B.RAMAN
( Article prepared for "Eternal India", a monthly published from New Delhi )
There were eight jihadi terrorist strikes in Indian territory outside Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) between 2000 and 2003 involving a total of 120 fatalities including civilians, members of the security forces and terrorists. The break-up of these strikes is given below. The identities of the terrorists involved in two of these strikes could not be established. In the remaining six strikes the suspects were from either the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) or the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) or the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami (HUJI), all of them Pakistani organisations sponsored by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). There was also evidence of local involvement from the Students" Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). In one incident at Kolkata an organisation called the Asif Reza Commando Force (ARCF) was also involved.
Year strikes fatalities
2000 ONE NINE
2001 3 17
2002 2 39
2003 2 64
2. During his visit to IsIalamabad in January 2004 to attend the SAARC summit, Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee, the then Prime Minister, took up with Pervez Musharraf, the then Pakistani President, the question of continued Pakistani sponsorship of jihadi terrorism in Indian territory and reportedly made it clear that any talks between the two countries on pending bilateral issues would depend on Pakistan stopping the
use of its territory for launching terrorist strikes against India in Indian territory. Musharraf made a formal commitment that he would not allow Pakistani territory or territory controlled by Pakistan to be used by Pakistan-based terrorists for mounting acts of terrorism in Indian territory.
3. A joint statement issued on January 6,2004, at the end of Shri Vajpayee's talks with Musharraf said inter alia : "Prime Minister Vajpayee said that in order to take forward and sustain the dialogue process, violence, hostility and terrorism must be prevented. President Musharraf reassured Prime Minister Vajpayee that he will not permit any territory under Pakistan's control to be used to support terrorism in any
manner. President Musharraf emphasised that a sustained and productive dialogue addressing all issues would lead to positive results.To carry the process of normalisation forward, the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India agreed to commence the process of the composite dialogue in February 2004. The two leaders are confident that the resumption of the composite dialogue will lead to peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides. The two leaders agreed that constructive dialogue would promote progress towards the common objective of peace, security and economic development for our peoples and forfuture generations."
4. A careful reading of the statement would show that while de jure Shri Vajpayee had linked the dialogue process to Pakistan carrying out its commitment to end the use of its territory for terrorist strikes in India, de facto he had agreed to the dialogue process starting in February 2004, without waiting to verify whether Musharraf carried out his commitment. He decided to commence the dialogue in February
2004, believing in Musharraf's good faith.
5. Musharraf did keep his de jure commitment as would be evident from the fact that there was no act of jihadi terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K between January 2004 and July 2005. After Dr.Manmohan Singh had taken over as the Prime Minister in May,2004,Musharraf visited India from April 16 to 18, 2005 at his invitation for bilateral talks. There were two significant sentences in the joint statement issued
by the two leaders at the end of their talks. Firstly, "they determined that the peace process was now irreversible." Secondly,"they condemned attempts to disrupt the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service and welcomed its successful operationalisation. The two leaders pledged that they would not allow terrorism to impede the peace process."
6. This meant a separation of terrorism from the dialogue process and an understanding between the two leaders that periodic acts of terrorism should not be allowed to disrupt the bilateral dialogue on various issues. Thus, Dr.Manmohan Singh had carried out the de facto and the de jure separation of terrorism and the dialogue process as early as April 2005.Hardly anybody in India noticed it or commented upon it. Why? The talks between Gen. Musharraf and Dr.Manmohan Singh were held against a back-drop of 18 months of respite from Pakistan-sponsored jihadi terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K. Indian public opinion was, therefore, not highly agitated over Dr.Manmohan Singh's action in removing the linkage between terrorism and progress in the dialogue process which Shri Vajpayee had introduced by inserting the condition " in order to take forward and sustain the dialogue process."
7.Shri Vajpayee, while expressing his belief in the good faith of Gen. Musharraf, had kept a Damocle's Sword hanging over Pakistan's head by making it clear that India would not hesitate to use a military or a para-military option if Pakistan-sponsored terrorists continued to indulge in terrorism in Indian territory and that India's continued participation in the dialogue process would depend upon Musharraf's honouring his commitment of January 6,2004. His mobilisation of the Indian Armed forces after the Pakistan-sponsored jihadi terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13,2001, was meant to underline India's readiness to use the military option if left with no other alternative to put a stop to Pakistan-sponsored terrorism.
8. What Dr. Manmohan Singh did in April 2005, was to remove this Damocle's Sword from the head of Pakistan. Pakistan interpreted the concessions made by Dr. Manmohan Singh at New Delhi in April 2005, to mean that if it resumed the acts of terrorism sponsored by the ISI there would be no disruption of the dialogue process, which would be "irreversible" and that it did not have to fear any military or
para-military retaliation by India.
9. This newly-acquired confidence of Pakistan that it did not have to worry about the dangers of any retaliation by Dr.Manmohan Singh had its immediate effect. ISI-sponsored Pakistani jihadi terrorist organisations as well as organisations of Indian Muslims supported by the ISI such as the SIMI and the so-called Indian Mujahideen (IM), which came into the picture subsequently in 2006, resumed their acts of terrorism in the Indian territory outside J&K from July 2005--- hardly two months after Dr.Manmohan Singh removed the Damocle's Sword from the head of Pakistan by deleting the conditionality dictated by Shri Vajpayee to Gen.Musharraf in January,2004.
10.On July 5, 2005, a group of unidentified terrorists unsuccessfully tried to attack the disputed temple complex in Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh. Their attempt was beaten back by the security forces guarding it. Since then, there has been a sharp surge in acts of jihadi terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K by ISI-sponsored Pakistani terrorist organisations such as the LET and the HUJI as well as by
Pakistan-helped Indian jihadi terrorists such as those of the SIMI and the Indian Mujahideen. The break-up figures are given below:
Year strikes Fatalities
2005 3 63
2006 3 241
2007 5 141
2008 7 335
2009 nil
11. A comparison of jihadi terrorist strikes outside J&K between 2000 and 2004 under Shri Vajpayee and between 2004 and 2009 under Dr.Manmohan Singh would be as follows:Under Shri Vajpayee there were eight strikes involving 120 fatalities.Of these, two remained undetected. Under Dr.Manmohan Singh there were 18 strikes involving 780 fatalities. Of these,10 remained undetected.
12. Since Dr.Manmohan Singh removed the Damocle's Sword from the head of Pakistan in April 2005, there has been a revival of jihadi terrorist strikes in Indian territory outside J&K after a respite of 18 months.The number of jihadi strikes has more than doubled, the number of fatalities has increased by more than six times and the number of undetected cases has increased by five times. The percentage of detected cases came down from 75 under Shri Vajpayee to less than 50 under Dr.Manmohan Singh. Dr.Manmohan Singh's tenure has been marked by the largest number of jihadi terrorist strikes since 2000 and two acts of mass casualty terrorism by any terrorist group jihadi or otherwise involving fatalities of more than 150 as against one each under Rajiv Gandhi ( the Kanishka explosion ) and Narasimha Rao (the
Mumbai blasts of March ,1993).
13. After the act of mass casualty terrorism directed at some suburban trains of Mumbai on July 11,2006, in which 182 innocent civilians were killed, one thought that he would reverse his post-April 2005 policy of a soft approach to Pakistani-sponsorship of terrorism in Indian territory and take a stronger line to make Pakistan pay a price for going back on its solemn commitment of January 6,2004, and for resuming the use of its terrorist groups in Indian territory. He did not do so. Instead, his attitude became even softer. A joint statement issued after his meeting with Gen. Musharraf at Havana in the margins of a non-aligned summit on September 16,2006, said: "The leaders agreed that the peace process must be maintained and its success was important for both countries and the future of the entire region. In this context, they directed their Foreign Secretaries to resume the composite dialogue at the earliest possible. The two leaders met in the
aftermath of the Mumbai blasts. They strongly condemned all acts of terrorism and agreed that terrorism is a scourge that needs to be effectively dealt with. They decided to put in place an India-Pakistan anti-terrorism institutional mechanism to identify and implement counter-terrorism initiatives and investigations."
14.The focus of the discussions at Havana and the joint statement was against " all terrorism" without specifying the Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. The reference to the act of mass casualty terrorism was merely in passing where it should have occupied the main attention. Despite the death of 182 civilians, Dr.Manmohan Singh stuck to his line of "the irreversibility of the peace process" even if the ISI and its
jihadi surrogates such as the LET, the JEM and the HUJI continued with their orgy of killings in Indian territory. Worse still, he agreed to a suggestion, which reportedly emanated from the US, for setting up a joint anti-terrorism institutional mechansim with Pakistan, which is behind all acts of jihadi terrorism against Indian nationals.
15. Even the July 7,2008, explosion of a vehicle with explosives outside the Indian Embassy in Kabul would not make him re-consider his policy towards Pakistan despite intelligence reportedly collected by the US agencies that the ISI was involved in the explosion. His reluctance to act vigorously against Pakistan after the Mumbai suburban train attack of July,2006, and the Kabul attack of July,2008,against the Indian Embassy strengthened the impression in the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment as well as among the Pakistani jihadi terrorist organisations that he did not have the stomach for retaliation against Pakistan. The more the number of Indians attacked and killed by the Pakistan sponsored and assisted jihadi terrorists, the more helpless he looked and the softer became his approach to
Pakistan. At least, that was the perception he created in the minds of the military and intelligence officers in Pakistan and the terrorists sponsored by them.
16. The inexorable result of Dr.Manmohan Singh's failure to act: The commando-style attack by 10 Pakistani terrorists of the LET, trained,armed and equipped in Pakistan on two hotels, a Jewish religious-cum-cultural centre and other public places in Mumbai, which started on November 26, 2008, and continued till November 28,2008.It was an army-style operation involving the use of hand-held weapons,explosives, sophisticated communication equipment and modern internet telephony facilities, which shocked the world and created feelings of anger and outrage in India.
17. The enormity of the public anger against Pakistan forced Dr.Manmohan Singh to freeze the composite dialogue process without disrupting the normal diplomatic relations between the two countries. He did so not because he was convinced that his earlier policy of appeasement of Pakistan had failed, but because he and his Congress (I) party were worried that if they did not give the impression of
taking strong action against Pakistan, it might affect the party adversely in the elections of April-May,2009, to the Lok Sabha, the lower House of the Indian Parliament. The resumption of the composite dialogue was made conditional on Pakistan acting strongly against the LET, its operatives based in Pakistan who had planned and got executed the terrorist attack in Mumbai and its terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory.
18. The Pakistani Government headed by President Asif Ali Zardari, under US pressure to act against the LET, gave the impression of acting against it and its operatives. It placed Hafeez Mohammad Sayeed, the Amir of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa(JUD), the political front organisation of the LET, under house arrest, registered a case under the Anti-Terrorism Act against five operatives of the LET named by India as the main
conspirators of the Mumbai attack and certain others, arrested five of them, started its own investigation of the conspiracy and shared its findings with the public and the Government of India.
19.The Indian expectations from Pakistan fell into three categories:
Firstly, mutual legal assistance in the investigation and prosecution of the Pakistan-based LET conspirators involved in the Mumbai errorist strike.
Secondly, action against the main leaders of the JUD and the LET, whether they were directly involved in the terrorist strike or not.India was particularly keen that effective legal action should be taken against Hafeez Mohammad Sayeed.
Thirdly, action against the anti-India terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory----particularly against that of the LET_-- in order to ensure that there would be no more terrorism in Indian territory emanating from Pakistan.
20. Of these expectations, the only forward movement ---though halting and only partially satisfactory--- has been in respect of the mutual legal assistance. While Pakistan has arrested five LET conspirators who, according to Indian investigators, were involved in planning the terrorist strike and having it carried out, it has not yet started their prosecution. The Pakistani authorities have been blaming their Indian counterparts for the delay. Only if and when the case is prosecuted and it ends in conviction can India be satisfied that there has been a genuine change for the better in Pakistan’s stand on the question of mutual legal assistance.
21. There was a seeming forward movement in respect of action against Sayeed. He was placed under house arrest immediately after the Mumbai attack. However, the case for his continued detention was not prepared and pursued in a vigorous manner---- as if the heart of the Pakistani investigators was not in his continued detention. The result: he was ordered to be released by the Lahore High Court before which he had challenged the legality of his detention. The Federal and the Punjab Governments have filed an appeal against his release, but have not been pursuing it vigorously on the ground that India has not provided any firm evidence of his involvement in the conspiracy relating to the Mumbai attack.
22. There has been no forward movement at all in respect of action against the anti-India terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory. Of all the pro-Al Qaeda jihadi terrorist organizations operating from Pakistani territory, the LET is the closest to the Pakistan Army and the ISI,which look upon it as a strategic asset in their operations against India. In the past, they had always avoided taking action against the LET under some pretext or the other and there has been no change in this policy.
23. Even though the US and the European nations are increasingly concerned over the links of the LET with Al Qaeda, its capability for acts of terrorism, which is second only to that of Al Qaeda, and the presence of its sleeper cells among the Pakistani-origin diaspora in many countries, they still look upon it as a looming and not an imminent threat to their nationals and interests. For them, the imminent threat is from Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Their present efforts are focused on making Pakistan act against the imminent threats while exercising only proforma pressure---- to reassure India of their solidarity--- on Pakistan to act against the LET. As a result, Pakistan’s inaction against the LET tends to be overlooked by the West so long as it is acting against the Taliban and helping the US in its actions against Al Qaeda.
24. Thus, India finds itself in an unenviable position. It is not in a position to make the US and the rest of the Western world act against Pakistan for its inaction against the LET. At the same time, it is not in a position to act by itself because it has denied to itself a deniable retaliatory capability ever since the fatal decision taken by Inder Gujral, the then Prime Minister, in 1997 to wind up any retaliatory capability as a mark of unilateral gesture to Pakistan---despite remonstrations by senior officers of our security bureaucracy that Pakistan has never been known to appreciate and reciprocate such unilateral gestures.
25 The Pakistani leaders----political or military--- know the constraints on India and are taking full advantage of them to persist with their present policy of seeming to act against the LET without actually acting against it. One of the major problems faced by us in dealing with the LET’s acts of terrorism in different parts of the country has been due to the failure of our political leadership and the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) to make it clear to the world through facts and figures ---- and not through rhetoric--- that the LET’s acts have a much larger
agenda and have no longer much to do with the Kashmir issue. Unfortunately, Pakistan has once again almost succeeded in making the US and the UK look at the LET activities through the Kashmir prism.
27. The Mumbai terrorist strike---the attacks on Israelis and other Jewish people, the targeted killings of nationals of countries having troops in Afghanistan, attacks on Western businessmen etc--- clearly illustrated the global agenda of the LET, but our political leadership and diplomacy failed to clearly draw attention to the much larger agenda. As a result, we are once again seeing references to the so-called linkages between the Kashmir issue and the LET’s acts of terrorism. Pakistan has profited from our inaction or inept action.
28. In the meanwhile, in the elections to the Lok Sabha held in April-May,2009, the Congress (I) led coalition retained power with the Congress (I) itself improving its performance as compared to the previous elections of 2004. After the elections, Dr.Manmohan Singh showed signs of wanting to return to his pre-November,2008 policy of separating terrorism from the dialogue process and treating the process as
irreversible whatever be the acts of jihadi terrorism against innocent Indians.
29.It was against this background that Dr. Manmohan Singh met President Asif Ali Zardari at Yekaterinburg in Russia on June 16, 2009.The two were in Yekaterinburg as the heads of their respective delegations to attend the summit of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) of which India and Pakistan are observers and not full-fledged members. In an assessment prepared by me before this meeting, I had stated as follows:"Manmohan Singh is not a man of confrontation. He took the decision to freeze the composite dialogue mainly because of the fears of a likely adverse impact on the voting in the recently-held elections to the Parliament if he did not take a seemingly hard line against Pakistan. Now that the Congress (I)-led coalition has come back to power----with the Congress (I) improving its own individual position in the Lok Sabha, the lower House of the Parliament--- he is unlikely to feel the need for maintaining the present hardline position on the composite dialogue...... Manmohan Singh would find it difficult to reject suggestions from the US for a political gesture to the Government in Islamabad by way of a resumption of the composite dialogue.... The question is no longer whether it will be resumed, but
when and how it will be projected to save the faces of both India and Pakistan."
30.The Manmohan Singh-Zardari meeting did not lead to a decision to resume the composite dialogue. It merely led to an agreement for a meeting between the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries to discuss the action taken by Pakistan after the Mumbai attack. It was stated that any decision on the resumption of the composite dialogue would depend on the outcome of this meeting.
