probably betrayed by some fellow Pashtuns. Attributing his death to illness would deprive him of martyrdom while fighting the 'infidel' Americans and the 'apostate' Pakistani Army.
7. Hakimullah is known as the mobile jihadi because of his habit of constantly traveling. He is believed to be the cousin of Qari Hussain Mehsud, who is in charge of training suicide bombers. Both of them are natives of South Waziristan. While Qari Hussain operates from South Waziristan, Hakimullah operates from the Orakzai Agency. Till his appointment as the chief, he was in charge of the TTP's operations in the Orakzai, Khyber and Kurram Agencies. He was, inter alia, in charge of disrupting the NATO's logistic supplies to Afghanistan via the Pakistani tribal areas. He is believed to be in his late 20s and often moves around in a Humvee vehicle captured by his men from a NATO logistics convoy. He reportedly has a large weapons holding of NATO origin. He is healthier than Baitullah and more ruthless.
8.On April 1,2009, a Drone attacked with a missile the house of Hakimullah Mehsud in the Khadezai area of the Orakzai Agency. Twelve persons were killed ----- six of them followers of Hakimullah, two women and four other unidentified persons. Hakimullah himself, who was apparently one of the targets, escaped unhurt and warned of a retaliatory strike by the Taliban in Islamabad. The retaliation through a
suicide bomber came within three days. Late on the evening of April 4,2009, a suicide bomber blew himself up in front of the barracks of a company of the Frontier Constabulary (FC) from the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), which is deployed in Islamabad on VIP security duties. At least eight members of the FC were killed by the explosion.
9. In the last week of November,2008, Hakimullah had invited a group of about 20 Pakistani journalists to his hide-out in the Orakzai Agency. In a report in "The News" of November 30,2008, Rahimullah Yusufzai, the Pakistani journalist, stated as follows: "Hakimullah, who could aspire to succeed Baitullah Mehsud one day, made some strong-worded statements in his maiden encounter with the journalists. He
threatened attacks against the PPP and ANP( Awami National Party) leadership for having ordered military operations against the Taliban.He made no effort to hide his group’s plans to disrupt the supplies for Nato forces passing through Pakistan and warned of a tit-for-tat response for the US drone attacks in the tribal areas. He claimed the Taliban could attempt to take Peshawar and other towns and cities “if
the rulers failed to change their pro-US policies”. The young Taliban commander remarked that he found no difference between Bush and Obama. He also felt former president General Pervez Musharraf’s policies were still being followed in Pakistan. Other claims made by Hakimullah were that Baitullah Mehsud was hale and hearty, that their differences with Pakistani Taliban commander for North Waziristan, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, had been resolved and that there were no Taliban in Karachi. He alleged that MQM leader Altaf Hussain was raising the bogey of Talibanisation in Karachi to hide his own reign of terror. He also denied Taliban involvement in the recent bomb explosions in Lahore.Obviously, there was no way to verify his claims. About the rise in missile strikes by US drones in the two Waziristans, Hakimullah
claimed the Taliban had apprehended and beheaded about 12 men spying for the Americans and guiding them to targets."
10. In the meanwhile, the TTP has undertaken an enquiry to find out how the US intelligence knew about the visit of Baitullah to his father-in-law's house. Ikramullah, the father-in-law, who was reportedly not in the house at the time of the attack and some other members of his family, who were also not in the house during the attack, have reportedly been detained for questioning.
11. According to local Police sources, the TTP leadership also suspects Qari Saifullah Akhtar, the Amir of the Pakistan branch of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), who had reportedly ingratiated himself with Baitullah and was collaborating with him.Last week, the Islamabad Police reported that he was found to be undergoing treatment in an Islamabad hospital for an injury suspected to have been sustained in a Drone attack and has been taken into custody. This is the fifth or sixth time Qari Saifullah has been taken into custody for questioning. Previously, he was detained for questioning in connection with a coup plot against Benazir Bhutto in 1995, the two attempts to murder Pervez Musharraf in December,2003, the attack on Benazir Bhutto in Karachi in October,2007, and the murder of the Surgeon
General of the Pakistan Army early last year. Every time he managed to come out unscathed.
12.The HUJI was not banned by Musharraf as a terrorist organisation either in his notification of January 2002 or in his notification of November,2003. No action has been taken against it by the present Government either. While the US has declared the Bangladesh branch of the HUJI as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation, it has not made a similar declaration against the HUJI of Pakistan. It has not declared
Saifullah as a terrorist, No action has been taken by the US to move for the declaration of the HUJI of Pakistan as a terrorist organisation by the anti-terrorism committee of the UN Security Council. All actions taken so far either by the US or the committee of the UNSC, which generally acts at the US initiative, have been against the Bangladesh branch. It is suspected that the US and Pakistani intelligence agencies have been going out of their way to protect the HUJI of Pakistan and Saifullah.Is he a double agent working for the ISI against the
TTP and for the TTP against the Pakistan Army? That is the question which is reported to be troubling the new leadership of the TTP.
13. This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article of August 8,2009, titled "The Mole In Their Midst: The Top Guns of the Taliban Suspect Each Other" available at http://ramanstrategicanalysis.blogspot.com/2009_08_08_archive.html
23-8-09
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical
Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Saturday, August 22, 2009
A JIHADI QUIZ
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO.549
B.RAMAN
Of all the jihadi terrorist organisations of Pakistan, there is one which has never been banned either by the Government of Pakistan or designated by the US State Department as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) or banned by the Governments of the European Union Countries or by the anti-terrorism sanctions committee of the UN Security Council.
2.Of all the jihadi terrorist organisations of Pakistan, there is one whose assets and bank accounts have never been sought to be frozen either by Pakistan or by the US or by the EU or by the UNSC Committee.
3.Of all the jihadi terrorist leaders of Pakistan, there is one who has not been sought to be declared as a terrorist by the anti-terrorism sanctions committee of the UNSC because this subject was not taken up by the US.
4. Which is that terrorist organisation and who is that terrorist leader? You find the answers to those questions and you will be able to make a fairly reasonable guess as to how the US managed to direct a Drone strike at the house of the father of the second wife of Baitullah Mehsud, the Amir of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan , in South Waziristan on August 5,2009, in which Baitullah was reported to have been
killed.
5. I have written repeatedly and extensively about this organisation and its leader. I am not going to say anything more.
6. It is for you to find the answers. (22-8-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
Of all the jihadi terrorist organisations of Pakistan, there is one which has never been banned either by the Government of Pakistan or designated by the US State Department as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) or banned by the Governments of the European Union Countries or by the anti-terrorism sanctions committee of the UN Security Council.
2.Of all the jihadi terrorist organisations of Pakistan, there is one whose assets and bank accounts have never been sought to be frozen either by Pakistan or by the US or by the EU or by the UNSC Committee.
3.Of all the jihadi terrorist leaders of Pakistan, there is one who has not been sought to be declared as a terrorist by the anti-terrorism sanctions committee of the UNSC because this subject was not taken up by the US.
4. Which is that terrorist organisation and who is that terrorist leader? You find the answers to those questions and you will be able to make a fairly reasonable guess as to how the US managed to direct a Drone strike at the house of the father of the second wife of Baitullah Mehsud, the Amir of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan , in South Waziristan on August 5,2009, in which Baitullah was reported to have been
killed.
5. I have written repeatedly and extensively about this organisation and its leader. I am not going to say anything more.
6. It is for you to find the answers. (22-8-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)