31.It was also reportedly agreed that the two leaders would meet again in the margins of a non-aligned summit at Sharm-el-Sheikh in Egypt in July,2009. Zardari, on returning to Pakistan, decided to send his Prime Minister Yousez Raza Gilani to Sharm-el-Sheikh. The Pakistani press attributed Zardari's decision not to attend the NAM summit to his unhappiness over some blunt remarks of Dr.Manmohan Singh on the
issue of terrorism at Yekaterinburg in the presence of the media before the two started their private talks.
32. Dr.Manmohan Singh's meeting with Mr. Gilani took place at Sharm-el-Sheikh on July 16,2009. The entire nation was expecting that the Prime Minister would stick to his firm line that there can be no resumption of the composite dialogue unless and until Pakistan gave satisfaction to the Indian demands in respect of unconditional Pakistani co-operation in the arrest and prosecution of the LET operatives
involved in the planning and execution of the Mumbai attack and action against the anti-India terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory.
33.Public opinion in India was shocked when the joint statement issued at the end of the meeting indicated that the Prime Minister had once again succumbed to the Pakistani position that acts of terrorism in Indian territory should not be allowed to disrupt the composite dialogue and that the issue of Pakistani action against terrorism should be separated from the issue of the composite dialogue. The
statement said: ".Both leaders agreed that terrorism is the main threat to both countries. Both leaders affirmed their resolve to fight terrorism and to cooperate with each other to this end.Prime Minister Singh reiterated the need to bring the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks to justice. Prime Minister Gilani assured that Pakistan will do everything in its power in this regard. He said that Pakistan has
provided an updated status dossier on the investigations of the Mumbai attacks and had sought additional information/evidence. Prime Minister Singh said that the dossier is being reviewed.Both leaders agreed that the two countries will share real time, credible and actionable information on any future terrorist threats".
34.What was disturbing was not so much the reported agreement of Dr.Manmohan Singh that "India was ready to discuss all issues with Pakistan, including all outstanding issues" as the phraseology relating to terrorism in the joint statement, which would enable Pakistan once again to wriggle out of any negative consequences arising from its involvement in the Mumbai terrorist strike of November 26, 2008.
35. The relevant question is not whether Pakistan is against terrorism. All Pakistani leaders had said that they are against terrorism. But, not one of them had ever agreed that the LET is a terrorist organisation. Even the Pakistani judiciary has already pronounced that the Zardari Government has not been able to produce any evidence linking the LET or the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD) with any terrorist movement.
The Lahore High Court judgement of June 6, 2009, explaining the decision to release Sayeed from house arrest,clearly said as reported by the "Daily Times" of Lahore: "About the Dawa leaders’ involvement in the Mumbai attacks, the bench observed that not a single document had been brought on the record that Dawa or the petitioners were involved in the said incident. There was no evidence that the petitioners had any links with Al Qaeda or any terrorist movement.”
36. The oral observations made subsequently in the Pakistan Supreme Court by Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury during the preliminary arguments on the appeals sought to be filed by the Punjab and the Federal Governments against the release of Sayeed made more or less similar observations and expressed considerable skepticism over the case against Sayeed and the JUD.
37. When senior judges of the Lahore High Court and the Supreme Court have already expressed their skepticism in open court over Indian allegations of the involvement of the JUD, the political wing of the LET, in the Mumbai attack, to expect that justice will be done to the memory of the 166 persons killed in Mumbai-----123 Indian civilians, 25 foreign civilians and 18 brave officers and other ranks of the security forces--- by the terrorists of the LET as promised by the Pakistani co-operation against terrorism will be naivete of a very high order comparable to the naivete of Neville Chamberlain, the predecessor of Winston Churchill as the British Prime Minister.
38. One would have been at least satisfied if the two Prime Ministers had specifically stated that the two countries would co-operate against the LET instead of just saying that they would co-operate against terrorism. If the Prime Minister's advisers had properly briefed him before his meeting with Gilani, they would have drawn his attention to the following facts:
·
While even Musharraf banned the LET for some months after the December, 2001, attack on the Indian Parliament, Zardari has till today not formally banned the JUD, through a Gazette notification though his Interior Minister Rehman Malik has claimed that it has been banned. If it has been banned, why Sayeed has not been arrested for leading a banned organisation?
Zardari and his advisers have been saying that they had to act against Sayeed and his associates because of the declaration of the anti-terrorism committee of the UN Security Council that the JUD is a terrorist organization and not because they had any independent evidence against it. It was on this ground that Sayeed was ordered to be released.
39. Not a single reference to the LET. Not a single reference to its continuing terrorist infrastructure. And, we have provided dignity to Pakistan's baseless allegations against Baloch freedom-fighters by agreeing to make a reference to Balochistan in the joint statement in the context of terrorism by indirectly bringing on record, without naming them, in an official statement Pakistan’s projection of the late Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti and other Baloch leaders as terrorists. Hafiz Mohammed Sayeed is not a terrorist, but Bugti and other Baloch leaders were or are. That has been Pakistan’s contention and we have let this figure in the joint statement in an implicit manner.
40. This agreement, which seeks to white-wash years of Pakistani sponsorship of terrorism against Indian civilians and security forces, will make all those who died at the hands of the terrorists shed tears in heaven. The public uproar in India over the volte face by Dr.Manmohan Singh at Sharm-el-Sheikh and reports of unhappiness in his own party over the implications of his volte face made Dr.Mammohan Singh
and his advisers go on the defensive. Dr.Manmohan Singh denied that there had been any change in India's position of not agreeing to a resumption of the composite dialogue till Pakistan gave satisfaction on the question of action against terrorism. The Foreign Secretary, Shri Shivshankar Menon, sought to blame poor drafting for the misunderstanding that a concession had been made. Shri Shashi Tharoor, the Minister of State For External Affairs, tried to play down the significance of the joint statement by creating an impression that it had no legal
value. The reference to Balochistan was sought to be explained away as indicating India's clear conscience since it had nothing to do with the happenings in Balochistan.
41.The explanation of the Prime Ministerin the Lok Sabha on July 29, 2009, on the subject skillfully sought to control the damage done by the ill-advised and ill-drafted joint statement. It was ill-advised because it has enabled Pakistan to claim to the international community that our PM was satisfied with the action taken by it against some Pakistan-based members of the LET for their involvement in the Mumbai
terrorist attack , in the hope that this would result in a relaxation of the international pressure to act against the LET.
42. The international pressure on Pakistan to act against the LET has been there since the attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13,2001. It was because of this pressure that Musharraf banned the LET through a gazette notification on January 15, 2002. The ban is still in force, but has not been implemented effectively by either the previous Government of Musharraf or by the present Government of Asif Ali Zardari.There was intensified international pressure on Pakistan after Mumbai 26/11 because among those killed were 25 foreign civilians. It
was this pressure and not the bilateral diplomacy of the Government of India, which made Pakistan register an offence against five members of the LET and investigate their involvement and place Sayeed under house arrest.
43. As a result of the unwarranted certificate of good neighbourly co-operation given by Dr. Manmohan Singh to Pakistan, there are already signs of this pressure being relaxed. This would be evident from the absence of forceful international reaction to the farce of the legal proceedings against Sayeed, which has resulted in his being released from house arrest.
44. The joint statement was also ill-advised because it has unwittingly conveyed an impression to Pakistan’s political leadership and military-intelligence establishment that a terrorism fatigue has set in among our political leadership and that continued use of terrorism by the ISI against Indian civilians and economic infrastructure could ultimately make India amenable to a change of the status quo in Jammu & Kashmir.
45. The Prime Minister is right in wanting peace and good-neighbourly relations with Pakistan, but unwise in giving an impression to Pakistani leaders that he is over-keen for peace with Pakistan and that he does not have the stomach for a prolonged confrontation with Pakistan on the terrorism issue----whether the confrontation is political, economic, military or covert. That was the impression which Gilani
and his advisers would have got at Sharm-el-Sheikh and the Prime Minister’s statement in the Lok Sabha has not been able to dissipate that impression.
46. The Prime Minister made use of the dossier given by Pakistan before Sharm-el-Sheikh on the investigation made by it so far against the LET in two ways. He tried to project this dossier as justifying the action taken by him at Sharm-el-Sheikh. He also tried to score a debating point against the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led opposition coalition by claiming that his Government through pressure had been able to make Pakistan concede the LET involvement whereas the BJP-led Government was not able to do this.
47. If the BJP members had carefully studied and mastered facts and figures, they could have effectively countered the PM’s claim of credit by pointing out the following:
There have been four acts of mass casualty terrorism since 1981. All the four were carried out when the Congress (I) was in power in New Delhi.
There have been three instances of targeted attacks on foreigners since 1991----two in J&K and one in Mumbai. All the three were carried out when the Congress (I) was in power.
There have been seven acts of ISI-sponsored aircraft hijackings since 1971. Six of them were carried out when the Congress (I) and one when the BJP was in power.
There has been one instance of an Air India plane being blown up in mid-air killing over 250 persons. This took place when the Congress (I) was in power.
The LET was banned by the Musharraf Government as a terrorist organization through a Gazette notification on January 15, 2002. The Manmohan Singh Government has not been able to get the JUD banned by the Zardari Government through a Gazette notification even nine months after the Mumbai attack.
Indira Gandhi was assassinated when the Congress (I) was in power in New Delhi. Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated when an ally of the Congress (I) was in power in New Delhi and another ally in Chennai.
The Indian Mujahideen came into existence when the Congress (I) was in power.
The first commando-style complex terrorist attack in Indian territory by a group of terrorists, all hailing from Pakistan, has taken place when the Congress (I) is in power.
48. The PM used the dossier against the LET received from Pakistan in justification of his action at Sharm-el-Sheikh. A close examination of the dossier as published in the media and a study of the various statements made since February,2009, by Rehman Malik, the Pakistani Interior Minister, would bring out the following:
The Pakistani authorities continue to make a distinction between the LET and the JUD, projecting the LET as a defunct organization in view of the January 15, 2002, ban still in force and the JUD as a legitimate organization despite the declaration of the anti-terrorism committee of the UN Security Council calling it a terrorist organization. Their action has been confined to those who hold position in the LET and not to those who hold position in the JUD.
Till now, their action has been focused on the logistics cell of the LET in Karachi and not against the planning and training cell of the LET based in Muridke in Punjab and in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir.
They continue to project the Mumbai attack as the outcome of a multi-national conspiracy involving elements in Pakistan, India, Europe, the US and Russia.
They have been trying to claim that the role of the Indian elements has not been fully investigated by the Mumbai Police.
49. As a result of the pressure from the Governments of countries whose nationals were killed in Mumbai, Pakistan has embarked on an elaborate exercise of seeming co-operation with India in the investigation, but the sincerity of this co-operation is yet to be established. We should have waited till this sincerity was established. What was the need for the indecent hurry shown by Dr.Manmohan Singh at
Sharm-el-Sheikh for fresh talks with Pakistan?If we had waited for a few months more till a clearer picture emerged from the proceedings of the Anti-Terrorism Court, will the heavens have fallen on our heads? A convincing answer to this has not been forthcoming from the Prime Minister.
50. The Prime Minister used former President Ronald Reagan of the US as a prop by quoting his remark: “Trust, but verify”. Yes, he had said it. In 1986 some US soldiers were killed by an explosion in a West Berlin discotheque. The US investigators established that the terrorists had come from Libya. After verification, he ordered the US Air Force to bomb the training centre in Libya.Indian investigators have clearly verified and established that the terrorists who attacked Mumbai were trained in the POK. Will the Prime Minister emulate Reagan?
51. By posing this rhetorical question, I am not advocating a military strike against Pakistan if there is another Mumbai 26/11.There is a basket of retaliatory options available before one is forced to consider a military retaliation---political, economic, diplomatic, covert action etc. Instead of considering these options, the Prime Minister keeps on repeating that there is no alternative between talks and a war. This is the typical argument of an appeaser who wants to avoid having to take firm action and to retaliate. It is not surprising that the Pakistanis have come to the conclusion that Dr.Manmohan Singh does not have the stomach for retaliation or a confrontation on the terrorism issue and so they can continue using terrorism against India.This impression of helplessness also encourages the terrorists.
52. In a study of the Mumbai attack, the prestigious Rand Corporation of the US has stated that more such terrorist attacks are possible because the jihadi terrorists have found out that India has neither an adequate preventive capability nor an effective retaliatory capability.All Prime Ministers after Shri Gujral have neglected this vital task of building up a retaliatory capability. Even if we have one today, of what use will it be when the Prime Minister of this country does not have the will for retaliation and would rather appease the state-sponsor of
terrorism than retaliate against it?
53. The Balochistan issue has not been properly understood by any party or even by the strategic analysts community. There has been a freedom struggle going on in Balochistan for nearly three years. Many Baloch nationalists are living in political exile in the UK, the US and other countries.The Pakistan Government has been trying to have them deported by projecting the freedom struggle as terrorism. No country in the world has recognised it as terrorism.By allowing a reference to Balochistan in the context of the references to action against terrorism, we have become unwitting accomplices of Pakistan to demonise the Baloch freedom struggle as terrorism.Balochistan is Pakistan's internal affairs. It is for Pakistan to sort out its problems with the Baloch people. There is no question of our helping the Baloch
freedom-fighters.But we must not harm their cause by allowing Pakistan to use a joint statement with India for projecting the Baloch nationalists as terrorists.
54. Pakistan does not agree with us that the indigenous Kashmiri organisations such as the J&K Liberation Front and the Hizbul Mujahideen, whose leader operates from Pakistani territory, are terrorist organisations. It projects them as freedom-fighters. Why should we agree to any reference to the Balochs in a bilateral statement on terrorism? The question is not so simple as our having a clear conscience and hence not objecting to the reference to Balochistan. The issue is that in a bilateral statement on Pakistani-sponsored terrorism in Indian territory, Balochistan is irrelevant. ( 19-8-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Thursday, August 20, 2009
Monday, August 17, 2009
MARITIME SECURITY CONCERNS OF JAPAN & PROSPECTS OF INDIA-JAPAN CO-OPERATION
B.RAMAN
( Talk delivered on August 17,2009, under the auspices of the Indo-Japan Chamber of Commerce & Industry, Chennai)
Since taking over as the Prime Minister in 2004, Dr.Manmohan Singh has visited Japan twice. His first visit was from December 13 to 16,2006, when Mr.Shinzo Abe was the Prime Minister. His second was from October 20 to 22,2008, when Mr. Taro Aso was the Prime Minister. Mr.Aso continues to be the Prime Minister of Japan and is facing election on August 30. Japanese analysts say that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has been in power for 52 of the last 53 years, has been facing difficulty. The centre-left Democratic Party of Japan ( DPJ), led by Mr.Yukio Hatoyama, has been ahead in the public opinion polls and may cause an upset by defeating the LDP.
2.If it does, it is expected that the foreign policy of Japan may not be the same as it has been till now. The DPJ leaders have been talking of a review of Japan's post-war security relations with the US and advocating improved ties with China and South Korea. The DPJ's manifesto says that it "will re-examine the role of the US military in the security of the Asia-Pacific region and the significance of the US bases in Japan." Its leaders have also said that Japan should pursue its own disarmament and non-proliferation policies. That means, its attitude to India's expectations of a nuclear trade with Japan may be even less favourable than that of the LDP-led Government.
3. "The Hindu" of August 12,2009, carried an assessment on the Japanese election campaign by Simon Tisdall of "The Guardian" of the UK. It said: " The apparently game-changing DPJ positions have led to talk of a generational shift in Japanese politics, bringing to office leaders, who have no personal memories, guilty or otherwise, of the war and no particular reason to thank the US for the post-war alliance."
4. To my knowledge, India has not much figured in the pre-electoral debate. If the DPJ comes to power and adopts a policy of greater distance from the US and closer relations with China, what impact it will have on Japan's relations with India, which are richer in security-related matters and weaker in matters relating to economic co-operation---- quite the opposite of India's relations with China----
richer in economic co-operation, but weaker in security co-operation?
5. Are we going to see in Japan a repetition of our experience in Australia and the US? Dr.Manmohan Singh has a propensity for putting all of India's eggs in the baskets of sun-set leaders than sun-rise leaders. In Australia, he tied India's future relations with Australia to Mr.John Howard, despite the fact that he was increasingly unpopular among his people. In the US, he tied India's future relations with that country to the highly unpopular Republican Administration headed by Mr.George Bush and paid little attention to the Democrats before the last
Presidential elections in November,2008.
6. The coming into office in Australia of Mr.Kevin Rudd as the Prime Minister after defeating the unpopular Mr.Howard has seen a down-grading by the new Government of the importance of Australia's relations with India and an upgrading of its ties with China. In the US,the end of Mr.Bush's term and the return of the Democrats under President Barack Obama to power have seen a similar upgrading of the
importance given to China and a downgrading of the importance earlier accorded by Mr.Bush to India.
7.Similarly, Dr.Manmohan Singh during his visit to Japan in October last tied India's future relations with Japan to the LDP Government headed by Mr.Aso of uncertain popularity. He signed with him a " comprehensive framework for the enhancement of security cooperation between the two countries." This agreement caused considerable excitement and euphoria in India because Japan had previously signed such a comprehensive security co-operation agreement with only two other countries,namely, the US and Australia.Will this framework agreement survive the exit of the LDP from power, if it comes about, and the election of the DPJ to power?
8. We are repeating in Japan the same mistake we earlier committed in Australia and the US. Before the election in Australia, we paid very little attention to studying the likely policy changes if Mr.Rudd came to power. In the US, we paid very little attention to studying the likely policy changes if Mr.Obama came to power. When the two came to power and changed their policy emphasis vis-a-vis China and India, we
were taken by surprise. One has the impression we have hardly paid any attention to studying likely policy changes towards India, China and the US if Mr.Hatoyama comes to power at the head of a DPJ-led Government. We will have to wait till post-August 30 to find out how much of the security co-operation framework will survive.
9.The traditional security concerns of successive LDP-led Governments have been five in number, namely:
First, the implications of the rise of China as a modern military power.
Second, the implications of any assertive Chinese policy in the South and East China Seas.
Third, the implications of North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities.
Four, the emergence of this region as an epicentre of nuclear proliferation.
Five, the threat to Japan's maritime trade and energy supplies from State as well as non-State actors.
10. Before Dr. Manmohan Singh's visit to Japan in 2006, the Hitachi Research Institute of Japan had prepared a brief paper on Indo-Japanese relations. It brought out that Indo-Japanese relations under different Japanese Prime Ministers have been a history of grandiose ideas and visions, which remained unimplemented due to conceptual obscurity and lack of convergence on issues of common concern. It wrote: " Grand themes of arcs and crescents, with India and Japan at either end of the curve, have never been far from strategic assessments of Indo-Japanese relations in Asia.... Prime Minister Koizumi unveiled an “arc of advantage and prosperity” to complement hisJapan-India Global Partnership. Not to be outdone, Foreign Minister Taro Aso, in a November 2006 speech aimed at laying out an expansive “values oriented” vision of the Abe government’s diplomatic strategy, revealed an “arc of freedom and prosperity” that spanned India and beyond.Yet the reality of Indo-Japanese relations has been rather more mundane and mutual interests rather less congruent – particularly in regard to that large continental entity situated within the geo-political arc of Asia."
11. Despite the disappointments of the past, the Hitachi paper was not pessimistic about the future. It said: "Indeed as variations of the China threat description have issued forth in Tokyo (be it as a “considerable threat,” “realistic threat” or a “potential threat”), the Indian foreign and defense policy establishment has, in equal measure, eliminated the language of ‘threat’ from its formal vocabulary of China policy. Behind the China factor though, a considerably wider gulf separates the guiding strategic precepts of modern Japanese and Indian foreign policies. Given this divide in foreign policy worldviews, efforts by Indian and Japanese statecraft to factor in their counterpart within its scheme of vital interests has perennially tended to fade away into a conceptual and geographic obscurity."
12. Of the five security concerns of Japan mentioned above, there is no convergence on China between India and Japan. During his visit to Japan last October, Dr.Manmohan Singh made it clear that India did not regard China as a threat and that the proposed comprehensive security framework was not directed against China. India is not interested in the issue of the denuclearisation of Noth Korea. While it is concerned over the Noth Korean nuclear and missile capabilities because of the long-standing supply relationship of North Korea with Pakistan, it feels that this issue be better handled by the countries of the region and the US through the mechanism of the six-party talks. India shares Japanese concerns over the emergence of this region as an epicentre of nuclear proliferation due to the transfer of nuclear and missile capabilities by North Korea to Pakistan and possibly to Iran. There have recently been unconfirmed reports of North Korean nuclear assistance to even Myanmar. At the same time, India does not support the intrusive Proliferation Security Initiative, which is
supported by Japan.
13. This leaves only the threat to maritime trade and energy supplies from non-State actors---mainly terrorists and pirates--- as a matter of intense common concern which could be used as a building block of a mutual security relationship between India and Japan. A carefulperusal of the framework agreement signed by Dr. Manmohan Singh and Mr.Aso on October 22,2008, broadly brings out the envisaged areas
of co-operation. Inter alia, they included:
Co-operation between Coast Guards.
Safety of transport.
Fight against terrorism and transnational crimes.
Sharing of experiences in peacekeeping and peacebuilding.
Disaster management.
Disarmament and non-proliferation
14. It spelt out the co-operation in the fields of maritime security and counter-terrorism as follows:
"The two Coast Guards will continue to promote cooperation to ensure maritime safety, maritime security and to protect marine environment through joint exercise and meeting between the two Coast Guards according to the Memorandum on Cooperation between the Japan Coast Guard and the Indian Coast Guard."
"In relation to the safety of transport, Shipping Policy Forum will be conducted between Maritime Authorities and private sectors, and consultation will be conducted between Railway Authorities."
"Bilateral consultation will be conducted to promote counter-terrorism cooperation through such means as Joint Working Group on counter terrorism between the relevant government offices including the Ministries of Foreign ffairs.Mechanism of sharing of information will be sought with regard to suspicious transaction on money laundering and terrorist financing between the two Financial Intelligence Units."
15. It was also agreed by the two Prime Ministers that officials of the two Governments will draw up specific action plans in respect of each agreed area of co-operation and put them up to the two Prime Ministers for approval. The follow-up action for the implementation of this framework agreement was discussed by Mr.S.M.Krishna, India's Minister For External Affairs, and Mr.Hirofumi Nakasone, his Japanese counterpart, when Mr.Krishna visited Tokyo on July 2 and 3,2009.Reporting on the talks between the two, "The Hindu" of July 4,2009, stated as follows: " The two Ministers discussed follow-up measures for formulating an action plan. A bilateral dialogue on maritime security, inclusive of anti-piracy co-operation, would start soon." This indicates that though eight months have passed since Dr.Manmohan Singh and Mr.Aso reached the framework agreement in October last, the drawing-up of action plans for implementation has not yet been either completed or even taken up. Now, the implementation of the comprehensice framework agreement on security co-operation will become the responsibility of the new Japanese Government, which will come to office after the elections of August 30.
16. One has no reason to apprehend that the framework agreement provisions relating to co-operation against maritime terrorism and piracy and to ensure the safety of transport may be diluted as a result of a new Government assuming office after the elections. There is a broad political consensus in Japan on the importance of Indo-Japanese co-operation to strengthen maritime security. Not only the Japanese political class, but also the Japanese business class and shipping circles see value in Indo-Japanese co-operation in this field because over 90 per cent of Japan's imports of oil and gas and a considerable percentage of its external trade pass through the Gulf of Aden and adjoining seas and the Strait of Malacca. Any disruption of the supplies passing through this area could seriously damage the
Japanese economy.
17. There are limitations to Indo-Japanese maritime co-operation for maritime security in the Malacca Strait area because of the lingering memories in the region of the Japanese occupation during the Second World War. While the countries of the region have no hesitation in accepting Japanese assistance in the form of equipment, capacity-building etc, there are still reservations over Japanese ships playing an
active tole in patrolling whereas there are no such reservations with regard to Indian ships.
18. There are no constraining factors in the seas to the West of India, where there is considerable scope for joint initiatives for maritime security by the Navies/Coast Guards of the two countries. Japan has been increasingly concerned over the uncontrolled activities of Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden and nearby seas. A number of Japan-related ships have been attacked in this area since the beginning of 2008 and some of them hijacked and released only on alleged payment of ransom. It is estimated that about 2000 Japan-related ships pass through this area every year. By Japan-related ships, one means Japanese-owned ships flying the Japanese or foreign flags.
19. The attacks on Japan-related ships by the Somali pirates are a matter of concern to India too because many of these ships employ Indian crew. Thus, India is concerned over the attacks on Indian ships as well as on Japanese and other foreign ships employing Indian crew. Moreover, if there is a terrorist attack on maritime trade and energy supplies by Al Qaeda and organisations affiliated to it, it is most
likely to originate from this area where their sanctuaries and training camps are located.
20. The increasing concerns of India and Japan over the threats to maritime security in this region are reflected in the two countries deputing anti-piracy patrols to this area----- India since last year and Japan since the beginning of this year. Many other countries from the West as well as Asia, incuding China, affected by the activities of the Somali pirates have similarly deputed anti-piracy patrols into this area. No effort has been made so far to co-ordinate effectively the patrolling by ships of different countries. This could be a matter for initiative by the authorities of Japan and India initially at the bilateral level, subsequently bringing in others.
21. The ideas for maritime security co-operation between India and Japan envisaged so far are largely of a tactical nature such as exchange of information, mutual assistance in capacity building, co-ordinated patrolling, holding of seminars etc. There is very little co-operation of a strategic nature because Japanese laws relating to overseas assistance did not permit such co-operation. Commenting on
this, the Hitachi report of 2006 referred to above said: "Important ground was broken by the Japanese government in two recently-issued policy documents. The 2003 revision of the ODA (Overseas Development Assistance ) Charter calls for the disbursal of aid from, among other angles, a strategic perspective too. The JDA’s Defense Guidelines issued in December 2004, meantime, for the first time refer to sea lanes of communication in the context of “international peace cooperation activities.”Together, the two afford a unique opportunity to route ODA
towards India’s ports, maritime infrastructure and shipyards, much of which is geared towards dual commercial and military servicing. With India committed to an ambitious ocean security program, and with Indo-U.S. naval cooperation making rapid strides forward,strategically-oriented ODA channeled towards functional areas such as marine transport, oceanographic surveys, sea bed exploration,ship-lift capabilities, etc. would lend additional focus to what is already the single, largest ODA country disbursal."
22. Will the new Japanese Government coming to office after August 30 implement this recommendation? If it doesn't, the Indo-Japanese maritime security co-operation wil remain largely tactical.
23. Presuming that a DPJ-led Government comes to power, it is likely to undertake a major review of Japan's policies not only towards the US, but also China. Is it not time for India to undertake a similar review of its policy towards the association of China with some of the maritime security initiatives between India and Japan. Despite India's assertions to the contrary, China continues to view India's maritime
security co-operation with the US on the one side and with Japan on the other as partly meant to contain the growing strength of the Chinese Navy. A question often posed by Chinese interlocutors is: If this co-operation is only against non-State actors and not against China, why exclude China from it? Has the time come to remove Chinese concerns by starting an India-Japan-China trialogue on maritime security----initially at the non-governmental level and subsequently expanding it to the Governmental level? (17-8-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical
Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies.E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
( Talk delivered on August 17,2009, under the auspices of the Indo-Japan Chamber of Commerce & Industry, Chennai)
Since taking over as the Prime Minister in 2004, Dr.Manmohan Singh has visited Japan twice. His first visit was from December 13 to 16,2006, when Mr.Shinzo Abe was the Prime Minister. His second was from October 20 to 22,2008, when Mr. Taro Aso was the Prime Minister. Mr.Aso continues to be the Prime Minister of Japan and is facing election on August 30. Japanese analysts say that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has been in power for 52 of the last 53 years, has been facing difficulty. The centre-left Democratic Party of Japan ( DPJ), led by Mr.Yukio Hatoyama, has been ahead in the public opinion polls and may cause an upset by defeating the LDP.
2.If it does, it is expected that the foreign policy of Japan may not be the same as it has been till now. The DPJ leaders have been talking of a review of Japan's post-war security relations with the US and advocating improved ties with China and South Korea. The DPJ's manifesto says that it "will re-examine the role of the US military in the security of the Asia-Pacific region and the significance of the US bases in Japan." Its leaders have also said that Japan should pursue its own disarmament and non-proliferation policies. That means, its attitude to India's expectations of a nuclear trade with Japan may be even less favourable than that of the LDP-led Government.
3. "The Hindu" of August 12,2009, carried an assessment on the Japanese election campaign by Simon Tisdall of "The Guardian" of the UK. It said: " The apparently game-changing DPJ positions have led to talk of a generational shift in Japanese politics, bringing to office leaders, who have no personal memories, guilty or otherwise, of the war and no particular reason to thank the US for the post-war alliance."
4. To my knowledge, India has not much figured in the pre-electoral debate. If the DPJ comes to power and adopts a policy of greater distance from the US and closer relations with China, what impact it will have on Japan's relations with India, which are richer in security-related matters and weaker in matters relating to economic co-operation---- quite the opposite of India's relations with China----
richer in economic co-operation, but weaker in security co-operation?
5. Are we going to see in Japan a repetition of our experience in Australia and the US? Dr.Manmohan Singh has a propensity for putting all of India's eggs in the baskets of sun-set leaders than sun-rise leaders. In Australia, he tied India's future relations with Australia to Mr.John Howard, despite the fact that he was increasingly unpopular among his people. In the US, he tied India's future relations with that country to the highly unpopular Republican Administration headed by Mr.George Bush and paid little attention to the Democrats before the last
Presidential elections in November,2008.
6. The coming into office in Australia of Mr.Kevin Rudd as the Prime Minister after defeating the unpopular Mr.Howard has seen a down-grading by the new Government of the importance of Australia's relations with India and an upgrading of its ties with China. In the US,the end of Mr.Bush's term and the return of the Democrats under President Barack Obama to power have seen a similar upgrading of the
importance given to China and a downgrading of the importance earlier accorded by Mr.Bush to India.
7.Similarly, Dr.Manmohan Singh during his visit to Japan in October last tied India's future relations with Japan to the LDP Government headed by Mr.Aso of uncertain popularity. He signed with him a " comprehensive framework for the enhancement of security cooperation between the two countries." This agreement caused considerable excitement and euphoria in India because Japan had previously signed such a comprehensive security co-operation agreement with only two other countries,namely, the US and Australia.Will this framework agreement survive the exit of the LDP from power, if it comes about, and the election of the DPJ to power?
8. We are repeating in Japan the same mistake we earlier committed in Australia and the US. Before the election in Australia, we paid very little attention to studying the likely policy changes if Mr.Rudd came to power. In the US, we paid very little attention to studying the likely policy changes if Mr.Obama came to power. When the two came to power and changed their policy emphasis vis-a-vis China and India, we
were taken by surprise. One has the impression we have hardly paid any attention to studying likely policy changes towards India, China and the US if Mr.Hatoyama comes to power at the head of a DPJ-led Government. We will have to wait till post-August 30 to find out how much of the security co-operation framework will survive.
9.The traditional security concerns of successive LDP-led Governments have been five in number, namely:
First, the implications of the rise of China as a modern military power.
Second, the implications of any assertive Chinese policy in the South and East China Seas.
Third, the implications of North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities.
Four, the emergence of this region as an epicentre of nuclear proliferation.
Five, the threat to Japan's maritime trade and energy supplies from State as well as non-State actors.
10. Before Dr. Manmohan Singh's visit to Japan in 2006, the Hitachi Research Institute of Japan had prepared a brief paper on Indo-Japanese relations. It brought out that Indo-Japanese relations under different Japanese Prime Ministers have been a history of grandiose ideas and visions, which remained unimplemented due to conceptual obscurity and lack of convergence on issues of common concern. It wrote: " Grand themes of arcs and crescents, with India and Japan at either end of the curve, have never been far from strategic assessments of Indo-Japanese relations in Asia.... Prime Minister Koizumi unveiled an “arc of advantage and prosperity” to complement hisJapan-India Global Partnership. Not to be outdone, Foreign Minister Taro Aso, in a November 2006 speech aimed at laying out an expansive “values oriented” vision of the Abe government’s diplomatic strategy, revealed an “arc of freedom and prosperity” that spanned India and beyond.Yet the reality of Indo-Japanese relations has been rather more mundane and mutual interests rather less congruent – particularly in regard to that large continental entity situated within the geo-political arc of Asia."
11. Despite the disappointments of the past, the Hitachi paper was not pessimistic about the future. It said: "Indeed as variations of the China threat description have issued forth in Tokyo (be it as a “considerable threat,” “realistic threat” or a “potential threat”), the Indian foreign and defense policy establishment has, in equal measure, eliminated the language of ‘threat’ from its formal vocabulary of China policy. Behind the China factor though, a considerably wider gulf separates the guiding strategic precepts of modern Japanese and Indian foreign policies. Given this divide in foreign policy worldviews, efforts by Indian and Japanese statecraft to factor in their counterpart within its scheme of vital interests has perennially tended to fade away into a conceptual and geographic obscurity."
12. Of the five security concerns of Japan mentioned above, there is no convergence on China between India and Japan. During his visit to Japan last October, Dr.Manmohan Singh made it clear that India did not regard China as a threat and that the proposed comprehensive security framework was not directed against China. India is not interested in the issue of the denuclearisation of Noth Korea. While it is concerned over the Noth Korean nuclear and missile capabilities because of the long-standing supply relationship of North Korea with Pakistan, it feels that this issue be better handled by the countries of the region and the US through the mechanism of the six-party talks. India shares Japanese concerns over the emergence of this region as an epicentre of nuclear proliferation due to the transfer of nuclear and missile capabilities by North Korea to Pakistan and possibly to Iran. There have recently been unconfirmed reports of North Korean nuclear assistance to even Myanmar. At the same time, India does not support the intrusive Proliferation Security Initiative, which is
supported by Japan.
13. This leaves only the threat to maritime trade and energy supplies from non-State actors---mainly terrorists and pirates--- as a matter of intense common concern which could be used as a building block of a mutual security relationship between India and Japan. A carefulperusal of the framework agreement signed by Dr. Manmohan Singh and Mr.Aso on October 22,2008, broadly brings out the envisaged areas
of co-operation. Inter alia, they included:
Co-operation between Coast Guards.
Safety of transport.
Fight against terrorism and transnational crimes.
Sharing of experiences in peacekeeping and peacebuilding.
Disaster management.
Disarmament and non-proliferation
14. It spelt out the co-operation in the fields of maritime security and counter-terrorism as follows:
"The two Coast Guards will continue to promote cooperation to ensure maritime safety, maritime security and to protect marine environment through joint exercise and meeting between the two Coast Guards according to the Memorandum on Cooperation between the Japan Coast Guard and the Indian Coast Guard."
"In relation to the safety of transport, Shipping Policy Forum will be conducted between Maritime Authorities and private sectors, and consultation will be conducted between Railway Authorities."
"Bilateral consultation will be conducted to promote counter-terrorism cooperation through such means as Joint Working Group on counter terrorism between the relevant government offices including the Ministries of Foreign ffairs.Mechanism of sharing of information will be sought with regard to suspicious transaction on money laundering and terrorist financing between the two Financial Intelligence Units."
15. It was also agreed by the two Prime Ministers that officials of the two Governments will draw up specific action plans in respect of each agreed area of co-operation and put them up to the two Prime Ministers for approval. The follow-up action for the implementation of this framework agreement was discussed by Mr.S.M.Krishna, India's Minister For External Affairs, and Mr.Hirofumi Nakasone, his Japanese counterpart, when Mr.Krishna visited Tokyo on July 2 and 3,2009.Reporting on the talks between the two, "The Hindu" of July 4,2009, stated as follows: " The two Ministers discussed follow-up measures for formulating an action plan. A bilateral dialogue on maritime security, inclusive of anti-piracy co-operation, would start soon." This indicates that though eight months have passed since Dr.Manmohan Singh and Mr.Aso reached the framework agreement in October last, the drawing-up of action plans for implementation has not yet been either completed or even taken up. Now, the implementation of the comprehensice framework agreement on security co-operation will become the responsibility of the new Japanese Government, which will come to office after the elections of August 30.
16. One has no reason to apprehend that the framework agreement provisions relating to co-operation against maritime terrorism and piracy and to ensure the safety of transport may be diluted as a result of a new Government assuming office after the elections. There is a broad political consensus in Japan on the importance of Indo-Japanese co-operation to strengthen maritime security. Not only the Japanese political class, but also the Japanese business class and shipping circles see value in Indo-Japanese co-operation in this field because over 90 per cent of Japan's imports of oil and gas and a considerable percentage of its external trade pass through the Gulf of Aden and adjoining seas and the Strait of Malacca. Any disruption of the supplies passing through this area could seriously damage the
Japanese economy.
17. There are limitations to Indo-Japanese maritime co-operation for maritime security in the Malacca Strait area because of the lingering memories in the region of the Japanese occupation during the Second World War. While the countries of the region have no hesitation in accepting Japanese assistance in the form of equipment, capacity-building etc, there are still reservations over Japanese ships playing an
active tole in patrolling whereas there are no such reservations with regard to Indian ships.
18. There are no constraining factors in the seas to the West of India, where there is considerable scope for joint initiatives for maritime security by the Navies/Coast Guards of the two countries. Japan has been increasingly concerned over the uncontrolled activities of Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden and nearby seas. A number of Japan-related ships have been attacked in this area since the beginning of 2008 and some of them hijacked and released only on alleged payment of ransom. It is estimated that about 2000 Japan-related ships pass through this area every year. By Japan-related ships, one means Japanese-owned ships flying the Japanese or foreign flags.
19. The attacks on Japan-related ships by the Somali pirates are a matter of concern to India too because many of these ships employ Indian crew. Thus, India is concerned over the attacks on Indian ships as well as on Japanese and other foreign ships employing Indian crew. Moreover, if there is a terrorist attack on maritime trade and energy supplies by Al Qaeda and organisations affiliated to it, it is most
likely to originate from this area where their sanctuaries and training camps are located.
20. The increasing concerns of India and Japan over the threats to maritime security in this region are reflected in the two countries deputing anti-piracy patrols to this area----- India since last year and Japan since the beginning of this year. Many other countries from the West as well as Asia, incuding China, affected by the activities of the Somali pirates have similarly deputed anti-piracy patrols into this area. No effort has been made so far to co-ordinate effectively the patrolling by ships of different countries. This could be a matter for initiative by the authorities of Japan and India initially at the bilateral level, subsequently bringing in others.
21. The ideas for maritime security co-operation between India and Japan envisaged so far are largely of a tactical nature such as exchange of information, mutual assistance in capacity building, co-ordinated patrolling, holding of seminars etc. There is very little co-operation of a strategic nature because Japanese laws relating to overseas assistance did not permit such co-operation. Commenting on
this, the Hitachi report of 2006 referred to above said: "Important ground was broken by the Japanese government in two recently-issued policy documents. The 2003 revision of the ODA (Overseas Development Assistance ) Charter calls for the disbursal of aid from, among other angles, a strategic perspective too. The JDA’s Defense Guidelines issued in December 2004, meantime, for the first time refer to sea lanes of communication in the context of “international peace cooperation activities.”Together, the two afford a unique opportunity to route ODA
towards India’s ports, maritime infrastructure and shipyards, much of which is geared towards dual commercial and military servicing. With India committed to an ambitious ocean security program, and with Indo-U.S. naval cooperation making rapid strides forward,strategically-oriented ODA channeled towards functional areas such as marine transport, oceanographic surveys, sea bed exploration,ship-lift capabilities, etc. would lend additional focus to what is already the single, largest ODA country disbursal."
22. Will the new Japanese Government coming to office after August 30 implement this recommendation? If it doesn't, the Indo-Japanese maritime security co-operation wil remain largely tactical.
23. Presuming that a DPJ-led Government comes to power, it is likely to undertake a major review of Japan's policies not only towards the US, but also China. Is it not time for India to undertake a similar review of its policy towards the association of China with some of the maritime security initiatives between India and Japan. Despite India's assertions to the contrary, China continues to view India's maritime
security co-operation with the US on the one side and with Japan on the other as partly meant to contain the growing strength of the Chinese Navy. A question often posed by Chinese interlocutors is: If this co-operation is only against non-State actors and not against China, why exclude China from it? Has the time come to remove Chinese concerns by starting an India-Japan-China trialogue on maritime security----initially at the non-governmental level and subsequently expanding it to the Governmental level? (17-8-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical
Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies.E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
CHINA AS SEEN & INTERPRETED BY "THE HINDU"
B.RAMAN
Normally, I do not pay serious attention to reports and articles on China carried by "The Hindu" of Chennai. Its sympathy for China and its policy in recent years of keeping out of its columns any report or article of a negative nature on China is well known. Equally well known is its policy of placing its columns at the disposal of the Xinhua news agency of China, which is owned by the Government of China, without telling its readers that the Xinhua is a mouthpiece of the Chinese government. It generally tries to create an impression in the minds of its
readers that India has no reason to worry about China.
2. But I did take notice of an article titled "Does Beijing Really Want To break Up India? " carried by "The Hindu" in its Op-Ed page on August 17,2009, for two reasons. Firstly, it tries to cast in a negative light the Chennai Centre For China Studies, which has been closely monitoring the Chinese language press and bringing interesting, significant or worrisome writings to the notice of the Indian readers. I have been given to understand that in recent months the Chennai Centre has been blacklisted by the Chinese authorities and I was intrigued to notice that
the article reflects some of the arguments used by the critics of the Centre in China.
3. The second reason is that "The Hindu" article tries to cast doubts on the credibility of an article titled 'China Should Break Up the Indian Union, Says A Chinese Strategist", written by Shri D.S.Rajan, of the Chennai Centre on August 9,2009. The article is available at
http://www.c3sindia.org/india/719 . The text of the article, which was also carried by a number of other Indian web sites, including that of the South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG), is annexed for ready reference,
4. "The Hindu" article has been written by Shri Ananth Krishnan, who has recently taken over as the Beijing correspondent of "The Hindu".One does not know his background and credentials as a China analyst. It is important for the readers to have some idea of the credentials of Shri Rajan. Before the Sino-Indian war of 1962, the Government of India was largely dependent on the media monitoring agencies of the UK and the US for monitoring and analysing the writings and broadcasts of the Chinese language media. After the war, the Government of Jawaharlal Nehru realised that it was unwise to totally depend on the Chinese media monitoring and analysis services of the West and decided to build up our own capability. In the years following the 1962 war, a creash drive was undertaken by the Government to recruit
and train a group of young people fresh from the universities in the Chinese and Japanese languages and make them responsible for monitoring and analysing the Chinese and Japanese language media.
5. Shri Rajan was one of those thus recruited and trained by being sent abroad for improving his proficiency. Shri Rajan, who is now 67 years old, had spent about 35 years as a Chinese analyst by monioring writings in the Chinese and Japanese language media. Of these 35 years,he had spent three years in Hong Kong when it was a British-administered territory, three years in China and six years in Japan in two spells.During his service, he was associated with the visits of a number of Chinese delegations to India as well as with the visits of a number of
Indian delegations to China.
6. Shri Rajan's article has eight paras. The first para gives Shri Rajan's comments on the web site which carried the article. The last para gives Shri Rajan's assessment of the article. The remaining paras are a gist of translations of the contents of the article. The first para on the background of the Chinese article says: "Almost coinciding with the 13th round of Sino-Indian border talks (New Delhi, August 7-8, 2009),an article (in Chinese language) has appeared in China captioned “If China takes a little action, the so-called Great Indian Federation can be broken up” ( Zhong Guo Zhan Lue Gang, www.iiss.cn , Chinese,8 August 2009). Interestingly, it has been reproduced in several other strategic and military websites of the country and by all means, targets the domestic audience. The authoritative host site is located in Beijing and is the new edition of one, which so far represented the China International Institute for Strategic Studies (www.chinaiiss.org)."
7.Shri Ananth Krishnan says in his first para: "The post was translated and analysed with some significant errors..." One would have lauded Shri Krishnan if he had specified these errors so that one could have stood corrected. Were the errors in translation or analysis? Shri Krishnan is silent on this question. If the errors are in translation and if Shri Krishnan's command of the Chinese language is better than that of Shri Rajan, why does he not specify them?
8. What has Shri Rajan said in his analysis of the contents of the article: " The Chinese article in question will certainly outrage readers in India. Its suggestion that China can follow a strategy to dismember India, a country always with a tradition of unity in diversity, is atrocious, to say the least. The write-up could not have been published without the permission of the Chinese authorities, but it is sure that Beijing will wash its hands out of this if the matter is taken up with it by New Delhi. It has generally been seen that China is speaking in two voices – its
diplomatic interlocutors have always shown understanding during their dealings with their Indian counterparts, but its selected media is pouring venom on India in their reporting. Which one to believe is a question confronting the public opinion and even policy makers in India.In any case, an approach of panic towards such outbursts will be a mistake, but also ignoring them will prove to be costly for India."
9. What is wrong in this analysis? In the 1950s, a number of maps of the Indo-Chinese border started circulating in China and appearing in sections of the Chinese media. The Indian intelligence rightly brought these to the notice of Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Prime Minister, who took up the matter with Chou En-lai, his Chinese counterpart. He assured Nehru that these maps were circulated by private individuals and had been prepared by the Taiwanese before 1949. He told Nehru that India should not worry about them. Nehru was shocked before the 1962 war when the Chinese used the very same maps, which Chou had described as not official, for claiming large parts of Indian territory and occupying much of it. Today, it is on the basis of the very same maps which the Chinese portrayed as not official that they are claiming
Arunachal Pradesh as Chinese territory.
10. Was Shri Rajan mistaken in sounding a word of caution that while " an approach of panic towards such outbursts will be a mistake, but also ignoring them will prove to be costly for India"? This was a sound word of caution based on our past experience of dealing with China. I leave it to the readers to decide what they will believe ---Shri Rajan's word of caution or Shri Krishnan's soothing words on China?
11. Shri Krishnan also writes: " The post in question appeared in an important-sounding web site calling itself the International Institute of Strategic Studies (which has no relation to the London-based think-tank of the same name). The Chennai Centre For China Studies, which first translated and analysed the post before it was circulated among the Indian media, assumed that this was a Government-sponsored
think-tank and also wrongly claimed that this was linked to the China Institute For International Starategic Studies (CIISS), a Beijing think-tank. But a quick-check revealed that the IISS web site where the post appeared actually has no government ties and is by no means an established Beijing think-tank---it is just a web site."
12. Dear Mr.Ananth Krishnan, where has the article said that this was a Government-sponsored think-tank? Where has it claimed that this was linked to the China Institute For International Strategic Studies? Mr.Krishnan: We know more than you probably do about the China Institute For International Strategic Studies, which is a highly reputed think tank of the Chinese Defence Ministry. Its chief is generally a
senior retired officer of the People's Liberation Army. Its past chiefs and scholars had visited India. Shri Rajan had interacted with it during his stay in China. Where is the question of Shri Rajan confusing the web site with this prestigious think-tank?
13. Following the uproar in Indian non-governmental circles over the contents of the Chinese article, there was a damage-control exercise mounted by Beijing through the owners of the web site in question as well as a former Chinese Ambassador to India and others. Many of us were in receipt of E-mails from Beijing making some of the same points which Shri Krishnan has made in his article, which I am inclined to see as part of this damage control exercise.
14. Shri Rajan had drawn attention to this anti-India web site as early as November 27,2006, immediately after the visit of President Hu Jintao to India in an article which can be found at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers21/paper2039.html . He was also the first to draw attention in 2006 to the fact that Chinese writings had started referring to Arunachal Pradesh as "southern Tibet" and not as Arunachal
Pradesh. One was told at that time that these were all private writings, that China was changing and that non-governmental views in China no longer necessarily reflected the governmental view. We know the reality today.
15. It is a fact that some sections of our media went to town with Shri Rajan's article and sensationalised the contents of the Chinese article, but the concern in large sections of the Indian civil society over the implications of the theme of the Chinese article is understandable if one remembers the fact that China before 1979 had trained many of our Nago and Mizo insurgents in secret training
camps in Yunnan, that there are reports that Paresh Barua of the United Liberation Front of Assam is even today in touch with the Chinese,that before November,2008, China opposed the declaration of the Lashkar-e-Toiba as a terrorist organisation by the Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council and even today opposes the declaration of the Jaish-e-Mohammad as a terrorist organisation.
(17-8-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Deelhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
China Should break up the Indian Union, suggests a Chinese Strategist
D.S.Rajan, C3S Paper No.325 dated August 9, 2009
Almost coinciding with the 13th round of Sino-Indian border talks (New Delhi, August 7-8, 2009), an article (in Chinese language) has appeared in China captioned “If China takes a little action, the so-called Great Indian Federation can be broken up” ( Zhong Guo Zhan Lue Gang, www.iiss.cn , Chinese,8 August 2009). Interestingly, it has been reproduced in several other strategic and military websites of the
country and by all means, targets the domestic audience. The authoritative host site is located in Beijing and is the new edition of one, which so far represented the China International Institute for Strategic Studies (www.chinaiiss.org)."
Claiming that Beijing’s ‘China-Centric’ Asian strategy, provides for splitting India, the writer of the article, Zhan Lue (strategy), has found that New Delhi’s corresponding ‘India-Centric’ policy in Asia, is in reality a ‘Hindustan centric’ one. Stating that on the other hand ‘local centres’ exist in several of the country’s provinces (excepting for the U.P and certain Northern regions), Zhan Lue has felt that in the face of such local characteristics, the ‘so-called’ Indian nation cannot be considered as one having existed in history.
According to the article, if India today relies on any thing for unity, it is the Hindu religion. The partition of the country was based on religion. Stating that today nation states are the main current in the world, it has said that India could only be termed now as a “Hindu Religious state’. Adding that Hinduism is a decadent religion as it allows caste exploitation and is unhelpful to the country’s modernization, it described the Indian government as one in a dilemma with regard to eradication of the caste system as it realizes that the process to do away with castes may shake the foundation of the consciousness of the Indian nation.
The writer has argued that in view of the above, China in its own interest and the progress of whole Asia, should join forces with different nationalities like Assamese, Tamils, and Kashmiris and support the latter in establishing independent nation-states of their own, out of India. In particular, the ULFA in Assam, a territory neighboring China, can be helped by China so that Assam realizes its national independence.
The article has also felt that for Bangladesh, the biggest threat is from India, which wants to develop a great Indian Federation extending from Afghanistan to Myanmar. India is also targeting China with support to Vietnam’s efforts to occupy Nansha (Spratly) group of islands in South China Sea. Hence the need for China’s consolidation of its alliance with Bangladesh, a country with which the US and Japan are also improving their relations to counter China. It has pointed out that China can give political support to Bangladesh enabling the latter to encourage ethnic Bengalis in India to get rid of Indian control and unite with Bangladesh as one Bengali nation; if the same is not possible,creation of at least another free Bengali nation state as a friendly neighbour of Bangladesh, would be desirable, for the purpose of weakening India’s expansion and threat aimed at forming a ‘unified South Asia’.
The punch line in the article has been that to split India, China can bring into its fold countries like Pakistan, Nepal and Bhutan, support ULFA in attaining its goal for Assam’s independence, back aspirations of Indian nationalities like Tamils and Nagas, encourage Bangladesh to give a push to the independence of West Bengal and lastly recover the 90,000 sq km. territory in Southern Tibet.
Wishing for India’s break-up into 20-30 nation-states like in Europe, the article has concluded by saying that if the consciousness of nationalities in India could be aroused, social reforms in South Asia can be achieved, the caste system can be eradicated and the region can march along the road of prosperity.
The Chinese article in question will certainly outrage readers in India. Its suggestion that China can follow a strategy to dismember India, a country always with a tradition of unity in diversity, is atrocious, to say the least. The write-up could not have been published without the permission of the Chinese authorities, but it is sure that Beijing will wash its hands out of this if the matter is taken up with it by New Delhi. It has generally been seen that China is speaking in two voices – its diplomatic interlocutors have always shown understanding during their
dealings with their Indian counterparts, but its selected media is pouring venom on India in their reporting. Which one to believe is a question confronting the public opinion and even policy makers in India. In any case, an approach of panic towards such outbursts will be a mistake, but also ignoring them will prove to be costly for India.
(The writer, D.S.Rajan, is Director of Chennai Centre for China Studies, Chennai, India, email: dsrajan@gmail.com).
Normally, I do not pay serious attention to reports and articles on China carried by "The Hindu" of Chennai. Its sympathy for China and its policy in recent years of keeping out of its columns any report or article of a negative nature on China is well known. Equally well known is its policy of placing its columns at the disposal of the Xinhua news agency of China, which is owned by the Government of China, without telling its readers that the Xinhua is a mouthpiece of the Chinese government. It generally tries to create an impression in the minds of its
readers that India has no reason to worry about China.
2. But I did take notice of an article titled "Does Beijing Really Want To break Up India? " carried by "The Hindu" in its Op-Ed page on August 17,2009, for two reasons. Firstly, it tries to cast in a negative light the Chennai Centre For China Studies, which has been closely monitoring the Chinese language press and bringing interesting, significant or worrisome writings to the notice of the Indian readers. I have been given to understand that in recent months the Chennai Centre has been blacklisted by the Chinese authorities and I was intrigued to notice that
the article reflects some of the arguments used by the critics of the Centre in China.
3. The second reason is that "The Hindu" article tries to cast doubts on the credibility of an article titled 'China Should Break Up the Indian Union, Says A Chinese Strategist", written by Shri D.S.Rajan, of the Chennai Centre on August 9,2009. The article is available at
http://www.c3sindia.org/india/719 . The text of the article, which was also carried by a number of other Indian web sites, including that of the South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG), is annexed for ready reference,
4. "The Hindu" article has been written by Shri Ananth Krishnan, who has recently taken over as the Beijing correspondent of "The Hindu".One does not know his background and credentials as a China analyst. It is important for the readers to have some idea of the credentials of Shri Rajan. Before the Sino-Indian war of 1962, the Government of India was largely dependent on the media monitoring agencies of the UK and the US for monitoring and analysing the writings and broadcasts of the Chinese language media. After the war, the Government of Jawaharlal Nehru realised that it was unwise to totally depend on the Chinese media monitoring and analysis services of the West and decided to build up our own capability. In the years following the 1962 war, a creash drive was undertaken by the Government to recruit
and train a group of young people fresh from the universities in the Chinese and Japanese languages and make them responsible for monitoring and analysing the Chinese and Japanese language media.
5. Shri Rajan was one of those thus recruited and trained by being sent abroad for improving his proficiency. Shri Rajan, who is now 67 years old, had spent about 35 years as a Chinese analyst by monioring writings in the Chinese and Japanese language media. Of these 35 years,he had spent three years in Hong Kong when it was a British-administered territory, three years in China and six years in Japan in two spells.During his service, he was associated with the visits of a number of Chinese delegations to India as well as with the visits of a number of
Indian delegations to China.
6. Shri Rajan's article has eight paras. The first para gives Shri Rajan's comments on the web site which carried the article. The last para gives Shri Rajan's assessment of the article. The remaining paras are a gist of translations of the contents of the article. The first para on the background of the Chinese article says: "Almost coinciding with the 13th round of Sino-Indian border talks (New Delhi, August 7-8, 2009),an article (in Chinese language) has appeared in China captioned “If China takes a little action, the so-called Great Indian Federation can be broken up” ( Zhong Guo Zhan Lue Gang, www.iiss.cn , Chinese,8 August 2009). Interestingly, it has been reproduced in several other strategic and military websites of the country and by all means, targets the domestic audience. The authoritative host site is located in Beijing and is the new edition of one, which so far represented the China International Institute for Strategic Studies (www.chinaiiss.org)."
7.Shri Ananth Krishnan says in his first para: "The post was translated and analysed with some significant errors..." One would have lauded Shri Krishnan if he had specified these errors so that one could have stood corrected. Were the errors in translation or analysis? Shri Krishnan is silent on this question. If the errors are in translation and if Shri Krishnan's command of the Chinese language is better than that of Shri Rajan, why does he not specify them?
8. What has Shri Rajan said in his analysis of the contents of the article: " The Chinese article in question will certainly outrage readers in India. Its suggestion that China can follow a strategy to dismember India, a country always with a tradition of unity in diversity, is atrocious, to say the least. The write-up could not have been published without the permission of the Chinese authorities, but it is sure that Beijing will wash its hands out of this if the matter is taken up with it by New Delhi. It has generally been seen that China is speaking in two voices – its
diplomatic interlocutors have always shown understanding during their dealings with their Indian counterparts, but its selected media is pouring venom on India in their reporting. Which one to believe is a question confronting the public opinion and even policy makers in India.In any case, an approach of panic towards such outbursts will be a mistake, but also ignoring them will prove to be costly for India."
9. What is wrong in this analysis? In the 1950s, a number of maps of the Indo-Chinese border started circulating in China and appearing in sections of the Chinese media. The Indian intelligence rightly brought these to the notice of Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Prime Minister, who took up the matter with Chou En-lai, his Chinese counterpart. He assured Nehru that these maps were circulated by private individuals and had been prepared by the Taiwanese before 1949. He told Nehru that India should not worry about them. Nehru was shocked before the 1962 war when the Chinese used the very same maps, which Chou had described as not official, for claiming large parts of Indian territory and occupying much of it. Today, it is on the basis of the very same maps which the Chinese portrayed as not official that they are claiming
Arunachal Pradesh as Chinese territory.
10. Was Shri Rajan mistaken in sounding a word of caution that while " an approach of panic towards such outbursts will be a mistake, but also ignoring them will prove to be costly for India"? This was a sound word of caution based on our past experience of dealing with China. I leave it to the readers to decide what they will believe ---Shri Rajan's word of caution or Shri Krishnan's soothing words on China?
11. Shri Krishnan also writes: " The post in question appeared in an important-sounding web site calling itself the International Institute of Strategic Studies (which has no relation to the London-based think-tank of the same name). The Chennai Centre For China Studies, which first translated and analysed the post before it was circulated among the Indian media, assumed that this was a Government-sponsored
think-tank and also wrongly claimed that this was linked to the China Institute For International Starategic Studies (CIISS), a Beijing think-tank. But a quick-check revealed that the IISS web site where the post appeared actually has no government ties and is by no means an established Beijing think-tank---it is just a web site."
12. Dear Mr.Ananth Krishnan, where has the article said that this was a Government-sponsored think-tank? Where has it claimed that this was linked to the China Institute For International Strategic Studies? Mr.Krishnan: We know more than you probably do about the China Institute For International Strategic Studies, which is a highly reputed think tank of the Chinese Defence Ministry. Its chief is generally a
senior retired officer of the People's Liberation Army. Its past chiefs and scholars had visited India. Shri Rajan had interacted with it during his stay in China. Where is the question of Shri Rajan confusing the web site with this prestigious think-tank?
13. Following the uproar in Indian non-governmental circles over the contents of the Chinese article, there was a damage-control exercise mounted by Beijing through the owners of the web site in question as well as a former Chinese Ambassador to India and others. Many of us were in receipt of E-mails from Beijing making some of the same points which Shri Krishnan has made in his article, which I am inclined to see as part of this damage control exercise.
14. Shri Rajan had drawn attention to this anti-India web site as early as November 27,2006, immediately after the visit of President Hu Jintao to India in an article which can be found at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers21/paper2039.html . He was also the first to draw attention in 2006 to the fact that Chinese writings had started referring to Arunachal Pradesh as "southern Tibet" and not as Arunachal
Pradesh. One was told at that time that these were all private writings, that China was changing and that non-governmental views in China no longer necessarily reflected the governmental view. We know the reality today.
15. It is a fact that some sections of our media went to town with Shri Rajan's article and sensationalised the contents of the Chinese article, but the concern in large sections of the Indian civil society over the implications of the theme of the Chinese article is understandable if one remembers the fact that China before 1979 had trained many of our Nago and Mizo insurgents in secret training
camps in Yunnan, that there are reports that Paresh Barua of the United Liberation Front of Assam is even today in touch with the Chinese,that before November,2008, China opposed the declaration of the Lashkar-e-Toiba as a terrorist organisation by the Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council and even today opposes the declaration of the Jaish-e-Mohammad as a terrorist organisation.
(17-8-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Deelhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
China Should break up the Indian Union, suggests a Chinese Strategist
D.S.Rajan, C3S Paper No.325 dated August 9, 2009
Almost coinciding with the 13th round of Sino-Indian border talks (New Delhi, August 7-8, 2009), an article (in Chinese language) has appeared in China captioned “If China takes a little action, the so-called Great Indian Federation can be broken up” ( Zhong Guo Zhan Lue Gang, www.iiss.cn , Chinese,8 August 2009). Interestingly, it has been reproduced in several other strategic and military websites of the
country and by all means, targets the domestic audience. The authoritative host site is located in Beijing and is the new edition of one, which so far represented the China International Institute for Strategic Studies (www.chinaiiss.org)."
Claiming that Beijing’s ‘China-Centric’ Asian strategy, provides for splitting India, the writer of the article, Zhan Lue (strategy), has found that New Delhi’s corresponding ‘India-Centric’ policy in Asia, is in reality a ‘Hindustan centric’ one. Stating that on the other hand ‘local centres’ exist in several of the country’s provinces (excepting for the U.P and certain Northern regions), Zhan Lue has felt that in the face of such local characteristics, the ‘so-called’ Indian nation cannot be considered as one having existed in history.
According to the article, if India today relies on any thing for unity, it is the Hindu religion. The partition of the country was based on religion. Stating that today nation states are the main current in the world, it has said that India could only be termed now as a “Hindu Religious state’. Adding that Hinduism is a decadent religion as it allows caste exploitation and is unhelpful to the country’s modernization, it described the Indian government as one in a dilemma with regard to eradication of the caste system as it realizes that the process to do away with castes may shake the foundation of the consciousness of the Indian nation.
The writer has argued that in view of the above, China in its own interest and the progress of whole Asia, should join forces with different nationalities like Assamese, Tamils, and Kashmiris and support the latter in establishing independent nation-states of their own, out of India. In particular, the ULFA in Assam, a territory neighboring China, can be helped by China so that Assam realizes its national independence.
The article has also felt that for Bangladesh, the biggest threat is from India, which wants to develop a great Indian Federation extending from Afghanistan to Myanmar. India is also targeting China with support to Vietnam’s efforts to occupy Nansha (Spratly) group of islands in South China Sea. Hence the need for China’s consolidation of its alliance with Bangladesh, a country with which the US and Japan are also improving their relations to counter China. It has pointed out that China can give political support to Bangladesh enabling the latter to encourage ethnic Bengalis in India to get rid of Indian control and unite with Bangladesh as one Bengali nation; if the same is not possible,creation of at least another free Bengali nation state as a friendly neighbour of Bangladesh, would be desirable, for the purpose of weakening India’s expansion and threat aimed at forming a ‘unified South Asia’.
The punch line in the article has been that to split India, China can bring into its fold countries like Pakistan, Nepal and Bhutan, support ULFA in attaining its goal for Assam’s independence, back aspirations of Indian nationalities like Tamils and Nagas, encourage Bangladesh to give a push to the independence of West Bengal and lastly recover the 90,000 sq km. territory in Southern Tibet.
Wishing for India’s break-up into 20-30 nation-states like in Europe, the article has concluded by saying that if the consciousness of nationalities in India could be aroused, social reforms in South Asia can be achieved, the caste system can be eradicated and the region can march along the road of prosperity.
The Chinese article in question will certainly outrage readers in India. Its suggestion that China can follow a strategy to dismember India, a country always with a tradition of unity in diversity, is atrocious, to say the least. The write-up could not have been published without the permission of the Chinese authorities, but it is sure that Beijing will wash its hands out of this if the matter is taken up with it by New Delhi. It has generally been seen that China is speaking in two voices – its diplomatic interlocutors have always shown understanding during their
dealings with their Indian counterparts, but its selected media is pouring venom on India in their reporting. Which one to believe is a question confronting the public opinion and even policy makers in India. In any case, an approach of panic towards such outbursts will be a mistake, but also ignoring them will prove to be costly for India.
(The writer, D.S.Rajan, is Director of Chennai Centre for China Studies, Chennai, India, email: dsrajan@gmail.com).
Saturday, August 15, 2009
MYANMAR: ANOTHER INSTANCE OF OBAMA'S REALPOLITIK
B.RAMAN
In my article of March 10,2009, titled "Obama: Good-Bye To Dalai Lama & Aung San Suu Kyi, Hail Hu Jintao" , available at
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers31/paper3090.html , I wrote as ollows: "There has been no surge in US rhetoric vis-a-vis China after Barack Obama assumed office on January 20, 2009. On the contrary, the focus of his advisers has been on identifying and expanding the mutual comfort features in the bilateral relations rather than on those features, which tended to cause friction in the past. The references from Washington DC to human rights issues---- whether they be in relation to Tibet, Myanmar or the Chinese role in the Sudan--- have been muted."
2. Suspicions that President Barack Obama was quietly planning a major departure from the policy followed by the previous US administrations towards Myanmar, its military junta and its heroic leader Aung San Suu Kyi proved correct on August 14,2009, when Democratic Senator Jim Webb, reputed to be close to Obama, arrived in Myanmar for talks with Senior Gen.Than Shwe, the leader of the military junta.
3. The Junta reportedly extended to Senator Webb courtesies the like of which it had not extended to any other foreign dignitary before,including Ban Ki-Moon, the UN Secretary-General, who visited Myanmar in the beginning of July. Webb was granted an audience to meet Than Shwe at Naypyidaw, the new capital,shortly after his arrival, instead of having to wait for hours, if not days, as had happened with some foreign visitors in the past. He was also allowed to meet Aung San Suu Kyi at Yangon, the old capital, , a courtesy which was denied to the UN Secretary-General.
4. Senator Webb, a Vietnam war veteran and a former Secretary of the Navy under Ronald Reagan, is presently the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs. He has been an advocate of a more "constructive" US engagement with the Junta. The ostensible purpose of his visit----evidently undertaken with the prior approval of Obama---- was to secure the release of John Yettaw, an American citizen, who was convicted on August 11 along with Aung San Suu Kyi after the American swam uninvited to the Nobel laureate's lakeside home and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment and to meet Aung San Suu Kyi, who has been placed under house arrest by the Junta for another 18 months after she was found guilty in the same case of harbouring the American in her house without informing the Police.
5. His visit was as carefully choreographed as the visit of former US President Bill Clinton to Pyongyang on August 4,2009, during which he met President Kim Jong-il and secured the release of two American woman journalists, who had been sentenced by a North Korean court to long periods of imprisonment on a charge of illegally entering North Korean territory from China.
6. One can be certain that Webb would not have undertaken the visit had he not been assured beforehand by the Junta through unidentified intermediaries that he would go back with Yettaw and would be allowed to meet Aung San Suu Kyi. Without a meeting with Suu Kyi, his visit would have been seen by the people of Myanmar as a cynical attempt to secure the release of an American citizen without worrying about
the continued violation of the human rights of the people of the country by the Junta.
7. After his meeting with the Junta chief and Aung San Suu Kyi and after the announcement that Yettaw would be deported on Auguast 16,Webb said in a statement: " I am grateful to the Myanmar Government for honouring these requests.It is my hope that we can take advantage of these gestures as a way to begin laying a foundation of goodwill and confidence-building in the future." Webb said he also
urged the military regime to free Aung San Suu Kyi, who has spent most of the last two decades under house arrest. Webb described themeeting with her as "an opportunity for me to convey my deep respect to Aung San Suu Kyi for the sacrifices she has made on behalf of democracy around the world".
8. Webb did not say what was Than Shwe's response to his request for her release and whether she would be allowed to participate in the elections scheduled to be held by the Junta next year.
9. Webb's visit to Myanmar and his meeting with Than Shwe, coming in the wake of Clinton's visit to Pyongyang, indicates that the Obama Administration sees no problem in dealing with dictators and playing down human rights issues, if it will serve US national interests. In North Korea, the US objective was clearly to explore the availability of other options for persuading or pressuring North Korea to give up its nuclear capability.
10. What are the US interests in Myanmar? It is difficult to answer this question definitely at present. However, it is quite likely that the Myanmar initiative was triggered off by concerns that the policy of more and more sanctions followed by the US is not only pushing Myanmar increasingly into the arms of China, but may also push it to embrace North Korea, with which the Junta re-established diplomatic
relations two years ago.There have recently been unconfirmed reports that North Korea has established a nuclear supply relationship withMyanmar.
11. While the leaders of the ASEAN would be happy over the US overtures to the Junta, the countries of the European Union, which had condemned very strongly the extended house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi, may have been taken by surprise. ( 15-8-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retired), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
In my article of March 10,2009, titled "Obama: Good-Bye To Dalai Lama & Aung San Suu Kyi, Hail Hu Jintao" , available at
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers31/paper3090.html , I wrote as ollows: "There has been no surge in US rhetoric vis-a-vis China after Barack Obama assumed office on January 20, 2009. On the contrary, the focus of his advisers has been on identifying and expanding the mutual comfort features in the bilateral relations rather than on those features, which tended to cause friction in the past. The references from Washington DC to human rights issues---- whether they be in relation to Tibet, Myanmar or the Chinese role in the Sudan--- have been muted."
2. Suspicions that President Barack Obama was quietly planning a major departure from the policy followed by the previous US administrations towards Myanmar, its military junta and its heroic leader Aung San Suu Kyi proved correct on August 14,2009, when Democratic Senator Jim Webb, reputed to be close to Obama, arrived in Myanmar for talks with Senior Gen.Than Shwe, the leader of the military junta.
3. The Junta reportedly extended to Senator Webb courtesies the like of which it had not extended to any other foreign dignitary before,including Ban Ki-Moon, the UN Secretary-General, who visited Myanmar in the beginning of July. Webb was granted an audience to meet Than Shwe at Naypyidaw, the new capital,shortly after his arrival, instead of having to wait for hours, if not days, as had happened with some foreign visitors in the past. He was also allowed to meet Aung San Suu Kyi at Yangon, the old capital, , a courtesy which was denied to the UN Secretary-General.
4. Senator Webb, a Vietnam war veteran and a former Secretary of the Navy under Ronald Reagan, is presently the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs. He has been an advocate of a more "constructive" US engagement with the Junta. The ostensible purpose of his visit----evidently undertaken with the prior approval of Obama---- was to secure the release of John Yettaw, an American citizen, who was convicted on August 11 along with Aung San Suu Kyi after the American swam uninvited to the Nobel laureate's lakeside home and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment and to meet Aung San Suu Kyi, who has been placed under house arrest by the Junta for another 18 months after she was found guilty in the same case of harbouring the American in her house without informing the Police.
5. His visit was as carefully choreographed as the visit of former US President Bill Clinton to Pyongyang on August 4,2009, during which he met President Kim Jong-il and secured the release of two American woman journalists, who had been sentenced by a North Korean court to long periods of imprisonment on a charge of illegally entering North Korean territory from China.
6. One can be certain that Webb would not have undertaken the visit had he not been assured beforehand by the Junta through unidentified intermediaries that he would go back with Yettaw and would be allowed to meet Aung San Suu Kyi. Without a meeting with Suu Kyi, his visit would have been seen by the people of Myanmar as a cynical attempt to secure the release of an American citizen without worrying about
the continued violation of the human rights of the people of the country by the Junta.
7. After his meeting with the Junta chief and Aung San Suu Kyi and after the announcement that Yettaw would be deported on Auguast 16,Webb said in a statement: " I am grateful to the Myanmar Government for honouring these requests.It is my hope that we can take advantage of these gestures as a way to begin laying a foundation of goodwill and confidence-building in the future." Webb said he also
urged the military regime to free Aung San Suu Kyi, who has spent most of the last two decades under house arrest. Webb described themeeting with her as "an opportunity for me to convey my deep respect to Aung San Suu Kyi for the sacrifices she has made on behalf of democracy around the world".
8. Webb did not say what was Than Shwe's response to his request for her release and whether she would be allowed to participate in the elections scheduled to be held by the Junta next year.
9. Webb's visit to Myanmar and his meeting with Than Shwe, coming in the wake of Clinton's visit to Pyongyang, indicates that the Obama Administration sees no problem in dealing with dictators and playing down human rights issues, if it will serve US national interests. In North Korea, the US objective was clearly to explore the availability of other options for persuading or pressuring North Korea to give up its nuclear capability.
10. What are the US interests in Myanmar? It is difficult to answer this question definitely at present. However, it is quite likely that the Myanmar initiative was triggered off by concerns that the policy of more and more sanctions followed by the US is not only pushing Myanmar increasingly into the arms of China, but may also push it to embrace North Korea, with which the Junta re-established diplomatic
relations two years ago.There have recently been unconfirmed reports that North Korea has established a nuclear supply relationship withMyanmar.
11. While the leaders of the ASEAN would be happy over the US overtures to the Junta, the countries of the European Union, which had condemned very strongly the extended house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi, may have been taken by surprise. ( 15-8-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retired), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Thursday, August 13, 2009
CHINA-- INDIA: NON-GOVERNMENTAL HOSTILITY BEHIND FACADE OF GOVERNMETAL CORDIALITY
B.RAMAN
The following are my comments in response to some E-mailed questions received from a correspondent of the "Washington Post" in Beijing on August 14,2009:
1) It seems that China has gotten some criticism about the border issue talk recently in India. What do these criticisms focus on?
My comments:The Government of India has not criticised the Govt. of China on the border issue and vice versa. However, governmental sources in New Delhi have been expressing concern periodically over repeated Chinese troop intrusions into Indian territory in the Arunachal Pradesh area at a time when the border talks are going on. There has been a lot of criticism in India at the non-Governmental level of the sarcastic and disparaging comments about India carried by the "Global Times" and voiced by some Chinese academics after media reports that India was reinforcing its military deployment in the Arunachal Pradesh area as a measure of self-defence in response to Chinese military deployments in Tibet after the Lhasa uprising of March 2008 and the improvement of road and rail infrastructure in Tibet.
2) Chinese experts we've interviwed said China did not add any troops along the disputed border and Chinese media only talked about India added
more troops along the disputed border. Did China send more troops along the disputed border?
My comments: Over the years, China has followed a policy of steadily strengthening its military-related infrastructure and troop deployments in Tibet for two reasons. Firstly, to suppress the supporters of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and to strengthen its hold over Tibet. Secondly, to protect Tibet from India. China looks upon its actions in Tibet as justified because it looks upon Tibet as Chinese territory de facto and de jure. India avoided any defensive action in Arunachal Pradesh till four years ago since border talks are going on with China. After the construction of the railway line to Lhasa and because of reports of Chinese plans to eventually extend it to the Indian border, India decided to reverse its policy of not sending troop reinforcements to Arunachal Pradesh and not strengthening the military-related infrastucture. This decision was also influenced by the movement of additional Chinese troops to Tibet after March 2008 and coninued Chinese troop intrusions into Indian territory. China looks upon Indian actions with hostility because it sees Arunachal Pradesh as a disputed territory over which it has claims.
3) Chinese domestic media maintains that 'China sticks to the principle of peaceful solution through talks' and Chinese government reacted to the move India made
regarding troops-employment in a reserved way. But is China speaking in two voices on Sino-Indian ties? How do you interprete the 'kindeness' Chinese side has shown?
My comments: The official comments on recent developments from Beijing have been polite, guarded and non-provocative, but comments from non-governmental circles such as the "Global Times", some academics etc have been virulent and hostile. Since the Indian public believes that there is no such thing as genuine non-governmental opinion in China, it sees their comments as influenced, if not encouraged, by the Chinese Government. This phenomenon of non-governmental hostility behind a facade of governmental cordiality baffles and worries Indian public opinion and, I am sure, of the policy-makers too though they do not openly say so.
4) What are the negotication bottomeline or framework both sides have?
My comments: I do not have knowledge of the way the border talks have been going on. But from open source information, one gets the impression that the deadlock remains. The Chinese continue to insist that without Indian agreement to transfer at least the Tawang area of Arunachal Pradesh if not the whole of it to China there can be no border settlement.They describe Arunachal Pradesh as "southern Tibet" and claim Tawang on the ground that historically the Tawang monastery, according to them, has had religious ties with the monastery in Lhasa and that one of the previous Dalai Lamas was born in Tawang. India's consistent position has been that there can be no transfer of populated areas. Arunachal Pradesh, including Tawang, is a populated area.
5) In the recent Chinese military exercise, Chengdu division did not participate. Chinese military analyst said 'it showed China's sincerity towards China-India border issue as it did not target India as the imaginary enemy.' How would you like to comment on this?
My.comments:In my article on the Chinese military exercise, I have myself drawn attention to the non-participation of the Chengdu Military Region in the military exercise and speculated that this might have been due to the Chinese desire not to cause any undue alarm in India by having a huge exercise in Tibet.
6) How do you look at the future solution of this issue? pessimistic or optimistic? Will that be possible that military resolution is the only one way as some Chinese strategist said?
My comments: I am neither pessimistic nor optimistic, but I have hopes that the expanding economic relations between the two countries will ultimately moderate the Chinese position and facilitate a mutually acceptable compromise.Last year, the value of the bilateral trade between India and China reached US $ 52 billion. For India, China has emerged as a more important trading partner than the US. India has become an important destination for Chinese construction companies, who are winning more lucrative contracts in India that anywhere else in Asia, including Pakistan. At the same time, while remaining hopeful of an ultimate moderation, one has to take note of the hostile comments in some sections of the so-called non-governmetal opinion in China, which even talk of a possible military conflict.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and,presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies.E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The following are my comments in response to some E-mailed questions received from a correspondent of the "Washington Post" in Beijing on August 14,2009:
1) It seems that China has gotten some criticism about the border issue talk recently in India. What do these criticisms focus on?
My comments:The Government of India has not criticised the Govt. of China on the border issue and vice versa. However, governmental sources in New Delhi have been expressing concern periodically over repeated Chinese troop intrusions into Indian territory in the Arunachal Pradesh area at a time when the border talks are going on. There has been a lot of criticism in India at the non-Governmental level of the sarcastic and disparaging comments about India carried by the "Global Times" and voiced by some Chinese academics after media reports that India was reinforcing its military deployment in the Arunachal Pradesh area as a measure of self-defence in response to Chinese military deployments in Tibet after the Lhasa uprising of March 2008 and the improvement of road and rail infrastructure in Tibet.
2) Chinese experts we've interviwed said China did not add any troops along the disputed border and Chinese media only talked about India added
more troops along the disputed border. Did China send more troops along the disputed border?
My comments: Over the years, China has followed a policy of steadily strengthening its military-related infrastructure and troop deployments in Tibet for two reasons. Firstly, to suppress the supporters of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and to strengthen its hold over Tibet. Secondly, to protect Tibet from India. China looks upon its actions in Tibet as justified because it looks upon Tibet as Chinese territory de facto and de jure. India avoided any defensive action in Arunachal Pradesh till four years ago since border talks are going on with China. After the construction of the railway line to Lhasa and because of reports of Chinese plans to eventually extend it to the Indian border, India decided to reverse its policy of not sending troop reinforcements to Arunachal Pradesh and not strengthening the military-related infrastucture. This decision was also influenced by the movement of additional Chinese troops to Tibet after March 2008 and coninued Chinese troop intrusions into Indian territory. China looks upon Indian actions with hostility because it sees Arunachal Pradesh as a disputed territory over which it has claims.
3) Chinese domestic media maintains that 'China sticks to the principle of peaceful solution through talks' and Chinese government reacted to the move India made
regarding troops-employment in a reserved way. But is China speaking in two voices on Sino-Indian ties? How do you interprete the 'kindeness' Chinese side has shown?
My comments: The official comments on recent developments from Beijing have been polite, guarded and non-provocative, but comments from non-governmental circles such as the "Global Times", some academics etc have been virulent and hostile. Since the Indian public believes that there is no such thing as genuine non-governmental opinion in China, it sees their comments as influenced, if not encouraged, by the Chinese Government. This phenomenon of non-governmental hostility behind a facade of governmental cordiality baffles and worries Indian public opinion and, I am sure, of the policy-makers too though they do not openly say so.
4) What are the negotication bottomeline or framework both sides have?
My comments: I do not have knowledge of the way the border talks have been going on. But from open source information, one gets the impression that the deadlock remains. The Chinese continue to insist that without Indian agreement to transfer at least the Tawang area of Arunachal Pradesh if not the whole of it to China there can be no border settlement.They describe Arunachal Pradesh as "southern Tibet" and claim Tawang on the ground that historically the Tawang monastery, according to them, has had religious ties with the monastery in Lhasa and that one of the previous Dalai Lamas was born in Tawang. India's consistent position has been that there can be no transfer of populated areas. Arunachal Pradesh, including Tawang, is a populated area.
5) In the recent Chinese military exercise, Chengdu division did not participate. Chinese military analyst said 'it showed China's sincerity towards China-India border issue as it did not target India as the imaginary enemy.' How would you like to comment on this?
My.comments:In my article on the Chinese military exercise, I have myself drawn attention to the non-participation of the Chengdu Military Region in the military exercise and speculated that this might have been due to the Chinese desire not to cause any undue alarm in India by having a huge exercise in Tibet.
6) How do you look at the future solution of this issue? pessimistic or optimistic? Will that be possible that military resolution is the only one way as some Chinese strategist said?
My comments: I am neither pessimistic nor optimistic, but I have hopes that the expanding economic relations between the two countries will ultimately moderate the Chinese position and facilitate a mutually acceptable compromise.Last year, the value of the bilateral trade between India and China reached US $ 52 billion. For India, China has emerged as a more important trading partner than the US. India has become an important destination for Chinese construction companies, who are winning more lucrative contracts in India that anywhere else in Asia, including Pakistan. At the same time, while remaining hopeful of an ultimate moderation, one has to take note of the hostile comments in some sections of the so-called non-governmetal opinion in China, which even talk of a possible military conflict.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and,presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies.E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
STRIDE 2009---CHINA'S LARGEST EVER LONG-RANGE MILITARY EXERCISE
B. Raman
Four Divisions of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China with a total strength of about 50,000 troops and drawn from the Shenyang, Lanzhou, Jinan and Guangzhou military regions have embarked on a military exercise code-named Stride--- 2009 since August 11,2009. The exercise is due to last for two months. The exercise has been projected by the "Global Times" (August 12,2009) as China's largest ever, long-range military exercise.
2. Under this exercise, a Division of the Shenyang Military Region in the North-East will move to the Lanzhou Military Region in the North-West and a Division from the Lanzhou Region will move to the Shenyang Region. Similarly, two Divisions from the Jinan and the Guangzhou military Regions will exchange places. It is not clear from available details carried by the Government and Party controlled Chinese media whether the four Divisions will remain in their new place of deployment after the exercise or they will move back to their original place of deployment.
3. The objective of the exercise has been described as to test the ability of the Divisions to move rapidly from an area where they were raised and trained to an area to which they were not used. The objective is also to train the troops to fight anywhere, anytime and under any conditions. The exercise will also test the ability of the troops to deal with natural disasters in any part of the country. Another important aim is to test the new road, rail and air infrastructure raised by China in recent years and examine their capacity to support such large-scale movements without causing much inconvenience to the civilian population
4. The Lanzhou Military Region, one of the seven military regions of China, has under its jurisdiction Xinjiang, Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia, and Shaanxi and the Ali area of northwest Tibet. The Shenyang Military region covers the Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongiang provinces. It plays an important role in the security of Beijing as well as of the areas bordering on the Russian Far East and North Korea. The Jinan Military region covers the Shandong and Henan provinces. It is responsible for security in one of the most heavily populated and industrialised areas of China. The Guangzhou Military region covers the Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan, Hebei and Hainan provinces. Inter alia, it is responsible for the security of Hong Kong and its Divisions are specially trained for possible military operations against Taiwan.
5. The three Regions not participating in the exercise are the Beijing, the Nanjing and the Chengdu Military Regions. The Beijing Military Region covers Beijing city, Tianjin city, the Hebei province, the Shanxi province, and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. It is mainly responsible for defending China from Mongolia and Russia, and also provides security to Beijing. The Nanjing Military Region covers the Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, and Jiangxi provinces. It is the principal Military Region responsible for operations against Taiwan in the event of a military conflct. Most of the missile units facing Taiwan are believed to be under its control. The Chengdu Military Region covers the Chongqing, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou provinces and the Xizang/Tibet Autonomous Region. It is responsible for security in Tibet and for protecting the border regions with India, Nepal and Myanmar.
6. Thus while the Military Regions responsible for security in Tibet and Beijing and for military operations in Taiwan have not been disturbed during the exercise, the Military Region responsible for security in the recently-disturbed Xinjiang province has been. One would have thought that the Chinese would be interested in testing the capacity of the newly-laid railway line to Lhasa and the road infrastructure in Tibet to support large-scale and rapid military movements. While the non-participation of the Nanjing Military Region has been seen by Chinese commentators as a confidence-building measure at a time when Beijing's relations with Taiwan are improving, no explanation has been forthcoming for the non-participation of the Chengdu Military Region. One is tempted to speculate whether this has been motivated by a desire not to cause undue alarm in India.
7. Citing the Government-controlled Xinhua news agency, the "Global Times" reported as follows: “This is the first cross-region long-range training maneuver involving troops from four military area commands,” an anonymous (unidentified) officer at the PLA Headquarters of General Staff was quoted by Xinhua as saying. “The exercise is to test the overall combat capability and long-range mobility of our army in information-based situations,” he said. According to the plan, 80 per cent of the 50,000 troops and 60,000 weapons, equipment and vehicles will be transported to the target area by railway and motorized maneuvers. Civil passenger and cargo aircraft will be deployed for the first time to transport troops and weapons. The drill marks a huge breakthrough in the history of Chinese military training, in which the armies are crossing geographical boundaries to fight in unfamiliar areas, a military specialist in Beijing surnamed Chen told the Global Times. “The capability for greater coordination, joint operations and long-range force projection will be tested,” Chen said."
8. The paper added: "Nanjing Military Area Command, one of the seven military commands in China and covering areas close to Taiwan, was not included in the drill. Military experts interpreted the absence of Nanjing Military Command as “the mainland showing goodwill to Taiwan,” Taiwan-based newspaper China Times reported. “This is a friendly gesture from the mainland toward Taiwan and shows cross-Straits relations have further eased up,” Li Daguang, a military expert from the National Defense University told the Global Times. Unlike previous military drills, this exercise has not prompted wild speculations by military watchers."
9. It further said: "Since early May, when the PLA Headquarters of the General Staff publicized the information on the planned military drill, foreign media carried factual reports on the military drill, a change from their previous critical or speculative tone. “As the Chinese army is more and more open to the outside world, the mysteries of the army will be unveiled. And there will be fewer and fewer false reports to speculate on the threatening effect of Chinese military drills,” Li said. In addition, the drill aims to test the army’s capacity to cope with large-scale natural disasters. It is not merely for military purposes, he added."
10. China will be observing in a big way the 60th anniversary of the People's Republic of China in October. One would have thought that in the weeks preceding this event they would not disturb four Divisions from their present areas of deployment so that they are available for any emergency if political, ethnic or religious dissidents try to create disturbances. It is a fact that the Chinese have been concerned over the possibility of such disturbances in Tibet and Xinjiang. Since April, they have strengthened preventive measures in those areas. These have been further strengthened in Xinjiang after the Urumqi disturbances in the first week of July. The fact that the Chinese are going ahead with this exercise involving four Divisions reflects their present confidence in their ability to deal with any disturbances that might break out even without the use of these Divisions.
11. The possibility that the long-term significance of this exercise may not be confined to only Chinese territory and may extend beyond its borders is evident from an editorial on the exercise carried by the "Global Times" on August 12 under the title "Build An Army That Suits Modern Requirement". The text of the editorial is annexed.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone-2@gmail.com)
ANNEXURE
Text of the editorial carried by the "Global Times" on August 12,2009
Build an army that suits modern requirements
“In war it’s speed that counts,” the traditional Chinese military wisdom goes. The real deterrent capability of a military force isn’t based on its scale, but rather the combat force it can deliver to a strategic location at the key moment.
Now, the “Stride-2009” military drill, the first massive cross-military areas drill in the history of the People’s Liberation Army, will test the Chinese military’s long-distance deployment capability.
A large-scale exercise will be conducted by some 50,000 PLA soldiers, air force members and army aviators. The exercise will include more than 60,000 heavy military vehicles and equipment.
Throughout history, the Chinese army followed a conservative strategy of territorial defense. Long-distance deployment and strategic maneuvers capability are the weakest link in its overall strength. Overseas military deployment has also been consciously shunned by China in the past, since it was seen as representing colonialization. China was once proud of having no soldiers deployed on foreign soil.
But this conception has started to change, as the expansion of Chinese interests overseas has required that long-distance military deployment capability be strengthened. China’s national interests have increasingly grown beyond its geographic boundary.
While Chinese commodities and business are going global, the country is also relying more on foreign supplies of energy to fuel its fast economic growth. Securing strategic sea routes through which vital resources are transported is an important mission of the modern Chinese military.
Meanwhile, as a rising power expected to take more responsibility, Chinese military force needs to be commensurate with China’s growing role in the international community. It must be prepared to participate in missions such as global anti-terrorism efforts, anti-pirate strikes, and disaster-relief tasks.
Ever-complicated domestic emergencies have also demanded fast responses by the military. The rescue efforts after the Wenchuan earthquake and the snowstorm disaster in southern China last year both show the critical importance of the ability to conduct long-distance strategic maneuvers. Swift military deployment is also vital to safeguarding security along China’s borders.
Lacking such capability, the combat strength of the Chinese military and its ambition have been significantly crippled. It is reported that the Chinese military is not able to launch an overseas dispatch of a division force through sea or air and provide logistic support.
By putting long-distance deployment capability as one of the top concerns of recent drills, the Chinese army is shaking off the long-time psychological restraint on acquiring it. This ability is critical for a truly modern military and necessary for a strong power. It is also a contribution China should make to world peace.
Four Divisions of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China with a total strength of about 50,000 troops and drawn from the Shenyang, Lanzhou, Jinan and Guangzhou military regions have embarked on a military exercise code-named Stride--- 2009 since August 11,2009. The exercise is due to last for two months. The exercise has been projected by the "Global Times" (August 12,2009) as China's largest ever, long-range military exercise.
2. Under this exercise, a Division of the Shenyang Military Region in the North-East will move to the Lanzhou Military Region in the North-West and a Division from the Lanzhou Region will move to the Shenyang Region. Similarly, two Divisions from the Jinan and the Guangzhou military Regions will exchange places. It is not clear from available details carried by the Government and Party controlled Chinese media whether the four Divisions will remain in their new place of deployment after the exercise or they will move back to their original place of deployment.
3. The objective of the exercise has been described as to test the ability of the Divisions to move rapidly from an area where they were raised and trained to an area to which they were not used. The objective is also to train the troops to fight anywhere, anytime and under any conditions. The exercise will also test the ability of the troops to deal with natural disasters in any part of the country. Another important aim is to test the new road, rail and air infrastructure raised by China in recent years and examine their capacity to support such large-scale movements without causing much inconvenience to the civilian population
4. The Lanzhou Military Region, one of the seven military regions of China, has under its jurisdiction Xinjiang, Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia, and Shaanxi and the Ali area of northwest Tibet. The Shenyang Military region covers the Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongiang provinces. It plays an important role in the security of Beijing as well as of the areas bordering on the Russian Far East and North Korea. The Jinan Military region covers the Shandong and Henan provinces. It is responsible for security in one of the most heavily populated and industrialised areas of China. The Guangzhou Military region covers the Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan, Hebei and Hainan provinces. Inter alia, it is responsible for the security of Hong Kong and its Divisions are specially trained for possible military operations against Taiwan.
5. The three Regions not participating in the exercise are the Beijing, the Nanjing and the Chengdu Military Regions. The Beijing Military Region covers Beijing city, Tianjin city, the Hebei province, the Shanxi province, and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. It is mainly responsible for defending China from Mongolia and Russia, and also provides security to Beijing. The Nanjing Military Region covers the Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, and Jiangxi provinces. It is the principal Military Region responsible for operations against Taiwan in the event of a military conflct. Most of the missile units facing Taiwan are believed to be under its control. The Chengdu Military Region covers the Chongqing, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou provinces and the Xizang/Tibet Autonomous Region. It is responsible for security in Tibet and for protecting the border regions with India, Nepal and Myanmar.
6. Thus while the Military Regions responsible for security in Tibet and Beijing and for military operations in Taiwan have not been disturbed during the exercise, the Military Region responsible for security in the recently-disturbed Xinjiang province has been. One would have thought that the Chinese would be interested in testing the capacity of the newly-laid railway line to Lhasa and the road infrastructure in Tibet to support large-scale and rapid military movements. While the non-participation of the Nanjing Military Region has been seen by Chinese commentators as a confidence-building measure at a time when Beijing's relations with Taiwan are improving, no explanation has been forthcoming for the non-participation of the Chengdu Military Region. One is tempted to speculate whether this has been motivated by a desire not to cause undue alarm in India.
7. Citing the Government-controlled Xinhua news agency, the "Global Times" reported as follows: “This is the first cross-region long-range training maneuver involving troops from four military area commands,” an anonymous (unidentified) officer at the PLA Headquarters of General Staff was quoted by Xinhua as saying. “The exercise is to test the overall combat capability and long-range mobility of our army in information-based situations,” he said. According to the plan, 80 per cent of the 50,000 troops and 60,000 weapons, equipment and vehicles will be transported to the target area by railway and motorized maneuvers. Civil passenger and cargo aircraft will be deployed for the first time to transport troops and weapons. The drill marks a huge breakthrough in the history of Chinese military training, in which the armies are crossing geographical boundaries to fight in unfamiliar areas, a military specialist in Beijing surnamed Chen told the Global Times. “The capability for greater coordination, joint operations and long-range force projection will be tested,” Chen said."
8. The paper added: "Nanjing Military Area Command, one of the seven military commands in China and covering areas close to Taiwan, was not included in the drill. Military experts interpreted the absence of Nanjing Military Command as “the mainland showing goodwill to Taiwan,” Taiwan-based newspaper China Times reported. “This is a friendly gesture from the mainland toward Taiwan and shows cross-Straits relations have further eased up,” Li Daguang, a military expert from the National Defense University told the Global Times. Unlike previous military drills, this exercise has not prompted wild speculations by military watchers."
9. It further said: "Since early May, when the PLA Headquarters of the General Staff publicized the information on the planned military drill, foreign media carried factual reports on the military drill, a change from their previous critical or speculative tone. “As the Chinese army is more and more open to the outside world, the mysteries of the army will be unveiled. And there will be fewer and fewer false reports to speculate on the threatening effect of Chinese military drills,” Li said. In addition, the drill aims to test the army’s capacity to cope with large-scale natural disasters. It is not merely for military purposes, he added."
10. China will be observing in a big way the 60th anniversary of the People's Republic of China in October. One would have thought that in the weeks preceding this event they would not disturb four Divisions from their present areas of deployment so that they are available for any emergency if political, ethnic or religious dissidents try to create disturbances. It is a fact that the Chinese have been concerned over the possibility of such disturbances in Tibet and Xinjiang. Since April, they have strengthened preventive measures in those areas. These have been further strengthened in Xinjiang after the Urumqi disturbances in the first week of July. The fact that the Chinese are going ahead with this exercise involving four Divisions reflects their present confidence in their ability to deal with any disturbances that might break out even without the use of these Divisions.
11. The possibility that the long-term significance of this exercise may not be confined to only Chinese territory and may extend beyond its borders is evident from an editorial on the exercise carried by the "Global Times" on August 12 under the title "Build An Army That Suits Modern Requirement". The text of the editorial is annexed.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone-2@gmail.com)
ANNEXURE
Text of the editorial carried by the "Global Times" on August 12,2009
Build an army that suits modern requirements
“In war it’s speed that counts,” the traditional Chinese military wisdom goes. The real deterrent capability of a military force isn’t based on its scale, but rather the combat force it can deliver to a strategic location at the key moment.
Now, the “Stride-2009” military drill, the first massive cross-military areas drill in the history of the People’s Liberation Army, will test the Chinese military’s long-distance deployment capability.
A large-scale exercise will be conducted by some 50,000 PLA soldiers, air force members and army aviators. The exercise will include more than 60,000 heavy military vehicles and equipment.
Throughout history, the Chinese army followed a conservative strategy of territorial defense. Long-distance deployment and strategic maneuvers capability are the weakest link in its overall strength. Overseas military deployment has also been consciously shunned by China in the past, since it was seen as representing colonialization. China was once proud of having no soldiers deployed on foreign soil.
But this conception has started to change, as the expansion of Chinese interests overseas has required that long-distance military deployment capability be strengthened. China’s national interests have increasingly grown beyond its geographic boundary.
While Chinese commodities and business are going global, the country is also relying more on foreign supplies of energy to fuel its fast economic growth. Securing strategic sea routes through which vital resources are transported is an important mission of the modern Chinese military.
Meanwhile, as a rising power expected to take more responsibility, Chinese military force needs to be commensurate with China’s growing role in the international community. It must be prepared to participate in missions such as global anti-terrorism efforts, anti-pirate strikes, and disaster-relief tasks.
Ever-complicated domestic emergencies have also demanded fast responses by the military. The rescue efforts after the Wenchuan earthquake and the snowstorm disaster in southern China last year both show the critical importance of the ability to conduct long-distance strategic maneuvers. Swift military deployment is also vital to safeguarding security along China’s borders.
Lacking such capability, the combat strength of the Chinese military and its ambition have been significantly crippled. It is reported that the Chinese military is not able to launch an overseas dispatch of a division force through sea or air and provide logistic support.
By putting long-distance deployment capability as one of the top concerns of recent drills, the Chinese army is shaking off the long-time psychological restraint on acquiring it. This ability is critical for a truly modern military and necessary for a strong power. It is also a contribution China should make to world peace.
Tuesday, August 11, 2009
INDIA-CHINA: LOOKING AHEAD
B.RAMAN
Admiral Sureesh Mehta, who will shortly be retiring as our Chief of the Naval Staff (CONS), made a presentation on "India's National Security Challenges---An Armed Forces Overview" at the National Maritime Foundation at New Delhi on August 10,2009.
2. During his tenure as the CONS, Admiral Mehta initiated a number of welcome changes in the policies and planning of the Indian Navy keeping in view the changed national and regional security requirements. Among the laudable steps initiated by him one could mention the Look West projection which he gave to the Navy to correct the over-focus on the Look East projection, the bringing together of the Naval
chiefs of the Indian Ocean powers in an exercise to promote a convergence of views and action for strengthening the mutual security of the Indian Ocean powers facing common new threats from non- State actors such as maritime terrorists and pirates and removing deficiencies in our coastal counter-terrorism capabilities.
3.Admiral Mehta's talk at the National Maritime Foundation was a lucid and frank exposition of the present and future challenges to our national security as seen by him. A summary of his presentation as carried by "The Hindu" in its online edition on August 11,2009, is annexed. Unfortunately, some sections of the media have tried to misinterpret his remarks on India and China and project them as if the
CONS was defeatist in his analysis of the respective capabilities of the Armed Forces of the two countries and particularly their naval capabilities. Far from it.
4. A careful reading of his remarks would indicate that he has tried to impart a sense of balance to the national debate on Sino-Indian relations and their impact on our national security. The salient points in his presentation are:
The trust deficit between India and China will persist till the border dispute is settled.
Cooperation rather than competition or conflict with China was preferable since it would be “foolhardy” to compare India and China as equals in terms of economy, infrastructure and military spending.
A military conflict would have grave consequences on the economic front for both nations and therefore it would be in the interest of both the countries to cooperate with each other in mutually beneficial endeavours and ensure that the potential for conflict is minimised.
Both in conventional and non-conventional military terms, India neither has the capability nor the intention to match China force for force.
4.Since India carried out its nuclear tests in 1998, there has been a national debate on what should be the ultimate objective of our military modernisation---- the ability to compete with China in power projection in the region or the ability to deter an external threat to our security and to defend ourselves and our territory if a threat materialises in spite of the deterrent capability built up by us or because of its inadequacy?
5.The importance of competitive power projection with China was the dominating theme of the debate in our security circles till about four years ago. The Government of Dr.Manmohan Singh has sought to change the priority from power projection to our capability for deterrence and self-defence. Once the validity of the changed priorities is accepted, there is no need for us to match China force for force.
6.India should avoid a policy of military confrontation with China and, at the same time, should develop the capability to defend ourselves and our territory should a confrontation be forced upon us. In the undesirable eventuality of such a confrontation, the military conflict,which will be of limited duration, will be in the mountainous region of the Himalayas and not on the seas. Our ability to repel any attacks and protect our territory along the Chinese border and our citizens living there will depend on the capabilities which we give to the Army and the Air Force more than the naval capability. It will also depend on the state of our infrastructure and our intelligence community, which is presently well-focused on Pakistan and not so well-focused on China.
7. Till four years ago, in our over-fascination for power projection through the Navy, we failed to pay adequate attention to strenghtening the capabilities of the Army and the Air Force to fight in the Himalayan areas and to developing a modern infrstructure without which even the best of Armies will feel handicapped in battle. It will not be an exaggeration to say that the vital Arunachal Pradesh region, so frequently and so vehemently claimed by China as its territory, was in a state of benign neglect with little attention paid to its economic development and military-related infrastructure. So long as this state of neglect of the Arunachal Pradesh region by us continued, China was happy and missed no opportunity to praise India and even made a seeming gesture by giving up its claim to Sikkim. It carefully monitored the strengthening of our Navy and its power projection in the seas to the East of India, but it did not show signs of any undue concern over it.
8. The Chinese attitude changed from positive to negative after the Government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh----in a welcome and long over-due change of policy--- decided four years ago to shift our priorities from naval power projection overseas to strengthening the capability of the Army and the Air Force for deterrence and self-defence in the areas along the Sino-Indian border. A hostile attitude to India in sections of the Government and party controlled media and in some academic circles became evident after India gave up its policy of
neglect of the Arunachal Pradesh area by undertaking a crash programme for the development of the infrastructure and by paying more attention to the views and requirements of the Army and the Air Force in that area such as by placing two more mountain divisions at the disposal of the Army, by improving local airfields and by enabling the Air Force to deploy a squadron or more in the area. The objective of the
virulent Chinese campaign against India on the issue of Arunachal Pradesh is to intimidate the Indian political leadersdhip into giving up the new priorities. It is important that we do not let ourselves be intimidated.
9.It is important for our policy-makers to take note of some of the themes of the debate going on since June,2009, in Chinese non-governmental circles----- India as a paper tiger, the blunder supposedly committed by the Chinese in withdrawing after occupying large parts of the Indian territory in the Arunachal Pradesh area in 1962, the importance of not repeating this blunder in the event of another military conflict,no bartering of territorial sovereignty for friendship, the advantages enjoyed by the Chinese society because of its supposedly homogenous character as against the allegedly fissiparous tendencies in the Indian society etc.
10. As a result of the difficulties faced by the Chinese in Tibet and Xinjiang, the Chinese are feeling increasingly insecure about their hold on these areas. As a result, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is increasingly in the seat of decision and policy-making in these two areas as also with respect to the border dispute. Even in the unlikely event of the Chinese political leadership wanting to dilute its claims to Indian territory in the over-all interest of the economic ties between the two countries and the stability of their economies, it is doubtful whether
the Chinese military leadership will accept any compromise which falls short of Chinese demands.
11. Against this background, even if India does not want a military confrontation, the Chinese may be prompted to force a confrontation in two scenarios:
SCENARIO I: If the Chinese military leadership concludes that the strengthening of India's military position in Arunachal Pradesh has reached a stage beyond which it should not be allowed to go lest lt come in the way of the materialisation of the Chinese designs.
SCENARIO II: If there is serious instability in Tibet after His Holiness the Dalai Lama due to the opposition of the Tibetans to Beijing's attempts to impose on them a successor to His Holines chosen by the Party.
12. Admiral Mehta is right in saying that the two countries should explore ways of minimising the potential for a military conflict. Avoiding a military conflict by strengthening the present relations and economic ties between the two countries should be important, but avoiding a military conflict should not mean not preparing ourselves to meet successfully a military conflict if our attempts to avoid it fail. For that, it is important for us to continue to strengthen our military capabilities in the Himalayan region in order to make any military conflict an unattractive option for the Chinese. We must examine what kind of armed forces and comprehensive national strength we would need for this objective and relentlessly go ahead in creating the required capabilities.
13. What should be the role of the Navy in such a contingency and what kind of capability it should have? This is a question which needs careful examination and follow-up action. Any naval plans should have at least two objectives---- to protect our energy supplies and to make it prohibitively costly for Pakistan to indulge in any adventurist actions against us by taking advantage of our preoccupation with China.
14. Admiral Mehta is again right in pointing out that we have lagged behind China in modernising our Armed Forces. This neglect has to be corrected. What is required is not competitive modernisation to meet force for force, but modernisation in the Indian perspective to meet Indian needs for deterrence and self-defence. (11-8-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
Text of the report carried by "The Hindu" in its online edition on August 11,2009.
Special Correspondent
NEW DELHI: The Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Sureesh Mehta, on Monday underscored the primacy of challenges posed by China as India draws its national security plans to keep pace with its rise to global prominence.
“It is quite evident that coping with China will certainly be one of our primary challenges in the years ahead. China is in the process of ‘consolidating’ its comprehensive national power and creating formidable military capabilities. Once that is done, China is likely to be more assertive on its claims, especially in its immediate neighbourhood,” Admiral Mehta said in his lecture “India’s national security challenges – an armed forces overview” organised by the National Maritime Foundation.
Admiral Mehta acknowledged that India’s trust-deficit with China could never be removed completely till the boundary issues are settled and flagged that Beijing’s propensity for intervention in space and cyber-warfare would also be major planning considerations in New Delhi’s strategic and operational thinking.
He said cooperation rather than competition or conflict with China was preferable since it would be “foolhardy” to compare India and China as equals in terms of economy, infrastructure and military spending.
The Navy Chief said both in conventional and non-conventional military terms, India neither has the capability nor the intention to match China force for force.
According to some American studies, China spends anywhere between $ 70 billion to $ 200 billion even though the official figure by Beijing is under $ 40 billion, he said.
A military conflict, he said, would have grave consequences on the economic front for both nations and therefore it would be in the interest of both the countries to cooperate with each other in mutually beneficial endeavours and ensure that the potential for conflict is minimised.
Admiral Sureesh Mehta, who will shortly be retiring as our Chief of the Naval Staff (CONS), made a presentation on "India's National Security Challenges---An Armed Forces Overview" at the National Maritime Foundation at New Delhi on August 10,2009.
2. During his tenure as the CONS, Admiral Mehta initiated a number of welcome changes in the policies and planning of the Indian Navy keeping in view the changed national and regional security requirements. Among the laudable steps initiated by him one could mention the Look West projection which he gave to the Navy to correct the over-focus on the Look East projection, the bringing together of the Naval
chiefs of the Indian Ocean powers in an exercise to promote a convergence of views and action for strengthening the mutual security of the Indian Ocean powers facing common new threats from non- State actors such as maritime terrorists and pirates and removing deficiencies in our coastal counter-terrorism capabilities.
3.Admiral Mehta's talk at the National Maritime Foundation was a lucid and frank exposition of the present and future challenges to our national security as seen by him. A summary of his presentation as carried by "The Hindu" in its online edition on August 11,2009, is annexed. Unfortunately, some sections of the media have tried to misinterpret his remarks on India and China and project them as if the
CONS was defeatist in his analysis of the respective capabilities of the Armed Forces of the two countries and particularly their naval capabilities. Far from it.
4. A careful reading of his remarks would indicate that he has tried to impart a sense of balance to the national debate on Sino-Indian relations and their impact on our national security. The salient points in his presentation are:
The trust deficit between India and China will persist till the border dispute is settled.
Cooperation rather than competition or conflict with China was preferable since it would be “foolhardy” to compare India and China as equals in terms of economy, infrastructure and military spending.
A military conflict would have grave consequences on the economic front for both nations and therefore it would be in the interest of both the countries to cooperate with each other in mutually beneficial endeavours and ensure that the potential for conflict is minimised.
Both in conventional and non-conventional military terms, India neither has the capability nor the intention to match China force for force.
4.Since India carried out its nuclear tests in 1998, there has been a national debate on what should be the ultimate objective of our military modernisation---- the ability to compete with China in power projection in the region or the ability to deter an external threat to our security and to defend ourselves and our territory if a threat materialises in spite of the deterrent capability built up by us or because of its inadequacy?
5.The importance of competitive power projection with China was the dominating theme of the debate in our security circles till about four years ago. The Government of Dr.Manmohan Singh has sought to change the priority from power projection to our capability for deterrence and self-defence. Once the validity of the changed priorities is accepted, there is no need for us to match China force for force.
6.India should avoid a policy of military confrontation with China and, at the same time, should develop the capability to defend ourselves and our territory should a confrontation be forced upon us. In the undesirable eventuality of such a confrontation, the military conflict,which will be of limited duration, will be in the mountainous region of the Himalayas and not on the seas. Our ability to repel any attacks and protect our territory along the Chinese border and our citizens living there will depend on the capabilities which we give to the Army and the Air Force more than the naval capability. It will also depend on the state of our infrastructure and our intelligence community, which is presently well-focused on Pakistan and not so well-focused on China.
7. Till four years ago, in our over-fascination for power projection through the Navy, we failed to pay adequate attention to strenghtening the capabilities of the Army and the Air Force to fight in the Himalayan areas and to developing a modern infrstructure without which even the best of Armies will feel handicapped in battle. It will not be an exaggeration to say that the vital Arunachal Pradesh region, so frequently and so vehemently claimed by China as its territory, was in a state of benign neglect with little attention paid to its economic development and military-related infrastructure. So long as this state of neglect of the Arunachal Pradesh region by us continued, China was happy and missed no opportunity to praise India and even made a seeming gesture by giving up its claim to Sikkim. It carefully monitored the strengthening of our Navy and its power projection in the seas to the East of India, but it did not show signs of any undue concern over it.
8. The Chinese attitude changed from positive to negative after the Government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh----in a welcome and long over-due change of policy--- decided four years ago to shift our priorities from naval power projection overseas to strengthening the capability of the Army and the Air Force for deterrence and self-defence in the areas along the Sino-Indian border. A hostile attitude to India in sections of the Government and party controlled media and in some academic circles became evident after India gave up its policy of
neglect of the Arunachal Pradesh area by undertaking a crash programme for the development of the infrastructure and by paying more attention to the views and requirements of the Army and the Air Force in that area such as by placing two more mountain divisions at the disposal of the Army, by improving local airfields and by enabling the Air Force to deploy a squadron or more in the area. The objective of the
virulent Chinese campaign against India on the issue of Arunachal Pradesh is to intimidate the Indian political leadersdhip into giving up the new priorities. It is important that we do not let ourselves be intimidated.
9.It is important for our policy-makers to take note of some of the themes of the debate going on since June,2009, in Chinese non-governmental circles----- India as a paper tiger, the blunder supposedly committed by the Chinese in withdrawing after occupying large parts of the Indian territory in the Arunachal Pradesh area in 1962, the importance of not repeating this blunder in the event of another military conflict,no bartering of territorial sovereignty for friendship, the advantages enjoyed by the Chinese society because of its supposedly homogenous character as against the allegedly fissiparous tendencies in the Indian society etc.
10. As a result of the difficulties faced by the Chinese in Tibet and Xinjiang, the Chinese are feeling increasingly insecure about their hold on these areas. As a result, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is increasingly in the seat of decision and policy-making in these two areas as also with respect to the border dispute. Even in the unlikely event of the Chinese political leadership wanting to dilute its claims to Indian territory in the over-all interest of the economic ties between the two countries and the stability of their economies, it is doubtful whether
the Chinese military leadership will accept any compromise which falls short of Chinese demands.
11. Against this background, even if India does not want a military confrontation, the Chinese may be prompted to force a confrontation in two scenarios:
SCENARIO I: If the Chinese military leadership concludes that the strengthening of India's military position in Arunachal Pradesh has reached a stage beyond which it should not be allowed to go lest lt come in the way of the materialisation of the Chinese designs.
SCENARIO II: If there is serious instability in Tibet after His Holiness the Dalai Lama due to the opposition of the Tibetans to Beijing's attempts to impose on them a successor to His Holines chosen by the Party.
12. Admiral Mehta is right in saying that the two countries should explore ways of minimising the potential for a military conflict. Avoiding a military conflict by strengthening the present relations and economic ties between the two countries should be important, but avoiding a military conflict should not mean not preparing ourselves to meet successfully a military conflict if our attempts to avoid it fail. For that, it is important for us to continue to strengthen our military capabilities in the Himalayan region in order to make any military conflict an unattractive option for the Chinese. We must examine what kind of armed forces and comprehensive national strength we would need for this objective and relentlessly go ahead in creating the required capabilities.
13. What should be the role of the Navy in such a contingency and what kind of capability it should have? This is a question which needs careful examination and follow-up action. Any naval plans should have at least two objectives---- to protect our energy supplies and to make it prohibitively costly for Pakistan to indulge in any adventurist actions against us by taking advantage of our preoccupation with China.
14. Admiral Mehta is again right in pointing out that we have lagged behind China in modernising our Armed Forces. This neglect has to be corrected. What is required is not competitive modernisation to meet force for force, but modernisation in the Indian perspective to meet Indian needs for deterrence and self-defence. (11-8-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
Text of the report carried by "The Hindu" in its online edition on August 11,2009.
Special Correspondent
NEW DELHI: The Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Sureesh Mehta, on Monday underscored the primacy of challenges posed by China as India draws its national security plans to keep pace with its rise to global prominence.
“It is quite evident that coping with China will certainly be one of our primary challenges in the years ahead. China is in the process of ‘consolidating’ its comprehensive national power and creating formidable military capabilities. Once that is done, China is likely to be more assertive on its claims, especially in its immediate neighbourhood,” Admiral Mehta said in his lecture “India’s national security challenges – an armed forces overview” organised by the National Maritime Foundation.
Admiral Mehta acknowledged that India’s trust-deficit with China could never be removed completely till the boundary issues are settled and flagged that Beijing’s propensity for intervention in space and cyber-warfare would also be major planning considerations in New Delhi’s strategic and operational thinking.
He said cooperation rather than competition or conflict with China was preferable since it would be “foolhardy” to compare India and China as equals in terms of economy, infrastructure and military spending.
The Navy Chief said both in conventional and non-conventional military terms, India neither has the capability nor the intention to match China force for force.
According to some American studies, China spends anywhere between $ 70 billion to $ 200 billion even though the official figure by Beijing is under $ 40 billion, he said.
A military conflict, he said, would have grave consequences on the economic front for both nations and therefore it would be in the interest of both the countries to cooperate with each other in mutually beneficial endeavours and ensure that the potential for conflict is minimised.
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